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#### US winning the war on terror- no WMD attacks

Oswald 13 Rachel Oswald, staff editor for the National Journal and the Global Security Newswire, “Despite WMD fears, terrorists are focused on conventional attacks,” May 30, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-are-focused-on-conventional-attacks-20130417?page=1&utm_source=feedly>

WASHINGTON – The United States has spent billions of dollars to prevent terrorists from obtaining a weapon of mass destruction even as this week’s [bombings in Boston](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/police-scrutinize-remnants-boston-blasts/" \t "_blank) further show that a nuclear weapon or lethal bioagent is not necessary for causing significant harm.¶ Organized group plots against the U.S. homeland since Sept. 11, 2001 have all involved conventional means of attack. Beyond that have been a handful of instances in which individuals used the postal system to deliver disease materials -- notably [this week’s ricin letters](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/lab-confirms-ricin-letter-sent-senator/" \t "_blank) to President Obama and at least one senator and the 2001 anthrax mailings.¶ Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation. These include:¶ -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials;¶ -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists;¶ -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials;¶ -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens;¶ -- elimination of most of al-Qaida’s original leadership, notably those members with the most experience orchestrating large-scale attacks abroad; and¶ -- the Arab Spring uprisings have likely drawn down the pool of terrorists with the proper training and focus to organize WMD attacks abroad as they have opted instead to join movements to overthrow governments in places such as Syria and Yemen.¶ “We killed a lot of people. That was one thing,” said Randall Larsen, founding director of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, referring to the deaths in recent years of al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden and any number of his direct or philosophical adherents.¶ Bin Laden is known to have exhorted his followers to seek weapons of mass destruction for use in attacks against the West. Leading al-Qaida propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki of the group’s Yemen affiliate, who was killed in a 2011 U.S. drone strike, used his Inspire magazine to [encourage sympathizers](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-magazine-urges-chemical-biological-strikes-us/" \t "_blank) to develop and carry out their own chemical and biological attacks.¶ Al-Qaida also had separate efforts in [Afghanistan](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-operatives-discussed-wmd-attacks-while-training-prior-to-911-report-says/" \t "_blank) and [Malaysia](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-officials-worried-by-release-of-al-qaeda-bioweapons-operative/" \t "_blank) that worked on developing anthrax for use in attacks before they were broken up or abandoned following the September 2001 attacks.¶ In the last decade, the technological means to carry out new kinds of improvised WMD attacks such as those involving [laboratory-engineered pathogens](http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/synthetic-pathogens-might-pose-bioterror-threat-scientists-warn/" \t "_blank) has become much more available. However, it can take some time for bad actors to recognize how these new technologies can open the doorway to heretofore unseen massively disruptive terrorist attacks, according to Larsen.¶ Passenger airplanes were flying across the United States for decades before any terrorists realized that they would make a highly destructive improvised weapon when flown at high speeds into skyscrapers filled with thousands of people, Larsen noted.¶ A 2012 analysis by terrorism experts at the New America Foundation detailed a number of disrupted unconventional weapon plots against the country that counterintuitively were much more likely to involve home-grown antigovernment groups and lone-wolf actors than Muslim extremists. "In the past decade, there is no evidence that jihadist extremists in the United States have acquired or attempted to acquire material to construct CBRN weapons," according to authors Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland.¶ They documented a [number of failed domestic plots](http://homegrown.newamerica.net/" \t "_blank), often involving cyanide or ricin. Only former Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins was successful in actually carrying out such an effort, killing five people with anthrax spores in 2001.¶ “Right-wing and left-wing extremist groups and individuals have been far more likely to acquire toxins and to assemble the makings of radiological weapons than al-Qaida sympathizers,” they said.

#### Reforms result in catastrophic terrorism---releases them and kills intel gathering

Jack **Goldsmith 09**, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, 2/4/09, “Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/2/09%20detention%20goldsmith/0209\_detention\_goldsmith.pdf

These three concerns challenge the detention paradigm. They do nothing to eliminate the need for detention to prevent detainees returning to the battlefield. But **many believe that we can meet this need by giving trials to everyone we want to detain and then incarcerating them under a theory of conviction rather than of military detention.** I disagree. **For many reasons, it is too risky for the U.S. government to deny itself the traditional military detention power altogether, and to commit itself instead to try or release every suspected terrorist. ¶** For one thing, **military detention will be necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan** for the foreseeable future. For another, **we likely cannot secure convictions of all of the dangerous terrorists at Guantánamo, much less all future dangerous terrorists**, who legitimately qualify for non-criminal military detention. **The evidentiary and procedural standards of trials, civilian and military alike, are much higher than the analogous standards for detention. With some terrorists too menacing to set free, the standards will prove difficult to satisfy. Key evidence in a given case may come from overseas and verifying it, understanding its provenance, or establishing its chain of custody in the manners required by criminal trials may be difficult. This** problem is **exacerbated when evidence was gathered on a battlefield or during an armed skirmish. The problem only grows when the evidence is old.** And perhaps most importantly, **the use of such evidence in a criminal process may compromise intelligence sources and methods**, requiring the disclosure of the identities of confidential sources or the nature of intelligence-gathering techniques, such as a sophisticated electronic interception capability. ¶ Opponents of non-criminal detention observe that despite these considerations, the government has successfully prosecuted some Al Qaeda terrorists—in particular, Zacharias Moussaoui and Jose Padilla. This is true, but it does not follow that prosecutions are achievable in every case in which disabling a terrorist suspect represents a surpassing government interest. Moreover, the Moussaoui and Padilla prosecutions highlight an under-appreciated cost of trials, at least in civilian courts. The Moussaoui and Padilla trials were messy affairs that stretched, and some observers believe broke, our ordinary criminal trial conceptions of conspiracy law and the rights of the accused, among other things. The Moussaoui trial, for example, watered down the important constitutional right of the defendant to confront witnesses against him in court, and the Padilla trial rested on an unprecedentedly broad conception of conspiracy.15 An important but under-appreciated cost of using trials in all cases is that these prosecutions will invariably bend the law in ways unfavorable to civil liberties and due process, and these changes, in turn, will invariably spill over into non-terrorist prosecutions and thus skew the larger criminal justice process.16¶ **A final problem with using any trial system, civilian or military, as the sole lawful basis for terrorist detention is that the trials can result in short sentences** (as the first military commission trial did) **or even acquittal of a dangerous terrorist**.17 In criminal trials, **guilty defendants often go free because of legal technicalities, government inability to introduce probative evidence, and other factors beyond the defendant's innocence. These factors are all exacerbated in terrorist trials by the difficulties of getting information from the place of capture, by classified information restrictions, and by stale or tainted evidence. One way to get around this problem is to assert the authority,** as the Bush administration did, **to use non-criminal detention for persons acquitted or given sentences too short to neutralize the danger they pose. But such an authority would undermine the whole purpose of trials and would render them a sham.** As a result, **putting a suspect on trial can make it hard to detain terrorists the government deems dangerous.** For example, the government would have had little trouble defending the indefinite detention of Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden's driver, under a military detention rationale. Having put him on trial before a military commission, however, it was stuck with the light sentence that Hamdan is completing at home in Yemen.¶ As a result of these considerations, **insistence on the exclusive use of criminal trials and the elimination of non-criminal detention would significantly raise the chances of releasing dangerous terrorists who would return** to kill Americans or others. Since noncriminal military detention is clearly a legally available option—at least if it is expressly authorized by Congress and contains adequate procedural guarantees—this risk should be unacceptable. In past military conflicts, the release of an enemy soldier posed risks. But they were not dramatic risks, for there was only so much damage a lone actor or small group of individuals could do.18 Today, however, **that lone actor can cause far more destruction and mayhem because technological advances are creating ever-smaller and ever-deadlier weapons**. It would be astounding if the American system, before the advent of modern terrorism, struck the balance between security and liberty in a manner that precisely reflected the new threats posed by asymmetric warfare. We face threats from individuals today that are of a different magnitude than threats by individuals in the past; having government authorities that reflect that change makes sense.

#### Risk is high now

Matthew, et al, 10/2/13 [ Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998.<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html>]

I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism.” The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists, and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real. The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated a consensus among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses a serious threat to the peace, security, and prosperity of our planet. For any country, a terrorist attack with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster, and the negative effects would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack requires international cooperation to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest experience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam**;** by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons; by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb would not be easy, but is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group, as numerous government studies have confirmed. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). Terrorists could, however, cut open a stolen nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own. • The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades. The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan. The group’s nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use. While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

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[Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus – South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct), accessed 9-16-2011,WYO/JF]

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , **Moore points out what most** **terrorists** obviously **already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries**. No doubt, **they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange**. As Moore points out, **all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel**. **Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,”** **it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States”**Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities**In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia.China would probably be involved as well,** **as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere**. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so.**The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons**. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors”  **In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons**, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, **leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.**

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#### Here’s a question – why is materialist criticism of capitalist social relations so utterly absent from Judith Butler’s theorizations of power and her critique of the ‘War on Terror’? Their affirmative, with its emphasis on the ethics of the Other, mourning, and representation, is the epitome of a toothless, facile leftism that is secretly wedded to the core of the system it hopes to critique. The desire for the public sphere to become inclusive of mourning and different understandings of the human is nothing more than an alibi for the liberal-democratic-capitalist status quo. Butler’s critical public perpetually plays the loyal opposition to the system, never willing to question its foundations. Putting our activist eggs in the affirmative’s basket is quite literally a recipe for political irrelevance and capitalist domination.

Paul Smith, Professor of Cultural Studies at George Mason University, 2004, symploke, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, p. 259-260

What all this amounts to, as I'm sure many other commentators have seen and remarked, is that Butler's thinking is essentially that of good old American liberalism leavened with a measure of imperfectly digested French structuralism and post-structuralism. The first casualty in that American tradition has always been political economy and history; they disappear even if they are ritually invoked in some polite way. The problem there, as I've suggested, is that real conditions and conjunctures cannot be fully understood. A second traditional characteristic is what might be called a creeping universalism, where the very fact of speaking from within the American context soon persuades the speaker that there is a "we" out there that shares assumptions and perceptions. An attentive reader of Butler's essays here will be easily able to track the mutations of the referent when she uses the pronoun "we." Even where her point is to argue for inclusivity, or for the extension of the boundaries of the human, it's clear that the initial vantage point is the American human. A third characteristic of America liberal discourse is its strain of religiosity. Butler's final chapter here, the only previously unpublished essay in the book, concentrates on Emmanuel Lévinas, and it exhibits that trait. The essay is intended to underline the philosophical basis of the book's general discussion of the human and it is from Lévinas that Butler gets her title, Precarious Life. For Lévinas the word précaire fully implicates its etymology in the Latin word precari, an interestingly intransitive verb meaning to pray. The suggestion in Lévinas is that the Other is finally the divinity to whom we must pray and upon whom our existence depends in a supplicatory way. Butler's text doesn't explicitly take on this thicker meaning of "precarious," but the pressure that the word exerts on her text produces a glimpse of the religiosity that lurks behind all her schemas of interrelational identity, or of mourning and melancholia, and of course of "the human." Like all liberal discourse Butler's essays have power and here they identify and assault some of the worst symptoms of post-9/11 America. Their tone is largely outraged and militant, and the essays are occasionally courageous and biting. But it would be a mistake, I think, to take them as much more than a kind of bien pensant liberalism. It's clear that liberalism has always acted as the loyal opposition, pressing for its right to dissent and question, but never finally questioning or dissenting from the very system that has produced both it and its master. Indeed, the condition of liberalism could be the dictionary definition of precariousness itself: utterly dependent on the system and its rules, always in a supplicatory or petitioning relation to it, wanting to have its voice heard but certainly never willing to overthrow it. Liberalism is, in that sense, not unlike the "embedded" journalists working hand in hand with the military in Iraq. All of which brings up the question that Butler's final chapter opens and closes with: what is the role and the use of cultural criticism in these times? Butler's answer is modest and limited. What we need, she claims, is to sustain the project of the humanities and cultural criticism by trying to ensure that dissenting voices are heard within American democracy; those voices will bring "us" back to find "the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense" (151). In my view, it's crucial to resist this strain of "cultural criticism." That's not because it's unnecessary to attack the same targets as Butler attacks—we cannot not attack those targets. But rather it's because the way of thinking—the philosophical tradition, indeed—that underpins her assaults is ultimately anything but radical. Cultural criticism would indeed be in a precarious state if this liberalism were its proper and uncontested location.

