# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation:

#### Targeted killings – premeditated acts of lethal force to eliminate specific individuals outside custody

Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor CFR, Backgrounder Targeted Killings, May 23, 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627>

According to a UN special report on the subject, targeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. "Targeted killing" is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained currency in 2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal force, usually undertaken by a nation's intelligence or armed services, can vary widely--from cruise missiles to drone strikes to special operations raids. The primary focus of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. operations have expanded in recent years to include countries such as Somalia and Yemen.

#### Indefinite detention is the authority to detain during hostilities

Glazier 6

Associate Professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, California David Glazier, ARTICLE: FULL AND FAIR BY WHAT MEASURE?: IDENTIFYING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW REGULATING MILITARY COMMISSION PROCEDURE, Boston University International Law Journal, Spring, 2006, 24 B.U. Int'l L.J. 55

President Bush’s decision to consider the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as an act of war has significant legal ramifications. Endorsed by Congress in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),1 this paradigm shift away from treating terrorism as a crime to treating terrorism as an armed conflict allows the United States to exercise “fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”2 Among these fundamental war powers are the authorities to detain enemy personnel for the duration of hostilities, to subject law of war violators to trials in military tribunals, and to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the full scope of the law of war, rather than over only those offenses defined in U.S. criminal statutes.3

#### Armed forces into hostilities refers to troops in kinetic operations

Healey and Wilson, 13

(“Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain” Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council. February 2013 Atlantic Council)

Subsequently, a few days before the ninety day outer limit of the WPR, the president provided to Congress a “supplemental consolidated report . . . consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” which reported on a number of ongoing deployments around the world, including the one in Libya.5 At the same time, the Pentagon and State Department sent congressional leaders a report with a legal analysis section justifying the non-application of the WPR, but also calling again for a congressional resolution supporting the war.6 Later, State Department legal adviser Harold Koh expanded upon this analysis in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that operations in Libya should not be considered relevant “hostilities” because there was no chance of US casualties, limited risk of escalation, no “active exchanges of fire,” and only “modest” levels of violence. It is apparent that in defining “hostilities” the administration’s focus is on kinetic operations passing a certain threshold of intensity: while there is no detailed indication in Koh’s testimony of what weight is to be accorded to each of the factors he enumerates, the overriding emphasis is on physical risk to US personnel. As Koh himself said, “we in no way advocate a legal theory that is indifferent to the loss of non-American lives. But . . . the Congress that adopted the War Powers Resolution was principally concerned with the safety of US forces.” The consequences for opposing forces, and for the foreign relations of the United States, matter less—or not at all. Libyan units were decimated by NATO airstrikes; indeed, it was a US strike that initially hit Muammar Gaddafi’s convoy in October 2011, leading directly to his capture and extra-legal execution. Significantly, though, the strike came not from an F-16 but from a pilotless Predator drone flown from a base in Nevada.8 The significance of this for present purposes is that, apparently, even an operation targeting a foreign head of state does not count as “hostilities,” provided there is no involvement of US troops. This is not a new view; indeed, Koh relied heavily on a memorandum from his predecessor in the Ford administration, which defined “hostilities” as “a situation in which units of the US armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.” This formulation would presumably exclude drone attacks and, most importantly for present purposes, remote cyber operations.7

the normal functioning of a computer system or network from the user’s

#### Offensive cyber operations refer to the destruction of computer information networks

Gellman and Nakishima, 8-30-13

[Washington post, U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, documents show, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814\_story.html] /Wyo-MB

U.S. agencies define offensive cyber-operations as activities intended “to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves,” according to a presidential directive issued in October 2012.

#### Violation: The affirmative doesn’t decrease war powers authority in targeted killing, indefinite detention, offensive cyber operations, or armed forces into hostilities

#### Reasons to prefer

#### Ground—arguments about restriction other war powers are neg counterplan ground, they test the necessity of the war power restrictions in the topic

#### Predictable limits—the topic is huge, 2 mechanisms and 4 areas is already large, expanding to additional war powers makes the topic skewed towards the affirmative in ways that make being negative impossible and unpredictable

#### Topic education—the questions of the 4 selected war powers should be prioritized, each debate lost detracts from education about those core issues

#### Prefer competing interpretations over reasonability

## 2

#### Interp: Having the “Based on a congressional assessment of national security threats “ is bad and extra topical

#### Violation: Nowhere in the topic does it indicate the need for congressional assessment of information

#### Ex-T is bad and a voting issue

#### Makes aff a moving target—allows the affirmative to avoid links to disadvantages or any argument by simply adding extra- topical portions of the plan, kills fairness and makes education impossible

#### Damages education—skews focus away from core question of the resolution and kills education

#### Voter for fairness and education

## 3

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should cease executive intelligence collection on issues that are not determined to be a significant threat to national security based on congressional assessments of national security threats. The president will comply with this mandate

#### Executive action is De Facto and De Jure self-binding create accountability from the courts and risk political alienation for going back on promises

Posner and Vermeule 2010 [Eric A. , Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and Editor of The Journal of Legal Studies; Adrian , Harvard Law Professor, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford Press, p. 138-139//wyo-sc]

Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.59 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is "yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can." Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.60 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of selfbinding: 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so. 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.61 However, there may be political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it. In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.

## 4

#### Obama’s political capital is key to ensure IMF reforms will be part of the Ukraine aid package which is key to secure the Ukrainian economy – secured foothold in senate, prominent conservative support, and mimics 2009 vote

Rogers 3-13

(David, congressional reporter for Politico. “IMF reforms get new life through Ukraine” 3-13-14 http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/international-monetary-fund-ukraine-russia-crimea-congress-104656.html//wyoccd)

Having secured a foothold in the Senate, allies of the International Monetary Fund are putting fresh energy into a campaign to enact long-delayed IMF reforms as part of a Ukrainian aid package before Congress.¶ House Republicans insist they will only approve loan guarantees for Ukraine — not the reforms. But as a practical matter, no Western aid package can move ahead without the IMF, and the fund’s backers say that loans without reforms is like putting gas in a car without checking the engine’s oil.¶ After sitting out an earlier skirmish in January, James Baker, a right-hand man for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, came off the sidelines this week in support of including the IMF provisions in the Ukraine package.¶ (Also on POLITICO: John Kerry: Include IMF changes in Ukraine package)¶ The Fund’s managing director, Christine Lagarde, has worked the issue steadily in private conversations with top lawmakers. And Secretary of State John Kerry weighed in more forcefully this week alongside Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, even as the IMF language survived a 13-4 vote Wednesday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¶ “It is only through the IMF, a reformed IMF, that Ukraine is going to receive the additional help it needs in order to stand on its own two feet,” Kerry told the House Appropriations Committee. Across the Capitol, Lew met resistance from Senate Budget Committee Republicans but warned that the U.S. would hurt itself if it failed to enact the reforms — negotiated more than three years ago.¶ The IMF is “the first responder. It is the foundation,” Lew said of the Ukraine aid package. “We as the leading voice — we hold the veto power in the IMF — have the ability to drive the IMF to do what it needs to do in situations like this. Clearly the reforms strengthen our voice. Not approving them weakens our voice.”¶ Congress is going home now for a week-long recess, during which the IMF, which has had a fact-finding mission in Ukraine since March 4, will begin negotiations with the government in Kiev on what assistance is possible. In a statement late Thursday, Lagarde set a goal of completing that mission by March 21 and the goal will be “to develop an economic reform program that will result in sound economic governance and sustainable growth while protecting the vulnerable in society.”.¶ The fact that there will be new elections — and perhaps new leaders — this spring makes the IMF’s task more complicated. And Ukraine brings to the table a record of poor performance in its past dealings with the Fund.¶ All this argues for Congress to do more to help the IMF — given the partnership Washington wants to help Ukraine. But the politics are brutal and not unlike a 2009 fight over IMF funding attached then to a wartime appropriations bill.¶ In that case too, President Barack Obama won first in May 2009 in the Senate and then prevailed in conference with the House. But it took all Obama’s power to win a gritty, 226-202 June 2009 vote.

#### Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital – trades off with IMF reforms

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 **In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61 **When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Without IMF reforms and aid the Ukrainian economy will collapse within the next few months and the global economy will follow suit

Thompson and Wallace 3-3

(Mark and Gregory, international editor at CNN Money. “Ukraine crisis: Why it matters to the world economy” 3-3-14 http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/02/news/economy/ukraine-economy///wyoccd)

While the world watches the escalating crisis in Ukraine, investors and world leaders are considering how the instability could roil the global economy.¶ The political turmoil is rooted in the country's strategic economic position. It is an important conduit between Russia and major European markets, as well as a significant exporter of grain.¶ But in the post-Soviet era, it's a weakened economy. Now, the government is in need of an economic rescue -- and torn between whether Russia or the Western economies (including the European Union) is the savior it needs.¶ Here are five reasons the world's largest economies are watching what happens in Ukraine.¶ 1. Ukraine is an important tie between Russia and the rest of Europe: Ukraine doesn't hold the economic power it once did, but it does retain its geography. Russia supplies about 25% of Europe's gas needs, and half of that is pumped via pipelines running through Ukraine. Moscow has cut off that flow in past disputes with Kiev and a disruption could push up energy prices for businesses and households.¶ The critical Crimean peninsula juts into the Black Sea, and the Russians base their Black Sea navy there.¶ Related: Russian markets take a beating¶ 2. Sanctions on Russia: One prospect on the table would be the unusual circumstance of a top-10 global economy placing sanctions on another. But Secretary of State John Kerry said Sunday the U.S. is "absolutely" willing to consider sanctions against Russia. President Obama, he added, "is currently considering all options."¶ That possibility must be on the mind of Russia's government, which is certainly "looking very seriously at the economic component of" its military and diplomatic moves, said John Beyrle, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia.¶ "The reality is that Russia is dependent on the international economy in a way that wasn't true 10 years ago," Beyrle said Sunday on CNN's "State of the Union." "Fully one -half of Russia's foreign trade now ... is with European Union countries. Russia depends on European imports to keep its stores filled, to keep the standard of living that Russians have gotten accustomed to."¶ Even if sanctions aren't leveled, the political relationship between Russia and the West will likely chill. Although President Obama spent an hour and a half on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday, the U.S. is expected to skip an upcoming G8 preparatory meeting in Sochi, Russia. On Sunday, U.S. officials also canceled upcoming energy and trade talks with their Russian counterparts.¶ Related: Russia tells Western critics to put Ukrainian people first¶ 3. European and world trade could be impacted: The impact could be felt beyond Europe if the world's supply of grain is impacted. Ukraine is one of the world's top exporters of corn and wheat, and prices could rise even on concern those exports could halt.¶ And the current political uprising was fueled by the government's handling of a trade agreement that would have brought Ukraine closer to the European Union. The government cut off negotiations in November amid pressure from Russia, which offered discounts on natural gas if Ukraine signed a pact with Moscow's Customs Union.¶ 4. Ukraine's government is in debt and needs assistance: The situation arguably would not be so volatile if Ukranian government coffers were more stable or the economy stronger. The country owes $13 billion in debt this year and $16 billion comes due before the end of 2015. Without help, the country appears to be headed for default.¶ "In order to avoid a complete collapse in the coming weeks, Ukraine needs money now," Lubomir Mitov, emerging Europe chief economist at the Institute of International Finance, said. "Ukraine cannot survive without reforms in the next few months."¶ It's not clear who would supply the needed economic assistance, especially after the ouster of key Russian-aligned officials prompted Moscow to freeze a $15 billion bailout and there is no comparable alternative in sight.¶ The most likely source of support would be the International Monetary Fund. Managing Director Christine Lagarde said the IMF is consulting with other bodies that could help raise the $35 billion Ukraine says it needs.¶ The IMF said Monday that it would begin a fact-finding mission in Kiev starting Tuesday and concluding on March 14 to "discuss the policy reforms" that world body would require as part of any loan.¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said Sunday the U.S. is "prepared to work (with) partners to provide as much support as Ukraine needs" for economic growth and stability.¶ Related: Global stocks tumble¶ 5. Ukraine isn't the only fragile emerging market: Ukraine's instability comes at a difficult time for emerging markets worldwide, which are seeing growth slow as the Federal Reserve eases its economic stimulus. The situation in Ukraine could lead investors to reassess the risks of other emerging markets slowing economic growth. Troubles in Ukraine will also hurt Russian banks, which have leant heavily to Ukraine. The Russian ruble is down about 10% since the start of 2014.

**Nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows ‘9**

**(**Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever**. While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies** (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the **sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that **become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed Iran **could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an** unintended escalation **and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to** escalatingcrises**.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge**, particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If** the **fiscal stimulus focus for** these **countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water** also **becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

## 5

**The plan would uniquely decimate Obama and the military’s ability to calm alliances and deter enemies ---- makes terrorism and global nuclear war more likely**

**WAXMAN 2013** - law professor at Columbia Law School, co-chairs the Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security (Matthew Waxman, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” August 27, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2316777)

