# 1nc

### 1

#### The aff is not topical --- introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems such as nuclear weapons --- prefer our interpretation because it’s based on textual analysis, legislative history, and intent of the WPR

Lorber 13 – Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). **Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the** W**ar** P**owers** R**esolution likely does not cover such activities**. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, **individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.** Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Vote negative for predictable limits --- nuclear weapons is a whole topic on its own --- requires research into a whole separate literature base --- undermines preparedness for all debates.

### 2

#### First, the “proliferation” image is built on three metaphors: balance, stability, and proliferation, all see spread of weapons technology as destabilizing

Mutimer in 1994

(David, Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts, Deputy Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

This discussion provides a framework for the examination of the PROLIFERATION image. The centrality of that image to the contemporary international security agenda is indicated by President Bill Clinton's first address to the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1993: "I have made non-proliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all our relationships with the world's nations and institutions." The PROLIFERATION image is built around three dominant metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and its related concept, 'balance'. The three metaphors were neatly joined together in a recent article on proliferation from the US Army Journal, Parameters, "The policy community uses the term 'proliferation' to define a wide array of activities regarding the spread of weapon technologies. Key to the definition is the notion that proliferation destabilizes the balance of power within a region."47 I can now examine each of these metaphors to show what features they highlight, downplay and hide in their information of the PROLIFERATION image, and how they thereby both privilege and preclude certain policy solutions.

#### The use of “balance” and “stability” metaphors connote a normative commitment to the creation and maintenance of stable and balanced orders that legitimize security

Mutimer in 1994

(David, Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts, Deputy Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

The two related terms 'stability' and 'balance' are so firmly seated in the language of international relations that their metaphorical nature is seldom remembered—as with many of the metaphors Lakoff and Johnson discuss. Thus the use of the two in imagining the new international security agenda around PROLIFERATION tends to draw more explicitly on the entailments that have been generated by that disciplinary use. It is, nevertheless, still useful to remember the first step of the two step process of metaphor creation—the understanding of international relations in terms of our common experiences of 'balance' and 'stability'. While the metaphor of 'proliferation' is grounded in processes which are most basic to human life, the metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are probably more firmly rooted in most people's common experiences. Both terms are used widely in the metaphors of our everyday lives, and wherever they occur, value is placed on maintaining stability and balance. Thus we speak of people being 'well balanced', or of having 'stable personalities'. Teams are most successful if they have a 'balanced' attack, and people look for 'stable' employment and to 'balance' their bank accounts. Given the positive connotations of 'stability' and 'balance', it should not be surprising that their use as metaphors of international relations connote a normative commitment to the creation and maintenance of stable and balanced orders.

#### The image of “proliferation” makes any disarmament strategy unsustainable and promotes the technology denial that widens the North/South gap [green]

Mutimer in 1994

(David, Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts, Deputy Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

There are two classes of conclusion I can draw from this discussion, those relating to policy and those to theory. I would suggest two conclusions concerning the present policies of proliferation control. The first is that the image of PROLIFERATION is giving rise to a policy agenda dominated by strategies of technology denial. Such strategies reflect the technological bias and the 'outward from a source' entailments of proliferation. However, they are profoundly problematic in the contemporary international system. Technology denial is serving to deepen the already wide gap between North and South. It ignores entirely the needs of economic development—needs which are at least as great a security concern as is the spreading of weapons technology. In addition, the strategy is unsustainable. Because the PROLIFERATION image is of an autonomous process, it takes no account of the political and economic interests driving the supply of military technology. These interests are presently being felt in the United States, for example, in opposition to any extension of export controls—despite the United States long being the leader of the supplier control groups.67 The second policy conclusion is related to the first. The metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are similarly ill-suited to the contemporary security environment. Even if we accept that they provided useful conceptual frames to understand the superpower relationship in the Cold War, they are not appropriate to the regional security arenas of the post-Cold War. The entailments of 'stability' in particular can not account for the variety and complexity of the Middle East, South Asia or the North Pacific, to mention the regions of contemporary concern. Regional security, and security policy, must then be 'reimagined' on bases other than those provided by 'stability' and 'balance', and hence by PROLIFERATION.

#### Suppression of proliferation only drives states to get them faster- Results in unending wars and more proliferation

Craig and Ruzicka 13

[Campbell Craig, Professor in International Politics, BA Carleton College, MA University of Chicago, PhD Ohio University, Jan Ruzicka, Lecturer in Security Studies, BA Charles University Prague, MA Brandeis University; Central European University, PhD University of Wales, Aberystwyth, “The Nonproliferation Complex”, Ethics & International Affairs, 27, no. 3 (2013), pp. 329–348., \\wyo-bb]

“The ultimate success of a national policy,” wrote Joseph Nye, “occurs when a¶ country is able to elevate its interest to the level of a general principle. In that¶ sense, U.S. nonproliferation policy over the years has been surprisingly successful.”¶  In two sentences, Nye puts his ﬁnger precisely upon the third consequence¶ of the nonproliferation complex. When a universalistic principle that purports to¶ seek a good anyone can perceive—the avoidance of nuclear apocalypse—is¶ wedded to the policy objectives of the world’s most powerful state and its¶ major allies, a dominant discourse is the result. Those who adhere to this discourse enjoy funding, political support, and “policy relevance”; those who deviate¶ from it do not. This is the way of the world and is hardly unique to the nonproliferation regime.¶ The problem here is not the plight of those who reject the nonproliferation line,¶ of course, but rather that ideas that more squarely tackle nuclear danger are¶ crowded out. As E. H. Carr pointed out in the s, it is precisely in situations¶ like this that the employment of ameliorative liberalism at the international level¶ can often be worse than doing nothing at all. By focusing upon “rogue states,”¶ avoiding demands for disarmament beyond vague calls for Global Zero, and in a¶ general sense conveying to the Western public the message that nuclear danger¶ should be blamed on other people, and not on them, the complex has cultivated¶ the false notion that nuclear peace can be accomplished incrementally, over time,¶ without requiring unorthodox forms of political action. As we have seen, the quest¶ to stop nonproliferation without simultaneously requiring great-power nuclear¶ disarmament runs into simple and logical obstacles that cannot, over the long¶ run, be overcome. Nuclear technology exists, the international environment¶ remains anarchical, and so unless the United States and its allies wish to wage¶ an endless series of Iraq-like wars to prevent states from obtaining a bomb, sooner¶ or later some will do so. Indeed, they will do so despite such wars, and, more¶ importantly, because of them. States thinking about building a bomb need only¶ contrast the fates of North Korea with Libya to see this logic. For a while, it¶ might have been possible to use the moral taboo of nuclear weapons to discourage¶ some states from taking this step, but the ongoing cynicism fostered by Article VI¶ hypocrisy has surely destroyed such hopes.

#### And, the technological distinction made be the “proliferation” image creates a stigma of underdevelopment that drives former colonial states to more desperate means that will cause extinction.

Bjork in 1995

(Rebecca, associate professor at the University of Utah, “Public Policy Argumentation and Colonialist Ideology”, in Warranting Assent, p.224-225)

Thinly veiled sexism and racism, however, are not the only assumptions operating in arguments such as these. A discourse of underdevelopment, which contrasts the “modern” nations of the industrial north with the “backward” nations of the south, although certainly related to racist assumptions, functions to keep high technology in the hands of the privileged few. Payne’s (1991) claim that countries with “embryonic nuclear forces lack the practical experience, technical skill, and know-how to safely handle high-technology weapons seems curious, since in this view, the United States in 1945 apparently did have such experience to justify its own nuclear arsenal development. Many commentators have noted the ethnocentric tendencies in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, arguing that claims of irresponsibility, irrationality, and backwardness represent a war of words between the technical haves and the technical have-nots (Kapur 1990; Dhanapala 1990; Subrahmanyam 1991). Resentment grows as the 1995 extension conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty approaches, given that many emerging nations feel that the United States and the Soviet Union failed to live up to Article VI of the treaty, requiring them to dismantle their own nuclear arsenals, in conjunction with efforts to control the spread of these heinous weapons. They argue that even with the completion of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, the superpowers will have 20 percent more nuclear warheads than when SALT I was signed hardly progress toward disarmament (Dhanapala 1990). Some argue that the superpowers never intended to disarm, using Article VI as a smokescreen to continue their own weapons development at the exclusion of other members of the international community (Kapur 1990). Tragically, given the realities of international power politics, it seems that former colonial states are being driven to more and more desperate means, in an attempt to overcome the stigma of “underdevelopment,” and to participate as equal voices in the international dialogue. Given the scope of global problems facing humanity in the years ahead, such an outcome can only serve to endanger the lives of all on this fragile planet.

#### Finally, the alternative is critique the 1ac’s imagery of “proliferation” in favor of an imagery of disarmament.

#### We must critique the image of “proliferation” and use an imagery of disarmament to unmask the hidden power structures at play.

Mutimer in 1994

(David, Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts, Deputy Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

On a more conceptual note, the implications of this argument are that in order better to understand and influence international security and security policy, we must identify the images that are supporting and informing that policy, and the metaphors of which they are composed. These will provide the scale along which policy responses are ordered, privileging some while rejecting others. Furthermore, to understand fully the nature of an image and its attendant metaphors, it is necessary to discover their origin. The metaphors which concerned Paul Chilton, for example, were drawn from everyday experience—quite deliberately, as their function was to bolster extant policy in the public mind. However, the images and metaphors which concerned me here structure the thought of policy-makers themselves. Therefore, while the images may be drawn from a different universe, the intellectual function they serve is the same. The analysis of metaphor provided here is by no means complete. I have examined the relationship between the metaphorical images of security problems and the policy responses. To draw this form of work more fully into a research agenda of 'critical security studies', it would be necessary to develop the relationship of these two to political interests. How does power affect the formation of metaphorical images? Whose interests are promoted by particular images, and whose are ignored? These questions need also be asked in reverse: do particular images operate so as to enhance the power of particular actors or groups, and also to create and reproduce sets of interest? Clearly these questions are well beyond the scope of this chapter, but need to be considered in the building of a new research agenda for international security. These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations. Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example. Finally, it is important that I be clear about the one conclusion I am not drawing. I am by no means suggesting that such imagining and metaphoric reasoning is by itself dangerous. Rather, it is both essential and impossible to eliminate. What must be recognised is that images and their metaphors privilege certain policy solutions. Therefore the choice of image must be guided by the appropriateness of the privileged solutions to the problem at hand, but more importantly by the normative convictions of the chooser.

