### Exceptionalism Good

#### US Imperialism Inevitable- History shows

Khodaee ‘11

[Esfandiar, American Studies at Tehran University, “Is imperialism Inevitable for America?” July 19, 2011, <http://peace.blog.com/2011/07/19/imperialism/>>//wyo-hdm]

Imperialism takes root from human nature. In history we see whenever a country had the power to expand its domination, it never hesitated. Historical examples are: Roman, Persian, Ottoman, Japanese, Chinese, French, Spanish, English, Portugal and Mongol Empires. Today American Empire is a live example having all the common features of previous Empires. Some common features of all Empires are: All these Empires have a clear date for emergence and a final date of weakness or even vanishing. For Example the Soviet Union Empire was born in the beginning of the twentieth century and collapsed in the end of the same century in 1991. All above mentioned Empires expanded to the point they could afford, and then declined. The “balance of power” theory presents a good perception. It reveals the fact that an imperialist power goes forward to the point that domestic and foreign pressure stops or remove it. Some of these Imperialist powers like the Soviet Union and America besides their realistic interests in Imperialism, have also ideological bases. The Soviet Union tried to expand Communism; America is trying to expand Capitalism. Today the United States of America both in realistic and idealistic point of view has chosen an Imperialistic way of dealing other countries. From the realistic point of view, America needs new markets to help its economy proceed, also for the sake of security America resorts to intervention in four corners of the world. In idealistic point of view American decision makers believe Capitalism through democracy is the best way for governing human societies. They sometimes use this ideology as a pretext for their realistic benefits. They know that any capitalist democracy in any corner of the world meets their interest and they have fewer problems with democracies around the world. For example Japan, Germany and Italy are no longer a threat to American security. So are India, Pakistan and South Africa. But countries like Iran, Venezuela and Sudan which are not in the realm of their alleged democracy will never meet their security standards. After the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, US found concrete security excuses to militarily intervening Afghanistan and Iraq. Imperialism is inevitable for America because it roots in American history and culture. From its early days of being English colonies America has never stopped expanding. The first victims were native Indians who lost their lands. Then the French colonies in America, then the Britain Kingdom and then the Mexico which lost Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. From 1850s to 1890s because of civil war between the two systems of Capitalism and Slavery and then the Reconstruction, American expansion came to a halt. In 1898 America emerged in a full imperialistic appearance to defeat the frustrated Spain and gain Filipinas in Far East Asia. During the twentieth century the United States in an average of less than a year (nearly every 10 month) has intervened a country. You can’t find a country in the world which America hasn’t attacked, intervened or at least performed a quota. Imagine an Iraqi citizen living in 1607 in Baghdad accidently learns about the establishment of a new English colony in thousands of kilometers far west. He never could believe four hundred years later (in 2003) the same colony as a superpower would change the fate of his country and remove his president (Saddam). America will never give up its Imperialism nature, unless the balance of power blocks it. Today, after the cold war and at the advent of globalization the A twinkle of hope is the multinational treaties between groups of countries. Through these treaties may be in the future they can defend themselves.

#### American imperialism should be embraced – it has been the greatest force for good in the world

Boot, 2003 (Max, Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away from Label," 5-18-2003, www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot\_Imperialim\_fine.pdf)

