# 1NC

## First

#### First, the Will to power is a part of life, it makes violence and suffering inevitable, --we should embrace it, this is key to affirm the will to life

Nietzsche, 1886 (Friedrich, Philosopher with a hammer, “Beyond Good and Evil” The Nietzsche Channel, online, MB)

 257. EVERY elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society and so it will always be--a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the PATHOS OF DISTANCE, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance--that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation of the type "man," the continued "self-surmounting of man," to use a moral formula in a supermoral sense. (that is to say, of the preliminary condition for the elevation of the type "man"): the truth is hard. Let us acknowledge unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto has ORIGINATED! Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power--they were more COMPLETE men (which at every point also implies the same as "more complete beasts"). 258. Corruption--as the indication that anarchy threatens to break out among the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions, called "life," is convulsed--is something radically different according to the organization in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like that of France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privileges with sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral sentiments, it was corruption:--it was really only the closing act of the corruption which had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristocracy had abdicated step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to a FUNCTION of royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress). The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the SIGNIFICANCE and highest justification thereof--that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is NOT allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher EXISTENCE: like those sun- seeking climbing plants in Java--they are called Sipo Matador,-- which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness. 259. To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY, it would immediately disclose what it really is--namely, a Will to the DENIAL of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;--but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy-- not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it LIVES, and because life IS precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this matter, people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which "the exploiting character" is to be absent--that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. "Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life--Granting that as a theory this is a novelty--as a reality it is the FUNDAMENTAL FACT of all history let us be so far honest towards ourselves!

And, embracing the tension of being marginalized, the tension and suffering of marginalization are prerequisites to greatness

HIGGINS '06

(Kathleen Marie, professor of philosophy at UT-Austin, CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT, p. 67)

While this conflict itself may be unavoidable, Nietzsche urges the individual tormented in this way to resist the temptation to use this as a basis for self-flagellation. Zarathustra proclaims, "I say unto you: One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star" (Z P 5). He cautions against too much caution, and he indicates that the solution to this inner tension is self-transformation along the lines that DuBois also suggests. But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods. Lonely, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils. You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes! (Z: 1 "The Creator") Instead of viewing tension as a sign that one is doing something wrong, those suffering from marginalization and the inner strife that it occasions should reassess their situation, Nietzsche contends. As he comments in Beyond Good and Evil, "The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us" (BGE 116). Instead of viewing oneself as deficient for not fitting in, one can view oneself as occupying a particularly valuable role. One might see oneself as a pioneer, an adventurer, or a legislator of new values. The last of these is particularly relevant to African Americans who seek a transformation of society's values. Seeing oneself in this manner, one is in a position to heal the self-doubt that typically arises in those who are exceptions to the communal norm. Nietzsche points out that the innovator is necessarily marginalized. Thus one's sense of being outside the mainstream, even of being cast outside it, may be an unavoidable feature of being a cultural pioneer. One also can attempt to interpret one's own position as central to the unfolding development of humanity, even if this centrality is not recognized by those comfortable with their positions within the status quo. Nietzsche argues that each individual's perceptions are limited by virtue of being perspectival but are simultaneously real contributions to human understanding for exactly the same reason. This suggests that individual and minority outlooks represent an enhancement to society generally, the more so because they are not viewpoints taken for granted by the majority. Marginalization, on this view, is a precondition for assuming a particularly significant cultural role.

#### And, their imagination of a better world is a continuation of the ascetic ideal. This association of all that is good at not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got—turns case. Fantasizing about a world without suffering produces creative impotence only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### And, the 1ac’s vision of a perfect world causes us to hate the one we have, leads to denial of life of this life for a more perfect one

Nietzsche, 1872 (Friedrich, philosopher, “The Birth of Tragedy” Online, MB)

Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, and *not* morality, is presented as the truly *metaphysical* activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive sentence is repeated several times, that the existence of the world is *justified* only as an aesthetic phenomenon. Indeed, the whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events—a "god," if you please, but certainly only an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory—one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the *distress* of fullness and *overfullness* and from the *affliction* of the contradictions compressed in his soul. The world—at every moment the *attained* salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant, and contradictory being who can find salvation only in *appearance*: you can call this whole artists' metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the *moral* interpretation and significance of existence. Here, perhaps for the first time, a pessimism "beyond good and evil" is suggested. Here that "perversity of mind" gains speech and formulation against which Schopenhauer never wearied of hurling in advance his most irate curses and thunderbolts [*Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851), II.5, 69]: a philosophy that dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance—and not merely among "appearances" or phenomena (in the sense of the idealistic **terminus technicus** [technical term]), but among "deceptions," as semblance, delusion, error, interpretation, contrivance, art. Perhaps the depth of this *antimoral* propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book—Christianity as the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected. In truth, nothing could be more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the Christian teaching, which is, and wants to be, *only* moral and which relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art. Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life—a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view [Optik], and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in "another: or "better" life. Hatred of "the world," condemnations of the passions [Affekte], fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing, for the end, for respite, for "the sabbath of sabbaths"—all this always struck me, no less than the unconditional will of Christianity to recognize *only* moral values, as the most dangerous and uncanny form of all possible forms of a "will to decline"—at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life. For, confronted with morality (especially Christian, or unconditional, morality), life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong, because life is something essentially amoral—and eventually, crushed by the weight of contempt and the eternal No, life must then be felt to be unworthy of desire and altogether worthless. Morality itself—how now? might not morality be "a will to negate life," a secret instinct of annihilation, a principle of decay, diminution, and slander—the beginning of the end? Hence, the danger of dangers? ... It was *against* morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life—purely artistic and *anti-Christian*. What to call it? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without taking some liberty—for who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist?—in the name of a Greek god: I called it *Dionysian*. —

#### Thus the alternative:

#### We should forget the 1ac in order to affirm life

Zupancic, 2003 (Alenka, Philosopher, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzche’s philosophy of the two” Online, MB)

It is true that there is also a rather different notion present in Christianity, a notion much closer to Nietzsche’s own position—namely, the notion of mercy as situated “beyond law” (Jenseits des Rechts). Nietzsche links to this notion nothing less than the possibility of an escape from the vicious circle of punishment and guilt. But his notion of mercy is not simply that of an act of forgiveness; it can spring only from a surplus of “power” and “richness.” Illustrating this with the example of actual wealth, Nietzsche writes that the creditor becomes more human to the extent that he has grown richer: so that, finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth.24 Such a creditor can now allow himself the noblest luxury possible: letting those who harm him go unpunished. In this way, the justice which began with “everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged” ends by winking, and letting those who are incapable of discharging their debt go free. This “self-overcoming of justice” is called mercy, and remains the privilege of the most “powerful.”25 We should be careful here not to believe that the terms “rich” and “powerful” refer simply to those who have a lot of money, and hold this or that position of power.As Nietzsche points out, it is the capacity not to be injured, and not to suffer because of an injustice, that constitutes the measure of one’s richness and power—not the capacity to endure suffering and injury, to bear pain, but the capacity not to let this suffering as suffering enter the constitution of one’s subjectivity (which also means the capacity not to let oneself be subjectivized in the figure of the “subject of injury,” the figure of the victim). Those who can manage this are “rich” and “powerful” because they can manage it, not the other way around. There is also an important difference between forgiving and (what Nietzsche calls) forgetting. Forgiveness has a perverse way of involving us even further in debt. To forgive somehow always implies to pay for the other, and thus to use the very occurrence of injury and its forgiveness as a new “engagement ring.” Nietzsche makes this very point in relation to Christianity: the way God has forgiven our sins has been to pay for them, to pay for them with His own “flesh.” This is the fundamental perversity of Christianity: while forgiving, it simultaneously brandishes at us the cross, the instrument of torture, the memory of the one who suffered and died so that we could be forgiven, the memory of the one who paid for us. Christianity forgives, but does not forget. One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions.We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we “temper” our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting (“a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he—forgot”).26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.”27 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure. In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human.Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes! Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued; . . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no artist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . . . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.30 If we read this passage carefully,we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion,we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion.

