## 1

#### Interpretation and violation: Targeted killings are strikes carried about against pre-meditated, individually designated targets---signature strikes are distinct

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and ‘Signature’ Attacks on Taliban Fighters,” August 29 2011, http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/

From the US standpoint, it is partly that it does not depend as much as it did on Pakistan’s intelligence. But it is also partly, as a couple of well-publicized incidents a few months ago made clear, that sharing targeting decisions with Pakistan’s military and ISI runs a very considerable possibility of having the targets tipped off (as even The Onion has observed). The article notes in this regard, the U.S. worries that “if they tell the Pakistanis that a drone strike is coming someone within Pakistani intelligence could tip off the intended target.” However, the Journal’s reporting goes from there to emphasize an aspect of targeted killing and drone warfare that is not sufficiently appreciated in public discussions trying to assess such issues as civilian collateral damage, strategic value and uses, and the uses of drones in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as distinct activities. The article explains:¶ The CIA carries out two different types of drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan—those against so-called high-value targets, including Mr. Rahman, and “signature” strikes targeting Taliban foot-soldiers who criss-cross the border with Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces there.¶ High-value targets are added to a classified list that the CIA maintains and updates. The agency often doesn’t know the names of the signature targets, but it tracks their movements and activities for hours or days before striking them, U.S. officials say.¶ Another way to put this is that, loosely speaking, the high value targets are part of a counterterrorism campaign – a worldwide one, reaching these days to Yemen and other places. It is targeted killing in its strict sense using drones – aimed at a distinct individual who has been identified by intelligence. The “signature” strikes, by contrast, are not strictly speaking “targeted killing,” because they are aimed at larger numbers of fighters who are targeted on the basis of being combatants, but not on the basis of individuated intelligence. They are fighting formations, being targeted on a mass basis as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the basic CI doctrine of closing down cross-border safe havens and border interdiction of fighters. Both of these functions can be, and are, carried out by drones – though each strategic function could be carried out by other means, such as SEAL 6 or CIA human teams, in the case of targeted killing, or manned aircraft in the case of attacks on Taliban formations. The fundamental point is that they serve distinct strategic purposes. Targeted killing is not synonymous with drone warfare, just as counterterrorism is analytically distinct from counterinsurgency. (I discuss this in the opening sections of this draft chapter on SSRN.)¶ This analytic point affects how one sees the levels of drone attacks going up or down over the years. Neither the total numbers of fighters killed nor the total number of drone strikes – going up or down over months – tells the whole story. Total numbers do not distinguish between the high value targets, being targeted as part of the top down dismantling of Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization, on the one hand, and ordinary Taliban being killed in much larger numbers as part of counterinsurgency activities essentially part of the ground war in Afghanistan, on the other. Yet the distinction is crucial insofar as the two activities are, at the level of truly grand strategy, in support of each other – the war in Afghanistan and the global counterterrorism war both in support of the AUMF and US national security broadly – but at the level of ordinary strategic concerns, quite distinct in their requirements and conduct. If targeted killing against AQ leadership goes well in Pakistan, those might diminish at some point in the future; what happens in the war against the Afghan Taliban is distinct and has its own rhythm, and in that effort, drones are simply another form of air weapon, an alternative to manned aircraft in an overt, conventional war. Rising or falling numbers of drone strikes in the aggregate will not tell one very much without knowing what mission is at issue.

#### Vote neg --- signature strikes and targeted killings are distinct operations with entirely separate lit bases and advantages---they kill precision and limits

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare,” Sept 23 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1812124

Although targeted killing and drone warfare are often closely connected, they are not the same and are not always associated with each other. We need to disaggregate the practices of targeted killing from the technologies of drone warfare.¶ Targeted killing consists of using deadly force, characterized by the identification of and then strike against an individual marked to be killed. It is distinguished, among other things, by making an individualized determination of a person to be killed, rather than simply identifying, for example, a mass of enemy combatants to attack as a whole. Since it is a practice that involves the determination of an identified person, rather than a mass of armed and obvious combatants, it is a use of force that is by its function integrated with intelligence work, whether the intelligence actors involved are uniformed military or a civilian agency such as the CIA.¶ Targeted killing might (and does) take place in the course of conventional warfare, through special operations or other mechanisms that narrowly focus operations through intelligence. But it might also take place outside of a conventional conflict, or perhaps far from the conventional battlefields of that conflict, sufficiently so operationally to best be understood as its own operational category of the use of force – “intelligence-driven,” often covert, and sometimes non-military intelligence agency use of force, typically aimed at “high value” targets in global counterterrorism operations. It might be covert or it might not – but it will be driven by intelligence, because of necessity it must identify and justify the choice of target (on operational, because resources are limited; or legal grounds; or, in practice, both).¶ Targeted killing might use a variety of tactical methods by which to carry out the attack. The method might be by drones firing missiles – the focus of discussion here. But targeted killing – assassination, generically – is a very old method for using force and drones are new. Targeted killing in current military and CIA doctrine might, and often does, take place with covert civilian intelligence agents or military special operations forces – a human team carrying out the attack, rather than a drone aircraft operated from a distance. The Bin Laden raid exemplifies the human team-conducted targeted killing, of course, and in today’s tactical environment, the US often uses combined operations that have available both human teams and drones, to be deployed according to circumstances.¶ Targeted killing is thus a tactic that might be carried out either by drones or human teams. If there are two ways to do targeted killing, there are also two functions for the use of drones – targeted killing as part of an “intelligence-driven” discrete use of force, on the one hand, and a role (really, roles) in conventional warfare. Drones have a role in an ever-increasing range of military operations that have no connection to “targeted killing.” For many reasons ranging from cost-effectiveness to mission-effectiveness, drones are becoming more ramified in their uses in military operations, and will certainly become more so. This is true starting with their fundamental use in surveillance, but is also true when used as weapons platforms.¶ From the standpoint of conventional military operations and ordinary battlefields, drones are seen by the military as simply an alternative air weapons platform. One might use an over-the-horizon manned aircraft – or, depending on circumstances, one might instead use a drone as the weapons platform. It might be a missile launched from a drone by an operator, whether sitting in a vehicle near the fighting or farther away; it might be a weapon fired from a helicopter twenty miles away, but invisible to the fighters; it might be a missile fired from a US Navy vessel hundreds of miles away by personnel sitting at a console deep inside the ship. Future air-to-air fighter aircraft systems are very likely to be remotely piloted, in order to take advantage of superior maneuverability and greater stresses endurable without a human pilot. Remotely-piloted aircraft are the future of much military and, for that matter, civil aviation; this is a technological revolution that is taking place for reasons having less to do with military aviation than general changes in aviation technology.¶ Missiles fired from a remotely-piloted standoff platform present the same legal issues as any other weapons system – the law of war categories of necessity and proportionality in targeting. To military professionals, therefore, the emphasis placed on “remoteness” from violence of drone weapons operators, and presumed psychological differences in operators versus pilots, is misplaced and indeed mystifying. Navy personnel firing missiles from ships are typically just as remote from the fighting, and yet one does not hear complaints about their indifference to violence and their “Playstation,” push-button approach to war. Air Force pilots more often than not fire from remote aircraft; pilots involved in the bombing campaign over Serbia in the Kosovo war sometimes flew in bombers taking off from the United States; bomber crews dropped their loads from high altitudes, guided by computer, with little connection to the “battlefield” and little conception of what they – what their targeting computers - were aiming at. Some of the crews in interviews described spending the flights of many hours at a time, flying from the Midwest and back, as a good chance to study for graduate school classes they were taking – not Playstation, but study hall. In many respects, the development of new sensor technologies make the pilots, targeters, and the now-extensive staff involved in a decision to fire a weapon from a drone far more aware of what is taking place at the target than other forms of remote targeting, from Navy ships or high altitude bombing.¶ Very few of the actors on a technologically advanced battlefield are personally present in a way that makes the destruction and killing truly personal – and that is part of the point. Fighting up close and personal, on the critics’ psychological theories, seems to mean that it has greater significance to the actors and therefore leads to greater restraint. That is extremely unlikely and contrary to the experience of US warfighters. Lawful kinetic violence is more likely to increase when force protection is an issue, and overuse of force is more likely to increase when forces are under personal pressure and risk. The US military has known since Vietnam at least that increased safety for fighting personnel allows them greater latitude in using force, encourages and permits greater willingness to consider the least damaging alternatives, and that putting violence at a remove reduces the passions and fears of war and allows a coolly professional consideration of what kinds, and how much, violence is required to accomplish a lawful military mission. Remote weapon systems, whether robotic or simply missiles launched from a safe distance, in US doctrine are more than just a means for reducing risk to forces – they are an integral part of the means of allowing more time to consider less-harmful alternatives.¶ This is an important point, given that drones today are being used for tasks that involve much greater uses of force than individualized targeted killing. Drones are used today, and with increasing frequency, to kill whole masses of enemy columns of Taliban fighters on the Pakistan border – in a way that would otherwise be carried out by manned attack aircraft. This is not targeted killing; this is conventional war operations. It is most easily framed in terms of the abstract strategic division of counterinsurgency from counterterrorism (though in practice the two are not so distinct as all that). In particular, drones are being deployed in the AfPak conflict as a counterinsurgency means of going after Taliban in their safe haven camps on the Pakistan side of the border. A fundamental tenet of counterinsurgency is that the safe havens have to be ended, and this has meant targeting much larger contingents of Taliban fighters than previously understood in the “targeted killing” deployment. This could be – and in some circumstances today is – being done by the military; it is also done by the CIA under orders of the President partly because of purely political concerns; much of it today seems to be a combined operation of military and CIA.¶ Whoever conducts it and whatever legal issues it might raise, the point is that this activity is fundamentally counterinsurgency. The fighters are targeted in much larger numbers in the camps than would be the case in “targeted killing,” and this is a good instance of how targeted killing and drone warfare need to be differentiated. The targets are not individuated, either in the act of targeting or in the decision of who and where to target: this is simply an alternative air platform for doing what might otherwise be done with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, or ground attack, in the course of conventional counterinsurgency operations. But it also means that the numbers killed in such operations are much larger, and consist often of ordinary fighters who would otherwise pile into trucks and cross back into Afghanistan, rather than individualized “high value” targets, whether Taliban or Al Qaeda.