As a prescriptive matter, Part II also shows that examination of threatened force and the credibility requirements for its effectiveness calls into question many orthodoxies of the policy advantages and risks attendant to various allocations of legal war powers, including the existing one and proposed reforms.23 Most functional arguments about war powers focus on fighting wars or hostile engagements, but that is not all – or even predominantly – what the United States does with its military power. Much of the time it seeks to avert such clashes while achieving its foreign policy objectives: to bargain, coerce, deter.24 The President’s flexibility to use force in turn affects decision-making about threatening it, with major implications for securing peace or dragging the United States into conflicts. Moreover, constitutional war power allocations affect potential conflicts not only because they **may constrain U.S. actions** but because **they** maysend **signal**s **and shape** other states’ (including adversaries’) expectations of U.S. actions.25 That is, most analysis of war-powers law is inward-looking, focused on audiences internal to the U.S. government and polity, but thinking about threatened force prompts us to look outward, at how war-powers law affects external perceptions among adversaries and allies. Here, extant political science and strategic studies offer few clear conclusions, but they point the way toward more sophisticated and realistic policy assessment of legal doctrine and proposed reform. More generally, as explained in Part III, analysis of threatened force and war powers exposes an under-appreciated relationship between constitutional doctrine and grand strategy. Instead of proposing a functionally optimal allocation of legal powers, as legal scholars are often tempted to do, this Article in the end denies the tenability of any such claim. Having identified new spaces of war and peace powers that legal scholars need to take account of in understanding how those powers are really exercised, this Article also highlights the extent to which any normative account of the proper distribution of authority over this area depends on many matters that cannot be predicted in advance or expected to remain constant.26 Instead of proposing a policy-optimal solution, this Article concludes that the allocation of constitutional war powers is – and should be –geopolitically and strategically contingent; the actual and effective balance between presidential and congressional powers over war and peace in practice necessarily depends on fundamental assumptions and shifting policy choices about how best to secure U.S. interests against potential threats.27 I. Constitutional War Powers and Threats of Force Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are immensely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates about constitutional war powers occupy so much space. But one of the most common and important ways that the United States uses its military power is by threatening war or force – and the constitutional dimensions of that activity receive almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation. A. War Powers Doctrine and Debates The Constitution grants Congress the powers to create military forces and to “declare war,”28 which the Supreme Court early on made clear includes the power to authorize limited uses of force short of full-blown war.29 The Constitution then vests the President with executive power and designates him commander in chief of the armed forces,30 and it has been well-accepted since the Founding that these powers include unilateral authority to repel invasions if the United States is attacked.31 Although there is nearly universal acceptance of these basic starting points, there is little legal agreement about how the Constitution allocates responsibility for the vast bulk of cases in which the United States has actually resorted to force. The United States has declared war or been invaded only a handful of times in its history, but it has used force – sometimes large-scale force – hundreds of other times.32 Views split over questions like when, if ever, the President may use force to deal with aggression against third parties and how much unilateral discretion the President has to use limited force short of full-blown war. For many lawyers and legal scholars, at least one important methodological tool for resolving such questions is to look at historical practice, and especially the extent to which the political branches acquiesced in common practices.33 Interpretation of that historical practice for constitutional purposes again divides legal scholars, but most would agree at least descriptively on some basic parts of that history. In particular, most scholars assess that from the Founding era through World War II, Presidents and Congresses alike recognized through their behavior and statements that except in certain narrow types of contingencies, congressional authorization was required for large-scale military operations against other states and international actors, even as many Presidents pushed and sometimes crossed those boundaries.34 Whatever constitutional constraints on presidential use of force existed prior to World War II, however, most scholars also note that the President asserted much more extensive unilateral powers to use force during and after the Cold War, and many trace the turning point to the 1950 Korean War.35 Congress did not declare war in that instance, nor did it expressly authorize U.S. participation.36 From that point forward, presidents have asserted broad unilateral authority to use force to address threats to U.S. interests, including threats to U.S. allies, and that neither Congress nor courts pushed back much against this expanding power.37 Concerns about expansive presidential war-making authority spiked during the Vietnam War. In the wind-down of that conflict, Congress passed – over President Nixon’s veto – the War Powers Resolution,38 which stated its purpose as to ensure the constitutional Founders’ original vision that the “collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.”39 Since then, presidentialists have argued that the President still retains expansive authority to use force abroad to protect American interests,40 and congressionalists argue that this authority is tightly circumscribed.41 These constitutional debates have continued through the first decade of the 21st century. Constitutional scholars split, for example, over President Obama’s power to participate in coalition operations against Libya without congressional authorization in 2011, especially after the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day clock expired.42 Some argue that President Obama’s use of military force without specific congressional authorization in that case **reflects the broad constitutional discretion presidents** now **have** to protect American interests, at least short of full-blown “war”, while others argue that it is the latest in a long record of presidential violations of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.43 B. Threats of Force and Constitutional Powers These days it is usually taken for granted that – whether or not he can make war unilaterally – the President is constitutionally empowered to threaten the use of force, implicitly or explicitly, through diplomatic means or shows of force. It is never seriously contested whether the President may declare that United States is contemplating military options in response to a crisis, or whether the President may move substantial U.S. military forces to a crisis region or engage in military exercises there. To take the Libya example just mentioned, is there any constitutional limitation on the President’s authority to move U.S. military forces to the Mediterranean region and prepare them very visibly to strike?44 Or his authority to issue an ultimatum to Libyan leaders that they cease their brutal conduct or else face military action? Would it matter whether such threats were explicit versus implicit, whether they were open and public versus secret, or whether they were just a bluff? If not a constitutional obstacle, could it be argued that the War Powers Resolution’s reporting requirements and limits on operations were triggered by a President’s mere ultimatum or threatening military demonstration, insofar as those moves might constitute a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”? These questions simply are not asked (at least not anymore).45 If anything, most lawyers would probably conclude that the President’s constitutional powers to threaten war **are not just expansive but largely beyond Congress’s authority** to regulate directly. From a constitutional standpoint, to the extent it is considered at all, the President’s power to threaten force is probably regarded to be at least as broad as his power to use it. One way to look at it is that the power to threaten force is a lesser included element of presidential war powers; the power to threaten to use force is simply a secondary question, the answer to which is bounded by the primary issue of the scope of presidential power to actually use it. If one interprets the President’s defensive war powers very broadly, to include dealing with aggression not only directed against U.S. territories but also against third parties,46 then it might seem easy to conclude that the President can also therefore take steps that stop short of actual armed intervention to deter or prevent such aggression. If, however, one interprets the President’s powers narrowly, for example, to include only limited unilateral authority to repel attacks against U.S. territory,47 then one might expect objections to arguably excessive presidential power to include his unilateral threats of armed intervention. Another way of looking at it is that in many cases, threats of war or force might fall within even quite narrow interpretations of the President’s inherent foreign relations powers to conduct diplomacy or his express commander in chief power to control U.S. military forces – or some combination of the two – depending on how a particular threat is communicated. A President’s verbal warning, ultimatum, or declared intention to use military force, for instance, could be seen as merely exercising his role as the “sole organ” of U.S. foreign diplomacy, conveying externally information about U.S. capabilities and intentions.48 A president’s movement of U.S. troops or warships to a crisis region or elevation of their alert level could be seen as merely exercising his dayto- day tactical control over forces under his command.49 Generally it is not seriously contested whether the exercise of these powers alone could so affect the likelihood of hostilities or war as to intrude on Congress’s powers over war and peace.50 We know from historical examples that such unilateral military moves, even those that are ostensibly pure defensive ones, can provoke wars – take, for example, President Polk’s movement of U.S. forces to the contested border with Mexico in 1846, and the resulting skirmishes that led Congress to declare war.51 Coming at the issue from Congress’s Article I powers rather than the President’s Article II powers, the very phrasing of the power “To declare War” puts most naturally all the emphasis on the present tense of U.S. military action, rather than its potentiality. Even as congressionalists advance interpretations of the clause to include not merely declarative authority but primary decision-making authority as to whether or not to wage war or use force abroad, their modern-day interpretations do not include a power to threaten war (except perhaps through the specific act of declaring it). None seriously argues – at least not any more – that the Declare War Clause precludes presidential threats of war. This was not always the case. During the early period of the Republic, there was a powerful view that beyond outright initiation of armed hostilities or declaration of war, more broadly the President also could not unilaterally take actions (putting aside actual military attacks) that would likely or directly risk war,52 provoke a war with another state,53 or change the condition of affairs or relations with another state along the continuum from peace to war.54 To do so, it was often argued, would usurp Congress’s prerogative to control the nation’s state of peace or war.55 During the Quasi-War with France at the end of the 18th century, for example, some members of Congress questioned whether the President, absent congressional authorization, could take actions that visibly signaled an intention to retaliate against French maritime harassment,56 and even some members of President Adams’ cabinet shared doubts.57 Some questions over the President’s power to threaten force arose (eventually) in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, announced in an 1823 presidential address to Congress and which in effect declared to European powers that the United States would oppose any efforts to colonize or reassert control in the Western Hemisphere.58 “Virtually no one questioned [Monroe’s proclamation] at the time. Yet it posed a constitutional difficulty of the first importance.”59 Of course, Monroe did not actually initiate any military hostilities, but his implied threat – without congressional action – risked provoking rather than deterring European aggression and by putting U.S. prestige and credibility on the line it limited Congress’s practical freedom of action if European powers chose to intervene.60 The United States would have had at the time to rely on British naval power to make good on that tacit threat, though a more assertive role for the President in wielding the potential for war or intervention during this period went hand in hand with a more sustained projection of U.S. power beyond its borders, especially in dealing with dangers emanating from Spanish-held Florida territory.61 Monroe’s successor, John Quincy Adams, faced complaints from opposition members of Congress that Monroe’s proclamation had exceeded his constitutional authority and had usurped Congress’s by committing the United States – even in a non-binding way – to resisting European meddling in the hemisphere.62 The question whether the President could unilaterally send militarily-threatening signals was in some respects a mirror image of the issues raised soon after the Constitution was ratified during the 1793 Neutrality Controversy: could President Washington unilaterally declare the United States to be neutral as to the war among European powers. Washington’s politically controversial proclamation declaring the nation “friendly and impartial” in the conflict between France and Great Britain (along with other European states) famously prompted a back-and-forth contest of public letters by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, writing pseudonymously as “Pacificus” and “Helvidius”, about whether the President had such unilateral power or whether it belonged to Congress.63 Legal historian David Currie points out the irony that the neutrality proclamation was met with stronger and more immediate constitutional scrutiny and criticism than was Monroe’s threat. After all, Washington’s action accorded with the principle that only Congress, representing popular will, should be able to take the country from the baseline state of peace to war, whereas Monroe’s action seemed (at least superficially) to commit it to a war that Congress had not approved.64 Curiously (though for reasons offered below, perhaps not surprisingly) this issue – whether there are constitutional limits on the President’s power to threaten war – has almost vanished completely from legal discussion, and that evaporation occurred even before the dramatic post-war expansion in asserted presidential power to make war. Just prior to World War II, political scientist and presidential powers theorist Edward Corwin remarked that “[o]f course, it may be argued, and has in fact been argued many times, that the President is under constitutional obligation not to incur the risk of war in the prosecution of a diplomatic policy without first consulting Congress and getting its consent.”65 “Nevertheless,” he continued,66 “the supposed principle is clearly a maxim of policy rather than a generalization from consistent practice.” In his 1945 study World Policing and the Constitution, James Grafton Rogers noted: [E]xamples of demonstrations on land and sea made for a variety of purposes and under Presidents of varied temper and in different political climates will suffice to make the point. The Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution can display our military resources and threaten their use whenever he thinks best. The weakness in the **diplomatic weapon** is the possibility of **dissidence at home** which may cast doubt on our serious intent. The danger of the weapon is war.67 At least since then, however, the importance to U.S. foreign policy of threatened force has increased dramatically, while legal questions about it have receded further from discussion. In recent decades a few prominent legal scholars have addressed the President’s power to threaten force, though in only brief terms.

