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### 1

#### LINK—THE AFF FETISHIZES THE LAW AND ITS ABILITY TO RESOLVE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, THEIR CALL RESULTS IN A RETURN TO LAW THAT DESTROYS THE POSSIBILITY FOR RADICAL POLITICS

NEOCLEOUS 2006

(Mark Neocleous, Politics & History @ Brunel University, “the Problem with Normality”, Alternatives, no. 31 //wyo-tjc)

To criticize the use of emergency powers in terms of a suspension of the law, then, is to make the mistake of counterpoising normality and emergency, law and violence. In separating “normal” from “emergency,” with the latter deemed “exceptional,” this approach parrots the conventional wisdom that posits normalcy and emergency as two discrete and separable phenomena. This essentially liberal paradigm assumes that there is such a thing as “normal” order governed by rules, and that the emergency constitutes an “exception” to this normality. “Normal” here equates with the separation of powers, entrenched civil liberties, an ongoing debate about public policy and law, and the rule of law, while “emergencies” are thought to require strong executive rule, little time for discussion, and are premised on the supposedly necessary suspension of the law and thus the discretion to suspend key liberties and rights. But this rests on two deeply ideological assumptions: first, the assumption that emergency rule is aberrational; and, second, an equation of the emergency/nonemergency dichotomy with a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional action. Thus liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the normal constitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form while providing the executive with the power to act in an emergency.47 But the historical evidence suggests that emergency powers are far from exceptional; rather, they are an ongoing aspect of normal political rule. Emergency, in this sense, is what emerges from the rule of law when violence needs to be exercised and the limits of the rule of law overcome. The genealogy of “emergency” is instructive here. “Emergency” has its roots in the idea of “emerge.” The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that “emerge” connotes “the rising of a submerged body out of the water” and “the process of coming forth, issuing from concealment, obscurity, or confinement.” Both these meanings of “emerge” were once part of the meaning of “emergency,” but the first is now rare and the second obsolete. Instead, the modern meaning of “emergency” has come to the fore, namely a sudden or unexpected occurrence demanding urgent action and, politically speaking, the term used to describe a condition close to war in which the normal constitution might be suspended. But what this tells us is that in “emergency” lies the idea of something coming out of concealment or issuing from confinement by certain events. This is why “emergency” is a better category than exception: Where “emergency” has this sense of “emergent,” exception instead implies a sense of ex capere, that is, of being taken outside. Far from being outside the rule of law, emergency powers emerge from within it. They are thus as important as the rule of law to the political management of the modern state. There is, however, an even wider argument to be made. The idea that the permanent emergency involves a suspension of the law encourages the idea that resistance must involve a return to legality, a return to the normal mode of governing through the rule of law. But this involves a serious misjudgment in which it is simply assumed that legal procedures, both international and domestic, are designed to protect human rights from state violence. Law itself comes to appear largely unproblematic. What this amounts to is what I have elsewhere called a form of legal fetishism, in which law becomes a universal answer to the problems posed by power. Law is treated as an independent or autonomous reality, explained according to its own dynamics. This produces the illusion that law has a life of its own, abstracting the rule of law from its origins in class domination and oppression and obscuring the ideological mystification of these processes in the liberal trumpeting of the rule of law.48 To demand the return to the “rule of law” is to seriously misread the history of the relation between the rule of law and emergency powers and, consequently, to get sucked into a less-than-radical politics in dealing with state violence. Part of what I am suggesting is that emergency measures, as state violence, are part of the everyday exercise of powers, working alongside and from within rather than against the rule of law, as part of a unified political strategy in the fabrication of social order.

#### Cyber security rhetoric locks in a permanent war against potential threats, results in the same kinds of policy making that promote only technical solutions, and blocks out other ways of thinking about complex threats—rethinking these knowledge networks is key

Bernard-Wills and Ashenden, 2012

[David and Debi, Department of Informatics and Systems Engineering, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Securing Virtual Space : Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk, Space and Culture 2012 15: 110, SAGE Journals] /Wyo-MB

This article has developed an overview of the dominant cyber security discourse, drawing on governmentality theory and discourse analysis. It identified a particular way of constructing the “problem of cyberspace” that focused on threat, risk, and vulnerability arising from technologi- cal sources and the nature of virtual space. Discourses attempt to suture the political space. For Laclau, this is the operation of ideology (a term he strips of some of its pejorative connotations). All discourses contain ideological elements, and there could not be a society without an ideo- logical dimension. We attempted to show that cyber security discourse, which is currently serv- ing as a basis for cyber security policy in the United Kingdom and United States, and perhaps elsewhere, is but one way of understanding and conceptualizing virtual space. There are a number of implications that arise from this discourse.¶ First, cyber security discourse supports the militarization of online space. Haggerty argues that information war, understood as an ongoing feature of the contemporary international envi- ronment, means that war essentially becomes permanent, part of the “ongoing military games- manship of cyberspace” (Haggerty, 2006b, p. 252). Constructing cyberspace as a source of national security threat encourages the application of security practices from other environments that may be inappropriate or actively harmful to online activity. The language of attack and defense and of “cyber war” risks pushing out the needs of the civil sector and individual Internet users, reducing openness and increasing surveillance. Security discourses risk shutting down discussion about Internet policy, moving it from relatively open areas of government to the closed world of national security decision making. This risks excluding an important range of actors. Furthermore, constructing cyberspace as a site of risk and threat poses the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy as that space is increasingly militarized by various parties. Nations do not operate in a vacuum and there is the possibility (although not the necessity) of a cyberspace security dilemma.¶ Governmental assemblages can make political accountability and transparency of decision making diffused through amorphous partnerships. Lessig (1999) argues that indirect regulation misdirects responsibility. When government uses other structures of constraint to affect a con- straint it could impose directly, it muddies the responsibility for the constraint, thus undermining political accountability. Burying policy choices in complex networks of actors potentially blurs the link between regulation and its consequences (Lessig, 1999). Care should be taken that cyber security relationships between the public sector and private sector should be transparent and democratically accountable.¶ Focusing purely on technological capabilities and vulnerabilities, wielded or exploited by faceless hostile actors, pushes out a consideration of the wider political, legal, and normative structure that surrounds these. Presenting technologically advanced societies as highly vulnera- ble is to invert a much deeper structural asymmetry between developed and developing countries and between states and individuals. It also confuses risk calculations, driven by possibility rather than probability or intention. Focusing purely on technological possibilities exaggerates the impact of “asymmetric” actors and ignores other resources of states. A greater attention needs be paid to the political and international dimensions surrounding cyber security.¶ Finally, the perpetually deferred threat and assumption of vulnerability arises from limited quantitative and qualitative data in the public domain. This allows a cyber security discourse to operate from a position of power derived from “expertise” and makes it hard to debate the claims made by industry for the prevalence of serious cyber threats. This leads to policymaking domi- nated by possibility and technological capability excluding the broader social, political, and international complex that surrounds and contextualizes cyber security.

