# 1NC MoState MR

### 1

#### First intep- Restrict means prohibit

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### Violation- They create a court that doesn’t prohibit his ability to use drones.

#### B. Standards:

#### 1. Limits – The topic is already huge – 4 areas times 2 mechanisms all with separate literature and unique advantages – its an impossible research burden.

#### 2. Bidirectionality – Absent prohibition they can create conditions that functionally increase authority

Wilson Center No Date

(War Powers Proposal Gives the President Even More Authority, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/war-powers-proposal-gives-the-president-even-more-authority)](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/war-powers-proposal-gives-the-president-even-more-authority%29)

A privately organized Commission on War Powers recommended last week that the 1973 War Powers Resolution be repealed and replaced by a Congressional Joint Committee on Consultation and new procedures to approve or disapprove a "significant armed conflict."¶ The 12-member, bipartisan commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and James Baker, said the current law is flawed. In fact, every president since Richard Nixon has refused to comply with the War Powers Resolution on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the president's powers as commander in chief. Among other things, the current act authorizes Congress to terminate combat operations by adopting a concurrent resolution. The Supreme Court ruled in the 1983 Chadha immigration case that one-house and two-house legislative vetoes do not conform to the Constitution's lawmaking requirements of two-house passage and presentment to the president. ¶ Under the substitute law proposed by the commission, the president must, prior to committing troops to "a significant armed conflict" (one likely to last more than a week), submit a classified report to the new joint committee justifying the need for action. The president is then required to consult at least once every 60 days with the committee. ¶ Within 30 days after the conflict begins, if Congress has not enacted a declaration of war or a law authorizing the use of force, a privileged concurrent resolution approving the troop commitment must be brought to a vote in both chambers. If either chamber rejects the approval resolution, any Member can then offer a privileged joint resolution disapproving the commitment. If the joint resolution is vetoed by the president, a two-thirds override vote by both chambers would be necessary to terminate the commitment. ¶ If I were either of the current presidential candidates, I would endorse the commission proposal in a heartbeat. It proposes to vastly expand presidential powers and options beyond current practice. In the "use of force" joint resolutions for Iraq (1991 and 2002) and Afghanistan (2001), Congress was able to negotiate conditions and limitations on the use of force with the president, who then signed the resolutions into law. ¶ That will not be the case if Congress uses the concurrent resolution of approval approach. No matter how many conditions Congress might try to place on the president's use of force in such a concurrent resolution, the president would be under no legal obligation to comply because the provisions would have no force or effect outside Congress. This is because concurrent resolutions are mere sense-of-Congress expressions. (Who's going to charge the president with failing to faithfully execute a non-law?) ¶ It stands to reason that, given this option, no future president will ask for a declaration of war or use of force law when the alternative is a nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolution approving the commitment of troops to combat. Never mind that such a resolution is probably unconstitutional under the Chadha decision requiring two-house passage and presentment to the president. (It's unlikely the court would directly rule on the issue since in recent times it has sidestepped war powers disputes between the branches on the grounds that they present political questions best left to the president and Congress to resolve.) ¶ Another clear advantage to the president presented by the commission's proposed law is the unique relationship that would be established with the 20-member, bipartisan joint committee. Its members would include the Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, House and Senate Minority Leaders and the chairmen and ranking members of eight key committees. Whereas the administration must currently answer to several committees for its war policies, often in public hearings, the new arrangement will give the president both the incentive and justification to deal exclusively with the joint committee in closed sessions. This is something administrations have wanted for years given the burden of officials delivering duplicative testimony in open forums before multiple committees and subcommittees. ¶ The real losers in this new arrangement, of course, will be the rest of the House and Senate and the American people, all of whom will be left in the dark about what is said and done in the closed-door committee consultations with the president. They will be left to trust the judgment of committee members on the necessity for war and its subsequent conduct. ¶ The Commission on War Powers understandably reflects the leadership and views of two former secretaries of State who no doubt see Congress as many of their predecessors have: as an ill-informed, noisy, quarrelsome and meddling micro-manager when it comes to deciding the great issues of war and peace. If the administration must accommodate Congress in some way before making such decisions, they reason, it is best done among a few power elites in Congress, behind closed doors and shielded by classified briefings and documents.

#### Vote negative- Topicality is a prima facie burden and should be evaluated as a question of competing interpretations.

### 2

#### Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

Mack 91

 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-**by distortions of perception**, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

#### Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – their obsession manufactures threats and conceals the US’ role in enemy construction – the alternative makes visible power relationships that enable endless warfare

McClintock 9

(Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of **benign US globalization** and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around **fantasies of global omnipotence** (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) **coinciding with nightmares of impending attack**, the United States has entered the domain of **paranoia**: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both **deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat.** Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f4) and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. [End Page 51] I have come to feel that we **urgently need to make visible** (the better politically to challenge) those established but **concealed circuits of imperial violence** that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f5) Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in **collusion** with a complicit corporate media would **render itself invisible**, casting **states of emergency** into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to **reconfigure**, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render **invisible**, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the **uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters**. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f6) Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. [End Page 52] Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the **pervasive presence of the paranoia** that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f7) Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an **inherent contradiction** with respect to power: a **double-sided phantasm** that **oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat**, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce **pyrotechnic displays of violence**. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f8) Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f9) Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiorityand omnipotence**,** and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an **analytically strategic concept**, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory **flashpoints of violence** that the state tries to conceal. [End Page 53] Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence **erupts from the force** of its multiple, **cascading contradictions**: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of **unspeakable violence**. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

#### Focus on security denies value to life—replacing it with ordered safety and control

Der Derian, 1995

(James, IR theorist and Philosopher, On Security “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard. Ed Ronnie Lipshutz” Online

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41 Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43 As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

**Exterminate Unkown !**

**K of Causality:**

Turn Strange to Familiar

**The apocalyptic imagining of climate change produces technological or treaty fixes which leave root cause of environment destruction intact**

**Crist, 2k7**

Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 Winter 2007

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his *The Revenge of Gaia*, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also **suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament**. **Just as** the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save itfrom impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a **crisis** that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Alternative: Vote negative to embrace the inevitable vulnerability of life.

Butler, 2004

[Judith Butler, is an [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) [post-structuralist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-structuralist) philosopher, who has contributed to the fields of [feminism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism), [queer theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queer_theory), [political philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_philosophy), and [ethics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics). She is the Maxine Elliot professor in the Departments of [Rhetoric](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhetoric) and [Comparative Literature](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_Literature) at the [University of California, Berkeley](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California%2C_Berkeley).) Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. Pg. 28-30]

Mourning, fear, anxiety, rage. In the United States, we have been surrounded with violence, having perpetrated it and perpetrating it still, having suffered it, living in fear of it, planning more of it, if not an open future of infinite war in the name of a "war on terrorism." Violence is surely a touch of the worst order, a way a primary human vulnerability to other humans is exposed in its most terrifying way, a way in which we are given over, without control, to the will ofanother, a way in which life itself can be expunged by the willful action of another. To the extent that we commit violence, we are acting on another, putting the other at risk, causing the other damage, threatening to expunge the other. In a way, we all live with this particular vulnerability, a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life, a vulnerability to a sudden address from elsewhere that we cannot preempt**.** This vulnerability**, however,** becomes highly exacerbated under certain social and political conditions, especially those in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defense are limited. Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war**.** We cannot, however, will away this vulnerability**.** We must attend to it, even abide by it, as we begin to think about what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability itself, a situation in which we can be vanquished or lose others.Is there something to be learned about the geopolitical distribution of corporeal vulnerability from our own brief and devastating exposure to this condition? I think, for instance, that we have seen, are seeing, various ways of dealing with vulnerability and grief, so that, for instance, William Safire citing Milton writes we must "banish melancholy," 5 as if the repudiation of melancholy ever did anything other than fortify its affective structure under another name, since melancholy is already the repudiation of mourning; so that, for instance, President Bush announced on September 21 that we have finished grieving and that now it is time for resolute action to take the place of grief.' When grieving is something to be feared, our fears can give rise to the impulse to resolve it quickly, to banish it in the name of an action invested with the power to restore the loss or return the world to a former order, or to reinvigorate a fantasy that the world formerly was orderly. Is there something to be gained from grieving, from tarrying with grief, from remaining exposed to its unbearability and not endeav­oring to seek a resolution for grief through violence? Is there something to be gained in the political domain by maintaining grief as part of the framework within which we think our international ties? If we stay with the sense of loss, are we left feeling only passive and powerless, as some might fear? Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of human vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical lives of one another? Could the experience of a dislocation of First World safety not condition the insight into the radically inequitable ways that corporeal vulnerability is distributed globally? To foreclose that vulnerability, to banish it, to make ourselves secure at the expense of every other human consideration is to eradicate one of the most important resources from which we must take our bearings and find our way.

