# 1NC Whitman

## 1

#### First intep- Restrict means prohibit

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### B. Standards:

#### 1. Limits – The topic is already huge – 4 areas times 2 mechanisms all with separate literature and unique advantages – its an impossible research burden.

#### 2. Bidirectionality – Absent prohibition they can create conditions that functionally increase authority

#### Vote negative- Topicality is a prima facie burden and should be evaluated as a question of competing interpretations.

## 2

#### Contemporary security is contingent on lashing out against those who are strange or unknown and is borne out of a fear of certain death that generates ressentiment because we cannot tame death nor truly ever be secure because the will to power ensures that there will always be violence

Der Derian, 1995

(James, IR theorist and Philosopher, On Security “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard. Ed Ronnie Lipshutz” Online)

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41 Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43 As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

**Exterminate Unkown !**

**K of Causality:**

Turn Strange to Familiar

**Negative vs Postive W2P**

Negative Will to Pwr:

Supress Fear

Sovereignty

Rational Consensus

Positive Will to Pwr:

Embrace Fear

Becoming

Aesthetic Affirm of Difference

Security Bad

🡪 ficiontal ID from fear

History of security is resentment

Generalize the fear of death into the fear of difference

**K of Transcend:**

Causality wrong – never answer cause-effect question. All things are effect of discourse

No bounded truth

**Geneology of Security**

State has taken the place of God

Communities bounded by fear: external and internal threats.

War no longer beautiful.

**NV2L !**

**Herd outweighs:**

Fear controls through conformity and rules through docile subjects.

Security at the cost of meaningful life

**Now key:**

Conditions uncertain and predicable.

#### These discourses of danger allow for the constructions of threats against the humanity when the real risk is nil, it also allow for the state to go after its geopolitical interests

Jackson 05

[Richard Jackson, Lecturer in International Security at The University of Manchester, “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005, pages 147-171, Taylor and Francis Online Database, \\wyo-bb]

As David Campbell has shown, discourses of danger and foreign threat have been integral in constituting and disciplining American identity as practiced through its foreign policy. 43 Collectivities, especially those as disparate and diverse as America, are often only unified by an external threat or danger; in this sense, threat creation can be functional to political life. Historically, the American government has relied on the discourse of threat and danger on numerous occasions: the “red scares” of the native Americans who threatened the spread of peaceful civilization along the Western frontier, the workers’ unrest at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the threat to the American way of life during the cold war; the threat of “rogue states” like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq; and the threats posed by the drug trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and now of course, terrorism. These discourses of danger are scripted for the purposes of maintaining inside/outside, self/other boundaries—they write American identity—and for enforcing unity on an unruly and (dis)United States.¶ Of course, there are other more mundane political functions for constructing fear and moral panic: provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence, de-legitimizing dissent, elevating the status of security actors, diverting scarce resources into ideologically driven political projects, distracting the public from more complex and pressing social ills. 44 This is not to say that terrorism poses no real threat; the dangers can plainly be seen in the images of falling bodies and the piles of rubble. Rather, it is to point out that dangers are those facets of social life interpreted as threats (in one sense, dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception), and what is interpreted as posing a threat may not always correspond to the realities of the actual risk of harm. Illegal narcotics, for example, pose less of a risk than the abuse of legal drugs, but a “war on drugs” makes it otherwise. Similarly, the “war on terrorism” is a multi-billion dollar exercise to protect Americans from a danger that, excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks, killed less people per year over several decades than bee stings and lightening strikes. Even in 2001, America's worst year of terrorist deaths, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by deaths from auto-related accidents, gun crimes, alcohol and tobacco-related illnesses, suicides, and a large number of diseases like influenza, cancer, and heart disease. Globally, terrorism, which kills a few thousand per year, pales into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, the half a million people who die every year from small wars, the 150,000 annual deaths from increased diseases caused by global warming, 45 and the millions who die from AIDS. And yet, the whole world is caught up in the global “war on terrorism” whose costs so far run into the hundreds of billions. In a world of multiple threats, many of which pose a far greater risk to individual safety, the fact that terrorism is widely seen as posing the greatest and most immediate threat is due to the deliberate construction of a discourse of danger.¶ The initial construction of the threat of terrorism involved fixing the attacks of 9/11 as the start of a whole new “age of terror,” rather than as an extraordinary event, or an aberration (out of 18,000 terrorist attacks since 1968 only a dozen or so have caused more than 100 deaths; high-casualty terrorist attacks are extremely rare and 9/11 was the rarest of the rare). Instead, the attacks were interpreted as the dawning of a new era of terrorist violence that knew no bounds. As Bush stated, “All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world.” 46 Vice-President Dick Cheney made it even clearer:¶ Today, we are not just looking at a new era in national security policy, we are actually living through it. The exact nature of the new dangers revealed themselves on September 11, 2001, with the murder of 3,000 innocent, unsuspecting men, women, and children right here at home. 47¶ This construct was only possible by severing all links between this act of terrorism and countless others that had preceded it, and by de-contextualizing it from the history of al Qaeda's previous attacks. As we saw earlier, “9/11” was constructed without a pre-history; it stands alone as a defining act of cruelty and evil. This break with the past makes it possible to assign it future significance as the start of “super-terrorism,” “catastrophic terrorism,” or simply “the new terrorism.” Logically, if there's a new super-terrorism, then a new super-war-on-terrorism seems reasonable.¶ A second feature of this discourse of danger is the hyperbolic language of threat. It is not just a threat of sudden violent death, it is actually a “threat to civilization,” a “threat to the very essence of what you do,” 48 a “threat to our way of life,” 49 and a threat to “the peace of the world.” 50 The notion of a “threat to our way of life” is a Cold War expression that vastly inflates the danger: instead of a tiny group of dissidents with resources that do not even begin to rival that of the smallest states, it implies that they are as powerful as the Soviet empire was once thought to be with its tens of thousands of missiles and its massive conventional army. Moreover, as Cheney reminds us, the threat of terrorism, like the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons, is supremely catastrophic:¶ The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time terrorists strike, they may well be armed with more than just plane tickets and box cutters. The next time they might direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. [ … ] no rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so. [ … ] we are dealing with terrorists [ … ] who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill millions of others. 51¶ In other words, not only are we threatened by evil terrorists eager to kill millions (not to mention civilization itself, the peace of the world, and the American way of life), but this is a rational and reasonable fear to have. We should be afraid, very afraid: “If they had the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?.” 52¶ As if this was not enough to spread panic throughout the community, officials then go to great lengths to explain how these same terrorists (who are eager to kill millions of us) are actually highly sophisticated, cunning, and extremely dangerous. As John Ashcroft put it: “The highly coordinated attacks of September 11 make it clear that terrorism is the activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated, and well–financed organizations and networks.” 53 Moreover, this is not a tiny and isolated group of dissidents, but “there are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries” and they “hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction”; 54 or, like the plot of a popular novel: “Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.” 55 In other speeches, officials inflate the numbers of the terrorists to “tens of thousands” of killers spread throughout the world.¶ The next layer of fear is the notion that the threat resides within; that it is no longer confined outside the borders of the community, but that it is inside of us and all around us. As Ashcroft constructs it:¶ The attacks of September 11 were acts of terrorism against America orchestrated and carried out by individuals living within our borders. Today's terrorists enjoy the benefits of our free society even as they commit themselves to our destruction. They live in our communities—plotting, planning, and waiting to kill Americans again [ … ] a conspiracy of evil. 56¶ Like the “red scares” of the past, the discourse of danger is deployed in this mode to enforce social discipline, mute dissent, and increase the powers of the national security state. It is designed to bring the war home, or, as Bush puts it: “And make no mistake about it, we've got a war here just like we've got a war abroad.” 57¶ In another genealogical link to previous American foreign policy, the threat of terrorism is from a very early stage reflexively conflated with the threat of “weapons of mass destruction” and the “rogue states” who might hand them on to terrorists. According to the discourse, rogue states are apparently eager to assist terrorists in killing millions of Americans. As Bush stated in his now infamous “axis of evil” speech,¶ States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. 58¶ This is actually an ingenious discursive slight of hand which allows America to re-target its military from a war against a tiny group of individual dissidents scattered across the globe, to territorially defined states who also happen to be the target of American foreign policy. It transforms the “war against terrorism” from a largely hidden and unspectacular intelligence gathering and criminal apprehension program, to a flag-waving public display of awesome military firepower that re-builds a rather dented American self-confidence. More importantly, it allows for the simultaneous pursuit of geo-strategic objectives in crucial regions such as the Middle East under the banner of the “war on terrorism.”