## 2

**LINK—THE AFF FETISHIZES THE LAW AND ITS ABILITY TO RESOLVE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, THEIR CALL RESULTS IN A RETURN TO LAW THAT DESTROYS THE POSSIBILITY FOR RADICAL POLITICS**

**NEOCLEOUS 2006**

(Mark Neocleous, Politics & History @ Brunel University, “the Problem with Normality”, Alternatives, no. 31 //wyo-tjc)

**To criticize the use of emergency powers in terms of a suspension of the law**, then, **is to make the mistake of counterpoising normality and emergency, law and violence. In separating “normal” from “emergency,” with the latter deemed “exceptional,” this approach parrots the conventional wisdom that posits normalcy and emergency as two discrete and separable phenomena. This essentially liberal paradigm assumes that there is such a thing as “normal” order governed by rules**, and that the emergency constitutes an “exception” to this normality. “**Normal” here equates with the separation of powers, entrenched civil liberties, an ongoing debate about public policy and law, and the rule of law, while “emergencies” are thought to require strong executive rule**, little time for discussion, and are premised on the supposedly necessary suspension of the law and thus the discretion to suspend key liberties and rights. **But this rests on two deeply ideological assumptions: first, the assumption that emergency rule is aberrational; and, second, an equation of the emergency/nonemergency dichotomy with a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional action. Thus liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the normal constitutional order**, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form while providing the executive with the power to act in an emergency.47 **But the historical evidence suggests that emergency powers are far from exceptional; rather, they are an ongoing aspect of normal political rule.** Emergency, in this sense, is what emerges from the rule of law when violence needs to be exercised and the limits of the rule of law overcome. The genealogy of “emergency” is instructive here. “Emergency” has its roots in the idea of “emerge.” The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that “emerge” connotes “the rising of a submerged body out of the water” and “the process of coming forth, issuing from concealment, obscurity, or confinement.” Both these meanings of “emerge” were once part of the meaning of “emergency,” but the first is now rare and the second obsolete. Instead, the modern meaning of “emergency” has come to the fore, namely a sudden or unexpected occurrence demanding urgent action and, politically speaking, the term used to describe a condition close to war in which the normal constitution might be suspended. But what this tells us is that in “emergency” lies the idea of something coming out of concealment or issuing from confinement by certain events. This is why “emergency” is a better category than exception: Where “emergency” has this sense of “emergent,” exception instead implies a sense of ex capere, that is, of being taken outside. **Far from being outside the rule of law, emergency powers emerge from within it. They are thus as important as the rule of law to the political management of the modern state**. There is, however, an even wider argument to be made. **The idea that the permanent emergency involves a suspension of the law encourages the idea that resistance must involve a return to legality, a return to the normal mode of governing through the rule of law. But this involves a serious misjudgment in which it is simply assumed that legal procedures**, both international and domestic, **are designed to protect human rights from state violence. Law itself comes to appear largely unproblematic. What this amounts to is** what I have elsewhere called a form of **legal fetishism, in which law becomes a universal answer to the problems posed by power. Law is treated as an independent or autonomous reality, explained according to its own dynamics. This produces the illusion that law has a life of its own, abstracting the rule of law from its origins in class domination and oppression and obscuring the ideological mystification of these processes in the liberal trumpeting of the rule of law.48 To demand the return to the “rule of law” is to seriously misread the history of the relation between the rule of law and emergency powers and, consequently, to get sucked into a less-than-radical politics in dealing with state violence.** Part of what I am suggesting is that **emergency measures, as state violence, are part of the everyday exercise of powers, working alongside and from within rather than against the rule of law, as part of a unified political strategy in the fabrication of social order.**

**SOCIETY HAS BEEN CONFOUNDED AT THE FAILURE OF LAW TO CONTAIN VIOLENCE—WE SEE LAW AS A ‘LESSER EVIL’ THAT IS NECESSARY TO HUMANIZE WAR.**

**BERMAN** (Prof of Law at Brooklyn Law School) **2004**

[Nathaniel, “Privleging Combat?”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. ln //wyo-tjc]

**Through examining the legal doctrines crucial to defining the combatants' privilege**, in my view the key concept of jus in bello, **this Article seeks to undo the circumlocutions that often block frank discussion of the relationship of law to war. Contrary to conventional wisdom**, I argue that **it is misleading to see law's relationship to war as primarily one of the limitation of organized violence, and even more misleading to see the laws of war as historically progressing toward an ever-greater** **limitation of violence. n6 Instead,** I put forward three central propositions. First, **rather than standing in opposition to war, law has long been directly involved in the construction of war - the construction of war as a separate sphere of human activity in [\*5] which the "normal" rules of social life, codified, for example, in the domestic criminal law regulating violence, do not operate. n7 Rather than opposing violence, the legal construction of war n8 serves to channel violence into certain forms of activity engaged in by certain kinds of people, while excluding other forms** engaged in by other people. n9

**The Alternative is to write against the state.**

**Exposing the law as violence is necessary to create space for rethinking that makes social relations outside of statist violence possible**

**Neocleous 2003**

[Mark, Teaches politics @ Brunel, Imagining the state, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 6-7/uwyo-ajl]

The last point should indicate to the reader that this is a polemical book about a polemical topic. As such, I should be clear about my intentions. If a hidden agenda seems nasty, then an exposed one looks downright impudent.13 Writers these days increasingly like to stand aside from the affray. **This is nowhere more obvious** than in books in which **affray is a central issue-namely** books **on issues such as the state, power and capital. On the one hand, this is no doubt due to the fate of the academy in contemporary capitalism-academic research assessment exercises which seem to have knocked the political stuffing out of seemingly political writers (best not write anything too political about this political topic, in case it damages one's promotion prospects).** On the other hand, **it is also clearly connected to the demise of any coherence the Left once had. Writers on the Left appear to be happier to retreat into ever more exegetical work** on text after text, with little sense as to the purpose of reading political writers in the first place. Or, worse, **they have bought into the stunningly naive socio-political claim that we have moved into a world in which there is politics without enemies.4 (And if there are no enemies, then there is no ground for any fundamental disagreement and thus no real need to say anything interesting at all.) Too many intellectuals on the Left have thus developed an instrumental inability to think beyond the instructions and parameters provided for them by the state and one of its key ideological apparatuses - the university**. So let me say that this book is written from outside the statist political imaginary (or at least as much as one can be outside it), and also against it. **To write against the statist imaginary is thus intended as an act of resistance - though admittedly not the bravest act of resistance one might imagine, since the state aims to dominate the thought of even those who oppose it (indeed, one might say especially those who oppose it).** Pierre Bourdieu has argued that `**to endeavour to think the state is to risk either taking over, or being taken over by, the thought of the state'**,'~ and as I argue in Chapter 2, **as part of its administration of civil society the state aims to structure the way we view the world by generating the categories through which citizens come to imagine collective identity and thus their own political subjectivity. One of the implications of this is that the statist political imaginary has assisted the state in setting limits on the theoretical imagination, acting as a block on the possibility of conceiving of a society beyond the state.**This is a book that tries **to think the state without either taking over or being taken over by the thought of the state. It therefore rests on a different political imaginary,** one which I mention here and return to only briefly at the very end of the book, **which arises out of the tradition of the oppressed which teaches us that the `state of exception' in which we live is not the exception but the rule.** As Walter Benjamin recognized, **to write against the state of exception in this way is to aim to bring about a real state of emergency which imagines the end of the state, and thus an end to the possibility of fascism.**

## 3

#### Text: The president of the United States should prohibit signature strike targeted killing operations.

#### Executive Orders alter policy quickly to employ flexibility and avoid the legislative process

Barilleaux and Kelley 2010 [Ryan J. , Professor of Political Science at Miami, OH; and Christopher S. , Lecturer (Political Science) at Miami, OH, The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency, Texas A&M Press, p. 80, 2010// wyo-sc]

An executive order is one of several unilateral tools presidents may use to carry out their policy objectives. Executive orders direct executive branch officers to "take an action, stop a certain type of activity, alter policy, change management practices, or accept a delegation of authority under which they will henceforth be responsible for the implementation of law."19 Presidents have come to favor the use of executive orders because they provide speed and flexibility and bypass the complicated legislative process, particularly when it appears Congress may be hostile to a president's goals. In *Wilcox v. Jackson* the Supreme Court affirmed that presidents may issue orders through department heads.20 These orders will have the same legal effect as if the president had issued them personally.21 The preamble of a typical modern executive order explains the constitutional and statutory authority of the president to issue the order, and the body of the order explains the actions to be taken or policy changes to be made. Most of the significant developments in presidential regulator review have been initiated by executive orders. (Unless otherwise spec fied, none of the regulatory review orders discussed in this chapter was based on anything besides the authority vested by the Constitution in the president and a general reference to statutes of the United States.2 )

## 4

#### Obama won’t negotiate now strengthens his hand – plan is a loss the saps capital and emboldens republicans

Christopher Flavelle, member of Bloomberg View's editorial board, “Flavelle: Barack Obama may have to cave on debt ceiling,” 9/25, 2013

President Obama says he won't negotiate with Republicans over the debt ceiling. That may be a good bargaining tactic, but if push comes to shove, is it good policy? There's no question that Obama strengthens his hand by saying, as he has over and over again, that he won't let Republicans use the debt ceiling to extract concessions from Democrats, whether it's Obamacare, the Keystone XL pipeline, spending cuts or anything else. In theory, that should make Republicans think twice about failing to raise the debt ceiling, by reducing their expectations of winning the fight. But what if the tactic doesn't work? What if House Republicans make good on their promise not to raise the debt ceiling without getting something in return, and on Oct. 17 Obama has to choose between caving in or letting the country renege on its obligations? To be sure, caving has all sorts of unpleasant consequences. Politically, it hurts the president's remaining credibility, emboldens Republicans and leads to policy outcomes that Democrats don't want (though what level of concessions would be required is unclear).