The greatest danger is that we won't use all of our power for fear of the ''I'' word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was ''empire building,'' Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. ''We don't seek empires,'' he replied huffily. ''We're not imperialistic. We never have been.'' That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the ''empire of liberty'' expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from ''sea to shining sea,'' the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after World War II, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was ''occupation.'' But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent ''nation-building'' experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (news - web sites) are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea (news - web sites) and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that ''imperialism'' carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of our goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighboring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views. The indications are mixed as to whether the United States is prepared to embrace its imperial role unapologetically. Rumsfeld has said that an Iranian-style theocracy ''isn't going to happen,'' and President Bush (news - web sites) has pledged to keep U.S. troops in Iraq as long as necessary to ''build a peaceful and representative government.'' After allowing a temporary power vacuum to develop, U.S. troops now are moving aggressively to put down challenges to their authority by, for example, arresting the self-declared ''mayor'' of Baghdad. That's all for the good. But there are also some worrisome signs. Bush asked for only $2.5 billion from Congress for rebuilding Iraq, even though a study from the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy estimates that $25 billion to $100 billion will be needed.  Iraq's oil revenues and contributions from allies won't cover the entire shortfall. The president should be doing more to prepare the U.S. public and Congress for a costly commitment. Otherwise, Iraqis quickly could become disillusioned about the benefits of liberation. The cost of our commitment will be measured not only in money but also in troops. While Bush and Rumsfeld have wisely eschewed any talk of an early ''exit strategy,'' they still seem to think that U.S. forces won't need to stay more than two years. Rumsfeld even denied a report that the U.S. armed forces are planning to open permanent bases in Iraq. If they're not, they should be. That's the only way to ensure the security of a nascent democracy in such a rough neighborhood. Does the administration really imagine that Iraq will have turned into Switzerland in two years' time? Allied rule lasted four years in Germany and seven years in Japan. American troops remain stationed in both places more than 50 years later. That's why these two countries have become paragons of liberal democracy. It is crazy to think that Iraq -- which has less of a democratic tradition than either Germany or Japan had in 1945 -- could make the leap overnight. The record of nation-building during the past decade is clear: The United States failed in Somalia and Haiti, where it pulled out troops prematurely. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show more promise because U.S. troops remain stationed there. Afghanistan would be making even more progress if the United States and its allies had made a bigger commitment to secure the countryside, not just Kabul. If we want Iraq to avoid becoming a Somalia on steroids, we'd better get used to U.S. troops being deployed there for years, possibly decades, to come. If that raises hackles about American imperialism, so be it. We're going to be called an empire whatever we do. We might as well be a successful empire.

#### Hegemonic stability theory’s predictions are accurate—hegemony disincentivizes conflict and substantially improves the global standard of living

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, **things have been getting better**. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony**. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. **What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that** American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the **steady decline of political deaths** in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call **globalization** is **caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon**. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the **spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### The world is getting better now because heg is peaceful

Busby 12 [Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Duck of Minerva, ”Get Real! Chicago IR guys out in force” http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I’ve been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein’s work that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with **interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare**. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal piece back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict **Data**, which **shows a steep decline in the number of deaths** **per 100,000 people**. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker’s account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, **Monteiro’s measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war**. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power **so the measure is partial and not systemic**. However, Monteiro’s theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth’s early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed out, Pinker’s argument isn’t based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn’t all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don’t want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen noted, the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn’t get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other reports based on Uppsala data is right, **war is becoming more rare and less deadly** (though later data suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media. Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro’s premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won’t merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some “recalcitrant” minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro’s world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I’m not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can’t balance against

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#### THEIR METHOD DESTROYS A MATERIALIST-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND STATE SECURITY—IDENTITY IS NOT DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED BUT IS MATERIALLY MEDIATED BY THE FORCES OF CAPITALISM

VARADARJAN (Professor of Political Science) 2004

[Latha, “Constructivism, Identity and Neoliberal (in)security”, Review of International Studies, p. cjo //wyo-tjc]

