## 1AC

### Contention One: Exclusion of the Outlaw

#### WE BEGIN WITH AL-AWLAKI TARGETED BY HIS GOVERNMENT FOR BEING AN OUTLAW, HOWEVER HISTORY SHOWS A LONG PRECEDENT OF THE STATE HUNTING THE OUTLAW

Chong 12

[Jane Y. Chong, Yale Law School, JD 2014; Duke University, BA 2009, “Targeting the Twenty-First-Century Outlaw”, December, 2012, Yale Law Journal, 122 Yale L.J. 724, Google Scholar, \\wyo-bb]

On September 30, 2011, when drones fired Hellfire missiles at his convoy in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki did not become the first American citizen to be successfully targeted by his own government for execution without a trial. He became the first citizen known to be so killed abroad as part of the CIA's covert counterterrorism operations. (2) As a general matter, government-sanctioned execution without trial is not a novel practice. Under the common law judgment of outlawry, a penalty "as old as the law itself," (3) a fugitive fleeing summons or indictment for a capital crime such as treason could be killed instead of captured on the theory that individuals unwilling to subject themselves to the judgment of the law could not avail themselves of its protections. A number of authorities have incorrectly asserted that outlawry, a legal weapon of critical importance for centuries in England, (4) "has never been known on this side of the Atlantic." (5) In fact, outlawry was practiced in the American colonies and remained in force as a criminal sanction in a number of states well after the ratification of the Constitution. North Carolina put its outlawry statute into occasional use until as late as 1975. (6) In the context of modern terrorism, however, the term "outlawry" has been used loosely to refer to terrorist movements or state counterterrorism activities that operate outside a cognizable legal regime or violate established legal norms. (7) On the rare occasion when outlawry has been invoked as a legal sentence, it has been disparaged as the Western equivalent of the Islamic fatwa and as the barbaric analogue to current targeted killing practices. (8) In contrast, this Note examines the historical use and legitimacy of outlawry as a court-issued judgment. (9) My central argument is that the theory and past practice of outlawry provide helpful principles for narrowly crafting due process protections for prospective targets who are U.S. citizens. (10) Properly implemented, these protections would prevent their targeted killing from amounting to extrajudicial execution. (11) The extraordinary circumstances of Awlaki's killing could not more clearly attest to the need for an extraordinary mechanism by which citizens accused of terrorism can be guaranteed an opportunity to partake in the legal process. One year and one month before the CIA-led drone attack on Awlaki and fellow American-born radical Samir Khan, (12) Awlaki's father sought unsuccessfully to enjoin the government from killing his son. (13) Nasser al-Aulaqi (14) claimed that the rumored targeted killing program violated both his rights and his son's rights under the Constitution and international law. (15) In its opposing brief, the Obama Administration refused to confirm or deny the existence of such a state-sponsored program but nevertheless objected to the requested injunction as an "unprecedented, improper, and extraordinarily dangerous" interference with the President's military powers. (16) Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Executive's targeting determinations fall outside the courts' purview. This had the practical effect of permitting the Executive to kill Awlaki without judicial intervention, irrespective of whether the killing constituted a denial of due process. (17) But the controversial decision also contained the intuition that informs this Note. Judge Bates declined to grant Awlaki's father standing as Awlaki's next friend, declaring that "no U.S. citizen may simultaneously avail himself of the U.S. judicial system and evade U.S. law enforcement authorities." (18) Judge Bates's reasoning suggests that even under modern precepts, a citizen's access to the legal system and his rights under that system are--or should be--predicated on his recognition of his obligations under that system. The alternative would be to permit the alleged citizen-terrorist to exercise his legal rights even while refusing to submit to the legal system that affords those rights, turning the law into his shield while denying the government the use of the law as a sword. It is perhaps an unwillingness to accept this alternative, one that renders the government captive to its own legal process, that informs the Obama Administration's targeted killing policy. That policy is part of an aggressive counterterrorism agenda that has, by all media accounts, "baffled liberal supporters and confounded conservative critics alike." (19)

#### IN FACT THE DOJ JUSTIFIES THE EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING THROUGH THE DECLARATION OF THEIR IDENTITY AS AN OUTLAW

Cole 13

[Juan Cole, Public intellectual, prominent blogger and essayist, and the Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan, 02/06/2013, “Top Five Objections to the White House’s Drone Killing Memo”, <http://www.juancole.com/2013/02/objections-houses-killing.html>, \\wyo-bb]

NBC’s Michael Isikoff has revealed the text of a white paper composed for Congress by the Department of Justice that sheds light on the legal arguments made by Eric Holder in justifying the killing by drone strike of Americans abroad, who are suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda. That the memo did not even require that the US know of a specific and imminent plot against the US, of which the al-Qaeda member was guilty, for it to kill him from the skies, alarmed all the country’s civil libertarians. Here are five objections to the vision of the memo, which it seems to me is directly contrary to the spirit and the letter of the US constitution. It is contrary in profound ways to the ideals of the founding generation. 1. In the Western tradition of law, there can be no punishment without the commission of a specific crime defined by statute. The memo does not require that a specific crime have been committed, or that a planned criminal act be a clear and present danger, for an American citizen to be targeted for execution by drone. 2. To any extent that the president’s powers under the memo are alleged to derive from the 2001 Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force, i.e. from the legislature, they are a form of bill of attainder (the History Learning Site explains what that is here): “A bill, act or writ of attainder was a piece of legislation that declared a person or persons guilty of a crime. A bill of attainder allowed for the guilty party to be punished without a trial. A bill of attainder was part of English common law. Whereas Habeus Corpus guaranteed a fair trial by jury, a bill of attainder bypassed this. The word “attainder” meant tainted. A bill of attainder was mostly used for treason . . . and such a move suspended a person’s civil rights and guaranteed that the person would be found guilty of the crimes stated in the bill as long as the Royal Assent was gained. For serious crimes such as treason, the result was invariably execution.” What, you might ask, is wrong with that? Only that it is unconstitutional. Tech Law Journal explains: “The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9, paragraph 3 provides that: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law will be passed.” . . . “These clauses of the Constitution are not of the broad, general nature of the Due Process Clause, but refer to rather precise legal terms which had a meaning under English law at the time the Constitution was adopted. A bill of attainder was a legislative act that singled out one or more persons and imposed punishment on them, without benefit of trial. Such actions were regarded as odious by the framers of the Constitution because it was the traditional role of a court, judging an individual case, to impose punishment.” William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, page 166. The form of the AUMF, in singling out all members of al-Qaeda wherever they are and regardless of nationality or of actual criminal action, as objects of legitimate lethal force, is that of a bill of attainder. Congress cannot declare war on small organizations– war is declared on states. Such a bill of attainder is inherently unconstitutional. 3. The memo’s vision violates the principle of the separation of powers. It makes the president judge, jury and executioner. Everything is done within the executive branch, with no judicial oversight whatsoever. The powers the memo grants the president are the same enjoyed by the absolute monarchs of the early modern period, against whom Montesquieu penned his Spirit of the Laws, which inspired most subsequent democracies, including the American. Montesquieu said: “Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is invested with the two first powers leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan’s person, the subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression. Ironically, given contemporary American Islamophobia, the Obama administration has made itself resemble not the Sun-King, Louis XIV, who at least did have a court system not completely under his thumb, but rather, as Montesquieu saw it, the Ottoman sultans, who he claimed combined in themselves executive, legislative and judicial power. (Actually the Muslim qadis or court judges who ruled according to Islamic law or sharia were also not completely subjugated to the monarch, so even the Ottomans were better than the drone memo). 4. The memo resurrects the medieval notion of “outlawry”– that an individual can be put outside the protection of the law by the sovereign for vague crimes such as “rebellion,” and merely by royal decree. A person declared an outlaw by the king was deprived of all rights and legal protections, and anyone could do anything to him that they wished, with no repercussions. (The slang use of “outlaw” to mean simply “habitual criminal” is an echo of this ancient practice, which was abolished in the UK and the US). I wrote on another occasion that the problem with branding someone an “outlaw” by virtue of being a traitor or a terrorist is that this whole idea was abolished by the US constitution. Its framers insisted that you couldn’t just hang someone out to dry by decree. Rather, a person who was alleged to have committed a crime such as treason or terrorism had to be captured, brought to court, tried, and sentenced in accordance with a specific statute, and then punished by the state. If someone is arrested, they have the right to demand to be produced in court before a judge, a right known as habeas corpus (“bringing the body,” i.e. bringing the physical person in front of a judge).

