### 2AC Anthro

#### 1.No link- we don’t place the human at the center, nor evaluate their life above other beings.

#### 2.We solve the impact: Our Aff pushes humans to enter becoming animal. What this does is forces them to consider themselves as a species among species, with every being have intrinsic self-worth. This nuanced approach allows us to solve all of their offense without even considering the alternative- Presumption vote aff

#### 3. We out weight – We solve dehumanization for EVERY BEING, totalization of static identity which makes war inevitable, and biopolitical management that leads to a genocidal approach of solving the fracture of difference. Finally case is a disad. Anthro has no way of theorizing itself out of a box in terms of targeted killing or indefinite detention. Finally War is worse for the environment.

#### 4.Perm: Do Both

#### 5. We Solve the impact of the K- Outlawry is becoming and the destruction of static identity which are the foundation of violence, the affirmative is revolutionary movement to the outside casting off privilege and safety for the unknown—this act counters the hegemony of the white male that is the standard of western metaphysics

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

Becoming-animal is a version of bare life that replaces the subject as the figure of political agency. This anti-identity political actor signals a movement toward outlawry: as bare life, becoming animal is vulnerable in her exclusion from the polis, but she nevertheless acts to counter the law. Such revolutionary becoming is ethical, in Levinas’ sense, because of its relationship to Otherness, and the disruption of finitude that constitutes it. But it is quite different from Levinasian ethics, because the ethics does not arise through facial recognition (identity). Where for Levinas it is recognition of the Other that constitutes one as a subject, for Deleuze and Guattari one literally becomes 147 Other in a dispersal away from subjectivity. Where Levinasian ethics is an ethics of hospitality in which the subject (understanding the self to be an other amongst others) welcomes the other. But the authors of A Thousand Plateaus are not concerned with hospitality; they are not concerned with welcoming in those that are on the outside. They are interested instead in a movement toward the outside, leaving the safety of the familiar and the similar, and casting off of privilege and dominance. It is an ethics of self- transformation, alliance, and exteriority, not hospitality. Deleuze and Guattari write: “As Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become- black” (292).Minoritarian politics is a politics of the Other, evoked through an ‘Anomalous’ phenomenon of bordering. The Anomalous (anomal) refers to “that which is outside rules or goes against the rules” and moreover “an-omalie...designates unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization” (244). The concept dislodges the dominant subject-position of the “self-conscious white male of the occident” and dismantles the human ideal inherited from western metaphysics (Günzel 9). As Stephan Günzel phrases it in “Immanence and Deterritorialization,” “the only way to realize what is hidden in the idea of justice within ‘human rights’ ... is exactly ‘a becoming-inhuman’” (9). Becoming- animal thus expresses a politics of the post-subject, a revolutionary politics of those who exceed or fall short of the law. But the mechanics and motivations for such peripheral revolutionary movement is perplexing. It is obvious why those who are outside of the law might want a new law. But why would anyone who inhabits a dominant subject position move out toward a minority position, which we know to be disenfranchised? How would this be revolutionary? It seems as though it would simply expand the space of disenfranchisement. Moreover it would appear to limit the ethical capacity of becoming- minoritarian to those that first have status in major political structures, much like the ethics of hospitality does (i.e. to men, but not women, to straights but not queers, to white majorities but not racialized minorities). If one is already a minority, dispossessed of subject status, is one barred from processes of becoming? Must one first assimilate to the majority in order to then dismantle it?148For Deleuze and Guattari, populations are not divided into simple categories such as included/excluded or majority/minority. We are always already both at once. What differentiates us, one from the other, as ethical beings is not our degree of inclusion or exclusion, nor precisely our orientation toward others (although the latter is important). Ethics is expressed through our becoming-ness, our movement away from generalizations toward the specificity of the outside in all of its multiplicity and otherness. Ethics is criticism, that is, self criticism and criticism of the general, from the perspective of the particular. Becoming-animal specifies the direction of the flow between those aspects of ourselves that are part of the majority (our sense of belonging, our sense of self) and our affiliation with the minute particular. A becoming always begins in the majority, until one meets that dispersive detail that launches the entity outward toward the margins.64 Deleuze and Guattari write: “Yes, all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower or stone one becomes are molecular collectivities, haeccities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or by habit” (275). However the apparent primacy of majoritarianism (primacy in the sense of coming first, which carries the implication of greater importance in western metaphysics) may be a problem on at least two counts. The first is the assumption that one is always already a subject, which returns us to the quandaries of the post-structural subject: the fiction that the subject comes before the law that hails it into being. The second is based on the risks of misreading Deleuze and Guattari’s specific uses of common terms such as ‘minority’ and ‘majority,’ which lends itself to a romanticization of disenfranchisement, and the erasure of the very real oppression experienced by some populations.For Deleuze and Guattari, one does not become a subject. Becoming is limited to a deconstruction of subjectivity, since becoming is a process of dispersal, not consolidation. While the authors specify that one’s engagement in molar politics may be necessary for survival, this does not constitute a becoming. With regard to identity feminism, for instance, they write: “It is of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as women’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation” (TP 276). But they find the revolutionary potential restricted in such identity politics, because149the approach tends toward stasis rather than movement. Its criteria are confining. As they continue: “But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow” (276).