#### Furthermore, we’ve got problems with their discursive politics. Their focus on subjects excluded from normative conceptions of the human has malicious political consequences – Butler’s argument for expanding our conception of the human doesn’t actually change any of the underlying conditions of representation she critiques. Even worse, their focus on representations gives rise to a politics in which people whose identities are defined by class and capitalism and have no relation to ‘normative conceptions of the human’ are excluded from view. This isn’t just a link of omission – it’s a structural necessity of their politics of representation, which makes it just as exclusive as the sovereign politics they critique.

Paul Smith, Professor of Cultural Studies at George Mason University, 2004, symploke, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, p. 256-257

The nub of all this comes early in the book, when Butler proposes to consider "the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others, and thus certain human lives more grievable than others" (30).Thus, she asks why it is that Americans cannot grieve the Muslim dead in the post 9/11 conflicts. The absence of the Muslim dead from the news and the obituaries is immediately aligned with the struggles of "sexual minorities . . . transgendered people . . . intersexed people . . . [the] physically challenged" and racial minorities, all of whom struggle with the social imposition of parameters of the human, with normative values and "culturally viable notions of the human" (35). This sweeping homology is driven home by reference to "the queer lives that vanished on September 11," who went unrecognized in the obituaries and whose relatives were "belatedly and selectively . . . made eligible for benefits" (35). This rather breathtaking alignment has perhaps the opposite effect to that intended. Here and elsewhere Butler is at pains to say that she's not calling for simply some warm and fuzzy inclusion of excluded subjective into the faulty normative schemes that she sees all around her. Instead, she is calling for what she calls "an insurrection at the level of ontology" (33). (If that's to be the new slogan of radicalism, Bush, Ashcroft, Rumsfeld and their ilk probably aren't going to be losing a lot of sleep!) But rather than offering ways to reconceive relational subjectivity, or even simply highlighting the specific struggles of different subjects, Butler in effect produces nothing more than some rough equivalency amongst all those who somehow don't fit neatly into the "culturally viable notions of the human." To conceive of such an equivalency you have to do a lot of stripping away of materiality and you have to be virtually impervious to levels of specificity. At best, what Butler is pointing to here is a purely discursive or ideological homology, and it turns out to be a very incomplete homology even in its own terms. That is, there's something analytically wrong when Butler's highlighting of the "vanished lives" from the WTC can't include the laborers, janitors, food workers, homeless people and undocumented immigrants who died there, and whose struggles for recognition were not just about their access to "culturally viable notions of humanity" but equally about their economic value. In mostly unpublicized struggles to gain compensation and benefits, the relatives of many of these people, as well as attack survivors themselves, confronted the simple fact that their lives were simply not valued. The struggles of many of these people continue, three years after the attacks. These kinds of people don't appear in Butler's pantheon of victims—and nor do her victims themselves appear as labor, or as subjects whose identity is in any way at all constituted by their relation to capitalism (even though this might well be why they were attacked, as representatives of a predatory capitalist imperium). This elision, executed during Butler's cheerleading for the principles of inculsivity and relationality, is more than simply symptomatic of Butler's approach; it is a reminder of the weakness of any consideration of identity that cannot or will not entertain the historical and material conditions under which such identities are formed. In the end, what divides and differentiates subjects is not some factitious, contingent and unsatisfactory use of the category "human;" rather more it is the continual and relentless depredations of capital. So it's not really "conditions" that Butler investigates in this book; she isn't asking about American imperialism, or media power, or any of the material factors that inflect contemporary ideologies. Rather, she is simply pointing to some of the discursive structures and attitudinal habits that express those conditions. Butler will no doubt be familiar with the criticism that she is unable or unwilling to investigate those conditions or to see subjects as in any significant part produced by them. Similar issues are notably at stake in her exchanges with Nancy Fraser (in New Left Review) or with Gayle Rubin (in differences) in the last decade; and they arise again in her conversations with Laclau and Zizek in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000). In my view, in all of these exchanges Butler comes across as more obstinate than correct in dealing with the challenge to her thinking that political-economic factors pose. Indeed, in the last named text, when called to account for these lapses, she comes out with one of the most perverse formulations in all of her writing: "It's unclear that the subject is not, for instance, from the start structured by certain general features of capitalism, or that capitalism does not produce certain quandaries for the unconscious and, indeed, for the psychic subject more generally" (277). Such circumphrasis (a spectacular double negative and a vagueness masquerading through the repeated word "certain") can only confirm the suspicion that, if an examination of "conditions" entails thinking in terms of political economy, Butler doesn't in fact want anything to do with it.

#### Butler’s refusal to interrogate the material conditions of the present is not an anomaly – it’s symptomatic of a larger problem within the contemporary left: an obsessive attachment to mourning and melancholy. In Butler’s politics, a narcissistic attachment to our own identities and discourses is elevated above any commitment to change the material circumstances we find ourselves in. Butler and those who subscribe to her discursive politics come to love their identities as critics so intensely that they nurture them at the expense of even the hope of a radical societal transformation.

Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley, 2002, Loss: The Politics of Mourning, p. 458-460

For the last two decades, cultural theorist Stuart Hall has insisted that the “crisis of the Left” is due neither to internal divisions in the activist or academic Left nor to the clever rhetoric or funding schemes of the Right. Rather, he has charged, this ascendancy is consequent to the Left’s own failure to apprehend the character of the age and to develop a political critique and a moral-political vision appropriate to this character. For Hall, the rise of the Thatcher-Reagan Right was a symptom rather than a cause of this failure, just as the Left’s dismissive or suspicious attitude toward cultural politics is for Hall a sign not of its unwavering principles but of its anachronistic habits of thought and its fears and anxieties about revising those habits. But what are the content and dynamic of these fears and anxieties? I want to develop just one thread of this problem through a consideration of the phenomenon named “Left melancholia” by Walter Benjamin more than half a century ago. What did Benjamin mean by and with this pejorative appellation for a certain intellectual and political bearing? As most readers will know, Benjamin was neither categorically nor characterologically opposed to the value and valence of sadness as such, nor to the potential insights gleaned from brooding over one’s losses. Indeed, he had a well-developed appreciation of the productive value of acedia, sadness, and mourning for political and cultural work, and in his study of Baudelaire, Benjamin treated melancholia itself as something of a creative wellspring. But “Left melancholia” is Benjamin’s unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, finally, more attached to a particular political analysis or ideal— even to the failure of that ideal— than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present. In Benjamin’s enigmatic insistence on the political value of a dialectical historical grasp of “the time of the Now,” Left melancholia represents not only a refusal to come to terms with the particular character of the present, that is, a failure to understand history in terms other than “empty time” or “progress.” It signifies as well a certain narcissism with regard to one’s past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance, or transformation. 1 The irony of melancholia, of course, is that attachment to the object of one’s sorrowful loss supersedes any desire to recover from this loss, to live free of it in the present, to be unburdened by it. This is what renders melancholia a persistent condition, a state, indeed, a structure of desire, rather than a transient response to death or loss. In Freud’s 1917 meditation on melancholia, he reminds us of a second singular feature of melancholy: It entails “a loss of a more ideal kind [than mourning]. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love.” 2 Moreover, Freud suggests, the melancholic will often not know precisely what about the object has been loved and lost: “This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious.” 3 The loss precipitating melancholy is more often than not unavowed and unavowable. Finally, Freud suggests that the melancholic subject— low in self-regard, despairing, even suicidal— has shifted the reproach of the once-loved object (a reproach waged for not living up to the idealization by the beloved) onto itself, thus preserving the love or idealization of the object even as the loss of this love is experienced in the suffering of the melancholic. Now why would Benjamin use this term, and the emotional economy it represents, to talk about a particular formation on and of the Left? Benjamin never offers a precise formulation of Left melancholia. Rather, he deploys it as a term of opprobrium for those more beholden to certain long-held sentiments and objects than to the possibilities of political transformation in the present. Benjamin is particularly attuned to the melancholic’s investment in “things.” In the Trauerspiel, he argues that “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge,” here suggesting that the loyalty of the melancholic converts its truth (“every loyal vow or memory”) about its beloved into a thing, indeed, imbues knowledge itself with a thinglike quality. 4 Another version of this formulation: “In its tenacious self-absorption [melancholy] embraces dead objects in its contemplation.” 5 More simply, melancholia is loyal “to the world of things,” 6 suggesting a certain logic of fetishism— with all the conservatism and withdrawal from human relations that fetishistic desire implies— contained within the melancholic logic. In the critique of Kastner’s poems in which Benjamin first coins “Left melancholia,” Benjamin suggests that sentiments themselves become things for the Left melancholic who “takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods.” 7 We come to love our Left passions and reasons, our Left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them. Left melancholia, in short, is Benjamin’s name for a mournful, conservative, backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen in the heart of the putative Leftist. If Freud is helpful here, then this condition presumably issues from some unaccountable loss, some unavowably crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms Left, Socialism, Marx, or the Movement.

#### This has the devastating consequence of extinction

DYER-WITHERFORD (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) 1999   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN HOW TO ACT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OUTSIDE OF LABOR MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION BEYOND OPPRESSION

TUMINO (Prof. English @ Pitt) 2001

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online //wyo-tjc]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### Case

#### Biopower doesn’t result in extermination

**Dickinson**, associate professor of history – UC Davis, **‘4**

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

#### They don’t solve – Butler’s theory of discursive politics can’t account for the nature of the contemporary state. Their model of critical citizenship is outdated and never even rises to the level of directly challenging those in power.

Eva Cherniavsky, Assistant Professor of English at Indiana University, June 2005, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 189

The turn to Foucault and to a direct engagement with new modes of state and other administrative power is particular to the chapter on the new war prison, in this book which otherwise thinks primarily through the philosophy of ethics (Levinas) and psychoanalysis. Precarious Life has much to say about people’s affective orientation to power—how we often remain “unmoved,” in Butler’s phrase, and might yet learn to be “moved,” through a recognition of the precariousness of other lives. “It was from that apprehension of the precariousness of those lives we destroyed,” Butler points out, “that many US citizens came to develop an important and vital consensus against the war” (150). Yet, the question remains how our affective “movements’” will matter to state power, when it no longer proceeds by manufacturing consent, but by regulating information flows—when, we might say, citizenship refers to a bureaucratic category that regulates the mobility of bodies in and across national, regional, and global space, rather than a mode of civic agency, to which, therefore, the affective orientation of the citizen is critical. I am suggesting that the category of democratic citizenship is at present a nostalgic reference that must be critically reconstructed as a precondition for engaging the new state formation Butler describes. From this vantage, where Precarious Life fails productively—which is to say, and by no means ingenuously, that it succeeds—is in marking the discontinuities between the psychic lives of political subjects and the operation of administrative power that it sets out to overcome.