In September 2002, almost exactly a year after the attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States government released a much awaited document. Rather routinely entitled ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (hereafter, the NSS), this spells out both the manner in which the Bush administration intends to secure the US, and the enemies that the US needs securing from. Not surprisingly, a consistent theme in the document is the notion that the nature of national security threats has changed dramatically. What is striking is that even in these changed times, part of the strategy of ‘securing the nation’ is one that various US governments have actively pursued since the end of World War II. As indicated in Section VI of the NSS, the United States remains committed to ‘[igniting] a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade’.2 Reiterated through the document as an important way to ensure ‘enhanced national security’, this commitment seems to draw its strength from the ‘decisive victory of the forces of freedom’ – a not too subtle commentary on the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union. The NSS document provides an extremely interesting and clear illustration of the manner in which questions regarding national security are closely interwoven with constant invocations of the desirability of a particular kind of global economy. This interweaving presents to IR scholars a question that has become sidelined in recent discussions in security studies: how are ‘national security’ and the global capitalist economy interrelated? Groups of scholars – particularly those subscribing to the traditions of neoliberal institutionalism and historical materialism – have in the past focused on variants of this question. However, they have treated the structure of the global economy as either making possible greater interdependence, and hence cooperation among nation-states, or ascribing certain structural positions (‘core’/ ‘periphery’) that engender dependent relationships among nation-states. In both cases, the concept of state identity as dynamic, historically constructed structures of meanings that constitute both ‘national security’ and ‘threats’ gets overlooked. In contrast, the recent constructivist turn in security studies has been largely responsible for opening up analytical space by focusing on questions of identity, such as what national security means, how those meanings have come about, the nature of the subject (the nation-state) that needs to be secured and the kind of threats it needs securing from.3 By focusing on these questions, constructivists have argued convincingly for the need to understand state interests and identities – and consequently, security practices – as ‘socially constructed’. However, in the process of emphasising the social construction of identities and interests, constructivists have generally tended to ignore the important constitutive role of the global economy. This overlooking is particularly puzzling because the collapse of the Soviet Union (usually treated as a transformative moment in security debates)4 was also heralded as the triumph of a particular world order – a neoliberal economic one. Given that constructivist scholars have opened the doors for thinking about security in the context of a ‘transnationalized’/‘global’ international system, how do we make sense of this disciplinary overlooking and what are its consequences? I argue in this article that state identities, historically constituted in and through a relationship to global capital, are neither given nor stable. The rapidly expanding scope of neoliberalism – the ‘spread of free markets and free trade’ (variously described as economic liberalisation, economic restructuring or economic globalisation) – has serious implications for the nature and meanings of these shifting, historically constituted state identities. Only by paying close attention to this fluctuating terrain can one make sense of the security practices of nation-states. I further argue that making this analytical move entails going beyond the liberal constructivist turn in security studies.5 Global economic processes have almost faded into the background of recent security discussions partly because of the manner in which constructivist scholars have sought to differentiate themselves from other schools of theorising – particularly neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Distancing themselves from the positivist epistemologies and structural analyses of these schools, constructivists have tended to emphasise the ‘cultural-institutional environment’ within which political identities are constructed and projected. The trouble with this framing is that the ‘cultural’/‘social’/‘normative’ is more often than not posited as an explanatory variable that is distinct from material factors, including those that would be termed ‘economic’. I argue that this implicit ontological distinction on which the constructivist analysis of security rests is problematic, especially in the context of an expanding neoliberal world order that is constitutive of the identity of its basic units – the nation-states. Given this, I argue that the one cannot make sense of national security policies without treating processes of neoliberalism as the inescapable grounds for such practices. In this article, I use the example of the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 to illustrate my argument. This article is divided into two parts. In the first part, I argue that their attempts to distance themselves from ‘materialist ontologies’ and ‘rationalist explanations’, have led liberal constructivists to ignore the important constitutive effects of the global economy on identity. This analytical blind-spot has serious consequences for their analysis of the security practices of states.

#### THE NARRATIVIZATION OF POLITICS IS INHERENTLY CONSERVATIVE—IT IS THE EMBRACE OF CAPITALIST EXCESS AND DESTROYS ANY ATTEMPT TO RESIST OR OPPOSE CAPITALISM ON ANY GROUNDS\*\*

FOSTER (Dept of Sociology at Oregon) 1997

[John Bellamy, “In Defense of History”, In Defense of History, ed. Foster & Wood //wyo-tjc]