#### There are no moral facts, only profound depths of unconscious and irrational forces which drive us and determine our destiny. We should allow full reign of these forces and rejoice in the ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life, declaring even the most terrible qualities of life as good

Carty in 2003

(Anthony, Professor of law, University of Westminster, London, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART I): NIETZSCHE AND SOCRATES / OR THE SPIRIT OF THE DEVIL AND THE LAW, Cardozo Law Review, January 2003, l/n)

The difference between Nietzsche and Socrates may well be more superficial and even pathetic - one of temperament. We have the gloomy Teutonic and the sanguine Mediterranean. Again, to refer to Nietzsche's perspectivism, it is a question of interpretation rather than fact. There are no moral facts, as it were. Nietzsche claims that there are profound depths: unconscious, irrational forces which drive us, making a mockery of the rhetoric of free will and devastating any social and personal restraints. Perhaps inconsistently he suggests that we should welcome this and allow full reign to these forces. They represent fate. In some sense, such drives may have to be sublimated, but they are still determining our destiny. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche says:   Only as much of that foundation of all existence, that Dionysiac underground of the world, can be permitted to enter an individual's consciousness as can be overcome, in its turn, by the Apolline power of transfiguration, so that both of these artistic drives are required to unfold their energies in strict, reciprocal proportion, according to the law of eternal justice. [n40](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n40)   The will to power is never anything more precise than an  [\*633]  expansion of the force of life itself. Intoxication to the point of the extinction of subjectivity appears to be recommended, even if Nietzsche himself may only have meant listening to a Wagner opera. The mature Nietzsche, by 1888, clearly prefers the Dionysian, the amor fati. [n41](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n41) The world Apollinian means: "the urge to perfect self-sufficiency, to the typical individual, to all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous, typical: freedom under the law." [n42](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n42) The word Dionysian means a reaching beyond personality, the everyday, reality, across the abyss of transitoriness:   a passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life as that which remains the same ... the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life ... the feeling of the necessary unity of creation and destruction. [n43](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.535935.9543583037&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1219266062225&returnToKey=20_T4396533563&parent=docview" \l "n43)

## Second

#### Al Qaeda is weak now but could recover if the US allows them the opportunity

McLaughlin 13 (John McLaughlin was a CIA officer for 32 years and served as deputy director and acting director from 2000-2004. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, ¶ 06:00 AM ET¶ Terrorism at a moment of transition7/12, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/)

A third major trend has to do with the debate underway among terrorists over tactics, targets, and ways to correct past errors.¶ On targets, jihadists are now pulled in many directions. Many experts contend they are less capable of a major attack on the U.S. homeland. But given the steady stream of surprises they’ve sprung – ranging from the 2009 “underwear bomber” to the more recent idea of a surgically implanted explosive – it is hard to believe they’ve given up trying to surprise us with innovations designed to penetrate our defenses.¶ We especially should remain alert that some of the smaller groups could surprise us by pointing an attacker toward the United States, as Pakistan’s Tehrik e Taliban did in preparing Faizal Shazad for his attempted bombing of Times Square in 2010.¶ At the same time, many of the groups are becoming intrigued by the possibility of scoring gains against regional governments that are now struggling to gain or keep their balance – opportunities that did not exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks.¶ Equally important, jihadists are now learning from their mistakes, especially the reasons for their past rejection by populations where they temporarily gained sway.¶ Documents from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, discovered after French forces chased them from Mali, reveal awareness that they were too harsh on local inhabitants, especially women. They also recognized that they need to move more gradually and provide tangible services to populations – a practice that has contributed to the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon.¶ We are now seeing a similar awareness among jihadists in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. If these “lessons learned” take hold and spread, it will become harder to separate terrorists from populations and root them out.¶ Taken together, these three trends are a cautionary tale for those seeking to gauge the future of the terrorist threat.¶ Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal. It is at a moment of transition, immersed in circumstances that could sow confusion and division in the movement or, more likely, extend its life and impart new momentum.¶ So if we are ever tempted to lower our guard in debating whether and when this war might end, we should take heed of these trends and of the wisdom J. R. R. Tolkien has Eowyn speak in “Lord of the Rings”: "It needs but one foe to breed a war, not two ..."

#### Securitization of terrorism is key to the war on terror

Vultee 2010

[Fred Vultee, PhD in Journalism, Associate Professor at Wayne State, 2010, Securitization: A new approach to framing and media portrayals of the "war on terror", <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/3/8/8/pages203884/p203884-2.php>, uwyo//amp]

What is happening when news accounts portray the effort to contain and prevent political violence as the formal War on Terror or the dubious “war on terror”? A promising explanation lies in securitization theory, a recent outgrowth of security studies. Securitization can be thought of as a particular form of framing. When an issue has been securitized, a political actor has been able to cast it as an existential threat – an imminent peril to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community – and has gained a degree of public assent to use extraordinary measures to combat that threat. The role of the news media in such a process is essential. Media frames are the lens through which the public sees an issue like terrorism or immigration as a matter best dealt with through the normal workings of law enforcement and politics or as a crisis that requires extreme measures.

#### Constrained executive makes it impossible to respond to the rapid and existential nature of the threat posed by terrorism-strong, flexible executive key to check nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks

Royal 2011

[John Paul, Fellow of the Institute for World Politics, 2011, War Powers and the Age of Terrorism, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Royal-_Final_Paper.pdf>, uwyo//amp]

The international system itself and national security challenges to the United States in particular, underwent rapid and significant change in the first decade of the twenty-first century. War can no longer be thought about strictly in the terms of the system and tradition created by the Treaty of Westphalia over three and a half centuries ago. Non-state actors now possess a level of destructiveness formerly enjoyed only by nation states. Global terrorism, coupled with the threat of weapons of mass destruction developed organically or obtained from rogue regimes, presents new challenges to U.S. national security and place innovative demands on the Constitution’s system of making war. In the past, as summarized in the 9/11 Commission Report, threats emerged due to hostile actions taken by enemy states and their ability to muster large enough forces to wage war: “Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred" (National Commission 2004, 362). This mindset assumed that peace was the default state for American national security. Today however, we know that threats can emerge quickly. Terrorist organizations half-way around the world are able to wield weapons of unparalleled destructive power. These attacks are more difficult to detect and deter due to their unconventional and asymmetrical nature. In light of these new asymmetric threats and the resultant changes to the international system, peace can no longer be considered the default state of American national security. Many have argued that the Constitution permits the president to use unilateral action only in response to an imminent direct attack on the United States. In the emerging security environment described above, pre-emptive action taken by the executive branch may be needed more often than when nation-states were the principal threat to American national interests. Here again, the 9/11 Commission Report is instructive as it considers the possibility of pre-emptive force utilized over large geographic areas due to the diffuse nature of terrorist networks: In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet (National Commission 2004, 362). Furthermore, the report explicitly describes the global nature of the threat and the global mission that must take place to address it. Its first strategic policy recommendation against terrorism states that the: U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power (National Commission 2004, 367). Thus, fighting continues against terrorists in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and beyond, as we approach the tenth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of these terrorists is the most dangerous threat to the United States. We know from the 9/11 Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a religious obligation while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004, 397). Considering these statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability such as North Korea and Iran, or extremely unstable nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to American national security interests. These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the United States in the past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign punishment and appropriate, rapid action against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the United States…with the full support of Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of pre-emptive and sustained action against those who have expressed hostility or declared war on the United States. Only the executive branch can effectively execute this mission, authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national consensus or the nature of the threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

#### Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they

#### Attempting to solve the root cause of terror is impossible, encourages more terrorism and casualties, only way to defeat is to incapacitate terrorism completely

Dershowitz 02

(Alan M., Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Pgs. 24-26//wyo-mm)

The reason terrorism works—and will persist unless there are significant changes in the response to it—is precisely because its perpetrators believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances and their demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their root causes.” To submit to this demand is to send the following counterproductive message to those with perceived grievances: if you resort to terrorism, we will try harder to understand your grievances and respond to them than we would have if you employed less violent methods. This is precisely the criterion for success established by the terrorist themselves. Listen to the words of Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s chief observer at the United Nations: “The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and the world opinion much more—and more effectively—than twenty years of pleading at the United Nations.” If this is true—and the Palestinians surely believe it is—then it should come as no surprise that hijackings and other forms of terrorism increased dramatically after the Palestinians were rewarded for their initial terrorism by increased world attention to its “root causes”—attention that quickly resulted in their leader being welcomed by the U.N. General Assembly, their organization being granted observer status at the United Nations, and their “government” being recognized by dozens of nations.9 We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. Our message must be this: even if you have legitimate grievances, if you resort to terrorism as a means toward eliminating them we will simply not listen to you, we will not try to understand you, and we will certainly never change any of our policies toward you. Instead, we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to engage in terror. Any other approach will encourage the use of terrorism as a means toward achieving ends—whether those ends are legitimate, illegitimate, or anything in between. Nor is there any single substantive root cause of all, or even most, terrorism. If there were—if poverty, for example, were the root cause of all terrorism—then by fixing that problem we could address the root cause of specific terrorist groups without encouraging others. But the reality is that the “root causes” of terrorism are as varied as human nature. Every single “root cause” associated with terrorism has existed for centuries, and the vast majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes—and with far greater poverty and disadvantage—have never resorted to terrorism. The search for “root causes” smacks more of after-the-fact political justification than inductive scientific inquiry. The variables that distinguish aggrieved groups willing to target innocent civilians from equally situated groups unwilling to murder children have far less to do with the legitimacy of their causes or the suffering of their people than with religious, cultural, political, and ethical differences.10 They also relate to universalism versus parochialism and especially to the value placed on human life. To focus on such favors as poverty, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, and others all too common around our imperfect world is to fail to explain why so many groups with far greater grievances and disabilities have never resorted to terrorism.11 Instead, the focus must be on the reality that using an act of terrorism as the occasion for addressing the root causes of that act only encourages other groups to resort to terrorism in order to have their root causes advanced on the international agenda. Put another way, the “root cause” of terrorism that must be eliminated is its success.

#### Focus on language-discourse in the war on terror fails to create effective models for combatting violence, understanding war, and history proves there’s no causality between language and war

Rodwell, 05

(Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” 2005, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>) /wyo-mm

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

## Case

Feminist critics pick away at straw arguments, nation-state interests are NOT inherently gendered – asserting they are is essentialist

Michael Lind – editor of the National Interest – 2005 Of Arms and the Woman, review of the Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War by Cynthia Enloe

http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt accessed 11-20-07 [nfb]

Now--if you are still with me--the great intellectual challenge to the conventional realist understanding of international relations comes from the standpoint feminists and the postmodernist feminists, who agree on the broad outlines of the critique. (In what follows I will use "feminist" to mean standpoint and postmodernist scholars.) According to feminist critics, international relations theory as it has evolved incorporates "masculinist" prejudices at each of its three levels of analysis: man, the state and war. Realists are "androcentric" in arguing that the propensity for conflict is universal in human nature ("man"); that the logic and the morality of sovereign states are not identical to those of individuals ("the state"); and that the world is an anarchy in which sovereign states must be prepared to rely on self-help, including organized violence ("war"). Feminist theorists would stress the nurturing and cooperative aspects--the conventionally feminine aspects--of human nature; they would expose the artificiality of notions of sovereignty, and their connection with patriarchy and militarism; and they would replace the narrow realist emphasis on security, especially military security, with a redefinition of security as universal social justice.

The first thing that must be said about the feminist critique of realism is that it is by no means incompatible with realism, properly understood. In fact, realist theory can hardly be recognized in the feminist caricature of it. Take the idea of the innate human propensity for conflict. Although some realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau have confused the matter (often under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr) with misleading talk of "original sin," the controlling idea of realism is that there is an ineradicable potential for conflict between human beings--"men" in the inclusive, gender-neutral sense-- when they are organized in groups. Realism is not about conflict between individual men, that is, males; if it were, it would be a theory of barroom brawls or adolescent male crime. It is about conflict between rival communities, and those communities include women and men alike.

Feminist critics of realism, then, begin by attacking a straw man, or a straw male. Even worse, they tend to indulge in the stereotypes that they otherwise abhor: aggression is "male," conciliation is "female." To their credit, most feminist theorists are aware of this danger, ever mindful of their dogma that all sexual identity is socially constructed, ever fearful that they will hear the cry of "Essentialist!" raised against them. Thus Enloe, in an earlier book called Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, struggles with how to answer what she calls "the `What about Margaret Thatcher?' taunt."

Her answer is that women like Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick reinforce the patriarchy by making international conflict look "less man-made, more people-made and thus more legitimate and harder to reverse." Enloe applies this analysis consistently--right-wing women like Phyllis Schlafly are pawns of the patriarchal-militarist power structure, while left-wing women like the Greenham Common Women are disinterested proponents of the good of humanity. Still, Enloe is troubled enough to return to the question: "some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule." Admit that, however, and you are close to conceding the point about collective human behavior made by realists.

#### Security’s inevitable—rejecting it causes the state to become more interventionist, turns the K

McCormack 10

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and **ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Shifting away from the squo security framework causes conflict and causes intervention – only the perm gives political content to rights

