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#### The Executive Branch of the United States should ban signature strikes. The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection.

#### The United States Congress should enact a resolution and issue a white paper stating that it has determined that the United States government is conducting such operations in full compliance with relevant laws, including but not limited to the Authorization to Use Military Force of 2001, covert action findings, and the President’s inherent powers under the Constitution.

#### The CP’s the best middle ground---preserves the vital counter-terror role of targeted killings while resolving all their downsides

Daniel Byman 13, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

#### Solves---the combination of executive disclosure and Congressional support boosts accountability and legitimacy

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Perhaps the most obvious way to add accountability to the targeted killing process is for someone in government to describe the process the way this article has, and from there, defend the process. The task of describing the government’s policies in detail should not fall to anonymous sources, confidential interviews, and selective leaks. Government’s failure to defend policies is not a phenomenon that is unique to post 9/11 targeted killings. In fact, James Baker once noted "In my experience, the United States does a better job at incorporating intelligence into its targeting decisions than it does in using intelligence to explain those decisions after the fact. This in part reflects the inherent difficulty in articulating a basis for targets derived from ongoing intelligence sources and methods. Moreover, it is hard to pause during ongoing operations to work through issues of disclosure…But articulation is an important part of the targeting process that must be incorporated into the decision cycle for that subset of targets raising the hardest issues…"519 Publicly defending the process is a natural fit for public accountability mechanisms. It provides information to voters and other external actors who can choose to exercise a degree of control over the process. However, a detailed public defense of the process also bolsters bureaucratic and professional accountability by demonstrating to those within government that they are involved in activities that their government is willing to publicly describe and defend (subject to the limits of necessary national security secrecy). However, the Executive branch, while wanting to reveal information to defend the process, similarly recognizes that by revealing too much information they may face legal accountability mechanisms that they may be unable to control, thus their caution is understandable (albeit self-serving).520 It’s not just the Executive branch that can benefit from a healthier defense of the process. Congress too can bolster the legitimacy of the program by specifying how they have conducted their oversight activities. The best mechanism by which they can do this is through a white paper. That paper could include: A statement about why the committees believe the U.S. government's use of force is lawful. If the U.S. government is employing armed force it's likely that it is only doing so pursuant to the AUMF, a covert action finding, or relying on the President's inherent powers under the Constitution. Congress could clear up a substantial amount of ambiguity by specifying that in the conduct of its oversight it has reviewed past and ongoing targeted killing operations and is satisfied that in the conduct of its operations the U.S. government is acting consistent with those sources of law. Moreover, Congress could also specify certain legal red lines that if crossed would cause members to cease believing the program was lawful. For example, if members do not believe the President may engage in targeted killings acting only pursuant to his Article II powers, they could say so in this white paper, and also articulate what the consequences of crossing that red line might be. To bolster their credibility, Congress could specifically articulate their powers and how they would exercise them if they believed the program was being conducted in an unlawful manner. Perhaps stating: "The undersigned members affirm that if the President were to conduct operations not authorized by the AUMF or a covert action finding, we would consider that action to be unlawful and would publicly withdraw our support for the program, and terminate funding for it." A statement detailing the breadth and depth of Congressional oversight activities. When Senator Feinstein released her statement regarding the nature and degree of Senate Intelligence Committee oversight of targeted killing operations it went a long way toward bolstering the argument that the program was being conducted in a responsible and lawful manner. An oversight white paper could add more details about the oversight being conducted by the intelligence and armed services committees, explaining in as much detail as possible the formal and informal activities that have been conducted by the relevant committees. How many briefings have members attended? Have members reviewed targeting criteria? Have members had an opportunity to question the robustness of the internal kill-list creation process and target vetting and validation processes? Have members been briefed on and had an opportunity to question how civilian casualties are counted and how battle damage assessments are conducted? Have members been informed of the internal disciplinary procedures for the DoD and CIA in the event a strike goes awry, and have they been informed of whether any individuals have been disciplined for improper targeting? Are the members satisfied that internal disciplinary procedures are adequate? 3) Congressional assessment of the foreign relations implications of the program. The Constitution divides some foreign policy powers between the President and Congress, and the oversight white paper should articulate whether members have assessed the diplomatic and foreign relations implications of the targeted killing program. While the white paper would likely not be able to address sensitive diplomatic matters such as whether Pakistan has privately consented to the use of force in their territory, the white paper could set forth the red lines that would cause Congress to withdraw support for the program. The white paper could specifically address whether the members have considered potential blow-back, whether the program has jeopardized alliances, whether it is creating more terrorists than it kills, etc. In specifying each of these and other factors, Congress could note the types of developments, that if witnessed would cause them to withdraw support for the program. For example, Congress could state "In the countries where strikes are conducted, we have not seen the types of formal objections to the activities that would normally be associated with a violation of state's sovereignty. Specifically, no nation has formally asked that the issue of strikes in their territory be added to the Security Council's agenda for resolution. No nation has shot down or threatened to shoot down our aircraft, severed diplomatic relations, expelled our personnel from their country, or refused foreign aid. If we were to witness such actions it would cause us to question the wisdom and perhaps even the legality of the program."

### 2

#### Presidential power high now-historical precedent and Obama domestic and international expansion

Fein ‘12

[Bruce Fein, associate deputy attorney general under President Reagan , A History of the Expansion of Presidential Power, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/opinion/a-history-of-the-expansion-of-presidential-power.html>, uwyo//amp]

The unilateral actions of President Obama in the domestic arena to circumvent Congress are more than matched by the president’s unilateralism in foreign affairs. Among other things, President Obama has unilaterally commenced war, authorized the assassination of American citizens abroad and denied the writ of habeas corpus to detainees not accused of a crime. Executive branch power at the expense of Congress and the Constitution’s checks and balances has mushroomed since World War II. Examples include President Truman’s undeclared war against North Korea; President Eisenhower’s executive agreements to defend Spain; President Johnson’s Gulf of Tonkin Resolution regarding Vietnam; President Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia and assertions of executive privilege; President Clinton’s undeclared war against Bosnia; and President Bush’s countless presidential signing statements, Terrorist Surveillance Program, waterboarding and Iraq war.

**Congressional restrictions on presidential war power prevent the presidency from responding to crises**

**Turner 2012**

[Professor Turner holds both professional and academic doctorates from the University of Virginia School of Law, where in 1981 he co-founded the Center for National Security Law with Professor John Norton Moore—who taught the nation’s first course on national security law in 1969. Turner served as chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security from 1989–1992., The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012, Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, [http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.pdf](http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.pdf), uwyo//amp]

**The 1973 War Powers Resolution** was a fraud upon the American people, **portrayed as a legislative fix to the problem of “imperial presidents” taking America to war** **in Korea and Vietnam without public approval** or the constitutionally required legislative sanction. By its own terms, the War Powers Resolution would not have stopped the Vietnam War. Sadly, **this and other legislative intrusions upon the constitutional authority of the president contributed to the loss of millions of lives in** places like **Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America**. The statute played a clear role in encouraging the terrorist attack that killed 241 Marines in 1983, and equally clearly encouraged Osama bin Laden to kill thousands of Americans on September 11, 2001. Similarly **unconstitutional usurpations of presidential power prevented our Intelligence Community from preventing those attacks and dissuaded a key ally from sharing sensitive information** **that might also have prevented them**. After forty years, **the time has come to bring an end to this congressional lawbreaking.**

**Its zero sum**

**Barilleaux and Kelley 2010** [Ryan J. , Professor of Political Science at Miami, OH; and Christopher S. , Lecturer (Political Science) at Miami, OH, The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency, Texas A&M Press, p. P 196-197, 2010// wyo-sc]

In their book *The Broken Branch,* Mann and Ornstein paint a different view. They discuss a wider range of public policy areas than just uses of force. Their argument is that although party is important as a conditioning factor for times when Congress might try to restrain an aggressive or noncompliant executive, **there has** also **been a broad**er **degrading of institutional power that has allowed,** **in a zero-sum context**, **the president to expand executive power at the expense of** **Congress**. Mann and Ornstein thus posit that congressional willingness to subordinate its collective power to that of the president has occurred across domestic politics and foreign affairs. They argue that a variety of factors are at fault for this trend, including the loss of institutional identity, the willingness to abdicate responsibility to the president, the demise of "regular order," and most importantly that **Congress has lost its one key advantage as a legislative body—the decay of the deliberative process.** Thus, they do recognize that party politics has played an important role in the degrading of congressional power, but they see a larger dynamic at work, one that reaches beyond partisanship. While we agree with Howell and Pevehouse that Congress retains important mechanisms for constraining the president, we tend to agree with the Mann and Ornstein view that there has been a significant and sustained decline in Congress's willingness to use these mechanisms to challenge presidential power. This tendency has been more prevalent in foreign affairs but has occurred noticeably across the spectrum of public policy issues. Building from both of those perspectives, and others, we argue that it is helpful to understand the pattern of congressional complicity in the rise of presidential power by viewing Congress's aiding and abetting as the logical outcomes of a collective action problem.31 By constitutional design, **the legislative** branch **is in competition with the president for** institutional **power**, **yet Congress is less than** ideally **suited for** such **a political conflict**. **Congress's** comparative **disadvantage begins with its 535 "interests**" **that are** very **rarely aligned,** and if so, only momentarily. **Because** individual **reelection overshadows all** other **goals**, members of Congress naturally seek to take as much credit and avoid as much blame from their constituencies as possible.32 The dilemma this creates for members is how to use or delegate its collective powers in order to maximize credit and minimize blame in the making of public policy. Congress can choose to delegate power internally to committees and party leaders or externally to the executive branch. **One can conceptualize** the strategic situation of members of **Congress** **in** terms of **a prisoner's dilemma**.33 **If members cooperate** (that is, in Mann and Ornstein's parlance, if members identify with the institution), **they could** maintain and **advance Congress's** institutional **power**. **But they would have to bypass** some potential **individual payoffs** **that could come from defection**, **such as "running against Congress" as an electoral strategy**. **A stronger institution should make** all members of **Congress better off, but it** also **makes them responsible for policymaking**. **If members defect** from the institution, **they** thus seek to **maximize constituency interests** either by simply allowing power to fall by the wayside or by simply **delegating it to the president**. **As more** and more **members choose to defect** over time, **the "public good" of a strong Congress is not provided** for or maintained—and **Congress's** institutional **authority** **erodes and presidential power fills in the gap**. Why, in other words, is congressional activism so often "less than meets the eye," as Barbara Hinckley maintained in her book by that title? Or why has the ''culture of deference" that Stephen Weissman identified developed as it has?34 We argue that the collective action problem that exists in Congress leads to the development of these trends away from meaningful congressional stewardship of foreign policy andspending**.**

**Speed and flexibility are key to maintain Heg**

**Berkowitz, 8**

[research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a senior analyst at RAND. He is currently a consultant to the Defense Department and the intelligence community (Bruce, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: CHALLENGERS, COMPETITORS, AND THREATS TO AMERICA’S FUTURE, p. 1-4)]