#### Zero risk of their impact---instrumental knowledge production doesn’t cause violence and discursive criticism could never solve it anyway

Ken Hirschkop 7, Professor of English and Rhetoric at the University of Waterloo, July 25, 2007, “On Being Difficult,” Electronic Book Review, online: http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/criticalecologies/transitive

This defect - not being art - is one that theory should prolong and celebrate, not remedy. For the most egregious error Chow makes is to imagine that obstructing instrumentalism is somehow a desirable and effective route for left-wing politics. The case against instrumentalism is made in depth in the opening chapter, which argues with reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki that "[t]he dropping of the atomic bombs effected what Michel Foucault would call a major shift in epistemes, a fundamental change in the organization, production and circulation of knowledge" (33). It initiates the "age of the world target" in which war becomes virtualized and knowledge militarized, particularly under the aegis of so-called "area studies". It's hard not to see this as a Pacific version of the notorious argument that the Gulag and/or the Holocaust reveal the exhaustion of modernity. And the first thing one has to say is that this interpretation of war as no longer "the physical, mechanical struggles between combative oppositional groups" (33), as now transformed into a matter technology and vision, puts Chow in some uncomfortable intellectual company: like that of Donald Rumsfeld, whose recent humiliation is a timely reminder that wars continue to depend on the deployment of young men and women in fairly traditional forms of battle. Pace Chow, war can indeed be fought, and fought successfully, "without the skills of playing video games" (35) and this is proved, with grim results, every day. But it's the title of this new epoch - the title of the book as well - that truly gives the game away. Heidegger's "Age of the World Picture" claimed that the distinguishing phenomena of what we like to call modernity - science, machine technology, secularization, the autonomy of art and culture - depended, in the last instance, on a particular metaphysics, that of the "world conceived of and grasped as a picture", as something prepared, if you like, for the manipulations of the subject. Against this vision of "sweeping global instrumentalism" Heidegger set not Mallarmé, but Hölderlin, and not just Hölderlin, but also "reflection", i.e., Heidegger's own philosophy. It's a philosophical reprise of what Francis Mulhern has dubbed "metaculture", the discourse in which culture is invoked as a principle of social organization superior to the degraded machinations of "politics", degraded machinations which, at the time he was composing this essay, had led Heidegger to lower his expectations of what National Socialism might achieve. In the fog of metaphysics, every actually existing nation - America, the Soviet Union, Germany - looks just as grey, as does every conceivable form of politics. For the antithesis of the "world picture" is not a more just democratic politics, but no politics at all, and it is hard to see how this stance can serve as the starting point for a political critique. If Chow decides to pursue this unpromising path anyhow, it is probably because turning exploitation, military conquest and prejudice into so many epiphenomena of a metaphysical "instrumentalism" grants philosophy and poetry a force and a role in revolutionising the world that would otherwise seem extravagant. Or it would do, if "instrumentalism" was, as Chow claims a "demotion of language", if language was somehow more at home exulting in its own plenitude than merely referring to things. Poor old language. Apparently ignored for centuries, it only receives its due when poststructuralists force us to acknowledge it. In their hands, "language flexes its muscles and breaks the chains of its hitherto subordination to thought" and, as a consequence, "those who pursue poststructuralist theory in the critical writings find themselves permanently at war with those who expect, and insist on, the transparency - that is, the invisibility - of language as a tool of communication" (48). We have been down this road before and will no doubt go down it again. In fact, it's fair to say this particular journey has become more or less the daily commute of critical theory, though few have thought it ought to be described in such openly military terms. There is good reason, however, to think Chow's chosen route will lead not to the promised land of resistance and emancipation, but to more Sisyphean frustration. In fact, there are several good reasons.

#### the aff can’t solve the broader power grabs of the state

Nasser Hussain 7, an assistant professor in the Department of Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought at Amherst College, Summer 07, “Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 4

Finally, what are some of the implications of the argument that norm and exception have blurred severely and perhaps irrevocably? Let me stress that my efforts to draw attention to the ways in which an administrative legality has made the concept of a state of exception superfluous is not just theoretical disagreement or just an effort to discredit one particular paradigm. One may agree or disagree about the continuing validity of a concept, but my more immediate concern here is that the concept not overshadow or distort efforts to fashion a newer, fairer, and more just response.¶ Consider then one such effort to fashion a new response: Bruce Ackerman’s proposals in “The Emergency Constitution.”50 Ackerman’s essay begins with the recognition that attacks on the U.S. similar to 9/11 are almost a virtual certainty and that without creative new constitutional concepts each attack will only prompt harsher political measures in a “downward cycle” (“A,” p. 1044). Dismissing the models currently provided for by war and crime, Ackerman settles on the concept of emergency and sets out to find a way to grant and yet control the use of extraordinary powers in the case of a genuine emergency. For Ackerman, it is time to try to rescue the concept of a state of exception from fascist thinkers like Schmitt, who used it as a battering ram against liberal democracy. Ackerman would confine a genuine emergency to a bounded state (tellingly, the “triggering event” in Ackerman’s proposals is left entirely uncharted, left to the hope of political wisdom). But because Ackerman neglects the more dispersed condition of emergency in contemporary conditions, his proposals hinge on the use of legislative oversight largely in the form of a “supermajoritarian escalator”: “majority support should serve to sustain emergency for a short time—two or three months. Continuation should require an escalating cascade of supermajorities: sixty percent for the next two months; seventy for the next; eighty thereafter” (“A,” p. 1047). While such a sensible and even workable proposal would go some of the way towards removing some of the current excesses of executive policy, my effort at highlighting the role of administrative agencies and regulations suggests that the effectiveness of Ackerman’s proposals would remain extremely limited. That is to say, only if we presume that a bounded state of exception rather than a more dispersed emergency regulation is currently being used would efforts to bind it further be effective. But proposals such as the supermajoritarian escalator would do very little to change the “spitting on the sidewalk” strategy endorsed by Ashcroft or the use of petty visa violations to enable large‐scale roundups and prolonged detention—as I noted earlier, what enables the indefinite detention of hundreds of people without charge is not the use of an exceptional measure but the multiple use of an everyday measure

. Moreover, as I earlier noted with reference to Nonet’s work, the internal structure of a rule of law and its relation to administrative regimes, far from negating such an outcome, actually facilitates it. The current emergency response whose operations we witness daily emerges from a broader field of governmentality, and until such a modular and legalistic character is addressed any effort to design a more liberal emergency constitution will invariably miss a great many of its intended targets.

#### They can’t stop dehumanization – dominant cultural and media forces will just shift to a different target to exclude from the sphere of the human.

Robin Schott, Ph.D., lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, Education, and Rhetoric, University of Copenhagen, December 20, 2004, online: http://www.kvinfo.dk/side/563/article/297/, accessed September 30, 2006

Butler's discussion of dependency and vulnerability in this book leads her also to use the language of relationality. Feminist philosophers have focused a good deal of attention on the relations that constitute human subjectivity, ethics and politics, though Butler has not previously used these terms. In *Bodies that Matter*, she writes of "subjectivation" and "subjection" to highlight the framework by which power, discourse, and the imaginary precede any actual encounter between people. In *Precarious Life*, however, she explicitly states her affinity to the term "relationality", but adds, "we may need other language to approach...how we not only are constituted by our relations but also dispossessed by them as well." Butler's primary position in this book in terms of identity politics is not that of a feminist or lesbian, but that of a "progressive Jew". She turns to Levinas to work through "what an ethic of Jewish non-violence might be.". She boldly criticizes current Israeli politics, arguing against the tendency to identify anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. And she argues for the possibility of a revised form of Zionism, a post-Zionist Israel, an autonomous Palestinian state, or a secular, one-state solution. Why does Jewishness have such a prominent position in her current reflection? On the theoretical level, she draws inspiration from Jewish philosophers like Levinas and Derrida. On the political level, by speaking publicly as a Jew who criticizes Israeli policies, she displaces the position of Jew as eternal victim. She notes that the victim is transposable: "it can shift from minute to minute from the Jew atrociously killed by suicide bombers on a bus to the Palestinian child atrociously killed by Israeli gunfire." Butler's essays are a very timely intervention in the political crises since September 11, 2001. She demonstrates how theories developed to analyze gender and sexuality provide important resources for addressing issues of political violence. Nonetheless, engaging with her work raises a number of questions. First, what is the relation between human vulnerability and politics? Thomas Hobbes also thought that human beings are vulnerable when he wrote in 1660 that human life is nasty, brutish and short *(Leviathan* I, 13). Yet the politics that Hobbes endorses is far from what Butler has in mind. The politics that she envisions is one that many progressives want. It is a politics that is opposed to war, to American imperialism, to the violation of human rights and the destruction of human lives. What is the connection between her starting point, that we are vulnerable, and her conclusion, that we must struggle for "a politics that seeks to diminish suffering universally"? Although Butler charts her course through the ethical theory of Levinas, many other progressives reach this political vision by a critique of capitalism, imperialism, racism and war. So her ethical theory is not a necessary step for reaching this political vision. Second, I wonder whether her own theory can support her call for us to widen the concept of the human. Her theoretical work has elaborated on how the process of dehumanization, which excludes certain lives from being recognized as human, is also constitutive of the concept of the human. If this is right, can one ever eliminate the logic by which some lives are treated as non-human? Is the ethical task to try to limit the number of lives who fall into this category? Or do we merely shift who is considered non-human in different places and times?

#### Butler understands power to be totalizing and without an outside – this view of power misses certain subjects, i.e. bare life, that are totally set outside of power relations. Bare life is distinct from people the U.S. refuses to mourn – bare life represents a life totally unintelligible within Butler’s understanding of power. This turns the aff because it means their theory of power makes the production of bare life possible.

