### Off Case

#### Counter interp – The role of the ballot should be whoever has most ethical relationship to beings.

#### Liberation can only come if we know how we should interact with one another, we must find what we seek before we know where we are going, prefer our role of the ballot.

#### 1st- Permutation: Do the aff and conceive of fracturing of identities as an outlaw- Becoming allows for the forfeiting of privilege not through pity, but through shame of being majoritarian building collations.

#### 2nd- Case is a DA- Critical race theory can’t theorize about how to stop targeted killing or detention policies which use static identities to inflict bare life, make war inevitable and death. Only the aff can through destruction of static identity.

#### 3rd- We Solve the impact through root cause- Dehumanization is the root cause of any oppression. Only be changing how we value static identities. It is because the oppressor finds that identity to be less than they can dominate the group.

#### 4th- No link- We don’t destroy the subject minorities but affirm their being in its multiplicity which allows individuals to become what they will with no final solution.

#### 5th- Terminal Defense- The goal is flawed, those in the minority or oppressed will never be a part of the majority because of the bench marks set by the center group. There must be an overhaul of static identities or the majority will always find new exceptions to ignore the minorities.

#### The root cause of race is a desire that predates any of the slave trade, colonialism. This desire cannot be overcome by bolstering the static identity of race, but only as seeing each other as a multiplicity, otherwise it risks reinforcing the squo.

Nesbitt 13

[Nick Nesbitt, Prof @ Princeton University, State University Ch. “Escaping Race” Book- “DELEUZE CONNECTIONS: Deleuze and Race”, pg 8-9, 2013, \\wyo-bb]

A focus on race also summons some of the most controversial questions relating to human-being impelling most thinkers between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari are not afraid of asking whether inequality is located in bodies (it is, but not genetically); like both Nietzsche and Freud, they ask what is wrong with civilization itself (it overcodes filiation). Reaching into the deep recesses of culture, an archaic and convoluted logic of differentiating civilization from savagery and barbarism is exposed. This logic preceded European colonialism by centuries (see Han chauvinism, Brahmanism, Arab–black relations and so on). Though not European in origin, this logic formed the basis for a retrospective Judeo-Christian narcissism, for the oceanic slave trade, nationalism and fascism. Far from ‘naturalising’ race, Deleuze’s nomadological and biophilosophical geology of morals can demonstrate that race is built upon fully contingent territorialisations of power and desire which could be disassembled and differently reassembled. That race is immanent to the machinics of bodies and flows does not mean it is automatic, any more than that it is autonomous in relation to, for example, capital or sexual difference. The immanence of race does suggest, however, that an end to racism is an always already incipient reality. My contention is that Deleuze and Guattari’s two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia present a hitherto undeveloped theory of biopower and hence of race. This is not to argue against existing interpretations but to recast desire, territory and capital towards the category of race. Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of biopower has a much greater historical and geographical scope than what Foucault (2003 and 2008) introduced roughly during the same period. If Foucault famously states in his foreword to Anti-Oedipus that it is a guide for antifascist living, I contend that countering fascism means, above all, delving into the machinic depths of civilisation’s intrinsic racism. Sidestepping the pitfalls of biological reductionism Deleuze and Guattari not only argue that there is a materiality of race, but also forge an affirmative kind of antiracism quite different from the liberal–democratic kinds prevalent today. Supplementing Deleuze and Guattari with Sylvain Lazarus, my suggested antiracism consists in naming, accelerating and staying true to the bastard and mixed-blood probe-heads escaping the global faciality machine.