#### THE EXCLUSION OF THE OUTLAW IS A CENTRAL FUNCTION OF MODERN POLITICS—DESTRUCTION OF TERRORISTS AND INDEFINITE DETENTION ARE EXAMPLES OF THE EXCLUSION OF DEMONIZATION OF OUTLAWS THAT EMBODIES POLITICS TODAY—THIS EXPOSES THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRATIC AND POLITICAL COMMUNITIES MARKING THE POINT WHERE VIOLENCE BECOMES POSSIBLE AND BIOPOLITICAL CATASTROPHE BECOMES INEVITABLE

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

The deconstructive logic of outlawry is ancient. The sovereign proclamation of outlawry – Wargus Esto, in Frankish law, or “become a wolf” – was a common legal penalty from the archaic period through the Middle Ages that tied sovereign power to its own undoing. The post-human politics of twentieth-century post-structuralism was thus anticipated hundreds of years earlier in a figure who challenged the law from the outside, not as a subject, but as liminal creature suspended between human and beast. This post-human figure is both a werewolf and an outlaw. In the wolf ban the law is constituted by what challenges it; as recourse to this challenge, the law is dissolved with respect to the offender in order to preserve itself; but it can never completely preserve itself. By banishing its challengers instead of killing or rehabilitating them, the sovereign reduces the outlaw to absolute vulnerability and exposure to death, but also ensures its own mortality. Outlawry exposes the law’s inability to be at one with itself, its fundamental insecurity, its undecidability, and its dependence on force to come into being and maintain itself. Yet outlawry is the non-presence that allows the law to begin its presencing. What is outside of the law is included in the law: even as the outside is severed from the inside – it is nonidentical to it, exterior to or excluded from it – it is nevertheless joined to it by the very limit that defines it as other. Outlawry is always already present as the law’s deconstructive double: it is fundamental to the law’s structure as a performative force. By refusing to allow the law to be final or complete, outlawry keeps the political system from stagnating. The law must continually transform as its context changes, or it will be replaced with a new law. In transformation or revolution, for better or for worse, this alterity is derived from outside of the law. Outlawry is persistent in its presence (as a nonpresence), and in its promise and threat to the law.But it seems as if in modernity, outlawry has a new logic; one that conserves the law instead of ensuring the law’s difference from itself. Giorgio Agamben points to the dangers of this modern mode of outlawry in Homo Sacer. Outlawry structures Agamben’s vision of biopolitics: sovereignty, which today takes life itself as its object,164depends on forces outside of the law for the foundation and conservation of its power (the sovereign’s decision on the exception comes from outside of the law). As such, modern sovereignty, even in democratic states, is a totalizing force that encloses its outside. In this extra-legal state, everybody becomes an outlaw of sorts as they suffer a withdrawal of legal rights and protections. Citizens are no longer subjects capable of political action, but instead are abjected and exposed to death. This double mode of outlawry is the legacy of the camps. Agamben writes:[t]here is no return from the camps to classical politics...[T]he possibility of distinguishing between our biological body and our political body...was taken from us forever. And we are not only, in Foucault’s words, animals whose life as living beings are at issue in their politics, but also—inversely—citizens whose very politics is at issue in the natural body.” (188)Western metaphysics, politics, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence are together implicated in a state of affairs that brings us to the edge of “an unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe” (188) as bare life (life that is excluded from the law) becomes the object of the law (a law that preserves its power by suspending itself in relation to the life that it excludes).There is something compelling in Agamben’s dark vision, in which exposure to death seems to enter the very core of life, infiltrating every aspect of social and political life in a new kind of totalitarianism. His diagnosis of the modern political condition as an indefinite state of exception populated by homo sacer, while cynical, seems to hit the mark, whether one is considering the post 9-11 global ‘war on terror,’ or biotechnology. Whether it is in the decision to cease life-preserving treatment, or to deem someone a terrorist or “unlawful enemy combatant” and detain them without the protection of the usual legal rights, the suspension of the law in relation to some lives changes the law’s relation to all human life. In Agamben’s analysis this new relation – what he defines as biopolitics–takes the structure of the archaic ban, the proclamation of outlawry that inaugurates sovereignty by excluding the outlaw. In this view, the ban does not deconstruct sovereignty, it preserves it. For Agamben, outlawry serves two functions. It165guarantees the total indivisible power of the sovereign, while in the case of the subject, outlawry constitutes an erasure of agency and exposure to death (the banned individual enters a liminal space between human and beast, and as such can be killed but not sacrificed). In effect, for Agamben the reappearance of outlawry as biopolitics encloses all forms of modern sovereignty in a form of totalitarianism.However, it is not outlawry that traps modernity in the logic of the camps, nor is it a return to some ‘normal’ situation that saves us from fascism. This was Walter Benjamin’s message, a message that often seems to go unheard, although it is obvious to those who are outside of the law: fascism is the normal situation. The fact that this has not changed in the six decades following the Shoah, but rather expanded to secretly structure even liberal democracies, as Agamben argues, is cause for significant concern. We cannot rid ourselves of outlawry in the political sphere. To ban outlawry, if such a thing were logically possible, would only intensify the biopolitical catastrophe because it would foreclose the law’s difference from itself, its capacity to transform, while to welcome only outlawry would surely invite chaos. Indeed, there must be law. Yet the solution is not a foreclosure of the outside of the law. Agamben creates a very compelling sketch of the problem when outlawry is taken up in biopolitics, but he forgets the challenge that outlawry poses to sovereignty, missing the deconstructive relation outlawry maintains with the law. A mimetic switch complicates the biopolitical situation, deconstructing biopolitics itself and reversing the significance of outlawry to sovereignty and subject. Sovereignty is exposed to its own annihilation, as Derrida surmises in Rogues, it has finally undone itself; it has lost all meaning (101). And the subject, exiled from the law, tastes its unmediated freedom (ipseity), glimpses the law’s mystical authority, and celebrates the possibility of a new law, if only for a suspended instant.

#### THE EXCLUSION AND ELIMINATION OF THE OUTLAW IS PART OF THE ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE A SINGLE AND UNIFIED PEOPLE UNDER THE LAW—THIS PROJECT RESULTS IN THE FINAL SOLUTION

Agamben, 2000

[Giorgio, Means without ends: notes on politics, Pg 33-35] /Wyo-MB

If this is the case-if the concept of people necessarily contains within itself the fundamental biopolitical fracture-it is possible to read anew some decisive pages of the history of our century. If the struggle between the two peoples has always been in process, in fact, it has undergone in our time one last and paroxysmal acceleration. In ancient Rome, the split internal to the people was juridically sanctioned by the clear distinction be- tween populus and plebs- each with its own institutions and magistrates-just as in the Middle Ages the division between artisans [popolo minuto] and merchants [popolo grasso] used to correspond to a precise articulation of different arts and crafts. But when, starting with the French Revolution, sovereignty is entrusted solely to the people, the people become an embarrassing presence, and poverty and exclusion appear for the first time as an intolerable scandal in every sense. In the modern age, poverty and exclusion are not only economic and social concepts but also eminently political categories. (The economism and "socialism" that seem to dominate modern politics actually have a political, or, rather, a biopolitical, meaning.) From this perspective, our time is nothing other than the methodical and implacable attempt to fill the split that divides the people by radically eliminating the people of the excluded. Such an attempt brings together, according to different modalities and horizons, both the right and the left, both capitalist countries and socialist countries, which have all been united in the plan to produce one single and undivided people-an ultimately futile plan that, however, has been partially realized in all industrialized countries. The obsession with development is so effective in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical plan to produce a people without fracture. "When seen in this light, the extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany acquires a radically new meaning. As a people that refuses integration in the national body politic (it is assumed, in fact, that its assimilation is actually only a feigned one), the Jews are the representatives par excellence and almost the living symbol of the people, of that naked life that modernity necessarily creates within itself but whose presence it is no longer able to tolerate in any way. We ought to understand the lucid fury with which the German Volk- representative par excellence of the people as integral body politic- tried to eliminate the ]ews forever as precisely the terminal phase of the internecine struggle that divides People and people. With the final solution-which included Gypsies and other unassimilable elements for a reason-· Nazism tried obscurely and in vain to free the Western political stage from this intolerable shadow so as to pro- duce finally the German Volk as the people that has been able to heal the original biopolitical fracture. (And that is why the Nazi chiefs repeated so obstinately that by eliminating Jews and Gypsies they were actually working also for the other European peoples.)