**Plan’s a perceived as a loss**

**Loomis 7** Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context**, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters**. The reputation for **success**—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—**is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have**. Conversely, the widespread **belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane** **or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster**, **as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly.** In simple terms, winners win and **losers lose more often than not**. **Failure begets failure**. In short**, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals**. As a result**, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority**. **A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies**. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of **presidential influence**—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—**go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic**.

#### Obama’s leadership in refusing negotiation is key to prevent economic catastrophe

Jason Linkins, “The Only Way To Show Leadership In A Debt Ceiling Crisis Is To Refuse To Negotiate On The Debt Ceiling,” Huffington Post, 9/26/13

The thing about the debt ceiling is that it's not in any way, shape, or form a "partisan" issue. There's no "position" to take on it. It is not a liberal or a conservative "idea." And raising the debt ceiling confers no privileges or advantages on anyone -- it doesn't advance any policy or philosophy, and it doesn't even permit new debt. Congress has passed laws and appropriated monies. Having done so, certain obligations must be met. Raising the debt ceiling says only, "We plan on honoring our obligations." Not raising the debt ceiling means you are saying, "We would like to cause the collapse of what is colloquially known as 'the economy.'" You signed a lease. You promised to pay rent. Maybe you don't like your rent increase. Maybe it wrecks your carefully calculated budget. Know what? You have options. Move if you want. Zero out another budget item to secure the money. Do whatever you like. Regardless, on the first of the month, you pay what you owe, or you may be forcibly evicted. The debt ceiling works the same way. If you're concerned by how high it's getting, there is nothing but ample opportunity to have debates, make cuts, raise revenue, and right the budget. If the vote doesn't go your way, you go out on the campaign trail and you make your case to the electorate. Next time, the vote maybe goes your way. But on the appointed date, you raise the debt ceiling. A lot of people these days are suggesting that it's natural to make big budget deals when the debt ceiling needs to be raised. This is what we call "erroneous." Here's Jonathan Chait, enumerating the two central errors: Error No. 1: As Richard Kogan points out, since the Reagan administration began, Congress has raised the debt ceiling 45 times. Only seven of those times were attached to significant budget legislation. Basically, when Congress does a budget deal, it usually attaches a debt-ceiling hike onto it. But it doesn’t make the debt-ceiling hike contingent on the deal. Error No. 2: Boehner is not proposing a “deal,” as in a deal involving the swapping of concessions. Indeed, all the previous agreements he cites involved the two sides making mutually agreeable policy bargains. None of them, save the 2011 debt-ceiling ransom, involved Congress threatening debt default in order to extract concessions. Boehner isn’t looking for a deal, except in the sense that Richie Aprile was looking for a deal with Beansie to share the profits from his restaurant. On Thursday, Chait sized up the House GOP's "offer" on the debt ceiling. It boils down to: Implement the economic policies that Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan ran on, or else you get default. You may remember Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan from their past masterworks, which include "Losing The 2012 Election." It's impossible to take this seriously. And not just in the sense that it's unreasonable to expect the winners of a presidential election to implement the policies they opposed on the way to that win. There's a second level of pure, mountain-grown unseriousness that Josh Barro points out, having examined this same offer: the GOP's demands -- which include blocking net neutrality regs and building the Keystone pipeline -- "have little or no connection to the federal debt." This is just a list of things Republicans would like to do if they ran the government. But they don't run the government. Instead, they are contending that it is a valid legislative strategy to use the leverage of the debt ceiling—which will cause an economic crisis if it is not increased—to demand their way on any unrelated issue. The pretense that debt limit fights are about the public debt is over. Well, I wish that this was the case, but unfortunately, the odd notion that the occasion of raising the debt ceiling is an appropriate time to extract unreasonable demands has been normalized. It's now baked into the Beltway Conventional Wisdom. And along with that comes the odd notion that navigating nihilist demands -- not simply rejecting them -- is the new way that a president shows leadership. Right now, if the House GOP demanded that John Boehner be allowed to amputate Barack Obama's legs with a rusty band saw in exchange for a debt ceiling hike, the Beltway commentariat would light up with talk about how irresponsible it would be for Obama to not, at the very least, consider it. Maybe just one and a half legs. It would be a big "win" for the White House to be left with half a gangrenous stump. So instead of this moment of clarity that Barro rightly suggests should happen, here's what's going to take place. The Beltway Conventional Wisdom mavens are going to go on the offensive, and castigate the administration for its current, correct, position on the debt ceiling, which is: "There will be no negotiations on the debt ceiling." Obama's failure to properly offer some ransom to economic terrorists will be met with scorn. And here's a simple truth about all of this: Obama does, definitely, share in the blame. As Matt Yglesias points out: The absolute worst mistake Obama has made as president came back in 2011 when Republicans first pulled this stunt. At that time, Obama desperately wanted a bargain over long-term fiscal policy. So he tried a bit of too-clever-by-half political jujitsu in which GOP debt ceiling hostage taking became a pretext to start negotiations over long-term budgeting. All manner of evils have fallen forth from that fateful decisions, including an economic weak patch in 2011 the ongoing mess of sequestration, and worst of all the setting of a precedent for future crises. "A terrible monster was let out of the box in 2011," says Yglesias, "and the best thing Obama can possibly do for the country at this point is to stuff it back in and hopefully kill it." I've long wondered why, exactly, Obama decided to allow this monster to escape from the box. Part of it may have to do with his own history on debt ceiling votes. See, in the past, presidents have always gotten a clean debt ceiling hike from Congress, but it was traditional for the opposition party to allow a few of its members to rail at the president for his policies and cast votes against it. Not so many votes that it threatened the eventual outcome, just enough to make a point. And during George W. Bush's presidency, then-Sen. Obama was one of the people to vote against raising the debt ceiling. So some small part of his desire to engage in deal-making may stem from his need to be internally consistent. But it's pretty clear that he's been largely motivated by a desire to satisfy the Beltway Conventional Wisdom mavens, show "leadership" on the issue, and achieve a big, shiny Grand Bargain on the long-term budget trajectory. But Obama made two miscalculations. First, he made the mistake of presuming that the GOP would be willing to bargain, to literally exchange concessions. Second, he made the mistake of assuming that once it became clear that a bargain wasn't possible, the party refusing to bargain would be held accountable. Fortunately, this is one mistake that the White House has not seemed willing to repeat, and its current "no negotiations" stance is correct. And as Greg Sargent points out, refusing to negotiate doesn't diminish Obama's opposition at all: Democrats are not asking Republicans to give up anything in requesting that they support a debt limit hike. They are not asking Republicans to agree to more spending. They are not asking for new taxes. They are simply asking Republicans to join them in making it possible for Congress to pay obligations it has already incurred, and in so doing, avert economic catastrophe for the whole country. There is no rationale for giving Republicans anything in return for this. Indeed, this is true. If Republicans do the responsible thing, and offer a clean debt ceiling hike, they will have conceded nothing. They will still be free to block spending, deny revenue increases, stage debates on their preferred policies, enter into bargains, and use the traditional campaign cycle to make the case for whatever the legislative process denies them. There is simply no reason to use the occasion of the debt ceiling to force anyone's hand with the threat of a default apocalypse. (In fact, the willingness to act responsibly when the occasion demands and put the country first only strengthens one's bargaining position.) The truth is that by taking this "no negotiations" stance, Obama is doing the GOP a great service. See, it is an inevitability that one day, there will be a Republican president. It is similarly inevitable that this future Republican president will have to seek a debt ceiling rise from a legislature in which the Democrats have sufficient potency to stage a hostage crisis. I truly want to believe that "making government work" is so central to the Democratic Party's "brand" that it would never consider these same apocalyptic posturings. But in my experience, these parliamentary battles, when left unchecked, tend only to escalate. And the roots of vengeance run deep. It is up to Obama to break this cycle of violence (and this is perhaps fitting, since he played such a major role in unleashing it in the first place). Remember, the debt ceiling is not a partisan issue. Anyone who tells you there is a "liberal" or "conservative" position on the debt ceiling is a grand fool. It is not "liberal" to raise the debt ceiling, nor is it "conservative" to not raise the debt ceiling. Raising it is simply a necessity -- a necessity that does not negate either side's ability to debate budget levels or priorities. The refusal to raise it is simple nihilism. By holding this line, Obama is truly engaging in an act of bipartisanship. He puts the monster back in the box. He preserves basic institutional governance for both parties. He protects future presidents, Democrats and Republicans alike, from having to face the constant threat of economic apocalypse. The media will pillory him for holding firm on this. All of the old arguments, that Obama is "failing to lead," will gain new currency. But it was according those arguments some validity that got us into the mess in the first place. So hold firm he must, because it is the one and only way a president can "lead" on this issue.

#### Nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

## Norms

#### No US precedent---not causal

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### Zero chance that U.S. self-restraint causes any other country to give up their plans for drones

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/>

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire:

If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.

“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”

This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran.

The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests.

Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone?

While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

#### Plan’s modeling restricts Chinese strikes on Uighur separatists

Bergen and Rowland 12 (Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst, Jennifer Rowland, Special to CNN, “A Dangerous New World of Drones,” CNN News, October 8, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/01/opinion/bergen-world-of-drones)

But without an international framework governing the use of drone attacks, the United States is **setting a** dangerous **precedent** for other nations with its aggressive and secretive drone programs in Pakistan and Yemen, which are aimed at suspected members of al Qaeda and their allies.