The weaknesses of postmodernism-from an emancipatory perspective- thus far overshadow its strengths. Missing from Foucault's analysis, like that of postmodernism generally, is any conception of a counter-order to the disciplinary orders described. In the more extreme case of "textual postmodernists"-those postmodernist thinkers like Derrida, as distinct from Foucault, who deny any reality outside the text-the political and historical weaknesses from a left perspective are even more glaring. By undermining the very concept of history-in any meaningful sense beyond mere story-telling-such theorists have robbed critical analysis of what has always been its most indispensable tool.'8 The denial within postmodernist theory of the validity of historical cri- tique covers up what is really at issue: the denial of the historical critique of capitalism, leading to a convergence between left thought infected by Nietzsche and the dominant liberal "end of history" conception. The danger of such ahistorical or anti-historical views, as E.P. Thompson observed, is that one loses sight not of "reason in history" in some abstract sense, but rather of "the reasons of power and the reasons of money."9 Historical materialism at its best provides a way out of this dilemma. This is not to ignore the fact that Marxism-which has sometimes given rise to its own crude interpretations and historical travesties, as in the case of Stalinism-has frequently been identified with the kind of "totalizations" and "essentialisms" that postmodernist theorists have singled out. As Thompson pointed out in a 1977 essay on Christopher Caudwell, Marxism has sometimes relied on " `essentialist' tricks of mind," the "tendency to intellectualize the social process"-"the rapid delineation of the deep proc- ess of a whole epoch." These are things that the historian (and social scientists in general) should guard against. But to abandon theory and historical explanation entirely in order to avoid "essentialism" and "foun- dationalism" is a bit like throwing out the baby in order to keep the bathwater clean. Marx himself provided another model, actively opposing theory (even "Marxist" theory) that purported to be "suprahistorical." In his Theses on Feuerbach, he presented what still ranks as the most thorough- going critique of what he called the "essentialist" conception of human beings and nature. Indeed, historical materialism has long engaged in its own self-critique, precisely in order to expel the kinds of "essentialisms," "positivisms," and "structuralisms" that have intruded on the philosophy of praxis itself-a self-critique that has produced the insights of theorists like Gramsci, Sartre, Thompson, and Raymond Williams.20 These thinkers distanced themselves from the positivistic "official Marx- ism" that grew out of the Second International and later turned into a caricature of itself in the form of Stalinism. Yet they held firm to the critique of capitalism and their commitment to the struggles of the oppressed. Moreover, these particular examples tell us that if what has sometimes been called "the postmodern agenda"-consisting of issues like identity, culture, and language-is to be addressed at all, this can only be accomplished within a historical context. And here one might openly wonder with Foucault "what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist." When placed within a more holistic historical materialist context-ani- mated by the concept of praxis-the problems raised by postmodernism look entirely different. As David McNally says, "Language is not a prison- house, but a site of struggle." What the contributions in this volume have in common is the insistence that issues like language, culture, nationality, race, gender, the environment, revolution, and history itself are only effec- tively analyzed within a context that is simultaneously historical in charac- ter, materialist (in the sense of focusing on concrete practices), and revolutionary. Such analyses do not abandon the hope of transcending capitalism, nor of the notion of human progress as a possible outcome of historical strug- gles. It is said that Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, issued an order banning the word "progress." Today we no longer believe, in a nineteenth century sense, in automatic human progress, embodying some definite content-the idea that the Czar found so threatening. But this does not mean, as the philoso- pher Michael Oakeshott contended with respect to political activity in the 1950s, that we "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" that has "neither starting-point nor appointed direction" and that our only task is "to keep afloat on an even keel." History-as centuries of struggle and indeed pro- gress suggest-is more meaningful than that. To abandon altogether the concept of progress, in the more general sense of the possibility of progres- sive human emancipation, would only be to submit to the wishes of the powers that be. Such political disengagement by intellectuals on the left in the present epoch could only mean one thing: the total obeisance to capi- tal.21 The irony of post-modernism is that while purporting to have transcended modernity, it abandons from the start all hope of transcending capitalism itself and entering a post-capitalist era. Postmodernist theory is therefore easily absorbed within the dominant cultural frame and has even given rise recently to texts such as Postmodern Marketing, which attempts to utilize the insights of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudillard to market goods within a capitalist economy. Perhaps this will be the final destiny of postmodernist theory-its absorption by the vast marketing apparatus of the capitalist economy, adding irony and color to a commercial order that must constantly find new ways to insinuate itself into the every- day lives of the population. Meanwhile, historical materialism will remain the necessary intellectual ground for all those who seek, not to revel in the "carnival" of capitalist productive and market relations, but to transcend them.22