McCormack 10

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

A corollary of this retreat from a political interpretation of conflict or social instability, is the delegitimation of social transformation in developing countries. Historically, social and political transformation has often been accompanied by war and strife. By pathologising conflict, the human security framework acts to prohibit social or political transformation, as such changes can only be understood in an entirely negative way (see for further discussion, Cramer 2006). As an important contributor to the human security framework has argued: ‘much human insecurity surely results from structural factors and the distribution of power, which are essentially beyond the reach of individuals’ (Newman, 2004b: 358). Thus to actually overcome human insecurity, collective action and change is needed. But this **may result in** **internal conflict or strife**, **precisely the changes that human security problematises in the first place**. People may be prepared to experience disruptions to their daily existence, or even severe societal conflict or economic deprivation in the pursuit of some other goals which are understood as worthy. The shift away from the pluralist security framework is **highly problematic**. The formal links between the state and its citizens are problematised and weak and failing states are potentially held up to increased international scrutiny and international intervention. International institutions and states have potentially greater freedom to intervene in other states, but with no reciprocal methods of control to replace the old political links between the state and its citizens which are weakened. The shift away from the pluralist security framework and the rhetorical adoption by international institutions and states of a more cosmopolitan security framework **does not challenge contemporary power inequalities, rather it serves to entrench them**. Once we separate rights from any rights bearing subject, these rights are only things that can be given by external agencies, indeed as Chandler (2009) has argued, here the subject is created by external powers. Ultimately the cosmopolitan and emancipatory framework which seeks to give universal human rights through international law or forms of intervention posits abstract rights, seeking to make the world conform to universal human rights and justice in the absence of a political constituency to give it content. Indeed this is seen as necessary in the face of the current global injustices. Yet the problem is that **without a political constituency to give content to those rights these rights are gifts of the powerful, they are closer to charity**. **Rights in themselves, without political form, are of little value**. Here rights are assumed to be able to correct political and economic and social wrongs, such as inequality or disempowerment. Yet such problems are not the result of a lack of rights, and cannot be corrected through rights. A lack of development is a political, economic and social problem (Lewis, 1998; Heartfield, 1996), the lack of rights or equality and empowerment stem from the real inequalities and power relations in the world. Divorcing rights from rights bearing subjects, and positing abstract individual rights that can only be ‘given’ by external agencies, does not enhance rights but ends up formalising real inequality (Lewis, 1998). Indeed, this is precisely what we can see with, for example, human security and contemporary interventions. Here, the old formal equality of the pluralist security framework is no longer relevant and it is increasingly accepted that more powerful states have a right to intervene in other states and to frame certain states as ‘outlaw states’ (Simpson, 2005). Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that there have been significant shifts in the post-Cold War security problematic which cannot be understood in terms of the pluralist security framework. The most striking aspect of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from and problematisation of the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. I have already discussed that the pluralist security framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral. This chapter lends support to broadening the initial conclusions drawn about the critical security theory more generally. In their own terms critical security theorists do not seem to be very critical. Critical security theorists **are not** **critically engaging and explaining the contemporary security problematic and offering an alternative** to contemporary power inequalities. A critical question to ask would be why have international institutions and states framed their security policies in terms of a rejection of the pluralist security framework and taken up cosmopolitan rhetoric? Where does this shift come from? Despite their ostensible focus on power and power inequalities, it is striking that critical security theorists exclude the way in which power is being exercised in the post-Cold War international order from their analysis. Were critical security theorists to include this in their analysis they would discover that they seem to be sharing many of the assumptions and aims of the post-Cold War international order. Specifically in the context of the shifting international security problematic, critical security theorists seem to share a normative and ethical critique of the old security framework, combined with a depoliticised account of conflict and social, economic and political instability, and a depoliticised and idealised view of the potential of major international institutions and states to intervene. Moreover, in the behaviour and rhetoric of international institutions, the problematic theoretical implications of critical security theory’s idealised assumptions of the potential of international institutions or transnational organisations to be a force for emancipation and freedom for individuals is shown to be problematic in practice. I have argued that this rejection of the pluralist security framework does not challenge the status quo, but serves to further entrench power inequalities. In fact, it seems to reflect the increased freedom of the international community to intervene in other states.

#### Promotion of security is an ethical responsibility of government. Total security is impossible but limited security avoids a hell on earth.

**Elshtain ‘3** (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics – U. Chicago, “Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World”, p. 46-48)

IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH of September 11, I said to a friend, "Now we are reminded of what governments are for." The primary responsibility of government is to provide basic security—ordinary civic peace. St. Augustine calls this form of earthly peace tranquillitas ordinis. This is not the perfect peace promised to believers in the Kingdom of God, the one in which the lion lies down with the lamb. On this earth, if the lion lies down with the lamb, the lamb must be replaced frequently, as Martin Luther opined with his characteristic mordant wit. 1 Portions of the U.S. Constitution refer specifically to security and public safety. "To ensure domestic tranquillity" was central to what the new order being created after the American Revolution was all about. None of the goods that human beings cherish, including the free exercise of religion, can flourish without a measure of civic peace and security. What good or goods do I have in mind? Mothers and fathers raising their children; men and women going to work; citizens of a great city making their way on streets and subways; ordinary people flying to California to visit the grandchildren or to transact business with colleagues— all of these actions are simple but profound goods made possible by civic peace. They include the faithful attending their churches, synagogues, and mosques without fear, and citizens—men and women, young and old, black, brown, and white—lining up to vote on Election Day. This civic peace is not the kingdom promised by scripture that awaits the end time. The vision of beating swords into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks, of creating a world in which "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore," is connected with certain conditions that will always elude us. That vision presupposes that all persons are under one law. But our condition of pluralism and religious diversity alone precludes the rule of one law. Moreover, our condition of fallibility and imperfection precludes a world in which discontents never erupt. That said, the civic peace that violence disrupts does offer intimations of the peaceable kingdom. If we live from day to day in fear of deadly attack, the goods we cherish become elusive. Human beings are fragile creatures. We cannot reveal the fullness of our being, including our deep sociality, if airplanes are flying into buildings or snipers are shooting at us randomly or deadly spores are being sent through the mail. As we have learned so shockingly, we can neither take this civic peace for granted nor shake off our responsibility to respect and promote the norms and rules that sustain civic peace. We know what happens to people who live in pervasive fear. The condition of fearfulness leads to severe isolation as the desire to protect oneself and one's family becomes overwhelming. It encourages harsh measures because, as the political theorist Thomas Hobbes wrote in his 1651 work Leviathan, if we live in constant fear of violent death we are likely to seek guarantees to prevent such. Chapter 13 of Hobbes's great work is justly renowned for its vivid depiction of the horrors of a "state of nature," Hobbes's description of a world in which there is no ordered civic peace of any kind. In that horrible circumstance, all persons have the strength to kill each other, "either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others." The overriding emotion in this nightmarish world is overwhelming, paralyzing fear, for every man has become an enemy to every other and men live without other security, that what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 2 This is Hobbes's famous, or infamous, war of all against all.

Militarism inevitable- aff can’t overcome

Astore 08

(William J., retired lieutenant colonel (USAF). He has taught cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy, officers at the Naval Postgraduate School, and currently teaches at the Pennsylvania College of Technology, “The Tenacity of American Militarism ¶ What Progressives and Other Critics Don't Get about the U.S. Military,” 2008, <http://www.alternet.org/story/75940/militarism_is_deeply_entrenched_in_the_american_psyche>) /wyo-mm

The point is this: It's not enough simply to rail against the military or militarism, however enlightened it makes you feel. There are powerful reasons why Americans trust our military and continue to join its ranks. Unless these are grasped, efforts to redirect our nation along less militaristic lines will founder on the shores of incomprehension. ¶ After all, isn't the full media story not only that our all-volunteer military is having trouble meeting its recruiting goals -- hardly surprising, given two major, exceedingly hard wars in which victory, however defined, remains frustratingly out of sight -- but also that the military is nonetheless close to meeting those goals? Admittedly, recruiting standards have been relaxed, signing bonuses increased, and waivers and promotions liberally granted. Even so, our military is not just signing up the rural poor, urban dead-enders, or knuckle-dragging hayseeds (though some critics seem to think otherwise, judging by the unfortunate title of a recent piece in Slate, "Dumb and Dumber"). The comment by John Kerry in 2006, to the effect that students who can't make it in college end up "stuck in Iraq," struck many Americans as grossly unfair precisely because military service still remains a proud first-choice for many young Americans. ¶ If the operating equation is military = bad, are we not effectively excusing ourselves or our children from any obligation to serve -- even any obligation simply to engage with the military? Indeed, are we even patting ourselves on the back for the wisdom of our non-choice and our non-participation? Rarely has a failure to sacrifice or even to engage come at a more self-ennobling price -- or a more self-destructive one for progressive agendas.

The belief that the state is always-already patriarchal is both a fiction and prevents the women’s movement from securing lasting changes in gender relations.