### Threats Real

#### Nuclear primacy now

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

Since 2006, we have discussed these issues with many nuclear analysts, ¶ US government officials, and military officers involved with the nuclear ¶ mission. Almost everything we learned reinforced our views about the counterforce revolution and suggests our earlier work understated the ¶ leap in US counterforce capabilities—with one exception. We previously ¶ argued that US “nuclear primacy”—the ability to use nuclear weapons ¶ to destroy the strategic forces of any other country—appeared to be an ¶ intentional goal of US policymakers. We noted that even as the United ¶ States greatly reduced its nuclear arsenal, it retained, and in some cases ¶ improved, those nuclear forces that were ideally suited to the counterforce mission. Based on what we have subsequently learned, we would ¶ recast and sharpen this part of our argument to contend that the United ¶ States is intentionally pursuing “strategic primacy”—meaning that Washington seeks the ability to defeat enemy nuclear forces (as well as other ¶ WMD)—but that US nuclear weapons are but one dimension of that ¶ effort. In fact, the effort to neutralize adversary strategic forces—that ¶ is, achieve strategic primacy—spans nearly every realm of warfare: for ¶ example, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence surveillance-and-reconnaissance systems, offensive cyber warfare, conventional precision strike, and long-range precision strike, in addition ¶ to nuclear strike capabilities.

#### First use is key to coercive function of nuclear weapons

Thayer 2012 [Bradley A. Thayer served as a consultant to the Department of Defense and is professor of political science at Baylor University. February 17, 2012 Washington Times “Preserving our nuclear deterrence” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/17/preserving-our-nuclear-deterrence/]

Nuclear weapons aid Uncle Sam’s ability to coerce opponents as well for three reasons. First, in a crisis situation, nuclear weapons help persuade a challenger not to escalate to a higher level of violence or move up a rung on the escalation ladder. Second, although laden with risks, they also provide the possibility of attacking first to limit the damage the United States or its allies would receive. Whether the U.S. would do so is another matter. But possessing the capability provides the nation with coercive capabilities in crisis situations or war. Third, nuclear weapons give the United States the ability to threaten nuclear first-use to stop a conventional attack or limited nuclear attack and to signal the risk of escalating violence to a higher level.

#### Inevitable conventional conflicts are coming with nuclear armed adversaries- nuclear primacy is key to contain those conflicts

Lieber and Press 2013 [Keir A. Lieber¶ ¶ Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School¶ ¶ of Foreign Service, Georgetown University¶ ¶ Daryl G. Press¶ ¶ Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College¶ ¶ Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at the John Sloan ¶ ¶ Dickey Center Spring 2013 Strategic Studies Quarterly “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_13/lieber.pdf]

A second set of arguments stems from the problem of nuclear escalation and the future of the US nuclear arsenal. Our main claim is that deterring nuclear conflict will be much more difficult in the coming decades ¶ than many analysts realize. As nuclear weapons proliferate, it becomes ¶ increasingly likely that the United States will find itself in conventional conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Those adversaries understand ¶ the consequences of losing a war to the United States—prison or death ¶ typically awaits enemy leaders.¶ 7¶ Coercive nuclear escalation as a means ¶ of creating stalemate and remaining in power is one of the only trump ¶ cards available to countries fighting the United States.¶ Some analysts might scoff at the notion that a rational leader would ¶ use nuclear weapons against a superpower like the United States. But ¶ that retort conflates the logic of peacetime deterrence with the logic ¶ of war, and it ignores history. During peacetime, almost any course of ¶ action is better than starting a nuclear war against a superpower. But ¶ during war—when that superpower’s planes are bombing command and ¶ leadership sites, and when its tanks are seizing territory—the greatest ¶ danger may be to refrain from escalation and let the war run its course. ¶ Leaders of weaker states—those unlikely to prevail on the conventional ¶ battlefield—face life-and-death pressures to compel a stalemate. And ¶ nuclear weapons provide a better means of coercive escalation than ¶ virtually any other.¶ The notion of countries escalating conflict to avoid conventional defeat may sound far-fetched, but it is well grounded in history. When ¶ nuclear-armed states face overwhelming conventional threats—or worry ¶ about the possibility of catastrophic conventional defeat—they often ¶ adopt coercive escalatory doctrines to deter war or stalemate a conflict ¶ that erupts. Pakistan openly intends to use nuclear weapons to counter ¶ an overwhelming conventional Indian invasion. Russia claims it needs ¶ theater nuclear weapons to counter NATO’s conventional advantages. ¶ Israel expects to win its conventional wars but retains the capability for ¶ nuclear escalation to prevent conquest in case its conventional forces ¶ suffer a catastrophic defeat. ¶ The discussion of coercive nuclear escalation should sound familiar ¶ to Western analysts, as it was NATO’s strategy for three decades. From ¶ the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War, NATO planned to deter ¶ war, and stalemate it if necessary, through coercive nuclear escalation. ¶ NATO understood that—by the mid 1960s—it could no longer win a ¶ nuclear war against the Soviet Union, but it still based its national security ¶ strategy on coercive escalation because it believed Warsaw Pact conventional forces were overwhelming.¶ In short, the escalatory dynamics that existed during the Cold War exist ¶ today—and they are just as powerful. States still face the same critical ¶ national security problem they faced during the Cold War and throughout history: namely, how to prevent stronger countries from conquering them. The high-stakes poker game of international politics has not ¶ ended; the players and the cards dealt have merely changed. Those who ¶ were weak during the Cold War are now strong, and another set of ¶ militarily “weak” countries—such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and ¶ even China and Russia—now clutch or seek nuclear weapons to defend ¶ themselves from overwhelming military might, just as NATO once did.¶ What can the United States do to mitigate the problem of escalation? ¶ Ideally, it should avoid wars against nuclear-armed enemies. But that ¶ option may not be possible given current US foreign policy and alliances. War may erupt on the Korean Peninsula, ensnaring the United ¶ States in a battle against a desperate nuclear-armed foe. In the future, ¶ Washington may fight a nuclear-armed Iran over sea lanes in the Persian ¶ Gulf. And the United States could someday be dragged into war by a ¶ clash between Chinese and Japanese naval forces near disputed islands. ¶ Alternatively, the United States could seek to develop conventional ¶ war plans designed to wage limited war without triggering enemy escalation. Development of alternative plans is sensible, but history shows ¶ that wars are difficult to contain, and modern conventional warfare is ¶ inherently escalatory. ¶ A third option to mitigate these dangers is to retain, and improve, ¶ US nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities. Fielding powerful ¶ counterforce weapons may help deter adversary escalation during war—¶ by convincing enemy leaders to choose a “golden parachute” rather than ¶ escalation—and would give US leaders better response options if deterrence failed. In particular, the United States should retain and develop ¶ nuclear weapons that bring together three key characteristics of counterforce: high accuracy, flexible yield, and prompt delivery.¶ To be clear, sharpening US counterforce capabilities is not a “solution” ¶ to the problem of adversary nuclear weapons. Although, ceteris paribus, ¶ it would be better to have excellent counterforce capabilities than to lack ¶ them, given enough time and motivation, many countries could greatly ¶ increase the survivability of their forces. But given the plausible prospect ¶ that the United States will find itself waging war against nuclear-armed ¶ states, and given the powerful incentives of US adversaries to brandish ¶ or use nuclear weapons, it would be reckless to proceed without a full ¶ suite of modern nuclear and nonnuclear counterforce capabilities.

### China

#### The U.S. has had primacy over China for decades---zero risk modernization’s driven by it

Blair and Chen 6 – Bruce G. Blair, President of the World Security Institute, and Chen Yali, Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group, Autumn 2006, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy,” China Security, online: <http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_4.pdf>

The professors ignore Cold War history in arguing that the nuclear primacy the United States allegedly enjoys will drive China toward a rapid build-up of its nuclear force that risks precipitating a nuclear arms race and aggravating tensions between them. Throughout the Cold War era, even when China was threatened repeatedly by both the United States and the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and possibility of military confrontation, both of whom held absolute nuclear superiority over China, China did not accelerate its nuclear program to close the gap. An unflinching China chose to cap its nuclear arsenal at a low level instead of launching a crash program to compete numerically with either of the nuclear superpowers that threatened it. This decision may have been partially based on the realization that China lacked the resources needed to compete and would lose an arms race with its adversaries. But the deeper rationale for China’s restraint was its belief that primacy lacked any real utility. China maintained and still maintains a stark indifference toward nuclear primacy. [“The professors” in this article refers to Lieber & Press]

Modernization is stable---no arms race or miscalc

Yuan 9 – Jing-Dong Yuan, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2009, “China and the Nuclear-Free World,” in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, eds. Hansell and Potter, online: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/op15.pdf

China has long maintained that its nuclear weapons development is largely driven by the need to respond to nuclear coercion and blackmail. The role of nuclear weapons, in this context, is purely defensive and retaliatory, rather than war-fighting, as some western analysts suggest.19 Indeed, in the early years, China even rejected the concept of deterrence, regarding it as an attempt by the superpowers to compel others with the threat of nuclear weapons. This probably explains the glacial pace with which China introduced, modified, and modernized its small-size nuclear arsenals over the past four decades. Mainly guided by the principle that nuclear weapons will only be used (but used in a rather indiscriminate way) if China is attacked with nuclear weapons by others, nuclear weapons in China’s defense strategy serve political rather than military purposes.20¶ PLA analysts emphasize that the terms “nuclear strategy” and “nuclear doctrine” are rarely used in Chinese strategic discourse; instead, a more commonly used term refers to “nuclear policy,” which in turn is governed by the country’s national strategy. Hence, the deployment and use of nuclear weapons are strictly under the “supreme command” of the Communist Party and its Central Military Commission. Nuclear weapons are for strategic deterrence only; no tactical or operational utility is entertained. If and when China is under a nuclear strike, regardless of the size and the yield, it warrants strategic responses and retaliation.21 Chinese leaders and military strategists consider the role for nuclear weapons as one of defensive nuclear deterrence (ziwei fangyu de heweishe). Specifically, the country’s nuclear doctrine and force modernization have been informed and guided by three general principles: effectiveness (youxiaoxing), sufficiency (zugou), and counter-deterrence (fanweishe).22 China’s 2006 Defense White Paper emphasizes the importance of developing land-based strategic capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, but provides no specifics on the existing arsenal, the structure of the Second Artillery Corps (China’s strategic nuclear force) order of battle, or the projected size of the nuclear force. It indicates only that China will continue to maintain and build a lean and effective nuclear force. While Chinese analysts acknowledge that deterrence underpins China’s nuclear doctrine, it is more in the sense of preventing nuclear coercion by the superpower(s) without being coercive itself, and hence it is counter-coercion or counter-deterrence. Rather than build a large nuclear arsenal as resources and relevant technologies have become available, a path pursued by the superpowers during the Cold War, China has kept the size of its nuclear weapons modest, compatible with a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence.23 According to Chinese analysts, nuclear weapons’ role in China’s defense doctrine and posture is limited and is reinforced by the NFU position, a limited nuclear arsenal, and support of nuclear disarmament.