THIS BOOK is intended to help readers better understand the national security issues facing the United States today and offer the general outline of a strategy for dealing with them. National security policy—both making it and debating it — is harder today because the issues that are involved are more numerous and varied. The problem of the day can **change at a moment's notice**. Yesterday, it might have been proliferation; today, terrorism; tomorrow, hostile regional powers. Threats are also more likely to be intertwined—proliferators use the same networks as narco-traffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align themselves with regional powers. Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat — the Soviet Union — was brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now faces are resilient. In at least one dimension where the Soviets were weak (economic efficiency, public morale, or leadership), the new threats are strong. They are going to be with us for a long time. As a result, we need to reconsider how we think about national security. The most important task for U.S. national security today is simply **to retain the strategic advantage**. This term, from the world of military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events.1 When you hold the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not. As national goals go, “keeping the strategic advantage” may not have the idealistic ring of “making the world safe for democracy” and does not sound as decisively macho as “maintaining American hegemony.” But keeping the strategic advantage is critical, because it is essential for just about **everything** else America hopes to achieve — promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values, **preserving peace**, and so on. The Changing Threat If one needs proof of this new, dynamic environment, consider the recent record. A search of the media during the past fifteen years suggests that there were at least a dozen or so events that were considered at one time or another the most pressing national security problem facing the United States — and thus the organizing concept for U.S. national security. What is most interesting is how varied and different the issues were, and how many different sets of players they involved — and how each was replaced in turn by a different issue and a cast of characters that seemed, at least for the moment, even more pressing. They included, roughly in chronological order, • regional conflicts — like Desert Storm — involving the threat of war between conventional armies; • stabilizing “failed states” like Somalia, where government broke down in toto; • staying economically competitive with Japan; • integrating Russia into the international community after the fall of communism and controlling the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union; • dealing with “rogue states,” unruly nations like North Korea that engage in trafficking and proliferation as a matter of national policy; • combating international crime, like the scandal involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or imports of illegal drugs; • strengthening international institutions for trade as countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America adopted market economies; • responding to ethnic conflicts and civil wars triggered by the reemergence of culture as a political force in the “clash of civilizations”; • providing relief to millions of people affected by natural catastrophes like earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, droughts, and the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria; • combating terrorism driven by sectarian or religious extremism; • grassroots activism on a global scale, ranging from the campaign to ban land mines to antiglobalization hoodlums and environmentalist crazies; • border security and illegal immigration; • the worldwide ripple effects of currency fluctuations and the collapse of confidence in complex financial securities; and • for at least one fleeting moment, the safety of toys imported from China. There is some overlap in this list, and one might want to group some of the events differently or add others. The important point, however, is that when you look at these problems and how they evolved during the past fifteen years, you do not see a single lesson or organizing principle on which to base U.S. strategy. Another way to see the dynamic nature of today's national security challenges is to consider the annual threat briefing the U.S. intelligence community has given Congress during the past decade. These briefings are essentially a snapshot of what U.S. officials worry most about. If one briefing is a snapshot, then several put together back to back provide a movie, showing how views have evolved.2 Figure 1 summarizes these assessments for every other year between 1996 and 2006. It shows when a particular threat first appeared, its rise and fall in the rankings, and in some cases how it fell off the chart completely. So, in 1995, when the public briefing first became a regular affair, the threat at the very top of the list was North Korea. This likely reflected the crisis that had occurred the preceding year, when Pyongyang seemed determined to develop nuclear weapons, Bill Clinton's administration seemed ready to use military action to prevent this, and the affair was defused by an agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter. Russia and China ranked high as threats in the early years, but by the end of the decade they sometimes did not even make the list. Proliferation has always been high in the listings, although the particular countries of greatest concern have varied. Terrorism made its first appearance in 1998, rose to first place after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and remains there today. The Balkans appeared and disappeared in the middle to late 1990s. A few of the entries today seem quaint and overstated. Catastrophic threats to information systems like an “electronic Pearl Harbor” and the “Y2K problem” entered the list in 1998 but disappeared after 2001. (Apparently, after people saw an airliner crash into a Manhattan skyscraper, the possible loss of their Quicken files seemed a lot less urgent.) Iraq first appeared in the briefing as a regional threat in 1997 and was still high on the list a decade later—though, of course, the Iraqi problem in the early years (suspected weapons of mass destruction) was very different from the later one (an insurgency and internationalized civil war). All this is why the United States **needs agility**. It not only must be able to refocus its resources repeatedly; it needs to do this **faster than an adversary can** focus its own resources.

#### Credible US leadership k2 prevent great power wars that go nuclear.

Brooks et al ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of **deep engagement** is that it prevents the **emergence** of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the **leverage** to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged **U.S. power dampens the** baleful **effects of anarchy** is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and **full-scale great power war.** 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that **the withdrawal of** the **America**n pacifier **will yield** either a competitive regional **multipolarity complete with** associated insecurity, arms racing, **crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and** the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional **great power war**). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional **proxy wars and arming of client states**—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, **the argument that U.S.** **security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship**, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### 3

#### Terrorism is fluid and unspecifiable, the attempt to solve or prevent terrorism, leads to an infinite war in the name of security

Hartley 2008

(Lucy, “War and Peace, or Governmentality as the ruin of Democracy.” Foucault in an Age of Terror. Pg 133-34, mb)

We live in deeply troubling times. The so-called war on terror, inaugurated by the United States and Great Britain after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, has brought about the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and, with Iran in its sights, this most inglorious of alliances has reinstalled the imperialist project at the heart of international relations. As Hardt and Negri have persuasively argued, - the Iraq conflict pivots on the issue of governmentality, and in particular the exercise of global power, the power of empire, in the name of democracy. What, we might ask, is the purpose of governmental intervention into the affairs of individuals and states? Under what conditions can these forays be justified? And what are the costs as well as the benefits of such actions?3 Terrorism is a notoriously slippery category of action performed for political ends; and one of the most horrifying of many aspects of the war on terror is that it presupposes a literal (and all too often physical) manifestation of 'terror' can be isolated and identified even though there is no received consensus at the national or international levels about how to define terrorism, in terms of either the activities involved in committing terrorist acts or the intentions that might motivate them.4 A war on terror is, in other words, an 'uninterrupted conflict' and a 'constant war' because it has no referent - neither a fixed object nor a precise target.

#### The logic of security makes violence inevitable, and is the root cause of destructive features of contemporary modernity

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that **war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that it is **rather the** product of hegemonic forms of knowledge **about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. **Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states** and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that **the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing**, argues Heidegger, **'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing.**..the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the** most destructive features of contemporary modernity **-- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and **political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe,** policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. **Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing'** and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how **the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making**; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, **even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.**88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. **When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the overarching strategic and security paradigms.** Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being **a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political.** But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives** from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? **Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable**?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### The alternative is to reject the security discourse of the 1ac.

#### We need to question the assumptions and language that frame policies. The alternative is a prerequisite to effective policies in the future

Bruce 96

(Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Prolif

#### Plan’s modeling restricts Turkish strikes on Kurdish militants

Roberts 13 (Kristin Roberts, News Editor for National Journal, M.A. in security studies from Georgetown University, “When the Whole World Has Drones,” The National Journal, March 22, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321)

Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, **we learned it by watching you.** In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

#### PKK resurgence threatens Northern Iraq and collapses regional stability

Clark 08(Perry Clark, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, U.S. Army War College, “Reassessing U.S. National Security Strategy: the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK),” Strategy Research Project, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478197&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The PKK is a recognized terrorist organization by the U.S. and the international community. It continues to **threaten regional stability in northern Iraq through terrorist** **actions,** and through its associations with transnational criminal organizations, it now threatens economic stability in Europe. Current USG policy against the PKK is achieving short-term goals with Turkey; however, achieving long-term regional stability will require the elimination of PKK terrorist capabilities and their known links to terrorist transnational criminal organizations. Both President Bush and the Turkish Prime Minister want to eliminate the PKK. In order to comply with President Bush’s policy, senior policy makers will need to reassess their strategies and take a more committed position to eradicate the PKK. As stated in the recommendation, the implementation of an International PKK Taskforce (IPKKTF) with the authority to implement policy and actions using the elements of national and multi-national power could effectively eliminate the PKK as a terrorist and transnational criminal threat. The IPKKITF would demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to allies on a global scale. The NSS (2007) states, The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. To succeed in our own efforts, we need the support and concerted action of friends and allies. We must join with others to deny the terrorists what they need to survive: safe haven, financial support, and the support and protection that certain nation-states historically have given them.61 By effectively synchronizing national and international interagency resources and assets, the IPKKTF will fracture, delink and deresource the PKK, thus, eliminating the PKK threat to regional stability and global economic corruption. This effort primarily uses soft power to succeed against the PKK. Military involvement (hard power) would be limited to SOF units with unique irregular warfare capabilities to use against the PKK. As the Honorable Colin Powell (2004) stated, “As the President made clear on May 1, 2003, we use all the tools of diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and finance….The use of force has been – and remains – our last resort.”62 For the past several months, the Turkish military has conducted both air and limited ground attacks against PKK targets, but this will not eliminate the PKK. It may have some affect towards fracturing the PKK, but these actions will not delink or deresource their efforts. Turkey is concerned about Kurdish autonomy and the situation with the PKK only fuels aggression. By implementing aggressive diplomacy through SC and an effective IO campaign, the IPKKTF could build alliances and media support against the PKK. Militarily, the use of SOF could restrict terrorist movements and reduce capabilities through PKK interdiction. Economics and finance would build and strengthen regional economies while disrupting PKK finance methods. Intelligence would continue to support all elements of national and international power to disrupt the PKK power base. Finally, the use of law enforcement can interdict and arrest those conducting transnational criminal activities to support the PKK, while training regional Kurds in checkpoint security operations at border crossings. There are a myriad of tasks to coordinate for IPKKTF support to succeed. Once successful the Turkish government would have to reevaluate its governmental and military policy concerning troops on the northern Iraq border. Stability and security could again gain momentum. Additionally, interdicting the PKK’s ability to manage their legal and illegal funding streams would restore a sense of assurance to our European allies. A threat to European economies is a threat to US economies. Powell (2004) commented, “Everyone knows America and Europe needs each other...”63 Situational threats, like those posed by the PKK, are becoming more prevalent within the 21st century. If regional stability, security, and growth are to continue then the USG needs to align its policies and strategies internationally to achieve effective results. Chiarelli with Smith (2007) noted, “In the increasing interconnected, interdependent, and dangerous world we live in, the U.S. cannot assume that it will be able to retreat from other nations’ problems for very long.”64 This is becoming evident regarding the Turkey, KRG, Iraq, and PKK situation in northern Iraq. Although the US National Security Strategy is clear concerning U.S. desires to eliminate terrorism, what is not clear in terms of policy is the level of U.S. intervention. **In order to retain regional stability within northern Iraq** and reaffirm alliances the USG needs to reassess its strategies, increase the level of intervention, and employ all its elements of power against the PKK. As a future concern to USG policy makers and importance to Kurdish issues, Aliza Marcus (2007) noted, “The crisis in Iraq and tensions over potential Kurdish separatist interests there underscore that the region’s some 28 million Kurds will long remain a source of instability for the governments that rule them and the western powers that try to influence events there.”65

#### Impact inevitable, but will take a long time- Turkey too reliant on others for tech and no game changers in the near future

Stein 13

(Aaron, Associate Fellow at RUSI. He is also the nonproliferation program manager at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies in Istanbul, where he works on security and proliferation issues in the Middle East, Turkey Wonk, “2013 Predictions for Turkey’s Missile and Drone Programs,” January 2, 2013, <http://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/2013/01/02/2013-predictions-for-turkeys-missile-and-drone-programs/>) /wyo-mm