#### THE LAW USES STATIC IDENTITY AS A TOOL TO TOTALIZE IDENTITY. THE ONLY WAY THE LAW CAN RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE TOTALIZED IDENTITIES IS THROUGH VIOLENCE, MAKING WAR INEVITABLE. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS TO REJECT STATIC IDENTITIES AND EMBRACE THE METHOD OF BECOMING

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If ethics and politics are separate, there also must be a separation, for Levinas, between the political subject and the ethical subject. A political subject would be an identity-based133subject, a subject-in-common, whereas an ethical subject is an other among others. Already there is some disruption of the political field when the subject is divided in this way, for neither commonality, nor subjection to the sovereign, are any longer a requirement for the agency of a subject who is split between their political being and ethical being. Of the ethical subject Levinas writes: “Subjectivity realizes these impossible exigencies – the astonishing feat of containing more than it is possible to contain.... subjectivity [is] welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated” (27). Ethics, in other words, is an openness to exteriority. But can a political subject open toward the Other? It seems this openness only happens in the ethical, and not the political sphere. The ethical relation, it follows, transcends the law, because the law, as an aspect of politics, invokes identity and erases difference, indeed it must, of we are to achieve ‘equality before the law.’ But this transcendence is not an ‘outlaw’ event, at least not prior to deconstruction, since it does not seem to exist in relation to law and politics at all.In a conversation with Derrida, recalled in Adieu Emmanuel Levinas, Levinas describes his ethical approach as a matter of theology: “You know, one often speaks of ethics to describe what I do, but what really interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy, the holiness of the holy” (4). A kind of transcendental disruption of politics is thus possible, but the disconnect between ethics and politics diminishes the political usefulness of ethics as a concept, as Simon Critchley elaborates in Five Problems in Levinas’ View of Politics. According to Critchley, Levinasian politics, in accordance with the Schmittian friend/enemy divide, is derived from the antagonism between friends and enemies. His ethics, however, is shaped by monotheism and a concept of fraternity that contradicts this division, for on an ethical level “all humanity is my friend and no one is my enemy,” as Critchley phrases it (174). In other words, humanity is a spiritual fraternity mediated through the presence of God.This separation, which aligns politics with totalitarianism and ethics with theology, does not bode well for our political life. The ideal transcendence of the face-to-face encounter is impossible in the plurality of beings that comprise the political sphere. Politics is the regulation of chaos, the imposition of order on disorder: there is no outside. We are134political when we find ways to manage our relation to each other, so the political is always a mediation. Levinas calls it le tier, the third party. In contrast to ethics, the third- party relation refers specifically to law and the state, which tend always toward totalization. Third-party relations are always already ethically unjust because they are unable to account for the specificity of the face-to-face encounter, and must generalize for the good of all citizens. As a consequence of this unifying function, Levinas equates the political with violence and war. Politics is “the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means ... the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy is to naiveté” (TI 21). As he continues Levinas links war, and implicitly politics and political subjects, to totalization: “The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates western philosophy. Individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves. The meaning of individuals (invisible outside this totality) is derived from the totality” (21-2). Thus for Levinas it is not possible to be a political actor without being complicit with the forces of totalization.Levinas puts ethics to the task of re-constituting political space by repeatedly interrupting all claims at totalization, including those hidden in liberal concepts of freedom and autonomy, as Critchley points out in Ethics and Deconstruction (223). In other words, the role of ethics in relation to the violent and totalizing forces of politics is to override and guide political reason, to disrupt politics (222). A recognition of and responsibility to the Other disrupts the hatred of the Other on which political unity is organized. Yet Levinas’ politics are fraught with difficulties. First of all, Levinas’ view of what counts as political is very narrow (173). Indeed, his approach appears similar to Schmittian political concepts in which the state’s role is to distinguish friend from enemy and foreclose all difference in the name of unity. Moreover the political, as Levinas conceptualizes it, has further traces of Schmittian decisionism, which ironically installs a different side of outlawry at the heart of politics. As Critchley elaborates, Levinas sees politics as archic: “it is obsessed with the moment of foundation, origination, declaration, or institution that is linked to the act of government, of sovereignty, most of all of decision that presupposes and initiates a sovereign political subject capable of self-government and the government of others” (182). A decision is extralegal, for in order to qualify as a decision135it must exceed the realm of rule and calculation that comprises the law. Yet the Schmittian sovereign decision aims not at disrupting law, but at conserving it. This is the essence of totalitarianism as conceived by Schmitt. As a result, the political sphere is a realm where only the sovereign has agency and political subjects find themselves limited by a prescribed social role, on the one hand, and exposed to the extralegal violence of the decision, on the other.To be clear, the similarities between these thinkers’ definitions of politics do not by any means align Levinas with Schmitt, either ethically or politically: where Schmitt recommends decisive totalitarian politics as an ideal political system, Levinas is intent on disrupting such totalizing forces with what lies outside of the political realm. Yet his ethical challenge to politics seems ineffectual. For as Critchley points out, Levinasian ethics leaves no room for progressive political action: the disruptive moment transforms into the archic founding gesture, instituting a new third party (1992). In other words, when ethics engages politics, it becomes political, which is to say it takes on a unifying, totalizing impulse and erasure of the ethics that founded it. If this is the case, can we put Levinasian ethics to the task of disrupting politics as a mode of outlawry? In the following section, I address this question, suggesting that while Levinas opens up the possibility for such an ethical role for outlawry by replacing the identity imperative of German Idealism with the imperative for alterity, he does not allow politics to contain that ethical disruption within itself: but Derrida’s re-working of the ethics of alterity does.

### Contention Two: Outlaw Politics

#### THUS OUR ADVOCACY: WE AFFIRM THAT WE ARE OUTLAWS.

#### We make two solvency claims:

#### First, Universal Recognition of being- recognition of the outlaw in all of us allows us to rethink ethics creating a ethical interaction towards the excluded other.

#### Second, This recognition solves dehumanization- a politics of outlawry is critical to challenging relationships of violence that exist in the status quo

Bunch, 2010

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I began this chapter with the becoming-animal of Levinas and the becoming-ethical of Bobby the dog, with the aim of exploring their mutual exposure at the level of bare life as a site of ethics – an ethics that is situated in the space outside the law, that exceeds the conditions of subjectivation, but that is nevertheless political. The irony of the association of ethics with bare life should not be ignored: indeed, we are most unethically political when we dehumanize others, as we have seen in the Shoah and other genocides, slavery, patriarchy, colonization and so on. So how can the very terms of dehumanization – bare life, or animal life – become a site for ethics and political action? Becoming animal sheds a different light on the politics of life itself by presenting a post-human, rather than merely de-humanized figure, that can be both ethical and political. Moreover, rather than referring to some individual who flouts the law in isolation, becoming animal shares an affective relation with other entities as part of a collective or multiplicity. If Agamben’s conception of bare life diagnoses a crisis in modern politics in which the law is suspended and everyone is homo sacer, exposed to death through totalitarian appropriations of the outside of the law, Deleuze and Guattari’s minoritarian politics, together with deconstruction, provide the framework to re-conceptualize our political concepts so that outlawry becomes a threshold for a revolving disruption of the political sphere with ethics. We might thus conceive of democracy in terms of a politics of bare life, but along the lines of becoming animal instead of homo sacer, and theorize democracy as processes of minority becomings instead of majority rule. How then might we conceive of democracy as a becoming that moves in the direction of the outside of the law, rather than always consolidating the terms of what is inside the law’s borders? In short, how does outlawry, in its deconstructive sense, transform our understanding of democracy?Democracy is typically affiliated with the politics of subjects, and is what Deleuze and Guattari term a molar model, since it is based on the majority, rather than minorities, and consensus, rather than dissensus. As Patton suggests, contemporary liberal democracy is155“a form of government in which the governed exercise control over governments and their policies, typically through regular and fair elections...They ensure equal rights to effective participation in political processes, but also set limits to what majorities can decide by protecting basic civil and political rights and ensuring the maintenance of a rule of law” (185-6). Derrida has demonstrated how problematic this understanding of democracy is with respect to minorities. As he argues in Rogues, the democratic state excludes “all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others,” in particular the “bad citizens, rogues [and] noncitizens,” despite its promise “at the same time or by turns... to open itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded” (63).The problem with – and the cure for, present forms of democracy arise from the auto- immunity of democracy. Democracy protects itself from what threatens it, from within and from without, by suspending democracy itself. Because it excludes its other, democracy is always ‘put off.’ Derrida refers to this as the Renvoi of democracy: “[R]envoi signifies putting off to later, the reprieve [sursis] that remits or defers [sursoit] democracy until the next resurgence [sursaut] or until the next turn or round; it suggests the incompletion or essential delay, the self inadequation of every present and presentable democracy, in other words, the interminable adjournment of the present democracy” (R 37-38). But this concept is more than simply a critique of the inherent failure of democracy on account of its deferral and difference from itself. The renvoi of democracy refers to alterity itself, to the difference of the other. The deferral is thus also a reaching toward difference. In the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, it is a becoming-minoritarian. Or as Derrida puts it: différance as reference or referral [renvoi] to the other, that is, as the ... undeniable, experience of the alterity of the other, of heterogeneity, of the singular, the not-same, the different, the dissymmetric, the heteronomous” (38). Democracy thus takes a liminal position between the law and justice, the political and the ultra-political: from this border it seeks to re-create itself through a simultaneous construction and deconstruction.With these concepts Derrida provides a starting place for bringing Levinas’ ethics into the political realm. It is through this very contradiction, this difference within itself that democracy-to-come incorporates an ethics of alterity and exteriority. The Derridean sense156of time as out of joint suspends the difference between the law and its outside through a ‘revolution’ that literally implies revolving or circling about. It is through this circular action that democracy-to-come overcomes the homogenizing exclusions of what Levinas terms third party politics (A Tier) with a movement toward alterity – that is ethics – in the political field. However, the deconstructive approach also has its limits: the impossibilities, passivity and the necessary deferral to the future produces a political concept whose praxis is somewhat obscure. What of the politics of the present? What route do we take, as individuals or collectively, toward this future? And who or what is the agent of such a politics?Deleuze and Guattari propose a theory of becoming-democratic that sounds strikingly similar to Derrida’s democracy-to-come, but point also to modes of political praxis in the present, or more precisely, to political praxis as a mode of resistance to the present. This includes a resistance to present democracies, which, Deleuze and Guattari agree, are Capitalist fraternities that have no claim to justice.66 As they ask in What is Philosophy: “What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor came out of their territory or ghetto?” (108). Democracy, no less than other political forms, makes outlaws of its minorities, in the vulnerable and disenfranchised sense of homo sacer. But like democracy-to-come, becoming-democratic involves becoming-outlaw in its anarchic sense. Becoming-democratic is the politics of the poor when they come out of their ghetto, and it is the becoming-minoritarian (opening up) of those very forces that exclude the poor. It is a dispersion of the majority that makes up a conventional democracy. Where a democracy is a state of law, becoming-democratic is outside of the law; where democracies are communicative, becoming-democratic is creative. Deleuze and Guattari describe becoming-democratic as a critical philosophy, as follows:We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist...Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of creation. ...This people and earth will not be found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority. (108)157 This form of politics differs from present constitutional states – indeed from any constitutional states – and does not specify a determinate structure. In his commentary on “Becoming-Democratic” Patton points out that the concept “points towards future as yet unrealized forms of democracy, but also reminds us that there is no definitive form that will ever arrive....it enables us to perceive the world differently (180-181). Like Derrida’s ‘to-come’ of democracy, the concept does not offer specific models of political practice, or universal maxims, but instead a critical approach that is anti-conservative; it deconstructs current realities from outside, rather than conserving them from within.With their series of concepts of becoming Deleuze and Guattari set the groundwork for an ethical politics of bare life because people are seized by these becomings to the extent that they are not subjects, citizens or members of normative majorities. Bare life is precisely what we exclude in order to be subjects. However, bare life is not simply ‘being alive’ in the sense that all animal and plant life is alive. It is the politicization of the sheer fact of living through its exclusion from the polis. Agamben discusses bare life as a site of vulnerability and exposure to death, but in Deleuze and Guattari’s framework we might also conceive of bare life as the spring of resistance to the present by which we strive for something new. Levinas experienced this ethics, and this politicization of his own bare life, with his fellow prisoners in the camp. Bare life is thus what constitutes the demos: the people, before they become a democracy, are in processes of becoming- democratic. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is possible as a movement of dispersal even when we are already citizens, or members of the majority, but it is absolutely necessary if we are not.The distinction between bare life and the subject is not absolute when we consider it in the framework of outlawry as a deconstructive becoming minoritarian. We might be both vulnerable and exposed, as in the camp, and yet imbued with the capacity to resist the present, as those in the camp did in various ways, even to their death. And this resistance has the capacity to reconfigure the political sphere – as indeed, those in the camp succeeded at doing (some like Levinas, in a literal sense, and others less directly), for our ethico-political concepts have been dramatically transformed as a consequence of the Shoah, and continue to be. For Deleuze and Guattari, ethical political action occurs at the 158 threshold between centre and periphery, subject and non-subject, singular and general that is expressed in ‘becoming-animal’ and becoming-minoritarian. From this liminal position agency is not only possible but is, as a matter of necessity, tied to the vulnerability of bare life, which is always poised at the edge of violence or death. In other words, it is those very people that are excluded, or more generally anyone to the extent that one is outside of the law, that demands both an ethical and political response. Political change, if it is to be ethical, mobilizes around those exclusions.