### Legitimacy

#### New great powers are rising and will soon be on par with the us—prefer our evidence because it cites the two most important indicators of a power shift

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now impossible to deny, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States.

#### Multipolarity will arrive in two decades as other powers catch up to the US—transition to offshore balancing now is key to avoid unending cycles of warfare\*\*

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Review of International Studies, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, 2009, p. asp]

Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.4 Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.5 And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two.

#### We outweigh- only a risk of a global nuclear war in a world of US primacy

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 176 //wyo-tjc]

If we assume, just for the sake of argument, that the magnet effect was a factor leading to U.S. involvement in Eurasian wars before 1945, nuclear weapons have changed the geopolitical equation since then. There are many imponderables about nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons today probably would deter war between nuclear-armed great powers in Eurasia. On the other hand, because of the stability-instability paradox (the standoff at the strategic nuclear level makes it more thinkable for nuclear-armed great powers to fight limited, conventional wars against one another), nuclear deterrence might allow great powers to begin wars in the hope that they would be fought with conventional weapons only. However, in a conventional conflict between nuclear-armed great powers, the risk of escalation would be omnipresent. Precisely because of these unknowns, American grand strategy should maximize U.S. autonomy, because the last thing the United States should want is to be caught in the cross fire of a nuclear war fought by Eurasian great powers. If the United States adopts an offshore balancing grand strategy, it simply is not the case that the United States would he sucked into a war between Eurasian great powers. A nuclear conflict in Eurasia cannot leap the Atlantic or Pacific oceans and engulf the United States unless the United States is embroiled from the outset because of its forward military presence in Eurasia. In a nuclear world, it would be irrational to risk being involved in such a conflict for economic reasons (and, probably, for any reason).

#### Theoretically impossible- too many actors, too self-interested- Copenhagen proves

Haas ‘10 (Richard N., President, “The Case for Messy Multilateralism” Council on Foreign Relations -- January 5 -- http://www.cfr.org/un/case-messy-multilateralism/p21132)

No country, not even the US, can face these challenges alone. The world is simply too large and too complex to control. By their nature, these challenges are best met by collective effort. Decisions to opt out of global arrangements (or an inability to opt in, as we see in the case of governments too weak to combat terrorists who set up shop on their territory) can have repercussions far beyond a country's borders. But to acknowledge that we are all multilateralists now (or at least need to be) is only to start the conversation. Multilateralism is not one thing but many. The issue takes on a new urgency in the aftermath of the recent Copenhagen conference, which brought together representatives of 193 governments in an unsuccessful effort to reach a formal, binding and comprehensive accord. Whatever its consequences for climate change, Copenhagen is but the most recent reminder that classic multilateralism is increasingly difficult to achieve. This same reality also helps to account for the world's inability to agree to a new global trade accord. Launched in Qatar nearly a decade ago, the Doha round of negotiations has stalled. There are simply too many participants, too many contentious issues and too many domestic political concerns to discuss. This problem also explains the near-total irrelevance of the United Nations General Assembly. "One [person], one vote" may provide a sound basis for domestic politics, but on a global scale democracy (or, more precisely, democratic multilateralism) is a prescription for doing nothing. It is not simply the large number of participants but the fact that it makes little sense to give countries with minuscule populations and economies equal standing with, say, China or the US. The UN's founders predicted as much when they created the Security Council. The idea was to establish an elite body to tackle the world's most important issues. The problem is that the composition of the Security Council reflects what the world looked like after the second world war. That world is now more than 60 years old. Missing from the ranks of permanent members are India, Japan, Germany, Brazil and representatives of a more integrated Europe. It was this weakness (along with the inability to agree on the make-up of a reformed Security Council) that in part led to the creation of the Group of Seven and the trilateral process in the 1970s. Japan and the European Commission gained a seat at this important table. Yet over the decades, the G7 also proved inadequate, as it left out such critical countries as China and India. Hence the emergence of the Group of 20 in the midst of the global financial crisis and the Major Economies Forum as concerns over climate change mounted. It is too soon to judge the impact of these latest versions of elite multilateralism. In the meantime, we are seeing the emergence of multiple innovations. One is regionalism. The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade pacts (most recently in Asia) is in part a reaction to the failure to conclude a global trade accord. Such arrangements are inferior - they do not, for example, normally deal with subsidies, much less cover all products and services. They can also have the perverse effect of retarding trade by discriminating against non-members. But some trade expansion is preferable to none. A second alternative is functional multilateralism - coalitions of the willing and relevant. A global accord on climate will prove elusive for some time to come. But that need not translate into international inaction. A useful step would be to conclude a global pact to discourage the cutting down and burning of forests, something that accounts for a fifth of the world's carbon output. Copenhagen made some limited progress here, but more needs to be done to assist such countries as Brazil and Indonesia. Yet another alternative might be described as informal multilateralism. In many cases it will prove impossible to negotiate international accords that will be approved by national parliaments. Instead, governments would sign up to implementing, as best they can, a series of measures consistent with agreed-upon international norms. We are most likely to see this in the financial realm, where setting standards for the capital requirements of banks, accounting systems and credit ratings would facilitate global economic growth. None of this - not elitism or regionalism or functionalism or informalism - is a panacea. Such collective action is invariably less inclusive, less comprehensive and less predictable than formal global accords. It can suffer from a lack of legitimacy. But it is doable and desirable, and can lead to or complement classic multilateralism. Multilateralism in the 21st century is, like the century itself, likely to be more fluid and, at times, messy than what we are used to.

#### No impact to Warming- Mitigation and adaptation will solve

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### China outweighs and won’t be influenced by the plan

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Birol also warned that China – the world's biggest emitter – would have to take on a much greater role in combating climate change. For years, Chinese officials have argued that the country's emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries, it was not required to take such stringent action on emissions. But the IEA's analysis found that within about four years, China's per capita emissions were likely to exceed those of the EU. In addition, by 2035 at the latest, China's cumulative emissions since 1900 are likely to exceed those of the EU, which will further weaken Beijing's argument that developed countries should take on more of the burden of emissions reduction as they carry more of the responsibility for past emissions. In a recent interview with the Guardian recently, China's top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, called on developing countries to take a greater part in the talks, while insisting that developed countries must sign up to a continuation of the Kyoto protocol – something only the European Union is willing to do. His words were greeted cautiously by other participants in the talks. Continuing its gloomy outlook, the IEA report said: "There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is under way. Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO2 emissions to a new high. Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400bn (£250.7bn)."Meanwhile, an "unacceptably high" number of people – about 1.3bn – still lack access to electricity. If people are to be lifted out of poverty, this must be solved – but providing people with renewable forms of energy generation is still expensive. Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said: "The decisions being made by politicians today risk passing a monumental carbon debt to the next generation, one for which they will pay a very heavy price. What's seriously lacking is a global plan and the political leverage to enact it. Governments have a chance to begin to turn this around when they meet in Durban later this month for the next round of global climate talks." One close observer of the climate talks said the $400bn subsidies devoted to fossil fuels, uncovered by the IEA, were "staggering", and the way in which these subsidies distort the market presented a massive problem in encouraging the move to renewables. He added that Birol's comments, though urgent and timely, were unlikely to galvanise China and the US – the world's two biggest emittters – into action on the international stage. "The US can't move (owing to Republican opposition) and there's no upside for China domestically in doing so. At least China is moving up the learning curve with its deployment of renewables, but it's doing so in parallel to the hugely damaging coal-fired assets that it is unlikely to ever want (to turn off in order to) to meet climate targets in years to come."