Don Moore, doctoral candidate in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 2005, Politics and Culture, Issue 1, online: http://aspen.conncoll.edu/politicsandculture/page.cfm?key=375, accessed October 1, 2006

Agamben states the problem like this: "If life, in modern biopolitics, is immediately politics, here this unity, which itself has the form of an irrevocable decision, withdraws from every external decision and appears as an indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into an existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold" (153). To state this differently, when one ignores the possibility of a sovereign exceptionalism that is both the precondition and epistemological "centre" of power and which has the capability of totally excluding certain subjects from power, you cut off those excluded, or "non-relevant" instances of humanity from recourse to the biopolitical law for protection or for inclusion in community. In other words, those subjects whose "life" exists outside of power cannot be advocated for if your critical lens filters out everything not schematizable in terms of power relations. Can the homo sacer (take, for example, the Jew in the Nazi death camp) exercise power, or ever penetrate the enabling infrastructures of the state or of communities of empowerment, a subversive agency that Foucault and Bulter suggest is always at least a remote possibility? Or is this option sometimes simply not available for those who have had parts or the entirety of their humanity relegated to irrelevant "bare existence?" And what is the effect of this remote(?) possibility when read into Butler's critique? But under what conditions can the law totally exclude some life from the power dynamics of humanity? Agamben's critique of the sovereign exception over "bare life" or the homo sacer seems to suggest that this is always the case, since it is only by the total exclusion of all but certain biopolitically relevant life that a system of power can inaugurate itself into epistemological being. And I will argue here that Agamben's critique allows for differing degrees of a subject's exclusion from biopolitical life through the sovereign exception. Examples of this ongoing negotiation over the shifting limits of "bare life" vs biopolitical life are the ethics around abortion, "brain death," the space of the concentration camp, and Agamben's example of the "wolf man" (Agamben 104-11). The wolf-man is a particularly interesting case due to its embodiment of an ambivalent human/animal subject. A mythical category in ancient Greek law, it was used to identify and apprehend human subjects on the basis that they fall neither into the categories of animality nor of humanity, and thus could not be murdered or sacrificed since they were already judged as "dead" by the law. The juridicial language of the "wolf-man" brings to mind President George W. Bush's vow to bomb terrorists and soldiers hiding in "caves" in Afghanistan "back to the stone age." The ethical implications and political stakes of such a dehumanizing, social Darwinist rhetoric are much more clear to me when I think, by way of Agamben's homo sacer, how the individual lives of these fighters have been rendered almost pre-historic, "animal" or "insect" (as dwelling underground or in caves suggests) and thus exterminatable outside of international human rights law or the Geneva convention, as opposed to Butler's method of straining to hear, within the rhetorical din (where I am in danger of become contained and managed as a critic) for the feint whispers of Butler's precariously human other. I think an important point here is not to dismiss Butler's method as irredeemably "western-centric," nor to discard her performative subject as somehow methodologically ineffective. Clearly this is not the case, and surely the rigorous exercise of "straining to hear" for gaps and absences in such a rhetorical morass as Bush's ethical rhetoric is worth the effort. But in order to better judge what traces of radical otherness we can actually hope to find in such a violent ethical discourse, perhaps it is important to recognize the drastic extent to which certain very powerful sovereign discourses of political exceptionalism can in effect erase the humanity, or the relevance, of certain "publics" within the dominant discourse of humanity, and that this depoliticization, which amounts to dehumanization, is the very condition and operating principle of power. I would argue that such a realization doesn't diminish the effectiveness of Butlerian power as a critical hinge for unpacking the nuances of biopower dynamics, but rather expands the effectiveness of that hinge by identifying the radical potentiality of understanding what it can't account for. The methodological point I am trying to make here is to underline the importance of rethinking the limitations of Butlerian power as a ground by which Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence theorizes the power of mourning to discursively produce the ethical limits of the "human" subject. Reading this book more carefully for the ways in which it is in dialogue with Agamben's critique of power demonstrates, for me, that power is not so much a totalizing "ground" by which to measure the operations of all modalities of subjectivity, i.e. class, race, gender, age, but is instead an important yet limited concept that works in, through, and alongside these other modalities of subjectivity. Not recognizing the epistemological limits of power as a concept, as Spivak and Agamben have pointed out, is to blind oneself - as perhaps Butler sometimes does - to the ways in which humanity is constituted by the sovereign exception over that which does not count in the biopolitics of humanity. And surely this is a crucial point to ponder for those interested in negotiating the possibilities of political agency for subjects that may find themselves not subject to power; those who, through the powerful hegemonic exceptionalism of certain sovereign groups - the abused prisoners of Abu Ghraib whose human rights were suspended by the US government come to mind - are either partially or entirely excluded from humanity and thus the rights afforded to humans.

# 2nc

## case

#### No unending violence- Political constraints check

Posner And Vermeule 11

Eric Posner, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, and Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, March 2011, The Executive Unbound, p. 176-7

So far we have attempted to show that the administrative state relaxes legal constraints on the executive, but generates political constraints in the form of public opinion. In this chapter we fit this picture together with the fear of unbridled executive power that is such a prominent strand in liberal legalism. We suggest that liberal legalists overlook the importance of de facto constraints arising from politics, and thus equate a legally unconstrained executive with one that is unconstrained tout court. The horror of dictatorship that results from this fallacy and that animates liberal legalism is what we call "tyrannophobia." Tyranny looms large in the American political imagination. For the framers of the Constitution, Caesar, Cromwell, James II, and George III were antimodels; for the current generation, Hitler takes pride of place, followed by Stalin, Mao, and a horde of tyrants both historical and literary. Students read 1984 and Animal Farm and relax by watching Chancellor Palpatine seize imperial power in Star Wars. Unsurprisingly, comparisons between sitting presidents and the tyrants of history and fiction are a trope of political discourse. Liberals and libertarians routinely compared George W. Bush to Hitler, George III, and Caesar. Today, Barack Obama receives the same treatment, albeit in less respectable media of opinion. All major presidents are called a "dictator" or said to have "dictatorial powers" from time to time.' Yet the United States has never had a Caesar or a Cromwell, or even come close to having one, and rational actors should update their risk estimates in the light of experience, reducing them if the risk repeatedly fails to materialize. By now, 235 years after independence, these risk estimates should be close to zero. Why then does the fear of dictatorship—tyrannophobia—persist so strongly in American political culture? Is the fear justified, or irrational? Does tyrannophobia itself affect the risk of dictatorship? If so, does it reduce the risk or increase it?

#### Threat con doesn’t result in war

Kaufman 9

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9 (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### Finally, extend the 1NC #6, our Moore evidence:

#### ( ) The state of exception IS the exception. Even if Butler’s theory of power is correct in the abstract, it breaks down when sovereign power begins to declare the state of exception, suspending the normal rules of power relations. Moore says that Agamben takes Butler to biopower school on the biopower bus –power relations are quite literally NOT universally vulnerable to strategic reversals, because there are some subjects who are completely beyond the realm of discursive resistance. The paradigmatic example is Jews in the Nazi concentration camps – subjects placed so far beyond actual relations of power that a Butlerian understanding of power cannot possibly account for them.

#### Agamben demonstrates that the distinction between those included in the sphere of recognizably human and those excluded from it ITSELF rests on another distinction – people excluded from representation itself, people who don’t even register as people. These are the people that Butler’s view of power excludes.

#### ( ) The implication – Moore says this is not a mere oversight on Butler’s part – rather, it’s a structural necessity of her theory of power, which has malicious political consequences. When we subscribe to Butler’s view of power we willingly exclude from view the populations subject to the worst biopolitical violence. This turns the aff, and has the external impact of rendering even more people as bare life.

## terror

### Motivation

**Al Qaeda’s actions, statements, and internal documents prove they want nuclear weapons and mass casualty attacks---\*\*if the US relents, it guarantees nuclear attacks**

Larry J. **Arbuckle 8**, Naval Postgraduate School, "The Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism through an Attribution Capability", Thesis for master of science in defense analysis, approved by Professor Robert O'Connell, and Gordon McCormick, Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, June

However, there is evidence that a small number of terrorist organizations in recent history, and at least one presently, have nuclear ambitions. These groups include Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and Chechen separatists (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Of these, Al Qaeda appears to have made the most serious attempts to obtain or otherwise develop a nuclear weapon. Demonstrating these intentions, in 2001 Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, and two other al Qaeda operatives met with two Pakistani scientists to discuss weapons of mass destruction development (Kokoshin, 2006). Additionally, Al Qaeda has made significant efforts to justify the use of mass violence to its supporters. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, an al Qaeda spokesman has stated that al Qaeda, “has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children,” in retaliation for deaths that al Qaeda links to the U.S. and its support of Israel (as cited in Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Indeed Bin Laden received a fatwa in May 2003 from an extreme Saudi cleric authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. civilians (Bunn, Wier, and Friedman; 2005). Further evidence of intent is the following figure taken from al Qaeda documents seized in Afghanistan. **It depicts a workable design for a nuclear weapon.** Additionally, the text accompanying the design sketch includes some **fairly advanced weapons design parameters** (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Clearly **maximizing the loss of life is key among al Qaeda’s goals**. Thus their use of conventional means of attack presently appears to be a **result of their current capabilities** and not a function of their pure preference (Western Europe, 2005).

Risk is high-- matthew

### Turns case

**Nuclear Terror turns the case because civil-liberties crackdowns**

Vladimir Z. **Dvorkin 12** Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “**dirty bombs**” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of **panic and socio-economic destabilization**.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that **well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities**.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. **Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible**. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is **comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima**. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. **The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order**.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

### Conseq

#### Consequentialism is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching\_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism\_and\_Global\_Ethics-1-2.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

### AT Security

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism** implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

#### Shifting away from the security framework causes conflict and causes intervention –

**McCormack 10**

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

A corollary of this retreat from a political interpretation of conflict or social instability, is the delegitimation of social transformation in developing countries. Historically, social and political transformation has often been accompanied by war and strife. By pathologising conflict, the human security framework acts to prohibit social or political transformation, as such changes can only be understood in an entirely negative way (see for further discussion, Cramer 2006). As an important contributor to the human security framework has argued: ‘much human insecurity surely results from structural factors and the distribution of power, which are essentially beyond the reach of individuals’ (Newman, 2004b: 358). Thus to actually overcome human insecurity, collective action and change is needed. But this **may result in** **internal conflict or strife**, **precisely the changes that human security problematises in the first place**. People may be prepared to experience disruptions to their daily existence, or even severe societal conflict or economic deprivation in the pursuit of some other goals which are understood as worthy. The shift away from the pluralist security framework is **highly problematic**. The formal links between the state and its citizens are problematised and weak and failing states are potentially held up to increased international scrutiny and international intervention. International institutions and states have potentially greater freedom to intervene in other states, but with no reciprocal methods of control to replace the old political links between the state and its citizens which are weakened. The shift away from the pluralist security framework and the rhetorical adoption by international institutions and states of a more cosmopolitan security framework **does not challenge contemporary power inequalities, rather it serves to entrench them**. Once we separate rights from any rights bearing subject, these rights are only things that can be given by external agencies, indeed as Chandler (2009) has argued, here the subject is created by external powers. Ultimately the cosmopolitan and emancipatory framework which seeks to give universal human rights through international law or forms of intervention posits abstract rights, seeking to make the world conform to universal human rights and justice in the absence of a political constituency to give it content. Indeed this is seen as necessary in the face of the current global injustices. Yet the problem is that **without a political constituency to give content to those rights these rights are gifts of the powerful, they are closer to charity**. **Rights in themselves, without political form, are of little value**. Here rights are assumed to be able to correct political and economic and social wrongs, such as inequality or disempowerment. Yet such problems are not the result of a lack of rights, and cannot be corrected through rights. A lack of development is a political, economic and social problem (Lewis, 1998; Heartfield, 1996), the lack of rights or equality and empowerment stem from the real inequalities and power relations in the world. Divorcing rights from rights bearing subjects, and positing abstract individual rights that can only be ‘given’ by external agencies, does not enhance rights but ends up formalising real inequality (Lewis, 1998). Indeed, this is precisely what we can see with, for example, human security and contemporary interventions. Here, the old formal equality of the pluralist security framework is no longer relevant and it is increasingly accepted that more powerful states have a right to intervene in other states and to frame certain states as ‘outlaw states’ (Simpson, 2005). Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that there have been significant shifts in the post-Cold War security problematic which cannot be understood in terms of the pluralist security framework. The most striking aspect of the contemporary international security problematic seems to be a shift away from and problematisation of the old security framework in both international and national security policy discourse. I have already discussed that the pluralist security framework with its underlying commitments of non-intervention and sovereign equality is held to be both anachronistic and immoral. This chapter lends support to broadening the initial conclusions drawn about the critical security theory more generally. In their own terms critical security theorists do not seem to be very critical. Critical security theorists **are not** **critically engaging and explaining the contemporary security problematic and offering an alternative** to contemporary power inequalities. A critical question to ask would be why have international institutions and states framed their security policies in terms of a rejection of the pluralist security framework and taken up cosmopolitan rhetoric? Where does this shift come from? Despite their ostensible focus on power and power inequalities, it is striking that critical security theorists exclude the way in which power is being exercised in the post-Cold War international order from their analysis. Were critical security theorists to include this in their analysis they would discover that they seem to be sharing many of the assumptions and aims of the post-Cold War international order. Specifically in the context of the shifting international security problematic, critical security theorists seem to share a normative and ethical critique of the old security framework, combined with a depoliticised account of conflict and social, economic and political instability, and a depoliticised and idealised view of the potential of major international institutions and states to intervene. Moreover, in the behaviour and rhetoric of international institutions, the problematic theoretical implications of critical security theory’s idealised assumptions of the potential of international institutions or transnational organisations to be a force for emancipation and freedom for individuals is shown to be problematic in practice. I have argued that this rejection of the pluralist security framework does not challenge the status quo, but serves to further entrench power inequalities. In fact, it seems to reflect the increased freedom of the international community to intervene in other states.