59¶ Instead of reassuring the nation that the attacks were an exceptional and a unique event in a long line of terrorist attacks against America (that have thus far failed to overthrow freedom), the Bush administration chose instead to construct them as the start of a whole new age of terror—the start of a deadly new form of violence directed at Americans, civilized people all over the world, freedom, and democracy. The Bush administration could have chosen to publicize the conclusions of the Gilmore Commission in 1999, a Clinton-appointed advisory panel on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Its final report concluded that “rogue states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because of the likelihood that such a group's actions might be unpredictable even to the point of using the weapon against its sponsor,” and they would be reluctant to use such weapons themselves due to “the prospect of significant reprisals.” 60 Condoleeza Rice herself wrote in 2000 that there was no need to panic about rogue states, because “if they do acquire WMD—their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” 61 Instead, officials engaged in the deliberate construction of a world of unimaginable dangers and unspeakable threats; they encouraged social fear and moral panic. Within the suffocating confines of such an emergency, where Americans measure their daily safety by the color of a national terrorist alert scale (reflected in the glow of every traffic light), it seems perfectly reasonable that the entire resources of the state be mobilized in defense of the homeland, and that pre-emptive war should be pursued. It also seems reasonable that national unity be maintained and expressions of dissent curtailed.¶ The reality effect of scripting such a powerful danger moreover, can be seen in the two major wars fought in two years (followed by costly ongoing “security operations” in each of those states to root out the terrorists), the arrest of thousands of suspects in America and around the world, and the vast sums spent unquestioningly (even by the Democrats) on domestic security, border control and the expansion of the military. Only the “reality” of the threat of terrorism allows such extravagance; in fact, the manner in which the threat has been constructed—catastrophic, ubiquitous, and ongoing—normalizes the entire effort. If an alternative interpretation of the threat emerged to challenge the dominant orthodoxy (that it was vastly over-blown, or misdirected, for example), support for the consumption of such massive amounts of resources might be questioned and the political order destabilized. A massive threat of terrorism then, is necessary for the continued viability of the “war on terrorism”; writing the threat of terrorism is co-constitutive of the practice of counter-terrorism.

#### Its impossible to truly know the world or make predictions, far too chaotic- local actors

Tskeris 10

[Charalambos Tsekeris, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Psychology,

Pateikta spaudai: 2010 12 02, 2010/2(27), ISSN 1392-3358, “Chaos and Unpredictability in Social Thought: General Considerations and Perspectives”, Google Scholar, \\wyo-bb]

Modernity, as a social and historical category, has been closely associated with the “old”, “received” or “conventional” strong ambition to know, predict and manipulate (engineer) the world in toto with total certainty. Sociology’s 19th-century founders strongly asserted that the discipline was about making long-term predictions and hence applying persuasive, practical and universally-applicable solutions to acute and pressing (real-world) social problems. This was how social science originally invented and justified its idiosyncratic (unique) epistemic status and role, in direct contrast to religion or metaphysics, as famously expressed by the classical Comtean formula savoir pour prévoir et prévoir pour pouvoir, or by C. Wright Mills’s conclusion (combined with a strong critique of bureaucratic technocracy) that the ultimate “purpose of social science is the prediction and control of human behaviour” (Mills 1970; 127). Human life, however, is inherently dynamic: it is inescapably and ceaselessly changing and polymorphous (kaleidoscopic). In other words, it may be simple, complicated or chaotic, easy or hard, calm or stressful, boring or exciting, dull or colourful, regular or irregular, happy or miserable, beautiful or evil. To put it very simply, life is never the same. Change is actually constitutive of all sorts of human co-existence/co-operation and social living over the ages. Especially since the early 1960s, the innovative theoretical and methodological paradigm of chaos has been increasingly simmering within the study of nature and society. The science of Chaos (Gleick 1987) is a science of change.2 It is the systematic investigation of non-linear processes within dynamic turbulent systems (human or non-human). Chaos does not in principle reject the basic tenets of determinism, but it decisively shows that there are indeed deterministic systems which are not predictable at all, since they exhibit sensitivity to initial conditions: “there is no proportionality between causes and effects. Small causes may give rise to large effects. Nonlinearity is the rule, linearity is the exception” (Tsoukas and Hatch 2001; 988).3 Contemporary “networked” societies are inherently chaotic systems – that is, both deterministic and unpredictable (this actually reconciles in a sophisticated way the aperiodicity and unpredictability of non-linear dynamic systems with a sense of order and structure). The most characteristic exemplifications are: the global economy and the global crisis, wars and armed conflicts, human beings and social organisations, romantic and intimate relationships, business and the stock market, political campaigns and elections, the Olympic Games, football games and other sporting events, weather systems, the Internet, World Wide Web, Web 2.0, journalism and journalism 2.0, science and technology4, etc. In other words, a chaotic system may appear completely random, but there is always an underlying generative “real” order, deeper mechanisms and hidden patterns, rules and norms, which patiently wait to be dis-covered and un-covered (therefore, there is no such thing as “luck”). But even if (positivist, essentialist, realist or neo-realist) social scientists someday arrive at the very final stage of “total” or “absolute” knowledge about these “hidden patterns, rules and norms”, they will not be capable of accurately predicting. To put it very simply, a human complex society (as well as any other non-linear dynamic system) can never be fully contained in any way – even by its own “creator” (in the special case of a computer-simulated artificial society). So, any ambitious, long-term planning is inescapably doomed to absolute failure. What is actually needed here, consequently, is to reflexively include ourselves, as both researchers and social actors, within this inherent general unpredictability. A system’s esoteric interactions usually prevail upon external control attempts. The counter-intuitive behaviours of human complex systems generally result from often “very complicated feedback loops in the system, which cause many management mistakes and undesired side effects. Such effects are particularly well-known from failing political attempts to improve the social or economic conditions” (Helbing 2009; 428). As John Urry perceptively observes, many small “local actions” can rapidly interact and surprisingly ramify to create “global waves” or “global fluids” (i.e. unstable networks such as travelling peoples, automobility, global brands, social and political movements, environmental and health hazards), which are seen as highly unpredictable, and as often lacking a clear starting and end point: “The ‘particles’ of people, information, objects, money, images, risks and networks move within and across diverse regions forming heterogeneous, uneven, unpredictable and often unplanned waves…Such waves demonstrate no clear point of departure, deterritorialised movement, at certain speeds and at different levels of viscosity with no necessary end state or purpose” (Urry 2003; 60).

#### Fantasizing about an ideal world causes us to hate this world because it causes us pain we can’t deal with. This association of all that is good as not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one we’ve got

Turlani in 2003

(Aydan, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Letters and Sciences   
Istanbul Technical University, “Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26 (2003), 55-63)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (*WP* III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. **[End Page 61]** Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants *to escape from torture*" (*GM* III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of *this* world'" (*GM* III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (*WP* III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (*WP* III 586). ¶ The way out of the circle created by the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (*PI* §309).

#### The Alternative is an affirmation of chance through a dicethrow—life is should be seen under a Dionysian paradigm, accepting life as it is, there is no certainty, but only perspective

Deleuze 83 [Giles Deleuze, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, “Nietzsche and Philosophy,” p. 25-27]

The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: "if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods" (Z III "The Seven Seals" 3 p. 245). "0 sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider's web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dicers" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186). But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of the player or the artist; "We temporarily abandon life, in order to then temporarily fix our gaze upon it." The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming.¶ It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single dicethrow which, due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such. It is not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the combination which produces the repetition¶ of the dicethrow. The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirma-tion of necessity. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multip-licity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown. Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation. The sky itself is called "chance-sky", "innocence-sky" (Z III "Before¶ Sunrise"); the reign of Zarathustra is called "great chance" (Z IV "The Honey Offering" and III "Of Old and New Law Tables"; Zarathustra calls himself the "redeemer of chance"). "By chance, he is the world's oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186); "My doctrine is `Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child!' " (Z III "On the Mount of Olives" p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed. For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dice- throw ."¶ To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock!" (Z IV "Of the Higher Man" 14 p. 303). The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes¶ use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of the eternal spider, of the spider's web of reason, "A kind of spider of imperative and finality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality — we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, "I fight the universal spider" (GM III 9). To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player. They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II "Of the Tarantulas"). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws, bad conscience in the belief in a purpose. But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known — this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP III 465). The dicethrow fails because chance has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance- necessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at once; not a final, desired, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, amor fati; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number. 23

## Case

### Norms

#### **XU.S. drone use doesn’t cause prolif – no international precedent**

Etzioni 13, Professor of International Relations @ George Washington University

(Aimtai Etzioni, adviser to the Carter administration, “The Great Drone Debate”, Military Review, 4/2013, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20130430\_art004.pdf)

Other critics contend that by the United States ¶ using drones, it leads other countries into making and ¶ using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, it does not follow that United States ¶ should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hard-to-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, the record shows that even when the ¶ United States did not develop a particular weapon, ¶ others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the ¶ development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly ¶ cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that the international environment is a hostile ¶ one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ ¶ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further ¶ their interests. The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology. I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However drones are but one ¶ step—following bombers and missiles—in the ¶ development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). In such circumstances, the role ¶ of norms is much more limited.

#### XChina won’t use drones to resolve territorial disputes – fears international backlash and creating a precedent for U.S. strikes in the area

Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 (Andrew and Austin, China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13) PC

#### Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

#### XTheir Uzbekistan scenario is awful— The U.S. has already agreed to leave equipment behind in Uzbekistan

Kucero in 13

[Joshua, freelance writer and journalist specializing in foreign affairs, “What Military Equipment Should The U.S. Give Uzbekistan?”, The Open Society Institute, 5-10-2013 <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66667//wyo> CTL]

The question of whether, or how, to give military aid to Uzbekistan is probably the hottest question among Central Asia policymakers in Washington these days. The U.S. has agreed to leave some equipment behind for its partners in Central Asia after its forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan has made clear that it has high expectations for the sort of equipment that it will get. But some in Washington are concerned that giving military equipment to Uzbekistan would only abet the misrule of President Islam Karimov, who heads one of the most repressive governments on the planet. This question will undoubtedly be at the top of the agenda this week when a large delegation from Uzbekistan, headed by Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov, visits Washington.