#### The only way to solve those desires it to break down identity through becoming

Nesbitt 13

[Nick Nesbitt, Prof @ Princeton University, State University Ch. “Escaping Race” Book- “DELEUZE CONNECTIONS: Deleuze and Race”, pg 3-5, 2013, \\wyo-bb]

Above all, perhaps, a Deleuzian critique of race and colonial exploitation would work to escape from the logic of identity and identification with one’s political and existential subjection at the heart of the Hobbesian narrative of political modernity. Deleuze’s critique of identity, above all in the fi rst chapter of Difference and Repetition, ‘Difference in Itself’, addresses the common(-sensical) distribution of beings according to (Aristotelian, Leibnizian and Hegelian) categories and hierarchies, and the cognitive judgment of the propriety of any distribution or attribution of identity. In this conservative, sedentary distribution of roles and identities, ‘difference is in effect fully subject to the identity of the concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgment and the resemblance of perception’ (1994: 52). Instead, Deleuze compels us to think identity not as illusory attribution (including racial categorisation), but rather as the repetition of pure difference, to think the singularity of any entity in terms of its protean powers of transformation. Here, Deleuze envisages not only or even principally the transformation of any determinate being as a subtraction from actualised identities, but as the event he calls differentiation, the transformation of the virtual itself. Disidentification, in other words, is for Deleuze always and necessarily a critical process, in the Spinozian, Kantian and even Marxian sense (I am thinking here of the Marx of the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’), aiming at no less than the radical reformulation of the transcendental operators governing any world. The world-historical importance of the Haitian Revolution lies in its transcendence of any identity-based politics to politicize instead the Idea of the universal human right to be free from enslavement. This Idea of 1804 must be emphatically distinguished from any conscious articulation of a political doctrine by individual participants in the various revolts from 1791 on. Instead, universal emancipation, the idea of the Haitian Revolution, like any true Idea in Deleuze’s precise use of the concept, is preconscious, independent of its representation under the aegis of a refl exive cogito (1994: 214–79). The Idea of the Haitian Revolution as the pure multiplicity of a swarming war machine was arguably first actualized as a disembodied claim of absolute equality in the Bois Caïman ceremony and in Boukman’s famous call to the slaves to ‘Koute libete li pale nan kè nou tous’ (Listen to the voice of liberty that speaks in all our hearts’). The call for libete sparked a non-localisable chain of connections within an anonymous, enslaved multitude that enjoyed no place in their post-1789 world. Libete’s multiplicity linked up to a series of adjunct fi elds that further informed this pure Idea (including the unfulfilled promise of the incomplete and partial French and American Revolutions and the political implications of voodoo), and moved to operate a specific condensation or actualization of the singular nature of their claim. This claim, as ideal, finding no identity or place in the world of Saint Domingue, focused around signifiers such as the creole libete. At the same time, it evinced an unsuspected power to enact, to unfold, and to dramatize on the world stage the implications of this Idea. This Idea was, in 1791, preconscious in Deleuze’s sense, literally a dream, in the way that we recall Martin Luther King’s celebrated phrase ‘I have a dream.’ This proto-Haitian multiplicity was self-defining. On the night of 29 August 1791, a massive uprising of some half-million slaves first began to actualize this pre-individual idea as a complex, unfolding differentiation of relationships and elements. In fact, it would doubtless be more accurate to contrast in Deleuzian terms the formalised concept of 1804 (as the independent state of Haiti and its constitution) to the properly virtual Idea of the initial uprising of 1791, and, moreover, to conclude that 1804 represented, inevitably, an impoverishment of the Idea of 1791. The idea of universal emancipation was at first only a pure problem (inherent to that of actual slavery prior to the 1791 uprising), but quickly became the struggle to instantiate a real solution to that problem. This subtractive politics, one that violently withdrew from the Atlantic world-system of plantation slavery in a manner analogous to the Brazilian quilombos, culminated in the 1804 declaration of Haitian independence and the universal right of all humans to freedom from enslavement and racial subjection. To think with Deleuze the destruction of racial identity, of law, of subjection, and to trace and follow through the immanent lines of flight from those various regimes is in this sense to unfold the extraordinary potentiality of any pure differentiation and becoming beyond the actual state of our human, all-too human, racialised being.