Just as the U.S. government justifies its drone strikes with the argument that it is at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates, one could imagine that India in the not too distant future might launch such attacks against suspected terrorists in Kashmir, or **China might strike Uighur separatists** in western China, or Iran might attack Baluchi nationalists along its border with Pakistan.

#### Drone strikes are key --- suppresses Xinjiang separatist violence and instability

Erickson and Strange 13 (Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College, Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, graduate student at Zhejiang University, “China Has Drones. Now How Will it Use Them?” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html)

Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and **violence** **in** the restive border regions, such as **Xinjiang** and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to **suppress** any **future violenc**e there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.

#### The impact is Chinese nuclear terrorism

Ferguson and Potter, 4 — president of the Federation of American Scientists, former project director of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, adjunct professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University, former scientist-in-residence at the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, winner of the 2003 Robert S. Landauer Lecture Award from the Health Physics Society, consultant for Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and the National Nuclear Security Administration, former physical scientist in the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety at the U.S. Department of State, co-chairman of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Working Group, M.A. and Ph.D. in physics from Boston University, AND, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Founding Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, member of the International Advisory Board of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (Charles D. and William C., “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004, http://jeffreyfields.net/427/Site/Blog/30F67A03-182C-4FC7-9EFD-A7C321F6DC8D\_files/analysis\_4faces.pdf)

China has been gradually modernizing its nuclear arsenal. However, at this time, it is unclear whether this modernization program will in- crease or decrease security risks that terrorists might exploit. While more Chinese nuclear weapons might mean more opportunities for theft, a modernized force might incorporate more up-to-date security proce- dures. Isolated storage and transportation links could pose increased risks for any nation’s nuclear weapons security program. China is be- lieved to assemble nuclear warheads at a number of nuclear facilities, and the Lop Nur test site may contain a storage facility for Chinese nuclear weapons (although it is probably unused, since China has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1996).56 Lop Nur is remotely located in northwest Xinjiang province, where nationalist/separatist organizations have been campaigning for autonomy from Beijing. Although Xinjiang separatist groups have not openly expressed interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, some reports have alleged that Uighur separatists may have stolen radioactive sources from Lop Nur in 1993.57 It is difficult to offer an overall assessment of the security of China’s nuclear arms against terrorists because Beijing has a long-standing prac- tice of not publishing sensitive information. In addition, China shows little concern (at least openly) that nuclear terrorism can occur on Chinese soil. While this lack of concern may be justified, the Chinese government still has to factor in security threats posed by Xinjiang separatists and other groups that may engage in terrorism in China. Nonetheless, the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Party and its security ap- paratus in Chinese society, and the limited presence of terrorist groups in China, appear to reduce substantially the danger that a terrorist or- ganization might gain control of an intact nuclear weapon in that country.

#### China won’t provoke a war- multiple warrants

-economy

-vulnerable military

-few outposts in Spratlys

-Not pumping oil

-Taiwan has more to lose

-Empirics

-Patrol ships are unarmed

Goldstein, associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, ‘11

[Lyle, He is co-editor of the recent volumes China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership and Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles. “The South China Sea's Georgia Scenario,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/11/the_south_china_seas_georgia_scenario?page=0,2>]

Washington's focus on "freedom of navigation," which has inexplicably become the main pillar of current U.S. policy in the region, is actually rather absurd. China, the world's largest maritime trading nation by almost any measure, is very unlikely to threaten navigational freedoms -- its own economy is almost wholly reliant on those very freedoms. The claim that China's opposition to regular U.S. military surveillance activities in the South China Sea threatens "freedom of navigation" is likewise disingenuous and represents an unfortunate tendency to reach for the clever sound bite. In fact, such U.S. surveillance activities all along China's coasts are excessive to the point of seriously disrupting the bilateral relationship and should thus be decreased, especially if linked to concrete progress on Chinese military transparency. The alleged Chinese threat to ASEAN states, moreover, turns out to be more hype than fact. Much has been said about China's new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island, but the surprise is that up to now Beijing has had only one nuclear submarine base (Qingdao) -- quite paltry when compared with the four operated by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific area. Similarly, the basing of a ballistic missile submarine and even China's first aircraft carrier at Hainan would more likely represent weakness than strength. After all, alternative basing in north China simply means these high-value assets would be closer and hence more vulnerable to the impressive striking power of both the Japanese and U.S. fleets that are based primarily in Northeast Asia. Those viewing Chinese "aggression" as the impetus for current tension might reasonably be asked why Beijing has only six outposts in the Spratlys (compared with 29 occupied by Vietnam), why Beijing is one of the only claimant states not currently pumping oil out of the South China Sea, and why the largest island in the Spratlys archipelago is actually occupied by Taiwan. In fact, China's policy in the South China Sea has been largely reactive in both present and historical circumstances, which indeed explains a good bit of the incoherence of China's present policy. China has settled the majority of its border disputes peacefully and is largely relying on unarmed patrol cutters to enforce its claims in the South China Sea -- clearly a sign that it does not seek escalation to armed conflict.

#### No impact to china drones – far behind

Zhou 2013 [Dillon columnist for PolicyMic, January, 2013, “China Drones Prompt Fears of a Drone Race With the US,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/19753/china-drones-prompt-fears-of-a-drone-race-with-the-us]

There are several facts that provide some solace to the U.S. as China's drones are far from being a real challenge

to the American drone program.¶ First, the Chinese drones are nowhere as sophisticated as U.S. drones in their range and proper hardware for optic systems and motors to power the "dragons." The DSB report notes that the U.S. technical systems are almost unrivaled at present.¶ Second, China lacks the manpower to properly support their new fleet of drones. Whereas the U.S. has been training and honing a large force of UAV pilots, technicians and operation managers for 15 years.¶ Finally, the U.S. drone program is about 20 years ahead of the Chinese program. The current models on show are considered to be prototypes and not finished products. The Chinese also have not had a chance to gain real experience with their drones during real operation.

## Pakistan

#### Signature strikes are key to thin the ranks of Al-Qaeda---they make it impossible for militants to keep pace with their rates of losses

Philip Mudd 13, was a senior official at the CIA and the FBI, now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management, 5/24/13, “Fear Factor,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear\_factor\_signature\_strikes

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough.

So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision.

Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover.

#### Targeting low-level militants is key to all aspects of counter-terror---in-depth network analysis means the people we target don’t seem important to observers, but they’re actually vital to the effectiveness of terror groups

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

This becomes obvious when one considers that national security bureaucrats will look beyond criticality and vulnerability, and also engage in network-based analysis. Network-based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another.143 Contrary to popular critiques of the targeting process that liken it to a “haphazardly prosecuted assassination program,” in reality modern targeting involves applying pressure to their functionality.144

To effectively pursue a network-based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves “connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life.” This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence,” it assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”145 While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram, and further analyzed.146 Through this process links and nodes in the enemy's network emerge.147 The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks,”148 identifying key decision-makers and those who support or influence them indirectly.149 This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests, and they will exploit human and signals intelligence combined with computerized knowledge integration that generates and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network.150 “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure . . . as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”151

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how seemingly low-level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization.152 Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.”153 Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations.154 Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by a bureaucrat relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security.155 This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be strong ties within the network.156 Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.157

#### Casualties are way down and drones are far more precise than alternatives---our ev uses the best data

Michael Cohen 13, Fellow at the Century Foundation, 5/23/13, “Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/23/obama-drone-speech-use-justified

Drone critics have a much different take. They are passionate in their conviction that US drones are indiscriminately killing and terrorizing civilians. The Guardian's own Glenn Greenwald argued recently that no "minimally rational person" can defend "Obama's drone kills on the ground that they are killing The Terrorists or that civilian deaths are rare". Conor Friedersdorf, an editor at the Atlantic and a vocal drone critic, wrote last year that liberals should not vote for President Obama's re-election because of the drone campaign, which he claimed "kills hundreds of innocents, including children," "terrorizes innocent Pakistanis on an almost daily basis" and "makes their lives into a nightmare worthy of dystopian novels". ¶ I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed – and dramatically so. ¶ This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy. ¶ Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates. ¶ There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program. As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting, which is also dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones. ¶ When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that a fairly clear pattern has emerged over the past year – far fewer civilians are dying from drones. "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there." ¶ While Woods makes clear that one has to be "cautious" on any estimates of casualties, it's not just a numeric decline that is being seen, but rather it's a "proportionate decline". In other words, the percentage of civilians dying in drone strikes is also falling, which suggests to Woods that US drone operators are showing far greater care in trying to limit collateral damage. ¶ Woods estimates are supported by the aforementioned databases. In Pakistan, New America Foundation claims there have been no civilian deaths this year and only five last year; Long War Journal reported four deaths in 2012 and 11 so far in 2013; and TBIJ reports a range of 7-42 in 2012 and 0-4 in 2013. In addition, the drop in casualty figures is occurring not just in Pakistan but also in Yemen. ¶ These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year. ¶ Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits".¶ Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates.¶ Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University has long maintained that civilian deaths from drones in Pakistan are dramatically overstated. She argues that considering the alternatives of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, drone strikes are a far more humane method of war-fighting.