**We’re already past the tipping point**

**Guterl 9 –** Fred Guterl 9, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Will Climate Go Over The Edge?, 2009 http://www.newsweek.com/id/185822

Since the real world is so messy, climate scientists Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker turned for insight to the distinctly neater world of mathematics. Last year, they published an analysis in the journal Science arguing that climate models were skewed in the direction of underestimating the warming effect of carbon. The report reasoned that carbon emissions have the potential to trigger many changes that amplify the warming effect—water absorbs more sunlight than ice, humidity traps more heat, and so on—but few that would mitigate it. The odds, they figure, are about one in three that temperatures will rise by 4.5 degrees C (the top of the IPCC's range), but there's little chance at all that they'll rise by less than 2 degrees C. "We've had a hard time eliminating the possibility of very large climate changes," says Roe. The answer is still couched in probabilities, but they've shifted in a worrying direction.¶ What can be done? Can a diplomatic miracle in Copenhagen save the planet from the dreaded tipping point? Sea ice in the Antarctic was supposed to last for 5,000 years until scientists found that the melting was proceeding at a faster pace than expected. Now it will all be gone in a mere 850 years. Bringing it back would require something like 10,000 years of cooler temperatures. **Is there any way to halt the process before it goes too far?**¶ **No**, says Susan Solomon, a climate scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder, Colorado. In a recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, she found that most of the **carbon we've already released** into the atmosphere **will hang around for another 1,000 years.Even if world leaders somehow** managed to persuade everybody to stop driving cars and heating their homes—**bring**ing **carbon emissions down to zero immediately**—the Earth would continue to warm for centuries. The effect of rising temperatures on rainfall patterns is also **irreversible**, says Solomon. Parts of the world that tend to be dry (Mexico, north Africa, southern Europe and the western parts of Australia and the United States) will continue to get drier, while wet areas (the South Pacific islands, the horn of Africa) will keep getting wetter. "You have to think of it as being like a dial that can only turn one way," she says. "We've cranked up the dial, and we don't get to crank it back." The point of a climate treaty, then, isn't so much to roll things back as to keep them from getting a whole lot worse—a worthy and important goal, if not a particularly inspiring one.

### Terrorism

**A terror attacks is unlikely and the response by Nations is just guessing.**

**Ayson ’10**

Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 – 593. InformaWorld

It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume. To consider what might follow the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon upon an industrialized country, and especially on a country that is itself armed with nuclear weapons, is to engage a whole cosmos of uncertainties and assumptions. Moreover, in order to acquire a nuclear weapon in the first place, the terrorist group in question would need to surmount considerable hurdles. Having done so, the successful delivery and detonation of the nuclear device is no automatic process. And even once past this second set of obstacles, there remains a battery of questions, likelihoods, and interactions regarding what might happen once the world's first dramatic act of nuclear terrorism has occurred. It is all too easy, as Mueller has explained, for the discussion of catastrophic terrorism to descend into exaggeration and alarmism.1 But the strategic consequences of nuclear terrorism deserve attention for at least two reasons. First, no matter how improbable, the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon could have even wider and more harmful implications than some might suppose. The detonation of a single weapon by a terrorist group could certainly be locally catastrophic in and of itself. But it is also important to consider whether that initial explosion might just spark a general nuclear exchange between states with much larger arsenals than the terrorists could ever hope to acquire and use. Either by accident or design is it possible that a terrorist nuclear detonation could ultimately result in a catastrophe of truly intercontinental proportions? Second, even though it is unclear whether these much graver developments have any real likelihood of occurring, the analytical consideration of this possibility presents an intellectual challenge that tests strategic imaginations, and that indicates that, at least in theory, even terrorists cannot escape the logic of the nuclear age. Before it considers the ways in which a terrorist nuclear detonation might just lead to such a wider strategic conflagration involving the arsenals of two or more of the world's nuclear weapons states, this article addresses the significant obstacles standing in the way of the possession, deployment, and detonation of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist group. After considering the possible motivations behind these actions, it then canvasses the range of responses that an attacked country might adopt following the initial nuclear explosion on its territory. These options span a spectrum from relative inaction to the substantial use of force and brings the article to the heart of the argument. Recalling early Cold War concern about the possibility of minor nuclear powers setting off a major exchange between the superpowers, the remainder of this preliminary study considers the possibility that a terrorist group might set off a wider nuclear exchange either inadvertently or by design.

#### Crunch is inevitable by 2050- energy, population and food

Grantham 12

[Jeremy, “The Big Crunch”, New Statesman, July, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Now economic statisticians can calculate a much more dangerous event that is being greeted with even less concern: our world is rapidly running out of resources -- of energy, metals and food. The data is readily available and is not in dispute. The market mechanism is reflecting what our leaders ignore. The start of the Industrial Revolution allowed us to make technological progress in delivering resources, outweighing the increasing marginal effort to dig ever deeper and chase lower-quality ores, for instance. The average price of 33 commodities (equally weighted) declined by 70 per cent (after inflation) between 1900 and 2002. Then, abruptly and without any particular crisis, prices reversed and in ten years the average commodity tripled to give back the advantage of the previous 100 years. It is perhaps the most important "phase" change of modern times, yet it attracted remarkably little concern. The causes are not hidden: there has been an explosion of both population and consumption since 1800, the advent of the Hydrocarbon Age. Global population increased from one billion to seven billion today, tripling even in my lifetime (I was born in 1938). In the same time, consumption of hydrocarbons and some metals increased one hundredfold. Initially, with few people and extensive high-grade resources, this did not show in prices, but more recently, with population still growing faster than ever in absolute terms, we have had to absorb an unprecedented surge in demand per capita from India, with its 1.2 billion people and growing at over 7 per cent a year, and China, with almost 1.3 billion and growing for over 20 years at 10 per cent a year -- a rate that will double consumption every seven years. China last year accounted for an astonishing 53 per cent of all the world's cement use, 48 per cent of its iron ore and 47 per cent of all the coal used. How could the best reserves not wither away under this attack, and prices not rise? Low-cost, high-grade coal, oil and natural gas -- the backbone of the Industrial Revolution -- will be a distant memory by 2050. Much higher cost remnants will still be available but they will not be able to drive our growth, our population and, most critically, our food supply as before. Conventional food production (let's call it "Big Ag") is desperately dependent on oil for insecticide, pesticide and fertiliser, and for transportation over thousands of miles. Modern agriculture has been accurately described as a way of turning oil into food. As the price of oil continues to rise, so will the price of food.

