### Kritik Answers

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Prefer this-

#### (\_\_\_) A. Aff Choice, any other framework moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### (\_\_\_) B. Its predictable, the res demands USFG action

#### (\_\_\_) C. Its fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and method of the Aff against the K, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of strategies

#### And voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Preventing extinction needs to come first

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

### 2AC AT- PolicyMaking K

#### First no link- aff decreases instrumental logic of the status quo by eliminating the worst types of targeted killing

#### We solve the link-

#### deliberative approaches to public policy makes participation in policy decisions by those without their hands on the levers of power possible

Hickman, 12

[Larry, director of the Center for Dewey Studies and professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, “Citizen Participation: more or less?” Online, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&page=hickman\_28\_6] /Wyo-MB

Progressives such as John Dewey have tended to take a very different view from that of Caplan, Lippmann, and the Roberts Court. In his 1927 book The Public and Its Problems, Dewey mounted an energetic response to Lippmann. He encouraged support for a free and vigorous press whose task would be to make the results of research in the social sciences available to every citizen. He denied that the “ordinary citizen” lacked sufficient intelligence or interest to participate in public affairs. And he called for greater support for a type of public education that would increase the critical skills that every citizen requires to cut through the web of disinformation that tends to be disseminated by governments, corporations, and other forces seeking to impede full discussion of matters affecting the public good. If ordinary citizens were as distracted as Lippmann claimed, Dewey suggested, they would hardly be amenable to control by the educated elites in any event. And if experts were cut off from the needs and concerns of the general population, then their databases would dry up. They and their reports would become increasingly irrelevant. Of course, Dewey was not advocating a pure form of participatory democracy. He recognized that men and women have different talents, needs, and interests and that when they associate themselves in groups larger than a mere handful, there is a tendency toward specialization in the various tasks required to support the continued existence of the group. One of those areas of specialization is the ability to act on behalf of other members of a group—or what Dewey termed a public—in ways that its members find acceptable. In sum, in order for a public to exist, it must have members who are able to take the lead in articulating its goals and interests and in representing those goals and interests to other publics. Dewey was in fact calling for a form of deliberative democracy that would achieve a creative balance between participation and representation. He realized that deliberative democracies cannot function in the absence of experts in various fields and representatives who take decisions on behalf of a voting public. On one side, while participation within civic affairs could hardly be required, it should nevertheless be open to anyone willing to develop the skills necessary for involvement in the processes of public debate and decision making. On the other side, efficient government requires both representatives who are sensitive to public problems and experts who can advise those representatives on technical matters.

Perm do both-

Perm plan then alt-

#### Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: university students already have preconceived and ideological notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, and it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by placing students as agents and decision makers

Esberg and Sagan 12

(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2-17-12 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108 Taylor and Francis Online DA: 5-23-13//wyoccd)

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very¶ similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations.¶ Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and¶ coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War,¶ political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced¶ government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal¶ organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis¶ or conflict.6¶ The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests¶ and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations¶ of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban¶ Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials¶ and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’¶ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the¶ primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other¶ states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7¶ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs,¶ and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave¶ and how their own government works.8¶ Since simulations became more common as a¶ teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits,¶ from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving¶ communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9¶ More broadly, simulations can deepen¶ understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts¶ while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable¶ in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy¶ makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’¶ 11¶ Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics¶ as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12¶ Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\*¶ but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and¶ merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions¶ and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly;¶ simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14¶

#### No impact- no risk of endless warfare from American exceptionalism-

Gray 7

Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### And alt fails- Spanos’s theories have no historical backing, his incoherence can’t be translated into real solutions, and his theories reify hegemonic power relations- turns the alt

Bryant 97

(John, Professor of English at Hofstra. “Review: Democracy, Being, and the Art of Becoming America” College English, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Oct., 1997), pp. 705-711)