#### Racism is produced through the thought of static identity, without destroying it the negative’s work is futile

Colebrook 13

[Claire Colebrook, is a Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Penn, State UniversityCh. “Face Race” Book- “DELEUZE CONNECTIONS: Deleuze and Race”, pg 35-36, 2013, \\wyo-bb]

 The problem with racism is not that it discriminates, nor that it takes one natural humanity and then perverts it into separate groups. On the contrary, racism does not discriminate enough; it does not recognise that ‘humanity,’ ‘Caucasian’ and ‘Asian’ are insufficiently distinguished. Humanity is a virtuality or majority of a monstrous and racial sort. One body – the white man of reason – is taken as the figure for life in general. A production of desire – the image of ‘man’ that was the effect of history and social groupings – is now seen as the ground of desire. Ultimately, a metalepsis takes place: despite seeming differences, it is imagined that, deep down, we are all the same. And because of this monstrous production of ‘man in general’, who is then placed before difference as the unified human ground from which different races appear, a trajectory of extinction appears to be relentless. Man’s self-evident unity, along with the belief in a historical unfolding that occurs as a greater and greater recognition of identity (the supposed overcoming of tribalism towards the recognition of one giant body of human reason), precludes any question of humanity’s composition, its emergence from difference and distinction and the further possibility of its un-becoming.

### Perm Love

#### AND Perm do both- Becoming allows people to forfeit their privilege, while supporting those in the minoritarian by creating a site of politics in the periphery, not out of pity, but in shame of what has been done before. This affirmation of sheer difference allows us to affirm every life, regardless of difference.

Lawlor 08

[Leonard Lawlor, University of Wisconsin System, “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari”, SubStance, Issue 117 (Volume 37, Number 3), 2008, pp. 171-174, \\wyo-bb]