#### SOCIETY HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY CONFOUNDED AT THE FAILURE OF LAW TO CONTAIN VIOLENCE—WE SEE LAW AS A ‘LESSER EVIL’ THAT IS NECESSARY TO HUMANIZE WAR. QUITE TO THE CONTRARY, THE LAWS OF WAR LEGITIMIZE AND PROTECT STATIST FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND CRUSH DISSENT

BERMAN (Prof of Law at Brooklyn Law School) 2004

[Nathaniel, “Privleging Combat?”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, p. ln //wyo-tjc]

**Through examining the legal doctrines crucial to defining the combatants' privilege**, in my view the key concept of jus in bello, **this Article seeks to undo the circumlocutions that often block frank discussion of the relationship of law to war. Contrary to conventional wisdom**, I argue that **it is misleading to see law's relationship to war as primarily one of the limitation of organized violence, and even more misleading to see the laws of war as historically progressing toward an ever-greater** **limitation of violence. n6 Instead**, I put forward three central propositions. First, **rather than standing in opposition to war, law has long been directly involved in the construction of war - the construction of war as a separate sphere of human activity in [\*5] which the "normal" rules of social life, codified, for example, in the domestic criminal law regulating violence, do not operate. n7 Rather than opposing violence, the legal construction of war n8 serves to channel violence into certain forms of activity engaged in by certain kinds of people, while excluding other forms** engaged in by other people. n9

#### The Alternative is to write against the state.

#### Exposing the law as violence is necessary to create space for rethinking that makes social relations outside of statist violence possible

Neocleous 2003

[Mark, Teaches politics @ Brunel, Imagining the state, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 6-7/uwyo-ajl]

The last point should indicate to the reader that this is a polemical book about a polemical topic. As such, I should be clear about my intentions. If a hidden agenda seems nasty, then an exposed one looks downright impudent.13 Writers these days increasingly like to stand aside from the affray. This is nowhere more obvious than in books in which affray is a central issue-namely books on issues such as the state, power and capital. On the one hand, this is no doubt due to the fate of the academy in contemporary capitalism-academic research assessment exercises which seem to have knocked the political stuffing out of seemingly political writers (best not write anything too political about this political topic, in case it damages one's promotion prospects). On the other hand, it is also clearly connected to the demise of any coherence the Left once had. Writers on the Left appear to be happier to retreat into ever more exegetical work on text after text, with little sense as to the purpose of reading political writers in the first place. Or, worse, they have bought into the stunningly naive socio-political claim that we have moved into a world in which there is politics without enemies.4 (And if there are no enemies, then there is no ground for any fundamental disagreement and thus no real need to say anything interesting at all.) Too many intellectuals on the Left have thus developed an instrumental inability to think beyond the instructions and parameters provided for them by the state and one of its key ideological apparatuses - the university. So let me say that this book is written from outside the statist political imaginary (or at least as much as one can be outside it), and also against it. To write against the statist imaginary is thus intended as an act of resistance - though admittedly not the bravest act of resistance one might imagine, since the state aims to dominate the thought of even those who oppose it (indeed, one might say especially those who oppose it). Pierre Bourdieu has argued that `to endeavour to think the state is to risk either taking over, or being taken over by, the thought of the state','~ and as I argue in Chapter 2, as part of its administration of civil society the state aims to structure the way we view the world by generating the categories through which citizens come to imagine collective identity and thus their own political subjectivity. One of the implications of this is that the statist political imaginary has assisted the state in setting limits on the theoretical imagination, acting as a block on the possibility of conceiving of a society beyond the state.This is a book that tries to think the state without either taking over or being taken over by the thought of the state. It therefore rests on a different political imaginary, one which I mention here and return to only briefly at the very end of the book, which arises out of the tradition of the oppressed which teaches us that the `state of exception' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. As Walter Benjamin recognized, to write against the state of exception in this way is to aim to bring about a real state of emergency which imagines the end of the state, and thus an end to the possibility of fascism.

### 2

#### CP TEXT: The Executive Branch of the United States should ban the authorization of preemptive strikes by the president.