As bracing as Spanos's subversive thesis is, and despite his attempts to rectify the New Americanist approach with a finer grounding in philosophy, its credibility is undermined by the book's wooden historicism and authoritarian style. Generally speaking, Spanos's "thematizing" of Ahab and Ishmael amounts to reductions supported more by assertion and endless reiteration than by textual demonstration. The result is a pronouncement, rather than an analysis, that never penetrates to the way Melville's words work to bring readers into his ontological dilemma. Spanos's historicism is similarly lacking. He reduces the development of American culture to a sequence of tableaux vivants with helpful intervening placards: The Puritans Hand Over the Mantle of American Identity to Andrew Jackson. He speaks of Lewis's American Adam and Bercovitch's American Jeremiad as if they were facts, or pieces of legislation fully endorsed by the populace, rather than cultural theses proposed by modern critics to extend, not end, debate on who we are and why. Spanos is most effective in discussing the more immediate aspects of Vietnam, but he never makes more distant eras come equally to life. His repeated reference to the "Salem Witch Burnings"-they were hanged-would be a dismissable gaffe if it did not suggest that the author is not sufficiently engaged in historical reality to deal with it except as a set of abstractions. ¶ Spanos's use of Heidegger is necessarily problematic. In purely metaphysical terms the philosopher's Nietzschean notion of the "will to power" is an intelligible means of comprehending Being's temporal differentiations: very transcendental. But then, Heidegger was no Emerson; he joined the Nazi party, took his Jewish mentor Husserl's job, sent a few colleagues racing to the border, but paradoxically conducted an affair with Hannah Arendt. Surely, Heidegger's nazism does not invalidate the notion of errancy that so effectively explains Ishmael. However, in a study such as this, in which politics is said to derail ontological interpretation, we naturally expect a full disclosure of an ontology's political potential. In Spanos's view, the liberal reaction to Stalin "blinded" Americanists to the true ontological value of Moby-Dick and led us into political disaster. Interestingly enough, the optician who crafted the lenses by which we might read Moby-Dick ontologically, with Ishmael as errant hero, was himself blind to that errancy; Heidegger somehow missed his own point and became the authoritarian his philosophy would deny. This fact alone suggests the need for a deeper ontological inquiry into the determinants in Melville's fiction (personality? sex? philosophy?) that cause individuals to mis-take Heideggerian fluidity and become an Ahab, or a Heidegger. To be fair, Spanos has written on Heidegger's nazism elsewhere, but his obscure and parenthetical allusions to the issue in this book fail to take this matter to its fullest ontological extent. ¶ Spanos's style is a curious self-negation of his principal ideas. It would be too easy to dismiss Spanos for his Heideggerian jargon and Derridean patois. I, for one, enjoy healthy licks of jargon; I love a patois: they encourage a certain critical economy. But Spanos uses language as a weapon to polarize readers. He consigns past critics to tidy, benighted "post-humanist" camps and virtually ignores more recent explorers of Melville's complex marginalizing rhetoric (including Barbara Johnson, Nina Baym, Lawrence Buell, Michael Rogin, Carolyn Porter, John Samson, and myself). This needless drawing of "boundaries" is precisely the opposite of what Spanos (editor of boundary 2, which seeks to break-and break again-critical boundaries) takes to be "errant" Ishmael's supreme achievement. Spanos uses language to claim hegemony over readers even as he tries to disclose Melville's counterhegemonic strategies. His sentences wage war against comprehension: it is not simply that abstract subjects perform abstract acts upon abstract objects in his sentences, but that these constructions are nested within larger equivalent abstractions-clause within clause-each interrupted by dashes into the contrapositive, each larded with oxymorons and paradoxes. And when such a sentence achieves a period, Spanos begins again with "In other words...." But his other words bring no relief. (Spanos's excessive use of mammoth, sometimes two-page block quotes would be offensive if not for the fact that they provide an occasional Tahiti of literary excellence amidst the ocean of his prose.) One might think this mimicry of Heidegger's famously dense style is a postmodern strategy to induce in readers an apt ontological crisis commensurate with Ishmael's condition. In fact, it simply erects a wall of language that circumscribes an academic domain alien to his ontological project. This book is the second in a projected trilogy. Let's hope Spanos finds a more effective voice.

#### There’s specific value to prediction and scenario-building in the context of debate – even if none of us have our hands on the levers of power, debate and dialogue over ways to avert catastrophic scenarios like nuclear war and environmental collapse creates a public sphere committed to countering the way in which the future has been colonized by neocons – scenario planning can check bad forms of elite futurism

Kurasawa, 2004

[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention

and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]

In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

#### Institution DA to the alt-

#### Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the plan then the alt

#### Conditionality is bad:

Interpretation: 1 conditional advocacy and the status squo

**Time Skew: allows them to neutralize large chunks of 2ac time, hurting 1AR strat. The 2AC matters most because it puts out all the arguments that the aff can go.**

**Decrease Education: multiple worlds cause muddled debates that preclude consistency of education.**

**Voting issue: for ground, fairness, and education.**

### Fear of Obama

#### 1st, no link:

#### also, we don’t criticize Obama for his drones policy, we criticize the structure of drones in general since Bush

#### and, we don’t call drones the ultimate evil—aff recognizes other problems exist in America and abroad

#### 2nd, Perm do both: there is no trade off established anywhere in their evidence should be able to critique racist policies at home and abroad

#### And, the perm solves should combine both criticism to search for similarities

Miller, 13

[Anna Lenkas, independent journalist on the Middle East, Global Comment feature writer, “Trayvon Martin, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi and Observing Drone Policy Through A White Lens,” Global Comment, August 1, 2013, http://globalcomment.com/trayvon-martin-abdulrahman-al-aulaqi-and-observing-drone-policy-through-a-white-lens/ uwyo-baj]

And it isn’t fair to minimize this pain for anyone—whether they are Black, Brown or White. It is inappropriate, useless and counter-productive. Ultimately, our racialized bodies and particularly the racialized bodies of the men in our communities are at the mercy of the same laws and oppressive forces of power that killed Trayvon and Abdulrahman. Instead of privileging one cause over the other—whether that is misappropriating the tragedy of Trayvon Martin’s killing into a conversation about the drone war or questioning what the purpose of discussing the detrimental effects of foreign policy and the national security state when there are issues of domestic racism and mass incarceration at home—we need to share our stories, listen to each others stories and find our common ground—which there is plenty—to question and combat those in power, whether they are the domestic forces targeting and criminalizing innocent teenagers, or the military might of our national security state that is killing our relatives and loved ones with our tax dollars.

#### And, the perm is key—the alt fails

Kerner 07

(Ina, presented at De/Konstruktionen von Okzidentalismus, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, “Challenges of Critical Whiteness Studies,” June 2007, <http://translate.eipcp.net/strands/03/kerner-strands01en/print>) /Wyo-MM