I want to focus on Turkey’s drone and missiles programs and make some predictions for upcoming year:¶ 1) Ankara will once again go public with its frustration about the US refusal to export to Turkey armed drones. The United States, due to export control laws, will not export armed drones to Turkey. Turkish politicians and columnists will point to the US decision to arm Italian and British predators as evidence of double standards and make a fuss about the United States’ commitment to aid in Turkey’s fight against the PKK. The issues, however, are different and thus subject to different export control laws. The fact remains that the US has refused to export armed drones to all of its allies and has designated the Italian and British armed drones for use in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the narrative about the US not being committed to Ankara’s “war on terror” will continue to be “political gold” for all of Turkey’s political parties. In the end, Ankara wont get its drones and will remain reliant on the current fleet of US owned and operated drones stationed in Turkey.¶ 2) Turkey will continue to rely on the Israeli made Heron for its drone derived intelligence. Despite having recently launched the Gokturk satellite, Ankara will remain beholden to its current fleet of 9 Heron UAVs for its operations against the PKK. Ankara’s troubled relationship with Israel will continue to hinder Turkey’s military operations.¶ 3) The ANKA will continue to be tested and used sporadically, but will not be a game changer. Turkey’s indigenous drone program has suffered numerous setbacks since its inception in the early 2000s. Turkey claims that it uses the ANKA on a limited basis in the southeast, though media reports about the tragic strike near Uludere suggest that Ankara is far more reliant on American operated Predators and the Israeli made and supplied Heron for surveillance. Thus, I do not think that the ANKA will make much of a difference this year and any hopes for the quick development of an armed variant will be stymied by engineering difficulties.¶ 4) Ankara will continue to develop both UAVs and cruise missiles and will continue to seek export markets in the Middle East. These developments will face little scrutiny locally, but will have implications for regional nonproliferation efforts. Specifically, the SOM cruise missile appears to have been designed with missile technology control regime restrictions in mind, which suggests that Ankara intends to sell the missile. While Ankara would not violate any international agreement if it did so, cruise missiles and UAVs are better delivery vehicles for chemical and biological weapons than ballistic missiles. Moreover, the developing world has identified cruise missiles as a comparably inexpensive tool to help compensate for weak air forces and missile defense. If Ankara intends to sell the missile in the Middle East, I foresee some mild international controversy.¶ 5) Turkey’s ballistic missile program, which remains murky, will continue to pop-up from time-to-time in the press. Ankara, however, will not release a lot of information about the project and will instead use it as a nationalist symbol for Turkey’s rise. I still suspect that the program is intended to produce a satellite launch vehicle, though it is entirely possible that Ankara is interested in having some sort of ballistic missile to hold longer range targets at risk. The program will not make any discernible progress in 2013 and the TSK will not release any information about the goal of the missile program (sigh).¶ 6) Turkey will not be able to reach an agreement for the sale of long range air and missile defenses. US export control laws will continue to hinder progress on the sale of Patriot missile defense to Turkey. Turkey will continue to review the tender sporadically, but will fail to secure a deal satisfactory for Ankara. Indigenous efforts to produce missile defenses, while unveiled with fanfare, will remain on the drawing board and not make much progress.

#### Turkey soft power fails

**Idiz 9-3**

[Semih Idiz contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. A journalist who has been covering diplomacy and foreign policy issues for major Turkish newspapers for 30 years, published in The Financial Times, The Times of London, Mediterranean Quarterly and Foreign Policy magazine.¶ “Turkey’s Middle East Policy Lies in Shambles” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/turkish-middle-east-policy-shambles.html]

Erdogan’s angry rhetoric, which is also aiming now at regional powers that supported the coup in Egypt, may be going down well with his followers, but his general line of argumentation is proving to be seriously out of touch with the course of developments in the Middle East. He is also coming under fire for allegedly increasing threats to Turkey with his fiery remarks.¶ Many Turks were made wary after the twin [car bombings in May](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-bombing-syria-reyhanli.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in the town of Reyhanli, near the Syrian border, said by Turkish authorities to have been carried out by pro-Assad elements, and which left 53 people dead. Public concerns about further retaliatory attacks such as these increased after the Syria-related kidnapping of two [Turkish Airlines (THY) pilots](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/08/turkey-pilots-abducted-beirut-quiet-bargaining.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in Lebanon, and the [rocket attack](http://www.aawsat.net/2013/09/article55315632%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) against the Turkish Consul General’s convoy in Mosul, Northern Iraq, on Monday [Sept. 2].¶ Although that attack occurred outside Syria and the perpetrators are still unknown, it has nevertheless resulted in more questions being asked as to why Turkey is being dragged into situations in the Middle East it has never had to face before. Meanwhile, Erdogan has come out openly saying any US-led operation against Syria must aim at toppling Bashar al-Assad and his regime.¶ His remarks stand in stark contrast, however, to Washington’s declaration that any operation designed to punish the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons will not aim at regime change. Unlike Erdogan, it appears that the West is now looking for a gradual and controlled change in leadership in Syria because of concerns about who might take over if the Assad regime were to be toppled in a disorderly manner.¶ [Answering questions from reporters](http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/08/30/erdogan.sinirli.operasyon.bizi.tatmin.etmez/721548.0/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) on Aug. 30, during the Victory Day reception in Ankara, Erdogan indicated in clear terms that a limited operation against Syria would not satisfy his government. “It must be like the one in Kosovo. It must not be an in-and-out intervention over one or two days, but aim at making the regime give up,” he said, referring to the 78-day NATO operation in 1999 that forced the Serbian military out of Kosovo. ¶ Remarks such as these clearly anger Turkey’s powerful northern neighbor, Russia, and eastern neighbor, Iran, with whom Ankara has to still maintain delicate diplomatic ties for a host of political and economic reasons. Both Moscow and Tehran continue to support the Assad regime and have expressed strong opposition to any US-led strike against Syria.¶ Meanwhile, Erdogan continues to hit at the military regime in Egypt, and that he has started to criticize regional Arab countries that are backing this regime is hardly likely to be going down well among government circles in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or Jordan. These countries have vowed political and economic support for Cairo.¶ The result is that Turkey today is almost isolated in the Arab League, where it has observer status, which is making it much harder for Ankara to play a key role in the Middle East. Apart form this, though, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s gross miscalculations in relation to the Arab Spring, and Erdogan’s angry rhetoric, which has turned most of the regions powers against him, have also left Turkey facing new threats it has not had to cope with in the past.¶ Ankara’s Middle East policy has traditionally been marked by excessive caution, given the unpredictability of the region, which is made up of a dangerous brew of Arab nationalism, radical Islam, violent sectarianism and gross social injustice fed by a serious lack of democracy.¶ Turkey under Erdogan may have started with a vision of “zero problems” with the Arab countries of the region, for which the “Turkish model” was supposed to provide an inspiration while they tried to develop democratically and economically. But with the “zero problems” approach turning into a bad joke at this stage, Ankara has ended up instead facing a whole range of risks, ranging from the threat of being flooded by refugees to chemical attacks on its Eastern border.¶ Meanwhile, public fears are mounting that the country could face terrorism, not just from al-Qaeda-related groups, but also from vengeful radical Shiite groups that are angry over Ankara’s overt support for Sunni groups, whether they be in Iraq, Syria or elsewhere.¶ It is also clear that Turkey’s once good ties with regional powers like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will require some fence mending, since the administration in those countries are unlikely to be very happy as Erdogan attempts to rouse the streets in the Middle East with “[Four-Finger Rabaa al-Adawiya salutes](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/08/21/Four-finger-salute-Egypt-rivals-use-Rabaa-symbol-to-turn-Facebook-yellow.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank).”¶ The rulers of these countries have always been mistrustful of any attempt at rousing the masses. The bottom line is that while Erdogan may continue to have admirers in the streets of the Middle East, he has lost the admiration of most of the region’s leaders that he ultimately has to deal with. The result is that Erdogan has left Ankara’s traditional Middle East policy — that was always based on maintaining stability in a turbulent environment — in shambles.¶ He has also left Turkey facing new risks with his angry, albeit often hollow, rhetoric that is seen to be out of touch with the realities that have governed the region, and appears set to continue to do so for some time to come.

#### No Middle East war

Salem 11—Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center. PhD from Harvard (Paul, 'Arab Spring' Has Yet to Alter Region's Strategic Balance, carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=43907)

Despite their sweeping repercussions for both domestic and international players, the Arab uprisings have not led to a dramatically new regional order or a new balance of power. This could change, particularly if developments in Syria continue to escalate. While Iran has welcomed uprisings against Western-backed regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, it dealt harshly with its own protesters and has been worried about recent events in Syria. Moreover, countries that threw out pro-Western dictators are not moving closer to Iran. Egypt's and Tunisia’s future foreign policies are more likely to resemble Turkey's in becoming more independent while remaining allied with the West. And Iran's soft power has decreased as its regime looks increasingly repressive and new models of revolutionary success have emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, and other parts of the Arab world. Turkey, for its part, bungled the opportunity to take advantage of this historic shift to bolster its influence in the Arab world. The Arab uprisings are effectively calling for the Arab world to be more like Turkey: democratic, with a vibrant civil society, political pluralism, secularism alongside Islam, and a productive and fairly balanced economy. However, after expressing clear support for Egyptian protesters, Turkey has hedged its bets in Libya and Syria. Turkey has over $15 billion in business contracts with Moammar Kadafi's Libya and has built a close relationship with Syrian President Bashar Assad. Turkey's foreign policy of "zero problems" with neighbors is becoming harder to implement as peoples and governments in the neighborhood are increasingly on opposite sides. Although Arab public opinion has held Turkey in very high esteem in past years, recent events have tarnished that image. This could have been Turkey's moment in the Middle East; the moment was lost. Saudi Arabia has been taken aback by the loss of old allies and remains worried about increased Iranian influence, but has maintained its sphere of influence. Its military intervention in Bahrain shows that Riyadh is extremely worried not only about Iranian influence but about the wave of democratic change, and still has not figured out a way to achieve a balance between addressing growing demands by citizens for better governance and social justice, while keeping Iranian influence out of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although the United States has generally suffered setbacks from the events of the past months, it is adjusting quickly to the new realities and stands to remain a key player in the coming period. It has not lost its leverage despite the demise of its main Egyptian and Tunisian allies, and has expressed support for protests after realizing they were not dominated by radical groups and that they echoed Western values. Emerging global powers such as Russia, China, India and Brazil have had mixed reactions to the "Arab Spring." All were reluctant to approve Western-led military intervention in Libya, expressing concerns ranging from the risk of higher oil prices to a potential spillover effect on their shores. As for Israel, even though its peace treaty with Egypt will remain in place, it no longer has any friends in the region after the departure of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, its declining relations with Turkey and growing unrest in Jordan. The recent Fatah-Hamas accord underlines Israel's predicament. Two difficult challenges lie ahead: The Palestinian Authority's unilateral move to declare Palestinian statehood by the end of the year and a potential Palestinian popular uprising encouraged by the success of neighboring populations. Although the Arab Spring has been largely about internal democracy and reform, it has affected all of the major regional and international actors. However, so far there has been no major shift in the balance of power or the basic pattern of regional relations.

### Yemen

#### No AQAP organization and attacks are localized

Robert Pape 8/22/13, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism and David Schneyer is a research associate at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 8/22/13, "WHY WE SHOULDN’T BE AFRAID OF AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN," http://www.yementimes.com/en/1705/opinion/2782/Why-we-shouldn%E2%80%99t-be-afraid-of-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.htm

¶ Last week, the U.S. State Department closed and evacuated 19 of its embassies and issued a worldwide travel alert based on intelligence concerning a terrorist organization based in Yemen. Many Americans are asking what this means. Is an attack on U.S. soil imminent?¶ ¶ While nothing is certain, of course, it is unlikely that such an attack would take place in the United States, or even outside of Yemen.¶ ¶ The intelligence seems to be reliable. But individual data points can be exaggerated or ignored, depending on the domestic political environment of the time. In this case, the State Department acted due to “increased chatter” that it monitored among terrorist groups. Intelligence officials highlighted one communication in particular, in which Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri gave his blessing to an attack proposed by Nasser Al-Wuhayshi. Wuhayshi is the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—a sort of “franchise affiliate” based in Yemen, not to be confused with the central Al-Qaeda organization.¶ ¶ Such information certainly warrants our attention. But talk is cheap, and it is critical that we don’t give terrorist organizations more credit than they are worth. In order to understand what a terrorist organization is truly capable of, we must look at its past behavior. In this case, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a deadly organization within its own borders, but it has not demonstrated that it possesses the means to successfully carry out an attack on U.S. soil. The one known attempt (carried out by the so-called “underwear bomber”) failed due to incompetence—the device did not properly detonate.¶ ¶ Let’s look at the data: AQAP has carried out 39 suicide attacks through 2012, with only one taking place outside of Yemen (just across the border in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia). Suicide attacks represent precisely the sort of attack we would fear—they are far more deadly than any other type. Now, AQAP has certainly proven itself capable of killing foreigners within its own borders, and so we should absolutely take the intercepted communication seriously with respect to our embassy in Yemen. But this is a far cry from being able to carry out an attack on foreign soil.¶ ¶ Consider 9/11, for instance, which obviously we failed to prevent. This failure was not a tactical one, or even a failure to “connect the dots.” Rather, it was a failure to properly assess the threat. In fact, a memo stating “Bin Laden determined to attack U.S.” made it to the White House by early August, 2001—the intelligence was there, but it was simply not given its due credibility or seriousness. ¶ ¶ Clearly, Al-Qaeda proved itself capable of attacking the United States across multiple borders long before 2001. But AQAP has not demonstrated this capability, and “increased chatter” among its leaders, no matter how heavy, is simply not enough evidence to be overly-concerned, unless the government has not revealed other critical details. Even if Al-Zawahiri were directing the attack—which U.S. intelligence officials confirmed he was not—the main Al-Qaeda group (now based in Pakistan) has not carried out a successful major attack on Western soil since the London bombings in 2005. Ayman Al-Zawahiri giving his blessing to AQAP leaders only proves how weak the main Al-Qaeda group really is.