#### Executive Orders alter policy quickly to employ flexibility and avoid the legislative process

Barilleaux and Kelley 2010 [Ryan J. , Professor of Political Science at Miami, OH; and Christopher S. , Lecturer (Political Science) at Miami, OH, The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency, Texas A&M Press, p. 80, 2010// wyo-sc]

An executive order is one of several unilateral tools presidents may use to carry out their policy objectives. Executive orders direct executive branch officers to "take an action, stop a certain type of activity, alter policy, change management practices, or accept a delegation of authority under which they will henceforth be responsible for the implementation of law."19 Presidents have come to favor the use of executive orders because they provide speed and flexibility and bypass the complicated legislative process, particularly when it appears Congress may be hostile to a president's goals. In *Wilcox v. Jackson* the Supreme Court affirmed that presidents may issue orders through department heads.20 These orders will have the same legal effect as if the president had issued them personally.21 The preamble of a typical modern executive order explains the constitutional and statutory authority of the president to issue the order, and the body of the order explains the actions to be taken or policy changes to be made. Most of the significant developments in presidential regulator review have been initiated by executive orders. (Unless otherwise spec fied, none of the regulatory review orders discussed in this chapter was based on anything besides the authority vested by the Constitution in the president and a general reference to statutes of the United States.2 )

### 3

#### Presidential power high now-historical precedent and Obama domestic and international expansion

Fein ‘12

[Bruce Fein, associate deputy attorney general under President Reagan , A History of the Expansion of Presidential Power, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/opinion/a-history-of-the-expansion-of-presidential-power.html>, uwyo//amp]

The unilateral actions of President Obama in the domestic arena to circumvent Congress are more than matched by the president’s unilateralism in foreign affairs. Among other things, President Obama has unilaterally commenced war, authorized the assassination of American citizens abroad and denied the writ of habeas corpus to detainees not accused of a crime. Executive branch power at the expense of Congress and the Constitution’s checks and balances has mushroomed since World War II. Examples include President Truman’s undeclared war against North Korea; President Eisenhower’s executive agreements to defend Spain; President Johnson’s Gulf of Tonkin Resolution regarding Vietnam; President Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia and assertions of executive privilege; President Clinton’s undeclared war against Bosnia; and President Bush’s countless presidential signing statements, Terrorist Surveillance Program, waterboarding and Iraq war.

#### Lack of restrictions on OCO key to presidential flexibility

Lorber 2013

[Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, Jan 2013, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013>, uwyo//amp]

The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at most eight).235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.

#### Presidential power is zero-sum- the branches compete

Barilleaux and Kelley 2010 [Ryan J. , Professor of Political Science at Miami, OH; and Christopher S. , Lecturer (Political Science) at Miami, OH, The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency, Texas A&M Press, p. P 196-197, 2010// wyo-sc]

In their book *The Broken Branch,* Mann and Ornstein paint a different view. They discuss a wider range of public policy areas than just uses of force. Their argument is that although party is important as a conditioning factor for times when Congress might try to restrain an aggressive or noncompliant executive, there has also been a broader degrading of institutional power that has allowed, in a zero-sum context, the president to expand executive power at the expense of Congress. Mann and Ornstein thus posit that congressional willingness to subordinate its collective power to that of the president has occurred across domestic politics and foreign affairs. They argue that a variety of factors are at fault for this trend, including the loss of institutional identity, the willingness to abdicate responsibility to the president, the demise of "regular order," and most importantly that Congress has lost its one key advantage as a legislative body—the decay of the deliberative process. Thus, they do recognize that party politics has played an important role in the degrading of congressional power, but they see a larger dynamic at work, one that reaches beyond partisanship. While we agree with Howell and Pevehouse that Congress retains important mechanisms for constraining the president, we tend to agree with the Mann and Ornstein view that there has been a significant and sustained decline in Congress's willingness to use these mechanisms to challenge presidential power. This tendency has been more prevalent in foreign affairs but has occurred noticeably across the spectrum of public policy issues. Building from both of those perspectives, and others, we argue that it is helpful to understand the pattern of congressional complicity in the rise of presidential power by viewing Congress's aiding and abetting as the logical outcomes of a collective action problem.31 By constitutional design, the legislative branch is in competition with the president for institutional power, yet Congress is less than ideally suited for such a political conflict. Congress's comparative disadvantage begins with its 535 "interests" that are very rarely aligned, and if so, only momentarily. Because individual reelection overshadows all other goals, members of Congress naturally seek to take as much credit and avoid as much blame from their constituencies as possible.32 The dilemma this creates for members is how to use or delegate its collective powers in order to maximize credit and minimize blame in the making of public policy. Congress can choose to delegate power internally to committees and party leaders or externally to the executive branch. One can conceptualize the strategic situation of members of Congress in terms of a prisoner's dilemma.33 If members cooperate (that is, in Mann and Ornstein's parlance, if members identify with the institution), they could maintain and advance Congress's institutional power. But they would have to bypass some potential individual payoffs that could come from defection, such as "running against Congress" as an electoral strategy. A stronger institution should make all members of Congress better off, but it also makes them responsible for policymaking. If members defect from the institution, they thus seek to maximize constituency interests either by simply allowing power to fall by the wayside or by simply delegating it to the president. As more and more members choose to defect over time, the "public good" of a strong Congress is not provided for or maintained—and Congress's institutional authority erodes and presidential power fills in the gap. Why, in other words, is congressional activism so often "less than meets the eye," as Barbara Hinckley maintained in her book by that title? Or why has the ''culture of deference" that Stephen Weissman identified developed as it has?34 We argue that the collective action problem that exists in Congress leads to the development of these trends away from meaningful congressional stewardship of foreign policy and spending.