### AT ISLAMAPHOBIA

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – it’s not a monolithic entity – defer to specific research

Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. **A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’**. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. **These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines** – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – **and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods** (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) **persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.**

#### Challenging Muslim groups that target civilians is not Islamophobic. Islamophobia instead results from conflating cultural characteristics and violence

**Ramadan ‘10** – Tariq, professor of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Theology at Oxford (Good Muslim, Bad Muslim”, Middle East Online, First Published: 2010-03-17, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37897)

There are those in the west today who are keen to define moderate Muslims as those who are invisible, or look just like us, who support us, or even as those who have accepted the terms of their subjection. In turn, they want to declare all the rest as fundamentalists or extremists. Such self-serving judgements are ideological in nature and lead only to an intellectual confusion that prevents us from grasping the essentially political and economic nature of the debate. They cannot help us to understand the complex dynamics at work in Muslim societies. Once we have condemned the violent -- extremist groups that murder innocent civilians supposedly in the name of Islam, we must move forward and place their political positions in context.

There exists a strictly religious debate, couched in the language of Islamic jurisprudence and the fundamentals of faith, over the notion of moderation. If this is grasped - as it must be - it becomes possible to approach the more relevant political questions with far less prejudice and naivety. We should never forget that religious moderation, however it is defined, is perfectly compatible with a radical, non-violent, democratic political stance that rejects all forms of domination, exploitation and oppression.

#### Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

### AT KATO

#### Imagining potential nuclear wars serves as a collective warning against its possibility and opens up space for interrogating national values

Seed, Professor of English literature at the University of Liverpool, 2000

(David, “Imagining the Worst: Science Fiction and Nuclear War,” Journal of American Studies of Turkey,

Vol. 11, pp. 39-49, <http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~jast/Number11/Seed.htm>)

A number of recurring features emerge from these narratives. In virtually every case the USA plays a reactive role, never attacking first. Secondly, **the nation’s capacity to cope with such an attack becomes a test of its morale and for that reason the nuclear aftermath**, in the short and long term, **occasions an interrogation of cherished national values.** Thirdly, because nuclear attack can only be mounted with the latest technology, these novels explore anxieties about problems of control. Finally this fiction expresses a collective horror of ultimate endings. Some human presence persists however tenuous or displaced. Cherished human values like reason might be transposed on to extraterrestrial beings; or reader might play out the role of a survivor through the very act of reading a narrative whose deliverer has died. Ultimately there is an unusual circularity to such narratives. **By deploying a whole range of strategies to imagine a dreaded future, they function as warnings against such imminent developments. The more the future fails to develop along these imagined lines, the more necessary is the reconfirmation of these narratives as mere imaginary extrapolations.**

#### Imagining future nuclear wars prevents them

Martin, 82

[Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982 (Brian, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159)

But these possibilities provide relatively little consolation for the human disaster of nuclear war, and certainly would not justify any policy which significantly increased the risk of nuclear war. **It is in their implications for the present that peace movement activities relating to nuclear war must be assessed.**

It is my belief that **preparation for nuclear war** by the peace movement **would reduce the chance of nuclear war by providing a visible threat to the otherwise unchallenged continuance of existing political institutions.** National decision-makers may wish to avoid nuclear war to save their own lives, but they have demonstrated a continued willingness to risk nuclear war, both in crises and confrontations and through the very existence of nuclear arsenals, through the policies they have promoted and the institutions they have constructed and supported. **This institutionalised risk of nuclear war will seem less acceptable if one consequence of continued preparations for war were a major challenge to the complete system of political and economic power and privilege**. Nuclear weapons states have refrained from nuclear war thus far not primarily because of their perception of the human disaster of nuclear war but because of the possible political consequences. A prepared peace movement would ensure that such political consequences are as serious as possible.

# 1nr

### O/V

Their vulnerable strategy falls victim to the erasure of history. Her and THEIR affirmation of life just being vulnerable. Smith shows that she leaves behind any kind of history. The reason those detainees are there in the first place is a motive of greed by capitalism to take the middle east from the 9/11 attacks. The defense against other terrorist attacks are the

#### FELLOW-FEELING OR COMPASSION ARE IMPOSSIBLE UNDER A CAPITALIST LOGIC -IT MONETIZES ALL LIFE, ENABLING THE WORST ATROCITIES IMAGINABLE

Kovel 02

Joel Kovel, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 2002, p. 141.

Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied by a racist drumbeat; for global capital, the losses are regrettable necessities.

### Perms

#### FIRST, YOU GET NO PERMUTATION —BEFORE WE CAN DISCUSS STRATEGIES FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM, YOU HAVE TO PROVE YOU *KNOW* THE PROBLEM. METHODOLOGY COMES FIRST—DEBATE IS THUS NOT A QUESTION OF COMPETITION BETWEEN A PLAN AND AN ALTERNATIVE, BUT WHETHER THE AFFIRMATIVE HAS ANY EPISTEMIC FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD THAT ISN’T INFECTED BY CAPITALISM TO IDEOLOGICALLY SUSTAIN THE SYSTEM

#### SECOND, THE PERM DOESN’T SOLVE OUR LINKS:

#### Here’s a question – why is materialist criticism of capitalist social relations so utterly absent from Judith Butler’s theorizations of power and her critique of the ‘War on Terror’? Their affirmative, with its emphasis on the ethics of the Other, mourning, and representation, is the epitome of a toothless, facile leftism that is secretly wedded to the core of the system it hopes to critique. The desire for the public sphere to become inclusive of mourning and different understandings of the human is nothing more than an alibi for the liberal-democratic-capitalist status quo. Butler’s critical public perpetually plays the loyal opposition to the system, never willing to question its foundations. Putting our activist eggs in the affirmative’s basket is quite literally a recipe for political irrelevance and capitalist domination.

Paul Smith, Professor of Cultural Studies at George Mason University, 2004, symploke, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, p. 259-260

What all this amounts to, as I'm sure many other commentators have seen and remarked, is that Butler's thinking is essentially that of good old American liberalism leavened with a measure of imperfectly digested French structuralism and post-structuralism. The first casualty in that American tradition has always been political economy and history; they disappear even if they are ritually invoked in some polite way. The problem there, as I've suggested, is that real conditions and conjunctures cannot be fully understood. A second traditional characteristic is what might be called a creeping universalism, where the very fact of speaking from within the American context soon persuades the speaker that there is a "we" out there that shares assumptions and perceptions. An attentive reader of Butler's essays here will be easily able to track the mutations of the referent when she uses the pronoun "we." Even where her point is to argue for inclusivity, or for the extension of the boundaries of the human, it's clear that the initial vantage point is the American human. A third characteristic of America liberal discourse is its strain of religiosity. Butler's final chapter here, the only previously unpublished essay in the book, concentrates on Emmanuel Lévinas, and it exhibits that trait. The essay is intended to underline the philosophical basis of the book's general discussion of the human and it is from Lévinas that Butler gets her title, Precarious Life. For Lévinas the word précaire fully implicates its etymology in the Latin word precari, an interestingly intransitive verb meaning to pray. The suggestion in Lévinas is that the Other is finally the divinity to whom we must pray and upon whom our existence depends in a supplicatory way. Butler's text doesn't explicitly take on this thicker meaning of "precarious," but the pressure that the word exerts on her text produces a glimpse of the religiosity that lurks behind all her schemas of interrelational identity, or of mourning and melancholia, and of course of "the human." Like all liberal discourse Butler's essays have power and here they identify and assault some of the worst symptoms of post-9/11 America. Their tone is largely outraged and militant, and the essays are occasionally courageous and biting. But it would be a mistake, I think, to take them as much more than a kind of bien pensant liberalism. It's clear that liberalism has always acted as the loyal opposition, pressing for its right to dissent and question, but never finally questioning or dissenting from the very system that has produced both it and its master. Indeed, the condition of liberalism could be the dictionary definition of precariousness itself: utterly dependent on the system and its rules, always in a supplicatory or petitioning relation to it, wanting to have its voice heard but certainly never willing to overthrow it. Liberalism is, in that sense, not unlike the "embedded" journalists working hand in hand with the military in Iraq. All of which brings up the question that Butler's final chapter opens and closes with: what is the role and the use of cultural criticism in these times? Butler's answer is modest and limited. What we need, she claims, is to sustain the project of the humanities and cultural criticism by trying to ensure that dissenting voices are heard within American democracy; those voices will bring "us" back to find "the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense" (151). In my view, it's crucial to resist this strain of "cultural criticism." That's not because it's unnecessary to attack the same targets as Butler attacks—we cannot not attack those targets. But rather it's because the way of thinking—the philosophical tradition, indeed—that underpins her assaults is ultimately anything but radical. Cultural criticism would indeed be in a precarious state if this liberalism were its proper and uncontested location.

#### Furthermore, we’ve got problems with their discursive politics. Their focus on subjects excluded from normative conceptions of the human has malicious political consequences – Butler’s argument for expanding our conception of the human doesn’t actually change any of the underlying conditions of representation she critiques. Even worse, their focus on representations gives rise to a politics in which people whose identities are defined by class and capitalism and have no relation to ‘normative conceptions of the human’ are excluded from view. This isn’t just a link of omission – it’s a structural necessity of their politics of representation, which makes it just as exclusive as the sovereign politics they critique.