#### XPakistan instability inevitable – economy, education, poor governance

Javaid ’11 (Umbreen, Director Center of Asian Studies & Chairperson Department of political science University of Punjab, “Thriving Fundamentalism and Militancy in Pakistan An Analytical Overview of their Impact on the Society,” South Asian Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1. Pg. 16-17)  
 ‘The recent increase of violence by jihadi groups, including suicide bombing of ¶ innocent bystanders as well attacks on the police and military, has perhaps brought ¶ more Pakistanis to consider how to strike a new balance between Islam and ¶ politics’ (Oldenburg, 2010: 158). ‘The Pakistani people also need to change their ¶ attitude, especially their outlook on religion. Suffered with anti-Americanism and ¶ religious fervor, Pakistanis are filtering their worldview through the prism of ¶ religion and the tensions between Islam and the West, making them to the radical ¶ propaganda and paralyzing their will to act against forces of extremism’ (Hussain, ¶ 2009: 11). mbreen Javaid Thriving Fundamentalism and ¶ 17¶ It is not only the task of the government to control this growing ¶ fundamentalism but the whole society needs to completely shun off these ¶ extremists. The political parties, intellectuals, sectarian and religious parties and ¶ the masses all have to openly condemn the extremists, so that they do not find any ¶ space to flourish. ‘Much still needs to be done on the home front curb religious ¶ zealotry and sectarianism, policies towards minorities, revision of school curricula, ¶ reconstructing ‘official’ history, promotion of universal education, and ¶ overhauling of the madrassah system’ (Niaz, 2011: 181). The best way to curtail the thriving fundamentalism in Pakistan is to look ¶ deeply into its causes. The whole society and especially the government needs to ¶ put in serious efforts in controlling on checking the causes if not diminishing ¶ them. It should also be understand that the issue of fundamentalism is very ¶ complex which entails number of factors which are playing their part. These ¶ include economic disparity, lack of education, religious ignorance, unemployment, ¶ extremism, judicial system, poor governance, ethnicity and sectarianism, ¶ corruption and alignment with United States, each of these have played their role ¶ separately and also a combined mix of all in flourishing militant fundamentalism ¶ in Pakistan. To control fundamentalism is not an easy task especially when it is ¶ now combined with militancy. Another major challenge for the government is that ¶ earlier the various militant extremist groups were operating separately and had ¶ divergent aims and objectives from each other but lately various local groups, AlQaeda and Taliban have all joined hands and helping each other irrespective of ¶ their particular objectives. These alignments have made these militant groups more ¶ lethal, thus making things more difficult for the government. ¶ Militant fundamentalism not only has the ability to destabilize Pakistan but it ¶ can, if not controlled, bring about serious security concerns for the region and also ¶ towards the global security and peace.

#### No impact --- drones are ineffective and there’s no incentive for them be used on a wide-scale --- they’ll be easily countered even if they are with limited escalation

Lewis 11

(Michael W. Lewis, professor of international law and the law of war at Ohio Northern University School of Law, former Navy fighter pilot, and coauthor of ‘The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective,’ “Unfounded Drone Fears,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/17/opinion/la-oe--lewis-drones-20111017)

Almost since the United States began using the unmanned aerial vehicles known as drones, their use has drawn criticism. The latest criticism, which has received considerable attention in the wake of the drone strike on Anwar Awlaki, is that America's use of drones has sparked a new international arms race.¶ While it is true that some other nations have begun developing their own unmanned aerial vehicles, the extent of the alarm is unjustified. Much of it rests on myths that are easily dispelled.¶ Myth 1: Drones will be a threat to the United States in the hands of other nations. Drones are surveillance and counter-terrorism tools; they are **not effective weapons** of conventional warfare. The unmanned aerial vehicles are slow and **extremely vulnerable** to even basic air defense systems, illustrated by the fact that a U.S. surveillance drone was shot down by a 1970s-era MIG-25 Soviet fighter over Iraq in 2002. Moreover, drones are dependent on constant telemetry signals from their ground controllers to remain in flight. Such signals can be easily jammed or disrupted, causing the drone to fall from the sky. It's even possible that a party sending stronger signals could take control of the drone. The drones, therefore, have limited usefulness. And certainly any drone flying over the U.S. while being controlled by a foreign nation could be easily detected and either destroyed or captured.¶ Myth 2: Terrorists could effectively use drones to strike targets that are otherwise safe. Though it would be preferable if terrorist groups did not acquire drones, the technology required to support them is not particularly advanced. If organizations such as Al Qaeda were intent on acquiring the technology, they probably could. One of the reasons Al Qaeda may not have spent the time and resources necessary to do so is that drones would be of limited value. In addition to being very vulnerable to even basic air defense systems, drones require a great deal of logistical support. They have to be launched, recovered and controlled from a reasonably large and secure permanent facility. Wherever Al Qaeda's drones landed would immediately become a target.¶ It is true that a small, hand-launched drone capable of delivering a small warhead over a reasonably short distance could be, like radio-controlled model airplanes, launched in a public park or other open area and flown to a target several miles away. However, the amount of explosives that such a drone can carry is very limited (at most a few pounds) and pales in comparison to the amount of explosives that can be delivered by a vehicle or even a suicide bomber. It seems likely that terrorist groups will continue to deliver their explosives by vehicle or suicide bomber.¶ Myth 3: The U.S. use of drones in cases such as the Awlaki killing in Yemen serves to legitimize their use by China or Russia. International law places the same restrictions on the use of drones that it places on any other use of military force. The U.S. used a drone on Yemeni territory to kill Awlaki because it was given permission to do so by the Yemeni government, and because Awlaki was an active member of an Al Qaeda affiliate who had repeatedly been involved in operations designed to kill Americans at home and abroad. With such permission, the U.S. could instead have employed special forces or a conventional airstrike.¶ Numerous commentators have suggested that U.S. drone use legitimizes Russian drone use in Chechnya or Chinese drone use against the Uighurs. If China or Russia were facing genuine threats from Chechen or Uighur separatists, they might be allowed under international law to use drones in neighboring states if those states gave them permission to do so. However, given the fact that Chechen separatists declared an end to armed resistance in 2009, and that the greatest concern Russians currently have with Chechnya is with the lavish subsidies that Russia is currently providing it, the likelihood of armed Russian drones over Chechnya seems **remote at best.**¶ Likewise, there is no Uighur separatist organization that even remotely resembles Al Qaeda. Uighur unrest has taken the form of uprisings in Urumqi and other areas, similar to the Tibetan unrest of a few years ago. The Chinese eliminated such unrest with widespread arrests and disappearances, which raised serious human rights concerns. But there has been no time in which Uighur opposition has met the threshold established by international law that would allow for the use of armed drones in response to Uighur actions.¶ It is important to recognize drones for what they are: slow, relatively low-tech anti-terrorism tools that would be of limited use on most modern battlefields and are particularly unsuited to use by terrorist organizations.

#### XNo trade impact

Fletcher 11 Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre\_b\_939967.html

The curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best.¶ Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one.¶ The standard example free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton Friedman on the right.¶ The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.¶ As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.¶ As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,¶ Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output. Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression.¶ The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical. According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:¶ With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way.¶ That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not happen.¶ "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.¶ There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war.

If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S. -- governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.¶ When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.¶ So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength.¶ Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.¶ At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can -- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate counter-move to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.¶ Thus a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but that's it. The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time without doing much harm; it will be no different if we join the party.

### Strikes

#### Crunch is inevitable by 2050- energy, population and food

Grantham 12

[Jeremy, “The Big Crunch”, New Statesman, July, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Now economic statisticians can calculate a much more dangerous event that is being greeted with even less concern: our world is rapidly running out of resources -- of energy, metals and food. The data is readily available and is not in dispute. The market mechanism is reflecting what our leaders ignore. The start of the Industrial Revolution allowed us to make technological progress in delivering resources, outweighing the increasing marginal effort to dig ever deeper and chase lower-quality ores, for instance. The average price of 33 commodities (equally weighted) declined by 70 per cent (after inflation) between 1900 and 2002. Then, abruptly and without any particular crisis, prices reversed and in ten years the average commodity tripled to give back the advantage of the previous 100 years. It is perhaps the most important "phase" change of modern times, yet it attracted remarkably little concern. The causes are not hidden: there has been an explosion of both population and consumption since 1800, the advent of the Hydrocarbon Age. Global population increased from one billion to seven billion today, tripling even in my lifetime (I was born in 1938). In the same time, consumption of hydrocarbons and some metals increased one hundredfold. Initially, with few people and extensive high-grade resources, this did not show in prices, but more recently, with population still growing faster than ever in absolute terms, we have had to absorb an unprecedented surge in demand per capita from India, with its 1.2 billion people and growing at over 7 per cent a year, and China, with almost 1.3 billion and growing for over 20 years at 10 per cent a year -- a rate that will double consumption every seven years. China last year accounted for an astonishing 53 per cent of all the world's cement use, 48 per cent of its iron ore and 47 per cent of all the coal used. How could the best reserves not wither away under this attack, and prices not rise? Low-cost, high-grade coal, oil and natural gas -- the backbone of the Industrial Revolution -- will be a distant memory by 2050. Much higher cost remnants will still be available but they will not be able to drive our growth, our population and, most critically, our food supply as before. Conventional food production (let's call it "Big Ag") is desperately dependent on oil for insecticide, pesticide and fertiliser, and for transportation over thousands of miles. Modern agriculture has been accurately described as a way of turning oil into food. As the price of oil continues to rise, so will the price of food.