#### COLLAPSE SOONER IS BETTER THAN LATER KEY TO SURVIVAL

LEWIS 02'

(Chris H., Instructor, Sewall Program @ CU Boulder, On the Edge of Society, "Global Industrial Civilization: The Necessary Collapse," ed. M Dobkowski & I Wllimann, Syracuse U. Press, P.\_\_\_\_)[BLUE]

In conclusion, **the only solution to the growing political and economic chaos caused by the collapse of global industrial civilization is to encourage the uncoupling of nations and regions from the global industrial economy. Unfortunately, millions will die in the wars and economic and political conflicts created by the accelerating collapse of global industrial civilization.** But we can be assured that on that basis of past history of the collapse of regional civilizations such as the Mayan and the Roman Empires, **barring global nuclear war, human societies and civilizations will continue to exist and develop a smaller, regional scale. Yes, such civilizations will be violent, corrupt, and often cruel, but, in the end, less so than our current global industrial civilization, which is abusing the entire planet and threatening the mass death and suffering of all its peoples and the living biological fabric of life on earth.** The paradox of **global economic development is that although it creates massive wealth and power for First World Elites, it also creates massive poverty and suffering for Third World people and societies. The failure of global development to end this suffering and destruction will bring about us collapse. This collapse will cause millions of people to suffer and die throughout the world, but it should paradoxically, ensure the survival of future human societies. Indeed, the collapse of global industrial civilization is necessary for the future long-term survival of human beings. Although this future seems hopeless and heartless, it is not. We can learn alot from our present global crisis. What we learn will shape our future and the future of the complex, interconnected web of life on Earth.**

#### Biodiversity loss Leads to Extinction

Diner 94

[David, Major in US Army, Winter, “THE ARMY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: WHO'S ENDANGERING WHOM?” Lexis]

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." [79](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2c2079b6a9753fd72b599ac94393715a&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=5d418220b8f79eb99eb7ad7f7b46acfc" \l "n79" \t "_self) By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [80](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2c2079b6a9753fd72b599ac94393715a&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=5d418220b8f79eb99eb7ad7f7b46acfc" \l "n80" \t "_self) mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K (Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### War is only sparked by upswings—Must transition before 2025

Chase-Dunn & Bornschier 99

(Christopher, Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems, U of California-Riverside, and Volker, prof at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, “The Future of Global Conflict”, Sage Publications, p. 43)

While the onset of a period of hegemonic rivalry is in itself disturbing, the picture becomes even grimmer when the influence of long-term economic cycles is taken into account. As an extensive body of research documents (see especially Van Duijn, 1983), the 50 to 60 year business cycle known as the Kondratieff wave (K-wave) has been in synchronous operation on an international scale for at least the last two centuries. Utilizing data gathering by Levy (1983) on war severity, Goldstein (1988) demonstrates that there is a corresponding 50 to 60 year cycle in the number of battle deaths per year for the period 1495-1975. Beyond merely showing that the K-wave and the war cycle are linked in a systematic fashion, Goldstein’s research suggests that severe core wars are much more likely to occur late in the upswing phase of the K-wave. This finding is interpreted as showing that, while states always desire to go to war, they can afford to do so only when economic growth is providing them with sufficient resources. Modelski and Thompson (1996) present a more complex interpretation of the systemic relationship between economic and war cycles, but it closely resembles Goldstein’s hypothesis. In their analysis, a first economic upswing generates the economic resources required by an ascending core state to make a bid for hegemony; a second period of economic growth follows a period of global war and the establishment of a new period of hegemony. Here, again, specific economic upswings are associated with an increased likelihood of the outbreak of core war. It is widely accepted that the current K-wave, which entered a downturn around 1967-73, is probably now in the process of beginning a new upturn which will reach its apex around 2025. It is also widely accepted that by this period US hegemony, already unravelling, will have been definitively eroded. This convergence of a plateauing economic cycle with a period of political multicentricity within the core should, if history truly does repeat itself, result in the outbreak of full-scale warfare between the declining hegemon and the ascending core powers. Although both Goldstein (1991) and Modelski and Thompson (1996) assert that such a global war can (somehow) be avoided, other theorists consider that the possibility of such a core war is sufficiently high that serious steps should be taken to ensure that such collective suicide does not occur (Chase-Dunn and O’Reilly, 1989; Goldfrank, 1987).

**No impact to terrorism – too hard to pull off post 9/11, not enough personnel to carry out an attack, too much pressure because of security restrictions**

**Schneier 10**

(Bruce, a security technologist and author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.", “Opinion: Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks?”, March 2010, <http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/opinion-why-arent-there-more-times-square-style-terrorist-attacks/19463843>)

Hard to Pull Off **Terrorism sounds easy**, but the actual attack is the easiest part. **Putting together the people, the plot and the materials is hard. It's hard to sneak terrorists into the U.S. It's hard to grow your own inside the U.S. It's hard to operate; the general population, even the Muslim population, is against you.** Movies and television make terrorist plots look easier than they are. It's hard to hold conspiracies together. It's easy to make a mistake. **Even 9/11, which was planned before the climate of fear that event engendered, just barely succeeded. Today, it's much harder to pull something like that off without slipping up and getting arrested.** Few Terrorists **But even more important than the difficulty of executing a terrorist attack, there aren't a lot of terrorists out there. Al-Qaida isn't a well-organized global organization** with movie-plot-villain capabilities; it's a loose collection of people using the same name. **Despite the post-9/11 rhetoric, there isn't a terrorist cell in every major city. If you think about the major terrorist plots we've foiled in the U.S. -- the JFK bombers, the Fort Dix plotters -- they were mostly** [**amateur terrorist wannabes**](http://www.schneier.com/essay-174.html) **with no connection to any sort of al-Qaida central command, and mostly no ability to effectively carry out the attacks they planned. The successful terrorist attacks** -- the Fort Hood shooter, the guy who flew his plane into the Austin IRS office, the anthrax mailer -- **were largely nut cases operating alone**. Even the unsuccessful shoe bomber, and the equally unsuccessful Christmas Day underwear bomber, had minimal organized help -- and that help originated outside the U.S. **Terrorism doesn't occur without terrorists, and they are far rarer than popular opinion would have it.**

#### No conflict and no nuclear escalation- deterrence

A. Vinod Kumar 6/30/13 MPhil in disarmament studies and an Associate Fellow at Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 6/30/13, "Nuclear Deterrence Works in Indo-Pak Ties," http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1650-nuclear-deterrence-works-in-indo-pak-ties

NEW DELHI (IDN | [IDSA](http://www.idsa.in/)) - For over two decades, a dominant section of western analysts harped on the volatilities of the India and Pakistan nuclear dyad, often overselling the ‘South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint’ axiom, and portending a potential nuclear flare-up in every major stand-off between the two countries. The turbulence in the sub-continent propelled such presages, with one crisis after another billowing towards serious confrontations, but eventually easing out on all occasions. While the optimists described this as evidence of nuclear deterrence gradually consolidating in this dyad, the pessimists saw in it the ingredients of instability that could lead to a nuclear conflict. Though there is no denial of the fact that the three major crises since the 1998 nuclear tests – Kargil (1999), the Parliament attack and Operation Parakram (2001-2002) and the Mumbai terror strike (2008) – brought the two rivals precariously close to nuclear showdowns, not once had their leaderships lost complete faith in the efficacy of mutual deterrence.

# 2NC

## heg

### warming

#### China outweighs and won’t be influenced by the plan

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Birol also warned that China – the world's biggest emitter – would have to take on a much greater role in combating climate change. For years, Chinese officials have argued that the country's emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries, it was not required to take such stringent action on emissions. But the IEA's analysis found that within about four years, China's per capita emissions were likely to exceed those of the EU. In addition, by 2035 at the latest, China's cumulative emissions since 1900 are likely to exceed those of the EU, which will further weaken Beijing's argument that developed countries should take on more of the burden of emissions reduction as they carry more of the responsibility for past emissions. In a recent interview with the Guardian recently, China's top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, called on developing countries to take a greater part in the talks, while insisting that developed countries must sign up to a continuation of the Kyoto protocol – something only the European Union is willing to do. His words were greeted cautiously by other participants in the talks. Continuing its gloomy outlook, the IEA report said: "There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is under way. Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO2 emissions to a new high. Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400bn (£250.7bn)."Meanwhile, an "unacceptably high" number of people – about 1.3bn – still lack access to electricity. If people are to be lifted out of poverty, this must be solved – but providing people with renewable forms of energy generation is still expensive. Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said: "The decisions being made by politicians today risk passing a monumental carbon debt to the next generation, one for which they will pay a very heavy price. What's seriously lacking is a global plan and the political leverage to enact it. Governments have a chance to begin to turn this around when they meet in Durban later this month for the next round of global climate talks." One close observer of the climate talks said the $400bn subsidies devoted to fossil fuels, uncovered by the IEA, were "staggering", and the way in which these subsidies distort the market presented a massive problem in encouraging the move to renewables. He added that Birol's comments, though urgent and timely, were unlikely to galvanise China and the US – the world's two biggest emittters – into action on the international stage. "The US can't move (owing to Republican opposition) and there's no upside for China domestically in doing so. At least China is moving up the learning curve with its deployment of renewables, but it's doing so in parallel to the hugely damaging coal-fired assets that it is unlikely to ever want (to turn off in order to) to meet climate targets in years to come."