#### Strong executive key to respond to proliferation- oversight short-circuits flexibility

Yoo 2012

[John C. Yoo is a professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law , February 2012, War powers belong to the president, ABA Journal. 98.2 (Feb. 2012): p34, Academic OneFile, uwyo//amp]

A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### Proliferation causes nuclear war, terrorism and global instability

Kroenig 12

[Matthew, assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, he served as a strategist on the policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&rtid=2>], accessed 6/5/13,WYO/JF

In this essay, I argue that the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to U.S. national security.  Scholars can grab attention by making counterintuitive arguments about nuclear weapons being less threatening than power holders believe them to be, but their provocative claims cannot wish away the very real dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. The more states that possess nuclear weapons, the more likely we are to suffer a number of devastating consequences including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.  While it is important not to exaggerate these threats, it would be an even greater sin to underestimate them and, as a result, not take the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.

### 4

#### Congress will successfully avert a government shutdown now, but time is super tight

Fox News, 9-11-2013, “House pulls spending bill amid backlash as government shutdown looms,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/09/11/house-leaders-pull-temporary-spending-bill-after-conservative-backlash/

House Republican leaders pulled their plan Wednesday to temporarily fund the federal government after rank-and-file party members said it sidestepped “defunding” ObamaCare. The action further narrowed Congress’ time to strike a budget deal before an Oct. 1 government shutdown. House Speaker John Boehner and his team pulled the plan, which could have gotten a full chamber vote as early as Thursday, after a conservative backlash led by the Tea Party movement and Heritage Action for America. The plan essentially called for the House to vote on defunding ObamaCare and the temporary spending bill, then send the package to the Democrat-controlled Senate, which almost certainly would have jettisoned the defund part and allowed the chambers to negotiate on a “clean” funding bill. “The Ruling Elite is up to it again,” the Tea Party Patriots group said Wednesday. “They want you to think they have voted for defunding ObamaCare. But it’s another shell game.” Meanwhile, Congress must also work on several other pressing issues, especially agreeing to increase the debt ceiling, which the government could hit as soon as mid-October, according to a recent Treasury Department assessment. Boehner defended his defund-spending plan Tuesday, saying his chamber has already voted 40 times to “defund, repeal and change” ObamaCare, so the Senate must now take up the fight. Although Boehner pulled the bill because he didn’t have the votes, sources tell Fox News the speaker has no intention of changing the plan and might revisit it next week -- after members realize its strengths. Meanwhile members from both parties appear optimistic about avoiding a partial government shutdown, despite the looming deadline and the potential for another internal House struggle. “We've got some time left,” Kentucky Republican Rep. Hal Rogers, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Fox News. “It's not time to panic.” The postponement of a Capitol Hill vote on a military strike on Syria will indeed eliminate the related hearings and classified briefings that slowed work on other pending issues, including immigration reform, the Farm Bill and whether to limit the extent to which the National Security Agency can collect data on Americans in its efforts to thwart terrorism.

#### The plan would trade off with Congress’s ability to avert the shutdown - GOP has momentum and will, but they need literally every hour to get it done

Frank James, 9-13-2013, “Congress Searches For A Shutdown-Free Future,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/09/13/221809062/congress-searches-for-a-shutdown-free-future

The only thing found Thursday seemed to be more time for negotiations and vote-wrangling. Republican leaders recall how their party was blamed for the shutdowns of the mid-1990s and earnestly want to avoid a repeat, especially heading into a midterm election year. Cantor alerted members Thursday that during the last week of September, when they are supposed to be on recess, they will now most likely find themselves in Washington voting on a continuing resolution to fund the government into October. It looks like lawmakers will need every hour of that additional time. While talking to reporters Thursday, Boehner strongly suggested that House Republicans weren't exactly coalescing around any one legislative strategy. "There are a lot of discussions going on about how — about how to deal with the [continuing resolution] and the issue of 'Obamacare,' and so we're continuing to work with our members," Boehner said. "There are a million options that are being discussed by a lot of people. When we have something to report, we'll let you know."

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Yi Wu, 8-27-2013, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### Iran

#### 1. OCO’s inevitable-ubiquitous and increasing because they even the playing field and lack consequences

Schreier

[Fred Schreier, On Cyberwarfare, DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER, www.dcaf.ch/content/download/67316/1025687/file/‎, uwyo//amp]

Although cyberspace is agnostic to politics and ideology, state and non-state actors can use this power to achieve objectives in cyberspace and the physical world. Low cost, high potential impact and general lack of transparency make cyberpower attractive to both powerful and less powerful actors. The former can combine cyberpower with existing military capabilities, economic assets, and soft-power means. Less powerful actors can gain asymmetrically in cyberspace by inflicting damage on vulnerable targets. The virtual terrain of cyberspace is said to favor the offense because cyber attacks are inexpensive and conducting them rarely has consequences. These two facts are a major reason why cyber attacks have become ubiquitous, increasing in scope, and at a scale far greater than national resources to respond and defend can handle.