Deborah L. Rhode, Professor, Stanford Law School; Director, Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Stanford University, April 1994, Harvard Law Review, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p. 1184-1186

In many left feminist accounts, the state is a patriarchal institution in the sense that it reflects and institutionalizes male dominance. Men control positions of official power and men's interests determine how that power is exercised. According to Catharine MacKinnon, the state's invocation of neutrality and objectivity ensures that, "[t]hose who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion." n15 In this view, "the state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization." n16 So, for example, to the extent that abortion functions "to facilitate male sexual access to women, access to abortion will be controlled by 'a man or The Man.'" n17 Other theorists similarly present women as a class and elaborate the ways in which even state policies ostensibly designed to assist women have institutionalized their subordination. n18 So, for example, welfare programs stigmatize female recipients without providing the support that would enable them to alter their disadvantaged status. n19 In patriarchal accounts, the choice for many women is between dependence  [\*1185]  on an intrusive and insensitive bureaucracy, or dependence on a controlling or abusive man. n20 Either situation involves sleeping with the enemy. As Virginia Woolf noted, these public and private spheres of subordination are similarly structured and "inseparably connected; . . . the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other." n21 This account is also problematic on many levels. To treat women as a class obscures other characteristics, such as race and economic status, that can be equally powerful in ordering social relations. Women are not "uniformly oppressed." n22 Nor are they exclusively victims. Patriarchy cannot account adequately for the mutual dependencies and complex power dynamics that characterize male-female relations. Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests. As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns. And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created]  [\*1186]  leverage for the representation of women's interests." n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.

#### Working from within but against the state is key to success of feminist struggles- the state is multifaceted and we reform aspects of the state to fight against dominant discourses and masculinist policies

Rai 02

[Shirin M. Rai - professor in the department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick – 2002 Gender and the Political Economy of Development p. 204-206]

As we saw in chapter 5, for feminists, the nation-state has always j presented serious intellectual and strategic challenges. For some, any engagement with the state has been questionable on the grounds that 'the state ... produces state subjects inter alia, bureaucratized, dependent, disciplined and gendered...' (Brown, 1992: 9; also see Allen, 1990). There has been an ongoing debate within the feminist movement about the expropriatory power of institutions (see Ehrenreich and Piven, 1983; Brown, 1992; Pringle and Watson, 1992;' Rai, 1995). The various positions have covered the entire spectrum from rejecting 'dealing' with state institutions entirely, to suggest­ing an 'in and against' the state approach, to examining the benefits of working with/through state institutions. I have argued elsewhere that for women, as for other marginalized groups, the state and civil society are both complex terrains - fractured, oppressive, threatening and also providing spaces for struggles and negotiations. These struggles and negotiations are grounded in the positionings of various groups of women articulating their short- and long-term interests in the context of the multiplicity of power relations that form the state in any country. In its turn, the state and its institutions are also 'shaped' by the forms and outcomes of these struggles. While deny­ing any intentionality to the state, or a necessary coherence to the alliances formed and engaged in struggles against states, there are, however, particular characteristics of Third World states that need to be examined to form a judgement about the various possible spaces for mobilization by women in their interests. My study of women's struggles against and engagement with the state in India, for example, showed that while state institutions and dominant political parties have taken up the cause of women's representation as part of the generalized discourse of modernity to which they subscribe, this discourse is not unified. As such, it allows sections of the state to take initiatives to respond to the struggles of women for equality as well as empowerment. This results in contradiction between different fractions of the state, which allows further possibilities for negotiation and struggle by and in the interests of women. Further, the capacity of the state to implement its policies and enforce its laws is undermined by the weakness of the economy and of the political infrastructure, and by widespread corruption which leads to the delegitimization of government and the political system. This lack of capacity further enhances intra-state conflict (Rai, 1995). The state thus cannot be regarded as and engaged with As a unified entity. It remains a fractured terra in that women's groups and struggles need to respond to in complex ways. Thus, in my earlier work (1995, 1996b, 1999) 1 have suggested that women's movements need to work 'in and against' the state. An engagement with the state should not be considered simply as one option to be weighed against others; it is a necessity. I have argued that a recognition of the particular splintered complexity of the state and of the multiplicity of the strategies of struggle is needed by women to confront and/or use state fractions in their own interests. An understanding of a relative autonomy of state fractions from the existing social relations and infrastructural capacity, on the one hand, and of state embeddedness in social relations and the consequences of such embeddedness for women, on the other, is necessary for engaging with institutions of power in a critical and thoughtful way. Such an approach, derived from analysis of particular struggles, also points to the potential for a strategy that holds in tension the engagement with, and the mobilization against, structures of power, be they at the local, national or global level. In the context of 'the neoliberal frame' under globalization (Runyan, 1999), I would suggest that strategizing for change in this way has become far more critical. As the global reach of social and political movements increases through technological and information networks, and as the pressures of international trade and markets begin to impinge significantly on national economies, leading to a fragmentation and repositioning of nation-states, the relationship between IocaI struggles, social movements and the national state is being constantly reshaped (Cohen and Rai, 2000a; Stienstra, 2000). I would suggest further that for a critical engagement with structures of power, the terms of engagement need to be clearly thought out. As we saw in chapter 5, not all, or even most, of these terms be determined by the women's movements, but a sensitivity to the issues at stake is still important if we are realistically to assess the extent to which agendas of institutions and structures of power be shifted. Finally, I would argue that an engagement with power structures need not rule out - indeed, needs to build upon a strong movement of opposition to these structures. Without such double move, early feminist concerns about co-optation within dominant discourses and by structural regimes of power become real. Such an analysis of 'in and against' organized power structures needs to reflect upon 'the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the other...' (Spivak, 1988) In doing so, we can begin to address the tension between feasible and transformative politics.

#### Gender oppression does not cause war, it’s the other way around

Goldstein 01

[Joshua, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412]

 First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Universalizing women’s oppression through the depictions of women as victims prevents real solutions to male violence, which is context and culturally specific

Mohanty, 1986

[Chandra Talpade, Under Western Eyes, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/raim0007/RaeSpot/under%20wstrn%20eyes.pdf)

Fran Hosken," in writing about the relationship between human rights and female genital mutilation in Africa and the Middle East, bases her whole discussion/condemnation of genital mutilation on one privileged premise: the goal of genital mutilation is "to mutilate the sexual pleasure and satisfaction of woman" ("FGM," p. 11). This, in turn, leads her to claim that women's sexuality is controlled, as is their reproductive potential. According to Hosken, "male sexual politics" in Africa and around the world "share the same political goal: to assure female dependence and subservience by any and all means" ("FGM," p. 14). Physical violence against women (rape, sexual assault, excision, infibulation, etc.) is thus carried out "with an astonishing consensus among men in the world" ("FGM," p. 14). Here, women are defined consistently as the victims of male control—the "sexually oppressed." Although it is true that the potential of male violence against women circumscribes and elucidates their social position to a certain extent, defining women as archetypal victims freezes them into "objects-who-defend ­themselves," men into "subjects-who-perpetrate-violence," and (every) society into powerless (read: women) and powerful (read: men) groups of people. Male violence must be theorized and interpreted within specific societies, both in order to understand it better, as well as in order to effectively organize to change it." Sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete, historical and political practice and analysis.

# 2NC

#### Suffering and loss are inevitable parts of a chaotic world—our alternative enables us to find meaning and lead a joyful life despite crises.