Taylor Reveley noted in his volume on war powers the importance of allocating constitutional responsibility not only for the actual use of force but also “[v]erbal or written threats or assurances about the circumstances in which the United States will take military action …, whether delivered by declarations of American policy, through formal agreements with foreign entities, by the demeanor or words of American officials, or by some other sign of national intent.”68 Beyond recognizing the critical importance of threats and other non-military actions in affecting war and peace, however, Reveley made little effort to address the issue in any detail. Among the few legal scholars attempting to define the limiting doctrinal contours of presidentially threatened force, Louis Henkin wrote in his monumental Foreign Affairs and the Constitution that: Unfortunately, the line between war and lesser uses of force is often elusive, sometimes illusory, and the use of force for foreign policy purposes can almost imperceptibly become a national commitment to war. Even when he does not use military force, the President can incite other nations or otherwise plunge or stumble this country into war, or force the hand of Congress to declare or to acquiesce and cooperate in war. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, however, one can declare with confidence that a President begins to exceed his authority if he willfully or recklessly moves the nation towards war…69 The implication seems to be that the President may not unilaterally threaten force in ways that are dramatically escalatory and could likely lead to war, or perhaps that the President may not unilaterally threaten the use of force that he does not have the authority to initiate unilaterally.70 Jefferson Powell, who generally takes a more expansive view than Henkin of the President’s war powers, argues by contrast that “[t]he ability to warn of, or threaten, the use of military force is an ordinary and essential element in the toolbox of that branch of government empowered to formulate and implement foreign policy.”71 For Powell, the President is constantly taking actions as part of everyday international relations that carry a risk of military escalation, and these are well-accepted as part of the President’s broader authority to manage, if not set, foreign policy. Such brief mentions are in recent times among the rare exceptions to otherwise barren constitutional discussion of presidential powers to threaten force. That the President’s authority to threaten force is so well-accepted these days as to seem self-evident is not just an academic phenomenon. It is also reflected in the legal debates among and inside all three branches of government. In 1989, Michael Reisman observed: Military maneuvers designed to convey commitment to allies or contingent threats to adversaries … **are matters of presidential competence**. Congress does not appear to view as within its bailiwick many low-profile contemporaneous expressions of gunboat diplomacy, i.e., the physical interposition of some U.S. war-making capacity as communication to an adversary of United States’ intentions and capacities to oppose it.72 This was and remains a correct description but understates the pattern of practice, insofar as even major and high-profile expressions of coercive diplomacy are regarded among all three branches of government as within presidential competence. In Dellums v. Bush – perhaps the most assertive judicial scrutiny of presidential power to use large-scale force abroad since the end of the Cold War – the district court dismissed on ripeness grounds congressmembers’ suit challenging President George H. W. Bush’s intended military operations against Iraq in 1991 and seeking to prevent him from initiating an offensive attack against Iraq without first securing explicit congressional authorization for such action.73 That at the time of the suit the President had openly threatened war – through ultimatums and deployment of several hundred thousand U.S. troops – but had not yet “committed to a definitive course of action” to carry out the threat meant there was no justiciable legal issue, held the court.74 The President’s threat of war did not seem to give the district court legal pause at all; quite the contrary, the mere threat of war was treated by the court as a non-issue entirely.75 There are several reasons why constitutional questions about threatened force have dropped out of legal discussions. First, the more politically salient debate about the President’s unilateral power to use force has probably swallowed up this seemingly secondary issue. As explained below, it is a mistake to view threats as secondary in importance to uses of force, but they do not command the same political attention and their impacts are harder to measure.76 Second, the expansion of American power after World War II, combined with the growth of peacetime military forces and a set of defense alliance commitments (developments that are elaborated below) make at least some threat of force much more common – in the case of defensive alliances and some deterrent policies, virtually constant – and difficult to distinguish from other forms of everyday diplomacy and security policy.77 Besides, for political and diplomatic reasons, presidents rarely threaten war or intervention without at least a little deliberate ambiguity. As historian Marc Trachtenberg puts it: “It often makes sense … to muddy the waters a bit and avoid direct threats.”78 Any legal lines one might try to draw (recall early attempts to restrict the President’s unilateral authority to alter the state of affairs along the peacetime-wartime continuum) have become blurrier and blurrier. In sum, if the constitutional power to threaten war ever posed a serious legal controversy, it does so no more. As the following section explains, however, threats of war and armed force have during most of our history become a greater and greater part of American grand strategy, defined here as long-term policies for using the country’s military and non-military power to achieve national goals. The prominent role of threatened force in U.S. strategy has become the focus of political scientists and other students of security strategy, crises, and responses – but constitutional study has not adjusted accordingly.79 C. Threats of Force and U.S. Grand Strategy While the Korean and Vietnam Wars were generating intense study among lawyers and legal scholars about constitutional authority to wage military actions abroad, during that same period many political scientists and strategists – economists, historians, statesmen, and others who studied international conflict – turned their focus to the role of threatened force as an instrument of foreign policy. The United States was building and sustaining a massive war-fighting apparatus, but its security policy was not oriented primarily around waging or winning wars but around deterring them and using the threat of war – including demonstrative military actions – to advance U.S. security interests. It was the potential of U.S. military might, not its direct application or engagement with the enemy, that would do much of the heavy lifting. U.S. military power would be used to deter the Soviet Union and other hostile states from taking aggressive action. It would be unsheathed to prompt them to back down over disputes. It would reassure allies that they could depend on U.S. help in defending themselves. All this required that U.S. willingness to go to war be credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies alike. Much of the early Cold War study of threatened force concerned nuclear strategy, and especially deterrence or escalation of nuclear war. Works by Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and others not only studied but shaped the strategy of nuclear threats, as well as how to use limited applications of force or threats of force to pursue strategic interests in remote parts of the globe without sparking massive conflagrations.80 As the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”81 Toward that end, U.S. government security and defense planners during this time focused heavily on preserving and improving the credibility of U.S. military threats – while the Soviet Union was doing likewise.82 The Truman administration developed a militarized version of containment strategy against the Soviet empire, emphasizing that stronger military capabilities were necessary to prevent the Soviets from seizing the initiative and to resist its aggressive probes: “it is clear,” according to NSC-68, the government document which encapsulated that strategy, “that a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is necessary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination.”83 The Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” policy and doctrine of “massive retaliation” emphasized making Western collective security both more effective and less costly by placing greater reliance on deterrent threats – including threatened escalation to general or nuclear war. As his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained, “[t]here is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.”84 As described in Evan Thomas’s recent book, Ike’s Bluff, Eisenhower managed to convince Soviet leaders that he was ready to use nuclear weapons to check their advance in Europe and elsewhere. In part due to concerns that threats of massive retaliation might be insufficiently credible in Soviet eyes (especially with respect to U.S. interests perceived as peripheral), the Kennedy administration in 1961 shifted toward a strategy of “flexible response,” which relied on the development of a wider spectrum of military options that could quickly and efficiently deliver varying degrees of force in response to foreign aggression.85 Throughout these periods, the President often resorted to discrete, limited uses of force to demonstrate U.S. willingness to escalate. For example, in 1961 the Kennedy administration (mostly successfully in the short-run) deployed intervention-ready military force immediately off the coast of the Dominican Republic to compel its government's ouster,86 and that same year it used military exercises and shows of force in ending the Berlin crisis;87 in 1964, the Johnson administration unsuccessfully used air strikes on North Vietnamese targets following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, failing to deter what it viewed as further North Vietnamese aggression.88 The point here is not the shifting details of U.S. strategy after World War II – during this era of dramatic expansion in asserted presidential war powers – but the central role of credible threats of war in it, as well as the interrelationship of plans for using force and credible threats to do so. Also during this period, the United States abandoned its long-standing aversion to “entangling alliances,”89 and committed to a network of mutual defense treaties with dependent allies. Besides the global collective security arrangement enshrined in the UN Charter, the United States committed soon after World War II to mutual defense pacts with, for example, groups of states in Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)90 and Asia (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,91 as well as a bilateral defense agreement with the Republic of Korea,92 Japan,93 and the Republic of China,94 among others). These alliance commitments were part of a U.S. effort to “extend” deterrence of Communist bloc aggression far beyond its own borders.95 “Extended deterrence” was also critical to reassuring these U.S. allies that their security needs would be met, in some instances to head off their own dangerous rearmament.96 Among the leading academic works on strategy of the 1960s and 70s were those of Thomas Schelling, who developed the theoretical structure of coercion theory, arguing that rational states routinely use the threat of military force – the manipulation of an adversary’s perceptions of future risks and costs with military threats – as a significant component of their diplomacy.97 Schelling distinguished between deterrence (the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from taking undesired action) and compellence (the use of threats to persuade an adversary to behave a certain way), and he distinguished both forms of coercion from brute force: “[B]rute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage to come that can make someone yield of comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice.”98 Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons then led the way in taking a more empirical approach, reviewing case studies to draw insights about the success and failure of U.S. coercive threats, analyzing contextual variables and their effects on parties’ reactions to threats during crises. Among their goals was to generate lessons informed by history for successful strategies that combine diplomatic efforts with threats or demonstrations of force, recognizing that the United States was relying heavily on threatened force in addressing security crises. Coercive diplomacy – if successful – offered ways to do so with minimal actual application of military force.99 One of the most influential studies that followed was Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, a Brookings Institution study led by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan and published in 1977.100 They studied “political uses of force”, defined as actions by U.S. military forces “as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continued contest of violence.”101 Blechman and Kaplan’s work, including their large data set and collected case studies, was important for showing the many ways that threatened force could support U.S. security policy. Besides deterrence and compellence, threats of force were used to assure allies (thereby, for example, avoiding their own drive toward militarization of policies or crises) and to induce third parties to behave certain ways (such as contributing to diplomatic resolution of crises). The record of success in relying on threatened force has been quite mixed, they showed. Blechman and Kaplan’s work, and that of others who built upon it through the end of the Cold War and the period that has followed,102 helped understand the factors that correlated with successful threats or demonstrations of force without resort or escalation to war, especially the importance of credible signals.103 After the Cold War, the United States continued to rely on coercive force – threatened force to deter or compel behavior by other actors – as a central pillar of its grand strategy. During the 1990s, the United States wielded coercive power with varied results against rogue actors in many cases that, without the overlay of superpower enmities, were considered secondary or peripheral, not vital, interests: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere. For analysts of U.S. national security policy, a major puzzle was reconciling the fact that the United States possessed overwhelming military superiority in raw terms over any rivals with its difficult time during this era in compelling changes in their behavior.104 As Daniel Byman and I wrote about that decade in our study of threats of force and American foreign policy: U.S. conventional and nuclear forces dwarf those of any adversaries, and the U.S. economy remains the largest and most robust in the world. Because of these overwhelming advantages, the United States can threaten any conceivable adversary with little danger of a major defeat or even significant retaliation. Yet coercion remains difficult. Despite the United States’ lopsided edge in raw strength, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. In confrontations with Somali militants, Serb nationalists, and an Iraqi dictator, the U.S. and allied record or coercion has been mixed over recent years…. Despite its mixed record of success, however, coercion will remain a critical element of U.S. foreign policy.105 One important factor that seemed to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. coercive threats during this period was that many adversaries perceived the United States as still afflicted with “Vietnam Syndrome,” unwilling to make good on its military threats and see military operations through.106 Since the turn of the 21st Century, major U.S. security challenges have included non-state terrorist threats, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and rapidly changing power balances in East Asia, and the United States has accordingly been reorienting but retaining its strategic reliance on threatened force. The Bush Administration’s “preemption doctrine” was premised on the idea that some dangerous actors – including terrorist organizations and some states seeking WMD arsenals – are undeterrable, so the United States might have to strike them first rather than waiting to be struck.107 On one hand, this was a move away from reliance on threatened force: “[t]he inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit” a reactive posture.108 Yet the very enunciation of such a policy – that “[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”109 – was intended to persuade those adversaries to alter their policies that the United States regarded as destabilizing and threatening. Although the Obama administration pulled back from this rhetoric and placed greater emphasis on international institutions, it has continued to rely on threatened force as a key pillar of its strategy with regard to deterring threats (such as aggressive Iranian moves), intervening in humanitarian crises (as in Libya), and reassuring allies.110 With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military force is a significant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North Korean aggression as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, to avert a destabilizing arms race.111 D. The Disconnect Between Constitutional Discourse and Strategy There is a major disconnect between the decades of work by strategists and many political scientists on American security policy and practice since the Second World War and legal analysis and scholarship of constitutional war powers during that period. Lawyers and strategists have been relying on not only distinct languages but distinct logics of military force – in short, when it comes to using U.S. military power, lawyers think in terms of “going to war” while strategists focus on potential war and processes leading to it. These framings manifest in differing theoretical starting points for considering how exercises of U.S. military might affect war and peace, and they skew the empirical insights and normative prescriptions about Presidential power often drawn from their analyses. 1. Lawyers’ Misframing Lawyers’ focus on actual uses of force – especially engagements with enemy military forces – as constitutionally salient, rather than including threats of force in their understanding of modern presidential powers tilts analysis toward a one-dimensional strategic logic, rather than a more complex and multi-dimensional and dynamic logic in which the credible will to use force is as important as the capacity to do so. As discussed above, early American constitutional thinkers and practitioners generally wanted to slow down with institutional checks decisions to go to war, because they thought that would make war less likely. “To invoke a more contemporary image,” wrote John Hart Ely of their vision, “it takes more than one key to launch a missile: It should take quite a number to start a war.”112 They also viewed the exercise of military power as generally a ratchet of hostilities, whereby as the intensity of authorized or deployed force increased, so generally did the state of hostilities between the United States and other parties move along a continuum from peace to war.113 Echoes of this logic still reverberate in modern congressionalist legal scholarship: the more flexibly the President can use military force, the more likely it is that the United States will find itself in wars; better, therefore, to clog decisions to make war with legislative checks.114 Modern presidentialist legal scholars usually respond that rapid action is a virtue, not a vice, in exercising military force.115 Especially as a superpower with global interests and facing global threats, presidential discretion to take rapid military **action** – endowed with what Alexander Hamilton called “[**d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch**”116 – **best protects American interests**. In either case the emphasis tends overwhelmingly to be placed on actual military engagements with adversaries. Strategists and many political scientists, by contrast, view some of the most significant use of military power as starting well before armed forces clash – and including important cases in which they never actually do. Coercive diplomacy and strategies of threatened force, they recognize, often involve a set of moves and countermoves by opposing sides and third parties before or even without the violent engagement of opposing forces. It is often the parties’ perceptions of anticipated actions and costs, not the actual carrying through of violence, that have the greatest impact on the course of events and resolution or escalation of crises. Instead of a ratchet of escalating hostilities, the flexing of military muscle can increase as well as decrease actual hostilities, inflame as well as stabilize relations with rivals or enemies. Moreover, those effects are determined not just by U.S. moves but by the responses of other parties to them – or even to anticipated U.S. moves and countermoves.117 Indeed, as Schelling observed, strategies of brinkmanship sometimes operate by “the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.”118 This insight – that effective strategies of threatened force involve not only great uncertainty about the adversary’s responses but also sometimes involve intentionally creating risk of inadvertent escalation119 – poses a difficult challenge for any effort to cabin legally the President’s power to threaten force in terms of likelihood of war or some due standard of care.120 2. Lawyers’ Selection Problems Methodologically, a lawyerly focus on actual uses of force – a list of which would then commonly be used to consider which ones were or were not authorized by Congress – vastly undercounts the instances in which presidents wield U.S. military might. It is already recognized by some legal scholars that studying actual uses of force risks ignoring instances in which President contemplated force but refrained from using it, whether because of political, congressional, or other constraints.121 The point here is a different one: that some of the most significant (and, in many instances, successful) presidential decisions to threaten force do not show up in legal studies of presidential war powers that consider actual deployment or engagement of U.S. military forces as the relevant data set. Moreover, some actual uses of force, whether authorized by Congress or not, were preceded by threats of force; in some cases these threats may have failed on their own to resolve the crisis, and in other cases they may have precipitated escalation. To the extent that lawyers are interested in understanding from historical practice what war powers the political branches thought they had and how well that understanding worked, they are excluding important cases. Consider, as an illustration of this difference in methodological starting point, that for the period of 1946-1975 (during which the exercise of unilateral Presidential war powers had its most rapid expansion), the Congressional Research Service compilation of instances in which the United States has utilized military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests – which is often relied upon by legal scholars studying war powers – lists only about two dozen incidents.122 For the same time period, the Blechman and Kaplan study of political uses of force (usually threats) – which is often relied upon by political scientists studying U.S. security strategy – includes dozens more data-point incidents, because they divide up many military crises into several discrete policy decisions, because many crises were resolved with threat-backed diplomacy, and because many uses of force were preceded by overt or implicit threats of force.123 Among the most significant incidents studied by Blechman and Kaplan but not included in the Congressional Research Service compilation at all are the 1958-59 and 1961 crises over Berlin and the 1973 Middle East War, during which U.S. Presidents signaled threats of superpower war, and in the latter case signaled particularly a willingness to resort to nuclear weapons.124 Because the presidents did not in the end carry out these threats, these cases lack the sort of authoritative legal justifications or reactions that accompany actual uses of force. It is therefore difficult to assess how the executive branch and congress understood the scope of the President’s war powers in these cases, but historical inquiry would probably show the executive branch’s interpretation to be very broad, even to include full-scale war and even where the main U.S. interest at stake was the very credibility of U.S. defense commitments undergirding its grand strategy, not simply the interests specific to divided Germany and the Middle East region.