#### Third, This act of becoming counteracts white male hegemonic acts- Outlawry is becoming and the destruction of static identity this act counters the hegemony of the white male that is the standard of western metaphysics

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

Becoming-animal is a version of bare life that replaces the subject as the figure of political agency. This anti-identity political actor signals a movement toward outlawry: as bare life, becoming animal is vulnerable in her exclusion from the polis, but she nevertheless acts to counter the law. Such revolutionary becoming is ethical, in Levinas’ sense, because of its relationship to Otherness, and the disruption of finitude that constitutes it. But it is quite different from Levinasian ethics, because the ethics does not arise through facial recognition (identity). Where for Levinas it is recognition of the Other that constitutes one as a subject, for Deleuze and Guattari one literally becomes147 Other in a dispersal away from subjectivity. Where Levinasian ethics is an ethics of hospitality in which the subject (understanding the self to be an other amongst others) welcomes the other. But the authors of A Thousand Plateaus are not concerned with hospitality; they are not concerned with welcoming in those that are on the outside. They are interested instead in a movement toward the outside, leaving the safety of the familiar and the similar, and casting off of privilege and dominance. It is an ethics of self- transformation, alliance, and exteriority, not hospitality. Deleuze and Guattari write: “As Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become- black” (292).Minoritarian politics is a politics of the Other, evoked through an ‘Anomalous’ phenomenon of bordering. The Anomalous (anomal) refers to “that which is outside rules or goes against the rules” and moreover “an-omalie...designates unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization” (244). The concept dislodges the dominant subject-position of the “self-conscious white male of the occident” and dismantles the human ideal inherited from western metaphysics (Günzel 9). As Stephan Günzel phrases it in “Immanence and Deterritorialization,” “the only way to realize what is hidden in the idea of justice within ‘human rights’ ... is exactly ‘a becoming-inhuman’” (9). Becoming- animal thus expresses a politics of the post-subject, a revolutionary politics of those who exceed or fall short of the law. But the mechanics and motivations for such peripheral revolutionary movement is perplexing. It is obvious why those who are outside of the law might want a new law. But why would anyone who inhabits a dominant subject position move out toward a minority position, which we know to be disenfranchised? How would this be revolutionary? It seems as though it would simply expand the space of disenfranchisement. Moreover it would appear to limit the ethical capacity of becoming- minoritarian to those that first have status in major political structures, much like the ethics of hospitality does (i.e. to men, but not women, to straights but not queers, to white majorities but not racialized minorities). If one is already a minority, dispossessed of subject status, is one barred from processes of becoming? Must one first assimilate to the majority in order to then dismantle it?148For Deleuze and Guattari, populations are not divided into simple categories such as included/excluded or majority/minority. We are always already both at once. What differentiates us, one from the other, as ethical beings is not our degree of inclusion or exclusion, nor precisely our orientation toward others (although the latter is important). Ethics is expressed through our becoming-ness, our movement away from generalizations toward the specificity of the outside in all of its multiplicity and otherness. Ethics is criticism, that is, self criticism and criticism of the general, from the perspective of the particular. Becoming-animal specifies the direction of the flow between those aspects of ourselves that are part of the majority (our sense of belonging, our sense of self) and our affiliation with the minute particular. A becoming always begins in the majority, until one meets that dispersive detail that launches the entity outward toward the margins.64 Deleuze and Guattari write: “Yes, all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower or stone one becomes are molecular collectivities, haeccities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or by habit” (275). However the apparent primacy of majoritarianism (primacy in the sense of coming first, which carries the implication of greater importance in western metaphysics) may be a problem on at least two counts. The first is the assumption that one is always already a subject, which returns us to the quandaries of the post-structural subject: the fiction that the subject comes before the law that hails it into being. The second is based on the risks of misreading Deleuze and Guattari’s specific uses of common terms such as ‘minority’ and ‘majority,’ which lends itself to a romanticization of disenfranchisement, and the erasure of the very real oppression experienced by some populations.For Deleuze and Guattari, one does not become a subject. Becoming is limited to a deconstruction of subjectivity, since becoming is a process of dispersal, not consolidation. While the authors specify that one’s engagement in molar politics may be necessary for survival, this does not constitute a becoming. With regard to identity feminism, for instance, they write: “It is of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as women’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation” (TP 276). But they find the revolutionary potential restricted in such identity politics, because149 the approach tends toward stasis rather than movement. Its criteria are confining. As they continue: “But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow” (276).

#### The Aff key to changing our relationship with the world, this is a key starting point for affirmation of sheer difference to affirm every life, regardless of difference.