#### 2. Iran isn’t a cyberthreat-capabilities are limited

Waterman 13

[Shaun, Washington Times reporter and was the senior editor correspondent for United Press International, “Iran’s cyber warfare could hit public more than military: report”, Washington Times, July 29, 2013,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/29/irans-cyber-warfare-could-hit-public-more-military/, wyo-bw]

Iran’s limited cyber capabilities enable it to launch attacks against the U.S. that would do more damage to public perceptions than actual infrastructure, a new study said.¶ “Iran does not need the equivalent of a Ferrari to inflict damage on U.S. infrastructure: A Fiat may do,” states the study “Iran: How a Third Tier Cyber Power Can Still Threaten the United States.”¶ The study was published Monday by the Atlantic Council, a pro-NATO think tank in Washington.¶ Previous cyberattacks on nation-states, like the Russian-backed one against Estonia in 2007, were not destructive and “caused a political crisis, not a military one,” the study says. In the same way, “a significant Iranian cyberattack against the United States would take on outsized importance, regardless of its technical sophistication.”¶ An anonymous cyberattack that shuts down the New York Stock Exchange for a few hours or cuts electricity to a major U.S. city could color public public perceptions during a military confrontation with Iran, the report says.¶ The Atlantic Council's Iran Task Force and its Cyber Statecraft Initiative worked together on the study — an analysis of various cyber warfare options available to Tehran in the event of a confrontation with U.S. forces.¶ The study cites the U.S., some Western nations and Russia as “tier one” cyber powers. China is “a step behind them” at “tier two,” and Iran, which only recently has begun to develop an online warfare capability, is a “third tier” power.¶ Hackers widely believed to be backed by Tehran already have launched attacks over the past year that slowed or knocked offline the websites of major U.S. banks.¶ And North Korea has been blamed for a cyberattack using malicious software that paralyzed ATM networks and three TV broadcasters in South Korea in March.¶ “There is no reason to believe that Iran’s growing cyber army is any less capable than that of an isolated Asian rogue state with few IT graduates, limited Internet access, and a paucity of computers,” the study says.¶ Iran could easily hide its hand in any cyberattacks by mounting them via hackers-for-hire in other countries like Russia or Lebanon, the study says.¶ “Given Iran’s conventional weakness, cyber is an attractive alternative — the ultimate asymmetric weapon,” states the study.¶

#### 3. Iran poses little cyber threat to the U.S.

Berman 12

[Ilan, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, “ Cyberwar and Iranian Strategy”, American Foreign Policy Council , August 2012, [http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf page 12](http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf%20page%2012) &, wyo-bw]

There is an old axiom that the gravity of a threat is determined by both capability and intent, and this holds true for cyberwarfare as well. Today, Iran is not the greatest cyber threat arrayed against the United States. Indeed, while significant, Iranian capabilities are generally judged to be inferior to those of China and Russia—perhaps considerably so. What Iran lacks in capability, however, it makes up for in intent. Politically, a cyber attack from Iran is significantly more likely than from either China or Russia, in light of the ongoing international impasse over its nuclear program.

#### 4. Restrictions gut US military ability to respond to Iranian threats which means 1ac restrictions trigger their Iran impact.

Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra ‘2013

[Steven P. Bucci Ph.D, director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, served America for three decades as an Army Special Forces officer and top Pentagon official; Paul Rosenzweig, visiting fellow for the Heritage Foundation, helped craft policy and strategy inside the Department of Homeland Security; Research Assistant, National Security and Cyber Security <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/a-congressional-guide-seven-steps-to-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom-in-cyberspace> //wyo-sf]

Failure to take responsible action, however, leaves the U.S. vulnerable to a variety of threats. Nation-states such as Russia, China, and Iran are more than willing to steal or destroy U.S. digital property to further their power or prestige. Non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah have also shown the capability to employ cyber methodologies and criminal organizations from around the world, and have acted as hired guns as well as on their own, using cyber tools as their weapon of choice.[1] Cyber espionage is rampant, with U.S. companies estimated to be losing a staggering $250 billion every year in intellectual property.[2] The latent nature of this threat leads many people to forgo investment in security because it has not yet harmed their organization or because they mistakenly believe that they have nothing a cyber adversary would want. More important, they misunderstand that their own cyber insecurity has collateral effects on others—effects for which they are responsible. There is, therefore, a role for the federal government to encourage actions that will improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the U.S. That role, however, is not to set mandatory regulations. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found, such an approach would be more like an anchor holding back U.S. entities while not providing additional security.[3]

#### Close cooperation with the US prevents Israeli lashout.

Gerald M. Steinberg 98, Bar-Ilan University political science professor, November 1998, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/meria/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a7.html

Following the invasion of Kuwait, U.S. views abruptly changed, and assessments of the threat from Iraq closely coincided with the Israeli assessments and concerns. Prior to and **during Desert Storm, the United States and Israel worked relatively closely (despite political differences** over the peace process and personality differences at the top levels). Intelligence information was shared, and **Israel agreed to act with restraint in response to missile attacks**, in order to allow the United States to maintain the coherence of the coalition. **The Israeli willingness to forgo both preemptive and retaliatory attacks after being hit repeatedly by missile warheads, and with the threat of chemical warheads, was unprecedented**, (and was strongly opposed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens and other key officials) **and was an important acknowledgment of the importance that Israel placed on maintaining a cooperative defense relationship with the United States**. Although, for political reasons, Israel was formally excluded from the coalition in which the Saudis played a central role, it was an important silent partner in the alliance, and the restraint was, in itself, and important contribution.