#### COLLAPSE SOONER IS BETTER THAN LATER KEY TO SURVIVAL

LEWIS 02'

(Chris H., Instructor, Sewall Program @ CU Boulder, On the Edge of Society, "Global Industrial Civilization: The Necessary Collapse," ed. M Dobkowski & I Wllimann, Syracuse U. Press, P.\_\_\_\_)[BLUE]

In conclusion, **the only solution to the growing political and economic chaos caused by the collapse of global industrial civilization is to encourage the uncoupling of nations and regions from the global industrial economy. Unfortunately, millions will die in the wars and economic and political conflicts created by the accelerating collapse of global industrial civilization.** But we can be assured that on that basis of past history of the collapse of regional civilizations such as the Mayan and the Roman Empires, **barring global nuclear war, human societies and civilizations will continue to exist and develop a smaller, regional scale. Yes, such civilizations will be violent, corrupt, and often cruel, but, in the end, less so than our current global industrial civilization, which is abusing the entire planet and threatening the mass death and suffering of all its peoples and the living biological fabric of life on earth.** The paradox of **global economic development is that although it creates massive wealth and power for First World Elites, it also creates massive poverty and suffering for Third World people and societies. The failure of global development to end this suffering and destruction will bring about us collapse. This collapse will cause millions of people to suffer and die throughout the world, but it should paradoxically, ensure the survival of future human societies. Indeed, the collapse of global industrial civilization is necessary for the future long-term survival of human beings. Although this future seems hopeless and heartless, it is not. We can learn alot from our present global crisis. What we learn will shape our future and the future of the complex, interconnected web of life on Earth.**

#### Biodiversity loss Leads to Extinction

Diner 94

[David, Major in US Army, Winter, “THE ARMY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: WHO'S ENDANGERING WHOM?” Lexis]

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." [79](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2c2079b6a9753fd72b599ac94393715a&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=5d418220b8f79eb99eb7ad7f7b46acfc" \l "n79" \t "_self) By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [80](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2c2079b6a9753fd72b599ac94393715a&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAA&_md5=5d418220b8f79eb99eb7ad7f7b46acfc" \l "n80" \t "_self) mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K (Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### War is only sparked by upswings—Must transition before 2025

Chase-Dunn & Bornschier 99

(Christopher, Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems, U of California-Riverside, and Volker, prof at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, “The Future of Global Conflict”, Sage Publications, p. 43)

While the onset of a period of hegemonic rivalry is in itself disturbing, the picture becomes even grimmer when the influence of long-term economic cycles is taken into account. As an extensive body of research documents (see especially Van Duijn, 1983), the 50 to 60 year business cycle known as the Kondratieff wave (K-wave) has been in synchronous operation on an international scale for at least the last two centuries. Utilizing data gathering by Levy (1983) on war severity, Goldstein (1988) demonstrates that there is a corresponding 50 to 60 year cycle in the number of battle deaths per year for the period 1495-1975. Beyond merely showing that the K-wave and the war cycle are linked in a systematic fashion, Goldstein’s research suggests that severe core wars are much more likely to occur late in the upswing phase of the K-wave. This finding is interpreted as showing that, while states always desire to go to war, they can afford to do so only when economic growth is providing them with sufficient resources. Modelski and Thompson (1996) present a more complex interpretation of the systemic relationship between economic and war cycles, but it closely resembles Goldstein’s hypothesis. In their analysis, a first economic upswing generates the economic resources required by an ascending core state to make a bid for hegemony; a second period of economic growth follows a period of global war and the establishment of a new period of hegemony. Here, again, specific economic upswings are associated with an increased likelihood of the outbreak of core war. It is widely accepted that the current K-wave, which entered a downturn around 1967-73, is probably now in the process of beginning a new upturn which will reach its apex around 2025. It is also widely accepted that by this period US hegemony, already unravelling, will have been definitively eroded. This convergence of a plateauing economic cycle with a period of political multicentricity within the core should, if history truly does repeat itself, result in the outbreak of full-scale warfare between the declining hegemon and the ascending core powers. Although both Goldstein (1991) and Modelski and Thompson (1996) assert that such a global war can (somehow) be avoided, other theorists consider that the possibility of such a core war is sufficiently high that serious steps should be taken to ensure that such collective suicide does not occur (Chase-Dunn and O’Reilly, 1989; Goldfrank, 1987).

#### Superpowers won’t go to war over the Middle East.

Gelb ’10

[Leslie, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, November/December Foreign Affairs, Proquest]

Also reducing the likelihood of conflict today is that there is no arena in which the vital interests of great powers seriously clash. Indeed, the most worrisome security threats today-rogue states with nuclear weapons and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction-actually tend to unite the great powers more than divide them. In the past, and specifically during the first era of globalization, major powers would war over practically nothing. Back then, they fought over the Balkans, a region devoid of resources and geographic importance, a strategic zero. Today, they are unlikely to shoulder their arms over almost anything, even the highly strategic Middle East. All have much more to lose than to gain from turmoil in that region. To be sure, great powers such as China and Russia will tussle with one another for advantages, but they will stop well short of direct confrontation. To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars. In the past, U.S. enemies-such as the Soviet Union-would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations.

#### No global escalation

Dyer, 02

Gwynne Dyer, December 2002. Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London and former professor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University. “The Coming War,” Queen’s Quarterly, Questia.

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. **Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled**, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. **The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undon**e. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

# 2NC

## FW

### 2nc AT Aff framework

#### WM- we’re a critique of the plan’s justifications for action.

#### WM- We’re an impact turn to the aff

#### C/I – The negative should be able to critique the affirmative’s ethical, ontological, or epistemological justifications for the plan

#### Education- allows different perspectives on why the plan is a bad idea- this requires both teams to research different perspectives and worldviews, which allows us to rethink our insulated views on IR and see the world in a different light.

#### Predictability—it’s a security K, it’s not like this is out of the ordinary.

#### Nothing in this debate will have an effect on policy implementation—the only thing we can do is better ourselves and improve the way we relate to the world.

#### Self-Perfection comes first—our self-enhancement allows the improvement of humankind

Conway 97 [Daniel Conway, Professor and Department Head 19th Century Philosophy at Texas A&M, 1997, Nietzsche and the Political, pg. 9, wyo-sc]

Great human beings accomplish the catalysis of culture not as a consciously articulated goal, but as an indirect and unintended by-product of their “private” pursuits of self-perfection. While they directly enhance the lives only of themselves and those select few who share their refined aesthetic sensibilities, they indirectly enhance the lives of all who are even minimally invested in the project of culture. Indeed, everyone who enters “the circle of culture” stands to benefit from the production of exemplary human types, for a justification of human existence would be impossible in their absence. Hence the central paradox of Nietzsche’s perfectionism: the enhancement of humanity and the enrichment of ethical life are dependent upon the exploits of “immoral” exemplars who hold no conscious or intentional stake in the lives of those whom they succor and renew. In fact, he insists, these exotic specimens must be allowed (and indeed encouraged) to free themselves from the chains of conventional morality if they are to contribute to the permanent enhancement of humankind.

#### Their epistemological justification for the plan is bad—their knowledge production privileges security experts who stand to make a large amount of money with the continuation of war and overstate threats to justify that security empire

### 2NC AT Calc/Predictions

#### 1st, no link, your predictions are a desire for certainty that you can never reach—the epistemology of those predictions is the very thing that allows the security regime to maintain power—it obfuscates how those predictions are revealed, and thus asserts them to be true without fully explaining why or how. There’s always a hidden agenda with predictions—that’s der derian and deleuze

#### 2nd, they need to prove that they can calculate their specific impacts and that the epistemological methods for those justifications are sound before they win a risk of those impacts

3rd,

### 2NC AT Util

#### Utilitarian ethics are a slave morality

Anomaly in 2005 (Jonny, Tulane University, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, pMUSE)

In interpreting Nietzsche's attacks on utilitarianism, it is crucial to understand the (often tenuous) connection Nietzsche makes between utilitarianism and Christianity. Because Nietzsche considers utilitarianism a secular offspring of Christian morality, many of his global attacks on utilitarianism resemble his more familiar critique of Christian "slave morality"—the morality of the herd. In particular, Nietzsche contends that utilitarianism inherited Christianity's commitment to the equal worth of each person, and perpetuated its erroneous assumption that a timeless, universal criterion for morality is tenable. Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil* culminates with the conclusion that "[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility" (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the *Genealogy*, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (*BGE* 260). The noble's power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises. The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor—for these are the most *useful* qualities [for the slave]" (*BGE* 260).