#### No signature strikes causes raiding—causes excessive killing and spurs extortive governments

Dan Trombly 13, National Security/International Affairs Analyst, Caerus Analytics, LLC, 5/29/13, “I Might Need You To Kill: Signatures, Patterns, and Alternatives,” http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2013/05/i-might-need-you-kill-signatures-patterns-and-alternatives.html

Of course, it is important to note these violent dynamics are hardly unique to signature strikes or aerial assassinations. Though improper targeting and munitions selection can rapidly magnify the danger of collateral damage in those operations, it is important to remember the enormous potential costs of seeking to kill or capture militants with any instruments that are unable to ensure security for civilians. ¶ Night raids, such as the infamous botched Gardez raid, can easily falter on poor intelligence and the mistaken use of force against civilians. While the U.S. has learned much since Black Hawk Down, compare the amount of force the U.S. has had to bring down to ensure adequate force protection in operations on or across the border with Pakistan. In 2008, the Angor Ada raid, involving dozens of US ground troops and multiple aircraft, killed at least several civilians, and meant that the next raid provoked a major standoff that threatened to cause large-scale firefights and civilian displacement. Or take the example of 2011, NATO and Afghan forces reported fire from Pakistani positions. The result was that NATO unleashed more airpower to protect its troops in contact than MQ-1s or MQ-9s ever could. Two Apache attack helicopters, two F-15Es, and an AC-130 gunship pummeled targets on the Pakistani border, killing as many as two dozen Pakistani soldiers. ¶ Even then, a regime of raiding into territories where we are not willing to actually create a sustained military presence does nothing to mitigate the dangerous dynamics for civilian cooperation and intelligence collection. Raids that leave territorial control an open question for host governments and militants do not give civilians much incentive to provide the intelligence necessary for more precise targeting, leaving them to try their luck at the dangerous game of avoiding militant counterintelligence efforts. The solution to such a quandary, especially when providing security to positively incentivize informers, is to remove potential informers from enemy retaliation through detention or concentration, and the use of high-tempo raiding operations to generate as much actionable intelligence as possible through the raiding process itself. ¶ The face of a robust capture program is not the FBI effort which retrieved the 1993 CIA shooter, which in the relatively sanguine climate of 1997, the Pakistani government was unwilling to publicly admit its role in handing over a citizen to the US. American law enforcement wisely worked with the ISI to lure the suspect into Punjab. In today’s climate, against targets part of active militant networks, an operation that relies on relatively unsavvy suspects and highly compliant host government security and intelligence seems less than forthcoming. ¶ The face of a capture program in Pakistan’s border regions with Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and similar environments, is not going to be law enforcements, but the types of programs that, past and present, we praise with intimidation or decry with disgust as “industrial-scale killing machines” or “executive assassination rings.” Wartime friction ensures that any well-intentioned capture program in denied or contested areas will live on as an assassination program. Just ask those involved in the Phoenix Program, who had even their own President thinking they were running a massive assassination machine.¶ Of course, programs like the CIA-Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, for all the reputation they gained as an unstoppable assassination machine, pale in comparison to the sanguinary behavior of other paramilitary efforts to dismantle insurgent infrastructure and disrupt irregular opponents. While the Anbar Awakening receives massive praise, enlisting irregular forces with relatively little opportunity to control their behavior,¶ and far less “skin in the game” with regard to the political situation on the ground, frequently results in incredibly excessive killing and the incorporation of civilian populations into horrific, racket-like forms of extortive governance. Even relatively antiseptic terms such as extending the reach of governance and strengthening the state, in the context of civil wars or internal conflict against irregular opponents, frequently involves the tacit or explicit cooperation between host government and paramilitary forces to purge not just insurgent infrastructure, but political sympathizers and threats to elite interests. Extending the reach of the state under such conditions is frequently a nasty thing, and while it is in vogue to speak of the death or decline of counterinsurgency, the clean language of empowering local partners and expanding state capacity is still counterinsurgency, just of a much different sort than the kind wealthy liberal 3rd-party interventions might try to steer their clients towards.

#### Pakistan instability and US-Pakistan relations tanked inevitably – laundry list and history of hate

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Panel “THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION¶ THE UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN:¶ TO THE BRINK AND BACK,” Brookings, February 26, 2013.

MS. BROWN: What do you think can be expected now for women in ¶ Pakistan? I mean, we were all, as you mentioned, very shocked by the whole Malala ¶ incident. If you talk to anybody there, they say that actually Malala was one that we ¶ happened to hear about, that there's plenty of that going on every month.¶ So, what kind of protection do you think can be offered to women in ¶ Pakistan and in Afghanistan now, in terms of the troops pulling out, in terms of the ¶ sectarian violence? Is this going to get worse for them now?¶ MR. RIEDEL: I think that we're certainly in for a rough next two years. ¶ The confluence of Pakistan's elections, the turnover and command of the Pakistani army, ¶ the chief of army staff changes this year. NATO, America draw down in Afghanistan. ¶ Elections in Afghanistan. The forces of militancy, of terrorism, of jihadism, of violence. ¶ You're going to see all of these as opportunities to try to veer the situation in the worstpossible direction.¶ Our ability to do much to help people in Pakistan is pretty limited. You ¶ quoted the numbers. We now out-poll India as the bad guy in Pakistan.¶ MS. BROWN: Is that a result of the drone policy?¶ MR. RIEDEL: No, it's -- the drones have added to it, but it's unfair to ¶ blame the drones for that. 60 years of American foreign policy has created this. ¶ Pakistanis believe that the United States treats their country like a tissue; use it and throw ¶ it away. They actually have a different terminology, but I'll stick with tissue in this ¶ audience. (Laughter)¶ And any objective review of U.S.-Pakistani relations would have to ¶ argue, I think they're right. That's where we are. We have -- we don't have -- you know,¶ in the State Department they like to call it the trust deficit. Such an innocuous term. You ¶ know, the trust deficit. That's not what it is. They hate us, they absolutely hate us. They ¶ may admire things about America, about our democracy, about our entrepreneurship, but ¶ they hate our foreign policy and the drones is only the latest part of that.¶ The challenge here is with all of that baggage, let's not make it worse ¶ first and then let's look for ways to help Malala and others like that by being on the side of ¶ democracy, good governance, the rule of law, accountability.

#### No Indo-Pak war

Mutti 9— Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. BA in History, Knox College. over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/)

Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes. The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries. 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but against militants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. The international attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to the terrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

#### No Escalation—No Vital Interests for Great Power War In Central Asia.

Weitz 06

[Richard Weitz, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer 2006. The Washington Quarterly, lexis.]

Central Asian security affairs have become much more complex than during the original nineteenth-century great game between czarist Russia and the United Kingdom. At that time, these two governments could largely dominate local affairs, but today a variety of influential actors are involved in the region. The early 1990s witnessed a vigorous competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Central Asia. More recently, India and Pakistan have pursued a mixture of cooperative and competitive policies in the region that have influenced and been affected by their broader relationship. The now independent Central Asian countries also invariably affect the region's international relations as they seek to maneuver among the major powers without compromising their newfound autonomy. Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States,

the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

#### No impact to Pakistani loose nukes – they’re separated.

Koring, ‘9

[Paul, Globe and Mail, “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal safe, security experts say”, 10-16-9

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-safe-security-experts-say/article1325820/

Pakistan's nuclear-weapons security is modeled on long-standing safeguards developed by the major powers and includes separately storing the physical components needed for a nuclear warhead and keeping them apart and heavily guarded. "Even if insurgents managed to get a fully assembled weapon, they would lack the 'secret decoder ring' [the special security codes] needed to arm it," Mr. Pike said. Thought to possess a relatively modest nuclear arsenal of between 70 and 100 warheads, Pakistan is even more secretive about its security measures than most nuclear-weapons states. But even if those measures were somehow breached, Mr. Pike said, even a complete nuclear weapon would be a limited threat in the hands of terrorists. "If they did try to hot-wire it to explode in the absence of knowing the approved firing sequences, it would probably only trigger the high-explosives, making a jim-dandy of a dirty bomb," he said, referring to an explosion that spreads radioactive material over a small area, but is not a nuclear blast.

## CP

#### Ending signature strikes is key – causes civilian casualties and stokes anti-American sentiment

Noah VanValkenberg, Contributing Writer, “Making Drones More Effective: Refining a Necessary Practice in Warfare,” March 2, 2013. Retrieved from <http://outsidecolby.com/2013/03/making-drones-more-effective-refining-a-necessary-practice-in-warfare/>

Drones are a crucial piece of the United States’ global war on terror. They have eliminated dangerous individuals such as Anwar al-Awlaki and other senior members of Al Qaeda. However, there is a significant difference between targeted strikes and “signature strikes”—and the use of the latter is only serving to endanger US security.

In a typical targeted strike, high-level terrorists are profiled and their names are passed up the chain of command. The National Security Adviser, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), will recommend individuals on this “kill list” to President Obama. Ultimately, the President makes the call of who to strike. This is the way drone strikes should work: a missile is only fired after careful analysis and evaluation by experts, and a decision by the President.

Signature strikes work entirely differently. Armed drones often loiter over a specific area with no specific mission. If they see a group of individuals acting suspiciously, a relatively low-level intelligence officer can make the call to shoot. The definition of “acting suspiciously” is particularly problematic, as a man carrying a rifle and riding in a pickup truck in the desert may meet that standard. Signature strikes have killed prominent pro-US Yemeni leaders, as documented in the New York Times, they have stoked significant anti-American sentiment, and they have killed 176 children in Northern Pakistan alone.

Currently, signature strikes make up the majority of drone attacks, and the targets’ identities are rarely conclusively known. According to an article published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice by Jens Ohlin, only eight percent of suspected militants killed in signature strikes between 2008 and 2010 were mid- to high-level targets. The rest posed no threat to US national security and the strikes incurred enormous collateral damage.

However, that collateral damage is enormous. According to the widely cited study Living Under Drones, published by Stanford and NYU, one signature strike alone killed forty members of a peaceful meeting of tribal elders in Northwest Pakistan. The same study argues that many individuals now refrain from going to funerals, because they are so frequently targeted by signature strikes.

Targeted strikes, on the other hand, often produce little collateral damage. A 2009 targeted strike killed Baitulluh Mehsud, the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. He was one of the most dangerous militants in the world and helped radicalize the suicide bomber who attacked a CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan. A 2011 strike killed Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, al-Qaeda’s #3 operative. These strikes work. They are effective. And they minimize collateral damage.