**When reading Critical Whiteness scholarship, it** sometimes **seems that critical self-positioning on the part of whites was more or less the solution to problems** of white/black-racism in Germany. I hold that **this overestimates the personal dimension – and de-emphasizes** that **there might be much more to be done, things that** by far **transcend** the **possibilities of individual acts and individual change. Because if** we assume that **racism has the three dimensions** that I have suggested, then **undoing racism requires much more than personal attempts to give away or share one’s privileges.** **It includes reworking racist assumptions, images, stereotypes and ascriptions on a societal level**, in other words **replacing racist knowledge by non-racist knowledge**; it **also includes undoing institutionalized forms of racism and their effects, like exclusive immigration and citizenship laws, or structural forms of discrimination;** and finally, it includes the need for subjects who don’t reproduce the above. So in fact, when employing such a more-dimensional account of racism, a whole new, and actually broadened concept of white privilege suggests itself. In the light of the three dimensions that I have mentioned, **white privilege cannot be reduced to a resource**, something that individuals have or don’t have, like a weightless, invisible knapsack full of maps, codebooks, visas, clothes and blank checks (cf. McIntosh 1989) that they carry with them on their way through life – even though such resources can surely be part of it.[7] Rather, **white privilege entails two** more **aspects**. First, and **this refers to the institutional dimension of racism, the structuring of parts of the way through live itself**, like elevators for some where others have to climb the steps, or like tunnels and bridges with restricted access based on group membership. Second, **referring to the epistemic dimension, a reformulated notion of white privilege entails the structuring of societal perceptions about who will make it far on this way through life and who won’t**, perceptions of who is supposed to get ahead, and who is supposed to stay behind. In general, I hold that such perceptions aren’t necessarily mirrored in people’s self-perceptions and identities – but they nevertheless influence the elements, the range of possibilities that each of us has for constructing our identities or our relations to ourselves.[8] Therefore, they can have great influence on the ways in which we want to and can live our lives.

#### 3rd, Obviously doesn’t solve the aff, both advantages are disads to the alt and outweigh the affirmative

**4th, Racism not the root cause of all violence**

**Mertus 99**

 (Professor Julie Mertus is the co-director of Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs. She has written widely on human rights and gender, conflict, the Balkans, U.S. foreign policy and U.N. institutions. She is the author or editor of ten books, including Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, named "human rights book of the year" by the American Political Science Association) and, most recently Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions and The United Nations and Human Rights. Before entering academia, she worked as a researcher, writer and lawyer for several human rights and humanitarian organizations., J.D., Yale Law School; B.S. Cornell University, International Council on Human Rights Policy, “THE ROLE OF RACISM AS A CAUSE OF OR FACTOR IN WARS AND CIVIL CONFLICT”, http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/167/112\_-\_The\_Role\_of\_Racism\_as\_a\_Cause\_of\_or\_Factor\_in\_Wars\_and\_Civil\_Conflict\_Mertus\_\_Julie\_\_1999.pdf)

**This paper examines the role of racism as a cause of or factor in wars and civil conflicts.** “Racism” as understood here is defined broadly to encompass acts and processes of dehumanisation. The conflicts in **Rwanda and Kosovo serve as case studies; the former illustrates a case where the racist nature of the conflict has been clear to most observers, and the latter represents a case where racism plays an important yet overlooked role. Racism did not cause either conflict. Rather, the conflicts were the outcome of political manipulation and enlargement of already existing group classification schemes and social polarisation, a history of real and imagined oppression and deprivation, the absence of the rule of law and democratic structures, and state monopoly over the provision of information. Under such conditions, political élites could use racist ideology as a method of gaining power and, when necessary, waging war.**

#### 6th, the alt fails—just adds a voice to the mix—doesn’t challenge assumptions

Shome, 1996

[Raka, Doctoral candidate at univ of Georgia, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An “other” view.” Communication theory, Vol. 6 issue 1, February, 40-59, Accessed Online via Wiley Online Library,] /Wyo-MB

In fact, **even when we do sometimes try to break out of the Eurocen- tric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and unchal- lenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and unchallenged.** Instead of examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western hegemony, we fre- quently use the canon to appropriate “other” voice^.^

#### 7th, the aff draws attention to American problems—doesn’t mask racism

Belton, 7-23-13

[Danielle, Cornel West Calls Obama A “Global George Zimmerman,” Internet Yawns, http://www.clutchmagonline.com/2013/07/cornel-west-calls-obama-a-global-george-zimmerman-internet-yawns/] /Wyo-MB

In the latest bit of “oh, it’s Tuesday again?” scholar and budding theologian Cornel West has gone on the record of calling President Barack Obama a “global George Zimmerman” due to the president’s use of drone strikes against potential terrorist targets. The strikes, which are problematic, are more of a deadly imperfect way of satisfying Americans fears of overseas terror without invading a country … again.¶ I won’t bother to defend the president on the drone strikes other than saying any American president would be doing something similar (or worse) since America is a greatly flawed country that is fighting an near unwinnable war on terror and America presidents are required to “get tough” on people we perceive as enemies overseas in the same way local governments “get tough on crime.” It leads to a lopsided result that’s grossly unfair and often creates the very danger it’s supposed to stopping. (I imagine nothing could radicalize a kid like his family getting blown away in a drone strike.) But what Prof. West is complaining about is really an “American” problem. But it’s just not as sexy to say America is a global George Zimmerman, profiling the world of terrorists and killing them without trial. The President isn’t ordering these drone strikes in a vacuum.¶ So, like many times before, I’m with Prof. West until he reaches this point where he always goes off the deep end and acts like President Obama is the villain the Ninja Turtles fight on Saturdays.¶ There’s a way to put pressure on the administration about drone strikes or poverty or racism without alienating the multitudes of African Americans who still support and like the president, but Cornel West (and his oft cohort Tavis Smiley), seem intent on going the nuclear route.¶ You can’t even get mad anymore. We get it. You think Obama is the worst. Obama is an extension of an American hegemony that has been trying to tell the rest of the world what to do since the end of WWII. He’s not community-organizer-in-chief. My God, he turned out to be a Commander-In-Chief, warmonger just like every other U.S. president! This, of course, forgets that Obama thought to fix the machine he had to become a part of it and work from the inside and found that to be a much harder task than he ever imagined.¶ Think about it. As much as people in 2008 hoped Obama would change Washington, Obama also though by the sheer power of his charm, will and desire he too would change Washington and you know what Washington did when he tried to close GITMO or tried for Universal Healthcare like the kind in Canada or dared to say the officer who arrested Prof. Skip Gates in front of his own house “acted stupidly”, Washington slapped him down and told him “We’re not changing. Not for you. Not for the people. Not for the good of the country. Not for anyone. We like ourselves as we are – completely screwed up and in the pocket of the military industrial complex.”