#### Slave morality creates an enemy that must be eliminated

Nietzsche, 1887 (Friedrich, philosopher, “The Genealogy of Morals” Online, MB)

The slave revolt in morality begins when the resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those beings who are prevented from a genuinely active reaction and who compensate for that with a merely imaginary vengeance. While all noble morality grows out of a triumphant self-affirmation, slave morality from the start says No to what is "outside," "other," "a non-self". And this No is its creative act. This transformation of the glance which confers value - this necessary projection towards what is outer instead of back into itself that is inherent in resentment: in order to arise. Slave morality always requires first an opposing world, a world outside itself. Psychologically speaking, it needs external stimuli in order to act at all. Its action is basically reaction. The reverse is the case with the noble method of valuing: it acts and grows spontaneously. It seeks its opposite only to affirm itself even more thankfully, with even more rejoicing. Its negative concept of "low," "common," "bad" is only a pale contrasting image after the fact in relation to its positive basic concept, intoxicated with life and passion, "We are noble, good, beautiful, and happy!" When the noble way of evaluating makes a mistake and abuses reality, that happens with reference to the sphere which it does not know well enough, indeed, the sphere it has strongly resisted learning the truth about: under certain circumstances it misjudges the sphere it despises - the sphere of the common man, the low people. On the other hand, we should consider that even assuming that the effect of contempt, of looking down or looking superior, falsifies the image of the person despised, such distortion will fall short by a long way of the distortion with which the repressed hatred and vengeance of the powerless man mistakenly assaults his opponent - naturally, in effigy. In fact, in contempt there is too much negligence, too much dismissive ness, too much looking away and impatience, all mixed together, even too much feeling of joy, for it to be capable of converting its object into a truly distorted monster. We should not fail to hear the almost benevolent nuances which for a Greek noble, for example, lay in all the words with which he set himself above the lower people - how a constant type of pity, consideration, and forbearance is mixed in there, sweetening the words, to the point where almost all words which refer to the common man finally remain as expressions for "unhappy," "worthy of pity" (compare deilos [cowardly], deilaios [lowly, mean], poneros [oppressed by toil, wretched], mochtheros [suffering, wretched]â€”the last two basically designating the common man as a slave worker and beast of burden). On the other hand, for the Greek ear the words "bad," "low," "unhappy" have never stopped echoing a single note, one tone colour, in which "unhappy" predominates. That is the inheritance of the old, noble, aristocratic way of evaluating, which does not betray its principles even in contempt. (Philologists might recall the sense in which oizuros [miserable], anolbos [unblessed], tlemon [wretched], dustychein [unfortunate], xymfora [misfortune] were used). The "well born" felt that they were "the happy ones"; they did not have to construct their happiness artificially first by looking at their enemies, or in some circumstance to talk themselves into it, to lie to themselves (the way all men of resentment habitually do). Similarly they knew, as complete men, overloaded with power and thus necessarily active, they must not separate action from happiness. They considered being active necessarily associated with happiness (that`s where the phrase eu prattein [do well, succeed] derives its origin) - all this very much the opposite of "happiness" at the level of the powerless, the oppressed, those festering with poisonous and hostile feelings, among whom happiness comes out essentially as a narcotic, an anesthetic, quiet, peace, "Sabbath", relaxing the soul, stretching one`s limbs, in short, as something passive. While the noble man lives for himself with trust and candour (gennaios, meaning "of noble birth" stresses the nuance "upright" and also probably "naÃ¯ve"), the man of resentment is neither upright nor naÃ¯ve, nor honest and direct with himself. His soul squints. His spirit loves hiding places, secret paths, and back doors. Everything furtive attracts him as his world, his security, his refreshment. He understands about remaining silent, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily diminishing himself, humiliating himself. A race of such men will necessarily end up cleverer than any noble race. It will value cleverness to a very different extent, that is, as a condition of existence of the utmost importance; whereas, cleverness among noble men easily acquires a delicate aftertaste of luxury and sophistication about it. Here it is not nearly so important as the complete certainly of the ruling unconscious instincts or even a certain lack of cleverness, something like brave recklessness, whether in the face of danger or of an enemy, or wildly enthusiastic, sudden fits of anger, love, reverence, thankfulness, and vengefulness, by which in all ages noble souls have recognized each other. The resentment of the noble man himself, if it comes over him, consumes and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction and therefore does not poison. On the other hand, in countless cases it just doesn`t appear, whereas in the case of all weak and powerless people it is unavoidable. The noble man cannot take his enemies, his misfortunes, even his bad deeds seriously for very long - that is the mark of a strong, complete nature, in whom there is a surplus of plastic, creative, healing power, which also can make one forget (a good example for that from the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no memory of the insults and maliciousness people directed at him, and who therefore could not forgive, because he just forgot). Such a man with one shrug throws off him all those worms which eat into other men. Only here is possible (provided that it is at all possible on earth) the real "love for one`s enemy." How much respect a noble man already has for his enemies! And such a respect is already a bridge to love . . . In fact, he demands his enemy for himself, as his mark of honour. Indeed, he has no enemy other than one who has nothing to despise and a great deal to respect! By contrast, imagine for yourself "the enemy" as a man of resentment conceives him - and right here we have his action, his creation: he has conceptualized "the evil enemy,: "the evil one," and as a fundamental idea - and from that he now thinks his way to an opposite image and counterpart, a "good man" - himself!

## Link

### 2NC Link OV

#### Extend Der Derian—he makes 2 link arguments

#### Their desire for security is an impossible attempt to securitize the state against the evil “other” and their capacity to end life—this leads to ressentiment because we can’t ever be secure because the will to power ensures that violence will always happen, so we seek the elimination of the different or unknown.

#### The security regime is sustained by its experts who provide knowledge of what threats exist, and they inflate those threats to make money off of that.

#### Extend Jackson 5—over hype threats bad

## Impact

### 2NC Impact OV

#### The affirmative is an imagination of a world devoid of threats—this is the result of their ressentiment towards those who contribute to their fear of insecurity—this imagination of a new world causes us to hate the parts of the world that makes us feel unsafe, which ultimately results in our hatred of all of the world because there is inevitably insecurity. That’s Turlani

#### The creature of ressentiment seeks a blame for its misfortune—this blame creates its desire for endless violence and revenge against who is the cause of misfortune—it will portray the other as evil to ensure its moral calculus seems good

Deleuze 83 [Giles Deleuze, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, “Nietzsche and Philosophy,” p. 116-119]

We must not be deceived by the expression "spirit of revenge". Spirit does not make revenge an intention, an unrealised end but, on the contrary, gives revenge a means. We have not understood ressentiment if we only see it as a desire for revenge, a desire to rebel and triumph. The topological principle of ressentiment entails a state of real forces: the state of reactive forces that no longer let themselves act, that evade the action of active forces. It gives revenge a means: a means of reversing the normal relation of active and reactive forces. This is why ressentiment itself is always a revolt and always the triumph of this revolt. Ressentiment is the triumph of the weak as weak, the revolt of the slaves and their victory as slaves. It is in their victory that the slaves form a type. The type of the master (the active type) is defined in terms of the faculty of forgetting and the power of acting reactions. The type of slave (the reactive type) is defined by a prodigious memory, by the power of ressentiment; several characteristics which determine this second type follow from this.¶ Inability to admire, respect or love (BGE 260, GM I 10). The memory of traces is itself full of hatred. Hatred or revenge is hidden even in the most tender and most loving memories. The ruminants of memory disguise this hatred by a subtle operation which consists in reproaching themselves with everything with which, in fact, they reproach the being whose memory they pretend to cherish. For this reason we must beware of those who condemn themselves before that which is good or beautiful, claiming not to understand, not to be worthy: their modesty is frightening. What hatred of beauty is hidden in their declarations of inferiority. Hating all that is experienced as lovable or admirable, diminishing by buffoonery or base interpreta- tions, seeing traps to be avoided in all things: always saying, "please don't engage me in a battle of wits". What is most striking in the man of ressentiment is not his nastiness but his disgusting malevolence, his capacity for disparagement. Nothing can resist it. He does not even respect his friends or even his enemies. He does not even respect misfortune or its causes . 9 Think of the Trojans who, in Helen, respected and admired the cause of their own misfortune. But the man of ressentiment must turn misfortune into something mediocre, he must recriminate and distribute blame: look at his inclination to play down the value of causes, to make misfortune "someone's fault". By contrast, the aristocrat's respect for the causes of misfortune goes together with an ability to take his own misfortunes seriously. The way in which the slave takes his misfortunes seriously shows a difficult digestion and a base way of thinking which is incapable of feeling respect.¶ "Passivity". In ressentiment happiness "appears essentially as a narco- tic drug, rest, peace, `sabbath', slackening of tension and relaxing of imbs, in short passively" (GM I 10 p. 38). In Nietzsche "passive" does not mean "non-active"; "non-active" means "reactive"; but "passive" means "non-acted". The only thing that is passive is reac- tion insofar as it is not acted. The term "passive" stands for the triumph of reaction, the moment when, ceasing to be acted, it becomes a ressentiment. The man of ressentiment does not know how to and does not want to love, but wants to be loved. He wants to be loved, fed, watered, caressed and put to sleep. He is the impotent, the dyspeptic, the frigid, the insomniac, the slave. Furthermore the man of ressentiment is extremely touchy: faced with all the activities he cannot undertake he considers that, at the very least, he ought to be compensated by benefiting from them. He therefore considers it a proof of obvious malice that he is not loved, that he is not fed. The man of ressentiment is the man of profit and gain. Moreover, ressenti-ment could only be imposed on the world through the triumph of the principle of gain, by making profit not only a desire and a way of thinking but an economic, social and theological system, a complete system, a divine mechanism. A failure to recognise profit — this is the theological crime and the only crime against the spirit. It is in this sense that slaves have a morality, and that this morality is that of utility (BGE 260). We asked: who considers action from the standpoint of its utility or harmfulness? And even: who considers action from the standpoint of good and evil, of praiseworthiness and blameworthi- ness? If we review all the qualities that morality calls "praiseworthy" or "good" in themselves, for example, the incredible notion of disin-terestedness, we realise that they conceal the demands and recrimina- tions of a passive third party: it is he who claims an interest in actions that he does not perform; he praises the disinterested character of precisely the actions from which he benefits.'° Morality in itself conceals the utilitarian standpoint; but utilitarianism conceals the standpoint of the passive third party, the triumphant standpoint of a slave who intervenes between masters.¶ The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation. All this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disap- pointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of ressentiment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of ressentiment from the typological point of view, it summarises and brings together all the preceding characteris- tics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil. The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the value- positing eye . . . is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM I 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset.