Signature strikes are neither effective nor legal. They simply kill low-level militants who pose no threat to U.S. national security, and by killing their friends and family along with them, these strikes make enemies. If the goal of successful counterterrorism operations is to eliminate the terrorists, it logically follows that any action that creates more terrorists is counterproductive. Signature strikes under the Obama administration must end, and targeted strikes must take their place.

#### First, Allies only perceive Obama’s actions on drones-want to preserve broad executive power while setting international drone standards

The Economist 2013

[The Economist, June 21st, 2013, Out of the shadows, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21578689-barack-obamas-rules-drones-could-shape-new-global-laws-war-out-shadows, uwyo//amp]

WHEN it comes to lethal drone strikes against foreign targets, America’s government and Congress should be aware that “what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”, says John Bellinger, for eight years a government lawyer charged with explaining George W. Bush’s global war on terror to allies. China and Russia are just two of the powers that may soon launch their own fleets of unmanned aircraft against suspected foes. It is not too far-fetched to imagine a near future in which a Russian drone targets a Chechen radical based in neighbouring Georgia, say, who appears immune from capture while apparently plotting an imminent strike on Russian targets. Experts such as Mr Bellinger have warned Congress in public hearings that unless America sets clear, internationally accepted rules for its own drone strikes, it can hardly condemn Russian or Chinese aerial killings with any credibility. Such advice has been echoed, privately, by diplomats from some of America’s closest partners, who fret about the legal underpinnings of Barack Obama’s war on terror. A few phrases passed by Congress days after the September 11th 2001 attacks give the president broad war-making powers in the name of self-defence. But such allies are worried not just about Mr Obama’s ability to stare down alarming, fast-rising powers such as China. The other reason why they want him to lead America back onto higher moral ground is that they fear for their own reputations, if they lend help to drone attacks. Even supportive governments face some hard choices about passing intelligence to America, when the ensuing drone strikes may leave spooks and spymasters facing public anger and even lawsuits

#### Second, unilateralism key

Singer 13

[Singer, director – Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence @ Brookings, and Wright, senior fellow – Brookings, 2/7/’13

(Peter W. and Thomas, "Obama, own your secret wars", www.nydailynews.com/opinion/obama-secret-wars-article-1.1265620])

It is time for a new approach. And **all that is required** of the President is to do the thing that he does perhaps best of all: to speak.

Obama has a unique opportunity — in fact, an urgent obligation — to create a new doctrine, unveiled in a major presidential speech, for the use and deployment of these new tools of war.

While the Republicans tried to paint the President as weak on security issues in the 2012 elections, history will record instead that his administration pushed into new frontiers of war, most especially in the new class of technologies that move the human role both geographically and chronologically further from the point of action on the battlefield.

The U.S. military’s unmanned systems, popularly known as “drones,” now number more than 8,000 in the air and 12,000 on the ground. And in a parallel development, the U.S. Cyber Command, which became operational in 2010, has added an array of new (and controversial) responsibilities — and is set to quintuple in size.

This is not just a military matter. American intelligence agencies are increasingly using these technologies as the tips of the spear in a series of so-called “shadow wars.” These include not only the more than 400 drone strikes that have taken place from Pakistan to Yemen, but also the deployment of the Stuxnet computer virus to sabotage Iranian nuclear development, the world’s first known use of a specially designed cyber weapon.

Throughout this period, the administration has tried to have it both ways — leaking out success stories of our growing use of these new technologies but not tying its hands with official statements and set policies.

This made great sense at first, when much of what was happening was ad hoc and being fleshed out as it went along.

But that position has become unsustainable. The less the U.S. government now says about our policies, the more that vacuum is becoming filled by others, in harmful ways.

By acting but barely explaining our actions, we’re creating precedents for other states to exploit. More than 75 countries now have military robotics programs, while another 20 have advanced cyber war capacities. Rest assured that nations like Iran, Russia and China will use these technologies in far more crude and indiscriminate ways — yet will do so while claiming to be merely following U.S. footsteps.

In turn, international organizations — the UN among them — are pushing ahead with special investigations into potential war crimes and proposing new treaties.

Our leaders, meanwhile, stay mum, which isolates the U.S. and drains its soft power.

The current policy also makes it harder to respond to growing concerns over civilian casualties. Indeed, Pew polling found 96% levels of opposition to U.S. drones in the key battleground state of Pakistan, a bellwether of the entire region. It is indisputable than many civilians have been harmed over the course of hundreds of strikes. And yet it is also indisputable that various groups have incentives to magnify such claims.

Yet so far, U.S. officials have painted themselves into a corner — either denying that any collateral losses have occurred, which no one believes, or reverting to the argument that we cannot confirm or deny our involvement, which no one believes, either.

Finally, the domestic support and legitimacy needed for the use of these weapons is in transition. Polling has found general public support for drone strikes, but only to a point, with growing numbers in the “not sure” category and growing worries around cases of targeting U.S. citizens abroad who are suspected of being terrorists.

The administration is so boxed in that, even when it recently won a court case to maintain the veil of semi-silence that surrounds the drone strike program, the judge described the current policy as having an “Alice in Wonderland” feel.

The White House seems to be finally starting to realize the problems caused by this disconnect of action but no explanation. After years of silence, occasional statements by senior aides are acknowledging the use of drones, while lesser-noticed working level documents have been created to formalize strike policies and even to explore what to do about the next, far more autonomous generation of weapons.

These efforts have been good starts, but they have been disjointed and partial. Most important, they are missing the **much-needed stamp of the President’s voice and authority**, which is essential to turn tentative first steps into established policy.

Much remains to be done — and said — out in the open.

This is why it’s time for Obama’s voice to ring loud and clear. Much as Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower were able keep secret aspects of the development of nuclear weapons, even as they articulated how and when we would use them, Obama should publicly lay out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use these new weapons.

The President has a strong case to make — if only he would finally make it. After all, the new weapons have worked. They have offered new options for military action that are more accurate and proportionate and less risky than previously available methods.

But they have also posed many new complications. Explaining our position is about embracing both the good and the bad. It is about acknowledging the harms that come with war regardless of what technology is being used and making clear what structures of accountability are in place to respond.

It’s also about finally defining where America truly stands on some of the most controversial questions. These include the tactics of “signature” strikes, where the identity is not firmly identified, and “double tap” strikes, where rescuers aiding victims of a first attack are also brought under fire. These have been reported as occurring and yet seem to run counter to the principles under which the programs have been defended so far.

The role of the President is not to conduct some kind of retrospective of what we have done and why, but to lay out a course of the future. What are the key strategic goals and ethical guidelines that should drive the development and use of these new technologies? Is current U.S. and international law sufficient to cover them?

There are also crucial executive management questions, like where to draw the dividing line between military and civilian intelligence agency use of such technologies, and how to keep a growing range of covert actions from morphing into undeclared and undebated wars.

And, finally, the President must help resolve growing tensions between the executive branch and an increasingly restive Congress, including how to handle situations where we create the effect of war but no U.S. personnel are ever sent in harm’s way.

Given the sprawling complexity of these matters, only the President can deliver an official statement on where we stand. If only we somehow had a commander in chief who was simultaneously a law professor and Nobel Peace Prize winner!

The President’s voice on these issues won’t be a cure-all. But it will lay down a powerful marker, shaping not just the next four years but the actions of future administrations.

#### Third, Executive action, not congressional *inaction,* is what is setting the international precedent on executive war powers-drones prove

Roberts 2013

[Kristin Roberts, News editor, March 22nd, 2013, When the Whole World Has Drones, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>, uwyo//amp]

America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. “I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.”—Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

#### CP solves better- statutory is bound to fail and makes the impacts worse- executive exploits increasing Congressional limits

Moe and Howell 99

(Terry, prof of political science @ Stanford, and William, Associate Prof @ Harvard, "The Presidental Power of Unilateral Action") KH

While Congress will sometimes have incentives to make broad delegations, legislators are more often likely to see the value in putting statutory restrictions on what presidents can do. Presidents, after all, have broad national constituencies, are less susceptible to pressures from special interest groups, are concerned about their historical legacies as strong national leaders, and in general have different political stakes in policy than parochially oriented legislators do-and the coalitions behind particular pieces of legislation, especially on domestic issues, will often have good reason to fear that presidents might use any discretion delegated them in unwanted ways. If so, they will want to constrain the president's powers of unilateral action through narrow and strategically crafted delegations (Moe, 1990; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999).

How well can this be expected to work? To begin with, legislators can only go so far with a strategy of truly narrow delegations. They are fundamentally concerned with making constituents happy, and thus with ensuring the flow of benefits. For policies of even moderate complexity in an ever-changing world, this unavoidably calls for placing most decisions in the hands of executives and allowing them to use their own expert judgment in fleshing out the details. Like the founders, then, the best legislators can do is to write statutory analogues to incomplete contracts, and thus to set up governing structures that, while perhaps restrictive in certain ways, still contain substantial discretion. And once these statutory governing structures are set up, it is the president and the agencies who do the governing, not the Congress.

To the extent that legislators find themselves proposing highly restrictive delegations, moreover, they have to reckon with the fact that presidents are pivotal players in the legislative process. They can veto any piece of legislation they want, and if they do, it is exceedingly difficult for Congress to override them. (Empirically, only about 7% of presidential vetoes have been overridden; see Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Since everyone is aware ex ante of how consequential the veto can be, presidents will have a major say in shaping the content of legislation, and as they do they will be highly sensitive to how legislation stands to affect their own formal power. Among other things, they will push hard for provisions that give them as much discretion as possible, and they will seriously discourage provisions that limit their prerogatives.