#### Drones don’t cause blowback – in-depth interviews in Yemen show pragmatic acceptance of US drone strikes against AQAP and alternative causes for insurgent recruitment

Christopher Swift, fellow at the University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy”: Strikes in Yemen Aren’t Pushing People into al-Qaeda, Foreign Affairs, July 1, 2012.

Recent revelations that the White House keeps a secret terrorist kill list, which it uses to target al Qaeda leaders, have spurred a debate over drone warfare. Progressive pundits excoriate the Obama administration for expanding the power of the executive branch. Senate Republicans, in turn, have demanded the appointment of a special counsel to probe the alleged leaks of classified information that brought the kill list to light. As the political drama unfolds in Washington, however, the United States is intensifying its drone campaign in the arid mountains and remote plateaus of Yemen.¶ With al Qaeda’s center of gravity shifting from Pakistan to Yemen, the Central Intelligence Agency recently sought authority to conduct “signature strikes,” in which drone pilots engage targets based on behavioral profiles rather than on positive identifications. The move marks a significant increase in the intensity and extensity of the drone campaign — in the first six months of 2012, the Obama administration conducted approximately 43 drone strikes in Yemen, nearly twice the total from the three preceding years.¶ Critics argue that drone strikes create new adversaries and drive al Qaeda’s recruiting. As the Yemeni youth activist Ibrahim Mothana recently wrote in The New York Times, “Drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair.” The Washington Post concurs. In May, it reported that the “escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes [in Yemen] is stirring increasing sympathy for al Qaeda-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States.” The ranks of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have tripled to 1,000 in the last three years, and the link between its burgeoning membership, U.S. drone strikes, and local resentment seems obvious.¶ Last month, I traveled to Yemen to study how AQAP operates and whether the conventional understanding of the relationship between drones and recruitment is correct. While there, I conducted 40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources. These subjects came from 14 of Yemen’s 21 provinces, most from rural regions. Many faced insurgent infiltration in their own districts. Some of them were actively fighting AQAP. Two had recently visited terrorist strongholds in Jaar and Zinjibar as guests. I conducted each of these in-depth interviews using structured questions and a skilled interpreter. I have withheld my subjects’ names to protect their safety — a necessity occasioned by the fact that some of them had survived assassination attempts and that others had recently received death threats.¶ These men had little in common with the Yemeni youth activists who capture headlines and inspire international acclaim. As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it.¶ Al Qaeda exploits U.S. errors, to be sure. As the Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen correctly observes, the death of some 40 civilians in the December 2009 cruise missile strike on Majala infuriated ordinary Yemenis and gave AQAP an unexpected propaganda coup. But the fury produced by such tragedies is not systemic, not sustained, and, ultimately, not sufficient. As much as al Qaeda might play up civilian casualties and U.S. intervention in its recruiting videos, the Yemeni tribal leaders I spoke to reported that the factors driving young men into the insurgency are overwhelmingly economic.¶ From al Hudaydah in the west to Hadhramaut in the east, AQAP is building complex webs of dependency within Yemen’s rural population. It gives idle teenagers cars, khat, and rifles — the symbols of Yemeni manhood. It pays salaries (up to $400 per month) that lift families out of poverty. It supports weak and marginalized sheikhs by digging wells, distributing patronage to tribesmen, and punishing local criminals. As the leader of one Yemeni tribal confederation told me, “Al Qaeda attracts those who can’t afford to turn away.”¶ Religious figures echoed these words. Though critical of the U.S. drone campaign, none of the Islamists and Salafists I interviewed believed that drone strikes explain al Qaeda’s burgeoning numbers. “The driving issue is development,” an Islamist parliamentarian from Hadramout province said. “Some districts are so poor that joining al Qaeda represents the best of several bad options.” (Other options include criminality, migration, and even starvation.) A Salafi scholar engaged in hostage negotiations with AQAP agreed. “Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country,” he explained. “A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption.”¶ Despite Yemenis’ antipathy toward drones, my conversations also revealed a surprising degree of pragmatism. Those living in active conflict zones drew clear distinctions between earlier U.S. operations, such as the Majala bombing, and more recent strikes on senior al Qaeda figures. “Things were very bad in 2009,” a tribal militia commander from Abyan province told me, “but now the drones are seen as helping us.” He explained that Yemenis could “accept [drones] as long as there are no more civilian casualties.” An Islamist member of the separatist al-Harak movement offered a similar assessment. “Ordinary people have become very practical about drones,” he said. “If the United States focuses on the leaders and civilians aren’t killed, then drone strikes will hurt al Qaeda more than they help them.”¶ Some of the men I interviewed admitted that they had changed their minds about drone strikes. Separatists in Aden who openly derided AQAP as a proxy of Yemen’s recently deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, privately acknowledged the utility of the U.S. drone campaign. “Saleh created this crisis in order to steal from America and stay in power,” a former official from the now-defunct People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen told me. “Now it is our crisis, and we need every tool to solve it.”¶ Yemeni journalists, particularly those with firsthand exposure to AQAP, shared this view: “I opposed the drone campaign until I saw what al Qaeda was doing in Jaar and Zinjibar,” an independent reporter in Aden said. “Al Qaeda hates the drones, they’re absolutely terrified of the drones … and that is why we need them.”

#### AQAP won’t take out Saudi

**Hill and Nonneman 11** (Ginny and Gerd, Associate Fellows of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, “Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy”, 5/11, <http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CH_YemenSaudiArabiaandGulfStatesPolPrtsRegDip.pdf>)

However, the campaign also enjoyed significant public support in Saudi Arabia and was ‘spun’ by the media as ‘a heroic and successful struggle to protect Saudi sovereignty’. 80 Some satisfaction is derived from the fact that there have been no further incursions since the intervention, and that Saudi Arabia was able to turn the episode to its advantage by securing the border area. There is now a semi-permanent military complex around the southern Saudi city of Najran. Nearly 80 border villages have been evacuated and the villagers are being re-housed in 10,000 purpose-built units. Visible security improvements have been reported, including earthen berms, concertina wire, floodlights and thermal cameras. 81 These measures serve Saudi Arabia’s longer-term objective of containing AQAP, as well as constraining cross-border flows of drugs, weapons and illegal migrants.

#### No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts

Matt Fay ‘13, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and argued against the prevailing alarmism. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

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### Solvency- gen

#### Strongly err neg---their authors don’t understand how thorough and effective inter-executive mechanisms are---adding transparency’s clearly sufficient

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

To date scholars have lacked a thorough understanding of the U.S. government’s targeted killing practices. As such, their commentary is oftentimes premised on easily describable issues, and fails to grapple with the multiple levels of intergovernmental accountability present in current practice. When dealing with the theoretical and normative issues associated with targeted killings, scholars have failed to specify what they mean when they aver that targeted killings are unaccountable. Both trends have impeded legal theory, and constrained scholarly discourse on a matter of public import.

This article is a necessary corrective to the public and scholarly debate. It has presented the complex web of bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political accountability mechanisms that exert influence over the targeted killing process. It has demonstrated that many of the critiques of targeted killings rest upon poorly conceived understandings of the process, unclear definitions, and unsubstantiated speculation. The article’s reform recommendations, grounded in a deep understanding of the actual process, reflect an assumption that transparency, performance criteria, and politically grounded independent review can enhance the already robust accountability mechanisms embedded in current practice.

### Solvency-

#### Transparency solves allied perception and blowback while maintaining the CT benefits of targeted killings

Michael Aaronson 13, Professorial Research Fellow and Executive Director of cii – the Centre for International Intervention – at the University of Surrey, and Adrian Johnson, Director of Publications at RUSI, the book reviews editor for the RUSI Journal, and chair of the RUSI Editorial Board, “Conclusion,” in Hitting the Target?: How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, ed. Aaronson & Johnson, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting\_the\_Target.pdf

The Obama administration faces some tough dilemmas, and analysts should be careful not to downplay the security challenges it faces. It must balance the principles of justice and accountability with a very real terrorist threat; and reconcile the need to demonstrate a credibly tough security policy with the ending of a long occupation of Afghanistan while Al-Qa’ida still remains active in the region. Nevertheless, more transparency would provide demonstrable oversight and accountability without sacrificing the necessary operational secrecy of counter-terrorism. It might also help assuage the concern of allies and their publics who worry about what use the intelligence they provide might be put to. A wise long-term vision can balance the short-term demands to disrupt and disable terrorist groups with a longer-term focus to resolve the grievances that give rise to radicalism, and also preclude inadvertently developing norms of drone use that sit uneasily with the civilised conduct of war. Drones are but one kinetic element of a solution to terrorism that is, ultimately, political.

#### Solves drone prolif and backlash in Yemen—their author

Boyle 13

Michael J. Boyle 13, Assistant Professor, Political Science – La Salle, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29

In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course

and establish a new drones policy which mitigates these costs and **avoids** some of

the long-term **consequences** that flow from them. A more sensible US approach

would impose some limits on drone use in order to minimize the political costs

and long-term strategic consequences. One step might be to limit the use of drones

to HVTs, such as leading political and operational figures for terrorist networks,

while reducing or eliminating the strikes against the ‘foot soldiers’ or other Islamist

networks not related to Al-Qaeda. This approach would reduce the number of

strikes and civilian deaths associated with drones while reserving their use for those

targets that pose a direct or imminent threat to the security of the United States.

Such a **self-limiting approach** to drones might also **minimize the degree of political**

**opposition** that US drone strikes generate in states such as Pakistan and Yemen, as

their leaders, and even the civilian population, often tolerate or even **approve of**

**strikes** against HVTs. Another step might be to **improve the levels of transparency**

of the drone programme. At present, there are no publicly articulated guidelines

stipulating who can be killed by a drone and who cannot, and no data on drone

strikes are released to the public.154

Even a Department of Justice memorandum

which authorized the Obama administration to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American

citizen, remains classified.155

Such **non-transparency fuels suspicions** that the US is

indifferent to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, a perception which in

turn magnifies the deleterious political consequences of the strikes. Letting some

sunlight in on the drones programme would not eliminate all of the opposition to

it, but it would go some way towards undercutting the worst conspiracy theories

about drone use in these countries while also signalling that the US government

holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour.

### Solves norms

#### The CP shapes the development of global norms on drones and actively builds legitimacy---that means it solves their perception deficits because all their ev is only about the way that drones are perceived now, not how they’re perceived after a vigorous defense by the U.S.