**We’re already past the tipping point**

**Guterl 9 –** Fred Guterl 9, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Will Climate Go Over The Edge?, 2009 http://www.newsweek.com/id/185822

Since the real world is so messy, climate scientists Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker turned for insight to the distinctly neater world of mathematics. Last year, they published an analysis in the journal Science arguing that climate models were skewed in the direction of underestimating the warming effect of carbon. The report reasoned that carbon emissions have the potential to trigger many changes that amplify the warming effect—water absorbs more sunlight than ice, humidity traps more heat, and so on—but few that would mitigate it. The odds, they figure, are about one in three that temperatures will rise by 4.5 degrees C (the top of the IPCC's range), but there's little chance at all that they'll rise by less than 2 degrees C. "We've had a hard time eliminating the possibility of very large climate changes," says Roe. The answer is still couched in probabilities, but they've shifted in a worrying direction.¶ What can be done? Can a diplomatic miracle in Copenhagen save the planet from the dreaded tipping point? Sea ice in the Antarctic was supposed to last for 5,000 years until scientists found that the melting was proceeding at a faster pace than expected. Now it will all be gone in a mere 850 years. Bringing it back would require something like 10,000 years of cooler temperatures. **Is there any way to halt the process before it goes too far?**¶ **No**, says Susan Solomon, a climate scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder, Colorado. In a recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, she found that most of the **carbon we've already released** into the atmosphere **will hang around for another 1,000 years.Even if world leaders somehow** managed to persuade everybody to stop driving cars and heating their homes—**bring**ing **carbon emissions down to zero immediately**—the Earth would continue to warm for centuries. The effect of rising temperatures on rainfall patterns is also **irreversible**, says Solomon. Parts of the world that tend to be dry (Mexico, north Africa, southern Europe and the western parts of Australia and the United States) will continue to get drier, while wet areas (the South Pacific islands, the horn of Africa) will keep getting wetter. "You have to think of it as being like a dial that can only turn one way," she says. "We've cranked up the dial, and we don't get to crank it back." The point of a climate treaty, then, isn't so much to roll things back as to keep them from getting a whole lot worse—a worthy and important goal, if not a particularly inspiring one.

#### No Impact to Warming:

#### [1] Numerous scientific studies prove that emissions have little consequences, and the timframe for severe impacts is a millennium out. And even if they win a risk, humans and the environment will be able to adapt which will avoid the impact. –That’s Mendelsohn

#### [2] Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### [3] Warming will take centuries

**Mendelsohn 9 –** Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

These statements are largely **alarmist and misleading**. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an**extremely low probability**of leading to**catastrophic consequences**. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only**mild consequences**. The **severe impacts** predicted by alarmists **require a century (or two** in the case of Stern 2006) **of no mitigation**. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts**will never occur because people will adapt.**It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### Sust

Zhang and shi don’t say heg is sustainable—they say that chalengers

#### HEGEMONY IS UNSUSTAINABLE: A) RE-BALANCING OF POWER, STRATEGIC OVERSTRETCH AND FINANCIAL BURDENS

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 148 //wyo-tjc]

Viewed properly, the real debate about the future of American hegemony has been miscast. The issue is not whether other states can, or will, balance against U.S. hegemony. They are, and have been since the cold war’s end. Similarly, the issue is not whether American hegemony will end. Even unipolar optimists and agnostics admit that someday it will end. The key question is when it will end. On this point, the unipolar pessimists of the balance-of power theorists is not misplaced. There are good reasons to believe that the uniplar era will end within the next decade or two. Indeed, the foundations of U.S. hegemony already are eroding due to the interaction of external and internal functions. First, unipolar optimism notwithstanding, the distribution of power in the international system will shift as new great powers (or “peer competitors”) emerge to challenge the United States. Second, by succumbing to the hegemon’s temptation,” the United States will become increasingly overextended abroad. Third, fiscal and economic constraints increasingly will impinge upon Washington’s ability to maintain America’s overwhelming military advantage, and, as the U.S. military edge declines, other major states will be emboldened to engage in hard balancing against the United States.

#### B) DOMESTIC POLITICS

Kupchan in ‘2

[Charles Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York //wyo-tjc]

The waning of U.S. primacy will result not just from the rise of alternative centers of power, but also from an America that is tiring of the burdens of global hegemony. The United States should not and will not pursue a foreign policy as ambitious as that of the Cold War now that it lives in a world in which it faces no major adversary but instead confronts a terrorist threat that is better countered by freezing bank accounts than by dropping bombs. As during earlier periods in American history, the absence of a commanding threat will make the country considerably more reluctant to shoulder strategic commit­ments abroad. Americans and their elected leaders are justifiably los­ing interest in playing the role of global guardian. At the same time, the United States is drawing away from multilateral institutions in favor of a unilateralism that risks estranging alternative centers of power, raising the chances that their ascent will lead to a new era of geopolitical rivalry. The rise of other powers and America’s waning and unilateralist internationalism will combine to make America’s unipolar moment a fleeting one. As unipolarity gives way to multipolarity the stability that follows naturally from the presence of an uncontested hegemon will be replaced by global competition for position, influence, and sta­tus. As in the past, the world’s principal fault lines will fall where they have fallen throughout the ages—between the world’s main centers of power. The disorder that comes with rivalry will soon replace the order afforded by Pax Americana. [P. 28-29

#### C) EVENT ARDENT DEFENDERS OF HEG AGREE

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 156-157 //wyo-tjc]

American hegemony cannot be sustained indefinitely. In fact, even hardcore unipolar optimists acknowledge that eventually new great powers will emerge, and when they do there is a good chance that they will challenge— on “balance” against—the United States. Perhaps sooner than they would have us believe. When unipolar optimists—who supposedly believe America’s hegemonic power will be unchallengeable far into the future—embrace the policy line of unipolar agnostics and urge the United States to practice “magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation” by acting multilaterally and being nice to other states, they betray both an unspoken anxiety about the durability of U.S. hegemony and a fear that it will provoke precisely the kind of geopolitical backlash that they say cannot happen (or, at least, cannot happen for a long time to come) .~7 At the end of the day the debate pitting unipolar optimists and agnostics against unipolar pessimists is about the related questions of timing and costs. How long can the United States keep the world unipolar? Do the benefits of perpetuating unipolarity outweigh the costs of doing so? In 1993, I suggested that by 2010 unipolaritv would give way to multipolarity.58 In contrast, in 1999 Dartmouth professor William C. Wohlforth—the foremost unipolar optimist—stated that American hegemony was then a decade old and “that if Washington plays its cards right, it may last as long as bipolarity.”59 The post— World War II bipolar era lasted forty-five years (1945—90). So by Wohlforth’s calculations, U.S. preponderance would last until around 2030. The difference in our predictions about how long American hegmeony would last was only about twenty years. Twenty years may seem like a big number, but it isn’t— especially for strategists, who are paid to look beyond the concerns of the day and think about how the state’s interests will be affected over the longer term by shifting power configurations. Two historical examples illustrate how much can change geopolitically in twenty years. In 19 18—20, Germany was defeated and seemingly shackled by the Treaty of Versailles, but twenty-two years later Germany was ascendant on the Continent. In 1896, a “splendidly’ isolated” Great Britain was acknowledged as the dominant world power. Twenty years later, the rise of German, American, and Japanese power had eroded Britain’s global power position and forced a profound change in British grand strategy, including the entente with France and the consequent “continental commitment” that sucked London into World War I.~° Far from being splendidly isolated, Britain was enmeshed in the horrors of trench warfare, and its soldiers were being slaughtered in the futile July 1916 Summer offensive. The change in Britain’s geopolitical fortunes between 1896 and 1916 is a reminder that a state’s position of dominance in international politics can melt away’ with unexpected rapidity.