If we want to change our relationship to the world, to others, and to animals, we must understand how it is possible for us to change—how it is possible to enter into the experience of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the cause or “agent” of becoming may be the experience that drugs produce in us (MP 347/283, see also QPh 156/165). While such a suggestion may seem infamous, one must recognize that hallucinogenic drugs change our perceptions (MP 304/278). Nevertheless, for Deleuze and Guattari, taking such drugs does not constitute a successful becoming. The failure is due to the fact that the drug user, and especially the addict, only enters into a cycle. He or she gets high, comes down, then wants to get high again, and so on. This cycle or circle is all that happens, which means in fact that nothing happens. For Deleuze and Guattari, becomings are never processes of beginning again; they are never processes that move only in a circle. We also see this cyclic behavior in the alcoholic’s idea of the last glass (MP 546/438), based on a subjective evaluation of how much the alcoholic is able to bear. Deleuze and Guattari say, “What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again [recommencer] (after a rest, a pause…)” (MP 546/438). Thus with the alcoholic, nothing happens but the same thing over and over again; recommencement is not an event. Although the concepts of limit and recommencement are very important for understanding A Thousand Plateaus—early in the book it’s said that the body without organs is a limit and that one is always attaining it (MP 197/159)—Deleuze and Guattari oppose the concept of limit to that of threshold. The threshold lies beyond the limit, beyond the last glass; crossing the threshold, they say, makes the alcoholic change, to become suicidal or to stop drinking. For Deleuze and Guattari, either choice would break out of the circle. The two choices however are clearly not identical; it is the choice between choice and non-choice (C2 231/177). The choice to commit suicide by drinking oneself to death is to choose to have no more choices, while the choice to stop drinking allows one to choose again and differently. The choice of more choices— to get drunk by drinking water10—constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call an event (or a line of flight). But when the threshold has been crossed, we can ask “what happened?” The character of the alcoholic does not allude to Proust, but to F. Scott Fitzgerald (although Proust is mentioned in relation to the concept of threshold: the narrator crosses the threshold and chooses to stop having love affairs and to start writing). In Plateau Eight, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that “what happened?” (qu’est-ce qui s’est passé?) is the question that Fitzgerald keeps coming back to, at the end, after having said that “all life of course is a process of breaking down [démolition]” (MP 242/198, see also C2 70/50). With the idea of demolition or destruction or unmaking, we come to the true agent and condition of becoming, which is neither drugs nor alcohol. According to Deleuze and Guattari, in a life, there is a type of cracking that is micrological, like the small, almost imperceptible cracks in a dish (MP 243/198). These cracks in a life are the cracks of aging. Such cracks are not big molar blows like losing all your money in the stock market. The micrological cracks in a life refer us to this sort of experience: you wake up one morning and realize you have gray hair, and now it’s over, you’re old; or you wake up and realize you no longer love the person in bed with you. What has happened is nothing assignable or perceptible; these are molecular changes, “such that when something occurs, the self [moi] that awaited it is already dead, or the one that would await it has not yet arrived” (MP 243/198-199). The micrological cracks of aging, these experiences in which one is finally aware that one has lost something of oneself, are the agent of becoming. But aging also indicates the necessary condition for becoming: the condition in which one’s molar form is destroyed—the condition, in other words, of “desubjectification” (MP 198/159). The condition of the molar form of the subject being destroyed has however a positive side, which we have already encountered—the choice of having more choices.11 But Deleuze and Guattari also call the positive side of desubjectification “rupture,” this being their translation of Fitzgerald’s “clean break” (MP 243/199). The clean break which aging causes—aging being the agent of becoming, while the destruction of the molar form is the necessary condition—does not mean that now one remains forever young. It means that, having shed the form of an adult, one is able to become something other than an adult man. One becomes a child, but becoming-child means that one frees the potentialities that the molar form of adult man was enclosing. Deleuze and Guattari say, with a rupture, I am now no more than a line. I have become capable of loving, not with an abstract, universal love, but a love I shall choose, and that shall choose me, blindly, my double, who has no more self than me [n’a pas plus de moi que moi]. One has been saved by love and for love, by abandoning love and self [.…] One has become like everyone, but in a way in which no one can become like everyone [tout le monde, also translated as “all the world”]. (MP 244/199-200). By means of this quote (whose importance we should not underestimate), we see that becoming involves love; but love in Deleuze and Guattari is no longer a feeling between persons; it is no longer a personal feeling (MP 294/240, also MP 133-134/105-106). Love is now an affect.12 As Deleuze and Guattari say, a feeling (sentiment) is the sense (sens) of a form and its development, the formation of a subject; it is introceptive. In contrast, an affect is informal, setting out ways (rather than the development of a form); an affect is a projectile (instead of a feeling that is introjected), a relation outward to the double (MP 497-498/399-400). But since the double is not an “I” or an ego, since it is not a molar unified self or subject, the double is really a multiplicity. Insofar as the love they are describing is not restricted to a feeling between persons, insofar as the love they are describing is a love of multiplicity, we see as well that becoming in Deleuze and Guattari is hyperbolic; it is the love of the whole world (tout le monde).13 And as love of the whole world (a utopian love), this love frees the potentiality of everyone (tout le monde). So, while aging is the agent that puts in place the condition of the demolished molar form of the subject, the motive or motor of becoming is the affect (as the motor of desubjectification, just as the function is the motor of deterritorialization). The imperceptible events of aging undo the molar form of oneself, which allows one to choose a clean break—to choose to become. And this choice of becoming is a choice to love the whole world; this is a love, as we just saw, that differs from the abstract universal love of persons. This love is no longer a feeling of one molar person or ego for another molar person or ego; it is no longer human love, no longer the love of man. Thus, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, it is a love of the minor. As is well known, all becomings in Deleuze and Guattari are becomings minor, but let us look at their exact definition in A Thousand Plateaus.14 First, they tell us that there is “no becoming-man … because man is majoritarian par excellence.”15 Then they state the positive definition: “all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (MP 356/ 291). A minority, for Deleuze and Guattari is not defined by statistics; it is not “quantitative” (MP 133/105) or a “definable aggregate” (MP 357/ 291). Women are a minority for Deleuze and Guattari, not because there are fewer women than men in a given population, but because “the body is stolen first from the girl … The girl’s becoming is stolen first…. The girl is the first victim” (MP 338-339/276, my emphasis). The positive definition of becoming therefore is not really a minor existence; it is that this minor existence is “oppressed” (MP 302/247), “wronged” (indûment) (MP 197/ 159, also C2 281/215); minor existence is one that is undergoing, as Deleuze and Guattari say in What is Philosophy, “abominable sufferings” (QPh 105/110). Abominable suffering is what defines a minority for Deleuze and Guattari. And the affect felt before this extreme suffering is “the shame of being a man” (QPh 102/107).16 The affect of shame at being a man, at being human all too human, with our oppressions, our clichés, our opinions, and our desires, is really the motive for change.17

### Human/Non-Human Binary DA

#### Your focus is a humanist standpoint that reinforces the human non human binary, this enables violence on the non human which undermines the whole non violence agenda.