Even when restrictions are included in final bills, Congress faces the problem of making them stick in practice-for a president will not be easy to control once governing shifts to his bailiwick. In part, this is due to the same problem that owners face in trying to control the management of a private firm, for managers-like presidents and their agencies-have expertise, experience, and operational leverage that allow them to engineer outcomes to their own advantage. Although expected to faithfully execute the laws, managers have a very substantial capacity to shirk. The problem that Congress faces, however, is even more severe than this classic economic analogy can suggest. The president possesses all the resources for shirking that the corporate manager does, but his position is far stronger, precisely because he is not really Congress's agent. He is not a subordinate, but a coequal authority. As a result, Congress cannot hire him, cannot fire him, and cannot structure his powers and incentives in any way it might like, yet it is forced to entrust the execution of the laws to his hands. From a control standpoint, this is a nightmare come true.

Finally, whatever the discretion contained in specific pieces of legislation, and whatever opportunities for shirking they open up, it is crucial to recognize that the president is greatly empowered by the sheer proliferation of statutes over time. In part, the reasons are pretty obvious. When new statutes are passed, almost whatever they are, they increase the president's total responsibilities and give him a formal basis for extending his authoritative reach into new realms. At the same time, they add to the total discretion available for presidential control, as well as to the resources contained within the executive.

Less obviously, though, the proliferation of statutes creates substantial ambiguity about what the "take care" clause ought to mean in operation, ambiguity that presidents can use to their great advantage (Corwin, 1973, 1984). While it may seem that the burgeoning corpus of legislative requirements would tie the president up in knots, the aggregate impact is liberating. For the president, as chief executive, is responsible for all the laws, and inevitably the laws turn out to be interdependent and conflicting in ways that the individual statutes themselves do not recognize. In the aggregate, what they require of him is ambiguous. The president's proper role, as would be true for any executive, is to rise above a myopic focus on each statute in isolation, to coordinate policies by taking account of their interdependence, and to resolve statutory conflicts by balancing their competing requirements. All of this affords him enormous discretion to impose his own priorities on government unilaterally and to push out the boundaries of his own power-claiming all the while that he is faithfully executing the laws.

Even though presidents are mere executives, then, charged with "taking care that the laws be faithfully executed," Congress cannot be expected to use statutory constraints with great effectiveness in restricting the expansion of presidential power.

## Terrorism

#### Prefer McNeil – to a casual observer, sig strikes don’t seem important, but he’s a total bad ass and knows that they are

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

To overcome the lack of empirical evidence which plagues theoretical discourse regarding targeted killings, I conducted field research using proven qualitative research techniques employed by case study researchers.18 The results of that research are contained in Parts II and III of this article, which explain how targeted killings are conducted. Part II addresses how kill-lists are made and Part III addresses how targeted killings are executed. The case study began with a review of hundreds of pages of military policy memoranda, disclosures of government policies through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests by NGOs and filings in court documents, public statements by military and intelligence officials, and descriptive accounts reported by the press and depicted in non-fiction books. I supplemented these findings by observing and reviewing aspects of the official training for individuals involved in targeted killings and by conducting confidential interviews with members of the military, special operations, and intelligence community who are involved in the targeted killing process. An earlier version of this article included citations to the confidential interviews, however every piece of information gathered in an interview has been substantiated by a publicly available source, obviating the need to cite to any individual interview. These research techniques resulted in a richly detailed depiction of the targeted killing process, the first of its kind to appear in any single publication. As such, these sections are quite lengthy, but the description is essential to legal theory as it is impossible to accurately critique on accountability grounds a process for which no empirical account exists.

## Politics

**[2] Default collapses the economy – goes global and past events don’t disprove**

**Davidson 9/10**

Adam, co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money,” Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all

**If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted** again **this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made**. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but **eventually the big-ticket items**, like Social Security and Medicare, **will have to be cut**. At some point, **the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds** and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, **the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina** (and now Greece). **In the case of the United States**, though, **it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be**, by most accounts, **the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.**¶ **Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans** (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) **appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised** — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, **the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government**, desperate to hold on to investment, **would then raise interest rates far higher**, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — **which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years**.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, **if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default** (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), **the world’s investors** — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — **might actually buy even more Treasury bonds**. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While **this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined**. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, **the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable**. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, **the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy**.¶ **The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven**. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. **If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper**; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, **no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier**.

**B) Timeframe – Catastrophic economic collapse by October 17th –**

Jonathan **Weisman and** Ashley **Parker**, NYT, “House G.O.P. Leaders List Conditions for Raising Debt Ceiling,” **9/26**, 2013

**Economists** of all political persuasions have **warned** that **a failure to raise the debt ceiling by** the Treasury’s deadline of **Oct. 17 could be catastrophic. The world economy’s faith** in the inviolable safety of Treasury debt **would be shaken** for years, **interest rates could shoot** up **and stock** prices **worldwide would** most likely **plummet**.

**C) Probability – Default causes severe economic impact – impact defense doesn’t assume magnitude of the impact of defaulting and impact uniqueness only goes one way – fragile economic recovery now**

 – credit rating, stifle sluggish recovery, kills US economic leadership

Tom **Cohen**, “Boehner signals GOP focus now on debt ceiling,” CNN, **9/26**, 2013

**Treasury Secretary** Jack **Lew said** this week the **debt ceiling must be raised by October 17, or the government may not** have enough money to **pay** all of **its bills**. **Analysts warn of severe economic impact in that case**. **A similar bout** of congressional brinksmanship over the debt ceiling in 2011 **led to the first-ever downgrade of the U.S. credit rating**. Obama cited that **potential harm to a still sluggish recovery** on Thursday, **saying the world looked to America for economic leadership and stability.** "You don't mess with that," he said to cheers at a speech in Maryland on Obamacare.

**[4] TURNS CASE – debt default means the plan would be delayed or under-funded – fiat only means the plan passes**

**Goldfarb 1-1** [Zachary A. Goldfarb 1-1-2013 Washington Post “‘Fiscal cliff’ deal does little to tame threats from debt ceiling, high unemployment rates” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/fiscal-cliff/fiscal-cliff-deal-does-little-to-tame-threats-from-debt-ceiling-high-unemployment-rates/2013/01/01/8e4c14aa-5393-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f\_story.html]

**Leaving the fate of the debt ceiling up in the air will cause anxiety among businesses** and individuals, potentially **crimping hiring, investing and consumer spending**.¶ In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, **the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation’s bills** and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding **debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.**¶ And **while a default would be all but certain to push the economy into recession, growth is likely to be slow** — and job-market improvement slight — **even without such a cataclysmic event.** The unemployment rate, which stands at 7.7 percent, is not expected to fall below 7.4 percent by the end of this year, and not below 6 percent until at least 2016 or later.

**Default causes global econ collapse**

**Schwarcz 8/14**/13 (Steven L., Star Professor of Law & Business, and Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center, Duke University of School of Law, “Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2307569)

Yet the harm caused by a U.S. debt default, even if the default is temporary, could be devastating. It would raise government borrowing costs, not only for the United States but for nations worldwide. It would almost certainly have **severe systemic consequences, causing financial markets to plummet and credit markets to freeze**, making it difficult for companies to borrow.

**Default causes global econ collapse**

**Tanner 1/15**/13 (Michael D., Cato institute Senior Fellow, “The Overrated Debt Ceiling,” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/overrated-debt-ceiling?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoHomepageHeadlines+(Cato+Headlines)

Don’t get me wrong — **failure to raise the debt limit would not be a good thing.** **Financial markets would likely react badly. We could even see another downgrade of the U.S.’s credit rating. Increased uncertainty would further slow economic growth. Unknown potential consequences abound.**

#### T-bond crisis causes food price spikes

**Min 10** – Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy, Center for American Progress (David, "The Big Freeze", 10/28, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big\_freeze.html)](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big_freeze.html%29)

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96, a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world. Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally. Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems. The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy.Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth. In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability— perhaps even a global economic depression.

#### Global war

**Brown 7** – Director, Earth Policy Institute, (Lester R., 3-21, <http://www.earth-policy.org/press_room/C68/senateepw07>)

Urban food protests in response to rising food prices in low and middle income countries, such as Mexico, could lead to political instability that would add to the growing list of failing states. At some point, spreading political instability could disrupt global economic progress. Against this backdrop, Washington is consumed with "ethanol euphoria." President Bush in his State of the Union address set a production goal for 2017 of 35 billion gallons of alternative fuels, including grain-based and cellulosic ethanol, and fuel from coal. Given the current difficulties in producing cellulosic ethanol at a competitive cost and given the mounting public opposition to coal fuels, which are far more carbon-intensive than gasoline, most of the fuel to meet this goal might well have to come from grain. This could take most of the U.S. grain harvest, leaving little grain to meet U.S. needs, much less those of the hundred or so countries that import grain. The stage is now set for direct competition for grain between the 800 million people who own automobiles, and the world's 2 billion poorest people. The risk is that millions of those on the lower rungs of the global economic ladder will start falling off as rising food prices drop their consumption below the survival level.