### China

#### 1. Chinese cyber threat real-military-dedicated hackers

Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra ‘2013

[Steven P. Bucci Ph.D, director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, served America for three decades as an Army Special Forces officer and top Pentagon official; Paul Rosenzweig, visiting fellow for the Heritage Foundation, helped craft policy and strategy inside the Department of Homeland Security; Research Assistant, National Security and Cyber Security <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/a-congressional-guide-seven-steps-to-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom-in-cyberspace> //wyo-sf]

The threats that the U.S faces from adversaries in the cyber realm are real and daunting. Indeed there are three tiers of cyber threats to consider. First, cyber crime hits many Americans in the form of identity theft, phishing, or cyber vandalism. In 2006, the GAO estimated that cyber identity theft cost U.S. citizens and companies almost $50 billion, and this cyber threat has only grown since then.[8] These crimes are usually committed by individual criminals, so-called hacktivists, or criminal organizations, and represent the most common form of cyber threat. Next is the threat of cyber espionage. Espionage pursues large, important targets, such as military blueprints or proprietary business plans, and is often state-sponsored. China, for instance, is a known bad actor in cyberspace. The Chinese not only allow and sponsor hackers, but have entire military and government units dedicated to stealing data from governments and private companies, as the recent Mandiant report makes clear.[9] China has been engaged in a prolonged campaign of stealing U.S. intellectual property and military secrets, as exemplified by the Titan Rain/Byzantine Hades hackers of the mid-2000s, which may have stolen portions of the F-35 designs.[10] Together with other hackers and cyber operations, China has stolen billions, if not trillions of dollars in U.S. intellectual property, not to mention compromising U.S. national security secrets.

#### 2. China is preparing for cyber-warfare—

Gertz 2013

[Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon <http://freebeacon.com/china-military-preparing-for-peoples-war-in-cyberspace-space/>/wyo-sf]

China’s military is preparing for war in cyberspace involving space attacks on satellites and the use of both military and civilian personnel for a digital “people’s war,” according to an internal Chinese defense report. “As cyber technology continues to develop, cyber warfare has quietly begun,” the report concludes, noting that the ability to wage cyber war in space is vital for China’s military modernization. According to the report, strategic warfare in the past was built on nuclear weapons. “But strategic warfare in the information age is cyber warfare,” the report said. “With the reliance of information warfare on space, cyberspace will surely become a hot spot in the struggle for cyberspace control,” the report said. The new details of Chinese plans for cyber and space warfare were revealed in a report “Study on Space Cyber Warfare” by four engineers working at a Chinese defense research center in Shanghai. The report presents a rare inside look of one of Beijing’s most secret military programs: Cyber warfare plans against the United States in a future conflict.

#### 3. Restrictions gut US military ability to respond to Chinese threats which means 1ac restrictions trigger their China impact.

Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra ‘2013

[Steven P. Bucci Ph.D, director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, served America for three decades as an Army Special Forces officer and top Pentagon official; Paul Rosenzweig, visiting fellow for the Heritage Foundation, helped craft policy and strategy inside the Department of Homeland Security; Research Assistant, National Security and Cyber Security <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/a-congressional-guide-seven-steps-to-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom-in-cyberspace> //wyo-sf]

Failure to take responsible action, however, leaves the U.S. vulnerable to a variety of threats. Nation-states such as Russia, China, and Iran are more than willing to steal or destroy U.S. digital property to further their power or prestige. Non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah have also shown the capability to employ cyber methodologies and criminal organizations from around the world, and have acted as hired guns as well as on their own, using cyber tools as their weapon of choice.[1] Cyber espionage is rampant, with U.S. companies estimated to be losing a staggering $250 billion every year in intellectual property.[2] The latent nature of this threat leads many people to forgo investment in security because it has not yet harmed their organization or because they mistakenly believe that they have nothing a cyber adversary would want. More important, they misunderstand that their own cyber insecurity has collateral effects on others—effects for which they are responsible. There is, therefore, a role for the federal government to encourage actions that will improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the U.S. That role, however, is not to set mandatory regulations. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found, such an approach would be more like an anchor holding back U.S. entities while not providing additional security.[3]

#### 4. The discourse of China as a threat is rooted in the neorealist epistemology of security and survival, this framing predetermines solutions to problems and locks China into a securitized framing that makes alternative solutions impossible

Pan, 2004

(Chengxin, “The ‘China-threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The discursive construction of the other as power politics.” Alternatives 29 (2004) 305-331, MB)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in inter- national relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

# 2NC

# 1NR

#### GOP will give in now

Alexander Bolton, 9-12-2013, "Reid 'really frightened' over potential for government shutdown ," The Hill, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/321923-reid-really-frightened-of-possible-government-shutdown-after-meeting-with-boehner

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said he is scared of a possible government shutdown after meeting with Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) Thursday morning. “I’m really frightened,” he told reporters after a press conference to discuss the morning meeting he had with Boehner, Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). “I think they’re looking like the House is having trouble controlling themselves,” he said. Earlier in the day, Reid declared that the lower chamber had been taken over by anarchists after an energy efficiency bill stalled on the Senate floor. “We’re diverted totally from what this bill is about. Why? Because the anarchists have taken over,” he said. “They’ve taken over the House and now they’ve taken over the Senate. Reid on Thursday delivered a blunt message to Boehner that he will not delay the 2010 Affordable Care Act in exchange for keeping the government open past the end of the month. Reid also made clear he will not grant Republicans any concessions in order to pass legislation to raise the debt limit. Reid told reporters that he will strip out any language defunding or delaying the new healthcare law included in House-passed legislation funding government beyond Sept. 30. “Go to something else, get away from ObamaCare. Send us something else,” he said. He plans to pass a “clean” stopgap spending measure to keep the government open through year’s end. Reid characterized Thursday morning’s bicameral leadership meeting as cordial and said he offered to help Boehner circumvent Tea Party-affiliated conservatives who are threatening a government shutdown. “I said to him, ‘What can I do to help?’,” Reid said. “It was not a yelling-at-each-other meeting. It was a very nice meeting we had. Hey listen, I like John Boehner.” Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking Senate Democratic leader, predicted House Republican leaders will fold before allowing the government to shut down. “I still think at the last minute they’ll have to blink,” Schumer said. “The fact that Boehner came up with his sort-of concoction shows that he knows that a government shutdown plays badly for him,” he added, referring to the stopgap spending measure House GOP leaders presented to their colleagues on Tuesday. “Should he go forward and let the Tea Party win on the government shutdown, then everyone will come down on him and say, ‘Why’d you allow them to do it?’.”