#### The discursive construction of China as threat is a veiled strategy to naturalize U.S. containment and managerial strategies, this influences and constrains policy solutions because it frames how we come to know the problem

Pan, 2004

(Chengxin, “The ‘China-threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The discursive construction of the other as power politics.” Alternatives 29 (2004) 305-331, MB)

The discursive construction of the U.S. self and the "Chinese threat" argument are not innocent, descriptive accounts of some "independent" reality. Rather, they are always a clarion call for the practice of power politics. At the apex of this power-politics agenda is the politico-strategic question of "what is to be done" to make the United States secure from the (perceived) threats it faces. At a general level, as Benjamin Schwarz proposes, this requires an unhindered path to U.S. global hegemony that means not only that the United States must dominate wealthy and technologically sophisticated states in Europe and East Asia— America's "allies"—but also that it must deal with such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Kim Jong II, so that potential great powers need not acquire the means to deal with those problems themselves. And those powers that eschew American supervision—such as China—must be both engaged and contained. The upshot of "American leadership" is that the United States must spend nearly as much on national security as the rest of the world combined.6' This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China,"Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Kraut- hammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the W orld Trade Organization on the terms it desires.^^ Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a sub- tle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bern- stein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy management.^^ Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of control- ling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and M unro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance.TM By framing U.S.- China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China manage- ment policy: In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard ahout three related questions:first,how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies.^^ This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

#### Attempts to protect ourselves from the looming Chinese threat create the tension and escalation towards war that they tried to prevent in the first place.

Pan 4

(Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives)

For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting com­ment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.

### Prolif

**Nuclear weapons prolif slowly, create peace, and prevent conventional warfare**

**Kenneth N. Waltz, 13**

Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; An Enduring Debate,” Book. Chapter 1: More May be Better. Accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

What will a world populated by a few more nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. **Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable** **of self-control than the old ones** have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. **Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread**. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for three main reasons. First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will con­tinue to be so. Second, **nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do.** Early in this century Norman Angell argued that war would not occur because it could not pay.42 **But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear coun­tries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains.** In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. **When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely**. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. **Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China**. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? **Third,** new nuclear states will feel the constraintsthat presentnuclear states have experienced**. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been**. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. **While nuclear weapons have spread slowly,** conven­tional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics**. The** likelihood of war decreases as deter­rent **and defensive** capabilities increase. N**uclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.**

**PROLIF SOLVES INEVITABLE MISCALCULATIONS AND ESCALATION AND NEW NUCLEAR STATES WILL FIT INTO A DETERRENCE WORLD ORDER AND PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF MAJOR WARS**

**Waltz in ‘3**

[Kenneth N., Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, with Scott D. Sagan, p.43-45.

What will a world populated by a few more nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self control than the old ones have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that **with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future**. I have reached this unusual conclusion for three main reasons. First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be so. Second, nuclear **weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do**. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that war would not occur because it could not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear countries, **possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains**. In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. **Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them**? Third, new **nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been**. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread slowly, con- [\*45//wyo-tjc] ventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. **Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared**.

**THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SLOWS THE PACE OF RAPID BALANCE SHIFTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL. THIS SOLVES THE OUTBREAK AND ESCALATION OF CATASTROPHIC WAR\*\***

**Alagappa in ‘8**

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center, “Nuclear Weapons and National Security”, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. M. Alagappa, 479-480//wyo-tjc]

**Nuclear weapons** cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the strategic policies and behavior of major powers (all but one of which possess nuclear weapons), their allies, and those states facing existential threats. They **induce caution and set boundaries to the strategic interaction of nuclear weapon states** and condition the role and use of force in their interactions. **The danger of escalation limits military options** in a crisis between nuclear weapon states and shapes the purpose and manner in which military force is used. Although relevant only in a small number of situations**, these** **include the most serious regional conflicts that could escalate to large—scale war.** **Nuclear weapons help prevent the outbreak of hostilities, keep hostilities limited when they do break out, and prevent their escalation to major wars. Nuclear weapons enable weaker powers to deter stronger adversaries and help ameliorate the effects of imbalance** in conventional military capability. **By providing insurance to cope with unanticipated contingencies, they reduce immediate anxieties over military imbalances and vulnerabilities. Nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view of the strategic environment**, set a moderate pace for their force development, and focus on other national priorities, including mutually beneficial interaction with other nuclear weapon states. Although nuclear weapons by themselves do not confer major power status, they are an important ingredient of power for countries that conduct themselves in a responsible manner and are experiencing rapid growth in other dimensions of power.

**Proliferation will not cause escalation and war, but rather deterrence and stability**

**Kenneth N. Waltz, 13**

Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; An Enduring Debate,” Book. Chapter 1: More May be Better. Accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

Examining the supposedly unfortunate characteristics of new nuclear states removes some of one's worries. One won­ders why their civil and military leaders should be less inter­ested in avoiding their own destruction than leaders of other states have been.13 **Nuclear weapons have never been used in a world in which two or more states had them.** Still, one's feel­ing that something awful will emerge as new nuclear powers are added to the present group is not easily quieted. **The fear remains that one state or another will fire its new nuclear weap­ons in a coolly calculated preemptive strike, or fire them in a moment of panic, or use them to launch a preventive war**. These possibilities are examined in the next section. **Nuclear weapons**, so it is feared, **may also be set off anonymously, or used to back a policy of blackmail,** or be used in a combined conventional-nuclear attack. Some have feared that a radical Arab state might fire a nuclear warhead anonymously at an Israeli city in order to block a peace settlement.14 **But the state firing the warhead could not be certain of remaining unidentified**. Even if a country's lead­ers persuaded themselves that chances of retaliation were low, who would run the risk? **Nor would blackmail be easy**, despite one instance of seeming success. In 1953, the Soviet Union and China may have been convinced by President Dwight D. Eisen­hower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that they would widen the Korean War and raise the level of violence by using nuclear weapons if a settlement were not reached. In Korea, we had gone so far that the threat of going farther was plausible. The blackmailer's threat is not a cheap way of working one's will. The threat is incredible unless a considerable investment has already been made. On January 12, 1954, Dulles gave a speech that seemed to threaten massive retaliation in response to bothersome actions by others, but the successful siege of Dien Bien Phu by Ho Chi Minh's forces in the spring of that year showed the limitations of such threats. Using American nuclear weapons to force the lifting of the siege was discussed in both the United States and France. **But using nuclear weap­ons to serve distant and doubtful interests would have been a monstrous policy, too horrible to carry through. Nuclear weap­ons deter adversaries from attacking one's vital—and not one's minor—interests**. Although nuclear weapons are poor instruments for black­mail, would they not provide a cheap and decisive offensive force when used against a conventionally armed enemy? Some people once thought that South Korea, and earlier, the Shah's Iran, wanted nuclear weapons for offensive use. Yet one can say neither why South Korea would have used nuclear weap­ons against fellow Koreans while trying to reunite them nor how it could have used nuclear weapons against the North, knowing that China and the Soviet Union might have retali­ated. And what goals might a conventionally strong Iran have entertained that would have tempted it to risk using nuclear weapons? **A country that launches a strike has to fear a pun­ishing blow from someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense, even against a nonnuclear state, raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other states. Nuclear weapons do not make nuclear war likely, as his­tory has shown**. The point made when discussing the internal use of nuclear weapons bears repeating. **No one can say that nuclear weapons will never be used. Their use is always pos­sible**. **In asking what the spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world, we are asking about the effects to be expected if a larger number of relatively weak states get nuclear weapons. If such states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end. The use of nuclear weapons by lesser powers would hardly trigger their use elsewhere**.

**Proliferation solves conventional arms races and shifts towards deterrence factors rather than offensive force postures**

**Kenneth N. Waltz, 13**

Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; An Enduring Debate,” Book. Chapter 1: More May be Better. Accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

**First, nuclear weapons alter the dynamics of arms races**. **In a competition of two or more parties, it may be hard to say who is pushing and who is being pushed**, who is leading and who is following. If one party seeks to increase its capabilities, it may seem that others must too. The dynamic may be built into the competition and may unfold despite a mutual wish to resist it. But need this be the case in a strategic competition among nuclear countries? **It need not be if the conditions of competition make deterrent logic dominant. Deterrent logic dominates if the conditions of competition make it nearly impossible for any of the competing parties to achieve a first-strike capability**. Early in the nuclear age, the implications of deterrent strategy were clearly seen. "When dealing with the absolute weapon," as Wil­liam T. R. Fox put it, "arguments based on relative advantage lose their point."29 The United States has sometimes designed its forces according to that logic. Donald A. Quarles, when he was President Eisenhower's secretary of the Air Force, argued that "sufficiency of air power" is determined by "the force required to accomplish the mission assigned." **Avoidance of total war then does not depend on the "relative strength of the two opposed forces." Instead, it depends on the "absolute power in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction**." 30 **In other words, if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant. Strategic arms races are then pointless. Deter­rent strategies offer this great advantage: Within wide ranges neither side need respond to increases in the other side's mili­tary capabilities. Those who foresee nuclear arms racing among new nuclear states fail to make the distinction between war-fighting and war-deterring capabilities.** War-fighting forces, because they threaten the forces of others, have to be compared. Supe­rior forces may bring victory to one country; inferior forces may bring defeat to another. **Force requirements vary with strategies and not just with the characteristics of weapons. With war-fighting strategies, arms races become hard to avoid**. Forces designed for deterrence need not be compared. As Harold Brown said when he was secretary of defense, purely deterrent forces "can be relatively modest, and their size can perhaps be made substantially, though not completely, insensitive to changes in the posture of an opponent."31 **With deterrent strate­gies, arms races make sense only if a first-strike capability is within reach. Because thwarting a first strike is easy, deterrent forces are quite cheap to build and maintain. Second, deterrent balances are inherently stable. This is another reason for new nuclear states to decrease, rather than increase, their military spending**. As Secretary Brown saw, within wide limits one state can be insensitive to changes in another state's forces. French leaders thought this way. France, as President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said, "fixes its security at the level required to maintain, regardless of the way the strategic situation develops in the world, the credibility—in other words, the effectiveness—of its deterrent force."32 **With deterrent forces securely established, no military requirement presses one side to try to surpass the other**. Human error and folly may lead some parties involved in deterrent balances to spend more on armaments than is needed, but other parties need not increase their armaments in response, because such excess spending does not threaten them. **The logic of deter­rence eliminates incentives for strategic-arms racing**. This should be easier for lesser nuclear states to understand than it was for the United States and the Soviet Union. Because most of them are economically hard-pressed, they will not want to have more than enough. Allowing for their particular situations, the policies of nuclear states confirm these statements. Britain and France are relatively rich countries, and they have tended to overspend. Their strategic forces were nevertheless modest enough when one considers that they thought that deterring the Soviet Union would be more difficult than deterring states with capabilities comparable to their own. China, of course, faced the same task. These three countries, however, have shown no inclination to engage in nuclear arms races. From 1974, when India tested its peaceful bomb, until 1998, when it resumed testing, India was content to have a nuclear military capability that may or may not have produced deliverable warheads, and Israel long maintained its own ambiguous status. **New nuclear states are likely to conform to these patterns and aim for a modest suf­ficiency rather than vie with one another for a meaningless superiority. Third, because strategic nuclear arms races among lesser powers are unlikely, the interesting question is not whether they will be run but whether countries having strategic nuclear weapons can avoid running conventional races.** No more than the United States will new nuclear states want to rely on exe­cuting the deterrent threat that risks all. Will not their vulner­ability to conventional attack induce them at least to maintain their conventional forces?