Paul Smith, Professor of Cultural Studies at George Mason University, 2004, symploke, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, p. 256-257

The nub of all this comes early in the book, when Butler proposes to consider "the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others, and thus certain human lives more grievable than others" (30).Thus, she asks why it is that Americans cannot grieve the Muslim dead in the post 9/11 conflicts. The absence of the Muslim dead from the news and the obituaries is immediately aligned with the struggles of "sexual minorities . . . transgendered people . . . intersexed people . . . [the] physically challenged" and racial minorities, all of whom struggle with the social imposition of parameters of the human, with normative values and "culturally viable notions of the human" (35). This sweeping homology is driven home by reference to "the queer lives that vanished on September 11," who went unrecognized in the obituaries and whose relatives were "belatedly and selectively . . . made eligible for benefits" (35). This rather breathtaking alignment has perhaps the opposite effect to that intended. Here and elsewhere Butler is at pains to say that she's not calling for simply some warm and fuzzy inclusion of excluded subjective into the faulty normative schemes that she sees all around her. Instead, she is calling for what she calls "an insurrection at the level of ontology" (33). (If that's to be the new slogan of radicalism, Bush, Ashcroft, Rumsfeld and their ilk probably aren't going to be losing a lot of sleep!) But rather than offering ways to reconceive relational subjectivity, or even simply highlighting the specific struggles of different subjects, Butler in effect produces nothing more than some rough equivalency amongst all those who somehow don't fit neatly into the "culturally viable notions of the human." To conceive of such an equivalency you have to do a lot of stripping away of materiality and you have to be virtually impervious to levels of specificity. At best, what Butler is pointing to here is a purely discursive or ideological homology, and it turns out to be a very incomplete homology even in its own terms. That is, there's something analytically wrong when Butler's highlighting of the "vanished lives" from the WTC can't include the laborers, janitors, food workers, homeless people and undocumented immigrants who died there, and whose struggles for recognition were not just about their access to "culturally viable notions of humanity" but equally about their economic value. In mostly unpublicized struggles to gain compensation and benefits, the relatives of many of these people, as well as attack survivors themselves, confronted the simple fact that their lives were simply not valued. The struggles of many of these people continue, three years after the attacks. These kinds of people don't appear in Butler's pantheon of victims—and nor do her victims themselves appear as labor, or as subjects whose identity is in any way at all constituted by their relation to capitalism (even though this might well be why they were attacked, as representatives of a predatory capitalist imperium). This elision, executed during Butler's cheerleading for the principles of inculsivity and relationality, is more than simply symptomatic of Butler's approach; it is a reminder of the weakness of any consideration of identity that cannot or will not entertain the historical and material conditions under which such identities are formed. In the end, what divides and differentiates subjects is not some factitious, contingent and unsatisfactory use of the category "human;" rather more it is the continual and relentless depredations of capital. So it's not really "conditions" that Butler investigates in this book; she isn't asking about American imperialism, or media power, or any of the material factors that inflect contemporary ideologies. Rather, she is simply pointing to some of the discursive structures and attitudinal habits that express those conditions. Butler will no doubt be familiar with the criticism that she is unable or unwilling to investigate those conditions or to see subjects as in any significant part produced by them. Similar issues are notably at stake in her exchanges with Nancy Fraser (in New Left Review) or with Gayle Rubin (in differences) in the last decade; and they arise again in her conversations with Laclau and Zizek in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000). In my view, in all of these exchanges Butler comes across as more obstinate than correct in dealing with the challenge to her thinking that political-economic factors pose. Indeed, in the last named text, when called to account for these lapses, she comes out with one of the most perverse formulations in all of her writing: "It's unclear that the subject is not, for instance, from the start structured by certain general features of capitalism, or that capitalism does not produce certain quandaries for the unconscious and, indeed, for the psychic subject more generally" (277). Such circumphrasis (a spectacular double negative and a vagueness masquerading through the repeated word "certain") can only confirm the suspicion that, if an examination of "conditions" entails thinking in terms of political economy, Butler doesn't in fact want anything to do with it.

#### Butler’s refusal to interrogate the material conditions of the present is not an anomaly – it’s symptomatic of a larger problem within the contemporary left: an obsessive attachment to mourning and melancholy. In Butler’s politics, a narcissistic attachment to our own identities and discourses is elevated above any commitment to change the material circumstances we find ourselves in. Butler and those who subscribe to her discursive politics come to love their identities as critics so intensely that they nurture them at the expense of even the hope of a radical societal transformation.

Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley, 2002, Loss: The Politics of Mourning, p. 458-460

For the last two decades, cultural theorist Stuart Hall has insisted that the “crisis of the Left” is due neither to internal divisions in the activist or academic Left nor to the clever rhetoric or funding schemes of the Right. Rather, he has charged, this ascendancy is consequent to the Left’s own failure to apprehend the character of the age and to develop a political critique and a moral-political vision appropriate to this character. For Hall, the rise of the Thatcher-Reagan Right was a symptom rather than a cause of this failure, just as the Left’s dismissive or suspicious attitude toward cultural politics is for Hall a sign not of its unwavering principles but of its anachronistic habits of thought and its fears and anxieties about revising those habits. But what are the content and dynamic of these fears and anxieties? I want to develop just one thread of this problem through a consideration of the phenomenon named “Left melancholia” by Walter Benjamin more than half a century ago. What did Benjamin mean by and with this pejorative appellation for a certain intellectual and political bearing? As most readers will know, Benjamin was neither categorically nor characterologically opposed to the value and valence of sadness as such, nor to the potential insights gleaned from brooding over one’s losses. Indeed, he had a well-developed appreciation of the productive value of acedia, sadness, and mourning for political and cultural work, and in his study of Baudelaire, Benjamin treated melancholia itself as something of a creative wellspring. But “Left melancholia” is Benjamin’s unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, finally, more attached to a particular political analysis or ideal— even to the failure of that ideal— than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present. In Benjamin’s enigmatic insistence on the political value of a dialectical historical grasp of “the time of the Now,” Left melancholia represents not only a refusal to come to terms with the particular character of the present, that is, a failure to understand history in terms other than “empty time” or “progress.” It signifies as well a certain narcissism with regard to one’s past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance, or transformation. 1 The irony of melancholia, of course, is that attachment to the object of one’s sorrowful loss supersedes any desire to recover from this loss, to live free of it in the present, to be unburdened by it. This is what renders melancholia a persistent condition, a state, indeed, a structure of desire, rather than a transient response to death or loss. In Freud’s 1917 meditation on melancholia, he reminds us of a second singular feature of melancholy: It entails “a loss of a more ideal kind [than mourning]. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an object of love.” 2 Moreover, Freud suggests, the melancholic will often not know precisely what about the object has been loved and lost: “This would suggest that melancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious.” 3 The loss precipitating melancholy is more often than not unavowed and unavowable. Finally, Freud suggests that the melancholic subject— low in self-regard, despairing, even suicidal— has shifted the reproach of the once-loved object (a reproach waged for not living up to the idealization by the beloved) onto itself, thus preserving the love or idealization of the object even as the loss of this love is experienced in the suffering of the melancholic. Now why would Benjamin use this term, and the emotional economy it represents, to talk about a particular formation on and of the Left? Benjamin never offers a precise formulation of Left melancholia. Rather, he deploys it as a term of opprobrium for those more beholden to certain long-held sentiments and objects than to the possibilities of political transformation in the present. Benjamin is particularly attuned to the melancholic’s investment in “things.” In the Trauerspiel, he argues that “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge,” here suggesting that the loyalty of the melancholic converts its truth (“every loyal vow or memory”) about its beloved into a thing, indeed, imbues knowledge itself with a thinglike quality. 4 Another version of this formulation: “In its tenacious self-absorption [melancholy] embraces dead objects in its contemplation.” 5 More simply, melancholia is loyal “to the world of things,” 6 suggesting a certain logic of fetishism— with all the conservatism and withdrawal from human relations that fetishistic desire implies— contained within the melancholic logic. In the critique of Kastner’s poems in which Benjamin first coins “Left melancholia,” Benjamin suggests that sentiments themselves become things for the Left melancholic who “takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods.” 7 We come to love our Left passions and reasons, our Left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them. Left melancholia, in short, is Benjamin’s name for a mournful, conservative, backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen in the heart of the putative Leftist. If Freud is helpful here, then this condition presumably issues from some unaccountable loss, some unavowably crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms Left, Socialism, Marx, or the Movement.

#### RESISTANCE MUST BE A TOTAL NEGATION OF THE SYSTEM FROM OUT-SIDE OF GOVERNMENT—WHILE SOME INSIDE POLITICAL GAINS ARE POSSIBLE, THEY ARE TRUMPED BY THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO USE REFORMS TO RESTABILIZE CAPITAL AND MARGINALIZE LABOR AS A SOCIAL ALTERNATIVE

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, p. 738// wyo]

Thus the role of labour’s extra-parliamentary movement is twofold. On the one hand, it has to assert its strategic interests as a social metabolic alternative by confronting and forcefully negating in practical terms the structural determinations of the established order as manifest in the capital-relation and in the concomitant subordination of labour in the socioeconomic reproduction process, instead of helping to restabiize capital in crisis as it happened at important junctures of the reformist past. At the same time, on the other hand, the political power of capital which prevails in parliament needs to be and can be challenged through the pressure which extra-parliamentary forms of action can exercise on the legislative and executive, as witnessed by the impact of even the ‘single issue’ anti-poll-tax movement which played a major role in the fall of Margaret Thatcher from the top of the political pyramid. Without a strategically oriented and sustained extra-parliamentary challenge the parties alternating in government can continue to function as convenient reciprocal alibis for the structural failure of the system towards labour, thus effectively confining the role of the labour movement to its position as an inconvenient but marginalizable afterthought in capital’s parliamentary system. Thus in relation to both the material reproductive and the political domain, the constitution of a strategically viable socialist extra-parliamentaty mass movement — in conjunction with the traditional forms of labour’s, at present hopelessly derailed, political organization, which badly needs the radicalizing pressure and support of such extra-parliamentary forces — is a vital precondition for countering the massive extra-parliamentary power of capital.

#### THE PERMUTATION IS WORSE THAN PLAN BECAUSE IT VALIDATES THE ABILITY OF CAPITALISM REFORM—COMPROMISING RADICAL POLITICS THROUGH ANY SHORT-TERM DEMANDS SHORT-CIRCUITS THE ALTERNATIVE

MESZAROS (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) 1995

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, 930// wyo]

THE difficulty is that the ‘moment’ of radical politics is strictly limited by the nature of the crises in question and the temporal determinations of their unfolding. The breach opened up at times of crisis cannot be left open forever and the measures adopted to fill it, from the earliest steps onwards, have their own logic and cumulative impact on subsequent interventions. Furthermore, both the existing socioeconomic structures and their corresponding framework of political institutions tend to act against radical initiatives by their very inertia as soon as the worst moment of the crisis is over and thus it becomes possible to contemplate again ‘the line of least resistance’. And no one can consider ‘radical restructuring’ the line of least resistance, since by its very nature it necessarily involves upheaval and the disconcerting prospect of the unknown. No immediate economic achievement can offer a way out of this dilemma so as to prolong the life-span of revolutionary politics, since such limited economic achievements made within the confines of the old premises — act in the opposite direction by relieving the most pressing crisis symptoms and, as a result, reinforcing the old reproductive mechanism shaken by the crisis. As history amply testifies, at the first sign of ‘recovery’, politics is pushed back Into its traditional role of helping to sustain and enforce the given socio-economic determinations. The claimed ‘recovery’ itself reached on the basis of the ‘well tried economic motivations’, acts as the self-evident ideological justification for reverting to the subservient, routine role of politics, in harmony with the dominant institutional framework. Thus, radical politics can only accelerate its own demise (and thereby shorten, instead of extending as it should, the favourable ‘moment’ of major political intervention) if it consents to define its own scope in terms of limited economic targets which are in fact necessarily dictated by the established socioeconomic structure in crisis.