Their only defense is a growth differential

#### Economically unsustainable—federal deficits, entitlement crises, debt-to-gdp ratio all ensure the loss of the dollar’s reserve currency status

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt ⁄GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ confidence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency.

#### Economically unsustainable: diffusion of power/wealth at the macro-level and ongoing fiscal crises domestically

Layne 12

[Chris, Professor of IR and Political Science at Texas A&M, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. online //wyo-tjc]

There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro- Atlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status.

### MP Coming

#### FIRST, EXTEND THE LAYNE 2010 EVIDENCE-- MAJOR POWERS WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY EMERGE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS, BRINGING HEGEMONY TO AN END

#### SECOND, YOU SHOULD SIDE WITH US:

#### A) YOUR AUTHORS AGREE- EVEN PEOPLE LIKE WOHLFORTH CONCEDE MULTIPOLARITY WILL END SOON

#### B) EVEN THE BEST GOVERNMENT ANALYSIS PROVES IT

Drexner in ‘7

[Daniel, Professor of International Politics at Tufts “The New New World Order”, Foreign Affairs, April, p. asp //wyo-tjc]

#### THROUGHOUT THE twentieth century, the list of the world's great powers was predictably short: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and northwestern Europe. The twenty-first century will be different. China and India are emerging as economic and political heavyweights: China holds over a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves, India's high-tech sector is growing by leaps and bounds, and both countries, already recognized nuclear powers, are developing blue-water navies. The National Intelligence Council, a U.S. government think tank, projects that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second- and fourth-largest economies, respectively. Such growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics. This tectonic shift will pose a challenge to the U.S.-dominated global institutions that have been in place since the 1940s. At the behest of Washington, these multilateral regimes have promoted trade liberalization, open capital markets, and nuclear nonproliferation, ensuring relative peace and prosperity for six decades--and untold benefits for the United States. But unless rising powers such as China and India are incorporated into this framework, the future of these international regimes will be.

#### Unipolarity is collapsing now—being replaced either by weak multipolarity or bipolarity

Walt 11

[Stephen M, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, The National Interest, “The End of the American Era”, Nov-Dec, p. online //wyo-tjc]

The security arrangements that defined the American Era are also being undermined by the rise of several key regional powers, most notably India, Turkey and Brazil. Each of these states has achieved impressive economic growth over the past decade, and each has become more willing to chart its own course independent of Washington’s wishes. None of them are on the verge of becoming true global powers—Brazil’s GDP is still less than one-sixth that of the United States, and India and Turkey’s economies are even smaller—but each has become increasingly influential within its own region. This gradual diffusion of power is also seen in the recent expansion of the G-8 into the so-called G-20, a tacit recognition that the global institutions created after World War II are increasingly obsolete and in need of reform. Each of these new regional powers is a democracy, which means that its leaders pay close attention to public opinion. As a result, the United States can no longer rely on cozy relations with privileged elites or military juntas. When only 10–15 percent of Turkish citizens have a “favorable” view of America, it becomes easier to understand why Ankara refused to let Washington use its territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and why Turkey has curtailed its previously close ties with Israel despite repeated U.S. efforts to heal the rift. Anti-Americanism is less prevalent in Brazil and India, but their democratically elected leaders are hardly deferential to Washington either. The rise of new powers is bringing the short-lived “unipolar moment” to an end, and the result will be either a bipolar Sino-American rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great powers. The United States is likely to remain the strongest, but its overall lead has shrunk—and it is shrinking further still.

#### Multipolarity will emerge by 2025; best research indicates this will occur

Layne 9

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, International Security, “The Waning of US Hegemony—Myth or Reality?”, 2009, p. asp]

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities.

### No impact

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### : A) AMERICA CAN’T PREVENT NEW POWERS

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 176-177 //wyo-tjc]

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the postconflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States “could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment.”59 This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia’s political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Here, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it’s a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states’ calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of “environment shaping” have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

#### B) THEIR SCENARIO IS RECKLESS EXAGERATION

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 127-128 //wyo-tjc]

The entire fabric of American grand strategy would unravel if U.S. allies no longer felt reassured by Washington’s security umbrella. If the credibility of U.S. commitments to regional stability is questioned, that “in turn could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad.”6’ Hence, credibility is viewed by U.S. decision makers as a vital interest.62 To establish its credibility, however, the United States often is forced to intervene in conflicts where its own interests are not at stake~3 Indeed, Robert McMahon has noted that this explains a paradox: the United States tends to intervene most frequently “in areas of demonstrably marginal value to core U.S. economic and security interests.”64 Precisely by being willing to fight in such places, the United States, or so policymakers believe, establishes its credibility.65 Of course, it’s not so easy for U.S. policymakers to explain to domestic audiences why the United States must intervene in regions of marginal strategic value, or why it must act before there is any obvious threat to U.S. interests. This is why, as John A. Thompson puts it, threat exaggeration—which includes the frequent invocation of domino imagery—is an American foreign policy tradition.66 As Jerome Slater observes, notwithstanding the cold war’s end, the domino theory retains its vitality in U.S. strategic thought. There are two reasons for this. First, the United States remains overwhelmingly powerful, which tempts it to define its security interests extravagantly. Second, the Wilsonian ideology that underpins U.S. foreign policy has inculcated a belief that the United States has an obligation “to provide world leadership for global order, collective security, democracy, and capitalism.”

### Transition good

#### FOURTH, ALLOWING THE STATUS QUO TRANSITION TO HAPPEN NOW IS CRITICAL BECAUSE

#### A) KEY TO US STRENGTH—PRESERVES MORE POWER TO DEAL WITH INEVITABLE MULTIPOLARITY MORE SUCCESSULLY

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 158 //wyo-tjc]

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others’ balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary’ to my 1993 prediction, probably will not he challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Given that American hegemony’ is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to “shape the international system” to America’s liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish), it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.

#### B) HEGEMONY CAUSES EXTENDED DETERRENCE BREAK DOWNS AND NUCLEAR WAR

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 169 //wyo-tjc]

Proponents of U.S. hegemony like to say that America’s military commitments in Eurasia are an insurance policy against the purportedly damaging consequences of a Eurasian great power war by preventing it from happening in the first place or limiting its harmful effects if it does happen. This is a dubious analogy, because insurance policies neither prevent, nor limit, damage to policyholders. Rather, they compensate the policyholder for damage incurred. Even on its own terms, however, the insurance policy argument is not persuasive. Both Californians and Floridians know that some types of insurance are either unaffordable or unobtainable at any price. The chances of the “Big One”—a catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault—jolting Los Angeles or San Francisco, or a Force 5 hurricane making a direct hit on Miami, are small. But if either were to happen the consequences could be catastrophic, which is why insurance companies don’t want to offer earthquake and hurricane insurance. Prospective great power wars in Eurasia represent a similar dynamic: the risk of such a war breaking out may be low, but if it does it could be prohibitively expensive for the United States to be involved. Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America’s alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapons were not involved—would he very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

#### C) CURRENT POWER CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED AT THE VERY MOST FOR ANOTHER TWO DECADES AND GUARANTEES THE MAJOR POWER WAR THEY TRY TO AVOID—MUCH SAFER TO DECLINE NOW

Layne in ‘6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science, Likely a Genius, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited”, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. asp //wyo-tjc]