## Alt

### 2NC Alt OV

#### The Alternative is an affirmation of chance through a dicethrow—this is a metaphor to represent how chaotic and uncontrollable the world is—we must love all parts of life, including death, because death is an inevitability, and by accepting that, we can enjoy life more and not just escape death, but rather find joy in the time that we have on earth.

#### Chance is the best paradigm to view the world through, because it is the only thing we can do. There is no possible way to establish causality or probability because infinite actors involved in complex international relations ensure that we will never be able to effectively predict what the effects of our policies are or how a certain country will react to our actions

#### That’s deleuze 83

## Death

#### **Value is Not Based on Duration of life – trying to evade death is not the same as living life—only by acknowledging that death is inevitable can we have value in life**

Razinsky, 2k9

(Liran Razinsky. “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2). 2009. Pg 76-81 ProjectMuse)

Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life.17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. **Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked**. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. **Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions**. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible**.** In a way, he is telling us that **we cannot accept the situation where death is** constantly **evaded.** Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. **When we invest all of our effort in surviving**, something of the true nature of **life evades us**. It is **only when the finite human** being **goes beyond** the **limitations** “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: **a life that is only fleeing death has less value.** Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. **The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest**. **Bataille calls this state**, or aspect of the world, **immanence or intimacy**: “immanence between man and the world, **between the subject and the object”** (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). **They are a demand of life itself**, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it**. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life.** Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “**the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions**.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). **Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others**. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place**,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty**.19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. **He contests**, as we have seen, the **sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it.** Freud poses the same tension here. **Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable**. **Our usual world**, according to Bataille, **is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time.** This is one reason for **the threat of death**: it **ruins value where value is only assured through duration**. **It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course**. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. **Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude”** (309; 212). **Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What** **Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life**. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is **this insistence on replacement** that **leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,**” in the words of Bataille, “**conceals life from us**” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, **when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial.**

## Case

#### No US precedent---not causal

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat. ¶ “Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.” ¶ By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?) ¶ It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be. ¶ Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so. ¶ But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.¶ Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

### 2NC – AT: China Impact

#### [1] China won’t use drones to attack— Erickson and Strange provide 3 warrants

#### Domestic politics will check China’s ability to use drone strikes offensively

#### They fear international backlash for brazenness in territorial disputes

#### They don’t want the US to be able to justify using drone strikes against China

#### [2] Chinese aggression won’t be increased by drones, they will simply use other means to escalate conflict, and chinese stability is high. –That’s Singh

#### [3] Their drones are way far behind—our zhou evidence indicates their models are prototypes, they lack operators, and are 20 years behind on tech

#### [4] China won’t provoke a war- multiple warrants

-economy

-vulnerable military

-few outposts in Spratlys

-Not pumping oil

-Taiwan has more to lose

-Empirics

-Patrol ships are unarmed

Goldstein, associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, ‘11

[Lyle, He is co-editor of the recent volumes China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership and Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles. “The South China Sea's Georgia Scenario,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/11/the_south_china_seas_georgia_scenario?page=0,2>]

Washington's focus on "freedom of navigation," which has inexplicably become the main pillar of current U.S. policy in the region, is actually rather absurd. China, the world's largest maritime trading nation by almost any measure, is very unlikely to threaten navigational freedoms -- its own economy is almost wholly reliant on those very freedoms. The claim that China's opposition to regular U.S. military surveillance activities in the South China Sea threatens "freedom of navigation" is likewise disingenuous and represents an unfortunate tendency to reach for the clever sound bite. In fact, such U.S. surveillance activities all along China's coasts are excessive to the point of seriously disrupting the bilateral relationship and should thus be decreased, especially if linked to concrete progress on Chinese military transparency. The alleged Chinese threat to ASEAN states, moreover, turns out to be more hype than fact. Much has been said about China's new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island, but the surprise is that up to now Beijing has had only one nuclear submarine base (Qingdao) -- quite paltry when compared with the four operated by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific area. Similarly, the basing of a ballistic missile submarine and even China's first aircraft carrier at Hainan would more likely represent weakness than strength. After all, alternative basing in north China simply means these high-value assets would be closer and hence more vulnerable to the impressive striking power of both the Japanese and U.S. fleets that are based primarily in Northeast Asia. Those viewing Chinese "aggression" as the impetus for current tension might reasonably be asked why Beijing has only six outposts in the Spratlys (compared with 29 occupied by Vietnam), why Beijing is one of the only claimant states not currently pumping oil out of the South China Sea, and why the largest island in the Spratlys archipelago is actually occupied by Taiwan. In fact, China's policy in the South China Sea has been largely reactive in both present and historical circumstances, which indeed explains a good bit of the incoherence of China's present policy. China has settled the majority of its border disputes peacefully and is largely relying on unarmed patrol cutters to enforce its claims in the South China Sea -- clearly a sign that it does not seek escalation to armed conflict.

# 1NR

### K Wave 2NC O/V

#### Wars happen on the upswing of the economy when people are most optimistic and wanting to expand that’s Boehmer and Cashman

#### Even if they win their internal link we’ll outweigh

#### a. Probability—higher risk because of resource shortages and expectations

Mauer 86 – economist (Nathan, The Kondratieif Waves, p 197-8)

The overall trend of the economy shapes perceptions as to its strength and direction. In a hull market, "experts" are almost uniformly optimistic; in a bear market the owlish analysts almost universally suggest caution. **It is during the upward swings**, soon after a trough and just before a peak, **that wars become more likely**. It should be rioted that peak wars are the result of a different kind of socioeconomic psychological pressure and have quite different economic results than trough wars. Nations become socially and politically unsettled after a long period of boom and expansion, perhaps because **in their final stages, peoples' expectations begin to outrun actual growth in the general level of prosperity. War** then **becomes the ultimate destination**. In as much as **all nations are attempting to expand simultaneously, the intense competition for resources and markets leads eventually to military confrontations, which become contagious**. One explanation suggested is that **during trough wars the public is still largely concerned with** private considerations and **their own wellbeing**. They tend to be less interested in international disputes, world crusades, or campaigns involving large investment of cash, effort, and the nervous energy needed to pursue projects to a conclusion. **Trough wars tend to be short**. They are more a matter of choice and sudden decision by the stronger power. Inasmuch as **peak wars are the result of frustration of expectations** {usually with economic elements), **peak wars tend to be more desperate, more widespread, and more destructive**.

#### b. Magnitude—increased capabilities mean wars are worse in the upswing

Modelski & Thompson 96

Professor of political science, professor of political science (George and William, Leading Sectors and World Powers, pg 20-22)

Goldstein (1985. 1987. 1988, 1991a) has probably contributed more than anyone else to reviving the question of how wars and prosperity are linked. His 1988 analysis went some way in summarizing many of the arguments concerning economic long waves and war. His 1991 analysis is one of the more sophisticated empirical studies to emerge after nearly a century of controversy (spatiotemporal boundaries: world system from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries).3 The basic perspective that emerges from his analyses, outlined in figure 2.2, sees economic upswings increasing the probability of severe wars. Severe wars usher in a phase of stagnation from which the world economy eventually recovers leading to another resurgence of robust economic growth. Goldstein's analysis suggests that this process has gone on since at least 1495. Economic upswings create economic surpluses and full war chests. The ability to wage war makes severe wars more likely. Severe wars, in turn, consume the surpluses and war chests and put an end to the growth upswing. Decades are required to rebuild. While there may be some gains registered in terms of resource mobilization for combat purposes, these gains are offset by the losses brought about by wartime distortions and destruction. Goldstein is careful to distinguish between production and prices. Prices, in his view, are functions of war. Other things being equal, the severity of the war greatly effects the rate of war-induced inflation—in other words, the greater the severity, then the higher the rate of inflation. When prices rise, real wages decline. Yet he also notes that production (production waves are said to precede war/price waves by some ten to fifteen years) is already stagnating toward the end of the upswing. This phenomenon is explained in terms of demand increases outstripping supply. As a result, inflation occurs. The lack of clarity on this issue may be traceable to the lack of specification among innovation, investment, and production. Cycles in innovation and investment are viewed as reinforcing the production long wave. Increases in innovation facilitate economic growth but growth discourages further innovation. Investment increases on the upswing but, eventually, over investment results. Investors retrench and growth slows down as a consequence. What is not exactly specified is whether innovation, investment, war, or some combination of the three processes is responsible for ending the upswing. Goldstein also raises the question of how these economic/war cycles impact the distribution of capabilities among the major powers. War severity increases capability concentration. Relative capabilities then begin a process of diffusion as they move toward equality among the major powers. Another bout of severe war ensues and the cycle repeats itself. In addition to war, differential rates of innovation and production influence relative capability standings. Presumably, all three factors share some responsibility for generating the fluctuations in capability concentration.