**Conventional war is a unique opportunity for disease spread**

**Singer 2**

Peter W., Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution: Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, PhD in Government Harvard University, Department of Defense-Balkans Task Force, “AIDS and International Security”, Spring 2002, Survival Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 2002, Pg. 145-148, [www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/2002\_singer.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/2002_singer.pdf).

**Besides more soldiers dying from war’s accessories, these forces typically leave a swath of disease in their path. The original spread of infection in East Africa can actually be traced back to the axes of advance used by individual units in the Tanzanian army.**52 At the same time, **the presence of war hinders efforts at countering the disease’s spread**, further heightening the impact of both. In Sierra Leone and the DRC, for example, **all efforts at AIDS prevention were put on hold by the breakdown of order during the wars.53 The added harm of war is that valuable windows of opportunity, in nipping diseases before they reach critical stages, are lost.**

**Extinction – don’t endorse the gendered language**

**Fox 97**

C. William. Lieutenant COLONEL. 6/24/97. <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=4341F68C-1AF1-FEB7-10D7-5EE127216D05&lng=en>.

HIV is a pandemic killer without a cure, and **viruses such as Ebola-Zaire are merely a plane ride away from the population centers of the developed world. Viruses like ebola,** which are endemic to Africa, **have the potential to inflict morbidity and mortality on a scale not seen in the world since the Black Plague epidemics of medieval Europe** (which killed a full quarter of Europe's population in the 13th and 14th centuries.)18 **These diseases** are not merely African problems, they **present a real threat to mankind. They should be taken every bit as seriously as the concern for deliberate use of weapons of mass destruction.**

**JAPANESE NUCLEARIZATION IS CRITICAL TO SOLVE CREDIBILITY GAPS THAT WILL ULIMTATELY CHAINGANG THE UNITED STATES INTO A GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR IN EAST ASIA**

**Layne in 96**

[Christopher, CATO Visiting Fellow, “Less is More”, National Interest, Spring, p. 72-73//wyo-tjc]

The conditions that contributed to successful extended nuclear deterrence in Cold War Europe do not exist in post-Cold War East Asia. Unlike the situation that prevailed in Europe between 1948 and 1990 -- which was fundamentally stable and static -- East Asia is a volatile region in which all the major players -- Japan, China, Korea, Russia, Vietnam -- are candidates to become involved in large-scale war. There is no clear and inviolable status quo. The lines of demarcation between spheres of influence are already blurred and may well become more so as Chinese and Japanese influence expand simultaneously, increasing the number and unpredictability of regional rivalries. The status of Taiwan, tension along the 38th Parallel in Korea, conflicting claims to ownership of the Spratly Islands, and the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands are only a few of the **flash-points** that **could ignite a great power war in East Asia**. Washington will clearly exercise far less control over the policies of East Asian powers than it exercised over America's European allies during the Cold War. Hence**, the risk of being chain-ganged into a nuclear conflict are much higher for the United States in post-Cold War East Asia if it maintains or extends nuclear guarantees to any of the region's major states**. Even more important, post-Cold War East Asia simply does not have the same degree of strategic importance to the United States as did Europe during the Cold War. Would the United States risk a nuclear confrontation to defend Taiwan, the Spratlys, or Senkaku**? Knowing that they would not constitute the same kind of threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union did, future revisionist East Asian powers would probably be more willing to discount America's credibility** and test its resolve. **The presence of American forces in the region may indeed have the perverse effect of failing to preserve peace while simultaneously ensuring the United States would be drawn automatically into a future East Asian war**. They could constitute the wrong sort of tripwire, tripping us rather than deterring them. Notwithstanding current conventional wisdom, **the United States should encourage East Asian states -- including Japan -- to resolve their own security dilemmas, even if it means acquiring** great power, including **nuclear**, military c**apabilities**. Reconfiguring American security policies anywhere in the world in ways that, in effect, encourage nuclear proliferation is widely seen as irresponsible and risky. This is not necessarily the case. Nuclear proliferation and extended deterrence are generally believed to be flip sides of the same coin, in the sense that providing the latter is seen to discourage the former. Nearly all maximalists are simultaneously proliferation pessimists (believing that any proliferation will have negative security implications) and extended nuclear deterrence optimists (believing that extended nuclear deterrence "works"). But this formulation comes apart from both ends in East Asia: Potential nuclear powers in the region are unlikely to act irresponsibly and, as suggested above, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is of uncertain credibility in post-Cold War circumstances in which the Soviet Union no longer exists and strains in the U.S.-Japanese relationship are manifest. Even selective proliferation by stable, non-rogue states admittedly raises important political, strategic, organizational, and doctrinal issues. But so does relying on America's nuclear extended deterrence strategy in changed circumstances. The need at hand is to weigh the dangers imbedded in an extended deterrence strategy against those posed by the possibility of nuclear proliferation, and here the Japanese case provides the most important and sobering illustration. Clearly, **most of the concerns about proliferation** that maximalists hold **are inapplicable to Japan.** Japan is not a rogue state, but a highly stable political system with a firm pattern of civil-military relations in which civilian primacy is unchallenged. On the technical side, Japan has both the technology and the resources to build an invulnerable, second strike deterrent force, thus contributing to crisis stability by muting a potential adversary's incentives to pre-empt in crisis. No one seriously doubts that Japan could develop command-and-control systems at least as sophisticated as our own to ensure against accidents, unauthorized use, or terrorism. And **while the dangers of japanese proliferation are more modest than commonly supposed, the risks to the United States of maintaining its nuclear umbrella are greater. In short, for the United States, some nuclear proliferation may be preferable to pledges of extended deterrence in circumstances in which credibility would be low compared to the dangers of catalytic war**. Retracting the nuclear umbrella from Japan would, it is true, set off a chain of foreseeable -- and unforeseeable -- events. But if the guarantee is left in place and deterrence should fail, that, too, would lead to a chain of unforeseeable -- and all-too-foreseeable -- consequences. On balance then, the risks to East Asians might rise even as the dangers for the United States shrink. It is not a simple matter, but inasmuch as the preeminent goal of U.S. foreign policy is the security of the United States, the choice in such circumstances is clear.

**AND NO RISK OF PREEMPTIVE STRIKES, PROLIF CASCADES OR INSTABILITY**

**O’Neil in 7**

[Andrew, School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University, Australia, Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia, 2007, P. 102//wyo-tjc]

In this chapter I have argued that **a stable nuclear relationship between China and Japan is indeed possible should Japan decide to operarionalize its thresh-old nuclear weapons capability** in the coming decades. **There is little Beijing could do other than accept a nuclear armed Japan**, with all of the consequences that would entail in terms of possibly diluting China’s power and influence in Northeast Asia and Asia more generally. **Military action** to degrade or neutralize Japan’s weapons capability **may present an option** for Chinese policy makers, **but it is hard to see why Beijing would risk provoking a Japanese or American military response, along with the international condemnation that would inevitably follow any preventive military strikes against Japan. Given the challenges confronting China’s elites to ensure continued national economic growth and development, they would be in no position to embark on a serious arms race** with Japan, **either at the conventional or nuclear level.** **Overlaying all of this is the shared view in Beijing and Tokyo that longer term regional stability is necessary for their economic relationship to continue to thrive and to safeguard their shared dependence on energy imports**. **There can be little doubt that any Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would trigger some short-term strategic instability** in Northeast Asia. **However**, as this chapter has shown, **the consequences** for bilateral relations between China and Japan in particular and Northeast Asian security overall **would be nowhere near as serious or dire as most observers claim**.