**Groff 04** – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bucknell University – 2004 (Peter S, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, “Al-Kindi and Nietzsche on the Stoic Art of Banishing Sorrow,” Issue 28, Autumn 2004, pg. 139-173)

Nietzsche goes on to reflect on the lies and "deadly silence" with which the advocates of extirpation have tried to hide the "over-rich happiness" [überreiche Glück] of passionate people, and concludes: "Is our life really painful and burdensome enough to make it advantageous to exchange it for a Stoic way of life and petrification? We are not so badly off that we have to be as badly off as Stoics" (GS 326). But Nietzsche is merely scratching the surface here, for the more fundamental question is whether suffering is something that necessarily ought to be ameliorated. In an earlier aphorism from the same book, Nietzsche ostensibly accepts the Stoics' doctrine of the inextricable bond between pleasure and pain, while at the same time drawing a radically different conclusion: [W]hat if pleasure [Lust] and displeasure [Unlust] were so tied together that whoever wanted to have as much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the other—that whoever wanted to learn to "jubilate up to the heavens" would also have to be prepared for "depression unto death"? And that is how things may well be. At least the Stoics believed that this was how things were, and they were consistent when they also desired as little pleasure as possible, in order to get as little displeasure as possible out of life.... To this day you have a choice: either as little displeasure as possible, painlessness in brief ... or as much displeasure as possible as the price for the growth of an abundance of subtle pleasures [Lüsten] and joys [Freuden] that have rarely been relished yet. If you decide for the former and desire to diminish and lower the level of human pain [Schmerzhaftigkeit], you also have to diminish and lower the level of their capacity for joy. Nietzsche concludes this aphorism with a rumination on the power of science to promote either goal: it can make us "colder, more like a statue, more Stoic," but it also has the "immense capacity for making new galaxies of joy flare up" (GS 12). To some extent, the Stoics function in this passage as a foil for Nietzsche's imperative to experiment—or "live dangerously," as he famously puts it (GS 283)—and one is reminded of Nietzsche's reflections on the health of the soul, where he poses the troubling question of the potential value of illness (GS 120). However, in spite of this we can already begin to see a more fundamental agreement between Nietzsche and the Stoics that underlies their internecine dispute and indeed makes it possible in the first place. Nietzsche's claim that "much displeasure" is a prerequisite for our capacity to experience great joy recalls his claim that suffering is a condition for the possibility of human greatness. Yet this assertion is not necessarily at odds with Stoic ethics, for whenever Nietzsche extols the virtues of suffering (insofar as it makes us profound and contributes to the growth and intensification of power), his primary target is the morality of pity. And Nietzsche and the Stoics are actually in accordance in their low estimation of the value of pity [Mitleid] (D 139).75 Thus in order to understand Nietzsche's Stoicism, it is crucial to distinguish between eliminating suffering and banishing sorrow. Nietzsche explicitly rejects the former program, inasmuch as it makes us small, mediocre, and ignoble. However, while Nietzsche valorizes suffering, he by no means advocates sorrow. The essential Nietzschean orientation toward the world is not one of recoiling, sadness, or regret, but rather one of affirmation, gaiety, cheerfulness, and joy. In order to make sense of this apparent tension in his thought, we might provisionally think of suffering as a brute, inescapable fact of embodied existence, and sorrow as one optional interpretation of that experience. In other words, sorrow and joy both have to do with one's interpretation and evaluation of the meaning and value of suffering. The Stoic can no more eliminate suffering than he can eliminate loss. As became clear in al-Kindī's epistle, loss is necessary and inevitable, but sorrow is not. In a similar way, the Nietzschean "ideal" is to become strong and healthy enough joyfully to affirm the entirety of existence—even its "accursed and loathsome aspects," including suffering (KSA 13.16[32], cf. EH P3). To attain this standpoint, I suggest, is to banish sorrow.

The morality of the affirmative depends on an external enemy to call itself good in opposition to itself – this means the affirmatives harms will always exist as they require them for their moral project turning the case

Newman 0 (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of ressentiment -- the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful. Nietzsche sees ressentiment as an entirely negative sentiment -- the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying 'no' to what is different, what is 'outside' or 'other'. Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self.[[7]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn7) While the master says 'I am good' and adds as an afterthought, 'therefore he is bad'; the slave says the opposite -- 'He (the master) is bad, therefore I am good'. Thus the invention of values comes from a comparison or opposition to that which is outside, other, different. Nietzsche says: "... in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all, -- its action is basically a reaction."[[8]](http://muse.jhu.edu.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn8) This reactive stance, this inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of ressentiment. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as 'good'. Thus the slave takes 'imaginary revenge' upon the master, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose. The man of ressentiment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy. It is this ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, that has poisoned the modern consciousness, and finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.

**Universal moralities are dangerous for all parties**

**Wrisley No Date** (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, “What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be,” Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of Attitudes and Ideals, <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi>=) Zanezor

None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as the cause of the general welfare) wants to know or even sense that “the general welfare” is no ideal, no goal, no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic—that what is fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others; that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher man; in short, that there is an order of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality. There is a great deal going on in this passage.  Nietzsche is arguing against the idea that English utilitarianism should be viewed as right for humanity as a whole.  Nietzsche wants to make clear that a desire for a universal morality is not only a bad idea—because of the order of rank—but also a dangerous one.  The morality of the ascetic priest is dangerous to the higher type of man, for it is the morality of the meek and those that do not suffer well.  And a morality that would be appropriate for the higher type would be dangerous for the lower type.  Those in the lower ranks could not bear the burden of responsibility and suffering that comes with the higher type.  This is, in part, why Nietzsche says that a further difference among people, one that further differentiates the order of rank, is their table of goods (what they take to be good) and what they take to be having something good.  The higher type, for example, takes strength, self-reverence, and the ability to bear heavy responsibility as goods; the lower type takes timidity, humbleness, and altruistic ideals as goods (or poverty, humility, and chastity).

The ability to overcome suffering can give us brutal satisfaction – alternative action results in a distrust and hate of life.

Cioran 34 (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Among the many forms of the grotesque, I find the one whose roots are steeped in despair more unusual and complex. The other forms have less intensity. It is important to note that the grotesque is inconceivable without intensity of feeling. And what intensity is deeper and more organic than despair? The grotesque appears only in very negative states, when great anxiety arises from a lack of life; the grotesque is exaltation in negativity. there is a mad launch toward negativity in that bestial, agonizing grimace when the shape and lines of the face are contorted into strangely expressive forms, when the look in one's eyes changes with distant light and shadow, and one's thoughts follow the curve of similar distortions. Truly intense and irrevocable despair cannot be objectified except in grotesque expressions, because the grotesque is the absolute negation of serenity, that state of purity, transparence, and lucidity so different from the chaos and nothingness of despair. Have you ever had the brutal and amazing satisfaction of looking at yourself in the mirror after countless sleepless nights? Have you suffered the torment of insomnia, when you count the minutes for nights on end, when you feel alone in this world, when your drama seems to be the most important in history and history ceases to have meaning, ceases to exist? When the most terrifying flames grow in you and your existence appears unique and isolated in a world made only for the consummation of your agony? You must have felt those moments, as countless and infinite as suffering, in order to have a clear picture of the grotesque when you look at yourself in the mirror. It is a picture of total strain, a tense grimace to which is added the demonically seductive pallor of a man who has struggled along horrible, dark precipices. Isn’t this grotesque expression of despair similar to a precipice? It has something of the abysmal maelstrom of great depths, the seduction of the all-encompassing infinite to which we bow as we bow to fatality. How good it would be if one could die by throwing oneself into an infinite void! The complexity of the grotesque born out of despair resides in its capacity to indicate an inner infinity and to produce a paroxysm of the highest tension. How could this intense agony manifest itself in pleasant linear curves and formal purity? The grotesque essentially negates the classic, as well as any idea of style, harmony, and perfection. It is evident to anyone who understands the multiple forms of inner drama that the grotesque hides secret tragedies, indirectly expressed. Whoever has seen his face grotesquely disfigured can never forget it, because he will always be afraid of himself. Despair is followed by painful anxiety. What else does the grotesque do if it does not actualize fear and anxiety?