#### The plan would trade off with Congress’s ability to avert the shutdown - timing is on the brink, they’ll only have a day or two to vote on the shutdown in the status quo

Jake Sherman and John Bresnahan, 9-11-2013, “John Boehner, Eric Cantor struggle to lead House,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/john-boehner-eric-cantor-house-leaders-96675.html

Time is an issue for Boehner, Cantor and Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.). The House is in session next week, out the following week and on the day they return — Sept. 30 — the government’s coffers run dry. Their time off can be canceled. The soonest a new government funding bill can hit the floor could be next Thursday. While confusion reigned on Wednesday afternoon, House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers (R-Ky.) said it is “not time to panic” “We’ve got some time left here,” Rogers noted. “Conversations are taking place among the various elements” inside the House GOP Conference about how to move forward.

Ev analysis on flow

A2: fiat solves link

Counter-interpretation---the aff must defend the political ramifications of passing the plan---that’s vital to holistic cost benefit analysis.

Politics disads are good:

* Key to current events education that’s useful immediately and promotes political engagement
* They’re a vital neg generic on this topic because there’s no limiting word in the resolution
* Most real world---politicians must always assess political consequences of advocating any bill---the real inherent barrier to the plan is political opposition

Intrinsicness bad—justifies object fiat and destroys the politics disad—cross apply reasons above for why that;s bad

China

#### US-China cooperating over cyberspace now.

Press TV, 13

(“China, US talks on cyber security go well” Jul 10, 2013 http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/07/10/313127/china-us-talks-on-cyber-security-work/) KH

Cyber security is one of the main issues for the four-day talks in Washington, began on Monday, as both countries accuse each other of hacking attacks.   
Snowden’s recent revelations of US electronic surveillance across the world gave Beijing an argument to counter America’s claims that China steals private intellectual property (IP) from American research centers and companies.   
However, China’s Xinhua news agency said that the talks between the world’s two largest economies have made progress on Monday and Tuesday.   
"The two sides held candid in-depth discussions on cyber security, including the mechanism of a bilateral cyber working group, international cyberspace rules, and measures to boost dialogue and cooperation on cyber security," the news agency said.   
The two countries agreed to improve cooperation to “play a positive role in enhancing mutual trust, reducing mutual suspicion, managing disputes and expanding cooperation,” it also said.

#### Cyber Warfare will not happen

Rid 13

[Thomas, reader in war studies at King’s College London, “Cyber War Will Not take Place”, Journal of Strategic Studies, October 2011, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939>, wyo-bw]

But is it? Are the Cassandras of cyber warfare on the right side of¶ history? Is cyber war really coming? This article argues that cyber war will not take place. That statement does not come with a Giraudouxian¶ twist and irony. It is meant literally – as a statement about the past, the¶ present, and the likely future: Cyber war has never happened in the past. Cyber war does not take place in the present. And it is highly unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. Instead, all past and¶ present political cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: subversion, espionage, and sabotage. That is improbable to change in the years ahead.¶ If the use of force in war is violent, instrumental, and political, then there is no cyber offense that meets all three criteria. But more than¶ that, there are very few cyber attacks in history that meet only one of¶ these criteria.¶ ¶ The first conclusion is about subversion. In the past and present, not high-tech but low-tech has been more likely to lead to an escalation of violence, instability, and ultimately even war. In the twenty-first century, the one type of political offence with the greatest potential to unleash instability and violence may not be technologically highly¶ sophisticated sabotage, but technically rather primitive subversion. Yet¶ the Internet facilitates an unexpected effect: specific social and political¶ causes may persist in subcultures and niche groups, either temporarily¶ or over an extended time, either violently or non-violently – and they¶ may never cease attracting followers yet never go mainstream. These¶ movements may be cause-driven to a significant extent, and less¶ dependent on leaders, organization, and mass support than classical¶ insurgent groups. Weak causes become stronger in the sense that they¶ garner enough support to persist over an extended period of time,¶ constantly maintaining a self-sufficient, self-recruiting, but also self limiting¶ number of supporters and activists.¶.¶ In the 1950s and 1960s, when Giraudoux was translated into¶ English, the world faced another problem that many thought was¶ inevitable: nuclear exchange. Herman Kahn, Bill Kaufmann, and Albert¶ Wohlstetter were told that nuclear war could not be discussed publicly,¶ as Richard Clarke pointed out in his alarmist book, Cyber War. He rightly concluded that as with nuclear security, there should be more public discussion on cyber security because so much of the work has been stamped secret. But in many ways the comparison between¶ nuclear war and cyber conflict, although often made, is misplaced and problematic. This should be obvious when the Pearl Harbor comparison or the Hiroshima-analogy is given a second thought: unlike the nuclear theorists in the 1950s, cyber war theorists of the 2010s have never experienced the actual use of a deadly cyber weapon,¶ let alone a devastating one like Little Boy. There was no and there is no¶ Pearl Harbor of cyber war. Unless significantly more evidence and¶ significantly more detail are presented publicly by more than one¶ agency, we have to conclude that there will not be a Pearl Harbor of¶ cyber war in the future either.70 Then the heading of this article should¶ not be understood with Giraudoux’s sense of fine irony, but literally.¶ Needless to say, Cassandra could still have the last word.¶