#### Claiming to solve for the Rouge states leads to ineffective policies of containment and drive the states to do what policy makers don’t want them to do faster becoming a SFP

O’Reilly 07

[K. P. O’Reilly, Global Studies Ph.D. from University of South Carolina, “Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the “Rogue State” Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites”, Foreign Policy Analysis Volume 3, Issue 4, pages 295–315, October 2007, Wiley Online Library, \\wyo-bb]

There appears to be a definitive rogue image held by U.S. foreign policy decision makers. While multifaceted, the perceptions held by key U.S. decision makers about rogues appear to be relatively stable and fixed over the decade examined. Foremost, the data illustrate that concerns about the future threat posed by rogues (e.g., the development of WMDs) far exceeds that of current power capabilities (e.g., state sponsorship of terrorism) in the mind of policy makers. In describing the behavior of a rogue state, however, policy makers are as likely to emphasize the general outlaw nature of rogues with their disregard for what U.S. leaders view as international norms then in describing rogues in terms of more specific and directed threatening behavior. Furthermore, in describing rogues, policy makers expend considerable energies in public statements solidifying the “us versus them” nature of the relationship assailing rogue states on the grounds of institutional (e.g., decision making) and cultural (e.g., intolerance) deficiencies. Although presenting evidence of converging criteria for the rogue image, the labeling of some states as rogues and others not still present the challenge of seemingly selective application given the relatively fixed criteria shown in policy makers public statements. As to the comparison of the rogue image devised among the U.S. presidential administrations subject to the time period examined several overarching commonalities were uncovered, differences were detectable among the administrations, as well as between actors within particular administrations. A main difference noted among the administrations revolved around the issue of voiced policy prescriptions. Specifically, the statements of the two Clinton administrations differed with those of the first Bush administration with the former making more mention of policies for sustaining and pursuing nonproliferation efforts. Nonetheless, aside from this difference as to policy advocacy among the administrations three findings regarding rogue states held across administrations. First, when describing the policy actions undertaken by rogue state, these states are nearly universally accused of sponsoring terrorism as well as seeking the acquisition/development of WMDs. Second, Secretaries of States were more prone to emphasize those behavior characteristics portraying rogues as outlaw in respect to the international community and as possessing of dubious governing regimes. Meanwhile, Secretaries of Defense overwhelming stress the threatening behavior characteristics of rogues. Third, as for resulting policy prescription in managing rogue states, the total of the elicited policy prescriptions demonstrates a predisposition towards policies associated with a containment strategy overall. In answering the third question posed at the outset of this study—the nature of the policy prescriptions advocated towards rogue and their consistency with the rogue image devised by policy makers—one must return to the useful framework provided by image theory whereby relationship dimensions can be compared with expected policy. As to the perceptions tied to rogue states, it appears that rogues present a unique interaction rather than merely an extension of previously theorized notions of “enemy.” In combining interaction dimensions of the perceived cultural differences/inferiority of rogues along with a hybrid perception of power capabilities, rogues present a dilemma in determining whether they constitute a threat to or an opportunity for the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy. In offering guidance as to this threat versus opportunity distinction, image theory directs us to the strategy script or policy actions pursued against such states. In answering this question then, the public statements of U.S. foreign policy decision makers appear to overwhelmingly conclude that rogue states present a threat by offering policy prescriptions aligning more with a policy of containment, comporting with the enemy image, rather than a policy of open aggression. Given that the perceptions of rogues differ from that of the more traditional enemy image while nevertheless perceived as threats to U.S. interests, the effectiveness of some policy actions commonly mentioned seem questionable given the behaviors attributed to rogue states. While advocating a strategy comprised of policy actions seeking to contain rogue states, U.S. policy makers also strongly advocate the development of defensive measures to protect against attacks from rogue states. One notable defensive measure put forward to deal with rogue states has been the development of a defensive missile shield. The application of containment strategies is problematic for two reasons. First, given that the public statements reveal concern over the future threat posed by rogue states, through their acquisition/ development of WMDs, containment strategies fail to prevent rogues from actually developing these improved power capabilities which drive the perception of threat in the first place. Second, given that rogues are routinely characterized as deficient in their decision making, the sensibility of a policy connected with an idea of defense and retaliation in the classical deterrence theory sense raises questions. Seemingly, driven by the threat (albeit future threat) component of the perception held of rogue states, policy makers rely on a containment strategy at odds with the cultural component of the rogue stereotype. At the same time, this perception of cultural dissonance appears to inhibit advocacy of policy prescriptions other than containment such as engagement.

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### Reps 1st

#### COHERENCE – ONLY INCORPORATION OF REPRESENTATIONS CAN MAKE SENSE OF POLITICAL REALITY

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Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

### North/south k

#### The shift to a self-defense paradigm for nuclear weapons is a justification for the non-proliferation complex to continue its politics of subordination, ensuring control over non-western states and deflecting any attempts at disarmament.

Craig and Ruzicka 2013 **[**Campbell Craig, professor of international politics at Aberystwyth University; Jan Ruzicka, lecturer in security studies in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “The Nonproliferation Complex,” 2013, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 27, Issue 03, pp 329-348, Oxford Journals,wyo-sc]

The signing of the NPT in 1968 represented an important moment in the history of the nonproliferation complex. While there were several initiatives to stem the spread of nuclear weapons prior to this point, the treaty ensured that nonproliferation became a formal objective of the international community.3 Most of the world's sovereign states signed and subsequently ratified the NPT, and it entered into force in 1970. The treaty's basic bargain is well known: the states not possessing nuclear weapons, typically referred to as the “have-not” signatories, agreed to forgo any pursuit of the bomb in exchange for international assistance, if they wanted it, in developing peaceful atomic energy. As for the nuclear “haves”—that is, the states that managed to manufacture and detonate a nuclear weapon before 1967—their end of the bargain was to commit in good faith to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.¶ This latter covenant, expressed in clear language in Article VI of the treaty, reflected the widespread understanding at the time that the “have-not” signatories were unlikely to eschew the acquisition of nuclear weapons indefinitely if the nuclear “haves” simply kept their bombs. Why should they respect an antinuclear ideal while the major powers defied it? There can also be no doubt that many of the treaty's founders were genuinely committed to the cause of nuclear peace, and grasped the obvious fact that the danger of nuclear war stemmed not only from the proliferation of the bomb to other states but also, and more apocalyptically, from the existing arsenals of the haves.4 This is why the ideal of disarmament was twinned with nonproliferation from the outset. But in 1968 the world was mired in a cold war between two heavily-armed superpowers. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was ever going to disarm without absolute assurance that the other had as well, and the only entity that could have provided such assurance would have been a supranational institution able to verify and enforce a permanent disarmament—which meant, effectively, a world state. Because the United States and the Soviet Union were unlikely to agree upon the political and economic orientation of such a state, disarmament was never going to happen as long as the cold war raged. And, indeed, supporters of the NPT and nuclear peace in Europe and North America could hardly be faulted for failing to demand that the West disarm when they had no means of persuading the Soviet Union to do the same.¶ Leaders of nonnuclear states were well aware, however, that this concession transformed the nonproliferation regime into a game rigged to keep them permanently subordinate to the nuclear powers. Indeed, this was a complaint that countries such as India, which refuses to join the NPT, frequently voiced throughout the cold war. Initially, many states did not even send representatives to the review conferences; when they did attend, they denounced the duplicity of the nuclear haves.5 At the 1980 review conference, for instance, disagreement over the issue of nuclear disarmament precluded the adoption of a final declaration.6 Thus, it became evident soon after the signing of the NPT that the mostly Western organizations dedicated to nonproliferation and disarmament faced a choice. This was either to adhere to the original spirit of the NPT by insisting upon the connection between the two objectives, a decision that would get them nowhere and probably lead to their institutional demise, or to develop a new approach to the problem that essentially avoided great-power disarmament. They chose the latter strategy. In the last decade of the cold war, two variants of this new nonproliferation regime began to emerge.¶ One approach sought to shift the complex's attention to more proximate aims, namely, the cause of nonproliferation with respect to smaller nonnuclear states that appeared interested in acquisition of the bomb. At a higher level, this incremental approach focused on the reduction and stabilization of the superpower arsenals by means of measured and negotiated arms control treaties. Prominent academics such as John Simpson, who is perhaps the most formidable proponent of the incremental approach, produced numerous and influential studies arguing that the existing nonproliferation regime was best suited to handle these tasks. These included an edited volume focused on sensible policy goals for the nonproliferation agenda in the 1990s.7 Recalling how in the early 1980s the Ford Foundation awarded a major multiyear grant to the University of Southampton, Simpson's institutional home, he noted that “one area singled out for intensive investigation was nuclear non-proliferation, for if additional states were to acquire nuclear weapons it would drastically alter the future context of global security relationships.”8 This meant, as Simpson put it, that “it is vitally important that the NPT be extended for a prolonged period of time in 1995.”9 Disarmament, insofar as it was considered at all, was written off as the impossible-to-achieve ideal that undermined the attainable good. Incremental advances were therefore viewed as preferable to radical—but unrealistic—visions of a nuclear-free world.¶ A different and more instrumental approach was articulated by Harvard University's Joseph Nye. After serving in the Carter administration as a deputy undersecretary of state in charge of nonproliferation policy, Nye returned to Harvard, where he continued writing on the subject as part of a larger project. In line with his liberal institutionalist conception of international politics, he focused on the question of how nonproliferation helped to uphold the existing international order. In his book Nuclear Ethics (1986), Nye argued that the inequality of possession of nuclear weapons might be justified not only thanks to the order and stability it creates but that such inequality could also be morally acceptable “if certain conditions were met.”10 Nye identified four such conditions of moral acceptability: if the purpose of nuclear weapons was limited to self-defense; if special care was taken to reduce the risk of their use; if the independence of states and other values created by the order were preserved; and, finally, if steps were taken to diminish reliance on nuclear weapons. Ultimately, however, what underpinned his moral argument was the core assumption that in the given global setting the alternatives—a more equitable distribution of nuclear weapons or total disarmament—would have increased the risk of nuclear war. Nonproliferation was required in the name of order and stability, which was in the overarching interest of both the nuclear haves and the have-nots. In Nye's view, this was the reason why many states signed up to the inherently unequal NPT and why it was worthwhile to maintain and eventually extend it.11¶ While the incremental approach emphasized the wider legitimacy of broad international cooperation and the instrumental approach stressed primarily superpower management, there was, of course, a degree of overlap between the two views. And under the conditions of the cold war, with disarmament out of the question, the compromises offered by both options appeared sensible. As Carr would have predicted, however, the effect of these compromises was to institutionalize an ameliorative approach that posed no threat to the nuclear haves, and indeed seemed to lock in their permanent superiority. This became obvious at the cold war's end, and especially at the 1995 NPT review conference, held a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not only was the conflict peacefully over, but due to a provision in the original document, the nonproliferation treaty itself was set to expire that year. Delegates to this first post–cold war review conference had to decide how long to extend the treaty, or even whether it should be extended at all. This gave an unprecedented opening to representatives from nonnuclear weapon states, whose demands had been stifled in the name of cold war practicalities whenever they tried to argue that the nuclear haves should begin to disarm, as Article VI and the whole logic of nonproliferation insisted they do. Certainly, this did not mean that the arsenals could all be dismantled immediately. What became obvious, rather, was that the focus of the NPT had to be redirected away from nonproliferation and arms-control efforts toward the more fundamental cause of great-power nuclear disarmament. If that did not happen, nonnuclear weapon states would have every reason to conclude that the NPT was indeed nothing more than a scam to keep them weak, and the dream of eventual nuclear abolition would fade away.¶ The participants at the 1995 review conference faced a choice. They could have made a collective and forceful decision to demand that the nuclear haves begin serious disarmament measures, and the obvious way to add substance to that position was to threaten to renounce nonproliferation efforts unless the powerful states finally met their responsibilities under Article VI. They also had the option of renewing the NPT for a limited period, but not indefinitely. Or they could have insisted that if the nuclear powers refused to commit to disarm, the NPT might as well be allowed to expire. There was much acrimony over the disarmament issue, but in the end the review conference concluded by extending the treaty in perpetuity.12¶ Veteran nuclear complex figures endorsed this decision, repeating their long-standing mantra that the NPT simply had to be extended, or instability and chaos would ensue.13 They saw attempts to emphasize nuclear disarmament as a fruitless continuation of “the stilted and confrontational manner of a bygone time.”14 Characteristically, they insisted that it was much more practical to focus on the reiteration of “principles” underpinning the treaty **and a** “strengthened review process” in the years to come. These arguments eventually formed the core of the extension decision, which was adopted without a vote.¶ The practical reasons why the nonproliferation complex advocated the treaty's indefinite extension are quite clear: without the NPT it would have lost its raison d'être and so, in all likelihood, its claim on the funds of its supporters. These were powerful governments and foundations in the West that had long and generously backed the complex's justification of the nuclear status quo.15 A decision to stand on the principle that serious nonproliferation **would** require the recognized nuclear states to live up to their part of the bargain meant, for the vast majority of those who profited from the complex, an almost-certain disappearance of funding and a descent into impoverishment and marginalization. By contrast, a continued focus upon isolated nonproliferation efforts, combined with vague talk of nuclear abolition, ran none of these risks. As Richard Betts concluded, several years after the 1995 review conference, “in contrast to its original rationale, the NPT now constitutes a simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so.”16¶ Since the 1995 conference, therefore, the nuclear complex has remained divided into its two schools of thought, with each adjusting to the new opportunities and conditions of the post–cold war world. For the incremental school, there has been no shortage of work: the end of the Soviet Union, the discovery that Iraq came close to developing a nuclear arsenal despite being a signatory of the NPT, North Korea's march toward nuclear weapons while it was still a treaty member, Libya and Iran's flirtation with the bomb, as well as actual nuclear detonations by India and Pakistan, have all provided it with a host of new opportunities to continue advocating small and “realistic” steps. With so many emerging challenges, the complex could warn about the abundance of loose nuclear material and offer its expertise in safeguarding this material. As Darryl Howlett and John Simpson wrote in 1999: “Whereas the East-West division enabled the Soviet Union and the United States to constrain proliferation among their allies and client states through security guarantees and conventional arms transfers, the world that is now evolving has led to both new insecurities and the potential for new nuclear proliferators.”17 In the late 1990s, the complex repeatedly warned of the danger of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of an unstable anti-Western regime, a scenario that was beginning to replace the Soviet Union as the predominant threat in the minds of many conservative figures in the West.¶ This changing geographical and political focus also led to a shift from nonproliferation toward more aggressive policies of antiproliferation or counterproliferation.18 Those representing the instrumental approach found ample reasons to emphasize the danger posed by inactivity. Indicative of this broader turn is a series of publications released by Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs. In 1993 the center published Cooperative Denuclearization, a book examining the nuclear dangers posed by the deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union. A similarly focused volume with the more alarming title of Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy appeared in 1996. By the year 2000, The Coming Crisis was global in its attention and examined an even broader range of threats.19¶ As the tone changed, so did the proposed policies. Cooperative Denuclearization stressed that “safety could only be sought through new policies emphasizing cooperative engagement,” because “a collaborative and international effort is appropriate and, indeed, required for prompt denuclearization.”20 The Marshall Plan and the coalition assembled prior to Operation Desert Storm were suggested as historical models worth considering. By the mid-1990s there was a palpable degree of irritation with the slow and limited nature of such an approach. The authors of Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy called for “a determined program of action to prevent nuclear leakage that is as focused, serious, and vigorous as America's cold war strategy.”21 International efforts, such as the indefinite extension of the NPT, were still welcome, but the analysts made it clear that “traditional nonproliferation approaches are not sufficient for dealing with the problem . . . which threatens to undermine the entire NPT regime.”22 At the turn of the century, The Coming Crisis considered implications of, and policies to deal with, the actual or potential spread of nuclear (and also biological or chemical) weapons to states such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. Although most authors were careful to warn that assertive, unilateral actions were unlikely to succeed and would serve neither U.S. interests nor any other states' interests, their concerns reflected the rise of a more aggressive counterproliferation discourse.¶ The rise of the instrumental approach was part of a larger trend in post–cold war theorizing about international relations that focused on the concept of hegemonic stability.23 According to this line of thinking, an international order dominated by one hegemon, while not always delightful, provides real benefits. These include a stable international economy, security guarantees (and, correspondingly, lower military budgets) for the hegemon's allies, and the absence of competitive great-power rivalries—the kind that led to two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. From the point of view of hegemonic stability theory (and of some U.S. foreign policy-makers), nonproliferation is not actually a universal project of nuclear peace, but rather one of many tools that help to perpetuate an international arrangement that is overtly unequal, yet for that very reason makes for a peaceful and prosperous world, at least for the major states.24¶ In sum, the complex now propagates a conservative ideology of post–cold war nuclear politics, one that privileges a stable international order dominated by status-quo large nuclear powers, and that has forsaken its original blueprint for a nuclear-free world.25 On one hand, these powers, together with subordinate international organizations, work to deny nuclear weapons to revisionist anti-Western states that might be tempted to use the bomb aggressively, or even to transfer their handiwork to subnational terrorist groups. On the other, nonproliferation is employed, if tacitly, as a means of preventing revisionist states from acquiring a nuclear arsenal to defend themselves from Western coercion and threats by **the** time-tested means of basic deterrence. It is much harder to compel a state to act according to one's wishes, much less to change its regime entirely, if that state possesses a nuclear arsenal, because the ultima ratio of war becomes much less plausible—a fact that the governments in both Pyongyang and Tehran surely understand all too well. By keeping the bomb out of the hands of such states, therefore, the international community makes it much more difficult for them to act aggressively toward the nuclear powers and to defy Western domination. That may be unpleasant for the nuclear have-nots, but it does prevent them from challenging an international order that is, in historical terms, quite stable and peaceful.