#### High growth wars are the most severe

Goldstein 87

(Joshua S, Poli- Sci @ MIT *, Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol 31, No 4, Dec. 1987, http://www.jstor.org/stable/174156 , P. 592-93)

This effect of economic growth on the severity of war may be augmented by a "lateral pressure" effect (North and Lagerstrom, 1971; Choucri and North, 1975; Strickland, 1982). During production upswings, the great powers grow more rapidly-heightening competition for world resources and markets, and raising the stakes for international competition and conflict. Kondratieff himself (I928/ 1984: 95) attributes the correlation of major wars with long wave upswings to a process much like lateral pressure: The upward movement in business conditions, and the growth of productive forces, cause a sharpening of the struggle for new markets-in particular, raw materials markets.. .. [This] makes for an aggravation of international political relations, an increase in the occasions for military conflicts, and military conflicts themselves. Lasswell (1935/1965: 121) likewise argues that "prosperity expands markets, intensifies contact, sharpens conflict and war."

### Cause all your shit

#### China War

O'Connell 6

(Meghan, Research Associate at the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University, “China Threatens To Rival American Power Status,” United Press International, June 22, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China\_Threatens\_To\_Rival\_American\_Power\_Status.html)

But the gap between America's dominance and China's power seems to be lessening. The debate is no longer about whether China has the military strength to pose a threat, but what to do about it, said Daniel Blumenthal, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "China is probably the only country in the world that can compete with the United States militarily and actually pose a challenge to its hegemony," Blumenthal said, pointing to what he called a serious peacetime military buildup by China over the last 10 years. The United States has been shoring up its alliances around the region, he continued, with countries such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Mongolia all concerned about what China's military rise means. Because of the nation's military expansion, intervention should China attack Taiwan can no longer be accomplished at a low cost, said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. And though China has been bulking up its military presence along borders near Taiwan, Schriver said that the nation's vision extends far beyond the small island to regional and global contingencies. "The game is on in Asia, and the United States has to be engaged," Schriver said, emphasizing the growing global importance of Asia. According to the National Intelligence Council, Schriver said, by 2020, Asia will hold 56 percent of the world's population, six of the 10 largest militaries, three of the four largest economies, and six of the 10 largest energy consumers. By contrast, Schriver added, the NIC expects the population of the Middle East to compose only 4 percent of the world's total in 2020. "The whole center of gravity of the earth and human existence is moving to Asia," Schriver said, explaining that the United States needs a policy that will develop relations with the rest of Asia while confronting China. You get Asia right by getting China right and you get China right by getting Asia right, Schriver said. Yet in an age of globalization, any moves by China or the United States would have grand influence in areas beyond the military. "Economic setbacks and crises of confidence could slow China's emergence as a full-scale great power," the National Intelligence Council wrote in its 2020 Project report on global trends for the future. "Beijing's failure to maintain its economic growth would itself have a global impact."

#### Terrorism

Cronin 3

Senior Associate at the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War(Audrey Kurth, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism”, Project MUSE)

The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes. The political incentives to attack major targets such as the United States with powerful weapons have greatly increased. The perceived corruption of indigenous customs, religions, languages, economies, and so on are blamed on an international system often unconsciously molded by American behavior. The accompanying distortions in local communities as a result of exposure to the global marketplace of goods and ideas are increasingly blamed on U.S.- sponsored modernization and those who support it. The advancement of technology, however, is not the driving force behind the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies, despite what some have assumed. Instead, at the heart of this threat are frustrated populations and international movements that are increasingly inclined to lash out against U.S.-led globalization. As Christopher Coker observes, globalization is reducing tendencies toward instrumental violence (i.e., violence between states and even between communities), but it is enhancing incentives for expressive violence (or violence that is ritualistic, symbolic, and communicative). The new international terrorism is [End Page 51] increasingly engendered by a need to assert identity or meaning against forces of homogeneity, especially on the part of cultures that are threatened by, or left behind by, the secular future that Western-led globalization brings. According to a report recently published by the United Nations Development Programme, the region of greatest deficit in measures of human development—the Arab world—is also the heart of the most threatening religiously inspired terrorism. Much more work needs to be done on the significance of this correlation, but increasingly sources of political discontent are arising from disenfranchised areas in the Arab world that feel left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurances of broader freedom, prosperity, and access to knowledge. The results are dashed expectations, heightened resentment of the perceived U.S.-led hegemonic system, and a shift of focus away from more proximate targets within the region. Of course, the motivations behind this threat should not be oversimplified: Anti-American terrorism is spurred in part by a desire to change U.S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as well as by growing antipathy in the developing world vis-à-vis the forces of globalization. It is also crucial to distinguish between the motivations of leaders such as Osama bin Laden and their followers. The former seem to be more driven by calculated strategic decisions to shift the locus of attack away from repressive indigenous governments to the more attractive and media-rich target of the United States. The latter appear to be more driven by religious concepts cleverly distorted to arouse anger and passion in societies full of pent-up frustration. To some degree, terrorism is directed against the United States because of its engagement and policies in various regions. Anti-Americanism is closely related to antiglobalization, because (intentionally or not) the primary driver of the powerful forces resulting in globalization is the United States. Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed globalization and terrorism are intricately intertwined forces characterizing international security in the twenty-first century. The main question is whether terrorism will succeed in disrupting the [End Page 52] promise of improved livelihoods for millions of people on Earth. Globalization is not an inevitable, linear development, and it can be disrupted by such unconventional means as international terrorism. Conversely, modern international terrorism is especially dangerous because of the power that it potentially derives from globalization—whether through access to CBNR weapons, global media outreach, or a diverse network of financial and information resources.

#### Arms Build up in Pakistan

Arnett 97 (Eric, Arms Control Today vol 27 no. 5, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/arnett.htm , Aug 97)

First, Pakistani planners may not be as sanguine about Indian capabilities, and the fears and perceptions of Pakistanis are the central issue. From Islamabad's perspective, it increasingly appears that most of the major arms suppliers are cooperating with India, even those that have already sold systems to Pakistan. Some of the systems that have been supplied, especially the Armat anti-radar missile, can be very effective even in the hands of less-skilled pilots. The quality and likely effectiveness of other systems are very difficult to judge without much greater transparency on the part of the IAE Second, Indian society is set to progress at an unprecedented rate, potentially enjoying economic growth and modernization that are likely to dramatically increase the budget and competence of the country's armed forces. As relations with China improve, even more of India's military potential can be focused on Pakistani contingencies. Even if IAF strike squadrons have some weaknesses now, U.S. policymakers should not be betting against substantial improvements in Indian technological proficiency in the near future, especially since U.S. firms are contributing to the technological base of both the civilian and military sectors.

#### Build up is the war

WASHINGTON TIMES 2001

[STAFF, “The Most Dangerous Place”, July 8, 2001, p. lexis// wyo-tjc]

The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.¶ This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

#### Growth will intensify world competition over oil causing war

Mason 12

[Colin Mason, “2030 Spike : Countdown to Global Catastrophe”, London, GBR: Earthscan, 2003. p 14., Australian journalist, author and former politician. Mason worked for 14 years as the first foreign correspondent of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation[1] and became deeply involved in Asian affairs, He joined the Australian Democrats and was elected to the Senate at the 1977 election as a senator for New South Wales., from the book, \\wyo-bb]

Intensifying world competition for fuel is only too likely to create an ongoing series of oil wars, such as the recent conflict in Iraq. John Pilger alleges ‘weapons of mass destruction’ have little to do with the American attack on that country. ‘America wants a more compliant thug to run the world’s second greatest source of oil.’ A number of recent American policy documents tend to support this view, warning that the United States is running out of oil, with a painful end to cheap oil already in sight, and suggesting armed force to secure oil supplies – even ‘painting over the real US motives for war with a nobly high minded veneer’ to mobilize public support for war. At the time of writing, six weeks after the successful invasion of Iraq, the earlier-stated motives for war – the elimination of Saddam Hussein and the discovery of weapons of mass destruction – have not eventuated, while the Iraqi oilfields have come under United States and British control. The influence of this driver is difficult to overestimate. Its potential to combine with some of the others, among them accelerated ‘terrorism’ and poverty, is very serious. It is possible that war or substantial terrorism in the Middle East could cut off the world’s major oil supplies abruptly if the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi wells were damaged or sabotaged. In that case there would be intense crises, involving severe food shortages, in most parts of the world.

### 2NC Extension

#### Group both Zey Evidence

#### Extend Grantham 12, the world will run out of energy, metals and food shocking markets via prices collapsing the economy.