# 1NR

#### Instrumental thought and language don’t cause militarism and resisting them can’t break it down

Ken Hirschkop 7, Professor of English and Rhetoric at the University of Waterloo, July 25, 2007, “On Being Difficult,” Electronic Book Review, online: http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/criticalecologies/transitive

First, by transparency Chow seems to mean a kind of spontaneous empiricism we adopt whenever we use language "referentially". But it is perfectly possible to use language transitively without assuming that our concepts are mere abstractions from sense experience. Physicists routinely refer to a range of particles that they know are theoretical constructs or metaphors. In everyday language we regularly refer to things ("his increasing uneasiness", "the bottom line") without for a moment assuming they are things. Chow confuses a doctrine about the nature of our concepts or signifieds with the act of referring, which can coexist with a variety of epistemologies.¶ Second, and perhaps more serious, is the confusion of "instrumentalism", a mode of action, with referring. It's hard to conceive of instrumental relationships without acts of reference, but you can't conceive of non-instrumental relationships without them, either ("I love you", after all, requires reference). In and of itself, referring in language doesn't incline us towards any particular mode of social existence, or any particular politics: it's just something we do in language, and do naturally.¶ Put another way, to imagine that language is only acknowledged in philosophy and poetry - as if asking it to behave transitively were degrading, unseemly and servile - is to assign it a singular telos and function, to identify it far too closely with forms of discourse that belong to particular societies and particular circumstances. It overloads language, asking it to do too much (resist the tide of US militarism) by insisting that when it is true to itself it does very little (produce self-referring works). This linguistic romanticism has a long and broad history, and you can find traces of it in everyone from Herder to Habermas.¶ For sure, human cooperation is inconceivable without the activities gathered under the title of "language". But if cooperation is inconceivable without language, so is much of what we find brutal in our shared social life. You cannot explain the ruthless pursuit of extraordinary wealth, the murder of millions of European Jews or the persistence of ethnic violence and torture by thinking of it as a betrayal of language. Humans are the only creatures who have language but they are also the only creatures who make a habit of such brutality, and it's more than disingenuous to pretend these two facts aren't connected.¶ Sisyphus was condemned to his task by Zeus. Cultural critics are free to stop pushing language up the hill whenever they want. Rey Chow can't emancipate the injured and exploited by giving up her vision of self-referentiality; but she'll free her readers from an illusion, and open up more promising political paths when she does.

#### Attempting to solve the root cause of terror is impossible, encourages more terrorism and casualties, only way to defeat is to incapacitate terrorism completely

Dershowitz 02

(Alan M., Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Pgs. 24-26//wyo-mm)

The reason terrorism works—and will persist unless there are significant changes in the response to it—is precisely because its perpetrators believe that by murdering innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world to their perceived grievances and their demand that the world “understand them” and “eliminate their root causes.” To submit to this demand is to send the following counterproductive message to those with perceived grievances: if you resort to terrorism, we will try harder to understand your grievances and respond to them than we would have if you employed less violent methods. This is precisely the criterion for success established by the terrorist themselves. Listen to the words of Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s chief observer at the United Nations: “The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and the world opinion much more—and more effectively—than twenty years of pleading at the United Nations.” If this is true—and the Palestinians surely believe it is—then it should come as no surprise that hijackings and other forms of terrorism increased dramatically after the Palestinians were rewarded for their initial terrorism by increased world attention to its “root causes”—attention that quickly resulted in their leader being welcomed by the U.N. General Assembly, their organization being granted observer status at the United Nations, and their “government” being recognized by dozens of nations.9 We must take precisely the opposite approach to terrorism. We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. Our message must be this: even if you have legitimate grievances, if you resort to terrorism as a means toward eliminating them we will simply not listen to you, we will not try to understand you, and we will certainly never change any of our policies toward you. Instead, we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to engage in terror. Any other approach will encourage the use of terrorism as a means toward achieving ends—whether those ends are legitimate, illegitimate, or anything in between. Nor is there any single substantive root cause of all, or even most, terrorism. If there were—if poverty, for example, were the root cause of all terrorism—then by fixing that problem we could address the root cause of specific terrorist groups without encouraging others. But the reality is that the “root causes” of terrorism are as varied as human nature. Every single “root cause” associated with terrorism has existed for centuries, and the vast majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes—and with far greater poverty and disadvantage—have never resorted to terrorism. The search for “root causes” smacks more of after-the-fact political justification than inductive scientific inquiry. The variables that distinguish aggrieved groups willing to target innocent civilians from equally situated groups unwilling to murder children have far less to do with the legitimacy of their causes or the suffering of their people than with religious, cultural, political, and ethical differences.10 They also relate to universalism versus parochialism and especially to the value placed on human life. To focus on such favors as poverty, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, and others all too common around our imperfect world is to fail to explain why so many groups with far greater grievances and disabilities have never resorted to terrorism.11 Instead, the focus must be on the reality that using an act of terrorism as the occasion for addressing the root causes of that act only encourages other groups to resort to terrorism in order to have their root causes advanced on the international agenda. Put another way, the “root cause” of terrorism that must be eliminated is its success.

#### Focus on otherization rhetoric in the war on terror fails to create effective models for combatting violence, understanding war, and history proves there’s no causality between language and war

Rodwell, 05

(Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching the U.S. Foreign Policy, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” 2005, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>) /wyo-mm

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

#### [2.] Securitization rhetoric is key-expands policies to solve the threat

Vultee 2010

[Fred Vultee, PhD in Journalism, Associate Professor at Wayne State, 2010, Securitization: A new approach to framing and media portrayals of the "war on terror", <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/3/8/8/pages203884/p203884-2.php>, uwyo//amp]

The actor who controls the frame draws on other assets as well. The narrative

version of a conflict or dispute that becomes internationalized through media coverage is

likely to be the one that gains the widest acceptance, as in the narratives of ‘‘ancient

hatreds’’ and ‘‘warring factions’’ that emerged during the Balkan wars (Campbell, 1998;

Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). In US politics, Democratic candidate John Kerry’s

‘‘reluctance . . . to call the war on terror an actual war’’ (Bishop, 2004) was more than

semantic quibbling for the pro-Bush New York Post. It defined the essential characteristic

that separated an unworthy candidate from one to whom the nation’s survival could be

trusted. Because securitization relies on the sense that ordinary measures are insufficient

for resolving a crisis, formalizing terrorism as a war is evidence of the frame’s value: ‘‘The

war against terror is about opening up a space outside the established range of police

operations and judicial procedures’’ (Oberleitner, 2004, p. 264).