### Terror PIC

### AT Word Pics

#### First, textual competition is bad

#### Education- word PICS destroy clash and crushes substantive debate about war powers by skewing the debate in an abstract direction of a word in the plan text, rather than the substance of the policy.

#### Textual competition kills debateability-

#### Justifies and encourages vague plan texts or no plan texts- this would be worse for negative ground because it kills legitimate lines of competition with core pieces of negative offense-

#### Kills fairness - focusing on a word in the text makes 9 minutes of the 1AC moot by jettisoning our ability to weigh affirmative offensive against counterplans- kills pre-round prep and makes unfair time-skews

#### They need to articulate a functional difference between the plan and the counter-plan in order for it to be competitive. Otherwise it justifies perm do the counter-plan to check back against 2AC abuse.

#### Voter for fairness and education

#### Second, perm do both-

#### Suppressing language because it is offensive preserves its injurious meaning – turning the counter plan. The only way to escape the injury is to reconstruct those terms in productive ways.

Kurtz and Oscarson 03

(Anna and Christopher, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference on College Composition and Communication, “BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate,” ProQuest)

However, Butler also argues that the daily, repeated use of words opens a space for another, more empowering kind of performance. This alternative performance, Butler insists, can be "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an original subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open" (p. 38). To think of words as having an "open" future is to recognize that their authority lies less in their historical than in their present uses; it is to acknowledge that people can revise the meaning of words even as we repeat them; it is to embrace the notion that the instability of words opens the possibility that we can use them to (re)construct a more humane future for ourselves and others. Because words can be revised, Butler contends that it would be counterproductive simply to stop using terms that we would deem injurious or oppressive. For when we choose not to use offensive words under any circumstance, we preserve their existing meanings as well as their power to injure. If as teachers, for instance, we were simply to forbid the use of speech that is hurtful to LGBT students we would be effectively denying the fact that such language still exists. To ignore words in this way, Butler insists, won't make them go away. Butler thus suggests that we actually use these words in thoughtful conversation in which we work through the injuries they cause (p. 1.02). Indeed, Butler insists that if we are to reclaim the power that oppressive speech robs from us, we must use, confront, and interrogate terms like "queer."

#### Rhetoric describes and reflects reality, it does not shape it—objective reality exists outside of language

Fram-Cohen ‘85

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible?” American Translators Association Conference, enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]

Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving ?reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.

#### Predictions of terrorism are true- their critique replicates the logic preceding the attacks on Britain

**Jones ‘6** (The commentariat and discourse failure: language and atrocity in Cool Britannia International Aff airs 82: 6 (2006) 1077–1100 © 2006 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Aff airs DAVID MARTIN JONES AND M. L. R. SMITH )