#### Their description of China is rooted in a positivist epistemology that assumes there is an objective world “out there” we can manage. This is a normative practice that legitimates US power politics over China and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes the aff impacts inevitable. We must rethink these positivist assumptions

Pan, 2004

(Chengxin, “The ‘China-threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The discursive construction of the other as power politics.” Alternatives 29 (2004) 305-331, MB)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China pre- cisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often con- flicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, sug- gests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."^ Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "obser- vation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" ver- sus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are bet- ter understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other con- structions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.\* Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical refiection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implica- tions for international politics.^ It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

### Iran

#### Extend 1nc 1- Schreier 13- Global cyber tech expansion inevitable- the nature of cyberspace creates an equal playing field, contributing to the growth of asymmetrical opportunities for less powerful actors.

#### Extend 1nc 2- Waterman 13- Majority of Iran OCO capacities are exaggerated- actual capabilities do not pose a dangerous threat.

#### Iran-US cyberwar happening now.

Infowars, 12

(“[War With Iran Started Five Years Ago](http://www.infowars.com/war-with-iran-started-five-years-ago/)” Kurt Nimmo and Alex Jones October 4, 2012

http://www.infowars.com/war-with-iran-started-five-years-ago/) KH

Evidence of the covert and not so covert war against Iran and other enemies in the Middle East abounds, as we note below:

“As a global-macro analyst, I am frequently asked if war with Iran will come and, if so, when,” writes [Jim Rickards](http://seekingalpha.com/article/348261-iran-the-dollar-and-financial-warfare), a Wall Street economist and investment banker, wrote in February.

“My answer is that the war has already begun. It’s not a shooting war – yet. What the U.S. and Israel are now waging with Iran is what experts call unrestricted warfare. This is warfare that consists of sabotage, assassination, special operations, psychological operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber warfare and – the most recent addition to the arsenal – financial warfare.”

A concerted effort aimed at [undermining Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Iran#1978) began in earnest following the Iranian revolution in 1979, but escalated considerably during the Bush years and continues under Obama.

The United States has spent millions funding militant ethnic separatist groups to cripple Iran. The CIA has worked closely with Kurds, Azeris, Ahwazi Arabs, and the Baluchis. “The latest attacks inside Iran fall in line with US efforts to supply and train Iran’s ethnic minorities to destabilize the Iranian regime,” Fred Burton, a former

#### Plan can’t solve- Iran has legal authority to respond to Stuxnet

Leadership online, 13

(“Cyber war becomes reality” April 23rd, 2013 http://www.leadershiponline.co.za/articles/cyber-war-becomes-reality-6090.html)

This handbook, called the Tallinn Manual after theEstoniancapital where it was compiled under the leadership of US military lawyer, Michael Schmitt, says acyber attack can be defined as one that is “reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects”.

Ironically, the implication of this definition is that the alleged US cyber attack on Iran's uranium enrichment programme in 2010, with the Stuxnet computer worm, could be regarded as an[illegal](http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2013/03/2013329104746382107.html) "act of force". Under international law, it would give Iran the right to retaliate.

The implications take on further ominous dimensions against a background of a US military [declaration](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/expanding-combat-zone-the-dangerous-new-rules-of-cyberwar-a-892238.html),two years ago, “that anyone who attempted to shut down the electric grid in the world's most powerful nation with a computer worm, could expect to see a missile in response.”

#### Restrictions gut US military ability to respond to Iranian threats which means 1ac restrictions trigger their Iran impact.

Bucci, Rosenzweig, and Inserra ‘2013

[Steven P. Bucci Ph.D, director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, served America for three decades as an Army Special Forces officer and top Pentagon official; Paul Rosenzweig, visiting fellow for the Heritage Foundation, helped craft policy and strategy inside the Department of Homeland Security; Research Assistant, National Security and Cyber Security <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/a-congressional-guide-seven-steps-to-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom-in-cyberspace> //wyo-sf]

Failure to take responsible action, however, leaves the U.S. vulnerable to a variety of threats. Nation-states such as Russia, China, and Iran are more than willing to steal or destroy U.S. digital property to further their power or prestige. Non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah have also shown the capability to employ cyber methodologies and criminal organizations from around the world, and have acted as hired guns as well as on their own, using cyber tools as their weapon of choice.[1] Cyber espionage is rampant, with U.S. companies estimated to be losing a staggering $250 billion every year in intellectual property.[2] The latent nature of this threat leads many people to forgo investment in security because it has not yet harmed their organization or because they mistakenly believe that they have nothing a cyber adversary would want. More important, they misunderstand that their own cyber insecurity has collateral effects on others—effects for which they are responsible. There is, therefore, a role for the federal government to encourage actions that will improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the U.S. That role, however, is not to set mandatory regulations. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found, such an approach would be more like an anchor holding back U.S. entities while not providing additional security.[3]