#### Widening the North/South Gap leads to endless conflict that will inflict unspeakable and colossal violence on others

Mutalik and Barnaby 1996

(Gururaj and Frank Crude Nuclear: We a p o n s Proliferation and the Te r ro r i s t T h re a t IPPNW Global Heal th Wa t c h R e p o r t Number http://www.ippnw.org/PDF%20files/crudenukes.pdf)

The disease of nuclearism, inflamed by the Cold War, has not abated with the end of the malignant East-West rivalry that had set it in motion. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was widely believed that the nuclear stockpiles would at last be dismantled. This hope remains frustrated. While nuclear arsenals have been reduced, and furt h e r reductions are in the offing, the nuclear powers are not committed to abolition except as a remote possibility in a distant future. In fact, the recent unconditional and indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty indicated that a majority of nations have acquiesced to the status quo. T h e nuclear powers justify their possession as a deterrent against nuclear blackmail by rogue states. Yet, paradoxically the very fact that some nations are permitted to stockpile nuclear weapons is a stimulus for proliferation and hastens the day when terrorism will go nuclear. World power now closely parallels nuclear might. The fact that all members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council are nuclear club members punctuates this political reality. In an age of jealously competing sovereign states, the possession of nuclear weapons by the powerful invites emulation. As the New York Times editorialized, “The nuclear powers cannot continue to emphasize how essential nuclear arms are and at the same time expect other states to forgo them forever.” (4/17/95) Nuclear apartheid cannot endure. The stimulus to proliferation derives largely from an inequitable world order and the growing economic divide between rich and poor countries. One fifth of the world lives on the edge of subsistence. At a time of potential abundance, more people are hungry than ever before. We end the century with far more desperately poor, illiterate, homeless, starving, and sick than we began. Nowhere are the inequities more in evidence than in the health sector. Eight hundred million people are without any health care at all. One-third of the world’s population lives in countries whose health care expenditures are far less than $12 per person per year (the bare minimum recommended by the World Bank) while the industrialized North spends more than $1,000 for health per person annually. Recent UN figures indicate that from 1960 to 1990, per capita income rose eight-fold in the North while increasing only half as much in the deprived lands of the South. This divide is likely to widen further while accelerating over-consumption in the North and burgeoning population pressures in the developing countries. As vital raw materials, scarce minerals, fossil fuels, and especially water become depleted, Northern affluence will be sustained by imposed belt tightening of impoverished multitudes struggling for mere subsistence. This is an agenda for endless conflict and colossal violence. The global pressure cooker will further superheat by the ongoing worldwide information revolution that exposes eve ryone to the pro m i s s o ry note of unlimited consumption, there by instilling impatience and igniting more embers of social upheaval. If desperation grows, the deprived will be tempted to challenge the affluent in the only conceivable way that can make an impact, namely by going nuclear. Their possession enables the weak to inflict unacceptable damage on the strong. Desperation and hopelessness breed religious fundamentalism and provide endless recruits ready to wreak vengeance, if necessary by self immolation in the process of inflicting unspeakable violence on others. A nuclear bomb affords “the cheapest and biggest bang for the buck.” No blackmail is as compelling as holding an entire city hostage. No other destructive device can cause greater societal disruption or exact a larger human toll. Terrorists will soon raise their sights to vaporizing a metropolitan area rather than merely pulverizing a building. Such nuclear-inflicted mayhem could not be carried out without state sponsorship. The Middle East and South Asia provide numerous examples of governments promoting acts of terror by their own secret services or through proxy fanatical groups. Mastering nuclear bomb technology is incre a s i n g achievable by any sovereign state with the political will to do so. Existing nuclear armories constitute a source of the essential bomb ingredients. The more nations go nuclear, the greater the chance of these weapons being used by terrorists.