Rather than accept the existence of a clear and present Islamist threat to western secularism and democracy after the 9/11 attacks, such critical thinking moved the discursive goal posts. **Critical thinkers and opinionators argued instead that western governments deliberately exaggerated the threat** to curtail legitimate dissent and civil liberties.46 In his bestselling book Dude, Where’s My Country? Michael Moore popularized this view, maintaining: ‘There is no terrorist threat. Why has our government gone to such absurd lengths to convince us our lives are in danger? The answer is nothing short of their feverish desire to rule the world, fi rst by controlling us, and then, in turn, getting us to support their eff orts to dominate the rest of the planet.’47 More measured academic commentary termed the propensity of liberal democratic governments to exaggerate the terrorist threat the ‘politics of fear’. Governments, they maintained, conjured the spectre of Islam and catastrophic terror attacks for illiberal purposes. The politics of fear persuaded the gullible masses to accept an illegitimate extension of state power under the rubric of counterterror policy. These measures eroded personal freedoms and restricted civil liberty. The UK government proposals to introduce identity cards, extend detention of terrorist suspects without trial and curtail expression of views calculated to infl ame racial hatred crystallized the new authoritarianism. The politics of fear also facilitated a contentious foreign policy legitimating the 2003 invasion of Iraq, on the grounds of necessary pre-emptive military action against all potential sources of threat and instability.48 Critics thus maintained that ‘Islamist terror’ constituted an all-purpose political bogeyman. Media commentary reinforced the politics of fear hypothesis. ‘So, a climate of fear it is,’ declared Jackie Ashley in the Guardian in March 2004: ‘Everywhere you turn, there is another gray-faced public fi gure telling you that a major terrorist attack is coming … and there is nothing we can do except trust our leaders.’49 In a similar, but academic, vein, security analyst Bill Durodié declared that ‘Insecurity is the key driving concept of our times. Politicians have packaged themselves as risk managers’ in order to pacify ‘a demand from below for protection’.50 The BBC series The Power of Nightmares, screened in the United Kingdom in early 2005, encapsulated this critical understanding for a wider audience.51 Advertising the series, the BBC News website in April 2005 announced: ‘The Power of Nightmares explores how the idea that we are threatened by a hidden and organized network is an illusion. It is a myth that has spread unquestioned through politics, the security services and the international media.’ Pre-publicity presented the threat as a ‘fantasy’ which ‘politicians then found restored their power and authority in a disillusioned age’, and argued somewhat mysteriously: ‘Those with the darkest fears became the most powerful.’52 If before 7/7 the politics of fear increasingly influenced mainstream media commentary, it also dominated UK and US campuses. The Guardian, sampling informed opinion prior to the screening of The Power of Nightmares, confi rmed the orthodoxy that the security bureaucracy and politicians constructed terrorism in order to pursue the politics of fear and repression.53 Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, observed that for governments the terror threat is of ‘absolute cosmic signifi cance’, legitimating an ‘anything goes’ attitude towards its defeat. For the historian Linda Colley, ‘States and their rulers expect to monopolise violence, and that is why they react so violently to terrorism.’ Given that there had been only one attack in Europe since 9/11, in Madrid in March 2003, Bill Durodié contended that the ‘reality [of the Al-Qaeda threat to the west] has been essentially a one-off ’.54 Nor was the evolving consensus confi ned to academic and media comment. Such views found support both among members of parliament and from common lawyers. In January 2005 Charles Kennedy, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third largest political party, asserted in his ‘New Year message’: A clear division is emerging in British politics: the politics of fear versus the politics of hope. Labour is counting on the politics of fear, ratcheting up talk of threat, crime and insecurity, while the Conservatives are re-working their populist scares about asylum and the European ‘menace’. Look at how Labour, with the support of the Conservatives, has undermined trust in the political process by its spin and reliance on external threats.55 Suspicion of a government policy based on the politics of fear similarly infl uenced legal decisions with respect to deportation or extradition orders for suspects wanted in third countries for terror-related off ences.56 More particularly, the law lords questioned the government’s authority to detain without trial non-British terror suspects resident in the UK, like Abu Qatada. In December 2004, the highest appellate court found Qatada’s detention illegal. One of the law lords, Lord Bingham, maintained that the government’s powers of detention ‘discriminate on the ground of nationality or immigration status’,57 while Lord Hoff man found that ‘The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’58 Those who criticized the government for its political exploitation of the threat, however, failed to recognize that their rejection of the politics of fear was also politically motivated. For the politics of fear itself resulted in highly politicized threat assessments couched in the language of balance, neutrality and concern for an abstract standard of law that transcended short-term political contingencies. Thus, in his judgment on the detention of non-UK citizens, Lord Hoff man argued that ‘fanatical groups’ ‘do not threaten the life of the nation’. He continued: ‘Terrorist crime, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.’59 Hoff man asserted as constitutional fact what could only be an expression of faith. In an analogous vein, the security analyst Bill Durodié discounted the pretensions of Islamism’s UK franchise. After the conviction of the Algerian Kamel Bourgass in 2005 for murder and conspiracy to commit a public nuisance using poisons and explosives, including ricin, Durodié dismissed Al-Qaeda as a ‘conspiracy of dunces’. Assessing the ‘sheer naivety and incompetence of all these so-called al- Qaeda operatives’ like Bourgass, Richard Reid, the ‘dim-witted shoe bomber who had trouble with matches’, and Sajid Badat, ‘the Gloucester loner who bottled out of emulating Reid’, Durodié asserted: ‘If that is the best of what the supposed massed ranks of al-Qaeda have to off er after three years [i.e. after 9/11] … we should have little to fear. But the media, politicians and the police have sought to portray the situation diff erently.’60 **The London bombs disproved the politics of fear hypothesis and exposed the evaluations of law lords like Hoff man and security analysts like Durodié. The facts, expressed in the toll of civilian lives, demonstrated that the government’s perception had been more acute than that of its critics.** But its detractors portrayed government attempts to counter the threat of terror and heighten the state of public vigilance as an insidious plot to undermine democratic values.**61 As Frank Furedi observed, those who believed in the politics of fear met one conspiratorial claim—that the government was using the threat of Islamic terror to weaken basic freedoms—with a counterconspiracy—that there wasn’t much of a threat to begin** **with**.62 **Hence, the politics of fear determined its own preferred policy response, namely, the practice of complacency. Rather than engaging in a debate about the proportionality of response to a home-grown threat of Islamist terror, those who detected the politics of fear lurking behind every government pronouncement instead presented the security predicament in the very reductionist terms of which they accused those who claimed to be exaggerating the threat**. **In other words, the proponents of the politics of fear played the politics of fear themselves.63** Indeed, the thesis required fear—in this case, fear of a creeping authoritarian dystopia—to sustain it. In this way, a reasonable public policy concern about counterterrorist measures eroding established legal rights rapidly degenerated into a one-dimensional caricature of government policy not far removed from paranoid post-9/11 movies like V for Vendetta (2006). Furthermore, the wider commentariat’s acceptance of the politics of fear had far from trivial consequences. Mainstream politicians, the liberal press, television, academics and the courts gave it wide currency as a more objective response to the post-9/11 environment. Its premise, fear, discounted the threat and denigrated any serious attempt to evaluate the actual character and extent of the problem, asserting, without empirical basis, its more insightful assessment of the situation. Lord Walker, the single dissenting law lord in the 8 to 1 judgment in favour of Qatada in December 2004, expressed the inherent danger contained in this politics of complacency, well before the 7/7 attacks. Walker found that It is certainly not the court’s function to substitute for the British Government’s assessment any other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism. When a state is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the outset each of its chosen means of action with each of the safeguards.64 The politics of complacency, by contrast, denied the existence of a ‘public emergency’. To the extent that a threat existed, it was attributed largely to government exploitation and overreaction, which had constructed a Muslim out-group.65 Consequently, for the West, the Islamist threat was an ‘enemy of its own making’.66 The rhetoric in response to both the 7/7 attacks and the subsequent revelation of plots and conspiracies in London refl ects a strategic misunderstanding that confuses limited tactical ability with limited political goals. The semantic laxity that informed discussion of the terrorist threat reinforced this misconception. Terrorism is a tactic practised as part of a strategy in war, but it is not a material phenomenon in itself. **The lax terminology and distorted meanings attached to the phenomenon created the epistemological foundations of discourse failure.** This failure enabled Islamist extremists to exploit the fault-lines in liberal, multicultural societies like Britain, which tolerated or ignored their evolving global campaign to engineer an apocalyptic confrontation with secular modernity. Prior to July 2005, the British authorities recognized only one theatre of the ‘war against terrorism’, which required confronting the Islamist threat externally. Yet since 9/11 Al-Qaeda has rapidly mutated, evolving **via the Internet a largely home-grown jihadist strategy to infi ltrate and attack the cosmopolitan western cityscape. A coherent response therefore demands the pursuit of a far more vigorous strategy at home**. In particular, it requires abandoning the prevailing view that the domestic threat is best prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy. **It demands instead a total strategy to deal with a totalizing threat**. **This means recognizing that there is an existential threat,** unencumbered by the politics of fear, root causes and denial that for too long has impeded its eff ective prosecution. An adequate strategy requires, moreover, a multifaceted response that goes beyond law enforcement. This does not mean imposing arbitrary regimes of detention without trial. What it does require, however, is enhanced means of intelligence-gathering, both technical and human, together with a coherent set of government policies addressing education, welfare, asylum, immigration and culture in order to safeguard a sustainable civil association. The **evidence demonstrates the existence of a physical threat, not merely the political fear of a threat**. The implementation of a coherent set of social policies confronting the threat at home recognizes that securing state borders and maintaining internal stability is the fi rst task of responsible government, responsible media and a responsible public education sector, both secondary and tertiary. For **without the basis of security, necessarily premised upon the inculcation of a shared political culture, the conditions for political pluralism and liberal democracy gradually disappear**. This requires a return to the Hobbesian verities of sovereignty, which, despite the illusion of post-Cold War cosmopolitan multiculturalism and the elitist dream of a post-national constellation, represents the only secure basis for liberal democratic order.