Lawlor 08

[Leonard Lawlor, University of Wisconsin System, “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari”, SubStance, Issue 117 (Volume 37, Number 3), 2008, pp. 171-174, \\wyo-bb]

If we want to change our relationship to the world, to others, and to animals, we must understand how it is possible for us to change—how it is possible to enter into the experience of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the cause or “agent” of becoming may be the experience that drugs produce in us (MP 347/283, see also QPh 156/165). While such a suggestion may seem infamous, one must recognize that hallucinogenic drugs change our perceptions (MP 304/278). Nevertheless, for Deleuze and Guattari, taking such drugs does not constitute a successful becoming. The failure is due to the fact that the drug user, and especially the addict, only enters into a cycle. He or she gets high, comes down, then wants to get high again, and so on. This cycle or circle is all that happens, which means in fact that nothing happens. For Deleuze and Guattari, becomings are never processes of beginning again; they are never processes that move only in a circle. We also see this cyclic behavior in the alcoholic’s idea of the last glass (MP 546/438), based on a subjective evaluation of how much the alcoholic is able to bear. Deleuze and Guattari say, “What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again [recommencer] (after a rest, a pause…)” (MP 546/438). Thus with the alcoholic, nothing happens but the same thing over and over again; recommencement is not an event. Although the concepts of limit and recommencement are very important for understanding A Thousand Plateaus—early in the book it’s said that the body without organs is a limit and that one is always attaining it (MP 197/159)—Deleuze and Guattari oppose the concept of limit to that of threshold. The threshold lies beyond the limit, beyond the last glass; crossing the threshold, they say, makes the alcoholic change, to become suicidal or to stop drinking. For Deleuze and Guattari, either choice would break out of the circle. The two choices however are clearly not identical; it is the choice between choice and non-choice (C2 231/177). The choice to commit suicide by drinking oneself to death is to choose to have no more choices, while the choice to stop drinking allows one to choose again and differently. The choice of more choices— to get drunk by drinking water10—constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call an event (or a line of flight). But when the threshold has been crossed, we can ask “what happened?” The character of the alcoholic does not allude to Proust, but to F. Scott Fitzgerald (although Proust is mentioned in relation to the concept of threshold: the narrator crosses the threshold and chooses to stop having love affairs and to start writing). In Plateau Eight, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that “what happened?” (qu’est-ce qui s’est passé?) is the question that Fitzgerald keeps coming back to, at the end, after having said that “all life of course is a process of breaking down [démolition]” (MP 242/198, see also C2 70/50). With the idea of demolition or destruction or unmaking, we come to the true agent and condition of becoming, which is neither drugs nor alcohol. According to Deleuze and Guattari, in a life, there is a type of cracking that is micrological, like the small, almost imperceptible cracks in a dish (MP 243/198). These cracks in a life are the cracks of aging. Such cracks are not big molar blows like losing all your money in the stock market. The micrological cracks in a life refer us to this sort of experience: you wake up one morning and realize you have gray hair, and now it’s over, you’re old; or you wake up and realize you no longer love the person in bed with you. What has happened is nothing assignable or perceptible; these are molecular changes, “such that when something occurs, the self [moi] that awaited it is already dead, or the one that would await it has not yet arrived” (MP 243/198-199). The micrological cracks of aging, these experiences in which one is finally aware that one has lost something of oneself, are the agent of becoming. But aging also indicates the necessary condition for becoming: the condition in which one’s molar form is destroyed—the condition, in other words, of “desubjectification” (MP 198/159). The condition of the molar form of the subject being destroyed has however a positive side, which we have already encountered—the choice of having more choices.11 But Deleuze and Guattari also call the positive side of desubjectification “rupture,” this being their translation of Fitzgerald’s “clean break” (MP 243/199). The clean break which aging causes—aging being the agent of becoming, while the destruction of the molar form is the necessary condition—does not mean that now one remains forever young. It means that, having shed the form of an adult, one is able to become something other than an adult man. One becomes a child, but becoming-child means that one frees the potentialities that the molar form of adult man was enclosing. Deleuze and Guattari say, with a rupture, I am now no more than a line. I have become capable of loving, not with an abstract, universal love, but a love I shall choose, and that shall choose me, blindly, my double, who has no more self than me [n’a pas plus de moi que moi]. One has been saved by love and for love, by abandoning love and self [.…] One has become like everyone, but in a way in which no one can become like everyone [tout le monde, also translated as “all the world”]. (MP 244/199-200). By means of this quote (whose importance we should not underestimate), we see that becoming involves love; but love in Deleuze and Guattari is no longer a feeling between persons; it is no longer a personal feeling (MP 294/240, also MP 133-134/105-106). Love is now an affect.12 As Deleuze and Guattari say, a feeling (sentiment) is the sense (sens) of a form and its development, the formation of a subject; it is introceptive. In contrast, an affect is informal, setting out ways (rather than the development of a form); an affect is a projectile (instead of a feeling that is introjected), a relation outward to the double (MP 497-498/399-400). But since the double is not an “I” or an ego, since it is not a molar unified self or subject, the double is really a multiplicity. Insofar as the love they are describing is not restricted to a feeling between persons, insofar as the love they are describing is a love of multiplicity, we see as well that becoming in Deleuze and Guattari is hyperbolic; it is the love of the whole world (tout le monde).13 And as love of the whole world (a utopian love), this love frees the potentiality of everyone (tout le monde). So, while aging is the agent that puts in place the condition of the demolished molar form of the subject, the motive or motor of becoming is the affect (as the motor of desubjectification, just as the function is the motor of deterritorialization). The imperceptible events of aging undo the molar form of oneself, which allows one to choose a clean break—to choose to become. And this choice of becoming is a choice to love the whole world; this is a love, as we just saw, that differs from the abstract universal love of persons. This love is no longer a feeling of one molar person or ego for another molar person or ego; it is no longer human love, no longer the love of man. Thus, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, it is a love of the minor. As is well known, all becomings in Deleuze and Guattari are becomings minor, but let us look at their exact definition in A Thousand Plateaus.14 First, they tell us that there is “no becoming-man … because man is majoritarian par excellence.”15 Then they state the positive definition: “all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (MP 356/ 291). A minority, for Deleuze and Guattari is not defined by statistics; it is not “quantitative” (MP 133/105) or a “definable aggregate” (MP 357/ 291). Women are a minority for Deleuze and Guattari, not because there are fewer women than men in a given population, but because “the body is stolen first from the girl … The girl’s becoming is stolen first…. The girl is the first victim” (MP 338-339/276, my emphasis). The positive definition of becoming therefore is not really a minor existence; it is that this minor existence is “oppressed” (MP 302/247), “wronged” (indûment) (MP 197/ 159, also C2 281/215); minor existence is one that is undergoing, as Deleuze and Guattari say in What is Philosophy, “abominable sufferings” (QPh 105/110). Abominable suffering is what defines a minority for Deleuze and Guattari. And the affect felt before this extreme suffering is “the shame of being a man” (QPh 102/107).16 The affect of shame at being a man, at being human all too human, with our oppressions, our clichés, our opinions, and our desires, is really the motive for change.17 II. Negative Definitions, Prepositions, Structure, and the Criterion for Becoming We have just seen one negative definition of becoming; there is no becoming major, no becoming man. But there are several more negative definitions. As we can see with the micrological process of aging, for Deleuze and Guattari, a process of becoming does not terminate in a molar form; in micrological aging, a subject, does not grow up to be an adult, a girl does not grow up to be a woman. So, when speaking of becoming animal, they say, “Becoming can and should be qualified as becoming-animal even in the absence of an endpoint [un terme] that would be the animal which one has become” (MP 291/238). So, the experience of becoming is not an experience directed toward or oriented by a final form. The lack of finalism is why Deleuze and Guattari separate becoming from history (MP 363/296). But they go further. If there is no final form into which one transforms oneself, then becoming is not based in imitation, resemblance, or analogy. The adverb “like” (comme) does not define becoming. In becoming animal, one does not end up looking like a horse or a dog or a rat. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari reject both the faculty of imagination (which is able to provide analogies of proportion) and the faculty of the understanding (l’entendement, Verstand, intellectus) (which is able to provide analogies of proportionality) (MP 286-87/234). Since becoming is not a process of imitating, there is no eminent term by means of which one could measure or judge what is undergoing the becoming. That there is no eminent term or standard explains why Deleuze and Guattari separate becoming from memory, from what they call “gigantic memory”—memory as the faculty that always recalls one major idea such as man (MP 358-359/293). As we shall see, although becoming is not this kind of memory, it maintains a relation to a strange kind of memory. Nevertheless, just as the experience of becoming is not an experience of “gigantic memory,” it is not an experience of recognition. As Deleuze and Guattari say, “The animal, flower, or stone one becomes are … not molar subjects, objects, or forms that one knows from the outside of us [on connaît hors de nous] and that one recognizes [reconnaît] from experience, through science, or by habit” (MP 337/275, my emphasis). Since the experience of becoming is not recognition, becoming is also not a relation of representation. In becoming I do not become the representative of what I am becoming; it is not a relation of one thing (me) standing in for another (the animal, for example). Finally, since the experience of becoming is not a representation, it is also not perception in the standard sense; it is not a relation in which the subject and the object remain outside of one another. Thus in Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is neither a circular process of recommencement nor a process that comes to an end. Moreover, it is not a process governed by an eminent form or endpoint; it is not a relation of recognition in which the subject and the object would be outside of one another, and it is not a representative relation of one thing standing in for another.