#### [3.] Securtization is key to legitimize prosecuting the war on terror

Vultee 2010

[Fred Vultee, PhD in Journalism, Associate Professor at Wayne State, 2010, Securitization: A new approach to framing and media portrayals of the "war on terror", <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/3/8/8/pages203884/p203884-2.php>, uwyo//amp]

Unlike the other two papers, the use of the paper’s voice remains steady or increases in the New York Post; it is three-fourths (76.9%) of the mentions in the campaign year 2004, compared with 50% in the Washington Post. There is no significant change in the war’s status; only 3 times out of 250 (1.2%) is it deemed even an ambiguous idea. When a location for the war can be determined, it is first predominantly, then overwhelmingly, a global conflict that could threaten the United States. When the securitization frame has changed in these pages, it has become more favorable toward the administration – the set of political actors with the most to gain if the U.S. effort to thwart and mitigate transnational terrorism is securitized as a “war.” Taken together, these findings support Hypothesis 2: Diverging from a rough consensus at the start of the study period, the prestige press grows less accepting of the securitization frame and the pro-administration press more accepting. Elements of that frame that remain consistent are most steadily portrayed in media that emphasize their ability to be all things to all readers or viewers. Discussion This paper has suggested that securitization is an appropriate theory for explaining a particular multidimensional type of media framing. The variation in these three measures the degree to which a news organization transmits the “reality” of a concept supported by a set of political actors, the organization’s willingness to use the elites’ terms in its own voice, and the precision or vagueness with which the threat is defined – provides a way of measuring whether the concept has been “securitized,” or understood as an existential threat requiring a suspension of normal routines and the arrogation of special powers to the actors who have been able to “call security.” The war on terrorism is a familiar and important example of an issue open for securitization, but the same mechanism can be used to study similar issues. In considering immigration, the debate over whether newspapers should use terms like “illegal alien” provides a comparable category. The language of news sources will find its way into the language of news no matter what, but the degree to which a contested term appears in the news organization’s own voice is a measure of the degree to which the security frame is passed along intact from political actors to audiences.

#### political correctness in the context of terrorism will result in political paralysis and greater casualties---their K turns a blind eye to the horrific acts of terrorists and their unwavering vigilance to taking innocent lives

Peters 4 (Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, 4 http://www.freeman.org/m\_online/apr04/peters.htm)

Have we lost the will to win wars? Not just in Iraq, but anywhere? Do we really believe that being nice is more important than victory? It's hard enough to bear the timidity of our civilian leaders—anxious to start wars but without the guts to finish them—but now **military leaders have fallen prey to political correctness**. Unwilling to accept that war is, by its nature, a savage act and that defeat is immoral, influential officers are arguing for a kinder, gentler approach to our enemies. **They're going to lead us into failure, sacrificing our soldiers and Marines for nothing: Political correctness kills.** Obsessed with low-level "tactical" morality—war's inevitable mistakes—the officers in question have lost sight of the strategic morality of winning. Our Army and Marine Corps are about to suffer the imposition of a new counterinsurgency doctrine designed for fairy-tale conflicts and utterly inappropriate for the religion-fueled, ethnicity-driven hyper-violence of our time. We're back to struggling to win hearts and minds that can't be won. The good news is that the Army and Marine Corps worked together on the new counterinsurgency doctrine laid out in Field Manual 3-24 (the Army version). The bad news is that the doctrine writers and their superiors came up with fatally wrong prescriptions for combating today's insurgencies. Astonishingly, the doctrine ignores faith-inspired terrorism and skirts ethnic issues in favor of analyzing yesteryear's political insurgencies. It would be a terrific manual if we returned to Vietnam circa 1963, but its recommendations are profoundly misguided when it comes to fighting terrorists intoxicated with religious visions and the smell of blood. Why did the officers in question avoid the decisive question of religion? Because the answers would have been ugly. Wars of faith and tribe are immeasurably crueler and tougher to resolve than ideological revolts. A Maoist in Malaya could be converted. But Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can—or would wish to—change his blood identity. So the doctrine writers ignored today's reality. Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have stated explicitly and repeatedly that they're waging a global jihad to re-establish the caliphate. Yet the new manual ignores religious belief as a motivation. **The politically correct atmosphere in Washington deems any discussion** of religion as a strategic factor **indelicate: Let our troops die, just don't hurt anyone's feelings**. So the doctrine writers faked it, treating all insurgencies as political. As a result, they prescribed an excellent head-cold treatment—for a cancer patient. The text is a mush of pop-zen mantras such as "Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction," "The best weapons do not shoot," or "The more force used, the less effective it is." That's just nutty. **Should we have done nothing in the wake of 9/11? Would everything have been OK if we'd just been nicer? What non-lethal "best weapons" might have snagged Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora, where the problem was too little military force, not too much violence?** Should we have sent fewer troops to Iraq, where inadequate numbers crippled everything we attempted? Will polite chats with tribal chiefs stop the sectarian violence drenching Iraq in blood? On the surface, the doctrine appears sober and serious. But it's morally frivolous and intellectually inert, a pathetic rehashing of yesteryear's discredited "wisdom" on counterinsurgencies and, worst of all, driven by a stalker-quality infatuation with T.E. Lawrence, "Lawrence of Arabia," who not only was a huckster of the first order, but whose "revolt in the desert" was a near-meaningless sideshow of a sideshow. Lawrence is quoted repeatedly, with reverence. We might as well cite the British generals of the Great War who sent men over the top in waves to face German machine guns. You can trust two kinds of officers: Those who read a great deal and those who don't read at all. But beware the officer who reads just a little and falls in love with one book. A little education really is a dangerous thing. The new manual is thick - length is supposed to substitute for insight. It should be 75 percent shorter and 100 percent more honest. If issued to our troops in its present form, it will lead to expensive failures. Various generals have already tried its prescriptions in Iraq—with discouraging results, to put it mildly. We've reached a fateful point when senior officers seek to evade war's brute reality. Our leaders, in and out of uniform, must regain their moral courage. We can't fight wars of any kind if the entire chain of command runs for cover every time an ambitious journalist cries, "War crime!" And sorry: **Soccer balls are no substitute for bullets when you face fanatics willing to kill every child on the playing** field. In war, you don't get points for good manners. It's about winning. Victory forgives. The new counterinsurgency doctrine recommends forbearance, patience, understanding, non-violent solutions and even outright passivity. Unfortunately, **our enemies won't sign up for a replay of the Summer of Love in San Francisco. We can't treat hardcore terrorists like Halloween pranksters on mid-term break from prep school** Where is the spirit of FDR and George C. Marshall, who recognized that the one unbearable possibility was for the free world to lose? We discount the value of ferocity —as a practical tool and as a deterrent. But war's immutable law —proven yet again in Iraq—is that those unwilling to pay the butcher's bill up front will pay it with compound interest in the end. The new counterinsurgency doctrine is dishonest and cowardly. We don't face half-hearted Marxists tired of living in the jungle, but religious zealots who behead prisoners to please their god and who torture captives by probing their skulls with electric drills. We're confronted by hatreds born of blood and belief and madmen whose appetite for blood is insatiable. And we're afraid to fight.

#### Terror rhetoric necessary- term key to create new forms of knowledge

Gunning 07

(Jeroen, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence Department of International Politics, “Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Studies on Terrorism,” 2007, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/9/6/pages178966/p178966-1.php>) /wyo-mm

Usage of the term ‘terrorism’ also poses serious security problems for those conducting fieldwork among ‘terrorists’ and the communities they belong to. 16 A colleague whose publisher insisted on including ‘terrorism’ in her book title found that her relationship with her research subjects had come under serious strain as a result. If one of the aims of CTS is to engage both those considered ‘terrorist’ and their communities, converging under the term ‘terrorism’ may have considerable drawbacks. Yet, if we do not converge under a central concept such as ‘terrorism’, however problematic, much of this critical research will remain fragmented, 17 preventing cross- fertilisation between critical cognate perspectives but also leaving traditional approaches and policy-makers relatively unchallenged. 18 There are two further reasons for retaining ‘terrorism’. One of the key tasks of CTS is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. The term ‘terrorism’ is furthermore currently so dominant that CTS cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to less critical scholars. Funds earmarked for studying ‘terrorism’ should similarly not be left simply to others.