Kenneth Anderson 10, Professor of International Law at American University, 3/8/10, “Predators Over Pakistan,” The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/predators-over-pakistan>

But a thorough reading of the Predator coverage calls to mind how the detention, interrogation, and rendition debates proceeded over the years after 9/11. As Brookings scholar Benjamin Wittes observes, those arguments also had elements of both legal sense and sensibility. Ultimately the battle of international legal legitimacy was lost, even though detention at Guantánamo continues for lack of a better option. It is largely on account of having given up the argument over legitimacy, after all, that it never occurred to the Obama administration not to Mirandize the Christmas Bomber. Baseline perceptions of legitimacy have consequences. ¶ Nor is the campaign to delegitimize targeted killing only about the United States. Legal moves in European courts have already been made against Israeli officials involved in targeted killing against Hamas in the Gaza war. Unsavory members of the U.N. act alongside the world’s most fatuously self-regarding human rights groups to press for war crimes prosecutions. All of this is merely an opening move in a larger campaign to stigmatize and delegitimize targeted killing and drone attacks. What can be done to Israelis can eventually be done to CIA officers. Perhaps a London bookmaker can offer odds on how soon after the Obama administration leaves office CIA officers will be investigated by a court, somewhere, on grounds related to targeted killing and Predator drone strikes. And whether the Obama administration’s senior lawyers will rise to their defense—or, alternatively, submit an amicus brief calling for their prosecution. ¶ Thus it matters when the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial execution, Philip Alston, demands, as he did recently, that the U.S. government justify the legality of its targeted killing program. Alston, a professor at New York University, is a measured professional and no ideologue, and he treads delicately with respect to the Obama administration—but he treads. Likewise it matters when, in mid-January, the ACLU handed the U.S. government a lengthy FOIA request seeking extensive information on every aspect of targeted killing through the use of UAVs. The FOIA request emphasizes the legal justification for the program as conducted by the U.S. military and the CIA. ¶ Legal justification matters, partly for reasons of legitimacy and partly because the United States is, and wants to be, a polity governed by law. This includes international law, at least insofar as it means something other than the opinions of professors and motley member-states at the U.N. seeking to extract concessions. International law, it is classically said, consists of what states consent to by treaty. Add to this “customary law”—as evidenced by how states actually behave and as provided in their statements, their so-called opinio juris. Customary law is evidenced when states do these things because they see them as binding obligations of law, done from a sense of legal obligation—not merely habit, policy, or convenience, practices that they might change at any moment because they did not engage in them as a matter of law. ¶ What the United States says regarding the lawfulness of its targeted killing practices matters. It matters both that it says it, and then of course it matters what it says. The fact of its practices is not enough, because they are subject to many different legal interpretations: The United States has to assert those practices as lawful, and declare its understanding of the content of that law. This is for two important reasons: first to preserve the U.S. government’s views and rights under the law; and second, to make clear what it regards as binding law not just for itself, but for others as well. ¶ Other states, the United Nations, international tribunals, NGOs, and academics can cavil and disagree with what the United States thinks is law. But no Great Power’s consistently reiterated views of international law, particularly in the field of international security, can be dismissed out of hand. It is true of the United States and it is also true of China. It is not a matter of “good” Great Powers or “bad.” Nor is it merely “might makes right.” It is, rather, a mechanism that keeps international law grounded in reality, and not a plaything of utopian experts and enthusiasts, departing this earth for the City of God. It remains tethered to the real world both as law and practice, conditioned by how states see and act on the law. ¶ The venerable U.S. view of the “law of nations” is one of moderate moral realism—the world “as it is,” as the president correctly put it in his Nobel Prize address. It is not the vision of radical utopians and idealists; neither is it that of radical skeptics about the very existence of law in international affairs. On the contrary, the time-honored American view has always been pragmatic about international law (thereby acting to preserve it from radical internationalism and radical skepticism). But upholding the American view requires more than simply dangling the inference that if the United States does it, it means the United States must intend it as law. Traditional international law requires more than that, for good reason. The U.S. government should provide an affirmative, aggressive, and uncompromising defense of the legal sense and sensibility of targeted killing. The U.S. government’s interlocutors and critics are not wrong to demand one, even those whose own conclusions have long since been set in stone. ¶ A clear statement of legal position need not be an invitation to negotiate or alter it, even when others loudly disagree. In international law, a state’s assertion that its policies are lawful, particularly such an assertion from a great power in matters of international security, is an important element all by itself in making it lawful, or at least not unlawful. But in vast areas of security, self-defense, and the use of force, the U.S. government has in recent years left a huge deficit as to how its actions constitute a coherent statement of international law. ¶ For once, Washington should move to get ahead of a contested issue of international legal legitimacy and “soft law.” Why else have an Obama administration, if not to get out in front on a practice that it has ramped up on grounds of both necessity and humanitarian minimization of force? The CIA has taken a few baby steps by selectively leaking some collateral damage data to a few reporters. But the CIA is going to have to say more. The U.S. government needs to defend targeted killings as both lawful, and as an important step forward in the development of more sparing and discriminating—more humanitarian—weaponry.

#### The counterplan aloneis key to effective drone operations---the permutation sends the signal that the rest of the government sides with critics of drones over the executive---that delegitimizes drones and collapses the program

Kenneth Anderson 10, Professor of International Law at American University, 3/8/10, “Predators Over Pakistan,” The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/predators-over-pakistan>

Obama deserves support and praise for this program from across the political spectrum. More than that, though, the drone strikes need an aggressive defense against increasingly vocal critics who are moving to create around drone warfare a narrative of American wickedness and cowardice and of CIA perfidy.

Here the administration has dropped the ball. It has so far failed to provide a robust affirmation of the propositions that underwrite Predator drone warfare. Namely:

n Targeted killings of terrorists, including by Predators and even when the targets are American citizens, are a lawful practice;

n Use of force is justified against terrorists anywhere they set up safe havens, including in states that cannot or will not prevent them;

n These operations may be covert—and they are as justifiable when the CIA is tasked to carry them out secretly as when the military does so in open armed conflict.

n All of the above fall within the traditional American legal view of “self-defense” in international law, and “vital national security interests” in U.S. domestic law.

There are good reasons for Republicans and centrist Democrats to make common cause in defending these propositions. On the one hand, they should want to aggressively protect the administration against its external critics—the domestic and international left—who are eager to prosecute Americans for their actions in the war on terror. They should also want to make clear that in defending drone strikes, they are defending the American (and not just the Obama) legal and strategic position. Moreover, it will be the American view of domestic and international law for future administrations, Democratic and Republican.

At the same time, congressional Republicans and centrist Democrats need to put Obama’s senior legal officials on the record and invite them to defend their own administration, defend it to the full extent that the Obama administration’s actions require. Which is to say, Congress needs to hear publicly from senior administration lawyers and officials who might be personally less-than-enthused about targeted killings of terrorists and not eager to endorse them publicly, or to do so only with hedged and narrow legal rationales from which they can later walk away.

Consider, for instance, the diffidence of Harold Koh, the legal adviser of the Department of State. In an informal public discussion with his predecessor, John Bellinger, aired on C-SPAN on February 17, he was asked about drones and targeted killings and declined to say that the practice was lawful. (Granted, it was in an unscripted setting, which cannot be taken as anyone’s last word and on which it would be unfair to place too much weight.) All he said was that if he concluded that it was unlawful, he would, if he thought it appropriate, resign his position. He added that he remained at his post. The statement falls far short of the defense one might hope for from such a high-ranking administration lawyer. More than a year into the new administration, that ought surely to strike the general counsels of the CIA, the Pentagon, the Director of National Intelligence, the NSC, and other agencies directly conducting these activities as somewhat less than reassuring.

In fact, the administration’s top lawyers should offer a public legal defense of its policies, and congressional Republicans and Democrats should insist on such a defense. This is partly to protect the full use-of-force tools of national security for future administrations, by affirming the traditional U.S. view of their legality. But it is also to protect and reassure the personnel of the CIA, NSC, and intelligence and military agencies who carry out these policies that they are not just effective but lawful policies of the U.S. government and will be publicly defended as such by their superiors.

Even as the Obama administration increasingly relies on Predator strikes for its counterterrorism strategy, the international legal basis of drone warfare (more precisely, its perceived international legal legitimacy) is eroding from under the administration’s feet—largely through the U.S. government’s inattention and unwillingness to defend its legal grounds, and require its own senior lawyers to step up and defend it as a matter of law, legal policy, and legal diplomacy. On the one hand, the president takes credit for the policy—as frankly he should—as taking the fight to the enemy. His vice president positively beams with pride over the administration’s flock of Predator goslings. On the other hand, the Obama administration appears remarkably sanguine about the campaign gearing up in the “international law community” aimed at undermining the legal basis of targeted killing as well as its broad political legitimacy, and ultimately at stigmatizing the use of Predators as both illegal and a coward’s weapon.

Stigmatizing the technology and the practice of targeted killing is only half of it, though. The other half is to undermine the idea that the CIA may use force and has the authority to act covertly under orders from the president and disclosure to Congress, as long provided in U.S. law. The aim is to create a legal and political perception that, under international law, all uses of force must be overt—either as law enforcement or as armed conflict conducted by uniformed military.

The Obama administration is complacent about this emerging “international soft law” campaign. But Obama’s opponents in this country, for their part, likewise underestimate and ignore the threat such a campaign presents to national security. That’s apparently because many on the right find it hard to imagine that mere congeries of NGOs, academics, activists, U.N. officials, and their allies could ever overcome “hard” American national security interests, particularly when covered by the magic of the Obama administration. Both liberal and conservative national security hands, looking at the long history of accepted lawfulness of targeted killings under American law, think, “Come on, there’s obvious sense to this, legal and political. These arguments in domestic and international law have long been settled, at least as far as the U.S. government is concerned.” But if there’s a sense to it, there’s a sensibility as well, one that goes to the overall political and legal “legitimacy” of the practice within a vague, diaphanous, but quite real thing called “global public opinion,” the which is woven and spun by the interlocking international “soft law” community and global media.

It’s a mistake to remain oblivious to either the sense or the sensibility. Outside of government, the oblivious include hard-realist conservatives. Inside government, some important political-legal actors are struggling impressively both to overcome bureaucratic inertia and get in front of this issue, and to overcome factions within government unpersuaded by, if not overtly opposed to, this program—particularly as conducted by the CIA. Those actors deserve political support from congressional Republicans and Democrats. Because obliviousness to the sensibility of lawfulness and legitimacy—well, we should all know better by now. Does anyone still believe that the international legal-media-academic-NGO-international organization-global opinion complex cannot set terms of debate over targeted killing or covert action? Or that it cannot overcome “hard” American security interests? Or that this is merely another fringe advocacy campaign of no real consequence, whether in the United States, or abroad in Europe, or at the United Nations?

The Obama administration assumes that it uniquely sets the terms of legal legitimacy and has the final word on political sensibility. This is not so—certainly not on this issue. The international soft-law campaign looks to the long-term if necessary, and will seek the political death of targeted killings, Predator drones, and their progeny, and even perhaps to CIA covert action, by a hundred thousand tiny paper cuts. The campaign has already moved to the media. Starting with Jane Mayer’s narrative of Predator drone targeted killing in the New Yorker last October, and followed by many imitators, the ideological framework of the story has shifted. In the space of a year—Obama’s year, no less—it has moved from Candidate Obama’s brave articulation of a bold new strategy for attacking terrorists to the NGOs’ preferred narrative of a cowardly, secretive American CIA dealing collateral damage from the skies. Here’s the thumbnail version of drone warfare, as portrayed in the media.

### Perm

**Voluntary executive consultation improves decision-making and captures all of the benefits of the aff without constraining authority to act**

**Baker, 7 -** Chief Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, former Special Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor to the National Security Council (James, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES, p. 25-27)

Understanding process also entails an appreciation as to how to effectively engage the constitutional process between branches. Unilateral executive action has advantages in surprise, speed, and secrecy. In context, it is also **functionally imperative**. As discussed in Chapter 8, for example, military command could hardly function if it were subject to interagency, let alone, interbranch application. Unilateral decision and action have other advantages. Advantage comes in part from the absence of objection or dissent and in the avoidance of partisan political obstruction. In the view of some experts, during the past fifteen years, “party and ideology routinely trump institutional interests and responsibilities” in the Congress.6 These years coincide with the emergence of the jihadist threat.

However, there are also security benefits that derive from the operation of external constitutional appraisal. These include the foreknowledge of objection and the improvements in policy or execution that dissent might influence. Chances are, if the executive cannot sell a policy to members of Congress, or persuade the courts that executive actions are lawful, the executive will not be able to convince the American public or the international community.