Of course, one might argue that because the threatened military actions were never carried out in these cases, it is impossible to know if the President would have sought congressional authorization or how Congress would have reacted to the use of force; nonetheless, it is easy to see that in crises like these a threat by the President to use force, having put U.S. credibility on the line in addition to whatever other foreign policy stakes were at issues, would have put Congress in a bind. 3. Lawyers’ Mis-Assessment Empirically, analysis of and insights gleaned from any particular incident – which might then be used to evaluate the functional merits of presidential powers – looks very different if one focuses predominantly on the actual use of force instead of considering also the role of threatened force. Take for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis – perhaps the Cold War’s most dangerous event. To the rare extent that they consider domestic legal issues of this crisis at all, lawyers interested in the constitutionality of President Kennedy’s actions generally ask only whether he was empowered to initiate the naval quarantine of Cuba, because that is the concrete military action Kennedy took that was readily observable and that resulted in actual engagement with Soviet forces or vessels – as it happens, very minimal engagement.125 To strategists who study the crisis, however, the naval quarantine is not in itself the key presidential action; after all, as Kennedy and his advisers realized, a quarantine alone could not remove the missiles that were already in Cuba. The most consequential presidential actions were threats of military or even nuclear escalation, signaled through various means including putting U.S. strategic bombers on highest alert.126 The quarantine itself was significant not for its direct military effects but because of its communicative impact in showing U.S. resolve. If one is focused, as lawyers often are, on presidential military action that actually engaged the enemy in combat or nearly did, it is easy to dismiss this case as not very constitutionally significant. If one focuses on it, as strategists and political scientists often do, on nuclear brinkmanship, it is arguably the most significant historical exercise of unilateral presidential powers to affect war and peace.127 Considering again the 1991 Gulf War, most legal scholars would dismiss this instance as constitutionally a pretty uninteresting military conflict: the President claimed unilateral authority to use force, but he eventually sought and obtained congressional authorization for what was ultimately – at least in the short-run – a quite successful war. For the most part this case is therefore neither celebrated nor decried much by either side of legal war powers debates,128 though some congressionalist scholars highlight the correlation of congressional authorization for this war and a successful outcome.129 Political scientists look at the case differently, though. They often study this event not as a successful war but as failed coercive diplomacy, in that the United States first threatened war through a set of dramatically escalating steps that ultimately failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.130 Some political scientists even see U.S. legal debate about military actions as an important part of this story, assessing that adversaries pay attention to congressional arguments and moves in evaluating U.S. resolve (an issue taken up in greater detail below) and that congressional opposition to Bush’s initial unilateralism in this case undermined the credibility of U.S. threats.131 Whether one sees the Gulf War as a case of (successful) war, as lawyers usually do, or (unsuccessful) threatened war, as political scientists usually do, colors how one evaluates the outcome and the credit one might attach to some factors such as vocal congressional opposition to initially-unilateral presidential moves. Notice also that legal analysis of Presidential authority to use force is sometimes thought to turn partly on the U.S. security interests at stake, as though those interests are purely contextual and exogenous to U.S. decision-making and grand strategy. In justifying President Obama’s 2011 use of force against the Libyan government, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the President had such legal authority “because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest,” and it then went on to detail the U.S. security and foreign policy interests.132 The interests at stake in crises like these, however, are altered dramatically if the President threatens force: doing so puts the credibility of U.S. threats at stake, which is important not only with respect to resolving the crisis at hand but with respect to other potential adversaries watching U.S. actions.133 The President’s power to threaten force means that he may unilaterally alter the costs and benefits of actually using force through his prior actions.134 The U.S. security interests in carrying through on threats are partly endogenous to the strategy embarked upon to address crises (consider, for example, that once President George H.W. Bush placed hundred of thousands of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf region and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein in 1990, the credibility of U.S. threats and assurances to regional allies were put on the line).135 Moreover, interests at stake in any one crisis cannot simply be disaggregated from broader U.S. grand strategy: if the United States generally relies heavily on threats of force to shape the behavior of other actors, then its demonstrated willingness or unwillingness to carry out a threat and the outcomes of that action affect its credibility in the eyes of other adversaries and allies, too.136 It is remarkable, though in the end not surprising, that the executive branch does not generally cite these credibility interests in justifying its unilateral uses of force. It does cite when relevant the U.S. interest in sustaining the credibility of its formal alliance commitments or U.N. Security Council resolutions, as reasons supporting the President’s constitutional authority to use force.137 The executive branch generally refrains from citing the similar interests in sustaining the credibility of the President’s own threats of force, however, probably in part because doing so would so nakedly expose the degree to which the President’s prior unilateral strategic decisions would tie Congress’s hands on the matter. \* \* \* In sum, lawyers’ focus on actual uses of force – usually in terms of armed clashes with an enemy or the placement of troops into hostile environments – does not account for much vaster ways that President’s wield U.S. military power and it skews the claims legal scholars make about the allocation of war powers between the political branches. A more complete account of constitutional war powers should recognize the significant role of threatened force in American foreign policy. II. Democratic Checks on Threatened Force The previous Parts of this Article showed that, especially since the end of World War II, the United States has relied heavily on strategies of threatened force in wielding its military might – for which credible signals are a necessary element – and that the President is not very constrained legally in any formal sense in threatening war. Drawing on recent political science scholarship, this Part takes some of the major questions often asked by students of constitutional war powers with respect to the actual use of force and reframes them in terms of threatened force. First, as a descriptive matter, in the absence of formal legal checks on the President’s power to threaten war, is the President nevertheless informally but significantly constrained by democratic institutions and processes, and what role does Congress play in that constraint? Second, as a normative matter, what are the strategic merits and drawbacks of this arrangement of democratic institutions and constraints with regard to strategies of threatened force? Third, as a prescriptive matter, although it is not really plausible that Congress or courts would ever erect direct legal barriers to the President’s power to threaten war, how might legal reform proposals to more strongly and formally constrain the President’s power to use force indirectly impact his power to threaten it effectively? For reasons discussed below, I do not consider whether Congress could legislatively restrict directly the President’s power to threaten force or war; in short, I set that issue aside because assuming that were constitutionally permissible, even ardent congressionalists have exhibited no interest in doing so, and instead have focused on legally controlling the actual use of force. Political science insights that bear on these questions emerge from several directions. One is from studies of Congress’ influence on use of force decisions, which usually assume that Congress’s formal legislative powers play only a limited role in this area, and the effects of this influence on presidential decision-making about threatened force. Another is international relations literature on international bargaining138 as well as literature on the theory of democratic peace, the notion that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.139 In attempting to explain the near-absence of military conflicts between democracies, political scientists have examined how particular features of democratic governments – electoral accountability, the institutionalized mobilization of political opponents, and the diffusion of decision-making authority regarding the use of force among executive and legislative branches – affect decision-making about war.140 These and other studies, in turn, have led some political scientists (especially those with a rational choice theory orientation) to focus on how those features affect the credibility of signals about force that governments send to adversaries in crises.141 My purpose in addressing these questions is to begin painting a more complete and detailed picture of the way war powers operate, or could operate, than one sees when looking only at actual wars and use of force. This is not intended to be a comprehensive account but an effort to synthesize some strands of scholarship from other fields regarding threatened force to inform legal discourse about how war powers function in practice and the strategic implications of reform. The answers to these questions also bear on raging debates among legal scholars on the nature of American executive power and its constraint by law. Initially they seem to support the views of those legal scholars who have long believed that in practice law no longer seriously binds the President with respect to war-making.142 That view has been taken even further recently by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who argue that “[l]aw does little constraint the modern executive” at all, but also observe that “politics and public opinion” operate effectively to cabin executive powers.143 The arguments offered here, however, do more to support the position of those legal scholars who describe a more complex relationship between law and politics, including that law is constitutive of the processes of political struggle.144 That law helps constitute the processes of political struggles is true of any area of public policy, though, and what is special here is the added importance of foreign audiences – including adversaries and allies, alike – observing and reacting to those politics, too. Democratic Constraints on the Power to the Threaten Force Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President’s and Congress’s war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is – in practice – the dominant branch with respect to military crises and that Congress wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very limited ways. A major school of thought, however, is that congressional members nevertheless wield significant influence over decisions about force, and that this influence extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain from threats that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even without any serious prospect for legislatively blocking the President’s threatened actions, Congress under certain conditions can loom large enough to force Presidents to adjust their policies; even when it cannot, congressional members can oblige the President expend lots of political capital. As Jon Pevehouse and William Howell explain: When members of Congress vocally **oppose a use of force, they undermine the president’s ability to convince** foreign states that he will see a fight through to the end. Sensing hesitation on the part of the United States, **allies may be reluctant to contribute** to a military campaign, **and adversaries are likely to fight harder and longer** when conflict erupts— thereby raising the costs of the military campaign, decreasing the president’s ability to negotiate a satisfactory resolution, and increasing the probability that American lives are lost along the way. Facing a limited band of allies willing to participate in a military venture and an enemy emboldened by domestic critics, presidents may choose to curtail, and even abandon, those military operations that do not involve vital strategic interests. 145 This statement also highlights the important point, alluded to earlier, that force and threatened force are not neatly separable categories. Often limited uses of force are intended as signals of resolve to escalate, and most conflicts involve bargaining in which the threat of future violence – rather than what Schelling calls “brute force”146 – is used to try to extract concessions. The formal participation of political opponents in legislative bodies provides them with a forum for registering dissent to presidential policies of force through such mechanisms floor statements, committee oversight hearings, resolution votes, and funding decisions.147 These official actions prevent the President “from monopolizing the nation’s political discourse” on decisions regarding military actions can thereby make it difficult for the President to depart too far from congressional preferences.148 Members of the political opposition in Congress also have access to resources for gathering policy relevant information from the government that informs their policy preferences. Their active participation in specialized legislative committees similarly gives opponent party members access to fact-finding resources and forums for registering informed dissent from decisions within the committee’s purview.149 As a result, legislative institutions within democracies can enable political opponents to have a more **immediate** and informed **impact** on executive’s decisions regarding force than can opponents among the general public. Moreover, studies suggest that Congress can actively shape media coverage and public support for a president’s foreign policy engagements.150 In short, these findings among political scientists suggest that, even without having to pass legislation or formally approve of actions, Congress often operates as an important check on threatened force by providing the president’s political opponents with a forum for registering dissent from the executive’s decisions regarding force in ways that attach domestic political costs to contemplated military actions or even the threats to use force. Under this logic, Presidents, anticipating dissent, will be more selective in issuing¶ threats in the first place, making only those commitments that would not incite¶ widespread political opposition should the threat be carried through.151 Political¶ opponents within a legislature also have few electoral incentives to collude in an¶ executive’s bluff, and they are capable of expressing opposition to a threatened use of¶ force in ways that could expose the bluff to a threatened adversary.152 This again narrows¶ the President’s range of viable policy options for brandishing military force. Counter-intuitively, given the President’s seemingly unlimited and unchallenged¶ constitutional power to threaten war, it may in some cases be easier for members of¶ Congress to influence presidential decisions to threaten military action than presidential¶ war decisions once U.S. forces are already engaged in hostilities. It is widely believed¶ that once U.S. armed forces are fighting, congress members’ hands are often tied: policy¶ opposition at that stage risks being portrayed as undermining our troops in the field.153¶ Perhaps, it could be argued, the President takes this phenomenon into account and¶ therefore discounts political opposition to threatened force; he can assume that such¶ opposition will dissipate if he carries it through. Even if that is true, before that point¶ occurs, however, members of Congress may have communicated messages domestically¶ and communicated signals abroad that the President will find difficult to counter.154 The bottom line is that a body of recent political science, while confirming the¶ President’s dominant position in setting policy in this area, also reveals that policymaking¶ with respect to threats of force is significantly shaped by domestic politics and¶ that Congress is institutionally positioned to play a powerful role in influencing those¶ politics, even without exercising its formal legislative powers. Given the centrality of¶ threatened force to U.S. foreign policy strategy and security crises, this suggests that the¶ practical war powers situation is not so imbalanced toward the President as many assume. B. Democratic Institutions and the Credibility of Threats A central question among constitutional war powers scholars is whether robust¶ checks – especially congressional ones – on presidential use of force lead to “sound”¶ policy decision-making. Congressionalists typically argue that legislative control over¶ war decisions promotes more thorough deliberation, including more accurate weighing of¶ consequences and gauging of political support of military action.155 Presidentialists¶ usually counter that the executive branch has better information and therefore better¶ ability to discern the dangers of action or inaction, and that quick and decisive military¶ moves are often required to deal with security crises.156 If we are interested in these sorts of functional arguments, then reframing the¶ inquiry to include threatened force prompts critical questions whether such checks also¶ contribute to or detract from effective deterrence and coercive diplomacy and therefore¶ positively or negatively affect the likelihood of achieving aims without resort to war.¶ Here, recent political science provides some reason for optimism, though the scholarship¶ in this area is neither yet well developed nor conclusive. To be sure, “soundness” of policy with respect to force is heavily laden with¶ normative assumptions about war and the appropriate role for the United States in the¶ broader international security system, so it is difficult to assess the merits and¶ disadvantages of constitutional allocations in the abstract. That said, whatever their¶ specific assumptions about appropriate uses of force in mind, constitutional war powers¶ scholars usually evaluate the policy advantages and dangers of decision-making¶ allocations narrowly in terms of the costs and outcomes of actual military engagements¶ with adversaries. The importance of credibility to strategies of threatened force adds important new¶ dimensions to this debate. On the one hand, one might intuitively expect that robust democratic checks would generally be ill-suited for coercive threats and negotiations –¶ that institutional centralization and secrecy of decision-making might better equip nondemocracies¶ to wield threats of force. As Quincy Wright speculated in 1944, autocracies¶ “can use war efficiently and threats of war even more efficiently” than democracies,157¶ especially the American democracy in which vocal public and congressional opposition¶ may undermine threats.158 Moreover, proponents of democratic checks on war powers¶ usually assume that careful deliberation is a virtue in preventing unnecessary wars, but¶ strategists of deterrence and coercion observe that perceived irrationality is sometimes¶ important in conveying threats: “don’t test me, because I might just be crazy enough to¶ do it!”159 On the other hand, some political scientists have recently called into question this¶ view and concluded that the institutionalization of political contestation and some¶ diffusion of decision-making power in democracies of the kind described in the previous¶ section make threats to use force rare but especially credible and effective in resolving¶ international crises without actual resort to armed conflict. In other words, recent¶ arguments in effect turn some old claims about the strategic disabilities of democracies¶ on their heads: whereas it used to be generally thought that democracies were ineffective¶ in wielding threats because they are poor at keeping secrets and their decision-making is¶ constrained by internal political pressures, a current wave of political science accepts this¶ basic description but argues that these democratic features are really strategic virtues.160 Rationalist models of crisis bargaining between states assume that because war is¶ risky and costly, states will be better off if they can resolve their disputes through¶ bargaining rather than by enduring the costs and uncertainties of armed conflict.161¶ Effective bargaining during such disputes – that which resolves the crisis without a resort¶ to force – depends largely on states’ perceptions of their adversary’s capacity to wage an¶ effective military campaign and its willingness to resort to force to obtain a favorable¶ outcome. A state targeted with a threat of force, for example, will be less willing to resist¶ the adversary’s demands if it believes that the adversary intends to wage and is capable of¶ waging an effective military campaign to achieve its ends. In other words, if a state¶ perceives that the threat from the adversary is credible, that state has less incentive to¶ resist such demands if doing so will escalate into armed conflict. The accuracy of such perceptions, however, is often compromised by¶ informational asymmetries that arise from private information about an adversary’s¶ relative military capabilities and resolve that prevents other states from correctly¶ assessing another states’ intentions, as well as by the incentives states have to¶ misrepresent their willingness to fight – that is, to bluff.162 Informational asymmetries¶ increase the potential for misperception and thereby make war more likely; war,¶ consequentially, can be thought of in these cases as a “bargaining failure.”163 Some political scientists have argued in recent decades – contrary to previously common wisdom – that features and constraints of democracies make them better suited than non-democracies to credibly signal their resolve when they threaten force. To bolster their bargaining position, states will seek to generate credible signals of their resolve by taking actions that can enhance the credibility of such threats, such as mobilizing military forces or making “hand-tying” commitments from which leaders cannot back down without suffering considerable political costs domestically.164 These domestic audience costs, according to some political scientists, are especially high for leaders in democratic states, where they may bear these costs at the polls.165 Given the potentially high domestic political and electoral repercussions democratic leaders face from backing down from a public threat, they have considerable incentives to refrain from bluffing. An adversary that understands these political vulnerabilities is thereby more likely to perceive the threats a democratic leader does issue as highly credible, in turn making it more likely that the adversary will yield.166 Other scholars have recently pointed to the special role of legislative bodies in signaling with regard to threatened force. This is especially interesting from the perspective of constitutional powers debates, because it posits a distinct role for Congress – and, again, one that does not necessarily rely on Congress’s ability to pass binding legislation that formally confines the President. Kenneth Schultz, for instance, argues that the open nature of competition within democratic societies ensures that the interplay of opposing parties in legislative bodies over the use of force is observable not just to their domestic publics but to foreign actors; this inherent transparency within democracies – magnified by legislative processes – **provides more information to adversaries** regarding the unity of domestic opponents around a government’s military and foreign policy decisions.167 Political opposition parties can undermine the credibility of some threats by the President to use force if they publicly voice their opposition in committee hearings, public statements, or through other institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, legislative processes – such as debates and hearings – make it difficult to conceal or misrepresent preferences about war and peace. Faced with such institutional constraints, Presidents will incline to be more selective about making such threats and avoid being undermined in that way.168 This restraining effect on the ability of governments to issue threats simultaneously makes those threats that the government issues more credible, if an observer assumes that the President would not be issuing it if he anticipated strong political opposition. Especially when members of the opposition party publicly support an executive’s threat to use force during a crisis, their visible support lends additional credibility to the government’s threat by demonstrating that political conditions domestically favor the use of force should it be necessary.169 In some cases, Congress may communicate greater willingness than the president to use force, for instance through non-binding resolutions.170 Such powerful signals of resolve should in theory make adversaries more likely to back down. The credibility-enhancing effects of legislative constraints on threats are subject to dispute. Some studies question the assumptions underpinning theories of audience costs – specifically the idea that democratic leaders suffer domestic political costs to failing to make good on their threats, and therefore that their threats are especially credible171 – and others question whether the empirical data supports claims that democracies have credibility advantages in making threats.172 Other scholars dispute the likelihood that leaders will really be punished politically for backing down, especially if the threat was not explicit and unambiguous or if they have good policy reasons for doing so.173 Additionally, even if transparency in democratic institutions allows domestic dissent from threats of force to be visible to foreign audiences, it is not clear that adversaries would interpret these mechanisms as political scientists expect in their models of strategic interaction, in light of various common problems of misperception in international relations.174 These disputes are not just between competing theoretical models but also over the links between any of the models and real-world political behavior by states. At this point there remains a dearth of good historical evidence as to how foreign leaders interpret political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force. Nevertheless, at the very least, strands of recent political science scholarship cast significant doubt on the intuition that democratic checks are inherently disadvantageous to strategies of threatened force. Quite the contrary, they suggest that legislative checks – or, indeed, even the signaling functions that Congress is institutionally situated to play with respect to foreign audiences interpreting U.S. government moves – can be harnessed in some circumstances to support such strategies. C. Legal Reform and Strategies of Threatened Force Among legal scholars of war powers, the ultimate prescriptive question is whether the President should be constrained more formally and strongly than he currently is by legislative checks, especially a more robust and effective mandatory requirement of congressional authorization to use force. Calls for reform usually take the form of narrowing and better enforcement (by all three branches of government) of purported constitutional requirements for congressional authorization of presidential uses of force or revising and enforcing the War Powers Resolutions or other framework legislation requiring express congressional authorization for such actions.175 As applied to strategies of threatened force, generally **under these proposals the President would lack authority to make good on them** unilaterally (except in whatever narrow circumstances for which he retains his own unilateral authority, such as deterring imminent attacks on the United States). Whereas legal scholars are consumed with the internal effects of war powers law, such as whether and when it constrains U.S. government decision-making, the analysis contained in the previous section shifts attention externally to whether and when U.S. law might influence decision-making by adversaries, allies, and other international actors. In prescriptive terms, if the President’s power to use force is linked to his ability to threaten it effectively, then any consideration of war powers reform on policy outcomes and longterm interests should include the important secondary effects on deterrent and coercive strategies – and how U.S. legal doctrine is perceived and understood abroad.176 Would stronger requirements for congressional authorization to use force reduce a president’s opportunities for bluffing, and if so would this improve U.S. coercive diplomacy by making ensuing threats more credible? Or would it undermine diplomacy by taking some threats off the table as viable policy options? Would stronger formal legislative powers with respect to force have significant marginal effects on the signaling effects of dissent within Congress, beyond those effects already resulting from open political discourse? These are difficult questions, but the analysis and evidence above helps generate some initial hypotheses and avenues for further research and analysis. One might ask at this point why, though, having exposed as a hole in war powers legal discourse the tendency to overlook threatened force, this Article does not take up whether Congress should assert some direct legislative control of threats – perhaps statutorily limiting the President’s authority to make them or establishing procedural conditions like presidential reporting requirements to Congress. This Article puts such a notion aside for several reasons. First, for reasons alluded to briefly above, such limits would be very constitutionally suspect and difficult to enforce.177 Second, even the most ardent war-power congressionalists do not contemplate such direct limits on the President’s power to threaten; they are not a realistic option for reform. Instead, this Article focuses on the more plausible – and much more discussed – possibility of strengthening Congress’s power over the ultimate decision whether to use force, but augments the usual debate over that question with appreciation for the importance of credible threats. A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued: In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps **the *most* important** of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could **carry nuclear implications**. … [I]t is the **diplomatic power the President needs** most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179 In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these concerns, arguing that **the law would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrent** and coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies – they would know that presidential authority to use force would expire after 60 days, so absent strong congressional support they could assume U.S. withdrawal at that point.180 In short, those who oppose tying the president’s hands with mandatory congressional authorization requirements to use force sometimes argue that doing so incidentally and dangerously ties his hands in threatening it. A critical assumption here is that presidential flexibility, preserved in legal doctrine, enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate.