#### Finally, Changing social structures and power is counter revolutionary changing one kind of rule for another, instead we need critique that remove meaning from identity destroying the foundation of power today

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

Deleuze and Guattari are thus interested in the politics of the subject at that moment of spontaneous rebellion that is a part of the movement of the subject between inside and outside. Even as we undergo processes of subjectivation, to some degree we evade hegemonic power and knowledge, as we engage in becomings that reverse subjectivation. This is why Deleuze and Guattari frame minoritarian becomings under the heading of becoming-animal: if subjectivity is based on a break from animality, then becoming- animal must derive from a break with subjectivity.65 In psychoanalysis and metaphysics more generally, such a movement toward animality is associated with degradation and abjection (as with homo sacer), but this is not necessarily the case for becoming- animal/becoming-minoritarian. The call to becoming-animal comes from the outside of the generalizing, molar force of law. It is not a naming call to conscience, but instead an affect that calls our humanity into question, propelling us into new configurations and transformations outside of the law, at the threshold, and between the borders, altering what it means to be political, revising what it means to be human.Become-animal constitutes another version of the outlaw that I elsewhere took up as the ‘unbecoming girl’ and werewolf. What is distinctive about becoming animal is that the concept brings a sense of multiplicity to conceptualizations of outlawry, unlike the werewolf and becoming girl, who were discussed in their singularity. For however singular an urge for becoming may be, becoming animal-minoritarian-revolutionary is qualitatively affective: becomings pull beings together, one to the other, without binding them under conditions of sameness. Deleuze and Guattari write: “[T]he affect is not a153personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of the power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. Who has not known the power of these animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant.... A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings” (240). The affect pulls us into a becoming that is a critical de-subjectivation (like the unbecoming girl); it launches into a border position (like the werewolf). But these alterations of the conditions of our subjectivity exceed the transformation of singular beings. We are a gang of girls, a pack of wolves, a swell of revolutionaries. The series of becomings produce a revolutionary humanity, or more precisely a revolutionary post-humanity.Becoming-animal thus brings us to a form of revolutionary philosophy, but not in the precise sense derived from Enlightenment politics, nor from Marxism, as transfers of power from one group to another. As Buchanen explicates, traditional revolutions, those that focus on securing power, are counter-revolutionary: they don’t change the institutions and ideologies in which power is invested; they merely transfer power from one class to another (14). But what would a revolutionary dispersal of power look like? Deleuze and Guattari propose a form of “revolutionary becoming” which Deleuze contends in his interview with Negri is “the only way of casting off ... shame or responding to what is intolerable.” Paul Patton notes that what these authors are after is a “resistance to the present” (178). Becoming-revolutionary transforms our social and collective identities. The impetus for change is derived from the diffusion of molar political forms, through a myriad of minoritarian-becomings (182). If these minoritarian- becomings constitute another version of outlawry, than revolutionary-becoming must as well. But what kind of politics does this portend? If it involves a dispersal, rather than a transfer of power, does becoming-revolutionary undo all molar forms and dismantle all identities, leaving us in a wild realm of outlaw chaos? Is this a return to the state of nature, in its brute Hobbesian form, or Rousseau’s idyllic version? Is becoming-outlaw nothing but an assault against any form of structure or authority? Not necessarily. Outlawry is a critique of molar political forms that allows for some creative processes of re-invention. It is a critique of the present, so to speak, that launches us toward that justice-to-come that Derrida promises. As such, outlawry, as I have conceptualized it, informs (by resisting) the political structures of the present, such as democracy.

## 2AC

### Experimental Framework Long

#### 1.We Meet- We’re germane to the topic. We theorize the rejection of the outlaw which is integral to understand current targeted killing practices. That’s Cole and Chong

#### And, good is good enough. They get their disads that defend TK good, counterplans that compare macro political engagement, and kritiks of our politics. Its sustainable ground.

#### 2. Counter interp – The role of the ballot should be whoever has most ethical relationship to beings. The resolution should be open to the possibility of difference.

#### We impact turn their framework:

#### A. Predictability and limits create static identities and the sameness in our community. This kind of sameness leads to stale debates as we continually learn the same knowledge. Limits are a political barrier used to exclude certain forms of knowledge in debate

Bunch 10

[Mary Bunch, PhD Candidate in Philosophy at The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario, “OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS,” 2010, wyo-sc]

In addition to the constitutive exclusions of western societies, a totalizing impulse infiltrates even the domain of citizenship and inclusion. This calls into question the efficacy of concepts like democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty. The totalizing impulse seems to be inherent to western metaphysics, and is transferred from the philosophical to the political domain. Jean Luc Nancy suggests the west’s totalizing impetus has its roots in Platonic Idealism; it is tightly linked to conceptions of subjectivity, and the need to ground propositions in ‘truth,’ including the self-certainty of an individual ego. The consequences in western democracies are twofold, as David Ingram elaborates. First, models of the political that prioritize public debate among equals are increasingly precluded through a “total infusion of scientific strategies of prediction and control in economy, polity, society, and culture.” Secondly, Ingram continues, “dialogic pluralism” is suppressed “by the totalitarian logic of a political practice aimed at strategically realizing some unquestioned global ideology” (95). Western democracies are thus structured according to a totalizing logic, this time in the form of bureaucracy instead of the tradition and authority emphasized in totalitarian regimes (96). The effects are insidious; what is taken to be the democracy and pluralism that Arendt once celebrated as non-totalitarian are revoked as masking the coercive manipulation of the population by the state; a variation on the infiltration of the interior of the individual by totalitarian political tactics. The implication is that the public consensus that is so fundamental to democracy is false; it has been orchestrated through limiting the real political choices available, controlling and oversimplifying the information on which the public bases its decisions, and reducing elections to the spectacle of personality (96).

#### The impact is our Agamben 1AC evidence. The attempt to regulate the community creates as assimilate or eliminate mentality to produces hatred and violence. The impact is quiet forms of genocide where groups and people are left behind.

#### B. Intolerance DA-Our approach would fundamentally change debate. Our community relates to its outlaws by forcing them to assimilate or be banished. We need strategies to recognize we are ALL outlaws to someone’s interpretation of debate, whether it be critical or policy.

#### The impact is destruction of debate

Secomb 00

(Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney “Fractured Community” Hypatia – Volume 15 Number 2 Spring 2000 pg. 138-139. //RC)

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a "reasonable agreement" can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities [End Page 138] so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are seen as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges. In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet , as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of différance indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976).While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and decision-making because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.

#### C. We’re key to broad education—we will never be policy makers, or affect the institutions, rather we should focus on better ourselves and our ethical relations. It is a better way to activate our power and agency in the community—that’s Bunch

#### leads us to be neocons

Spanos 04

(William V., available online cross-x.com url: <http://www.crossx.com/vb/showthread.php?t=945110&highlight=Spanos+Email> Nov. 18)

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language of "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "deterring democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

## Case

### 2AC Schmitt

####  We Solve the impact through root cause- Dehumanization is the root cause of any oppression. Only be changing how we value static identities. It is because the oppressor finds that identity to be less than they can dominate the group.

#### Internal link turn- Friend enemy distinction creates the inhuman

Noorani 05

(Yaseen, Prof. Of Near Eastern Studies @ Univ. of Tucson, “The Rhetoric of Security” Online, 2005, MB)

The idea here is that no end or objective having to do with the way we think things *ought to be* can justify dying and killing. We are only driven to these in cases of pure necessity, when we merely need to survive. For Schmitt, this non-normative condition of the state of war is the essence of the political, because the possibility of destruction at the hands of an enemy is always present and must therefore govern the nature of social organization and political authority. The problem with liberalism, in Schmitt's view, is that it does not even take this foundational eventuality of politics into account in formulating its principles. Since liberal doctrine holds that individuals and nations may live peacefully by respecting each other's autonomy, liberalism provides no incentive for organizing society so as to confront potential threats to it. Liberal principles endanger the nation by placing all value in individual liberty and rights and none in the requirements of national security. Indeed, liberal individualism has no means of demanding self-sacrifice from citizens for the sake of the nation. But most significantly, liberalism can only call upon individuals to participate in a war that claims to be moral and just, a war on behalf of humanity that supposedly aims at putting an end to war. "When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent" (Schmitt 1996, 54). The introduction of morality into the nonmoral realm of self-preservation makes matters worse, indeed vitiates the state of war entirely by condemning the enemy as an immoral and inhuman agency that must be exterminated. Such moral claims for prosecuting a war are designed to veil ulterior motives, such as greed,[6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v005/5.1noorani.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT6) or indicate internal fissures in the state, the posturing of political parties to gain power through control of the government's authority to wage war. This sort of political contestation within the state is for Schmitt the negative form of politics that must be eliminated by the repudiation of moral normativity in the political.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v005/5.1noorani.html#FOOT7) "The justification of **[End Page 19]** war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy" (49). Sheer existence is the only standard allowed, and protecting the existence of the nation/state is the only orientation politics can have. This ensures for Schmitt that only necessary wars will be fought and that wars will indeed be fought when necessary.