A sustained and indefinite conflict will involve difficult public policy trade-offs that will require sustained public support; that means support from a majority of the population, not just a president’s political base or party. Such support is found in the effective operation of all the constitutional branches operating with transparency. Where members of Congress of both parties review and validate a policy, it is more likely to win public support. Likewise, where the government’s legal arguments and facts are validated through independent judicial review, they are more likely to garner sustained public support. Thus, where there is more than one legal and effective way to accomplish the mission, as a matter of legal policy, the president and his national security lawyers should espouse the inclusive argument that is more likely to persuade more people for a longer period of time. The extreme and divisive argument should be reserved for the extraordinary circumstance. In short, congressional and judicial review, **not necessarily decision**, offers a source of independent policy and legal validation that is not found in the executive branch alone.

Further, while the president alone has the **authority** to wield the tools of national security and the bureaucratic efficiencies to do so effectively, that is not to say the president does not benefit from maximizing his authority through the involvement and validation of the other branches of government. Whatever can be said of the president’s independent authority to act, as the Jacksonian paradigm recognizes, when the president acts with the express or implied authorization of the Congress in addition to his own inherent authority, he acts at the zenith of his powers. Therefore, those who believe in the necessity of executive action to preempt and respond to the terrorist threat, as I do, should favor legal arguments that maximize presidential authority. In context, this means the meaningful and transparent participation of the Congress and the courts.

Prez power zero sum—barilleaux and Kelly

### AT OBJECT

#### No link: Object of the resolution is “authority” not “war powers”--restricting authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.

#### Taylor, 1996 (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

### AT ROLLBACK

**CP constrains future Presidents – it creates a legal framework**

**Brecher**, JD University of Michigan, December **2012**

(Aaron, Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 423, Lexis)

The executive might also issue the proposed order, even though it would limit her freedom in some ways, because of the possible benefits of **constraining future administrations** or preempting legislative intervention. n149 For example, in this context, an administration may choose to follow the finding and reporting requirements in order to convince Congress that legislative intervention is unnecessary for proper oversight. This is acceptable if the covert action regime is in fact adequate on its own. Moreover, if greater statutory control over cyberattacks is needed, the information shared with Congress may give Congress the tools and knowledge of the issue necessary to craft related legislation. n150 Additionally, while executive orders are hardly binding, **the inertia following adoption of an order may help constrain future administrations**, which may be more or less trustworthy than the current one. **Creating a presumption through an executive order** also **establishes a stable legal framework** for cyberattacks that allows law to follow policy in this new field, and permits decisionmakers to learn more about the nature of cyberoperations before passing detailed statutes that may result in unintended consequences.

### CASE

#### Extend 1NC Idiz- Turkey doesn’t have the regional influence necessary to establish credible soft power- the country’s too isolated and experienced too much backlash from Erdogan during the Arab Spring- means no solvency

#### Turkish soft power fails ---

Domestic instability in Turkey undermines its soft power and the credibility of its model

**ALTUNIŞIK, 8** --- Professor, Department. of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara (MELİHA BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK, Insight Turkey, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” vol.10,, no. 2,, <http://www.insightturkey.com/Insight_Turkey_10_2_Meliha_Benli_Altunisik.pdf>

Still, however, **the emergence of Turkey as a soft power in the Arab world is an evolving process, and there are several obstacles to its sustainability: First, to some extent, Turkey’s soft power is a factor of Turkey’s ability to solve its own internal problems. The current political instability in Turkey, including that related to the Kurdish issue, undermines Turkey’s soft power capabilities**. **Similarly, the prospects for the future of the AKP experience will have repercussion for Turkey’s soft power status, as the coming to power of this party contributed in an important way to the perception and the relevance of the Turkish experience in the eyes of the region. D**uring the first term of the AKP government, the traditional establishment to a large extent tolerated its rule, and indeed the AKP has continued to work within the confines of democracy. Yet recently **this experience seems to have come under duress as polarization began to reemerge between the secularists and the AKP government. The political crisis in the system would undermine the image of Turkey in the Arab world as a successful example of political modernization**.

#### Extend 1NC Stein- Turkey doesn’t have the weaponry necessary to cause escalatory conflict, too reliant on US and Israel and doesn’t have the capacity to develop sustainable tech- means their impact would take forever, prefer this evidence because it’s predictive

#### No impact- Turkey drones fail- bad tech

Zion 12

(Ilan Ben, The Times of Israel, “Turkey to return Israeli-made drones, citing technical problems,” October 28, 2012, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkey-to-return-israeli-made-drones-citing-technical-problems/>) /wyo-mm

Ankara is returning three unmanned aerial vehicles purchased from Israel and demanding damages, claiming Israel didn’t uphold the terms of an agreement, Turkish media reported on Saturday. ¶ Get The Times of Israel's Daily Edition by email ¶ and never miss our top stories ¶ Turkey decided to send the three Heron drones back after technical problems were found with the aircraft, Turkish news outlet NTV reported. Turkey acquired the drones four years ago as part of a 10 drone, $183 million deal with Israel Aerospace Industries. According to Israel Radio, Ankara claimed the Israeli government has rejected repeated requests to repair the aircraft, as specified in their agreement. As a result, Turkey has decided to return them to Israel and demand compensation for damages incurred because of Israel’s unwillingness to meet its obligations.¶ One of the planes crashed while operating on a mission in southeastern Turkey and two others haven’t been used in eight months due to technical issues, Turkey claimed, according to the NTV report.¶ IAI responded to the report saying that it had stood by all its obligations regarding repair of the aircraft, and that it did not know what the problem was.¶ Last year, Turkish daily Today’s Zaman reported that Turkey returned several Heron drones for repair because of ”engine-related” and “other problems.” After delays in getting them back to Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly complained. Israel then returned the drones and sent technicians to fix them.

#### Turkey and PKK committed to peace process—public recognition and turkish actions prove

Villellas 13 [Ana Villellas, research fellow at the School for a Culture of Peace based at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She heads the Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia unit in the Programme on Conflict and Peacebuilding, “New peace talks in Turkey: opportunities and challenges in conflict resolution,” Insight Turkey Volume: 15 Issue: 2 ,Spring 2013, p19, OneFile, wyo-sc]

As mentioned above, there are very positive indicators in Turkey that point to the seriousness of this process. The public stances taken by the different sides indicate a firm commitment -at least apparently-to the peace talks. The attitude has been mainly constructive and the parties have expressed their determination and political will to push the process forward and overcome obstacles. Even if it is too early to determine the real extent of this commitment, the approach of "speaking less and doing more" appears to be a sign of the willingness to avoid the rhetorical provocations and ambiguity that hindered previous peace initiatives and that created so much distrust.¶ Among its already positive indicators, one can highlight the fact that for the first time the Turkish Government has publicly recognised Abdullah Ocalan as its interlocutor in peace talks and as a central figure for millions of Kurds in Turkey. In such an identity-related conflict as the Kurdish one, public acknowledgement and recognition plays a significant role. For many Kurds, regardless of whether or not they accept armed struggle, Ocalan symbolizes Kurdish identity and resistance. In addition to that symbolic importance, any realistic approach to the dynamics of power and conflict had at some point to include dealing with Ocalan (and the KCK/PKK) in the search for an end to violence. The Turkish government is now in a position where it can publicly accept this. Thus, public recognition by the AKP Government that Ocalan is a valid interlocutor and that it accepts direct talks as the way to settle the conflict makes an important difference compared to the ambiguity and secretiveness of past attempts. This could partially reduce accumulated Kurdish fears, deep distrust, and scepticism.

#### No terror attacks- Al Qaeda weak and focused on local initiatives- anti-western rhetoric is posturing

Thomas Hegghammer 7/18/13, PhD in political science Zuckerman Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), 7/18/13, "The Future of Anti-Western Jihadism," Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade On “Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges,” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20130718/101155/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-HegghammerT-20130718.pdf¶

The decline of al-Qaida Core is the easiest aspect of the current state of affairs to explain. It is¶ fundamentally a story of what terrorism scholars call government “learning”, i.e., gradual accumulation of information about the identity and location of the members of the rebel group, which in turn allows for increasingly targeted and more effective repressive measures. At the beginning of the war on terror, al-Qaida enjoyed an informational advantage over the US government – as do all terrorist groups at the outset of their campaigns – because it knew where to¶ find us but we did not know where to find them. With the help of time and massive investments in¶ intelligence, we were able to map the organization, contain it, and eliminate leaders faster than it could train new ones. Learning is also behind the moderate decline in attacks by independents. Advances in data mining and analysis have allowed governments to collect, accumulate, and exploit data about the¶ fringes of the jihadi network to a much greater extent than before, allowing for the identification of many, though not all, plots before they reach execution. Governments are helped here by the fact¶ that true lone wolves are extremely rare, and that, for most individuals, the radicalization process¶ involves socialization with other activists and/or consumption of jihadi propaganda online, both of which leave traces to be exploited. This, incidentally, is one of several reasons why the Internet is proving to be less of a boon to terrorists than many analysts predicted some years ago. For all their skill using the internet for propaganda distribution, jihadists are struggling use the web for operational purposes; they are having particular problems avoiding surveillance and establishing¶ trust between one another online. The more contentious question is why the affiliates are not attacking in the West more often. One argument holds that this is a capability issue, i.e, that the groups are not operationally¶ capable of circumventing the many countermeasures and detection systems that Western¶ governments have put in place since 9/11. This argument is unconvincing for two main reasons. One¶ is that several affiliates, especially AQIM and al-Shabaab, do have economic resources and human¶ assets that should arguably enable them to carry out at least some attacks in the West. The other¶ reason is if capability was the main problem, we should still expect to see more attempts. The¶ combination of high intent and low capability is observable in the form of failed and foiled attacks. The fact that we do not see many such attempts, except from AQAP, suggests most affiliates are not really trying.¶ I argue that the relatively low supply of anti-Western plots from the affiliates reflects low motivation, which in turn has two origins: a preference for local targets and fear of US retaliation. For all their anti-Western rhetoric and declared allegiance to al-Qaida Core, many affiliates appear to¶ place greater emphasis on achieving local political objectives than inflicting harm on the West. We¶ can infer this preference from the content of group declarations. Some groups say explicitly that¶ they do not plan to attack in the West; others are more ambiguous in their statements, but reveal their preferences by devoting more attention to local topics than to global ones or describing close¶ enemies with more vitriol than distant ones. Groups also reveal their preferences by the way they allocate operational resources. Most affiliates devote their resources overwhelmingly to local or regional operations. Even those organizations that have attempted operations against the West have conducted a much larger number of operations in the local theatre. This is in stark contrast to AQ core, which devoted nearly all of its resources after 2001 to attacks in the West. By far the most plausible explanation for these allocations is that groups value local political gains higher than¶ international ones. If your aim is to establish control over a given territory and you are caught up in a¶ fight with a regional enemy, it makes little strategic sense to attack the West. However, you might have an incentive to launch verbal attacks on the West, because this makes you appear strong and¶ principled in your local setting. Attacking the West makes even less strategic sense for such groups given the cost to the organization of provoking the ire of the American military. There is solid evidence from captured¶ documentation that leaders of jihadi organizations think strategically and make decisions based on¶ an informed calculus of costs and benefits. Leaders are, as a rule, not suicidal or irrational. There is also extensive evidence – from internal strategy documents – that leaders are aware of the¶ capabilities of the US military and seek to avoid unnecessary exposure to these capabilities. In the 1990s, some jihadi leaders explicitly admitted fearing US retaliation and cited it as a reason not to¶ pursue Osama bin Ladin’s “America first” strategy. Such explicit admissions are rare today, but it would be surprising if the prospect of retaliation did not factor into the decision calculus in an era where the US has proven much more willing to use force against terrorists than perhaps ever before¶ in modern history. Most likely, affiliate leaders understand that targeting the US homeland might bring their own demise.

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### Blowback arguments are wrong and outweighed by conducting the war against terror

Kenneth Anderson, professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, June 2013.

