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# Weber Round 2

## 2AC

### Case

#### Prior to the larger K of settlerism there is no non- colonizer term – Native American, American India, Indian, tribe, etc are all tied to colonial legacy - Critiques of terminology are a distraction. The best solution is deploying the generic terms in a context that is critical of the colonizer’s worldview which gave rise to the terms.

d’Errico 5 (Peter, Legal Studies Department @ U.Mass., “Native American Indian Studies – A Note on Names”, <http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/name.html>, Accessed 7/12/08)

"American Indians" derives from the colonizers' world-view and is therefore not the real name of anyone. It is a name given to people by outsiders, not by themselves. Why should we use any name given to a people by someone other than themselves? [2](http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/name.html#2) ¶ On the other hand, why shouldn't we use it? Almost everybody in the world knows the name and to whom it refers. It is commonly used by many Indigenous Peoples in the United States, even today. It is the legal definition of these Peoples in United States law. ¶ Some people get upset about "American Indian" because of its association with Columbus. There is an equally serious dilemma with the use of "Native American," which came into vogue as part of a concern for "political correctness." The latter was an effort to acknowledge ethnic diversity in the United States while insisting on an over-arching American unity. Groups became identified as hyphen-American. Thus, African-American, Irish-American, Italian-American, and so on. For the original inhabitants of the land, the "correct" term became Native-American. ¶ The word "native" has a generic meaning, referring to anyone or anything that is at home in its place of origin. "Native" also has a pejorative meaning in English colonization, as in "The natives are restless tonight." From an English perspective (and, after all, we are talking about English words), "native" carries the connotation of "primitive," which itself has both a generic definition, meaning "first" or "primary," and a pejorative use, meaning "backward" or "ignorant." And, as we have seen, "American" derives from that other Italian. So "Native American" does not avoid the problem of naming from an outsider's perspective. ¶ Concern for political correctness focuses more on appearances than reality. As John Trudell observed at the time, "They change our name and treat us the same." Basic to the treatment is an insistence that the original inhabitants of the land are not permitted to name themselves. As an added twist, it seems that the only full, un-hyphenated Americans are those who make no claim of origin beyond the shores of this land. Many of these folk assert that they are in fact the real "native" Americans. ¶ We have to discard both "American Indian" and "Native American" if we want to be faithful to reality and true to the principle that a People's name ought to come from themselves. The consequence of this is that the original inhabitants of this land are to be called by whatever names they give themselves. There are no American Indians or Native Americans. There are many different peoples, hundreds in fact, bearing such names as Wampanoag, Cherokee, Seminole, Navajo, Hopi, and so on and on through the field of names. These are the "real" names of the people. ¶ But the conundrum of names doesn't end there. Some of the traditional or "real" names are not actually derived from the people themselves, but from their neighbors or even enemies. "Mohawk" is a Narraganset name, meaning "flesh eaters." "Sioux" is a French corruption of an Anishinabe word for "enemy." Similarly, "Apache" is a Spanish corruption of a Zuni word for "enemy," while Navajo is from the Spanish version of a Tewa word. If we want to be fully authentic in every instance, we will have to inquire into the language of each People to find the name they call themselves. It may not be surprising to find that the deepest real names are often a word for "people" or for the homeland or for some differentiating characteristic of the people as seen through their own eyes. ¶ The important thing is to acknowledge the fundamental difference between how a People view themselves and how they are viewed by others, and to not get hung up on names for the sake of "political correctness." ¶ In this context, the difference between "American Indian" and "Native-American" is nonexistent. Both are names given from the outside. On the other hand, in studying the situation and history of the Original Peoples of the continent, we do not need to completely avoid names whose significance is understood by all. Indeed, it may be that the shortest way to penetrate the situation of Indigenous Peoples is to critically use the generic name imposed on them.

### K

#### As academics within this space we must reject creeping legacies of colonialism in our pedagogical practices – failure to do so makes us complicit with cultural genocide

Graveline’ 98  
[Fyre Jean, BSW, MSW, PhD, M'etis feminist, Department of First Nations Studies at University of Northern British Columbia "CIRCLE WORKS", p. 28-30//wyo-hdm]

Aboriginal people in the schools were very aware of the "civilizing functions," including standard practices of "physical punishment for speaking their own language even when they knew no English" (Barman, Hebert and McCaskill 1986: 10). The colonization process, and in particular education, targeted oral Tradition—our voice. The decimation of our tribal languages is mourned by many. This process, aided by colonial education, is understood as one fundaSettingtrie Terms mental aspect of cultural genocide. Johnston eloquently exprj tional view of the connections among transmission of an Aborid language and language loss: They lose not only the ability to express the simplest of daily sentiments and needs but they can no longer understand the ideas, concepts, insights, attitudes, rituals, ceremonies, institutions brought into being by their ancestors; and, having lost the power to understand, cannot sustain, enrich, or pass on their heritage. No longer will they think Indian or feel Indian. (1992: 10) Language as a symbol system is always challenged as part of the power structure in an ecological revolution. Johnston asks: "[W]hat is it that has undermined the validity of some of the 'Indian' languages and deprived this generation and this society of the promise and the benefit of the wisdom and the knowledge embodied in tribal literature?" (1992: 15). He notes: In the case of the Beothuk and their language, the means used were simple and direct: it was the blade, the bludgeon, and the bullet. The speakers were annihilated . . . . In other instances, other means were used to put an end to the speaking of an "Indian" language If a boot or a fist were not administered, then a lash or a yardstick was plied until the "Indian" language was beaten out. To boot and fist and lash was added ridicule. (1992: 14, 16) Ridicule was an effective tool against Aboriginal children who had been Traditionally exposed to Elders who used humor to challenge their conduct towards others.