The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons. American primacists conflate balancing (a grand strategy pursued by individual states) with the attainment of balance in the international system (a more or less equal distribution of power among the great powers). That others' balancing efforts have not yet produced a balance of power does not mean they are not trying to offset U.S. hegemony, although these balancing efforts will require time to bear fruit. Thus, contrary to my 1993 prediction, the United States probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. Yet, it also is doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until 2030, as Wohlforth predicted in 1999. The key question facing American strategists, therefore, is: Should the United States cling to unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Or should it abandon its hegemonic grand strategy for a less ambitious one of offshore balancing? There are two versions of offshore balancing from which the United States can choose: multilateral or unilateral. 125 As a multilateral offshore balancer, the United States would act both to "reassure its allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint" and to "reduce the fear created by its superior power by giving other states a voice in the circumstances in which it will use force." 126 Multilateral offshore balancing is problematic for four reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent, because its twin goals of preserving U.S. primacy while persuading others that they need not fear U.S. power do not mesh. 127 Second, the idea that the United States should exercise its power in concert with others runs counter to the fundamental realities of international politics. 128 Third, even if the United States could reassure its allies that it will use [End Page 39]its power wisely, its ability to reassure potential adversaries such as China and Russia remains doubtful. Finally, multilateral offshore balancing can fairly be viewed as a backdoor strategy for preserving U.S. hegemony, rather than as a policy of restraint. 129 At bottom, multilateral offshore balancing does not address the United States' "hegemony problem," which is not caused by U.S. unilateralism. The real problem is that too often the United States acts unwisely (or, as in the case of Iraq, foolishly)—something it just as easily can do multilaterally as unilaterally. Although some analysts blame the George W. Bush administration for the United States' hegemony problem, the facts suggest otherwise. Concerns about unchecked U.S. power in a unipolar world first were voiced almost simultaneously with the Soviet Union's collapse. And it was during the Clinton administration that U.S. officials first acknowledged in so many words that America had a hegemony problem. The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40]that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

# 1nr

### K Wave 2NC O/V

#### Wars happen on the upswing of the economy when people are most optimistic and wanting to expand that’s Boehmer and Cashman

#### Even if they win their internal link we’ll outweigh

#### a. Probability—higher risk because of resource shortages and expectations

Mauer 86 – economist (Nathan, The Kondratieif Waves, p 197-8)

The overall trend of the economy shapes perceptions as to its strength and direction. In a hull market, "experts" are almost uniformly optimistic; in a bear market the owlish analysts almost universally suggest caution. **It is during the upward swings**, soon after a trough and just before a peak, **that wars become more likely**. It should be rioted that peak wars are the result of a different kind of socioeconomic psychological pressure and have quite different economic results than trough wars. Nations become socially and politically unsettled after a long period of boom and expansion, perhaps because **in their final stages, peoples' expectations begin to outrun actual growth in the general level of prosperity. War** then **becomes the ultimate destination**. In as much as **all nations are attempting to expand simultaneously, the intense competition for resources and markets leads eventually to military confrontations, which become contagious**. One explanation suggested is that **during trough wars the public is still largely concerned with** private considerations and **their own wellbeing**. They tend to be less interested in international disputes, world crusades, or campaigns involving large investment of cash, effort, and the nervous energy needed to pursue projects to a conclusion. **Trough wars tend to be short**. They are more a matter of choice and sudden decision by the stronger power. Inasmuch as **peak wars are the result of frustration of expectations** {usually with economic elements), **peak wars tend to be more desperate, more widespread, and more destructive**.

#### b. Magnitude—increased capabilities mean wars are worse in the upswing

Modelski & Thompson 96

Professor of political science, professor of political science (George and William, Leading Sectors and World Powers, pg 20-22)

Goldstein (1985. 1987. 1988, 1991a) has probably contributed more than anyone else to reviving the question of how wars and prosperity are linked. His 1988 analysis went some way in summarizing many of the arguments concerning economic long waves and war. His 1991 analysis is one of the more sophisticated empirical studies to emerge after nearly a century of controversy (spatiotemporal boundaries: world system from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries).3 The basic perspective that emerges from his analyses, outlined in figure 2.2, sees economic upswings increasing the probability of severe wars. Severe wars usher in a phase of stagnation from which the world economy eventually recovers leading to another resurgence of robust economic growth. Goldstein's analysis suggests that this process has gone on since at least 1495. Economic upswings create economic surpluses and full war chests. The ability to wage war makes severe wars more likely. Severe wars, in turn, consume the surpluses and war chests and put an end to the growth upswing. Decades are required to rebuild. While there may be some gains registered in terms of resource mobilization for combat purposes, these gains are offset by the losses brought about by wartime distortions and destruction. Goldstein is careful to distinguish between production and prices. Prices, in his view, are functions of war. Other things being equal, the severity of the war greatly effects the rate of war-induced inflation—in other words, the greater the severity, then the higher the rate of inflation. When prices rise, real wages decline. Yet he also notes that production (production waves are said to precede war/price waves by some ten to fifteen years) is already stagnating toward the end of the upswing. This phenomenon is explained in terms of demand increases outstripping supply. As a result, inflation occurs. The lack of clarity on this issue may be traceable to the lack of specification among innovation, investment, and production. Cycles in innovation and investment are viewed as reinforcing the production long wave. Increases in innovation facilitate economic growth but growth discourages further innovation. Investment increases on the upswing but, eventually, over investment results. Investors retrench and growth slows down as a consequence. What is not exactly specified is whether innovation, investment, war, or some combination of the three processes is responsible for ending the upswing. Goldstein also raises the question of how these economic/war cycles impact the distribution of capabilities among the major powers. War severity increases capability concentration. Relative capabilities then begin a process of diffusion as they move toward equality among the major powers. Another bout of severe war ensues and the cycle repeats itself. In addition to war, differential rates of innovation and production influence relative capability standings. Presumably, all three factors share some responsibility for generating the fluctuations in capability concentration.

### K-Wave Mpx- L2 NW

#### Any war goes nuclear

Goldstein, 85

(Joshua, International studies quarterly, v29, n4, p411-444, “Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles,” jstor)

First, the incidence of great power war is declining-more and more 'peace' years separate the great power wars. Second, and related, the great power wars are becoming shorter. Third, however, those wars are becoming more severe-annual fatalities during war increasing more than a hundred- fold over the five centuries. Fourth (and more tentatively), the war cycle may be gradually lengthening in each successive era, from about 40 years in the first era to about 60 years in the third. The presence of nuclear weapons has continued these trends in great power war from the past five centuries-any great power wars in this era will likely be fewer, shorter and much more deadly.

### Warming Shell- General

#### Independently decline is key to solving extinction level-warming

Li 11

[Minqi Li, Assistant Professor of Economics at Utah, “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism,” Review of Radical Political Economics 43:3, 8-23-11, p.289-301, Sage Journals \\wyo-bb]

The global average surface temperature is now about 0.8°C (0.8 degrees Celsius) higher than in pre-industrial times. Under the current trend, the world is on track towards a long-term warming between 4°C and 8°C. At this level of global warming, the world would be in an extreme greenhouse state not seen for almost 100 million years, devastating human civilization and destroying nearly all forms of life on Earth (Conner and McCarthy 2009). The scientific community has reached consensus that the current global warming results from the excessive accumulation in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide (CO2 ) and other greenhouse gases (such as methane and nitrous oxide) emitted by human economic activities. 1 The capitalist historical epoch has been characterized by the explosive growth of material production and consumption. The massive expansion of the world economy has been powered by fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas). Since 1820, the world economy has expanded by about seventy times and the world emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels burning have increased by about sixty times (see Figure 1). At the United Nations Conference on Climate Change concluded in Copenhagen in December 2009, the world’s governments officially committed to the objective of limiting global warming to no more than 2°C. However, according to the “Climate Action Tracker,” despite the official statement, the national governments’ current pledges regarding emission reduction in fact imply a warming of at least 3°C by the end of the 21st century with more warming to come in the following centuries (Climate Action Tracker 2010). In reality, all the major national governments are committed to infinite economic growth and none of them is willing to consider any emission reduction policy that could undermine economic growth. This is not simply because of intellectual ignorance or lack of political will. The pursuit of endless accumulation of capital (and infinite economic growth) is derived from the basic laws of motion of the capitalist economic system. Without fundamental social transformation, human civilization is now on the path to self-destruction. The next section (section 2) reviews the basic scientific facts concerning the climate change crisis. Without an end to economic growth, it is virtually impossible for meaningful climate stabilization to be achieved (section 3). However, both capitalist enterprises and states are constantly driven to expand production and consumption. The system of nation states effectively rules out a meaningful global political solution to the climate change crisis (section 4). The climate change crisis is but one of several long-term historical trends that are now leading to the structural crisis of capitalism (section 5). The resolution of the crisis and the survival of humanity require the building of a fundamentally different social system that is based on social ownership of the means of production and society-wide planning (section 6).