4. Blowback ¶ The most prominent critique today, however, is that drone warfare is counterproductive because it produces “blowback.” What is blowback?¶ Blowback comprises the supposed bad consequences of drones that swamp the benefits, if any, of drone warfare itself—the anger of villagers whose civilian relatives have been killed, for instance, or the resentment among larger populations in Pakistan or Yemen over drone strikes. The anger, we are told, is fanned by Islamist preachers, local media, and global Web communities, and then goes global in the ummah about the perceived targeting of Muslims and Islam. This leads to radicalization and membership recruitment where the strikes take place. Or maybe it leads to independently organized violence—perhaps the case of the Boston bombers, though it is too early to say. All this bad public perception outweighs whatever tactical value, if any, drone strikes might have.¶ Blowback can never be dismissed, because it might be true in some cases. But even when true, it would exist as a matter of degree, to be set against the benefits of the drone strikes themselves. By definition, blowback is a second-order effect, and its diffuse nature makes its existence more a matter of subjective judgment than any other evaluation of drone warfare. As a hypothesis, the possibility of blowback arises in two distinct settings: “narrow” counterinsurgency and “broad” global counterterrorism.¶ The narrow blowback hypothesis concerns those in communities directly affected by global counterterrorism drone strikes while the United States is trying to carry out a ground-level counterinsurgency campaign. The question is whether civilians, women and children especially, are being killed by drones in such numbers—because collateral damage is a fact, including from drone strikes—that they make these local communities even more fertile ground for anti-American operations. Do the drone strikes make things unacceptably more difficult for ground forces attempting to carry out a hearts-and-minds campaign to win over the local population?¶ Direct and immediate concerns about villagers’ perceptions during the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan led, at some points, to extraordinary (from the standpoint of lawful targeting and acceptable collateral damage) measures against using air power and even infantry to fire back at insurgents. But local counterinsurgency is not the long-term concern today; global counterterrorism is. Village-level resentments fueling recruitment might be a concern, but this type of blowback matters far less in terms of war fighting when the United States no longer has infantry in those places (and is no longer making its counterterrorism policy rest upon the chimera of a stable, democratic Afghanistan).¶ It is sharply contested, to say the least, whether and to what extent drone strikes are creating blowback among villagers, or whether and to what extent, as a former British soldier recently returned from Afghanistan remarked to me, villagers are sad to see the Taliban commander who just insisted on marrying someone’s young daughter blown up in an airstrike. There is also debate about the degree to which villagers are aware that the American drones are undertaking strikes that the Pakistani government might otherwise undertake. Critics often neglect to focus on the Pakistani government’s regular and brutal assaults in the tribal zones. Despite a general perception that all of Pakistan is united against drone strikes, voices in the Pakistani newspapers have often made note that the tribal areas fear the Pakistani army far more than they fear U.S. drones, because, despite mistakes and inevitable civilian casualties, they see them as smaller and more precise. But the blunt reality is that as the counterinsurgency era ends for U.S. forces, narrow blowback concerns about whether villages might be sufficiently provoked against American infantry are subsiding.¶ That leaves the broader claim of global blowback—the idea that drone campaigns are effectively creating transnational terrorists as well as sympathy for their actions. That could always be true and could conceivably outweigh all other concerns. But the evidence is so diffuse as to be pointless. Do Gallup polls of the general Pakistani population indicate overwhelming resentment about drone strikes—or do they really suggest that more than half the country is unaware of a drone campaign at all? Recent polls found the latter to be the case. Any causal connections that lead from supposed resentments to actual terrorist recruitment are contingent and uncertain. Discussing global blowback is also an easy stance for journalists writing about U.S. counterterrorism—Mark Mazzetti’s new book, The Way of the Knife, is a good example—because it automatically frames an oppositional narrative, one with dark undertones and intimations of unattractive, unintended consequence. The blowback argument is also peculiarly susceptible to raising the behavioral bar the United States must meet in order to keep the local population happy enough not to embrace suicide bombing and terrorism. It defines terrorist deviancy down, while U.S. and Western security behaviors are always defined up.¶ From a strategic standpoint, however, the trouble with the blowback theory is simple: It will always counsel doing nothing rather than doing something. It’s the kibitzer’s lazy objection. Whether one knows a lot or a little about the action and its possible blowback consequences, whether one has an axe to grind or is reasonably objective, one can always offer the blowback scenario.¶ There might be situations in which to give it priority; Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert, for example, says that a particular form of strike in Yemen causes blowback because it hits low-level fighters whose families cannot understand the American justification. (The response is, usually, that we are effectively fighting as the air arm of the Yemen government against its insurgents, including its low-level fighters.) That bears attention; whether it outweighs the strategic concern of supporting the Yemeni government, which does have to fight even low-level insurgents who in effect offer protection to the transnational terrorist wing, is another question. But we should consider it carefully.¶ Blowback is a form of the precautionary principle. But it’s awfully difficult to conduct war, after all, on the basis of “first do no harm.” As it happens, the United States once had a commander driven largely by considerations of blowback from a restive local population. His name was George McClellan. If he had not been replaced by Abraham Lincoln, the Union would have lost the Civil War.

## 1NR

### 2NC Impact: Heg Good

#### Extend Brooks 13—credible US leadership is key to prevent a descent into global anarchy marked by unchecked nuclear proliferation and war.

#### American hegemony has stewarded 60 years of great power peace in an unprecedented break from history AND the transition won’t be smooth, Roman and British/European collapse destroyed economic systems, institutions, and lead to two World Wars

Kagan 2012

[Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, The World America Made, 2012 uwyo//amp]

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today—the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic . crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are over a hundred. For four centuries prior to 1950, global gross domestic product (GDP) rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the twentieth century saw' the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past sixty years no great powers have gone to war with one another. Our era is best known for the war that never happened, between the United States and the Soviet Union.1 There's plenty wrong with our world, of course, but from the perspective of thousands of years of recorded history, in which war, despotism, and poverty have been the norm, and peace, democracy, and prosperity the rare exceptions, our own era has been a golden age. Some believe this is the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government—forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there is also another possibility. Perhaps the progress we enjoy was not an inevitable evolution of the human species but rather the product of a unique and perhaps fleeting set of circumstances: a particular arrangement of power in the international system that favors a certain worldview over others. Maybe if those conditions were to change, if power were to shift, then the characteristics of the world order would change, too. Perhaps democracy has spread to over a hundred nations since 1950 not simply because people yearn for democracy but because the most powerful nation in the world since 1950 has been a democracy. Perhaps the stunning global economic growth of the past six decades reflects an economic order shaped by the world's leading free-market economy. Per"haps the era of peace we have known has something to do with the enormous power wielded by one nation. History shows that world orders, including our own, are transient. They rise and fall. And the institutions they erected, the beliefs that guided them, and the "norms" that shaped the relations among nations within them—they fall, too. Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers, and every international order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests. On some occasions, the prevailing world order has simply collapsed into disorder. When the Roman Empire fell, the order it supported fell, too. Not just Roman government and law but an entire economic system stretching from northern Europe to North Africa was disrupted and would take centuries to rebuild. Culture, the arts, even progress in science and technology, were set back for centuries. People lost the recipe for cement. We saw a similar collapse of world order in our own time. The world we know today was erected amid the chaos and destruction following World War II and the collapse of the European-dominated order that had evolved over four centuries. That order was far from perfect: it produced many wars, an aggressive imperialism, and the widespread oppression of nonwhite races, but it also produced the conditions for an era of great human advances. By the late nineteenth century British control of the seas and the balance of great powers on the European continent together had provided the relative security and stability to allow a growth in prosperity, a modest if tenuous expansion of personal freedoms, and a world knit closer by the revolutions in commerce and communication we today call globalization. It kept peace among the great powers for almost four decades after the Napoleonic Wars, and for another four decades after the wars of German unification. It was so successful that many concluded at the dawn of the twentieth century that mankind had reached a summit of evolution and that major war and tyranny had become obsolete. Yet with the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalism—of European civilization approaching its pinnacle—collapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism, and economic calamity. The once promising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of their newly fascist and totalitarian neighbors. Suddenly it was a world filled with predatory leaders sitting atop predatory powers. The collapse of the British and European orders in the twentieth century did not produce a new dark age—though if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had won the war, it might have—but the cataclysm it did produce was, in its own way, no less devastating.

### Sustainability

#### As long as US is perceived as willing to use its power in the international arena second tier states will side with the US. This maintains US heg much further than thought [Blue}

Selden 13

[Zachary Selden, assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony”, 08 May 2013, Security Studies, 22:2, 330-364, \\wyo-bb]

Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United¶ States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009¶ period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing¶ to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its¶ power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier¶ states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner¶ that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness¶ to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony¶ would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to¶ project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its¶ national interests.¶ As Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander note, the United States is threatening to a relatively small number of states.7¶ Regional powers such as Russia¶ and China, however, present a security challenge to many of the states on¶ their borders. Russia has used its energy resources to pressure Ukraine during its elections, has repeatedly violated the airspace of the Baltic states, and¶ has taken a range of actions against Georgia.8¶ In 2007 alone, a cyber attack¶ emanating from Russia temporarily crippled internet connectivity in Estonia,¶ Russia cut off the ﬂow of energy to Lithuania when that country decided to¶ sell its main oil reﬁnery to a Polish rather than Russian company, and Russian aircraft ﬁred missiles into Georgian territory.9¶ In the summer of 2008,¶ Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that demonstrated its willingness to¶ use military force to resolve issues in its “near abroad.”¶ China as well has sought to expand its inﬂuence in the Asia-Paciﬁc¶ region and South Asia. Its military buildup, establishment of military facilities¶ in Burma and islands off the coast of India, and major assistance to Pakistan’s¶ nuclear program are all viewed with varying levels of concern by China’s¶ neighbors. Defense spending is difﬁcult to gauge given the opacity of the¶ Chinese budgeting system, but most estimates show double-digit increases¶ since the early 1990s with an average increase of 16.5 percent annually since¶ 2001.10 A 2006 review of the country’s foreign and defense policy signaled a¶ decision to “make a break with Deng’s cautious axioms and instead, embark¶ on a path of high-proﬁle force projection.”11 Although many scholars of¶ Asian security note the success of China’s “charm offensive” using trade,¶ diplomacy, and other tools of persuasion to bolster its position in the region,¶ there is a debate within the ﬁeld as to China’s intentions and how other¶ states in the region are reacting.12¶ These actions push second-tier states to align with the United States¶ and, despite much discussion of the emergence of a multipolar world and¶ the end of American hegemony, the emerging pattern of alignment with¶ the United States means that its hegemony may be far longer-lasting than¶ some assume. This article ﬁrst proposes an explanation of the expansion of¶ security cooperation with the United States between 2001 and 2009. It then¶ examines the increasingly broad range of alignment with the United States¶ demonstrated by second-tier states in the same period and offers a means to¶ measure alignment. It then examines the changes in the relationship between¶ the United States and three states in the 2001–2009 period that span the range from soft alignment to hard alliance. Lastly, it concludes with a consideration¶ of the implications of this pattern for the future of American hegemony.