#### The logic of security makes violence inevitable, and is the root cause of destructive features of contemporary modernity

Burke 7

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war **is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that it is **rather** the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge **about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. **Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states** and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that **the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing**, argues Heidegger, **'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing.**..the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that **the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the** most destructive features of contemporary modernity **-- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and **political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe,** policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, **'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. **Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing'** and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how **the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making**; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, **even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.**88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. **When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined** (sometimes quite wilfully) **within the overarching strategic and security paradigms.** Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being **a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political.** But this **cannot be done without seizing alternatives** from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? **Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable**?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Survival politics destroys the value to life and results in genocidal extermination

Dillon, 2008

(Michael, “Revisiting Franco’s Death” Foucault on Politics, Security and War. Pg 176-178, mb)

If Foucault is right, that **liberal peace is the extension of war by other means**, then t**hose other means come in the form of** the prevalence of **security discourses**. **Peace becomes the extension of war through the discourse of security.** [Foucault cryptically notes how liberal biopolitics is a dispositif de securite (Foucault, 2007: p. 91). **Its very arts of governance revolve around the securing of life as species existence**.] Here is how and why. **Whatever endangers the promotion of species life endangers liberal biopolitics. The peace for which liberal biopolitics strives is that of the uninterrupted promotion of species existence. Such a peace is endangered when it is challenged by other accounts of existence and by the sheer intractability of species existence itself. Liberal biopolitics makes war on that which endangers species existence through the discursive practices which seeks to secure the promotion of species existence. Peace and war find their biopolitical articulation in the biopolitical discourses of security** (Dillon and Reid, 2008). In sum, **making life live ostensibly rejects war as a virtue and proclaims peace.** The vocation of war is to kill. The vocation of biopolitics is 'to make live'. But **biopolitics cannot make live unless it preserves life from that which threatens it. To do that biopolitics must also seek a command of a refigured death, specifically that of biopoliticised economy of who shall live and who shall die**. Although he acknowledges it, Foucault does not reflect on this necropolitics beyond the observations he made about the state racism of Nazi Germany and the incipient racism of state socialism. My additional argument is that it is their **apparatuses of security** which, therefore**, do the biopolitical work of inscribing the logos of peace with the logos of war**. **Liberal peace is a necropolitics of security which makes permanent war against life on behalf of life. Making life live is therefore a lethal business because the promotion of species existence appears to be threatened on all sides, not only by alternative accounts of existence, but also by the danger which species existence always seems to pose to itself not least in often being resistant to the biopolitical injunction to make life live. For not all life can live if life itself is to be promoted. Some life is inimical to life and has to be exterminated if it cannot be corrected and reformed. Life is like that. To be precise species life is like that and so we have to clarify this basic classification of what it is to be a living being because it is foundational to biopolitics** and how, as such, it has need of the sub-division of species life into more or less functionally utile categories of human life to which the term race applies. Foucault pursues the point through two well formed questions: 'Given this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? **How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower**?' (Foucault, 2003b: P. 254). **The answer is** prefigured in how he habitually talks about power and politics in terms of **political rationalities and governmental technologies. If governmental technologies regulate, political rationalities ontologise**. They express an understanding of the real. In Foucault ontologies matter but he does not presume that material practices proceed from ontological principles. The world is too messy for that. **There is continual interplay between ontologising and technologising**. An understanding of the real lurks in every technology. Every ontology desires to be operationalised in an appropriate technology.6 **Biopolitics performs the ontologising and technologising thorough the simultaneous refiguration of both life and death**. That is to say through the biopolitical enunciation of the real as species existence (political rationality), and its micro-political practices (governmental technologies). **It is at this point**, Foucault says, that **'racism intervenes' (**2003b: p. 254). **It breaks up the biological continuum, sub-divides the species, according to which forms of life are more fit, more eligible or more disposed to life and which are not; and which are indeed inimical to life and in need of extermination.** Here Foucault says, in addition, that racism enacts the relation of war which templates the modern account of the political: `this relation ("If you want to live you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war' (2003b: p. 255). Enacting the relation of war, the martial imprinting of modern politics in biological terms, **biopolitics differentiates life into categories of living things more and less eligible to live by virtue of the ways in which they live, accounting whether or not that living promotes, diminishes or profoundly threatens species life itself: The fact that the other dies does mean simply that I live** in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; **the death of the other**, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) **is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.** (2003b: p. 255) **Biopolitics thus enacts a necropolitical audit of living things** in which race functions as a sorting device. Racism is the 'Appel' **which classifies those marked out for biopolitical discrimination, selection, correction and, if necessary, elimination. This necropoliticised peace machine - which runs the gamut from peace-keeping and peace-making to 'operations other than war' and imperial conquest - is the liberal way of war** (Dillon and Reid, 2008).

### A2 Ojakangas

#### This is just false: Extend the cole and chong evidence, even if the state is looking for the betterment of the people all of this is done through survival politics. These survival politics are used to justify the extermination of individuals who threaten the biopoltical order. This is seen through the targeted killings of terrorists, or indefinite detentions the other. These are not large wars, but silent genocides of cultures and populations.

### Link- Disease

#### The demarcation of disease and health discourse makes possible the foundation of exclusion from the nation state

Wiebe, 2009

(Sarah, “Producing Bodies and Borders: An Review of Immigrant Medical Examinations in Canada. Surveillance & Society 6(2): 128-141. http://www.surveillance-and-society.org | ISSN: 1477-7487, Online, MB)

Immigration and citizenship technologies in Canada separate qualified and worthy citizens from unqualified, unworthy lives. Not only does the state divide its population into citizens and foreign nationals, but the state also divides people into dichotomous categories of the healthy and the sick. As Susan Sontag states in Illness as Metaphor: ‘illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick’ (Sontag 1997: 47-48). Sontag discusses how the metaphor of illness operates to formulate a certain (mis)perception about people. She evaluates two diseases in particular, tuberculosis (TB) and cancer and the stigmas that are associated with these illnesses. Her research illuminates the myth about these diseases and how this myth places the onus of responsibility for one’s health on the individual rather than society or the state (Sontag 1997). Illness is depicted as a negation of self-responsibility and a negative consequence resulting from reckless self-conduct. These expectations for citizens to be responsible for their health appear in contemporary public health policy, discourse and practice. Consequently, these health-related expectations, both repressive and productive, motivate justifications for exclusion or inclusion into the Canadian state. Public health policies as well as citizenship and immigration law, policy and practice have historically and continue today to operate as spatial forms of exclusion, integral to forming the Canadian nation. Since the end of the 19th Century in Canada,

 (Mawani 2003: 4). In a quest to evaluate the meaning a healthy citizenry, I discuss medical diagnostics at the border. While contemporary health screening of migrants reflects historical exclusionary practices, current policy and discursive directions focus on how to use these exclusionary technologies for inclusive and productive population-health based strategies. The final section of this article evaluates this re- conceptualization of inclusive and productive population management at the border.

### 2AC Generic Impact

#### Security is a psychological construct—the negative’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

Mack 91

 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-**by distortions of perception**, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

### CP 2AC

#### 1.No Link- We don’t claim to make any of the changing of the laws on the books, nor do we in this space.

#### 2. We solve your impact- changing our relationship and treating “extremists” ethically would fundamentally change how they act towards us, solving your impact. That’s Bunch.

#### 3.Long term predictions fail and have disastrous consequences

Quirk 11

([THE TROUBLE WITH EXPERTS](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699), Paul J. Quirk, [Critical Review,](http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rcri20/22/4)Vol. 22, Iss. 4, 2011)

 In his remarkable book Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock ([2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699#CIT0028)) presents findings that might seem to account for some of the dire events of the succeeding years. Putting hundreds of experts through rigorous tests of their ability to predict economic and political trends, he found their predictions, on the whole, wanting. Experts performed only marginally better than they would have done by randomly guessing among the alternative predictions that the tests permitted. Experts actually performed worse, on average, than a standardized statistical model that Tetlock designed to extrapolate from long-term patterns and current trends in any context. In addition to their lack of accuracy, Tetlock shows that the experts consistently overestimated their ability to make these predictions accurately, and that they failed to learn from their mistakes-refusing to admit that their methods or assumptions might need revising. Although no category of experts performed substantially better than others, the ones that Tetlock calls “hedgehogs”-those who claimed to rely on a central idea or explanatory notion-did somewhat worse than his “foxes”-those who used a complex and flexible intellectual approach. In fact, apparently underlining Tetlock's concerns, disastrous failures of expert advice, real or alleged, have been a theme of the past decade. In the run-up to the Iraq War, intelligence officials drastically exaggerated the clarity of the evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (Commission on Intelligence Capabilities [2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699#CIT0006); Jervis[2010](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699#CIT0017)). On many accounts, the financial crisis and economic recession of 2008-2010 were partly the result of economic advice in the 1990s that promoted sweeping deregulation of financial services and endorsed a wide range of high-risk investment innovations contrived by financial managers.[1](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699#NOTE0001) In the aftermath of the economic calamity, economists trumpeting a sharp reversal in approach helped design some of the most expansive measures for governmental direction of economic activity in American history-with results that remain to be seen.[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08913811.2010.541699#NOTE0002) One might conclude that the so-called experts have no real insight, and yet that policymakers act on their advice, with the public suffering the consequences. The problem with experts, in this view, is, as Tetlock suggests, a severe shortage of discipline, accountability, and ultimately competence.