#### The nonproliferation complex gives neocons endless, structural justifications for wars of their choosing—this makes war an inevitability

Craig and Ruzicka 2013 **[**Campbell Craig, professor of international politics at Aberystwyth University; Jan Ruzicka, lecturer in security studies in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “The Nonproliferation Complex,” 2013, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 27, Issue 03, pp 329-348, Oxford Journals,wyo-sc]

The complex plays a central role in providing major powers, and in particular the United States, with a powerful justification to wage wars against small states that might be attempting to obtain the bomb. The most obvious example is the disastrous case of Iraq, whose population endured a sanctions campaign throughout the 1990s and then a war beginning in 2003—both of which were undertaken in the name of nonproliferation, and both of which have caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. In Atomic Obsession, John Mueller insists that responsibility for these deaths must be laid directly at the feet of the nonproliferation regime.26 He asks whether something like a million dead Iraqis, not to mention the staggering material costs of the war, was a worthwhile price to pay to prevent Saddam Hussein from getting a bomb—one that he would have been unable to use without risking the vaporizing of Iraq, not to mention the end of his rule.¶ Clearly, the sanctions campaign and especially the war were about more than just preventing Iraq from going nuclear. Powerful political forces in the United States and United Kingdom lobbied for a war in Iraq for reasons that had nothing to do with the cause of universalistic nonproliferation, a reality that is demonstrated by the fact that few in Washington or London demanded any serious action at all in response to the actual successful acquisition of a nuclear weapon by North Korea. In addition, it should be stressed that the enormous casualties in Iraq in the 1990s were not only a consequence of the sanctions but also of Saddam's decisions to spend his money on palaces and armies rather than hospitals. But Mueller's larger point stands. The single-minded focus on keeping the bomb out of the hands of anti-Western dictators provided the architects of the sanctions and the neoconservative advocates of the war with a useful liberal justification to pursue their campaigns. It was an argument that few in the international community could dispute: if one keeps calling for something, eventually someone might take those demands seriously. That is exactly what the Bush administration did in 2002–2003. As George Perkovich, otherwise critical of the Bush administration, had to admit at that time: “[Preemption] is not the crazy idea it is often portrayed to be. To enforce a robust nonproliferation regime, preemption might actually make sense in certain cases.”27 Caught in a trap of their own making, few prominent members of the complex openly opposed the war during the tumultuous days of 2002–2003.¶ The widespread understanding in the United States and throughout the West that the Iraq war was a disaster that must never be repeated might prompt defenders of the complex to characterize it as a one-off event, less attributable to the politics of nuclear nonproliferation than to the hysterical climate after the September 11 attacks and to the presence in Washington of a uniquely dysfunctional presidential administration. It has also become popular to distinguish between counterproliferation and nonproliferation: the former is often characterized by the aggressive, even reckless, use of military force, whereas the latter is defined by the application of more subtle diplomatic tools. The war in Iraq is then simply dismissed as an alarming instance when counterproliferation gained the upper hand. But this view overemphasizes the distinction between these two approaches. To be sure, while there are more belligerent and less belligerent ways of denying states nuclear weapons, military force always remains the ultimate means of stopping proliferation—which is precisely why the complex failed to speak out during the run-up to the war in Iraq.28 In any case, and most important, the structural environment established by the nonproliferation complex presents major powers with a permanent condition of casus belli, regardless of whether one advocates counterproliferation or nonproliferation measures.¶ Wars of nonproliferation have thus become a core element of what Anthony Burke calls the “new internationalism.”29 Burke claims that this “sweeping effort to combine preventive war and unilateral humanitarian enforcement into a new normative framework for international intervention” is “likely to undermine the [UN] Charter and the nonproliferation regime even more than unilateral actions such as the invasion of Iraq.”30 Contrary to Burke's argument, however, the new internationalism and the nonproliferation regime do not stand in opposition to each other: the nonproliferation regime is well-suited to provide comfortable and readily-available justifications for interventions such as Iraq. These justifications rely not only on the claims of the great powers (with their obvious interests) but also, crucially, on the perpetual arguments made by the nonproliferation complex about the NPT regime's demise.31¶ Because the regime permits signatories to the NPT to acquire peaceful atomic technology, it allows for the “spreading of the bomb without quite breaking the rules,” as Albert Wohlstetter pointed out in the mid-1970s.32 Thus, it is always possible for states to act in a way that might raise suspicions that they are considering building a bomb; and unless a world in which all states are forever regarded by the United States and other major powers as reliable friends comes into being, it is always possible for those who seek war to sound the alarm of dangerous proliferation. Simply put, in a world of nuclear technology and international anarchy, the proliferation problem will always exist, and so, therefore, will a justification for war.33 As long as nonproliferation is seen as an indisputable public good, a universal objective so important that the international community must accept war as a legitimate last resort, another war like Iraq is bound to occur.

### 2NC Impact OV

#### Policies of non-proliferation only cause more proliferation—states fear the response of the United States to Iraq’s alleged proliferation and want to develop nuclear weapons to deter conventional conflict, this drive for non-proliferation will require that the US fights endless wars of attrition to stop countries from obtaining the bomb that’s craig and ruzicka 13

#### The proliferation imagery of the affirmative presents a discourse of underdevelopment about the global south, founded on racist assumptions that “certain countries can’t obtain nuclear weapons or catastrophe will occur,” but the real catastrophe happens when those states use dangerous means of developing nuclear weapons or using them to regain a voice in international power politics—that’s Bjork 95

### 2NC Alt OV

#### the alternative is critique the 1ac’s imagery of “proliferation” in favor of an imagery of disarmament.

#### The only way to resolve the images of “proliferation” that dominate the 1ac’s epistemological assumptions about the world are through a criticism of the type of exclusion and violence that those metaphors of “proliferation” and “stability” allow for. Only through imageries of disarmament can we begin to get to a world without nuclear weapons. This happens by critiquing the power relations that an imagery of “proliferation” allows. The construction of policy solutions from the perspective of the oppressed is the only possibility for changing the racist nature of the non-proliferation complex. That’s mutimer

#### The “proliferation” image creates the mindset that perpetuates the crisis. Only by reframing it in terms of disarmament can we solve.

Mutimer in 2000

(David, Prof. Political Science York University, THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY, p.103)

What is particularly significant about the Indian ambassador's critique is the recognition that the problem rests in the mind-set of states. The ambassador recognizes, in other words, that the proliferation problem is not an objective problem but the product of a mind-set. The point of this book is to explore the way this mind-set has come about and to ask about its effects and the alternatives that were and are possible. One of the effects of this mind-set-or, more properly, the discursive construction of the "proliferation" problem and its instantiation in practices such as the indefinite extension of the NPT-has been to marginalize and alienate the second most populous country in the world. Ironically, in a time in which the promotion of liberal democracy has been argued as the road to global peace and prosperity, the effect has been to marginalize the most populous liberal democracy. In terms of the proliferation control agenda, the myopia of marginalizing India became glaringly apparent in 1998, when India chose to test a series of nuclear weapons. If this security agenda and its effects rest contingently on a discursive construction of a problem, however, then it is open to alternative framings. The nonaligned proposals accepted "the important role of the Treaty in the maintenance of international security" but argued, with the Indians, that the security problem should be framed as one of "disarmament."

#### Alt solves

Mutimer in 2000

(David, Prof. Political Science York University, THE WEAPONS STATE: PROLIFERATION AND THE FRAMING OF SECURITY, p.8-9)

There are alternatives to the world of "proliferation" control. The creation of a "proliferation" image has drawn selectively on a rich set of discursive resources to form the world the practices it enables are in the process of effecting. Those same resources are available to opponents of the "proliferation" image to contest its practices. The nonaligned movement in general, and India in particular, have sporadically attempted to engage in such a contest, notably in terms of an image of "disarmament." In Chapter 6 1 explore this contest, looking not only at what opponents of a proliferation agenda have done but at how the terms in which they have tried to conduct the contest could be extended for a more successful contestation of "proliferation." In this chapter I begin to sketch one possible alternative representation of the relationship among weaponry, technology, and security-beginning with the preferred language of disarmament employed by those outside the privileged suppliers of the "proliferation" image and suggesting the resources available to articulate a successful alternative image. Such an image, drawing on features of the preproliferation discourses of military technology I discuss in Chapter 3, as well as contemporary discourses of technology and economy, would effect a rather different world from that of "proliferation." Before I can talk of a world different from that created by the practices of proliferation control and of why it might be sought, however, I must explore the nature of the world those practices are effecting. To begin, I set out the terms in which that exploration will be conducted.

# 1nr

### 2NC Overview

#### The plan doesn’t restrict authority to introduce armed forces into hostilities

#### Weapons systems are distinct from armed forces – introducing armed forces into hostilities only applies to human members of the branches of the military and weapons systems were not assumed to be covered by the WPR

#### Prefer 1NC Lorber evidence – uses textual analysis, legislative history, and the intent of the WPR prove that weapons systems are not “armed forces” and only US soldiers are covered under the language “introduction of armed forces into hostilities”

#### Prefer our interpretation

#### Disaggregating the two is key clear ground and limits – they unlimit the topic to entire separate questions of war powers authorities and weapon systems including nuclear weapons, space weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, drone weapons, and any subset of those. Never be prepared for the weapon system of the week affirmative. Lorber substantiates that introduction of troops is the key controversy.

**Only impact that leaves the room—broad topics destroy participation and education**

**Rowland ‘84**

Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p.53-54

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing both in scope and size. This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breadth. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. National debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change. The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process. Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske believes that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breath of the topic and experience “negophobia,” the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novice through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caught without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.” The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters who eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much time and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity. Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.” The final effect may be that entire programs wither cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.” In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### Topicality is an apriori reason to vote negative - rule of the game and jurisdiction.

### 2NC Nuclear Weapons Violation

#### Here is a nuclear specific card that there was a specific amendment during the war powers debate, and it was rejected in the WPR – it was intended to exclude nuclear weapons from that particular phrase

Peter Raven-Hansen October 1989; Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center “SPECIAL ISSUE: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN ITS THIRD CENTURY: FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: NUCLEAR WAR POWERS” The American Society of International Law, American Journal of International Law 83 A.J.I.L. 786; Lexis Nexis Academic

The statutory argument against delegation rests on the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(a)(1) of the Resolution provides that authorization for the introduction of U.S. armed forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes [such introduction] and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution. n35 Congress has never specifically delegated nuclear war power to the President. How specific that delegation would have to be to satisfy this provision of the Resolution is unclear. The Court has long applied a canon of liberal statutory construction to legislation affecting the war powers, n36 and it has declined "to require the Congress to employ magical passwords" to satisfy the same kind of rule of construction in the Administrative Procedure Act. n37 It would not make sense, moreover, to require appropriations acts or other legislation predating the Resolution to contain "magical passwords" acknowledging an intent to authorize military force within the meaning of the Resolution. Nor, in light of its legislative history, is it tenable to argue that the Resolution itself cut off all prior delegations of nuclear war power resting on appropriations. During debate on an early version of the war powers legislation, the Senate overwhelmingly defeated an amendment that would have required "the prior, explicit authorization of Congress" for first use of nuclear weapons. n38 Even Senator Eagleton, a vigorous opponent of presidential claims of independent war power, argued and voted against the amendment, explaining that "[t]his bill is not the proper vehicle for restricting the President's use of weapons previously appropriated by Congress to the executive arsenal. . . ." n39

#### Here is evidence for that

**Friedman, 99 –** US District Court Judge (TOM CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, President of the United States, Defendant. Civil Action No. 99-1072 (PLF) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 52 F. Supp. 2d 34; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8630 June 8, 1999, Decided, lexis)

Finally, the War Powers Resolution explicitly provides that authority to introduce forces into hostilities shall not be inferred "from any provision of law . . . including any provision contained in any appropriations Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of [the War Powers Resolution]," or "from any treaty . . . unless such [\*\*6] treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States [\*37] Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of [the War Powers Resolution]." 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (emphasis added).