## 1AR

#### We must decolonize education by centering minority epistemologies- we are key to intersectionality

Richardson 12 (Troy A, Associate Professor, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS), Cornell University, "Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education." Studies in Philosophy and Education 31.6 (2012): 539-551)OG

Countering hierarchical social and educational relations in contexts of racialization is¶ outlined by Margonis (1999, 2000, 2011a, b) as an ontological project and philosophers of¶ education invested in a critical analysis of the intersections of race, class and colonialism¶ are indebted to his thinking. I think it is important to read Margonis as fostering a¶ de-colonial position in philosophy of education and his call for a dialogical pedagogical¶ practice is crucially important for shifting the location of philosophical knowledge generation and the languages of education. Indeed, Margonis’ dialogical (2007, 2011a, b)¶ project for anti-assimilatory education would suggests multilingualism to assist in moving¶ from the hegemonic languages of philosophy (German, French and English) to Indigenous¶ languages, African-American Vernacular English, creole and Chicano Spanish. Accordingly, his call for dialogue is in direct conversation with Mignolo (2000) and MaldonadoTorres (2004, 2009). For each of these thinkers, coming into and becoming through a¶ dialogical relation re-situates being by exposing and disrupting the colonialist claims that¶ Indigenous and African and African diaspora peoples were or are primitive. Likewise,¶ dialogue resituates being by placing minoritized knowledge systems and forms of being at¶ the center of relationships of learning.¶ Dialogue and multilingualism in the service of more expansive discussions of being¶ cannot then be grounded in a pre-formulated or normalized (continental) existentialist¶ language of philosophy. Rather, dialogue can be outlined according to a de-colonial¶ attitude (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262) which takes as its primary effort the assertion of¶ the languages which relate those knowledge systems and forms of being that have been¶ conceived as outside or below the domain of Being. Dialogue conceived with a decolonial¶ attitude would necessitate bi- or multilingualism to undermine the ways in which the term¶ ‘‘enigma’’ is used to dismiss and denigrate minoritized knowledges and forms of life. As I¶ will elaborate below, multilingualism should be rethought according to languaging¶ (Mignolo 2000). Following the work of Khatibi (1999) and Anzaldua (1987) Mignolo has¶ used the terms languaging and bilanguaging to signal a shift away from a strictly technical¶ project for linguistic communication or translation (see also Sandoval 2000). For each of¶ these thinkers, bilanguaging operates to re-position being according to the ways of life of¶ the minoritized. In this way, African Americans, Latina/os and Native Americans are not¶ enigmas for philosophers of education but opportunities and invitations for a formulation¶ of being that is non-assimilationist to the privileged and hegemonic languages of¶ philosophy.¶ Dialogue and the Decolonial Attitude¶ Maldonado-Torres (2007) speaks of a Du Bois (1999) inspired de-colonial attitude that¶ ‘‘demands responsibility and the willingness to take many perspectives and [the] points of¶ view of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as insigniﬁcant’’ (262).¶ While dialogue is not explicitly named here, it is an assumed element in developing the¶ decolonial attitude. Indeed, elsewhere Maldonado-Torres (2004) elaborates how ‘‘radical¶ critique should take dialogical form’’ whereby philosophers ‘‘make space for the¶ enunciation of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural,¶ political and social memories’’ (51). Du Bois (1999) is for Maldonado-Torres (2007) one¶ who made spaces for the memories of African and African diaspora peoples through a¶ radical form of dialogue. From this dialogue a different direction for the articulation and¶ formulation of African American forms of being was charted.¶ Moreover, as Maldonado-Torres (2007) goes on to note, Du Bois’ dialogue enabled ‘‘the¶ creation of black institutions in the United States as well as furthering Pan-African visions¶ and struggles’’ (262). Du Bois fostered and called forth spaces for Pan-African visions,¶ providing a ‘‘fundamental shift in perspective that leads one to see the world anew in a way¶ that targets its evil in a new way and gives us a better sense of what to do next’’¶ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 262). On Maldonado-Torres’ (2004, 2007) reading, the institution building Du Bois achieved was a realization of a radicalized form of dialogue where¶ the knowledges, terms and forms of being expressed by African and African diaspora¶ peoples provide the intellectual, philosophical and ontological force for these projects.