#### Attempting to solve the root cause of terror is impossible, encourages more terrorism and casualties, only way to defeat is to incapacitate terrorism completely

Dershowitz 02

(Alan M., Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Pgs. 24-26//wyo-mm)

The reason terrorism works—and will persist unless there are significant changes in the response to it—is precisely because its perpetrators believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances and their demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their root causes.” To submit to this demand is to send the following counterproductive message to those with perceived grievances: if you resort to terrorism, we will try harder to understand your grievances and respond to them than we would have if you employed less violent methods. This is precisely the criterion for success established by the terrorist themselves. Listen to the words of Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s chief observer at the United Nations: “The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and the world opinion much more—and more effectively—than twenty years of pleading at the United Nations.” If this is true—and the Palestinians surely believe it is—then it should come as no surprise that hijackings and other forms of terrorism increased dramatically after the Palestinians were rewarded for their initial terrorism by increased world attention to its “root causes”—attention that quickly resulted in their leader being welcomed by the U.N. General Assembly, their organization being granted observer status at the United Nations, and their “government” being recognized by dozens of nations.9 We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. Our message must be this: even if you have legitimate grievances, if you resort to terrorism as a means toward eliminating them we will simply not listen to you, we will not try to understand you, and we will certainly never change any of our policies toward you. Instead, we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to engage in terror. Any other approach will encourage the use of terrorism as a means toward achieving ends—whether those ends are legitimate, illegitimate, or anything in between. Nor is there any single substantive root cause of all, or even most, terrorism. If there were—if poverty, for example, were the root cause of all terrorism—then by fixing that problem we could address the root cause of specific terrorist groups without encouraging others. But the reality is that the “root causes” of terrorism are as varied as human nature. Every single “root cause” associated with terrorism has existed for centuries, and the vast majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes—and with far greater poverty and disadvantage—have never resorted to terrorism. The search for “root causes” smacks more of after-the-fact political justification than inductive scientific inquiry. The variables that distinguish aggrieved groups willing to target innocent civilians from equally situated groups unwilling to murder children have far less to do with the legitimacy of their causes or the suffering of their people than with religious, cultural, political, and ethical differences.10 They also relate to universalism versus parochialism and especially to the value placed on human life. To focus on such favors as poverty, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, and others all too common around our imperfect world is to fail to explain why so many groups with far greater grievances and disabilities have never resorted to terrorism.11 Instead, the focus must be on the reality that using an act of terrorism as the occasion for addressing the root causes of that act only encourages other groups to resort to terrorism in order to have their root causes advanced on the international agenda. Put another way, the “root cause” of terrorism that must be eliminated is its success.

#### Turn – Labeling and condemning the term “terrorism” is vital to stigmatizing terrorist legitimacy and to eliminating violence against civilians as a means to attain political goals

**Ganor, 01** (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “Defining Terrorism”, <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm>)