## 6

#### Text: Based on a congressional assessment the United States Congress should substantially increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by prohibiting executive intelligence collection

#### Using national security to justify restraints on the executive is self-defeating. Security discourse consolidates authoritarian politics.

RANA 11

[Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/> pg 1-7]

Today politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction of government’s coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such worries are so commonplace that in the words of one commentator, “it has become part of the drinking water of this country that there has been a trade-off of liberty for security.”1 According to civil libertarians, centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law. For Jeremy Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability not only to intimidate external enemies but also internal dissidents and legitimate political opponents. As he writes, “We have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used by the government against its enemies.”2 Especially disconcerting for many commentators, executive judgments—due to fears of infiltration and security leaks—are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency undermines a core value of democratic decisionmaking: popular scrutiny of government action. As U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch, “Democracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.”3 In the view of no less an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current presidency into “the most dangerous branch,” one that “subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.”4 Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis.5 After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action.6 More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices.7 As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches.8 Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.”9 The hope—returned to by constitutional scholars for decades—has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the postSeptember 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner—buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics.10 As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments.11 Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge—its strengths and limitations—have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature. As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge and security, I will argue that throughout most of the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being (especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to John Locke, politicians and thinkers—ranging from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison at the founding to Abraham Lincoln and Roger Taney—maintained that most citizens understood the forms of danger that imperiled their physical safety. The average individual knew that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this paramount interest. A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and those institutions—especially majoritarian legislatures and juries—most closely bound to the public’s wishes. What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modern complexity (marked by heightened bureaucracy, institutional specialization, global interdependence, and technological development) mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to pursue such objectives adequately. Rather than viewing security as a matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. Insulated decision-makers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self-defense.12 The result is that the other branches—let alone the public writ large—face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies. How did the governing, expertise-oriented concept of security gain such theoretical and institutional dominance and what alternative formulations exist to challenge its ideological supremacy? In offering an answer to these questions, I begin in Part II by examining the principal philosophical alternatives that existed prior to the emergence of today’s approach, one of which grounded early American thought on security issues. I refer to these alternatives in the Anglo-American tradition as broadly ‘Hobbesian’ and ‘Lockean’ and develop them through a close reading of the two thinkers’ accounts of security. For all their internal differences, what is noteworthy for my purposes is that each approach rejected the idea—pervasive at present—that there exists a basic divide between elite understanding and mass uncertainty. In other words, John Locke and even Thomas Hobbes (famous as the philosopher of absolutism) presented accounts of security and self-defense that I argue were normatively more democratic than the current framework. Part III will then explore how the Lockean perspective in particular took constitutional root in early American life, focusing especially on the views of the founders and on the intellectual and legal climate in the mid nineteenth century. In Part IV, I will continue by detailing the steady emergence beginning during the New Deal of our prevailing idea of security, with its emphasis on professional expertise and insulated decision-making. This discussion highlights the work of Pendleton Herring, a political scientist and policymaker in the 1930s and 1940s who co-wrote the National Security Act of 1947 and played a critical role in tying notions of elite specialization to a new language of ‘national security.’ Part V will then show how Herring’s ‘national security’ vision increasingly became internalized by judicial actors during and after World War II. I argue that the emblematic figure in this development was Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who not only defended security expertise but actually sought to redefine the very meaning of democracy in terms of such expertise. For Frankfurter, the ideal of an ‘open society’ was one premised on meritocracy, or the belief that decisions should be made by those whose natural talents make them most capable of reaching the technically correct outcome. According to Frankfurter, the rise of security expertise meant the welcome spread of meritocratic commitments to a critical and complex arena of policymaking. In this discussion, I focus especially on a series of Frankfurter opinions, including in Ex parte Quirin (1942), Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), Korematsu v. United States (1944), and Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), and connect these opinions to contemporary cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). Finally, by way of conclusion, I note how today’s security concept—normatively sustained by Frankfurter’s judgments about merit and elite authority—shapes current discussions over threat and foreign policy in ways that often inhibit rather than promote actual security. I then end with some reflections on what would be required to alter governing arrangements. As a final introductory note, a clarification of what I mean by the term ‘security’ is in order. Despite its continuous invocation in public life, the concept remains slippery and surprisingly under-theorized. As Jeremy Waldron writes, “Although we know that ‘security’ is a vague and ambiguous concept, and though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger when talk of trade-offs is in the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept.”13 As a general matter, security refers to protection from those threats that imperil survival—both of the individual and of a given society’s collective institutions or way of life. At its broadest, these threats are multidimensional and can result from phenomena as wide-ranging as environmental disasters or food shortages. Thus, political actors with divergent ideological commitments defend the often competing goals of social security, economic security, financial security, collective security, human security, food security, environmental security, and—the granddaddy of them all—national security. But for my purposes, when invoked without any modifier the word ‘security’ refers to more specific questions of common defense and physical safety. These questions, emphasizing issues of war and peace, are largely coterminous with what Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously referred to in his “Four Freedoms” State of the Union Adresss as “the freedom from fear”: namely ensuring that citizens are protected from external and internal acts of “physical aggression.”14 This definitional choice is meant to serve two connected theoretical objectives. First, as a conceptual matter it is important to keep the term security analytically separate from ‘national security’—a phrase ubiquitous in current legal and political debate. While on the face of it, both terms might appear synonymous, my claim in the following pages is that ‘national security’ is in fact a relatively novel concept, which emerged in the mid twentieth century as a particular vision of how to address issues of common defense and personal safety. Thus national security embodies only one of a number of competing theoretical and historical approaches to matters of external violence and warfare. Second, and relatedly, it has become a truism in political philosophy that the concept of liberty is plural and multifaceted.15 In other words, different ideals of liberty presuppose distinct visions of political life and possibility. Yet far less attention has been paid to the fact that security is similarly a plural concept, embodying divergent assumptions about social ordering. In fact, competing notions of security—by offering different answers to the question of “who decides?”—can be more or less compatible with democratic ideals. If anything, the problem of the contemporary moment is the dominance of a security concept that systematically challenges those sociological and normative assumptions required to sustain popular involvement in matters of threat and safety.

#### The logic of security makes violence inevitable, and is the root cause of destructive features of contemporary modernity

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that **war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that it is **rather the** product of hegemonic forms of knowledge **about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. **Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states** and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that **the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing**, argues Heidegger, **'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing.**..the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the** most destructive features of contemporary modernity **-- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and **political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe,** policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. **Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing'** and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how **the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making**; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, **even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.**88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. **When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the overarching strategic and security paradigms.** Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being **a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political.** But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives** from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? **Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable**?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

## Brazil

#### US-Brazil Relations Inevitable – multiple mechanisms of opportunities and increasing private sector industrial proliferation – gradualism is key

**Sotero, 12** – Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington (Paul, “Why United States and Brazil Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship”, Huffington Post, 11/09/12, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/why-united-states-and-bra\_b\_2102004.html)//EX](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/why-united-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html%29//EX)

Whereas previous conversations between Brazilian and American policymakers might have been limited to a few areas of core interest, it is now all-encompassing. There are mechanisms for regular ministerial cooperation and consultation ranging from challenging topics such as trade, finance and defense, to 21st century concerns such as cyber security, open government, and innovation in science and technology, to issues that directly affect the average citizen such as education and social policies. People to people exchanges are on the rise, strengthening and expanding networks particularly in education and scientific research. Viewed by skeptics as window dressing and no substitute for concrete agreements on hard issues such as trade and taxation, the rapid increase in the breadth and depth of the bilateral dialogue and the Brazilian and American governments' efforts to maintain the doors open for a more productive and consequential relationship suggest, at a minimum, that they understand they need each other, benefit from working together and risk paying a political price for not doing so.¶ Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty that the two countries have talked about for four decades.¶ What was once an issue of interest only for U.S. companies in Brazil is now also a topic on the agenda of Brazilian firms operating in the U.S. market. Participants in the annual meeting of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, held last month in Brasília, say the political pressure generated by the new reality of Brazilian global companies in the United States has created momentum for the approval by the Brazilian Congress of a bilateral agreement on exchange of tax information that is seen as the first step for a treaty addressing double taxation.¶ Brazil and the U.S. have also taken on global challenges together, benefiting from Brazil's ability to wield soft power and newfound status in multilateral fora. The Open Government Initiative (OGI) that Brazil and the United States launched last year has attracted over forty countries committed to promoting transparency, fighting corruption and harnessing new technologies to make government more open, effective, and accountable.¶ As suggested by developments on taxation and the progress made in OGI, gradualism is the crucial ingredient in efforts to advance U.S.-Brazil relations.

#### No risk of nuclear terrorism---too many obstacles

John J. Mearsheimer 14, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

#### No US nuclear retaliation

Neely 13—Meggaen Neely, The George Washington University Master of Arts (M.A.), Security Policy Studies 2012—2014 (expected) Baylor University Master of Arts (M.A.), Public Policy and Administration 2010—2012, Richard D. Huff Distinguished Masters Student in Political Science (2012) Baylor University Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science and Government, Research Assistant, Elliott School at George Washington University, Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Communications Intern at Federation of American Scientists Graduate Assistant at Department of Political Science, Baylor University [March 21, 2013, “Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrence-nuclear-terrorism]

Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon’s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions. Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems unlikely. Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift. Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons. Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation, the United States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public. This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution. Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States’ nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.

#### Preventing extinction comes first

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

## EU

#### Multiple alt causes to EU

McGill, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy – Norwich U, and Gray, Campbell University, ‘12

(Anna-Katherine and David, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” Global Security Studies, Summer, Volume 3, Issue 3)

Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11 the US saw not only its NATO counterparts rise to action but also a new enthusiasm from its traditional bilateral relationships in improving counterterrorism coordination and more specifically intelligence sharing. Still, the rallying of support for the US following the attacks is not enough to overcome longstanding political and institutional hurdles to counterterrorism intelligence sharing. Although the US shares many political and cultural values with its traditional allies, their views diverge on issues like the invasion of Iraq, personal data protection, and the treatment or punishment of terrorists. The Invasion of Iraq The invasion of Iraq provides a perfect example of how the national interests of one nation can threaten the interests of its allies and more specifically, how policies in one arena can affect cooperation in another. According to US Senator Byrd, a major critic of the Bush administration, the invasion of Iraq “split traditional alliances, possibly crippling, for all time, international order-keeping entities like the United Nations and NATO” (qtd in Gardner 16). The central concerns arising from the 2003 Iraq invasion were the use of “preemptive” or “preventative” (depending on who you ask) strikes, unilateral action, and ultimately questionable motives. Consequently, bilateral cooperation from Germany, France, and NATO ally Turkey has taken a major hit. France argued against military intervention in favor of enforced inspections and diplomacy. Furthermore, it refuted that the US invasion of Iraq did not constitute collective security and therefore was not an obligation of NATO’s article V. Hall Gardner explains that while France has always been a reluctant ally, Germany and Turkey “represented the most loyal NATO allies during the Cold War” (3). As a result of the Iraq invasion, however, these two nations “bitterly questioned US policies and actions for very different reasons” (Gardner 3). For Germany, the use of preventative military strikes set a dangerous precedent for state behavior. They feared that should this become the norm, “it would undermine international law and concepts of national sovereignty dating back to Westphalia” (Gardner 3). Turkey, on the other hand, feared that the US invasion of Iraq would run directly counter to its national interests in regards to the Kurds of northern Iraq. While these countries have remained committed to the counterterrorism effort, the public row over the Iraq invasion shaped global public opinion of the US led war on terrorism and likely lessened domestic support for aiding the Americans in future CT endeavors. The fallout from US actions and its greater presence in the Middle East has arguably made it a larger target to terrorist organization which portray the US as a global crusader. By default, those who supported and contributed to the invasion of Iraq are also greater targets of transnational terrorist networks like al Qaeda. Additionally, the use of ultimately false intelligence on Iraqi position of WMD to justify the invasion heightened criticism of the US intelligence community and thus hurt their reputation in producing credible intelligence analysis. Personal data protection Personal data is critical to counterterrorism efforts because it “often provide[s] the only evidence of connections between members of terrorist groups and the types of activities that they are conducting” (Bensehal 48). However, Europe has shown resistance to freely sharing this type of information with its American counterparts since many of the US’s European allies have much more stringent views on the protection of personal data. In the EU, there are safeguards at the national and regional level that regulate the storage and sharing of personal data information. These laws are a product of Europe’s historical experience with fascism and thus its sensitivity to the abuse of such information as travel records or communications (Bensahel, 48). In “The Counterterror Coalitions: Europe, NATO, and the European Union” Nora Bensahel explains “by contrast, the United States protects personal information through legal precedents and procedures rather than [unified] legislation” which the Europeans find insufficient (48). The EU’s concerns over the US’s protection of personal data caused them to withhold information from the US and created a substantial challenge to their combined counterterrorism efforts. Following 9/11 the heightened political will to overcome such issues enabled the US and the EU to compromise on this issue but there are lingering limits to EU willingness to share personal data with the US. In the wake of the attacks, the US and Europol signed an agreement to permit the sharing of personal data. Although it increased operational effectiveness and intelligence sharing this agreement is limited to law enforcement operations which excludes personal data found in commercial activities. Furthermore, provisions in the agreement state that “personal information can be used only for the specific investigation for which it was requested” (Bensahel, 48). If the suspect is being investigated for murder and is discovered to have ties to a smuggling ring the US must submit a separate request to use the murder information in the case regarding the smuggling activities. The Rights of the Accused The US and the EU have also had substantial disagreements on the treatment and punishment of accused terrorists. This tension hinges on such issues as the use of the death penalty and “extraordinary rendition”. Fortunately, the death penalty issue was resolved with the passage of an multilateral treaty on extradition however the US has not fully recovered from the backlash of criticism and mistrust from its practice of “extraordinary rendition”. Prior to a May 2002 summit, the US and EU were at a disagreement over the death penalty. The EU’s aversion to capital punishment led it to not only hesitate from sharing information but deny requests for extradition unless the US would guarantee that the individual in question would not face the death penalty. The 2002 summit did however bring both the US and EU to at least agree in principle to a treaty on extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and both parties ratified the treaties in 2003. The extradition treaty allowed for a blanket policy for European nations to “grant extradition on the condition that the death penalty will not be imposed” and the MLAT provided enhanced capability to gather and exchange information (Bensahel 49). The CIA’s use of “extraordinary rendition”, the practice of transporting a suspect to a third country for interrogation, has also stoked the ire of many traditional allies. Critics charge that this tactic quite simply allows the CIA to sidestep international laws and obligations by conducting interrogations in nations with poor human-rights records. In 2003, an Italian magistrate formally indicted 13 CIA agents for allegedly kidnapping an Italian resident and transporting him to a third country for interrogation. Ultimately 22 CIA agents and one US military officer were convicted in absentia of crimes connected to the abduction (Stewart, 1). The case not only heightened criticism of the US in Italy but challenged U.S. strategic communications aimed at reducing anti-Americanism worldwide (Reveron 462). According to Julianne Smith, director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “[extraordinary rendition] makes it extremely difficult [for European governments] to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.” (Heller 1).