#### Obama’s has capital to face down divided republicans on debt default

**Liasson 9-21**

(Mara Liasson is an American journalist and political pundit. She is the national political correspondent for National Public Radio and also a contributor at Fox News. “Have Obama's Troubles Weakened Him For Fall's Fiscal Fights?” 9-21-13 http://wwno.org/post/have-obamas-troubles-weakened-him-falls-fiscal-fights//wyoccd)

Manley says the president will be well-positioned to take on Republicans in those fiscal fights, "if only because ... their policies are so out of the mainstream that they won't enjoy any support on the Hill and/or with the American people."¶ **The plan to bomb Syria was extremely unpopular. But on budget issues, the president is on firmer footing with the public, who may not like Obamacare but don't want it repealed or defunded**.¶ So, in the House at least, Republicans are making demands the president cannot and will not meet.¶ "You have never seen, in the history of the United States, the debt ceiling or the threat of not raising the debt ceiling being used to extort a president or a governing party, and trying to force issues that have nothing to do with the budget and have nothing to do with the debt," Obama has said.¶ White House officials say Democrats will always have internal divisions, but right now they are nothing compared with the fights inside the GOP.¶ "**There is essentially a civil war brimming in the Republican Party right now**," says Dan Pfeiffer, the president's senior adviser.¶ Pfeiffer points to open warfare between Tea Party conservatives and moderates, and even between House and Senate conservatives, as Republicans struggle to settle on a viable budget strategy.¶ "**The important thing is, as we head into these budget battles this fall, Democrats ... are in lock-step about the way to approach this,**" he says, "which is that we are not going to negotiate on the debt ceiling — we're not going to allow the full faith and credit of the United States to be held hostage by the Republicans, who want to ... deny health insurance to millions of Americans. We're in lock-step and they're divided, so I feel pretty good about that."¶ Despite the setbacks of the spring and summer, **the Obama team is counting on the latent power of the presidency — one of the most resilient institutions in American life.**¶ **Unlike on Syria, Obama seems to have a budget strategy. He's hanging tough on his two red lines: no negotiations on the debt ceiling and no changes to Obamacare**.¶ **The president is willing for now to let the Republicans flirt with the unpopular and dangerous possibilities of a government shutdown and a debt default. It's a high-stakes game of chicken, and one where the White House feels confident it has the upper hand.**

#### He just needs to stay the course

**Robinson, 9/20**/13 – Washington Post columnist (Eugene, “Obama Needs to Stand His Ground” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/09/20/obama_needs_to_stand_his_ground_120003.html>)

Obama is by nature a reasonable and flexible man, but this time he must not yield. Even if you leave aside what delaying or defunding Obamacare would mean for his legacy -- erasing his most significant domestic accomplishment -- it would be irresponsible for him to bow to the GOP zealots' demands.¶ The practical impact of acquiescing would be huge. Individuals who have been uninsured are anticipating access to adequate care. State governments, insurance companies and health care providers have spent vast amounts of time and money preparing for the law to take effect. To suddenly say "never mind" would be unbelievably reckless.¶ The political implication of compromising with blackmailers would be an unthinkable surrender of presidential authority. The next time he said "I will do this" or "I will not do that," why should Congress or the American people take him seriously? How could that possibly enhance Obama's image on the world stage?¶ Obama has said he will not accept a budget deal that cripples Obamacare and will never negotiate on the debt ceiling. Even if the Republicans carry through with their threats -- and this may happen -- the president has no option but to stand his ground.¶ You don't deal with bullies by making a deal to keep the peace. That only rewards and encourages them. You have to push back.¶ The thing is, this showdown is a sure political loser for the GOP -- and smart Republicans know it. Boehner doesn't want this fight, and in fact should be grateful if Obama hangs tough and shows the crazies the limits of their power. Republicans in the Senate don't want this fight. It's doubtful that even a majority of House Republicans really, truly want this fight, no matter what they say publicly.¶ But irresponsible demagogues -- I mean you, Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas -- have whipped the GOP base into a frenzy of unrealistic expectations. House members who balk at jumping off the cliff risk being labeled "moderate," which is the very worst thing you can call a Republican -- and the most likely thing to shorten his or her political career.¶ The way to end this madness is by firmly saying no. If Boehner won't do it, Obama must.

#### GOP will blink on debt ceiling - political capital is key to drumming up public support to pressure the GOP

**Meet the Press, 9/15/13** (NBC News, lexis) **Woodward = Bob Woodward, investigative journalist.**

¶ GREGORY: Well, we`ll see.¶ But I want to bring up a point with about a minute left. You know, Syria is now going to get mired in whether this agreement is lived up to or not. We`ve got a budget battle that`s brewing again with the debt ceiling.¶ But, you think this is the next crisis that Obama is facing with Congress. Are we going to raise the debt ceiling? Will he negotiate? He says...¶ WOODWARD: And this is really serious. Back in 2011, when the crisis visited them, the Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner was running around and saying if we don`t fix this, we could trigger a depression worse than the 1930s. And when I talked to Obama about this, he said, it was the most intense three weeks of his presidency. More than Osama bin Laden and so forth.¶ So -- and the Republicans are out here, a group of them in the House, essentially using extortion and blackmail methods to say, if we don`t defund Obamacare we`re not going to do the routine things of government.¶ PARKER: Well, we`re at a game of chicken at this point. And they are not -- no one thinks they`re going to defund Obama, not even the people pushing for it.¶ And at some point, you know, the Republicans are going to have to blink and they`re going to fund it. If they pass a bill that doesn`t include funding for Obamacare, then the Senate won`t pass the bill and, you know, somebody`s got to blink. We`re not going to shut down government. We can`t.¶ NAVARRO: But let`s be I think fair to the Republicans here. It`s not all Republicans saying let`s shut down the government if we don`t defund Obamacare. So I don`t think it`s fair to paint it as the Republicans, because the Republicans that have been here today, including John McCain, have been very much against this and saying...¶ WOODWARD: Yes, it`s the 40 extremists that`s who`s doing it.¶ PARKER: The insane caucus.¶ WOODWARD: You used it.¶ GREGORY: We`ll leave it there.¶ NAVARRO: You`re going to get a lot of flak from mental health advocates.¶ PARKER: Never had that happen.¶ GREGORY: All right, thank you all very much. We`ll leave it there.¶ Coming up next the future of our economy five years after the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Among our guests, former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and CNBC`s Maria Bartiromo along with former Congresswoman Barney Frank on where we are five years later.¶ First our political collector Chuck Todd will be along with his "First Read Sunday." What to look for in the week ahead in politics. Back here in just a moment.¶ GREGORY: We`re back with more politics. Our political director Chuck Todd with his "First Read Sunday."¶ We just talked about the debt ceiling business. You`re looking at it this, this week. That of our poll.¶ CHUCK TODD, NBC NEWS CORRESPONDENT: We did. And we have a poll and we show the initial gauge of the public, the default position is don`t raise it. Look at this, 44 percent say no, 22 percent say yes. The White House pushing back on this poll saying you have to explain it to the people.¶ Well, this is the exact same place the debt ceiling was in April 2011.¶ Now, by the time if hit a crisis point, more of the public moved into in favor of raising the debt ceiling, but what this shows is the president has to use political capital and time to flip these numbers. It`s going to be a lot of work.

#### Perception of losing decks the president

Ornstein, 1 (Norman, American Enterprise Institute, September 10, Lexis)

The compromise accomplished two ends. First, it changed the agenda base of the issue. Patients' rights went from an issue where the only viable proposal was from Democrats (with GOP co-sponsors), which the President vowed to veto - to one where both Democrats and Bush are for patients' rights and merely differ on the details. Two, it gave the President a victory on the House floor when all the pundits predicted defeat - a major momentum builder. In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success - the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory - is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not.

**Current set of losses aren’t enough to sink his agenda – but another high profile loss will end it**

**Lawrence, 9/17/13 -** national correspondent at National Journal.(Jill, “Obama Says He’s Not Worried About Style Points. He Should Be.” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-says-he-s-not-worried-about-style-points-he-should-be-20130917>)

In some ways Obama's fifth year is typical of fifth years, when reelected presidents aim high and often fail. But in some ways it is atypical, notably in the number of failures, setbacks, and incompletes Obama has piled up. **Gun control and immigration reform are stalled. Two Obama favorites withdrew their names as potential nominees in the face of congressional opposition** – Susan Rice, once a frontrunner for secretary of state, followed by Larry Summers, a top candidate to head the Federal Reserve. Secretary of State John Kerry's possibly offhand remark about Assad giving up his chemical weapons, and Putin's jump into the arena with a diplomatic proposal, saved him from almost certain defeat on Capitol Hill. Edward Snowden set the national security establishment on its heels, then won temporary refuge from … Putin. It's far from clear how that will be resolved. And that's as true for the budget and debt-limit showdowns ahead. **Some of Obama's troubles are due to the intransigence of House conservatives**, and some may be inevitable in a world far less black and white than the one Reagan faced. **But the impression of ineffectiveness is the same.** "People don't like it when circumstances are dictating the way in which a president behaves. They want him to be the one in charge," says Dallek, who has written books about nine presidents, including Reagan and Franklin Roosevelt. "It's unfair… On the other hand, that's what goes with the territory. People expect presidents to be in command, and they can't always be in command, and the public is not forgiving." Obama's job approval numbers remain in the mid-40s. The farther they fall below 50 percent, history suggests, the worse he can expect Democrats to do in the midterm House and Senate elections next year. Obama would likely be in worse trouble with the public, at least in the short term, if he had pushed forward with a military strike in Syria. In fact, a new Pew Research Center poll shows 67 percent approve of Obama's switch to diplomacy. But his journey to that point made him look weak and indecisive. Indeed, **the year's setbacks are accumulating and that is dangerous for Obama. "At some point people make a collective decision and they don't listen to the president anymore.** **That's what happened to both Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush**," Cannon says. "**I don't think Obama has quite gone off the diving board yet** in the way that Carter or Bush did … **but he's close to the edge**. He needs to have some successes and perceptions of success."

#### Plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital

Loomis, 7 --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, ¶ In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. ¶ Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. ¶ The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.¶ This brief review of the literature suggests how legitimacy norms enhance presidential influence in ways that structural powers cannot explain. Correspondingly, increased executive power improves the prospects for policy success. As a variety of cases indicate—from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in Iraq—the effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As a result, policymakers—starting with the president—pay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.¶ **Political capital is finite --- the plan would tradeoff with domestic economic priorities** ¶ **Moore, 9/10** --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor¶ (Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” [http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester%29))¶ Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.¶ There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.¶ **The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.**¶ The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.¶ Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.¶ The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.¶ These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.¶ More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.¶ The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.¶ This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.¶ Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.¶ Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:¶ Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.¶ Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.¶ **Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that **congressional Republicans**, particularly in the House, **have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.**¶The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.¶ It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.¶ **There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda** that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.