#### FINALLY, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN ETHICAL ACTION THAT STANDS OUTSIDE OF POLITICS—YOUR ETHICAL DEMAND TO COME PRIOR TO THE NEGATION OF CAPITAL IS THE LARGEST VIOLATION

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p. 409-10 // wyo]

Politics and morality are so closely intertwined in the real world that it is hardly imaginable to confront and resolve the conflicts of any age without bringing into play the crucial dimensions of both. Thus, whenever it is difficult to face the problems and contradictions of politics in the prevailing social order, theories of morality are also bound to suffer the consequences. Naturally, this relationship tends to prevail also in the positive direction. As the entire history of philosophy testifies, the authors of all major ethical works are also the originators of the seminal theoretical works on politics; and vice versa, all serious conceptualizations of politics have their necessary corollaries on the plane of moral discourse. This goes for Aristotle as much as for Hobbes and Spinoza, and for Rousseau and Kant as much as for Hegel. Indeed, in the case of Hegel we find his ethics fully integrated into his Philosophy of Right, i.e. his theory of the state. This is why it is so astonishing to read in Lukácss ‘Tactics and Ethics’ that ‘Hegel’s system is devoid of ethics’: a view which he later mellows to saying that the Hegelian treatment of ethics suffers the consequences of his system and the conservative bias of his theory of the state. It would be much more correct to say that — despite the conservative bias of his political conception — Hegel is the author of the last great systematic treatment of ethics. Compared to that, the twentieth century in the field of ethics (as well as in that of political philosophy) is very problematical. No doubt this has a great deal to do ‘eith the ever narrowing margin of alternatives allowed by the necessary mode of functioning of the global capital system which produces the wisdom of ‘there is no alternative’. For, evidently, there can be no meaningful moral discourse on the premiss that ‘there is no alternative’. Ethics is concerned with the evaluation and implementation of alternative goals which individuals and social groups can actually set themselves in their confrontations with the problems of their age. And this is where the inescapability of politics makes its impact. For even the most intensely committed investigation of ethics cannot be a substitute for a radical critique of politics in its frustrating and alienating contemporary reality. The slogan of ‘there is no alternative did not originate in ethics; nor is it enough to reassert in ethical/ontological terms the need for alternatives, no matter how passionately this is felt and predicated. The pursuit of viable alternatives to the destructive reality of capital’s social order in all its forms without which the socialist project is utterly pointless —is a practical matter. The role of morality and ethics is crucial to the success of this enterprise. But there can be no hope of success without the joint re-articulation of socialist moral discourse and political strategy, taking fully on board the painful lessons of the recent past.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN HOW TO ACT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OUTSIDE OF LABOR MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### 1NC Agonism

#### First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.

Gutmann & Thompson 96

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Second, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

#### First, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

#### Second is your argument filter: It is OK to divorce debate from the ‘real-world’- a laboratory separate from conviction is necessary to teach methods of argumentative reasoning AND advocacy skills—You should privilege these skills even if you have to sacrifice purity of inquiry because these are the skills MOST UNIQUE to the debate forum—they can’t be garnered anywhere else

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[Star A., Professor of Communication Studies at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

The emphasis on method---focusing on the technique of debate as an educational end---is characteristic of the defense of debating both sides of a resolution. Interscholastic debate, many scholars reason, is different from “real world” disputation; it lacks the purposes or functions of a senate speech, a public demonstration, or a legal plea. Debate is designed to train students to construct arguments, to locate weaknesses in reasoning, to organize ideas, and to present and defend ideas effectively, not to convert the judge to a particular belief. As such, it is intended to teach debaters to see both sides of an issue and to become proficient in the exposition of argument independent of moral or ethical convictions. The debaters are to present the best case possible given the issues they have to work with. The definition of debate thus shapes a conception of its role in the development of the individual. Windes reaffirms the value of such a procedural training in his view of the activity: Academic debating is a generic term for oral contests in argumentation, held according to established rules, the purpose being to present both sides of a controversy so effectively that a decision may be reached---not on which side was right or wrong but on which side did the better job of arguing. Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to argumentation, not the trivial and amusing gamesmanship often thought of, but sober, realistic, important gamesmanship.