#### GROWTH MAKES TERRORISM INEVITABLE

Cronin 3

Senior Associate at the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War(Audrey Kurth, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism”, Project MUSE)

The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes. The political incentives to attack major targets such as the United States with powerful weapons have greatly increased. The perceived corruption of indigenous customs, religions, languages, economies, and so on are blamed on an international system often unconsciously molded by American behavior. The accompanying distortions in local communities as a result of exposure to the global marketplace of goods and ideas are increasingly blamed on U.S.- sponsored modernization and those who support it. The advancement of technology, however, is not the driving force behind the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies, despite what some have assumed. Instead, at the heart of this threat are frustrated populations and international movements that are increasingly inclined to lash out against U.S.-led globalization. As Christopher Coker observes, globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative). The new international terrorism is [End Page 51] increasingly engendered by a need to assert identity or meaning against forces of homogeneity, especially on the part of cultures that are threatened by, or left behind by, the secular future that Western-led globalization brings. According to a report recently published by the United Nations Development Programme, the region of greatest deficit in measures of human development—the Arab world—is also the heart of the most threatening religiously inspired terrorism. Much more work needs to be done on the significance of this correlation, but increasingly sources of political discontent are arising from disenfranchised areas in the Arab world that feel left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurances of broader freedom, prosperity, and access to knowledge. The results are dashed expectations, heightened resentment of the perceived U.S.-led hegemonic system, and a shift of focus away from more proximate targets within the region. Of course, the motivations behind this threat should not be oversimplified: Anti-American terrorism is spurred in part by a desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as well as by growing antipathy in the developing world vis-à-vis the forces of globalization. It is also crucial to distinguish between the motivations of leaders such as Osama bin Laden and their followers. The former seem to be more driven by calculated strategic decisions to shift the locus of attack away from repressive indigenous governments to the more attractive and media-rich target of the United States. The latter appear to be more driven by religious concepts cleverly distorted to arouse anger and passion in societies full of pent-up frustration. To some degree, terrorism is directed against the United States because of its engagement and policies in various regions. Anti-Americanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century. The main question is whether terrorism will succeed in disrupting the [End Page 52] promise of improved livelihoods for millions of people on Earth. Globalization is not an inevitable, linear development, and it can be disrupted by such unconventional means as international terrorism. Conversely, modern international terrorism is especially dangerous because of the power that it potentially derives from globalization—whether through access to CBNR weapons, global media outreach, or a diverse network of financial and information resources.

#### Russia And Chinese growth leads to arms build up to challenge the US

Layne in 6

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 145-146 //wyo-tjc]

The very fact of U.S. hegemony is a powerful disincentive for states to engage in open, aggressive counterbalancing. Yet, because mere soft balancing in itself cannot constrain the United States, those states that want to offset American hegemony ultimately must find some way to match U.S. hard power capabilities. The trick is to do so without becoming the object of American enmity. One way to do so is to engage in an opaque form of internal balancing. Rather than undertaking an overt arms buildup aimed at the United States, major powers might try first to close the capabilities gap with the United States by concentrating on building up—and catching up—economically and technologically. Opaque balancing is inherently ambiguous, because it is difficult to determine whether its underlying purpose is to develop a state’s civilian economy or to lay the groundwork for an eventual military challenge to U.S. hegemony. This very ambiguity, however, reduces the risk that opaque balancers will be the targets of preventive U.S. military action. China and Russia are good illustrations. Clearly, both states today are accommodating themselves to U.S. preponderance, and, because it benefits them economically, they are integrating into the U.S-dominated international economic system. This does not mean, however, that their long-term grand strategic intentions are benign. In today’s unipolar world, states like China and Russia are bandwagoning with the United States in the short and medium term to spur their economic growth. But looking down the road, they aim to convert their economic gains into the military capabilities they need to contest American preponderance. As Mark Brawley puts it: Since economic ties can deliver benefits to both parties, the weaker power might hope to survive in the short term by allying with the hegemonic power, but add to its current economic base as well. If current economic gains can be converted to military power in the future, the bandwagoning state might improve its power potential so that it could reassert its autonomy at some point in the future. States like China and Russia are following the timeless strategy of those that are relatively weak today hut expect to be relatively strong tomorrow: lying low in the weeds and waiting for the opportune moment—when the trends in the relative distribution of power are more favorable—to balance openly against the United States. Other examples of opaque balancing are joint military cooperation (such as the fall 2005 Sino-Russian exercises) amid arms sales (sales of advanced Russian weaponry to China, for example, amid the prospective lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China) 91 The Sino-Russian maneuvers are opaque balancing because they arc not clearly directed at any other states, and also because China has conducted joint exercises with India, a strategic rival. Arms sales are opaque balancing because it is often difficult to tell whether they are motivated by commercial or by strategic imperatives.

### Terrorism

#### Terrorists aren’t pursuing nukes

**Wolfe 12 –** Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

**No successful detonation**

**Schneidmiller 9**(Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php)

There is an "almost vanishinglysmall" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow itup. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to giveup their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, *Atomic Obsession*. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely tobe able to steala whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissingthe idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see *GSN*, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue withthe finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occurin the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim**,** which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give anuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weaponor use one that has been stolen.

**] It Won’t Cause Extinction**

**Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 04**

[November 1, Vol. 60, #6, Lexis]

There are too many different ways in which terrorists could perpetrate some kind of nuclear attack to mention in this limited space. But keep this in mind: **There have been zero cases of nuclear terrorism --neither nuclear nor radiological. There are no known cases of theft or purchase of an intact nuclear weapon, so a terrorist attack with one is more than unlikely. There has not been any documented theft of enough fissile material for a crude nuke**--although there have been attempts. **There has never been a dirty bomb attack. There has never been a case of nuclear plant sabotage. If there were, it would** be awful--but **not the end of humanity.**

**] No nuclear retaliation**

**Kimball ‘9**

Daryl. President of the ACA. Change U.S. Nuclear Policy? Yes, We Can. September 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_09/focus.

Given the United States’ conventional military edge, no plausible circumstance requires or could justify the use of nuclear weapons to deal with a non-nuclear threat. They are useless in deterring or responding to nuclear terrorism. Gen. Colin Powell put it well in his 1995 autobiography: “No matter how small these nuclear payloads were, we would be crossing a threshold. Using nukes at this point would mark one of the most significant political decisions since Hiroshima.”

### 2NC A2 Decline L2 War

#### Extend Miller, decline has historically bore no relationship to violence.

Historically—no war—Germany only went to war on the upswing—that’s ferguson—proves our k wave argument

2007 recession disproves the theory—not every war leads to collapse, means that you should side with our impact d that the risk of their war is up to chance, but they concede all of our scenarios besides terrorism—that’s barnett

#### Doesn’t Lead to war, Correlation not Causation

Ferguson 06

Niall Ferguson, Prof of Economic History @ Harvard, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, p. asp, Sept/Oct 2006 //wyo-tjc

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett 9

[Thomas Barnett, Senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>, \\wyo-bb]

**When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago**, the **blogosphere was ablaze with** all sorts of scary predictions of, and **commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery** -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. **None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession.** Indeed, the l**ast new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century.** Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). **Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger** (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) **for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements.** Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), **our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis**: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). **Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully** -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, **to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts** (in all the usual places); **Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers** (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and **No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role.** (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, **the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage** (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but **there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed.** Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, **the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency.** Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the **beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead.** Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! **Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.**

#### Diversionary theory is wrong –effect is brief, won’t rally against stronger targets ,Down Turn Fosters Cooperation

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[M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19:2 (2010) 10-26-10, google the title. First result\\wyo-bb]

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish decision making. The historical record, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain. My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf Cooperation Council.131

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