Deckha ‘10

[Maneesha Deckha, Associate Professor at the University of Victoria Faculty of Law. “It’s time to abandon the idea of ‘human’ rights,” The Scavenger, December 13, 2010, \\wyo-bb]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans, writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

#### The second impact is that first priority arguments to secure a better future allows for current injustices to continue- continues a litany of other oppressions

Smith 10

(Andrea “Queer Theory and Native Studies: The Heteronormativity of Settler Colonialism” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 16, Number 1-2, 2010, pp. 42-68 (Article) //RC)

Thus normative futurity depends on an “origin story.” The future is legitimated as a continuation of the past. Here I am reminded of how I have often heard Native activists say, “Let us not work on domestic or other forms of gender violence now, we must work on survival issues ﬁrst.”25 Of course, since Native women are the women most likely to be killed by acts of gender violence in the United States, they are clearly not surviving. The many works on Native women and feminism that say that we are “American Indian women in that order,” that position gender justice as something to be addressed after decolonization, all speak to how this politics of futurity sacriﬁces the lives of women and those who are not gender nor- mative for the indeﬁnitely postponed postcolonial future. As Denetdale notes, the Native nationhood that becomes articulated under this strategy of futurity is one that supports heteropatriarchy, U.S. imperialism, antiblack racism, and capitalism. As Edelman states: “Political programs are programmed to reify difference and thus to secure in the form of the future, the order of the same.”26 Edelman calls us to queer “social organization as such” to show how our efforts to secure a better future for our children lead us to excuse injustice in the present.27 At the same time, however, this subjectless critique has its limits with regard to decolonization. For instance, Edelman’s analysis lapses into a vulgar construc- tionism by creating a fantasy that there can actually be a politics without a political program that does not always reinstantiate what it deconstructs, that does not always also in some way reafﬁrm the order of the same. Edelman’s “anti-oppositional” politics in the context of multinational capitalism and empire ensures the continu- ation of that status quo by disabling collective struggle designed to dismantle these systems. That is, it seems difﬁcult to dismantle multinational capitalism, settler colonialism, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy without some kind of politi- cal program, however provisional it may be. Here, Native studies can temper this subjectless critique by engaging queer of color critique in particular. José Esteban Muñoz notes, for example, that an anti-oppositional politic ultimately opts out of relationality and politics. “Relationality is not pretty, but the option of simply opting out of it . . . is imaginable only if one can frame queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix.”28 Furthermore, an anti-oppositional politic can quickly lapse into a leftist cynicism, in which all politics are dismissed as “reproductive” with no disruptive potential. This cynicism then becomes an apology for maintaining the status quo. As Muñoz argues: “The here and now is simply not enough. Queerness should and could be about a desire for another way of being in both the world and time, a desire that resists mandates to accept that which is not enough.”29 A politics of “opting out” clearly privileges those who are relatively more comfortable under the current situation. For indig- enous peoples, however, who face genocide, as well as all peoples subjected to conditions of starvation, violence, and war, opting out is simply not an option. The question then arises, who will be left when we opt out of a struggle against white supremacy, settler colonialism, and capitalism? Those most imme- diately sacriﬁced in this “anti-oppositional” politic are indigenous peoples, poor peoples, and all those whose lives are under immediate attack. Thus, while Edel- man contends that the Child can be analytically separated from actual children, Muñoz demonstrates that Edelman’s Child is nonetheless a disavowed white Child. “The future is the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity. [Edelman’s] framing nonetheless accepts and repro- duces this monolithic future of the child that is indeed always already white.”30 An indigenous critique must question the value of “no future” in the con- text of genocide, where Native peoples have already been determined by settler colonialism to have no future. If the goal of queerness is to challenge the repro- duction of the social order, then the Native child may already be queered. For instance, Colonel John Chivington, the leader of the famous massacre at Sand Creek, charged his followers to not only kill Native adults but to mutilate their reproductive organs and to kill their children because “nits make lice.”31 In this context, the Native Child is not the guarantor of the reproductive future of white supremacy; it is the nit that undoes it. In addition, while both “tradition” and “the future” must be critically engaged, it does not follow that they can be dismissed. As with identity, the notion of a tradition-free subject simply reinstantiates the notion of a liberal subject who is free from past encumbrances. As Elizabeth Povinelli’s work suggests, the liberal subject articulates itself as an autological subject that is completely self- determining over and against the “genealogical” subject (i.e., the indigenous sub- ject) trapped within tradition, determined by the past and the future.32 Essentially then, this call for “no future” relies on a primitivizing discourse that positions the [white] queer subject in relation to a premodern subject who is locked in history. The “Native” serves as the origin story that generates the autonomous present for the white queer subject.