#### No impact to US-EU relations, and collapse is inevitable

**Leonard 12** (Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think tank., 7/24/2012, "The End of the Affair", www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/24/the\_end\_of\_the\_affair)

But Obama's stellar personal ratings in Europe hide the fact that the Western alliance has **never loomed smaller** in the imagination of policymakers on either side of the Atlantic. Seen from Washington, there is **not a single problem in the world to be looked at primarily through a transatlantic prism**. Although the administration looks first to Europeans as partners in any of its global endeavors -- from dealing with Iran's nuclear program to stopping genocide in Syria -- it no longer sees the European theater as its core problem or seeks a partnership of equals with Europeans. It was not until the eurozone looked like it might collapse -- threatening to bring down the global economy and with it Obama's chances of reelection -- that the president became truly interested in Europe. Conversely, Europeans have never cared less about what the United States thinks. Germany, traditionally among the most Atlanticist of European countries, has led the pack. Many German foreign-policy makers think it was simply a tactical error for Berlin to line up with Moscow and Beijing against Washington on Libya. But there is nothing accidental about the way Berlin has systematically refused even to engage with American concerns over German policy on the euro. During the Bush years, Europeans who were unable to influence the strategy of the White House would give a running commentary on American actions in lieu of a substantive policy. They had no influence in Washington, so they complained. But now, the tables are turned, with Obama passing continual judgment on German policy while Chancellor Angela Merkel stoically refuses to heed his advice. Europeans who for many years were infantilized by the transatlantic alliance, either using sycophancy and self-delusion about a "special relationship" to advance their goals or, in the case of Jacques Chirac's France, pursuing the even more futile goal of balancing American power, have finally come to realize that they can no longer outsource their security or their prosperity to Uncle Sam. On both sides of the Atlantic, **the ties that held the alliance together are weakening**. On the American side, Obama's biography links him to the Pacific and Africa but not to the old continent. His personal story echoes the demographic changes in the United States that have reduced the influence of Americans of European origin. Meanwhile, on the European side, the depth of the euro crisis has crowded out almost all foreign policy from the agenda of Europe's top decision-makers. The end of the Cold War means that Europeans no longer need American protection, and the U.S. financial crisis has led to a fall in American demand for European products (although U.S. exports to Europe are at an all-time high). What's more, Obama's lack of warmth has precluded him from establishing the sorts of human relationships with European leaders that animate alliances. When asked to name his closest allies, Obama mentions non-European leaders such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Lee Myung-bak of South Korea. And his transactional nature has led to a neglect of countries that he feels will not contribute more to the relationship -- within a year of being elected, Obama had managed to alienate the leaders of most of Europe's big states, from Gordon Brown to Nicolas Sarkozy to Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Americans hardly remember, but Europe's collective nose was put out of joint by Obama's refusal to make the trip to Europe for the 2010 EU-U.S. summit. More recently, Obama has reached out to allies to counteract the impression that the only way to get a friendly reception in Washington is to be a problem nation -- but far too late to erase the sense that Europe matters little to this American president. Underlying these superficial issues is a more **fundamental divergence** in the way Europe and the United States are coping with their respective declines. As the EU's role shrinks in the world, Europeans have sought to help build a multilateral, rule-based world. That is why it is they, rather than the Chinese or the Americans, that have pushed for the creation of institutionalized global responses to climate change, genocide, or various trade disputes. To the extent that today's world has not collapsed into the deadlocked chaos of a "G-zero," it is often due to European efforts to create a functioning institutional order. To Washington's eternal frustration, however, Europeans have not put their energies into becoming a full partner on global issues. For all the existential angst of the euro crisis, Europe is not as weak as people think it is. It still has the world's largest market and represents 17 percent of world trade, compared with 12 percent for the United States. Even in military terms, the EU is the world's No. 2 military power, with 21 percent of the world's military spending, versus 5 percent for China, 3 percent for Russia, 2 percent for India, and 1.5 percent for Brazil, according to Harvard scholar Joseph Nye. But, ironically for a people who have embraced multilateralism more than any other on Earth, Europeans have not pooled their impressive economic, political, and military resources. And with the eurozone's need to resolve the euro crisis, the EU may split into two or more tiers -- making concerted action even more difficult. As a result, **European power is too diffuse to be much of a help or a hindrance on many issues**. On the other hand, Obama's United States -- although equally committed to liberal values -- thinks that the best way to safeguard American interests and values is to craft a multipartner world. On the one hand, Obama continues to believe that he can transform rising powers by integrating them into existing institutions (despite much evidence to the contrary). On the other, he thinks that Europe's overrepresentation in existing institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is a threat to the consolidation of that order. This is leading a declining America to increasingly turn against Europe on issues ranging from climate change to currencies. The most striking example came at the 2009 G-20 in Pittsburgh, when Obama worked together with the emerging powers to pressure Europeans to give up their voting power at the IMF. As Walter Russell Mead, the U.S. international relations scholar, has written, "[I]ncreasingly it will be in the American interest to help Asian powers rebalance the world power structure in ways that redistribute power from the former great powers of Europe to the rising great powers of Asia today." But the long-term consequence of the cooling of this unique alliance could be the hollowing out of the world order that the Atlantic powers have made. The big unwritten story of the last few decades is the way that a European-inspired liberal economic and political order has been crafted in the shell of the American security order. It is an order that limits the powers of states and markets and puts the protection of individuals at its core. If the United States was the sheriff of this order, the EU was its constitutional court. And now it is being challenged by the emerging powers. Countries like Brazil, China, and India are all relatively new states forged by movements of national liberation whose experience of globalization has been bound up with their new sense of nationhood. While globalization is destroying sovereignty for the West, these former colonies are enjoying it on a scale never experienced before. As a result, they are not about to invite their former colonial masters to interfere in their internal affairs. Just look at the dynamics of the United Nations Security Council on issues from Sudan to Syria. Even in the General Assembly, the balance of power is shifting: 10 years ago, China won 43 percent of the votes on human rights in the United Nations, far behind Europe's 78 percent. But in 2010-11, the EU won less than 50 percent to China's nearly 60 percent, according to research by the European Council on Foreign Relations. Rather than being transformed by global institutions, China's sophisticated multilateral diplomacy is changing the global order itself. As relative power flows Eastward, **it is** perhaps **inevitable** that the Western alliance that kept liberty's flame alight during the Cold War and then sought to construct a liberal order in its aftermath **is fading fast**. It was perhaps inevitable that both Europeans and Americans should fail to live up to each other's expectations of their respective roles in a post-Cold War world. After all, America is still too powerful to happily commit to a multilateral world order (as evidenced by Congress's reluctance to ratify treaties). And Europe is too physically safe to be willing to match U.S. defense spending or pool its resources. What is surprising is that the passing of this alliance has not been mourned by many on either side. The legacy of Barack Obama is that the transatlantic relationship is at its most harmonious and yet least relevant in 50 years. Ironically, it may take the election of someone who is less naturally popular on the European stage for both sides to wake up and realize just what is at stake.

#### international coop cant solve warming-mildest requirements and singular government approaches are better

Bakalar 05

(Nicholas, National Geographic News. “Global Treaties Ineffective Against Warming, Experts Say” 9-15-05 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0915\_050915\_warming.html//wyoccd)

Wide-ranging international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol may not be the best ways to battle global warming, according to three California scientists. Arguing that global treaties are only as effective as their least willing signatories, the team says that climate change is better fought from the bottom up.¶ Countries, regional partnerships, U.S. states, and even individual private firms, the scientists believe, can establish various controls to limit climate-changing activities—and many already have. There are hundreds of independent policies at work now contributing to the effort to limit carbon dioxide emissions, the main cause of climate change.¶ The European Union, for example, limits emissions from about 12,000 industrial plants. And the United Kingdom and World Bank have established emissions-credit trading systems. Under these plans plants that exceed emissions limits may buy emissions "credits" from plants that emit relatively little greenhouse gas.¶ The United States government famously rejects greenhouse gas limitations. The U.S. nevertheless has at least two dozen firms that have imposed their own limits. And the rejection of binding limitations at the federal level has not stopped nine northeastern U.S. states from collaborating on their own plan to cap carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.¶ Lowest Common Denominator¶ The authors of the new article, which will be published tomorrow in the journal Science, point out that international treaties tend toward the mildest binding measures, since such measures are always the easiest for everyone to agree upon.¶ The more countries that sign on to a treaty, the less stringent the terms become, because everyone has to be accommodated, the authors say. "A system that originates from the top," they write, "takes the speed of its least ambitious nation."¶ The authors see a different, and more effective, approach, one that is already underway: Make nonbinding agreements on goals at the international level and let each nation create its own climate-enhancing projects to meet them.¶ These projects can take various forms: commitments to control emissions, funding for scientific research into cleaner energy sources, or policies that make populations more resistant to climate change, for example.¶ Not all experts agree that this is the most effective approach.¶ A. Denny Ellerman is a senior lecturer with the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge. Invoking Mao Zedong's motto encouraging many ideas from many sources, Ellerman calls the bottom-up tactic the "let a thousand flowers bloom" method, and he remains skeptical. It sounds appealing to say that everyone will do positive things," he said. "But are they really doing them or just claiming they are? Acting together is fine, but what are we agreeing to do? That's the problem.¶ "How do you develop some sort of standard and structure beyond just voluntarism?" Ellerman said. International Treaties: Symbolism Over Substance?¶ David G. Victor is the lead author on the new paper and director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. He says that the grassroots approach is less a recommendation than a description of what is in fact happening.¶ "The real heavy lifting," he said, "gets done by national governments and markets, not international treaties." These treaties are not irrelevant, but they don't push nations into changing their behavior. Instead, he said, they "codify what is already happening at the ground level."¶

# 2NC

## T

### C/I

#### Offensive cyber operations refer to deliberate destructive cyber attacks—the distinction is whether computer information is gathered or destroyed

Lin, 2010

[Herbert, Chief Scientist, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/06\_Lin.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Hostile actions against a computer system or network can take two ¶ forms.1¶ One form – a cyber attack – is destructive in nature. An example ¶ of such a hostile action is erasure by a computer virus resident on the hard ¶ disk of any infected computer. In this article, “cyber attack” refers to the ¶ use of deliberate actions and operations – perhaps over an extended period ¶ of time – to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer ¶ systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or ¶ transiting these systems or networks.2¶ Such effects on adversary systems ¶ and networks may also have indirect effects on entities coupled to or reliant ¶ on them. A cyber attack seeks to cause the adversary’s computer systems ¶ and networks to be unavailable or untrustworthy and therefore less useful to ¶ the adversary. ¶ The second form – cyberexploitation – is nondestructive. An example ¶ is a computer virus that searches the hard disk of any infected computer and ¶ emails to the hostile party all files containing a credit card number. ¶ “Cyberexploitation” refers to the use of actions and operations – perhaps ¶ over an extended period of time – to obtain information that would ¶ otherwise be kept confidential and is resident on or transiting through an ¶ adversary’s computer systems or networks. Cyberexploitations are usually ¶ clandestine and conducted with the smallest possible intervention that still ¶ allows extraction of the information sought.3¶ They do not seek to disturb ¶ point of view, and the best cyberexploitation is one that a user never ¶ notices. ¶ For purposes of this article, the term “offensive cyber operations” will ¶ include military operations and activities in cyberspace for cyber attack ¶ against and (or) cyberexploitation of adversary information systems and ¶ networks. When greater specificity is needed, the terms “cyber attack” and ¶ “cyberexploitation” will be used.4¶ ¶ Although the objectives and the legal and policy constructs relevant to ¶ cyber attack and cyberexploitation are quite different (see the table in the ¶ Appendix to this article), the technological underpinnings and associated ¶ operational considerations of both are quite similar. ¶ Cyber attacks and cyberexploitation require a vulnerability, access to ¶ that vulnerability, and a payload to be executed.5¶ In a noncyber context, a ¶ vulnerability might be a lock to a file cabinet that could be easily picked. ¶ Access would be an available path for reaching the file cabinet. From an ¶ intruder’s perspective, access to a file cabinet located on the International ¶ Space Station would pose a very different problem from that posed by the ¶ same cabinet located in an office in Washington, D.C. The payload is ¶ responsible for executing the action taken by the intruder after the lock is ¶ picked. For example, the intruder can destroy the papers inside, or alter ¶ some of the information in those papers. ¶ The primary technical difference between cyber attack and ¶ cyberexploitation is in the nature of the payload to be executed – a cyber ¶ attack payload is destructive whereas a cyberexploitation payload acquires ¶ information nondestructively. In addition, because a cyberexploitation ¶ should not be detected, the cyber operation involved must only minimally ¶ disturb the normal operating state of the computer involved. In other ¶ words, the intelligence collectors need to be able to maintain a clandestine ¶ presence on the adversary computer or network despite the fact that ¶ information exfiltrations provide the adversary with opportunities to ¶ discover that presence. ¶

### AT Competing interpretation/Reasonability

#### Finally precision is vital—turns solvency and research quality

**Resnick 1** [Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, “Defining Engagement”]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## CP

### 2NC- AT: Object Fiat

#### No link: Object of the resolution is “authority” not “war powers”--restricting authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.