The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with more positive connotations—guerrilla movements, underground movements, national liberation movements, commandos, etc.—are often used to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint. By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Naturally, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, such as “revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry fewer negative connotations than the term, “terrorism.” Terrorism or Revolutionary Violence? Salah Khalef (Abu Iyad) was Yasser Arafat’s deputy and one of the leaders of Fatah and Black September. He was responsible for a number of lethal attacks, including the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In order to rationalize such actions, he used the tactic of confounding “terrorism” with “political violence,” stating, “By nature, and even on ideological grounds, I am firmly opposed to political murder and, more generally, to terrorism. Nevertheless, unlike many others, I do not confuse revolutionary violence with terrorism, or operations that constitute political acts with others that do not.”[[4](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#4)] Abu Iyad tries to present terrorism and political violence as two different and unconnected phenomena. The implication of this statement is that a political motive makes the activity respectable, and the end justifies the means. I will examine this point below. Terrorism or National Liberation? A rather widespread attempt to make all definitions of terrorism meaningless is to lump together terrorist activities and the struggle to achieve national liberation. Thus, for instance, the recurrently stated Syrian official position is that Syria does not assist terrorist organizations; rather, it supports national liberation movements. President Hafez el-Assad, in a November 1986 speech to the participants in the 21st Convention of Workers Unions in Syria, said the following: We have always opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing and a national struggle against occupation is another. We are against terrorism… Nevertheless, we support the struggle against occupation waged by national liberation movements.[[5](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%225)] The attempt to confound the concepts of “terrorism” and “national liberation” comes to the fore in various official pronouncements from the Arab world. For instance, the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait, at the beginning of 1987, stated in its resolutions that: The conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from the legitimate struggle of oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values, and by international conventions.[[6](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%226)] The foreign and interior ministers of the Arab League reiterated this position at their April 1998 meeting in Cairo. In a document entitled “Arab Strategy in the Struggle against Terrorism,” they emphasized that belligerent activities aimed at “liberation and self determination” are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults.[[7](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#7)] Here again we notice an attempt to justify the “means” (terrorism) in terms of the “end” (national liberation). Regardless of the nature of the operation, when we speak of “liberation from the yoke of a foreign occupation” this will not be terrorism but a legitimate and justified activity. This is the source of the cliché, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” which stresses that all depends on the perspective and the worldview of the one doing the defining. The former President of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, made the following statement in April 1981, during the visit of the Libyan ruler, Muamar Qadhafi: “Imperialists have no regard either for the will of the people or the laws of history. Liberation struggles cause their indignation. They describe them as ‘terrorism’.”[[8](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#8)] Surprisingly, many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence. The struggle for “national liberation” would appear to be the positive and justified end of this sequence, whereas terrorism is the negative and odious one. It is impossible, according to this approach, for any organization to be both a terrorist group and a movement for national liberation at the same time. In failing to understand the difference between these two concepts, many have, in effect, been caught in a semantic trap laid by the terrorist organizations and their allies. They have attempted to contend with the clichés of national liberation by resorting to odd arguments, instead of stating that when a group or organization chooses terrorism as a means, the aim of their struggle cannot be used to justify their actions (see below). Thus, for instance, Senator Jackson was quoted in Benyamin Netanyahu’s book Terrorism: How the West Can Win as saying, The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do . . . It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.[[9](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#9)] Professor Benzion Netanyahu also assumed, a priori, that freedom fighters are incapable of perpetrating terrorist acts: For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately attacked innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or passersby in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen to reside in the area of conflict or are merely associated ethnically or religiously with the people of that area… The conclusion we must draw from all this is evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement . . .[[10](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%2210)] This approach strengthens the attempt by terrorist organizations to present terrorism and the struggle for liberation as two contradictory concepts. It thus plays into the terrorists’ hands by supporting their claim that, since they are struggling to remove someone they consider a foreign occupier, they cannot be considered terrorists. The claim that a freedom fighter cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing is, of course, groundless. A terrorist organization can also be a movement of national liberation, and the concepts of “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” are not mutually contradictory. Targeting “the innocent”? Not only terrorists and their allies use the definition of terrorism to promote their own goals and needs. Politicians in countries affected by terrorism at times make political use of the definition of terrorism by attempting to emphasize its brutality. One of the prevalent ways of illustrating the cruelty and inhumanity of terrorists is to present them as harming “the innocent.” Thus, in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Binyamin Netanyahu states that terrorism is “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”[[11](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#11)] This definition was changed in Netanyahu’s third book, Fighting Terrorism, when the phrase “the innocent” was replaced by the term “civilians”: “Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.”[[12](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#12)] “Innocent” (as opposed to “civilian”) is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terrorism. The use of the concept “innocent” in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the political game. The dilemma entailed by the use of the term “innocent” is amply illustrated in the following statement by Abu Iyad: As much as we repudiate any activity that endangers innocent lives, that is, against civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we feel no remorse concerning attacks against Israeli military and political elements who wage war against the Palestinian people . . . Israeli acts of vengeance usually result in high casualties among Palestinian civilians—particularly when the Israeli Air Force blindly and savagely bombs refugee camps—and it is only natural that we should respond in appropriate ways to deter the enemy from continuing its slaughter of innocent victims.”