#### Seek to be a part the system of humanity by establishing the history and origin will inevitably exclude the other and requires subject to be validated by the colonizer. Becoming and the use of a rhizome for politics allows the being to find their own worth. Only the perm can solve by moving past the search for humanity

Larue 11

[Robert Larue, Graduate School of The University of Texas Arlington, “MOVING BEYOND THIS MOMENT: EMPLOYING DELEUZE AND GUATARRI‟S RHIZOME IN POSTCOLONIALISM”, August 2011, <https://dspace.uta.edu/bitstream/handle/10106/6148/LaRue_uta_2502M_11318.pdf?sequence=1>, \\wyo-bb]

By trying to uncover a human ontology, humanism underscores the necessity and value of “knowing” origins. Origins, to date, have been used as principles by which things, objects, and people can be grouped and segregated. Questions such as “where are your people from?” or “where are you from?” seek origins so that the speaker can be lumped into a group, which is usually pre-established as either “acceptable” (Western European) or “unacceptable” (all others). While this is a gross oversimplification of categories, it does serve to show how determining ontological roots affects human society. Not only did Descartes‟ cogito renew a desire to find the origins of human existence, but it set the origins of the human within the confines of its own mind—in the human‟s ability (or lack thereof) to reason. This practice both set the stage for understanding existence through a reliance on reason and provided a “reasonable” justification for an exclusion of all those beings who, according to the Enlightenment model of the human, could not demonstrate reason. Since colonized individuals did not effectively demonstrate “Enlightenment” reason, they were effectively considered outside of European humanity. Apart from this, setting up this “foundation” for human existence proves troubling because the very concept of a foundation—structurally speaking—seeks to dislocate bodies from the rest of the world. Foundations set apart, and isolate, all that is built on their perimeter. It limits what can and cannot be established, killing off all roots--or histories--and establishing itself as the origin of the order. Ironically, as they convey a desire to unite multiple elements into one single structure (just as the foundation of a house attempts to bring together all of the parts of the house, from the wood used to construct spaces, to the spaces themselves), foundations are based on a system of “is/is not.” Because they are finite regions, they always exclude. Seeking a “foundational” humanity, then, sets up an understanding of the human that requires exclusions and boundaries. So far, this desire for a foundational humanity is what has limited much expansion of the concept of what it means to be “human.” In order for humanity to progress beyond the point of a binarized logic of either/or this concept of a “foundation” of human existence must be eradicated. Since its inception, the Cartesian division (of mind and body, or reason and form) has become the cornerstone for definitions of humanity. However, if, as Bart Simon argues, “the revolutionary Enlightenment narratives” of the human reestablished the foundations of the human and “challenged an oppressive feudal order and reenvisioned [sic] „man‟ as rational, autonomous, unique, and free” (4), it only did so for a small sector of humanity. As focusing on the “feudal order” left many other sectors of humanity untouched and without vision, it served to both turn the human into a product of politics and economics by expanding the population of humanity based on ownership rights. And, as Susan Bordo argues, the Cartesian model presents problems for humanity because it “is nothing if not a passion for separation, purification, and demarcation,” where the body is separated from the mind (17). Acting as the scalpel, Descartes‟ reliance--or, perhaps more appropriately, his insistence—on reason further complicates the question of “what is human” since, in an attempt to form “a unified system of absolute knowledge” (4), the model further divided human existence within the world, and placed humanity further at odds with the rest of the world (4). Instead of uniting humanity, the Cartesian “Man” was now limited to white males who could reason and who could, with this reason, properly make use of the environment; or, in other words, at this point, another classification of the human was established based on “his” ability to subjugate “his” environment and all that existed (without Enlightenment approved reason) within it.6 Origins became tied to It is from this point—from an