#### - Totality DA - links prove that the differences will manifest in a way that prevents the working class from realizing its potential – only totalizing the economic base in relation to the working class can violence end – anything short of totality results in fractured movements and no revolutionary progress

Lukacs in 67 (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

**Class consciousness is the 'ethics\* of the proletariat**, **the unity of** its **theory and** its **practice**, **the point at which the economic necessity of** its **struggle** for liberation **changes** dialectically **into freedom**. By realising that the party is the historical embodiment and the active incarnation of class consciousness, we see that it is also the incarnation of the ethics of the fighting proletariat. **This must determine** its **politics**. **Its politics may not always accord with the empirical reality of the moment**; at such times its slogans may be ignored. But the ineluctable course of history will give it its due. Even more, **the moral strength conferred by the correct class consciousness will bear fruit in terms of practical politics**.17 **The** true **strength of the party is moral**: **it is fed by the trust of the** spontaneously **revolutionary masses whom economic conditions have forced into revolt**. It is nourished by the feeling that the party is the objectification of their own will (obscure though this may be to themselves), that it is the visible and organised incarnation of their class consciousness. **Only when the party has fought for this trust** and earned it **can it become the leader of the revolution.** For **only then will the masses spontaneously and instinctively press forward with all their energies towards the** party and **towards their own class consciousness. By separating the inseparable, the opportunists have barred their own path to this knowledge,** the active self-knowledge of the proletariat. Hence their leaders speak scornfully, in the authentic tones of the free-thinking petty bourgeoisie of the "religious faith' that is said to lie at the roots of Bolshevism and revolutionary Marxism. The accusation is a tacit confession of their own impotence. In vain do they disguise their moth-eaten doubts, by cloaking their negativity in the spendid mantle of a cool and objective 'scientific method'. Every word and gesture betrays the despair of the best of them and the inner emptiness of the worst: their complete divorce from the proletariat, from its path and from its vocation. **What they call faith** and seek to deprecate by adding the epithet 'religious\* **is nothing more nor less than the certainty that capitalism is doomed and that**—ultimately—**the proletariat will be victorious. There can be no 'material' guarantee of this certitude. It can be guaranteed methodologically—by the dialectical method**. And even this must be tested and proved by action, by the revolution itself, by living and dying for the revolution. A Marxist who cultivates the objectivity of the academic study is just as reprehensible as the man who believes that the victory of the world revolution can be guaranteed by the 'laws of nature'. **The unity of theory and practice exists** not only **in theory but also for practice. We have seen that the proletariat as a class can only conquer and retain a hold on class consciousness and raise itself to the level of its**—objectively-given—**historic task through conflict and action**. It is likewise true that **the party and the individual fighter can only really take possession of their theory if they are able to bring this unity into their praxis**. The so-called religious faith is nothing more than the certitude that regardless of all temporary defeats and setbacks, the historical process will come to fruition in our deeds and through our deeds. <p42-43>

#### BPTX – the TOOLS of biopower are based on capitalistic control

(Cotter 12) Jennifer Cotter, writer at The Red Critique, “Bio-politics, Transspecies Love and/as Class Commons-Sense” The Red Critique, Winter/Spring 2012. <http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/biopoliticstransspeciesismandclasscommonssense.htm>

As class contradictions have grown sharper with intensification of the crisis of profitability in global capitalism, cultural theory in the North Atlantic retreats further and further into spiritual explanations and resolutions of material contradictions. Yet, rather than confronting the relationship of increasing exploitation and, therefore, poverty of workers around the world, the concentration of wealth into fewer hands, sharp increases in unemployment and economic insecurity, the commodification of all aspects of "life" subordinating them to production for profit, and the sharpening alienation of workers to class relations founded on exploitation in production, contemporary cultural theory is retreating away from the social, the historical, and the material basis of these questions in production relations to "immaterial," "affective" and "spiritual" resolutions of material contradictions and ideologically translating capitalism and exploitation into existential conditions of "life" as such. ¶ It is in this context that cultural theory in the global North has embraced what Christian Marazzi calls "the biopolitical turn of the economy"—an increasing turn to "bio-politics" as a means to explain and address the social and economic contradictions in capitalism now (as qtd. in Corsani 107). At the core of "bio-political" theory is a substitution of "life"—particularly the spiritualist concept of a creative "life-force" or what Henri Bergson calls elan vital—for the historical and material relations of the dialectical praxis of labor and class as explanations of the material basis of contradictions in capitalism now and their transformation. In other words, at the core of biopolitics is a cultural spiritualism which ideologically translates historical and material relations into a transhistorical and autonomous power of life—a mystical vitalism—and posits this spiritual vitalism as the basis of bringing about new social relations. This new "spiritualism" of life is offered in a variety of articulations in contemporary cultural theory from the writings that overtly address theories of "biopower" and "biopolitics" as in the writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Commonwealth), Giorgio Agamben (Homo Sacer), Maurizio Lazzarato, and Antonella Corsani, among others, to the transspecies posthumanist writings of Derrida (The Animal That Therefore I Am), Agamben (The Open), and Donna Haraway (When Species Meet). These biopolitical theories claim to address a range of material problems that are the effect of production for profit in capitalism while at the same time abstracting these problems from their origins in class relations and exploitation: from the encroachment of commodity relations into all aspects of life, including the private ownership of strands of DNA and whole species of plants and animals; to the degradation of the environment in the interests of profit; to economic crisis; to the extension of the working day; to the subordination of love and sexuality to production for profit; to the estrangement of workers from social wealth... In place of addressing the material conditions and relations that have given rise to these problems, however, bio-political theories posit an "other-world" and an "other-worldly life"—a concept of spiritual life that is prior to, constitutive of, transcendent of and/or outside of the historical and social relations of capitalism—as the basis of a new "commons" beyond the material contradictions of capitalism. ¶ The spiritualization of life in biopolitical theories, to be clear, is represented as a new form of materialism. The substitution of "life" for "class" in bio-political theories draws from Foucault’s theory of "bio-power" in which he argues that "modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question" (The History of Sexuality Vol 1 143). "Bio-power," Foucault contends, is a regime of power that, rather than ruling by threat of death, produces life through the disciplining of bodies, the regulation of populations, and through the "technologies of the self" in which bodies come to bind themselves to identities produced through sovereign power. In fact, Foucault posits "bio-power"—the instrumental disciplining of bodies such that they come to experience their own subjection as the norm of life and source of pleasure—rather than the exploitation of labor as the material basis of capitalism. Capitalism, Foucault contends, is not possible without "bio-power": "bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production" (140-141). According to Foucault, "There is no binary and all encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations" (94). In this view there is "no regulative mechanism" of power relations. Instead, in Foucault’s cultural imaginary of power, "power is everywhere ... because it comes from everywhere" (93). ¶ In this narrative, an explanatory critique of "power" as the effect of class relations of capitalism—relations between exploiter and exploited—is part of a "binary metaphysics" of power which discursively imposes a regime of truth (power/knowledge) onto what is "actually," so the story goes, an ineffably and mysteriously plural, diffuse, and amorphous "multiplicity of forces." On the one hand, "life" is assumed to spontaneously produce a discursive proliferation of meanings (knowledges) that then discipline and contain it. On the other hand, life is regarded as an ineffable and plural opacity that "resists" all conceptual explanation. The subjection of bodies is reduced to a contingent, "spontaneous" and aleatory effect of "life" as such or the sheer fact of living. This makes it appear as if "power over life" comes not from structural relations relations of exploitation, but from a non-structural, amorphous, cultural plurality—a cultural democracy of "power from below" to which all have access by virtue of living—that is "everywhere." ¶ Foucault’s theory of "bio-power" is not a form of materialism but a form of cultural spiritualism. When Foucault argues that "bio-politics" is at the root of capitalism, he dehistoricizes "the machinery of production" into which he claims bodies are "inserted." The existence of "the machinery of production"—or a "controlled insertion" of bodies—is itself the effect of the dialectical praxis of labor. This is because power is not an autonomous, trans-historical life force nor is it an ineffable diffuse plurality beyond historical and conceptual explanation, but an effect of definite historical and material conditions and relations. Power, in other words, rests upon material conditions of production. Whether or not the society has the "power" to end starvation or to condemn the majority of the laboring population to a lifetime of starvation, has to do with the level of development of its material conditions of production—its forces of production—and the social relations of production (the labor and property relations) that determine the social ends and interests toward which labor is put. This is another way of saying that power is the historical and material effect of labor in the form of property. In a society in which property is privately owned, power is the capacity of the ruling class to "command over the surplus-labor" of workers in production (The German Ideology 102). At the root of power relations is an antagonistic class relation: the antagonism between owners of the means of production and workers who only own their labor to sell in order to survive and are exploited. The binary of class, to be clear, is historical and material not, at root, discursive: class binaries are not the effect of nature, god, nor are they the effect of "western metaphysics," "discursive construction," "binary thinking," or conceptualization, but the effect of private ownership of the means of production.¶ Foucault’s theory of power does the ideological work of capital by concealing and ideologically inverting the structural relations of class in capitalism. In place of the material transformation of structural relations of capitalism, Foucault advocates "resistance" within—a change in the discursive and cultural regimes and a re-valuing of "life"—as the basis of a "different economy of bodies and pleasures" (159). This amounts to the the updating of the culture of capitalism as the limit of change while the needs of the masses for material abolition of exploitation is dismissed as a reactionary nostalgia for the impossible—what Foucault dismisses as "The ‘right’ to life ... beyond all the oppressions" (145). Changing the cultural values of life and regarding this as constituting material change—i.e., as an end in itself—becomes a means to ideologically update power relations without fundamentally transforming them.

### Group precursor evidence

( ) Can’t separate the two - It’s impossible to separate their ‘discursive politics’ from the material realities that their interrogation presupposes – our 1NC Smith evidence demonstrates that this theorization of material reality is entirely absent from Butler’s reading of the “war on terror,” which is itself enough to invalidate their discursive politics.

And, we have impact evidence for our tradeoff argument – each moment spent focusing on the politics of speech is a lost chance to directly confront capitalist institutions. Any successful politics must directly grapple with capitalist institutions, which they necessarily can’t do.