#### Taylor, 1996 (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

#### Key to education: Internal constraints are key neg ground – it matches the academic debate

**Sinnar**, assistant professor of law at Stanford Law School, May **2013**

(Shirin, “Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight,” 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, Lexis)

More than a decade after September 11, 2001, the debate over which institutions of government are best suited to resolve competing liberty and national security concerns continues unabated. While the Bush Administration's unilateralism in detaining suspected terrorists and authorizing secret surveillance initially raised separation of powers concerns, the Obama Administration's aggressive use of drone strikes to target suspected terrorists, with little oversight, demonstrates how salient these questions remain. Congress frequently lacks the [\*1029] information or incentive to oversee executive national security actions that implicate individual rights. Meanwhile, courts often decline to review counterterrorism practices challenged as violations of constitutional rights out of concern for state secrets or institutional competence. n1

These limitations on traditional external checks on the executive - Congress and the courts - have led to **increased academic interest** in potential checks within the executive branch. Many legal scholars have argued that executive branch institutions supply, or ought to supply, an alternative constraint on executive national security power. Some argue that these institutions have comparative advantages over courts or Congress in addressing rights concerns; others characterize them as a second-best option necessitated by congressional enfeeblement and judicial abdication.

**CP focuses the debate on policy specifics – that’s key**

**Bradley**, professor of law at Duke, **and Morrison**, professor of law at Columbia, May **2013**

(Curtis A. and Trevor W., PRESIDENTIAL POWER, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, AND LEGAL CONSTRAINT, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, Lexis)

**The relationship between law and presidential power is** **not merely a matter of academic debate**. **Whether**, **how**, **and to what extent presidential decisionmaking is subject to legal constraint is a central issue in the practice of modern government**, as illustrated by two recent episodes. First, in March 2011, the Obama Administration initiated military operations against Libya without congressional authorization, and then continued them past the statutory sixty-day limit set forth in the War Powers Resolution. Critics treated this episode as evidence that the executive branch did not take seriously constitutional and statutory limits [\*1100] on the use of military force. n8 Despite a low likelihood that courts would resolve the dispute, however, the Obama Administration offered public legal justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical practice, for both the initial deployment of military force in Libya and its continuation past the sixty-day point. n9 The felt need of the executive branch to justify itself in legal terms might be puzzling if the law were not playing any constraining role, but it is difficult to discern precisely what that role might have been.

Second, in the summer of 2011, a confrontation developed between the Obama Administration and Republican leaders in Congress over whether to raise the statutory debt ceiling to accommodate the government's increased borrowing. When a legislative extension of the ceiling appeared unlikely, some commentators suggested, based on either novel constitutional arguments or pure policy grounds, that the President could and should unilaterally exceed the debt ceiling. n10 Others insisted that such unilateral action would be unconstitutional because it would usurp Congress's constitutional authority "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." n11 President Obama did not attempt to address the issue unilaterally and instead continued to seek a legislative extension of the ceiling, which he ultimately obtained. Nor did the President attempt or even threaten a unilateral extension when the issue resurfaced in late 2012 and early 2013 in connection with the so-called "fiscal cliff," by which time such an action appeared to be off the table altogether. It might be that the President felt constrained not to pursue a unilateral extension by legal concerns about such a course of action, but it is also possible that political considerations would have driven the President to a similar decision. n12 In this context too, then, the role of law is unclear.

Episodes like these underscore the importance of thinking carefully not just about the general question whether the President is constrained by law, but **more particularly about what it means to say that the President is so constrained**, **and how such constraints operate**. On issues of executive power unlikely to come before the courts, one familiar idea - espoused by James Madison in The Federalist Papers - is that members of Congress have sufficient personal motivations and professional resources to protect Congress's institutional prerogatives [\*1101] from executive incursions. n13 A number of scholars have concluded, however, that such checking is not as consistent or robust as is often assumed, and that whether Congress curbs presidential power depends more often on partisan political considerations or situation-specific policy objections than on any systematic effort to protect institutional prerogatives. n14 If Congress is not as reliable a check on presidential power as Madison and others envisioned, there is arguably a greater need for other mechanisms of constraint in this area, including legal constraints. In the absence of judicial review, however, it is fair to ask how the legal constraints might operate.

### Interbranch

#### Impact empirically denied-Libya and history prove

Zeilizer 2011

[Julian E. Zelizer is a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University. He is the author of "Jimmy Carter," published by Times Books, and editor of a book assessing former President George W. Bush's administration, published by Princeton University Press. 2011, War powers belong to Congress and the president, http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/, uwyo//amp]

Still, tension over military action can develop between the White House and Congress. In the most recent chapter of the nation's inter-branch conflict, Speaker of the House John Boehner has charged that President Barack Obama violated the War Powers Resolution, which Congress passed in 1973 in an effort to seize war power back from the executive branch.

Obama is being criticized because he did not request congressional approval of the military operations in Libya even though they have lasted for more than 90 days. In a symbolic vote, 225 Republicans allied with 70 Democrats to vote down a measure authorizing the operations in Libya. They did not vote to cut funding, however.

#### Interbranch conflict is inevitable and built into the American constitution- greater degree of relationality guarantees greater chance for conflict

Zeisberg 04

[MARIAH ZEISBERG, Research Fellow, The Political Theory Project, Department of Political Science, "INTERBRANCH CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE: THE CASE OF WAR POWERS" SEPTEMBER 22, 2004]

¶ ¶ It is frequent for people to speak of the independent branches as systems of ‘separated powers.’ This can be misleading. Richard Neustadt, among others, has pointed out the inaccuracy of the term: he wrote, “[t]he Constitutional Convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of ‘separated powers.’ It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.” I agree that the formulation of ‘separated powers’ is misleading. At best, the idea of separated powers is a simple misnomer whose deleterious consequences can be overcome by the invocation of other concepts of constitutional relationship, like ‘checks-and-balances.’ At worst, the concept of separated powers implies an authority by each branch ultimately reviewable only by the electorate, not by the other branches. ¶ Much of the ‘separation of powers’ dispute hinges on our definition of the branches’ “powers.” If we speak simply of the government’s power to make war, it is clear that this is a power shared by both the executive and Congress. To speak plainly, government simply cannot make war without the cooperation of these two branches. In fact, all of the sovereign powers of government—the power to regulate commerce, the power to tax, the power to convict and imprison criminals—all of these powers require the participation of more than one branch. ¶ We can also understand ‘powers’ more abstractly, as, for example, the power to decide general matters of public policy, the power to judge whether general determinations of law apply to particular people, or the power to disburse government funds. This is the understanding of power which lies behind classical doctrines of separated powers, and behind separation of powers jurisprudence at its best. On this understanding of power, the legislature makes law, the president implements law, and the judiciary decides on whether the law applies to particular individuals. And on this understanding, the distinctiveness of the capacities of the various branches is indeed significant. However, it is worth noting that even on this understanding, the American Constitution manifests significant departures from classical separation of powers theory. The executive can propose legislation, veto bills, call Congress into special session, and adjourn the houses under certain circumstances. Executive orders provide a significant locus for executive ‘lawmaking,’ especially with the rise of the administrative state, where so many of the government’s activities are conducted under the umbrella of the executive. Congress creates every executive office and agency, establishes lines of authority within the executive branch, and shares in the appointments power; and both the legislature and executive share in some judicial powers, the executive through his pardon power, his initiation of law suits, and his defense of the government when it is sued; and the legislature most especially through appointments and impeachments.. The courts exercise legislative and executive authority in their capacity to rectify legal wrongs through their equitable powers. Madison describes this pattern as “partial agency in, or . . . controul over the acts of each other.” The departures from classical separation of powers theory are meant to bring the branches into greater relationship with each other then they would otherwise be; to protect the integrity of each branch’s authority; and to ensure that the different branches have the capacity to review and evaluate each other’s actions.¶ This pattern, then, is a final noteworthy condition: their powers bring the branches into relationship with one another, activating the potential of their independent sources of authority and distinctive perspectives to bring them into conflict. These conditions mean that the possibility for interbranch conflict is endemic to American politics. The branches cannot destroy each other; and if officials within the branches care about making their political commitments operative, they cannot ignore each other. Because these conditions taken together are what activate the possibility for interbranch conflict, I will call them the conditions of conflict.

### Signal

#### 1st- Presidential commitments are the gold standard-congress isn’t believed internationally because perceived as a circus

Marvin Kalb 13, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy, James Clark Welling Presidential Fellow, The George Washington University Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice (Emeritus), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2013, "The Road to War," book,pg. 7-8, www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2013/theroadtowar/theroadtowar\_samplechapter.pdf

As we learned in Vietnam and in the broader Middle East, a presidential commitment could lead to war, based on miscalculation, misjudgment, or mistrust. It could also lead to reconciliation. We live in a world of uncertainty, where even the word of a president is now questioned in wider circles of critical commentary. On domestic policy, Washington often resembles a political circus detached from reason and responsibility. But on foreign policy, when an international crisis erupts and some degree of global leadership is required, the word or commitment of an American president still represents the gold standard, even if the gold does not glitter as once it did.

### Rollback

#### We should get durable fiat—Aff has just as high of a potential to gets rolled back in the future, impossible to debate

**And executive orders have the force of law:**

**Oxford** Dictionary of English **2010**

(Oxford Reference, Georgetown Library)

executive order

▶ noun US (Law) a rule or order issued by the President to an executive branch of the government and having the **force of law**.

**Executive orders are permanent**

**Duncan**, Associate Professor of Law at Florida A&M, Winter **2010**

(John C., “A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders,” 35 Vt. L. Rev. 333, Lexis)

The trajectory of the evolution of the executive power in the United States, as seen through the prism of the growing edifice of executive orders have become increasingly **formal and permanent**. The evolution of executive power in the United States has shifted executive orders from mere legislative interpretation to ancillary legislation. **Executive orders continue to influence subsequent presidents**. The elaboration of executive order promulgation, as an autopoietic process was necessary to the very existence of presidential power. That is, the mechanisms for formalizing executive orders have always existed in the executive power in a government whose legitimacy lives in written pronouncements treated as delicate, sacred, and worth protecting at all cost. **Part of this formalization is** a consequence of **the reverence for precedent**. Thus, **prior presidents influence future presidents**, less because future presidents wish to mimic their predecessors, but more **because future presidents act within an edifice their predecessors have already erected**. Thus, the growth and elaboration of an ever more robust structure of executive orders resembles an autopoietic process. n561

# 1NR

## Politics

#### Economic decline causes failed states – risks terrorism and increased traffickings

Green and Schrage 9 (Michael J and Steven,., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University, the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee.  “It's not just the economy,” Asia Times Online, March 26, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian\_Economy/KC26Dk01.html AD 6/30/09)

The trend in East Asia has been for developing economies to steadily embrace democracy and the rule of law in order to sustain their national success. But to thrive, new democracies also have to deliver basic economic growth. The economic crisis has hit democracies hard, with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval collapsing to single digits in the polls and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Taiwan's Ma Ying Jeou doing only a little better (and the collapse in Taiwan's exports - particularly to China - is sure to undermine Ma's argument that a more accommodating stance toward Beijing will bring economic benefits to Taiwan). Thailand's new coalition government has an uncertain future after two years of post-coup drift and noweconomic crisis.  The string of old and new democracies in East Asia has helped to anchor US relations with China and to maintain what former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice once called a "balance of power that favors freedom". A reversal of the democratic expansion of the past two decades would not only impact the global balance of power but also increase the potential number of failed states, with all the attendant risk they bring from harboring terrorists to incubating pandemic diseases and trafficking in persons. It would also undermine the demonstration effect of liberal norms we are urging China to embrace at home.

**Economic leadership is the lynchpin to global cooperation – solves all 1AC impacts**

**Haas 13** – President of the CFR, former director of policy planning at the Department of State (Richard N, “The World Without America”, April 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/world-without-america/p30599>, )

But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America's imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. **America's failure to deal with** its **internal challenges would come at a steep price**. Indeed, **the rest of the world's stake in American success is** nearly **as large as that of the US itself.**¶ Part of **the reason is economic**. **The US economy** still **accounts for** about **one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America's capacity to consume other countries' goods and services will increase**, thereby **boosting growth around the world**. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, **only the US** (or, more broadly, North America) **has the potential to drive global economic recovery.**¶ **The US remains a unique source of innovation**. Most of the world's citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This **tech**nology **is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease** both their **reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions.**¶ The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, **the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish**. **People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding**.¶ Finally, **the world faces many serious challenges**, ranging from the need to halt **the spread of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, fight **climate change**, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to **regulating** practices in **cyberspace**, **improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out.**¶ While Adam Smith's "invisible hand" may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics. **Order requires** the visible hand of **leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges.**¶ Don't get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world's problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding.¶ But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook.¶ This brings me back to the argument that **the US must put its house in order – economically**, physically, socially, and politically – if it is **to have the resources needed to promote order in the world**. Everyone should hope that it does: **The alternative** to a world led by the US **is** not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by **chronic crisis and conflict.** That would be **bad** not just **for** Americans, but for **the** vast majority of the **planet**'s inhabitants.

#### Turns Enviornement--

#### Growth leads to environmental protections that sustain habitats

Anderson 4 [Terry L. professor of economics at Montana State University, Ph.D. in economics, “Why Economic Growth is Good for the Environment,” http://www.perc.org/articles/article446.php]

Market forces also cause economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment."

#### Failure to reform IMF tanks credibility and heg—causes the same US hypocrisy their internal links are about

Vinik 3-6

(Danny, writer for the New Republic. “Republicans Are Playing Politics While Ukraine Faces Default” 3-6-14 http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116894/republicans-are-blocking-imf-reforms-help-ukraine//wyoccd)

The U.S.’s refusal to pass the reforms—which 130 countries have already approved—only hurts our credibility. Given the broad constituency of nations that want to help Ukraine, this won’t stop the IMF from offering a loan. But it’s a bit rich for the U.S. to call for IMF help when it refuses to pass basic reforms that would have no material effect on the United States and that most of the world has already approved.¶ “The rest of the world is furious at us,” Ted Truman, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury for International Affairs from 1998 to 2001, said. “For us to say, ‘We just stiffed you in January’ and now we’re turning around to try to ask you to be part of the team helping Ukraine, we look silly.”¶ “It does undermine our credibility and leadership,” he added. “We look like we’re giving with our right hand and taking with our left hand.”¶

#### Specifically Collapses global economic power

Callaghan, 1-20-14

[Mike, The Interpreter, Failure to act on IMF reform damages US (and G20) credibility, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/20/Failure-to-act-on-IMF-reform-damages-US-(and-G20)-credibility.aspx?COLLCC=2339903959&] /Wyo-MB

The insularity of the US Congress should never be underestimated. It has blocked (again) the implementation of IMF governance reforms. This has damaged the credibility of the US, the IMF and the G20. Nancy Birdsall from the Center for Global Development said 'as an American citizen, I'm embarrassed'. Ted Truman from the Peterson Institute said that the US kicked an own goal when it comes to global economic leadership.¶ The reforms to the IMF that the Obama Administration had submitted to Congress as part of its appropriation bill (and the good news is that Congress did agree on aspects of appropriations, removing the threat of another federal shutdown for over nine months), were those agreed with much fanfare by the G20 in 2010. The reforms would have doubled IMF quotas to $720 billion and shifted 6% of quota to emerging markets (an IMF member's quota determines both its financial commitment to the Fund and its voting power). Europe was to reduce its current representation on the 24 member IMF Executive Board by two so as to make room for more directors from emerging markets. In addition, the formula for deciding quota allocations was to be revised and the next review of quotas was accelerated to January 2014. The expectation was that there would be a further shift in quota shares to emerging markets as part of this review.¶ The IMF Managing Director expressed her disappointment and noted that the reforms were to ensure that the governance structure of the IMF was brought into line with the changes in the global economy, particularly the rise of the emerging markets. Not surprisingly, the reforms are considered extremely important by the emerging markets and they also expressed their disappointment and called on the IMF to implement the reforms.¶ But it is not up to the IMF. It all depends on the US Congress. Major reforms in the IMF require an 85% voting share approval. With a share of 16.75%, the US has a veto. If the reforms had been passed, the US voting share would have declined only slightly and it would have maintained its veto. So the world waits for US leadership. When will that happen?¶ As Truman notes, US credibility has been damaged. The US will be less trusted to honour agreements in this area. The BRICS will continue to criticise the IMF as being excessively dominated by advanced countries and will continue to promote alternative bodies, such as a BRIC development bank and currency support arrangements. And the credibility of the G20 has also taken a body blow. The reform of IMF governance was meant to be one of its major achievements.