attempt to enter the “body” of humanity—that Fanon‟s humanism seems to stem Fanon‟s cries for seeing the “equality of all men in the world” (Black Skin 110) based on their ability to rationalize it (123) show him continually trying to climb onto, and establish residency on this “revolutionary” foundation of humanity. By clinging to the already troubled concept of a “foundational” humanness, Fanon seems to ignore the fact that this “all inclusive” humanity is established on principles of exclusion and can never be entered as long as the system remains intact. Fanon troubles a potentially fruitful argument on postcolonial existence because he, as many of his predecessors, attempts to focus on the origins of postcolonial individuals—looking to the ideologies of the colonizer as the point of this origin— and, all the while further grounding a postcolonial future within the colonial situation. If postcoloniality is forever a “descendent” of colonization, it can never move beyond exclusion because it is always defined as exclusion. For postcolonialism alone, this is an arduous—and perhaps impossible—task. However, by “reading” postcoloniality as part of what Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call a rhizome (6), it is possible to break Fanon‟s postcolonial search for reclaiming an origin, and allow for an understanding of “self” that does not predicate itself upon the rationalization of existence, but on the understanding and appreciation of interconnections of existence. In order to move beyond the effects of colonization, postcoloniality can no longer afford to be seen as a “product of” colonization—or white European actions. It must be understood on different terms. While it must be noted that posthumanism— much like postcolonialism—is an academic endeavor, the field‟s importance comes in its insistence that, as Myra Seaman phrases it, “there has never been one unified, cohesive „human‟” (246-47). The “human” derived from European humanism have been nothing more than, to quote N. Katherine Hayles, a labels knighted upon a “fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice” (286). It is in this attempt to rethink human relationships not only with the environment but with other human bodies, and ultimately redefine what it means to be human from a more “global” perspective that possible strategies for rethinking postcoloniality arise. Because it emphasizes “deterritorializations” and “reterritorializations” (Deleuze and Guattari 10) the rhizome offers a break from an understanding of the human as a “point” to be entered. As “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root” (8) the idea that the human has a point of origin, and that, in postcoloniality, European culture is the postcolonial‟s point of origin can be discarded. What, instead, the rhizome makes available are a multiplicity of lines (8) which can be understood as continuous forms. This is important because, “reading” postcoloniality as part a rhizome means understanding that there was existence before, through, and after the events of colonization, therefore separating the origins of postcolonial individuals from those of the colonizer. A separation in this way restores “validity” to the existence of the postcolonial, removes the concept of victimhood—or victimization—and sets the understanding that not all contact is—although there may at times be horrific incidents, or periods—negative. In addition to this, since rhizomes are multiplicities (of lines, no less) and seek—unlike Fanon—to do away with the concept of “unity,” since unity “always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)” (8), there no longer exists a need for postcolonial individuals to desire to ascend the hierarchy established by colonization. Postcoloniality, as a rhizome, no longer needs to enter into the humanity of the colonizer because, as a rhizome, it is allowed—no, it is necessary—to be apart from the other. As a rhizome they remain connected. Moreover, redefining the human in terms of a posthuman postcoloniality allows for the possibility of opening all sectors of humanity so that the human is understood as a nexus rather than a solid form. Still, much work is needed in order to more fully understand postcoloniality as rhizomatic. As established, postcoloniality includes not only the physical, political, economic, and social modes of postcolonized individuals, but at the heart of these modes rests a linguistic model that establishes the “presence” of individuals. This presence works in two parts: first it establishes a vacuum in which it can place its subject, and it then institutes them as European-style individuals.