¶ There is in Maldonado-Torres’s description here an important complementarity to¶ Margonis’ (2011a, b) notion of being in dialogue with the sentiments and existential¶ situations of racialized/colonized peoples. Indeed, Margonis (2011a, b) echoes some of this¶ Du Boisian de-colonial attitude when he writes ‘‘educators would do well to invite broad¶ and cacophonous forms of interaction in the classroom; a mix of conservative, artistic,¶ comedic, and narrative patterns in the classroom gives a broader range of points of contact¶ with students’’ (3). Margonis arrives at this call for a cacophonous classroom in large part¶ through his careful reading and reworking of Freire’s (1993) notion of dialogue. ‘‘Freire’s¶ description of egalitarian, de-colonizing dialogue,’’ he writes, provide ‘‘means for setting¶ in motion social spaces of focused, passionate intellectual intensity’’ (Margonis 2011a, b,¶ 3). Like Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007) the insistence here on dialogue as crucial to¶ providing the space for engagements with multiple intellectual traditions is crucial for¶ Margonis. As I have suggested above however, this space for dialogue has not prompted a¶ stance which works to expose the coloniality of being operating in Rousseau (1984) or¶ Heidegger (1962). Again, Margonis (2007, 2011a, b) seems to limit a more radical¶ understanding of dialogue provokes an anti-assimilationist stance toward Rousseau’s¶ (1984) and Heidegger’s (1962) philosophies of being. In this way, Margonis (1999, 2009)¶ inadvertently de-couples a particular existentialist philosophical discourse from its relationship to colonialism.¶ In stating this, I am not suggesting that Margonis, I or Maldonado-Torres (2007, 2009)¶ could easily ‘‘ﬁx’’ the discourse of primitive in Heidegger for example (1962) as a way to¶ deploy him otherwise. As Bernasconi (2005) has warned, we cannot simply enact a¶ ‘‘surgical [philosophical] operation’’ (243) to smooth over these tensions for a more¶ ‘‘inclusive’’ Heideggerian existentialism. A de-colonial dialogue can be more attentive to¶ shifts toward bilanguaging in the enunciations and learning of Indigenous, African and¶ African diaspora and Latino/a traditions of being.¶ Bilanguaging and/as Border Thinking for Trans-Ontologies¶ Finally, Mignolo (2000) identiﬁes the space of dialogue as a site of ‘‘border thinking’’ and¶ ‘‘bilanguaging.’’ Anticipating Maldonado-Torres’ (2004) idea of a more radical form of¶ dialogue, bilanguaging is ‘‘a form of life possible in the fractures of a hegemonic (national¶ or imperial) language’’ that ‘‘draw[s] in something that is beyond sound, syntax and¶ lexicon’’ (Mignolo 2000, 264). Margonis (2011a, b) pedagogy of cacophony solicits a form¶ of border thinking and hints at this idea of bilanguanging, but his philosophical framework¶ has not been fractured in ways that would shift us away from the Rousseauean (1994) and¶ Heideggerian (1962) coloniality of being. Dialogical practice as focused intellectual¶ intensity would seem to entail the kind of bilanguaging Mignolo (2000) speaks of here to¶ achieve a decolonial dialogue. This would more fully attend to the way trans-ontologies¶ undermine the coloniality of being enacted through professional philosophy. Taken¶ together, a decolonial trans-ontology is an emergent form of being stemming from a border¶ thinking and bilanguaging.¶ In the context of the United States and the Americas more broadly, it is not only an¶ intellectual and pedagogical project that would provide the opportunity for trans-ontologies¶ to emerge. An anti-assimilatory pedagogy seeking cacophony would entail a shift in¶ location to those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being¶ continuously emerge. That is, philosophers and teachers would situate themselves where¶ African American youth are not conceived as enigmas. In this sense, Margonis’ (2007,¶ 2011a, b) teachers would not only seek a cacophonous classroom, but the cacophonous,¶ creative, driven and constructive locations of African American, Indigenous and Latono/a¶ being. Through radical dialogues in these shifted locations we learn the pre-situations of¶ such youth. Learning with minoritized youth in this way entails forms of bilanguaging¶ wherein European ontologies lose something of their habitability. In those, perhaps ﬂeeting¶ moments, decolonial trans-ontologies are more clearly recognized as the future which¶ denies the coloniality of being.¶ The processes of radical dialogue (Maldonado-Torres 2004) and bilanguaging (Mignolo¶ 2000) for trans-ontologies underscores the potentialities of a de-colonial turn in philosophy¶ of education. ‘‘The de-colonial turn,’’ writes Maldonado-Torres (2007), ‘‘marks the¶ deﬁnitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at before¶ unknown institutional levels’’ (262). Margonis’ (1999, 2007, 2011a, b) efforts for antioppressive pedagogical practices and philosophical frameworks serves as an important¶ moment in a de-colonial turn in philosophy of education. Continuing with him toward a¶ critique of the coloniality of being provide a way to move past the terms of enigma and¶ primitive to decolonial trans-ontologies in philosophy of education.