Brett Neilson, senior lecturer in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney and a member of the Centre for Cultural Research, and Ned Rossiter, senior lecturer at the Centre for Media Research, University of Ulster and adjuct research fellow at the Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney, September 2005, Fiberculture, Issue 5, online: http://www.journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/neilson\_rossiter.html, accessed October 1, 2006

There is little chance, then, that a coherent political opposition will emerge from the organised activities of civil society. Rather, what we see here is a further consolidation of capital. More disconcerting is the likelihood of civil society organisations becoming increasingly decoupled from their material constitution - that is, the continual formation and reformation of social forces from which they were born. This is a predicament faced by activist movements undergoing a scalar transformation. The system of modern sovereignty, which functioned around the dual axiom of representation and rights, cannot encompass these new modes of organisation. Nor can the postliberal model of governance, which rearranges vertical relations into a horizontal order of differentiated subjectivities. Nonetheless, the problem of scale remains. In the case of social movements that begin to engage with what passes for global civil society, this can entail an abstraction of material constitution that is often difficult to separate from the histories and practices of abstract sociality vis-à-vis capitalism. Such a condition begins to explain why there is a tendency to collapse the vastly different situations of workers into the catch-all categories of the multitudes and precarity. This, if you will, is the logic of the empty signifier. And here lies the challenge, and difficulty, of articulating new forms of social-political organisation in ways that remain receptive to local circumstances that are bound to the international division of labour. Paradoxically, the increased institutional visibility that attends the action of speech - as seen, for example, by civil society actors participating at WSIS - compounds the invisibility of material constitution. This is why radical political movements must face the question of institutions - a question that brings to the fore fundamental issues surrounding the subject of security, both from the political and anthropological points of view. With shifts in the level of scalar organisation, pressures come to bear upon the primary organisers or advocates of social movements from participants and other actors who demand forms of accountability and transparency. Networks cannot hope to entirely transcend this relation. Even those movements that bring precarity to the fore risk disconnecting from the subject that conditioned their emergence. Thus while networks can be understood as non-representational modes of organising political and social relations, they are nonetheless bound to prevailing discourses and expectations

surrounding notions of networked governance. These kinds of tensions may operate as a generative force, resulting in the development of protocols and modes of engagement that enhance the capacities of the network, but they can also result in dysfunctionality and eventual breakdown. The unresolved relation between social movements and institutions can thus have a distracting effect that obscures the position and actions of the precarious worker. How, for example, are networks to account for the invisibility of exploited workers engaged in the production process? Who, for instance, is the constituent subject of the creative industries? Not, it would seem, those engaged in activities of production and creation - the primary base for 'the generation and exploitation of intellectual property'. Given that invisibility becomes common, how, then, does a politics of precarity take form? This imperceptibility is, of course, crucial for undocumented migrants who destroy their papers as a means of avoiding the sovereign world of border administration. But such a strategy of invisibility need not obscure the fact that the dark underbelly of the creative industries consists of undocumented labour, domestic labour, those engaged in the assembly production of micro-chips, the toxic impact of such manufacturing on the environment and health of those living adjacent to these industries, and so on and so forth. These actors comprise the subaltern of the new economies. For all the interest by government, business and academic stakeholders to "map" the "value-chain" of the creative industries, there is a tendency to overlook the actual relations of production that enable the internal clusters of creative industry.[[3]](http://www.journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/neilson_rossiter.html#3) In this sense, the mapping documents function as agents that proliferate the fantasy of the creative industries as somehow new rather than, as Ursula Huws notes in her feminist political economy of information technology and domestic labour, 'a continuation of a process that has been evolving for a least the past century and a half' (2003: 136).

And, their aff does nothing – Butler’s project can’t alter the fundamentally capitalist nature of the state or the media, which is the root cause of their harms.

Paul Smith, Professor of Cultural Studies at George Mason University, 2004, symploke, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, p. 258-259

The limitations of that reluctance are in full view all across this book, but perhaps nowhere so overtly as in Butler's repeated insistence that the media are to blame for the parlous state of "contemporary conditions of representation." While that may well be the case in some limited sense, the assertion should surely mark the beginning of an investigation rather than establish the media as a kind of untranscendable horizon; but this underlying assumption about the conditions of representation is never granted explication or elaboration. It seems to me that, even in Butler's own terms, little progress could be made in the "revolution at the level of ontology" without at the same time rethinking those conditions of representation and the role of capitalist media in enforcing them. Indeed, to reformulate a sentence I quoted above: It's in fact perfectly clear that the conditions of representation are from the start structured by very specific historical features of capitalism. Butler's way of circumnavigating the material emerges in many other places in these essays. For example, in her chapter on the policy of indefinite detention she spends several pages explaining Foucault's distinction between governmentalityand sovereignty (tapping into a debate that takes many forms and different vocabularies in different disciplines and discourses—though you wouldn't know that from her account). Essentially, she tries to establish a kind of dialectical description of the Bush administration's actions: increases in the bureaucratic processes of governmentality give rise to gestures of authoritarian sovereignty, and sovereignty thence gives itself back over to the mechanisms of governmentality to secure itself. There might be simpler ways of describing the rise of authoritarianism in the post-9/11 administration, and certainly there are alternative ways of describing the same thing. But Butler's chosen mode sets the tone and intent, which is in the end to disembody the political processes involved. That is—and even despite her naming of names (Rumsfeld and Ashcroft in particular)—those processes come to seem unmotivated, untouched by human hand. It's almost as if the administration's sovereign behavior can have no material explanation; it's simply what's happening and its monstrous agents are simply ciphers. Butler's thinking, especially on political issues, often seems to operate in a similar fashion such that materiality is invoked but evacuated in the same gesture, and where cultural and social processes are regarded more as a structural machine than as motivated forms and processes.

Gibson-Graham rely on binaries that re-inscribe capitalist and gender-based oppression

Linda Disch, associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, 1999, Theory & Event 3:1

There is, however, one disadvantage to the way that Gibson-Graham formulates the analytic link between capitalism and the phallus. It is possible that she takes the phallus too literally as a symbol of masculinist power. Several feminists have argued that the phallus cannot stand up to its promise to be the ultimate ground of meaning; it is, rather, the binary oppositions that the phallus seems to authorize that sustain its fiction of mastery. By her emphasis on the household as a leading domain of non-capitalist economic difference, Gibson-Graham herself reiterates the sequence of oppositions--public/private, market/household, male/female- -that plays into the fiction of the phallus, and funds the dominant discourses of capitalism and gender. I wished that she had attended to sites of difference that map less readily onto a gendered division of labor, such as the emergent welfare-workfare economy in the United States, or the economies of graft in Eastern Europe. This is a small shortcoming in a book that makes so creative and even witty a joining between feminism and critical political economy, however. This book is fun to read. It deserves a wide audience not only for deconstructing capitalism but for exemplifying how to practice deconstruction on the "real world" with a sense of humor.

There’s no link – Gibson-Graham’s argument is that viewing alternate forms of economics as inferior to capital is bad – we view them as superior to capital

Linda Disch, associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, 1999, Theory & Event 3:1

The book is feminist in an even more provocative sense by its strategic articulation of critical political economy to feminist critical analysis. The implicit premise for this connection is that capitalism is to economic practice as the phallus is to human subjectivity (p. 35). Gibson-Graham argue that we know capitalism as the source from which all meaning, all progress, all crises emanate, and as the standard that defines all other economies as lacking (p. 35). Moreover, "by analogy [to man] and by extension [of the attributes of masculinity], the economy is the locus of Reason in the social totality; it is therefore the dominant social instance. It is the social site of rationality and order, to which the irrational disorder of non-economic life must submit" (p. 103).

#### PLURALISM, AND INTERSECIONTALITY CAUSE THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM TO FAIL-ULTIMATELY THE CRITIQUE CUTS BACK AGAINST THE ITSELF JUSTIFYING SMALL INSTANCES OF GOOD, WHILE LEAVING THE STRUCTURE OF INEQUALITY INTACT.

Ebert et al. 2008

[Teresa L. Ebert, Professor of Cultural Theory @ University of Albany State University of New York, Mas’Ud Zavarzadeh retired professor @ Syracuse University, “Class in Culture”, 2008, pg. 135-137, \\wyo-bb]

Gibson-Graham's general argument uses feminism as a pluralizing strategy to claim that capitalism is not the sole source of exploitation in the global world. Therefore, "the script of globalization," they write, "need not draw solely upon an image of the body of capitalism as hard, thrusting and powerful" (The End of Capitalism 138). Consequently the representation of the intervention of multinational corporations (MNC) in the economy of the host country, does not have to be read in terms of the standard script. They then ask the question which implies its own answer: "Could we not see MNC activity in Third World situation in a slightly different light, as perhaps sometimes unwittingly generative rather than merely destructive" (130)? In other words, their Ludic Feminism ends up as an apologist of multinational corporations and leads to the climax "that the economic 'rape' wrought by globalization in the Third World is a script with many different outcomes. In this case we might read the rape event as inducing a pregnancy" (131). The grand finale of their discursive analysis of globalization as rape is that exploitation is good for women: For some women involvement in capitalist exploitation has freed them from aspects of the exploitation associated with their household class positions and has given them a position from which to struggle with and redefine traditional gender roles. (132) This is too painful to call it comical. The conclusion of their cutting-edge feminist "analysis" is identical to the liberal banalities that are written day in and day out in the pages of such house organs of global capitalism as The New York Times (the main site for the dissemination of Thomas Friedman's views on globalization). In his "In Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop," which we have already discussed, Nicholas D. Kristof writes that the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists from the North are, in fact, "opportunities," and he advises that "anyone who cares about fighting poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops" (The New York Times, June 6, 2006, A-21) His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in bold font and foregrounded in his essay: "What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited" (A-21).

#### METHODOLOGY IS THE FOREMOST POINT OF DEPARTURE TO ANY POLITICAL QUERY. YOU MUST EVALUATE EPISTEMOLOGY FIRST BECAUSE THE WAY YOU THINK ABOUT PROBLEMS DETERMINES SOLUTIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES THEY ENGENDER

Smith ‘96

[Steve, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, “Positivism and Beyond,” International theory: Positivism and beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 12-1 3//uwyo-ajl]

But the stakes are also high because of the links between theory and practice. International theory underpins and informs international practice, even if there is a lengthy lag between the high- point of theories and their gradual absorption into political debate. Once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those who swim outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance may be ridiculed or seen as dangerous iust because their theoretical assumptions are deemed as unrealistic. Defining common sense is therefore the ultimate act of political power. In this sense what is at stake in debates about epistemology is very significant for political practice. Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons. In this Kantian light epistemology matters, and the stakes are far more considerable than at first sight seem to be the case.

### 2NC Alternative Overview

#### AN EXPLANATION OF THE ALT AND ITS RELATION TO THIS ROUND:

#### THE PLAN OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT HAPPEN NOR DOES A ‘REVOLUTION’ AGAINST CAPITAL. HOWEVER THIS DEBATE DOES HAVE VALUE AS A KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTIVE SPHERE BECAUSE WE CAN RESEARCH, AND TEST IDEAS WHICH IS SHOWING OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD AND THE POLITICS WE EVENTUALLY CHOOSE TO SUPPORT. IN THIS FRAMEWORK, INTEROGATING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD IS A PRIORI TO ANY POLITICAL PRAXIS BECAUSE OUR POINT OF DEPARTURE IS OUR ENTIRE POLITICAL HORIZON. THATS SMITH AND TUMINO

#### NEXT, METHODOLOGY SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF THE DEBATE. THE 1NC IS A PERFORMANCE OF OUR METHOD AS IT INVESTIGATES MATERIAL BASIS HARMS AND IDENTIFIES THE CONSCIOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION BEHIND THOSE REPRESENTATIONS, WHICH SHORES UP CAPITALISM. THE ALTERNATIVE IS THUS NOT ABOUT ‘SOLVING’ CAPITALISM, BUT A PERFORMANCE OF MATERIALIST/HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY. THE AFFIRMATIVE MUST WIN EITHER THAT THEIR METHOD IS CORRECT, STRUCTURAL HISTORICISM IS WRONG OR THAT CAPITALISM IS GOOD.