#### That’s the largest internal link to leadership and power projection

Three Consulting, 2012

[Copywrite on 2012, James Kennedy provides consulting services to the financial, mining and nuclear energy industry on strategic issues related to Rare Earths, Thorium and the U.S. regulatory environment, The Economics of Projected Power, http://threeconsulting.com/pdfs/EconomicsVProjectedPowerUSA.pdf] /Wyo-MB

It should be obvious that any projected power based system is unsustainable without an economic ¶ engine. The history of all failed empires confirms this, but they need not be mutually exclusive. ¶ U.S. policy must adopt some balance between projected power and economic viability. These policies ¶ must match the real world economics of China’s State Sponsored Monopoly in rare earths. ¶ There are no ‘free market’ solutions when critical and strategic resources become the weapon of ¶ industrial economic policy for one nation. Molycorp, currently the only U.S. producer of rare earths, has ¶ already morphed into part of China’s monopoly (they will send 100% of the high value rare earths to ¶ China for refining). Even with this contortion of allegiance Molycorp’s economic viability is uncertain. ¶ If the U.S. wants to maintain the implements of projected power then it must also establish and support ¶ the essential elements of industry and economics. That means that the U.S. must do whatever is ¶ necessary to support and defend an economy that provides jobs that offer security and dignity to the men ¶ and women who defend this Nation.

#### History goes our way

Markowitz and Fariss, 2013

[JONATHAN N. MARKOWITZ and CHRISTOPHER J. FARISS, University of California, San Diego, International Interactions, 39:119–143, 2013, Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power, http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/cfariss/documents/MarkFariss2013II.pdf] /Wyo-MB

In the early twentieth century, a number of economically ascendant powers, including Germany, Japan, and the United States, plunged their newfound wealth into the construction and deployment of fleets of battleships, expe- ditionary forces, and distant bases. However, during the second half of the twentieth century most great powers abandoned the high seas and moth- balled their battle fleets. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, we are witnessing a reversal of this trend: China, India, Brazil, and Russia, and a group of rising minor powers (such as South Korea, Norway, and Australia) have been modernizing by building submarines, warships, aircraft, and expe- ditionary forces. Why are these states building power projection capabilities again and how much of their behavior can be explained by their economic ascendance or technological innovation?¶ Conventional wisdom among realists and military historians is that the relationship between economic power and the development and deploy- ment of military power is a tight one (Kennedy 1989; Mearsheimer 2001). These scholars contend that as states become economically powerful, they generally choose to build and project military power. But is this really true, and if so, how strong is the relationship between economic power and mil- itary power projection empirically? A second set of scholars argue that not just economic power, but technology and its effect on the cost of project- ing power determines the distance and frequency with which states deploy military force (Bean 1973; Boulding 1962; Dudley 1991; Quester 1977). Our paper provides one of the first empirical analyses of how the cost of project- ing power affects the distance over which states project power. The specific research question we focus on in this paper is what determines how far states send their military forces?

#### Economic decline causes US-Russia war

Rasmus, 3-17-14

[Jack, Dr. Jack Rasmus is author of the 2012 book, ‘Obama’s Economy: Recovery for the Few’, and the 2010 book, ‘Epic Recession: Prelude to Global Depression’, both published by Pluto Press and Palgrave-Macmillan, Who Benefits From Ukraine’s Economic Crisis?, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/03/17/who-benefits-from-ukraines-economic-crisis/] /Wyo-MB

Given the strong trends in the global economy in general toward slowdown, and the decline of currencies in emerging markets, it is likely as well that Ukraine’s currency will continue to decline, further exacerbating all the above problems. The recent 20% drop in its value in relation to the dollar will continue, as the Ukraine is swept up in the general emerging markets crisis in addition to its own set of problems.¶ With the secession of the Crimea the Ukrainian crisis, economically and politically now shifts to a new level. As the economic crisis deepens in the country, demands for secession will grow elsewhere in the eastern Ukraine as well. How the Ukraine government and the USA/EU chooses to address that likelihood will be critical. Further political unrest and uncertainty will mean more economic crisis, as business investment and production stalls and employment and inflation rises.¶ The response to the growing economic problems by the post-Coup government in Kiev will also prove critical. With its security forces now being led by proto-fascist elements that want above all a military conflict between the EU/USA and Russia, the great danger is that those proto-fascist forces may provoke a military conflict in an attempt to draw in NATO forces. Should that occur, then Ukraine’s economic crisis will be the least of its problems.

#### Russia-US war outweighs everything else

Bostrom 2

Nick, PhD, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March 2002, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

 **[2.] Losers lose link – plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital**

**Loomis, 7** --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman **Ornstein writes** of the domestic context, ¶ **In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success**—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—**is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have**. **Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly.** In simple terms, winners win and **losers lose more often than not. ¶ Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals.** As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. **Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies.** ¶ The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that **the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution**. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.¶ This brief review of the literature suggests how **legitimacy norms enhance presidential influence in ways that structural powers cannot explain**. Correspondingly, **increased executive power improves the prospects for policy success**. As a variety of cases indicate—from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in Iraq—the effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As a result, policymakers—starting with the president—pay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.¶ **Political capital is finite --- the plan would tradeoff with domestic economic priorities** ¶ **Moore, 9/10** --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor¶ (Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” [http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester%29))¶ Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.¶ There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.¶ **The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.**¶ The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.¶ Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.¶ The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.¶ These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.¶ More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.¶ The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.¶ This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.¶ Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.¶ Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:¶ Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.¶ Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.¶ **Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that **congressional Republicans**, particularly in the House, **have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.**

#### 2. Political capital is true – best scholarship proves

Beckmann and Kumar, UC-Irvine political science professor and Indian Institute of Technology economics professor, 11

[Matthew N., & Vimal, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41: 488-503, September 2011, “Opportunism in Polarization: Presidential Success in Senate Key Votes, 1953-2008”, p. 498-9]

Before developing presidents’ lobbying options for building winning coalitions on Capitol Hill, it is instructive to consider cases where the president has no political capital and no viable lobbying options. In such circumstances of imposed passivity (beyond offering a proposal), a president’s fate is clear: his proposals are subject to pivotal voters’ preferences. So if a president lacking political capital proposes to change some far-off status quo, that is, one on the opposite side of the median or otherwise pivotal voter, a (Condorcet) winner always exists, and it coincides with the pivot’s predisposition (Brady and Volden, 1998; Krehbiel, 1998) (see also Black (1948) and Downs (1957)). Considering that there tends to be substantial ideological distance between presidents and pivotal voters, positive presidential inﬂuence without lobbying, then, is not much inﬂuence at all.¶ As with all lobbyists, presidents looking to push legislation must do so indirectly by pushing the lawmakers whom they need to pass it. Or, as Richard Nesustadt artfully explained:¶ The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his…Persuasion deals in the coin of self-interest with men who have some freedom to reject what they ﬁnd counterfeit. (Neustadt, 1990: 40) ¶ Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply of persuasive carrots and sticks. Beyond the ofﬁce’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives in Congress, presidents may also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so often characterizes legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the ﬁght. In the following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining.¶ Speciﬁ- cally, we deﬁne presidents’ political capital as the class of tactics White House ofﬁcials employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.¶Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only meshes with previous scholarship on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also presidential practice**.** For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated ‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members:¶ The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237) Of course, presidential political capital is a scarce commodity with a ﬂoating value. Even a favorabl[e]y situated president enjoys only a ﬁnite supply of political capital; he can only promise or pressure so much. What is more, this capital ebbs and ﬂows as realities and/or perceptions change. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking, however important those margins may be (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon (1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how presidents may systematically inﬂuence them.

#### Hirsh agrees with the thesis of the politics DA even if he disagrees with the term “political capital”

Michael Hirsh, National Journal, 2/7/13, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.

#### 2. Political capital finite:

#### A. PC finite – opportunity cost

Hayward 12

[John, writer at Human Events. “DON’T BE GLAD THE BUFFETT RULE IS DEAD, BE ANGRY IT EVER EXISTED,” 4/17, <http://www.humanevents.com/2012/04/17/dont-be-glad-the-buffett-rule-is-dead-be-angry-it-ever-existed/>]

Toomey makes the excellent point that Obama’s class-warfare sideshow act is worse than useless, because it’s wasting America’s valuable time, even as the last fiscal sand runs through our hourglass. Politicians speak of “political capital” in selfish terms, as a pile of chips each party hoards on its side of the poker table, but in truth America has only a finite amount of political capital in total. When time and energy is wasted on pointless distractions, the capital expended---in the form of the public’s attention, and the debates they hold among themselves---cannot easily be regained. ¶ There is an “opportunity cost” associated with the debates we aren’t having, and the valid ideas we’re not considering, when our time is wasted upon nonsense that is useful only to political re-election campaigns. Health care reform is the paramount example of our time, as countless real, workable market-based reforms were obscured by the flaccid bulk of ObamaCare. The Buffett Rule, like all talk of tax increases in the shadow of outrageous government spending, likewise distracts us from the real issues.

#### B. PC finite – Obama perceives and acts like it

Burnett, 13

Bob Burnett, Founding Executive @ CiscoSystems, Berkeley writer, journalist, columnist @ huffington post, 4/5, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-burnett/keystone-xl-obama_b_3020154.html>

On April 3 and 4, President Obama spoke at several San Francisco fundraisers. While he didn't specifically mention the Keystone XL pipeline, the tenor of his remarks indicated that he's likely to approve the controversial project. Obama seems to be most influenced by his inherent political pragmatism. I've heard Barack Obama speak on several occasions. The first was February 19, 2007, at a San Francisco ore-election fundraiser with a lengthy question and answer session. Towards the end of the event a woman asked then presidential-candidate Obama what his position was on same-sex marriage. For an instant, Obama seemed surprised; then he gathered himself and responded he was aware of strong feelings on both sides of this issue and his position was evolving. Five years later, in May of 2012, President Obama announced his support for same-sex marriage. What took Obama so long to make up his mind? No doubt he needed to clarify his own moral position -- although the Protestant denomination he was baptized into, the United Church of Christ, announced its support for same-sex marriage in 2005. But I'm sure the president carefully weighed the political consequences and, last May, thought the timing was right. Over the last six years I've realized Barack Obama has several personas. On occasion he moves us with stirring oratory; that's Reverend Obama, the rock star. Once in a while, he turns philosophical; that's Professor Obama, the student of American history. On April 3, I saw Politician Obama, the pragmatic leader of the Democratic Party. Obama has learned that, as president, he only gets a fixed amount of political capital each year and has learned to ration it. In 2007, he didn't feel it was worth stirring up controversy by supporting same-sex marriage; in 2012 he thought it was. He's a cautious pragmatist. He doesn't make snap decisions or ones that will divert his larger agenda. Intuitively, most Democrats know this about the president. At the beginning of 2012, many Democratic stalwarts were less than thrilled by the prospect of a second Obama term. While their reasons varied, there was a common theme, "Obama hasn't kept his promises to my constituency." There were lingering complaints that 2009's stimulus package should have been bigger and a communal whine, "Obama should have listened to us." Nonetheless, by the end of the Democratic convention on September 6, most Dems had come around. In part, this transformation occurred because from January to September of 2012 Dems scrutinized Mitt Romney and were horrified by what they saw. In January some had muttered, "There's no difference between Obama and Romney," but nine months later none believed that. While many Democrats were not thrilled by Obama's first-term performance, they saw him as preferable to Romney on a wide range of issues. In 2009, Obama got a bad rap from some Dems because they believed he did not fight hard enough for the fiscal stimulus and affordable healthcare. In March of 2011, veteran Washington columnist, Elizabeth Drew, described Obama as: ... a somewhat left-of-center pragmatist, and a man who has avoided fixed positions for most of his life. Even his health care proposal -- denounced by the right as a 'government takeover' and 'socialism' -- was essentially moderate or centrist. When he cut a deal on the tax bill, announced on December 7 [2010], he pragmatically concluded that he did not have the votes to end the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest, and in exchange for giving in on that he got significant concessions from the Republicans, such as a fairly lengthy extension of unemployment insurance and the cut in payroll taxes. Making this deal also left him time to achieve other things -- ratification of the START treaty, the repeal of don't ask, don't tell. Drew's description of the president as a "left-of-center pragmatist" resonates with my sense of him. He is a political pragmatist who, over the past five years, has learned to guard his political capital and focus it on his highest priorities. In this year's State-of-the-Union address half of the president's remarks concerned jobs and the economy. We gather here knowing that there are millions of Americans whose hard work and dedication have not yet been rewarded. Our economy is adding jobs -- but too many people still can't find full-time employment. Corporate profits have rocketed to all-time highs -- but for more than a decade, wages and incomes have barely budged. It is our generation's task, then, to reignite the true engine of America's economic growth -- a rising, thriving middle class. He also spoke passionately about the need to address to address global warming, "For the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate change." But it's clear that's a secondary objective. At one of the Bay Area fundraisers, President Obama observed that his big challenge is to show middle-class families that, "we are working just as hard for them as we are for an environmental agenda." Obama isn't going to block the Keystone XL pipeline because he doesn't believe that he can make the case his action will help the middle-class. He's conserving his political capital. He's being pragmatic.

#### C. PC finite – uniquely true for 2nd term

Nakamura, 2/20/2013

[David, staff writer, “Obama says he has a year to get stuff done,” Washington Post, February 20, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/02/20/in-interview-obama-says-he-has-a-year-to-get-stuff-done/> //uwyo-baj]

“Once we get through this year, then people start looking at the mid-terms and after that start thinking about the presidential election,” Obama said during a brief interview with KGO, an ABC affiliate. “The American people don’t want us thinking about elections, they want us to do some work. America is poised to grow in 2013 and add a lot of jobs as long as Washington doesn’t get in the way.” Obama’s remarks were an acknowledgement that a second-term president’s ability to use his political capital faces rapidly diminishing returns, highlighting the high stakes of his bids to strike deals with Congress on issues from tax reform, budget cuts, immigration reform and gun control.