#### Second Tier States Shifting to the United states now- Historical Trends in the Last Decade

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[Zachary Selden, assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony”, 08 May 2013, Security Studies, 22:2, 330-364, \\wyo-bb]

This latter interpretation appears to be more supported by the history of¶ the past decade in which a large number of states strengthened their security¶ cooperation with the United States and increased their ability to facilitate¶ the global reach of the US military. Between 2001 and 2009, nine eastern¶ European states sought and obtained membership in NATO, an institution¶ deﬁned by its explicit American security guarantee. Georgia, several Balkan¶ states, and Ukraine (until 2010) continue to seek NATO membership and¶ the vast majority of them participated in US-led military operations in this¶ period. India dramatically shifted away from its deeply rooted principle of¶ nonalignment to engage in a range of cooperative military activities with¶ the United States. Japan and Australia reafﬁrmed their alliances with the¶ United States and also participated in US-led military operations in Iraq and¶ Afghanistan.¶ In an effort to reduce their vulnerability, states in close proximity to Russia and China have strengthened their security ties with the United States.¶ Some have done so by seeking membership in NATO, or reafﬁrming and increasing their commitment to existing alliances with the United States. Others¶ have done so by demonstrating their value to the United States by facilitating¶ US military activities in the region, participating in US-led missions, and tying¶ their militaries to that of the United States through cooperative programs,¶ training exercises, and other activities. This supports William Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity may endure because attempts by regional powers¶ such as China and Russia to increase their standing are likely to generate regional counterbalances among neighboring states that in many cases involve¶ the United States.20

#### Second Tier states solve your sustainability- Alternate Financing, Troops and bases solve overstretch

Selden 13

[Zachary Selden, assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony”, 08 May 2013, Security Studies, 22:2, 330-364, \\wyo-bb]

Secondary states take actions to extend and preserve American hegemony through contributions of national military facilities that extend the¶ reach of the US military, direct and indirect ﬁnancial contributions, and troop¶ contributions to US-led operations. For example, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to maintain its global strategic reach without¶ military bases in partner countries. American bases, however, are costly to¶ construct and maintain, which leads to an alternative that is far more affordable: using national facilities of the secondary state. In the case of Singapore,¶ the government constructed a naval facility conﬁgured to host US Navy vessels. The Changi naval base in Singapore opened in 2004 and is an important¶ port for the US Navy in a particularly strategic region. It was speciﬁcally built¶ to hold an American aircraft carrier, and Singapore also hosts four US littoral¶ combat ships on a rotational basis at Changi.21¶ Another means of taking on some of the costs of American hegemony¶ is by providing direct or indirect ﬁnancial contributions. Japan provides ﬁ-¶ nancial contributions that help to spread some of the costs of maintaining US¶ hegemony in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Not only has Japan paid for approximately half of the eight billion dollars it cost to rearrange the presence of US¶ forces in Japan along the lines set forth in the US Global Posture Review,22 it¶ also used its development assistance to pay for military equipment for other¶ US Asian partners.23¶ Ukraine and Georgia use troop contributions as a means of taking on¶ some of the burden of maintaining American hegemony. Ukraine committed¶ approximately two thousand troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq, the largest¶ single non-NATO contribution. This was not a symbolic contribution: excluding the United States, Ukrainian forces suffered the third highest number of¶ coalition casualties in that conﬂict.24 Georgia committed 2,000 troops to the¶ coalition in Iraq and approximately 2,400 under US command in Afghanistan.¶ In both cases those contributions represent signiﬁcant portions of their deployable active duty armed forces.¶ In all of these cases the countries in question could have made merely¶ token contributions to US-led missions or minimized their investment in facilities that enable the reach of the US military. Instead they took measures and¶ incurred costs that spread the burden of maintaining American hegemony. It¶ is difﬁcult to put a total value on these contributions, but it is certainly true¶ that the maintenance of American hegemony would be more expensive and¶ logistically difﬁcult for the United States without them. As an example, the¶ total troop contributions of the states in this study to the US-led operations¶ in Iraq and Afghanistan amounted to more than ﬁfteen thousand military¶ personnel, or approximately one US Army division.25 As strained as the US¶ military was in the 2001–2009 period, it would have been under much greater¶ stress without those troop contributions.

#### American economic hegemony is sustainable-American share of GDP has remained steady, and at best GDP doesn’t determine power polarity, per capita GDP does and America dominates that field

Kagan 2012

[Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, The World America Made, 2012 uwyo//amp]

Some of the arguments for America's relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 18905, the 19305, and the 19705. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The first decade of the twentieth century, the 19405, and the 19805 were all high points of American global power and influence. Less than a decade ago most observers spoke not of America's decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002 the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 19805 had written a much-discussed book on "the rise and fall of the great powers," America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great "disparity of power" as between the United States and the rest of the world.82 John Ikenberry agreed that "no other great power" had held "such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities ... The preeminence of American power" was "unprecedented."83 In 2004, Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a "comprehensive uni-polarity" unlike anything seen since Rome.84 But a mere four years later, Zakaria was writing about the "post-American world," and Kennedy, again, about the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America's relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years? The answer is no. Let's start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America's position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world's GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade, but over the past four decades. In 1969 the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world's economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far has been almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy.85 Optimists about China's development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. The sheer size of an economy, however, is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early-nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world's largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country's growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP.

#### American electorate will always tolerate hegemony, it is just a question of the particular policies—retrenchment not inevitable

McDonough 9

[David S., doctoral student in Political Science and a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, ORBIS, “Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy”, Jan. 2009, p. asp]

The debate over American strategic options has narrowed considerably in the post-9/11 period. “The new debate on U.S. grand strategy is essentially about which variant of a hegemonic strategy the United States should pursue.”14 Posen labeled these two variants of primacy “national liberalism” and “liberal internationalism.”15 The former is essentially the current administration's unilateral approach, while the latter has been embraced by a Democratic Party eager to demonstrate its competence in national security affairs. President Bush's strategy does not represent a revolutionary change when compared to its predecessor, but it does represent the culmination of a strategic adjustment process that has effectively settled on primacy–in one form or another–for the post-9/11 period.

### Counter balancing

#### First, No counterbalancing now- status quo trends are all too modest and informal to be threatening

Walt 9

[Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard University, WORLD POLITICS, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, Jan. 2009, World Politics, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, Jan. 2009, p. asp]

Yet as several scholars have noted previously, what is striking about these efforts is how tentative and half-hearted most of them are, especially when one considers the other major powers. There have been no attempts to form a formal alliance whose explicit purpose is to contain the United States (even though leaders like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez [End Page 102] have called for such arrangements), and even the most far-reaching informal efforts have been fairly modest.44 Equally important, these efforts do not appear to be driven largely by structural concerns (that is, by the distribution of capabilities), and there has been little or no effort to assemble a countervailing coalition of even approximately equal capabilities.

#### Second, Theories of counterbalancing don’t apply to established hegemons

Brooks and Wohlforth 2008

[Stephen G. Brooks, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, uwyo/amp]

In this chapter, we show that the theory does not predict and historical experience does not imply that there will be efforts to counter balance the United States today’. Balance-of-power theory predicts that states try to prevent rise of a hegemon. While scholars debate the historical evidence for this proposition, they fail to register a point important for constraints on U.S. power today: Even if a potential hegemon must be concerned about counterbalancing, the theory yields no such implication for one that has already established its material primacy. We argue that once a country achieves such a position, it has passed a threshold, and the effect of increasing power is reversed: the stronger the leading state and the more entrenched its dominance, the more unlikely and thus less constraining are counterbalancing dynamics. Our explanation for the absence of counterbalancing against the United States emphasizes a simple point: counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively costly for the other major powers. l3ecause no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international system. Matching U.S. capabilities could become even more formidably costly, moreover, if the United States decided to increase its defense expenditures (cur rently around 4 percent of GDP) to Cold War levels (which averaged 7.5 percent of GDP).

#### Third, Hard balancing not possible under unipolarity because even incentive is there the cost is too high—worst that will happen is soft balancing

Ikenberry et al. 9

[G. John, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth, professors of politics and international affairs at Princeton University and Dartmouth College, World Politics, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, 2009, p. asp]

The proposition that great concentrations of capabilities generate countervailing tendencies toward balance is among the oldest and best known in international relations.33 Applying this balancing proposition to a unipolar system is complex, however, for even as unipolarity increases the incentives for counterbalancing it also raises the costs. Walt [End Page 18] and Finnemore each analyze the interplay between these incentives. They agree on the basic proposition that the current unipolar order pushes secondary states away from traditional hard counterbalancing—formal military alliances and/or military buildups meant to create a global counterweight to the unipole—and toward other, often subtler strategies, such as soft balancing, hiding, binding, delegitimation, or norm entrapment. These analyses lead to the general expectation that a shift from a multipolar or bipolar to a unipolar structure would increase the relative salience of such subtler balancing/resistance strategies.

#### THE INEVITABLE DEATH OF US HEGEMONY YOUR EVIDENCE ASSUMES IS NOT A SMOOTH WITHDRAWAL—IT’S A COLLAPSE INTO VIOLENT MULTIPOLARITY THAT GENERATES NUCLEAR WAR

**BRZEZINSKI** (Former Sect. Of State) **2004**

[Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York // wyo-tjc]

In any case, the eventual end of American hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major pow­ers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemon that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technologi­cal, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a com­parative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their eco­nomic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only the United States, however, unambigu­ously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty- year intervals, and the gap in the year 2000 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before,

The former major European powers—Great Britain, Germany, and France—are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become suf­ficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico-military arena, Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomi­cally lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan’s population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next “superstate” now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still con­strained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which addition­ally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity.

Even a coalition among the above—a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims—would lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to both push America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove, Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America’sleadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hege­mony would not dampen the clashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions—in the event of America’s decline—could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. [P. 2-4]

#### Withdrawal creates Middle East vacuum, massive Sunni-Shia war and wildfire proliferation—and there’s no regional balancer so OSB would fail

Starobin 6

[Paul, editior of National Journal, The National Journal, “Beyond Hegemony”, 12.2.2006, p. lexis]

Still, if stability in a multipolar world is to depend on big-power police forces taking care of business in their own 'hoods, who would perform that function in the Middle East, the planet's most turbulent region? No question is more vexing. For centuries the region has been under the sway of outside powers, from the Ottoman Empire to the French, British, and American empires. America's departure would leave a vacuum. Among Middle Eastern Muslim countries, neither Egypt nor Iran, the two most populous states, has the status of an accepted power broker; nor does Saudi Arabia, which has the biggest bank account and is the cradle of Islam but whose monarchy suffers in the region from popular dislike of its historically close security relationship with the United States. Given sharp regional tensions between Sunni and Shiite sects, it is conceivable that a civil war, spilling outside of Iraq, would have to be fought to settle top-dog status. Perhaps a rough balance could be achieved in a grouping pitting a nuclear-armed Israel against a nuclear-armed Islamic country, such as Iran. But it is likely that if Persian Iran gains nukes, then Arab countries like Algeria, Egypt, and Syria will try to match that feat, Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, said at a recent roundtable at the New America Foundation in Washington. (He skirted comment on my question of how the Saudis would react; some analysts believe that the Saudis might seek protection under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella.) It is understandable why countries like France and Russia, chafing at America's global dominance, view a multipolar world as a desirable one. But would a multipolar world ever be stable? "I don't think stability exists anywhere, except in death," Merry, the former diplomat, said.

#### American decline results in a radical, nuclear warlord state of Paksitan, instigating clashes with India that become exploited by China and Russia

Brzezinski 2012

[Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, CSIS Counselor and Trustee, 2012, Strategic Vision, uwyo//amp]

While Pakistan is armed with twenty-first-century nuclear weapons and is held together by a professional late twentieth-century army, the majority of its people—despite a politically active middle class and a congested urban popxilation—are still premodern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Together they share the Muslim faith, which provided the passionate impulse for a separate state upon Britain's departure from India. The resulting conflicts with India have defined Pakistan's sense of separate national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir has sustained a shared and profound antipathy for each other. Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability. And a decline in US power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development. Pakistan could transform into a state run by the military, or a radical Islamic state, or a state that combines both military and Islamic rule, or a "state" with no centralized government at all. The worst-case scenarios are that Pakistan devolves into some variation of nuclear warlordism or transforms into a militant-Islamic and anti-Western government similar to Iran. The latter could in turn infect Central Asia, generating wider regional instability of concern both to Russia and to China. In the above circumstances, America's decline would also increase Chinese security concerns about South Asia and could intensify Indian temptations to undermine Pakistan. China's exploitation of any clashes between Pakistan and India would also be more likely, thus potentially increasing regional instability. Ultimately, an unstable peace or a wider conflict in the region would depend almost entirely on the degree to which both India and China could restrain their own increasingly nationalistic impulses to exploit Pakistan's instability in order to gain the regional upper hand.

#### SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR WAR RISKs EXTINCTIION

**CALDICOTT** (Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility) **2002**

[Helen, The New Nuclear Danger, 2002, p. xii // wyo-tjc]

 The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2, 250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.