[[13](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#13)] Abu Iyad here clarifies that innocent victims are civilians in countries that are not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict (implying that civilians in Israel, even children and old people, are not innocent), while he describes Palestinian civilians as innocent victims. Proposing a Definition of Terrorism The question is whether it is at all possible to arrive at an exhaustive and objective definition of terrorism, which could constitute an accepted and agreed-upon foundation for academic research, as well as facilitating operations on an international scale against the perpetrators of terrorist activities. The definition proposed here states that terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. **Continues…** This distinction between the target of the attack and its aims shows that the discrepancy between “terrorism” and “freedom fighting” is not a subjective difference reflecting the personal viewpoint of the definer. Rather it constitutes an essential difference, involving a clear distinction between the perpetrators’ aims and their mode of operation. As noted, an organization is defined as “terrorist” because of its mode of operation and its target of attack, whereas calling something a “struggle for liberation” has to do with the aim that the organization seeks to attain. Diagram 2 illustrates that non-conventional war (between a state and an organization), may include both terrorism and guerrilla activities on the background of different and unrelated aims. Hiding behind the guise of national liberation does not release terrorists from responsibility for their actions. Not only is it untrue that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” but it is also untrue that “the end justifies the means.” The end of national liberation may, in some cases, justify recourse to violence, in an attempt to solve the problem that led to the emergence of a particular organization in the first place. Nevertheless, the organization must still act according to the rules of war, directing its activities toward the conquest of military and security targets; in short, it must confine itself to guerrilla activities. When the organization breaks these rules and intentionally targets civilians, it becomes a terrorist organization, according to objective measures, and not according to the subjective perception of the definer. It may be difficult at times to determine whether the victim of an attack was indeed a civilian, or whether the attack was intentional. These cases could be placed under the rubric of a “gray area,” to be decided in line with the evidence and through the exercise of judicial discretion. The proposed definition may therefore be useful in the legal realm as a criterion for defining and categorizing the perpetrators’ activities. In any event, adopting the proposed definition of terrorism will considerably reduce the “gray area” to a few marginal cases. Defining States’ Involvement in Terrorism **Continues…** supporting terrorism – terrorist organizations often rely on the assistance of a sympathetic civilian population. An effective instrument in the limitation of terrorist activity is to undermine the ability of the organization to obtain support, assistance, and aid from this population. A definition of terrorism could be helpful here too by determining new rules of the game in both the local and the international sphere. Any organization contemplating the use of terrorism to attain its political aims will have to risk losing its legitimacy, even with the population that supports its aims. Public relations – a definition that separates terrorism out from other violent actions will enable the initiation of an international campaign designed to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist organizations, curtail support for them, and galvanize a united international front against them. In order to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist activity (usually stemming from the tendency of various countries to identify with some of the aims of terrorist organizations), terrorist activity must be distinguished from guerrilla activity, as two forms of violent struggle reflecting different levels of illegitimacy. The Attitude of Terrorist Organizations Toward the Definition The definition of terrorism does not require that the terrorist organizations themselves accept it as such. Nevertheless, reaching international agreement will be easier the more objective the definition, and the more the definition takes into account the demands and viewpoints of terrorist organizations and their supporters. The proposed definition, as noted, draws a distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare at both the conceptual and moral levels. If properly applied, it could challenge organizations that are presently involved in terrorism to abandon it so as to engage exclusively in guerrilla warfare. As noted, most organizations active today in the national and international arena engage in both terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare; after all, international convention makes no distinction between the two. Hence, there are no rules defining what is forbidden and what is allowed in non-conventional war, and equal punishments are imposed on both terrorists and guerrilla fighters. People perpetrating terrorist attacks or engaging in guerrilla warfare know they can expect the same punishment, whether they attack a military installation or take over a kindergarten. The terrorist attack may be more heavily censored because it involves children, but the legitimacy of these actions will be inferred from their political aims. In these circumstances, why not prefer a terrorist attack that will have far more impact, and will be easier to accomplish, with much less risk? The international adoption of the proposed definition, with its distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare—and its concomitant separation from political aims—could motivate the perpetrators to reconsider their intentions, choosing military targets over civilian targets—guerrilla warfare over terrorism–both because of moral considerations and because of “cost-benefit” considerations. The moral consideration – many terrorist organizations are troubled by the moral question bearing on their right to harm civilians, and this concern is reflected in their literature and in interviews with terrorists. Thus, for instance, an activist of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Walid Salam, argued in December 1996 that “among activists of the Popular Front, more and more are opposed to military activities against civilians, as the one near Ramallah on Wednesday. They do not say so publicly because of internal discipline and to preserve unity.”[[27](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#27)] We can also see something of this moral dilemma in Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the leader of Hamas: “According to our religion it is forbidden to kill a woman, a baby, or an old man, but when you kill my sister, and my daughter, and my son, it is my right to defend them.”[[28](http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm#28)] This concern might explain why, after attacks on civilian targets, organizations such as Hamas often make public statements proclaiming that they have attacked military targets. The moral dilemma does exist, and the opponents of terrorism must intensify it. When countries acknowledge the principle of relying on guerrilla warfare to attain legitimate political aims, and unite in their moral condemnation of terrorism, they increase the moral dilemma that is already prevalent in terrorist organizations. The utilitarian consideration – If the perpetrators know that attacking a kindergarten or other civilian target will never be acceptable; that these attacks will turn them into wanted and extraditable terrorists and will undermine the legitimacy of their political goals—and that, when apprehended, they will be punished much more harshly than would guerrilla fighters—they may think twice before choosing terrorism as their modus operandi. Adopting the proposed definition of terrorism, formulating rules of behavior, and setting appropriate punishments in line with the proposed definition will sharpen the “cost-benefit” considerations of terrorist organizations. One way of encouraging this trend among terrorist organizations is, as noted, to agree on different punishments for those convicted of terrorism and those convicted of guerrilla warfare. Thus, for instance, the possibility should be considered of bringing to criminal trial, under specific charges of terrorism, individuals involved in terrorist activities, while allotting prisoner of war status to those accused of involvement in guerrilla activities. The proposed definition of terrorism may indeed help in the struggle against terrorism at many and varied operative levels. An accepted definition, capable of serving as a basis for international counter-terrorist activity, could above all, bring terrorist organizations to reconsider their actions. They must face the question of whether they will persist in terrorist attacks and risk all that such persistence entails—loosing legitimacy, incurring harsh and specific punishments, facing a coordinated international opposition (including military activity), and suffering harm to sources of support and revenue. The international community must encourage the moral and utilitarian dilemmas of terrorist organizations, and establish a clear policy accompanied by adequate means of punishment on the basis of an accepted definition. Summary We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

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