Seriously thought, this is so noncompetitive it hurts- D&G find that things like animals and humans interact on a plane of mapping experiances where both influence in equal ways eachothers subjectivity through involution

Hantel 13

[Max Hantel, Rutgers University, Women's and Gender Studies, “BOBBY BETWEEN DELEUZE AND LEVINAS, OR ETHICS BECOMING-ANIMAL”, 23 Jul 2013, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 18:2, 105-126, Access via Taylor & Francis, \\wyo-bb]

The idea that Bobby is an active participant in the maintenance and struggles of a biopolitical project, in concrete terms, suggests that, while we lack the theoretical and scientific resources to claim an accurate representation of Bobby’s sensory world since we can only describe its observed effects, we can be sure his world is not the same as or subsumed by Levinas’s. Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, representational accuracy is not the question to be asked in following a becoming-animal, as that only makes possible modes of mimesis, resemblance, or identification. Becoming-animal, instead, is a question of singularities that break down the tripartite schema of reality, representation, and subjectivity (or the world, the book and the author) described by Deleuze and Guattari in the first plateau, “Introduction: Rhizome.”52 Within that schema, we would be “tracing” Bobby and Levinas’s encounter, reproducing their already-given internal states in terms of an intersubjective balance.53 If representation of Bobby’s world were the only goal – a more accurate description of what Bobby is – then, at best, we would make more capacious categories, like subjectivity. This inclusiveness is not a new ethics; it simply humanizes particular animals. Instead of tracing, Deleuze and Guattari map these encounters: “What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real.”54 Mapping a becoming-animal, as opposed to tracing it, is a way to investigate how the proximity of human and animal worlds can instantiate a movement beyond the limited capacities of human chauvinism, especially in how animal bodies trouble prepackaged representations of generalized animality.55 It is clear at this point that becoming-animal does not proceed by imitation, resemblance, correspondence or identification, but is instead a question of singularities drawn together into a block of becoming. But how does this block emerge? The answer to this question is as capacious as life itself, in the sense explained above: these temporary localizations of univocal being, Bobby and Levinas, articulate a set of networks and connections that reverberate out to the entirety of universal matter-flow, if one wanted to follow them that far. The challenge of thinking Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological insight vis-a`-vis Levinas’s ethical project situated in France during the Holocaust is somehow to account for the stakes of different localizations, or different bodies, and their encounters – as opposed to flattening all bodies into sameness, as Levinas warns, since they are all of the same substance. In other words, how to think singularity. Becoming-animal works through the univocity of being, describing the radical possibilities of the universe’s folding and unfolding and the relative densities of variegated assemblages. Deleuze and Guattari call this process “involution,” clarifying that becomings do not work vertically in terms of evolution.56 To argue for an immanent ethics illuminated by the encounter between Bobby and Levinas, in other words, is not simply to argue that Bobby exhibits a primitive form of human ethics. Their block of becoming is not a continuum of differentiation where one moves from less to more. It is an “involution,” a horizontal relationship in which a block is formed by way of a mutually implicating line that connects two elements to each other and simultaneously takes them beyond their limited perspective.57 Involution is the positive alternative to Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of hylomorphic representation (in which ideational form is imprinted on undifferentiated matter). Involution of the univocal substance of being shows why there is not an either/or choice between hylomorphism and the chaos of undifferentiated matter. Instead, there are singularities that creatively involve a horizontally related set of terms, actualizing emergent bodies and affects. Thus, becoming-animal works through a specific, material encounter and juxtaposes ethics-as-ethology with the descriptive aspects of univocal ontology. To concretely map the block of becoming formed by Bobby and Levinas, I will articulate becoming-animal in the following terms most helpful for that immediate scene, while keeping in mind the vastness indexed by such an encounter: an alliance with the Anomalous, individuating haecceities, and a zone of proximity. First, the concept of the Anomalous only makes sense in relation to the heterogeneous field in which it is ensconced. “A becominganimal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity.”58 All the terms of a becoming are always-already multiple insofar as any body or entity is an assemblage of forces that are unevenly distributed and differentially intense. Put simply, neither the human nor the dog is a monolithic whole when caught in a block of becoming. Their alliance brings into relief just how heterogeneous and contingent they are as particular encounters territorialize or deterritorialize different elements in each. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari argue that there are at least three types of animal: the Oedipal animal assimilated to the psychoanalytic structure of the family; the classified animal of royal science or the state (such as the animal as species or the earlier discussion of the symbolic animal of structuralism); and finally, demonic animals who disrupt the self.59 Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari ask, “[…] cannot any animal be treated in all three ways?”60 No animal – the authors’ distaste for domestic animals aside – is self-evidently or essentially one of those three categories. The wolf can communicate demonically with the wolf-man or conjugate with the Nazis to symbolize a primordial telos. Different connections and stoppages make stark just how multiple individual singularities already are.61 Deleuze and Guattari add, however, “Wherever there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made in order to become-animal.”62 This individual is the Anomalous who, on the one hand indexes the rest of the pack and marks the limit of the pack, but on the other ensures that the pack is radically open to transversal relationships with the outside and beyond. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the apparent contradiction between “contagion through the animal as pack” and “pact with the anomalous” is a false one, since the anomalous “functions as the borderline of an animal pack, into which the human being passes or in which his or her becoming takes place, by contagion.”63 The Anomalous is a point of entry or a node of connection, not an organism, individual, or species – in other words, “it has only affects,” understood as the impersonal forces that undo the self by effecting relations beyond our recognition or control.64 Can we think Bobby as the Anomalous?