#### Also a question of access to the food, a lot of food in Africa dies in the crops and different areas because of a lack of access and movement. No bolstering of this, no internals

#### Zey is embarrassing, he is doing the math wrong- The sheer size of the population ensures scarcity and collapse of resources

Blodget 11

[Henry, quoting Jeremy Grantham who is co-founder and Chief Investment Strategist of Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo (GMO), a Boston-based asset management, Business Insider, “There Are Now 7 Billion People In The World And We're Running Out Of Stuff”, Nov 5, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/commodities-boom-2011-11?op=1> //wyo-tjc]

Earlier this week, the (estimated) total number of people in the world blew past 7 billion. To put that number in context, for the first 70,000-odd years of human history, the total human population was around 1 million. Then, over the course of the next ~10,000 years through 1800, the population gradually grew to 1 billion. And now the population has increased 7X in the past 200 years. Many of the resources used to sustain this population, meanwhile, have not grown. On the contrary, they've shrunk. Because we've used them up. Oil, for example. And metals. And potassium, which is used to make fertilizer, which is used to grow the food we eat. Just go to the slides > Optimists laugh at the idea that we should be concerned about this — ever-growing population and ever-shrinking resources. Science and innovation will save us, they argue. They always have. ("Always," in this context, of course, means the past few hundred years, which is less than 1% of human history). And hopefully the optimists will be right. If you were a stock-market investor and you saw the population chart above, though, you'd probably think to yourself, "WHOA — talk about a bubble! Can't wait to short that thing!" And some smart investors would agree with you. Jeremy Grantham. Earlier this year, Jeremy Grantham of GMO published a treatise on the root cause of the exploding commodity prices of the past few years. He also offered a startlingly depressing outlook for the future of humanity. Grantham concludes that the world has undergone a permanent "paradigm shift" in which the number of people on planet Earth has finally and permanently outstripped the planet's ability to support us. Specifically, Grantham says, the phenomenon of ever-more humans using a finite supply of natural resources cannot continue forever — and the prices of metals, hydrocarbons (oil), and food are now beginning to reflect that. In other words, Grantham says, it is different this time. Grantham believes that the trend of the last 100 years, in which the prices of almost all major commodities have steadily declined, is permanently over. And from here on in, he says, humans will be competing more — and paying more — for ever-scarcer resources. From an investment standpoint, this paradigm shift need not mean disaster: Grantham says the obvious play is to own "the stuff in the ground" (and the ground itself, as the huge boom in farmland prices illustrates). The less obvious but equally compelling play is to own companies and technologies that facilitate resource conservation. From a societal standpoint, the news is far worse. Grantham believes that the planet can only sustainably support about 1.5 billion humans, versus the 7 billion on Earth right now (heading to 10-12 billion). For all of history except the last 200 years, the human population has been controlled via the limits of the food supply. Grantham thinks that, eventually, the same force will come into play again. This question, whether we're headed for a resource and environmental crisis, is obviously a critical question, not just for investors, but for humanity at large. We'll be looking into the question in detail here over the next few months.

Opop: Death Checks Necessary

### A2 Tech Solves Resource Shortages

#### Extend Grantham- Markets will collapse before we realize the need for innovation

#### Tech can’t solve –overshoot of demand overwhelms

Trainer 12

[Ted Trainer, Social Sciences and International Studies University of New South Wales, Futures, Volume 44, Issue 6, August 2012, Pages 590–599, Special Issue: Politics, Democracy and Degrowth, “De-growth: Do you realise what it means?”, Science Direct \\wyo-bb]

The **common response** to the general “limits” claim is **that technical advances** can **solve** the problems **enabling** **us to go on living with ever increasing “living standards**”. Green agencies can be among the front ranks of those claiming technical solutions already exist and attributing the continuation of the problems to the failure of politicians to implement them. People on the left are similarly inclined to assume that when capitalism has been eliminated “everyone can have a Mercedes.” However it is easily shown that **the overshoot is far too great for any plausible technical advances** to be able to reduce the problems to tolerable proportions. Perhaps the best known “technical fix” optimist, Amory **Lovins**, **claims** that **we could** at least **double global output** while **halving the resource** and **environmental impacts**, i.e., we could **achieve a “Factor Four**” **reduction** [8]. But **it is easily shown that this would be nowhere near sufficient to solve the problems.** Let us **assume** that present **global resource and ecological impacts** **must be halved** (although much more than that is needed). It has been explained above that **if we in rich countries average 3% growth**, and **10 billion rose to the living standards we would then have by 2050, total world output would be about 20 times as great as it is today. It is not remotely plausible that technical advance will make it possible to multiply total world economic output by 20 while halving impacts, i.e., enable a Factor 40 reduction?**

### A2 Transition Mind Shift/ Hyper Growth

#### 1 Death Checks- We concede that there will be small conventional wars that will kill off large portions of the population solving for all offense. Even if we don’t win the transition away from growth permanent, there would be too few of people to damage the planet.

#### 3.Collapse now creates a mindset shift towards small local civilizations

Lewis 2000

- Ph.D. University of Colorado at Boulder (Chris H, “The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Global Industrial Civilization” <http://www.cross-x.com/archives/LewisParadox.pdf>)

With the collapse of global industrial civilization, smaller, autonomous, local and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will emerge. We can reduce the threat of mass death and genocide that will surely accompany this collapse by encouraging the creation and growth of sustainable, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a case for how this may work in the United States and how it is working in Kerala, India. After the collapse of global industrial civilization, First and Third World peoples won't have the material resources, biological capital, and energy and human resources to re-establish global industrial civilization. Forced by economic necessity to become dependent on local resources and ecosystems for their survival, peoples throughout the world will work to conserve and restore their environments. Those societies that destroy their local environments and economies, as modern people so often do, will themselves face collapse and ruin.

### Case

#### And the risk of Indonesian state breakup has already been solved

**Kurlantzick 11** Josh is currently a Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Middle East revolutions only aspire to Indonesia's success,” Feb 20, <http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/middle-east-revolutions-only-aspire-to-indonesias-success>

On the surface, looking to Indonesia makes sense. No developing nation over the past decade has enjoyed such a dramatic turnaround, from a nearly failed state to a vibrant and stable democracy. In the late 1990s, after the fall of the longtime dictator Suharto, Indonesia appeared on the verge of collapse.Newly empowered Islamist organisations seized on the post-Suharto chaos to build networks and launch major terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali. Like Yemen, Indonesia had many outlying regions that sought to secede, and in the early days of democracy some almost did. East Timor gained independence in 1999 after bloody fighting. Some Indonesian observers predicted the country was turning into an Asian version of ungovernable Nigeria. It appeared that Suharto's contention that only he could hold the nation together - a boast similar to Hosni Mubarak's - might prove true. About a decade later, look again. **The Indonesian government has resolved nearly every secessionist issue and stability has allowed for renewed growth**. The country's economy grew by more than 6 per cent last year and likely will grow faster in 2011. Indonesia's Islamists have been blunted and secular parties dominate the legislature. The country has held multiple free and fair elections, and remained a close partner of western democracies even after the end of its strongman rule.

**Indonesia is resilient—small disruptions self-correct**

**Asmoro 9** [Andry Asmoro, economist at Bahana Securities and writer @ Jakarta Post “Political Stability and Economic Resilience Go Hand in Hand,” July 29 http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/news/2009/07/news134.htm]

The satisfaction rate with the 2009 presidential election is high. Based on the Indonesia Survey Institute's (LSI) latest exit-poll survey, 33 percent of respondents stated the presidential election was very honest and fair. Another 59 percent of those surveyed conceded the election was indeed honest and reasonably fair. Thus, at least 92 percent of total respondents agreed incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) won the presidential election fair and square, compared to a 67 percent satisfaction rate with the April legislative elections. An overwhelming satisfaction rate is imperative to give legitimacy to the ruling government for the next five years. At least 90 percent of the respondents who voted for the Megawati-Prabowo pair stated the presidential election was honest and fair slightly more than the 89 percent of Kalla-Wiranto voters who expressed a similar view, but lower than the 95 percent of SBY-Boediono voters who found the election fair. In our view, these results show the threat of political instability going forward is minimal. As politics and economics go hand in hand, we believe the current stable political climate witnessed during this presidential election will support and strengthen Indonesia's future economic growth. This is particularly important given the recent political instability in places such as Thailand and Iran. The double bombings at the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels have served as a reminder of the importance of political stability to a country's prospects for prosperity. It is thus misguided to say Indonesia will emerge entirely unscathed from the recent bombings, as the tourism and hotel industry will be hard hit. Fortunately, our tourism industry, which consists mainly of the hotel and restaurant sector, only contributed to 3.1 percent of Indonesia's real GDP in the first quarter of 2009. At the macroeconomic level, domestic consumption, which accounts for some 60 percent of Indonesia's total GDP, remains the backbone of the country's economic growth. We expect year-end private spending growth will reach 5.27 percent as it will be supported by low inflation, a higher absorption of the fiscal stimulus into infrastructure projects, the upcoming fasting month and Lebaran or Idul Fitri. We expect the year-on-year inflation rate to reach just 3.9 percent by year end 2009, before rising to 5.5 percent in 2010. Our estimate for the year-end economic growth remains at 4.1 percent, higher than the 3.4 percent we earlier estimated. We also expect investment will grow 3.7 percent year-on-year, higher than our initial 1.6 percent estimate.