### 2NC AT: Aff Ground

#### There are plenty of topical affirmatives under our interpretation without exploding limits – Michigan State’s prior congressional approval affirmative, Dartmouth’s iran affirmative, and UMKC’s peacekeeping affirmative prove.

#### We don’t overlimit or exclude technology affs – war powers aren’t restricted now and even if they were there is a robust debate about substantially increasing those restrictions. “Substantially increase” ensures link uniqueness better than unlimiting the topic

#### Restrictions on war powers could include restrictions on any weapons system – nuclear weapons, land mine bans, cluster bombs, chemical weapons – it’s why we need a ‘human’ limit

**Lobel, 8** - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>)

The third theory—based on the distinction between general rules and specific tactics—also has surface appeal, but is unworkable when applied to specific issues because the line between policy and tactic is too amorphous and hazy to be useful in real world situations. For example, how does one decide whether the use of waterboarding as a technique of interrogation is a policy or specific tactic? Even if it is arguably a specific tactic, Congress could certainly prohibit that tactic as antithetical to a policy prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. So too, President Bush’s surge strategy in Iraq could be viewed as a tactic to promote a more stable Iraq, or as a general policy which Congress should be able to limit through use of its funding power. Congress can limit tactical decisions to use particular weapons such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or cluster bombs by forbidding the production or use of such weapons, or simply refusing to fund them.42 Congress could also, however, enact more limited and specific restrictions to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or land mines in a particular conflict or even a particular theater of war. Indeed, most specific tactics could be permitted or prohibited by a rule. In short, the distinctions between strategies and tactics, rules and detailed instructions, or policies and tactics are simply labels which are virtually indistinguishable. Labeling an activity with one of these terms is largely a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, these labels are not helpful to the real problem of determining the respective powers of Congress and the President.43

#### Ground – troops are the true controversy:

Lorber, JD University of Pennsylvania, January 2013

(Eric, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, Lexis)

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with **sending U.S.** troops **into harm's way**." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, **Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops** to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained **deployment of U.S. personnel**, not weapons, **into hostilities**.

### AT: Aff Flexibility

#### 1. Topic bias—it’s harder to be neg against two agents and four areas including the tangential cyber operations topic, get updates for every strategy every tournament, and no viable universal generics. It’s an insane amount of work EVEN WITH only one aff per area because even tiny affs are topical so other words like “substantial” can’t check.

#### 2. Their remedy makes a bad topic worse. The only way this topic could get worse is to be unpredictably expanded. Deviations are unreasonable when there’s an overwhelming consensus on what each word means. The fact that it’s hard to be aff doesn’t mean you can quit being aff, it means the topic grows in a million random directions since every expansion is conceptually unique.

#### 3. Past years prove—better topics have been narrow, like sanctions with 5 affs and treaties with even less. Even on insanely neg topics like courts, the aff still keeps up.

#### 4. The topic is still evolving—means there’s still potential innovation and aff ground, but also means if we don’t keep a lid on it early it will get out of hand fast.

#### Turn—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

Intrator 10 [David, President of The Creative Organization, October 21, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

#### Overwhelming weight of empirical experience with art and music demonstrates that limits are best for creativity

Slee 10 (Mark, “Are limitless resources or a certain number of constraints more beneficial for creativity?,”May 24, <http://www.quora.com/Art-Creativity/Are-limitless-resources-or-a-certain-number-of-constraints-more-beneficial-for-creativity>)

There are countless clear examples of this approach. Pablo Picasso had his Blue Period. Mark Rothko spent a great deal of time exploring compositions of colored rectangles. Most musical composers use highly restricted forms, in both structure and instrumentation, and some composers will write countless variations on a single piece. Brian Eno talks a lot about generative music, which evolves from a fixed set of starting rules. Periods of Frank Lloyd Wright's architecture, or even architectural trends in general, show adherence to clear themes (many constrained by the requirements of structural engineering). I actually think it is more difficult to identify great works of creativity that have not employed constraints, many of which are self-imposed.

#### Constraints ensure focus and innovation – strict limits ensure productivity

Slee 10 (Mark, “Are limitless resources or a certain number of constraints more beneficial for creativity?,”May 24, <http://www.quora.com/Art-Creativity/Are-limitless-resources-or-a-certain-number-of-constraints-more-beneficial-for-creativity>)

Both anecdotally and from personal experience, I'm inclined to say that constraints are a strong enabler of creative output, and a requirement for most. The degree certainly varies by individual and depends upon the method. With that said, I think the most commonly applied creative approach essentially involves two steps: \* Define a set of parameters to work within (you'll often hear artists/musicians speaking similarly about "setting up a creative space") \* Explore the space as freely and fully as possible (the bulk of creative time tends to be spent in this phase) The obvious pitfalls here are creating either too large or too narrow a space to work in. Intuitively, it may seem that a larger space is better due to the freedom it affords, but I tend to think the opposite is actually the case. Having too many variables or resources to work with can be very paralyzing, especially for highly creative types. Highly creative people may easily overwhelm themselves with an incredible number of exciting new ideas, which can make it very difficult to actually execute on anything (I don't have personal experience with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, but I imagine there's a reasonably strong analogy to be made here). Generating creative output (not just a deluge of ideas) requires finding a way to artificially suppress the firehose of competing new concepts, thereby enabling a more intense focus.

### AT: Reasonability

#### They’re not reasonably topical – that’s the debate we’re having

#### And reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

### Proliferation

#### Prolif will be slow and contained

Kenneth N. Waltz, 13

Genius & Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; An Enduring Debate,” Book. Chapter 1: More May be Better. Accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

What will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? I say “spread” rather than “proliferation” because so far nuclear weapons have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. Horizontally, they have spread slowly across the world, and the pace is not likely to change much. Short-term candidates for admission to the nuclear club are not numerous, and they are not likely to rush into the nuclear business. One reason is that the United States works with some effect to keep countries from doing that. Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally joining the club. Membership grew to twelve in the first fifty years of the nuclear age, and that number included three countries that suddenly found themselves in the nuclear military business as successor states to the Soviet Union. Membership in the club then dropped to eight as South Africa, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine liquidated their weapons, and rose to nine when North Korea developed its first weapon. A 50 percent growth of membership in the next decade would be surprising. Since rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the spread of nuclear weapons is fortunate. Someday the world will be populated by fifteen or eighteen nuclear-weapon states (hereafter referred to as nuclear states). What the further spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is therefore a compelling question.

**ZERO RISK OF A PROLIFERATION SNOWBALL- ‘CREDIBILITY’ OF THE NPT IS NOT EVEN A FACTOR IN A STATES CALCULATION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.\*\***

**O’Neil in 7**

[Andrew, School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University, Australia, Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia, 2007, P. 122-124//wyo-tjc]

This criticism is based on **the claim that legitimizing nuclear possession** in Northeast Asia **will** serve to dilute the credibility and force of efforts elsewhere in the international system to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. By embracing a strategy whereby proliferation is managed, rather than prevented, Northeast Asian policy makers will make it that much harder for states in other regions to dampen proliferation pressures among those countries capable of going nuclear. This will **encourage the dangerous dynamic of “copycat” proliferation where states in the Middle East, South America, and elsewhere will** point to states that **have gone nuclear** in Northeast Asia as justification for their own nuclear ambitions. By accepting the demise of the nonproliferation regime, and acting accordingly by adopting a proliferation management strategy, policy makers in Northeast Asia will help destroy any remaining possibility of “repairing the regime.”~4 Like the claim concerning proliferation management enumerated above, this criticism **is superficially persuasive due to the long-standing and surprisingly resilient assumption among a number of analysts that nuclear proliferation begets further proliferation**. Melodramatic phrases included in the titles of academic analyses like “heading toward disaster”55 and “no end in sight”96 merely serve to reinforce this perception among observers. However, **the logic underlying this “domino effect” assumption is more often assumed than demonstrated. Somewhat analogous to the discredited cold war domino theory**—where it was feared that Communism would somehow spread from country to country irrespective of prevailing domestic factors in those countries—**the idea that a state that acquires nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia will inevitably lead to other states going down that path is unpersuasive**. For example, **the assumption** that accepting North Korea’s nuclear weapons force as legitimate will somehow act as an incentive for other states in regions outside Northeast Asia to acquire nuclear weapons **lacks credibility for the simple reason that history shows that states that are determined to go nuclear are driven by immediate security concerns in their own regional domains or by more generic considerations** of prestige and status. **While North Korea’s successful nuclear “breakout” strategy may provide something of a model to** **a determined proliferator like Iran, there are few grounds to assume that proliferation trends in Northeast Asia will influence “nuclear fence sitters” in other regions, largely because *such a variety of state does not exist***. **Without exception, every state that has acquired nuclear weapons** since 1945 **has been a determined proliferator willing to pay almost any price** to achieve a nuclear capability. **The idea that conferring legitimacy** on North Korea’s nuclear weapons force **might just serve to “tip” states in other regions over the nuclear threshold is unconvincing**. As I argued in Chapter 4, **even in the event that Japan acquires a nuclear force at some future point, it is by no means clear that regional neighbors**, South Korea and Taiwan, **will follow suit, despite their technological capacity** to manufacture nuclear weapons if they decided to go down this path. **Whether conferring legitimacy on the nuclear weapons** forces of states that have gone nuclear further **erodes the global nonproliferation regime is**, in some ways, **beside the point: the fact they have gone nuclear at all demonstrates the inability of the NPT and associated instruments to prevent proliferation in the first place**. In itself, this should act as a something of a wakeup call for those who advocate the strategy of nonproliferation to reassess their own set of arguments and responses concerning the issue of nuclear proliferation. The time has come to break our of the intellectual and policy straightjackets of nonproliferation and evaluate alternative proliferation management strategies. As I have argued, the cost of failure is simply too high to remain wedded to an orthodoxy that does nor provide a way forward for managing nuclear proliferation in the twenty-first century.