#### 4.Drones cause blowback- casualties causes civilians to pair up with terrorist organizations

Khan 11

(Akbar Nasir, Senior Training Consultant at Strengthening Rule of Law in Malakand Project (SRLMP), KP-UNDP Pakistan Senior Consultant Citizens' Voice & Accountability at The Asia Foundation Pakistan, IPRI Journal, “U.S. Policy of Targeted Killing by Drones in Pakistan,” Winter 2011, <http://www.academia.edu/225132/U.S._Policy_of_Targeted_Killing_by_Drones_in_Pakistan>) /wyo-mm

Many experts stress that drone attacks are counterproductive in counter-insurgency campaign 56 . Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University professor, widely regarded as the dean of terrorism studies, says, "We are deluding ourselves if we think the drone program is going to be the answer” 57 . He points out that in 2006, following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi's death by the US airstrikes, violence in Iraq accelerated 58 . The same trend was followed by the death of Nek Muhammad and recently Baitullah Mehsud in Pakistan . Major General Flynn of the US Army opines that “… inescapable truth asserts thatmerely killing insurgents usually serves to multiply enemies rather than subtract them 59 . This counter-intuitive dynamic is common in many guerrilla conflicts and is especially relevant in the revenge-prone Pushtun communities whose cooperation military forces seek to earn and maintain. The Soviets experienced this reality in the 1980s, when despite killing hundreds of thousands of Afghans, they faced a larger insurgency near the end of the war than they did at the beginning” 60 . The present targets of drones are also Pushtuns of Pakistan and the above analysis of Soviet Union army is relevant because Pushtuns have a culture of revenge. The death of innocent people gives the victim family strong reason to join the Taliban rather than working against them. The claims of effectiveness cannot be sustained when compared with collateral damage and killing of innocent civilians including women, children and elderly people in the civilian population. This is the same logic which suicide terrorists use to justify the loss of any number of civilians if their targets happen to be present among them.

61

#### 5.[Optional]Blowback theory true- casualties motivate surrounding civilians to take up arms

Masood 13

(Hassan, Monmouth College, “Death from the Heavens: The Politics of the United States’ Drone Campaign in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” 2013) /wyo-mm

In terms of their current usage, drone strikes that cause civilian deaths as a result of targeting ‘suspected’ terrorists are the most counterproductive to the U.S.’s strategic goals in the region. The next most destructive aspect of this policy is the Obama administration’s previously stated initial directive to not even acknowledge the existence of the program, enraging Pakistanis to a further degree and lending more legitimacy to militancy. The third aspect of this program and how it has been administrated is the ‘accidental guerilla’ phenomenon. This phenomenon is directly related to the tribal custom of Pashtunwali, which translates to “revenge for the death of a close relative or fellow tribesman.” When the Obama administration carries out drone strikes that kill civilians and later maintains that those civilians were in fact militants, this disingenuous method actually produces more militants. How does this happen? By motivating regular civilians living in that area to take up arms against the United States in revenge for those killed. An emphasis must then be placed on publicly acknowledging the drone strikes in order to keep Pakistani public opinion from boiling over. Keeping negative Pakistani public opinion relatively low will also mitigate the complex relationship between the U.S. and Pakistani governments, and help to smooth over the United States’ military’s withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan. The program should finally re-focus the strikes themselves on High-Value Targets (HVTs) so that the attacks can be justified. Striking surgically and minimizing collateral damage will also lend some legitimacy to these strikes in the eyes of the Pakistani people.

#### 6.These survival politics results in genocidal management of the other

Dillon, 2008

(Michael, “Revisiting Franco’s Death” Foucault on Politics, Security and War. Pg 176-178, mb)

If Foucault is right, that **liberal peace is the extension of war by other means**, then t**hose other means come in the form of** the prevalence of **security discourses**. **Peace becomes the extension of war through the discourse of security.** [Foucault cryptically notes how liberal biopolitics is a dispositif de securite (Foucault, 2007: p. 91). **Its very arts of governance revolve around the securing of life as species existence**.] Here is how and why. **Whatever endangers the promotion of species life endangers liberal biopolitics. The peace for which liberal biopolitics strives is that of the uninterrupted promotion of species existence. Such a peace is endangered when it is challenged by other accounts of existence and by the sheer intractability of species existence itself. Liberal biopolitics makes war on that which endangers species existence through the discursive practices which seeks to secure the promotion of species existence. Peace and war find their biopolitical articulation in the biopolitical discourses of security** (Dillon and Reid, 2008). In sum, **making life live ostensibly rejects war as a virtue and proclaims peace.** The vocation of war is to kill. The vocation of biopolitics is 'to make live'. But **biopolitics cannot make live unless it preserves life from that which threatens it. To do that biopolitics must also seek a command of a refigured death, specifically that of biopoliticised economy of who shall live and who shall die**. Although he acknowledges it, Foucault does not reflect on this necropolitics beyond the observations he made about the state racism of Nazi Germany and the incipient racism of state socialism. My additional argument is that it is their **apparatuses of security** which, therefore**, do the biopolitical work of inscribing the logos of peace with the logos of war**. **Liberal peace is a necropolitics of security which makes permanent war against life on behalf of life. Making life live is therefore a lethal business because the promotion of species existence appears to be threatened on all sides, not only by alternative accounts of existence, but also by the danger which species existence always seems to pose to itself not least in often being resistant to the biopolitical injunction to make life live. For not all life can live if life itself is to be promoted. Some life is inimical to life and has to be exterminated if it cannot be corrected and reformed. Life is like that. To be precise species life is like that and so we have to clarify this basic classification of what it is to be a living being because it is foundational to biopolitics** and how, as such, it has need of the sub-division of species life into more or less functionally utile categories of human life to which the term race applies. Foucault pursues the point through two well formed questions: 'Given this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? **How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower**?' (Foucault, 2003b: P. 254). **The answer is** prefigured in how he habitually talks about power and politics in terms of **political rationalities and governmental technologies. If governmental technologies regulate, political rationalities ontologise**. They express an understanding of the real. In Foucault ontologies matter but he does not presume that material practices proceed from ontological principles. The world is too messy for that. **There is continual interplay between ontologising and technologising**. An understanding of the real lurks in every technology. Every ontology desires to be operationalised in an appropriate technology.6 **Biopolitics performs the ontologising and technologising thorough the simultaneous refiguration of both life and death**. That is to say through the biopolitical enunciation of the real as species existence (political rationality), and its micro-political practices (governmental technologies). **It is at this point**, Foucault says, that **'racism intervenes' (**2003b: p. 254). **It breaks up the biological continuum, sub-divides the species, according to which forms of life are more fit, more eligible or more disposed to life and which are not; and which are indeed inimical to life and in need of extermination.** Here Foucault says, in addition, that racism enacts the relation of war which templates the modern account of the political: `this relation ("If you want to live you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war' (2003b: p. 255). Enacting the relation of war, the martial imprinting of modern politics in biological terms, **biopolitics differentiates life into categories of living things more and less eligible to live by virtue of the ways in which they live, accounting whether or not that living promotes, diminishes or profoundly threatens species life itself: The fact that the other dies does mean simply that I live** in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; **the death of the other**, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) **is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.** (2003b: p. 255) **Biopolitics thus enacts a necropolitical audit of living things** in which race functions as a sorting device. Racism is the 'Appel' **which classifies those marked out for biopolitical discrimination, selection, correction and, if necessary, elimination. This necropoliticised peace machine - which runs the gamut from peace-keeping and peace-making to 'operations other than war' and imperial conquest - is the liberal way of war** (Dillon and Reid, 2008).

### 2AC Marx Long

#### 1st- Permutation: Do the aff and conceive of the proletariat politics as an outlaw- Becoming allows for the forfeiting of privilege and building collations towards unethical responces in the world.

#### 2nd- Case is a DA- Marxism can’t theorize about how to stop targeted killing or detention policies which use static identities to inflict bare life, make war inevitable and death. Only the aff can through destruction of static identity.

#### 3rd- We Solve the impact through root cause- Dehumanization is the root cause of any oppression. Only be changing how we value static identities. It is because the oppressor finds that identity to be less than they can dominate the group.

#### 4th- No link- We don’t destroy the building of the Marxism movement from building and attacking capitalism.

#### 5th- Terminal Defense- Without the ability to change how we feel about the static identities then there will always be people oppressed because they would still have a law state or groups that would focus on static identities which is the root cause of oppression.

#### Changing social structures and power is counter revolutionary changing one kind of rule for another, instead we need critique that remove meaning from identity destroying the foundation of power today

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

Deleuze and Guattari are thus interested in the politics of the subject at that moment of spontaneous rebellion that is a part of the movement of the subject between inside and outside. Even as we undergo processes of subjectivation, to some degree we evade hegemonic power and knowledge, as we engage in becomings that reverse subjectivation. This is why Deleuze and Guattari frame minoritarian becomings under the heading of becoming-animal: if subjectivity is based on a break from animality, then becoming- animal must derive from a break with subjectivity.65 In psychoanalysis and metaphysics more generally, such a movement toward animality is associated with degradation and abjection (as with homo sacer), but this is not necessarily the case for becoming- animal/becoming-minoritarian. The call to becoming-animal comes from the outside of the generalizing, molar force of law. It is not a naming call to conscience, but instead an affect that calls our humanity into question, propelling us into new configurations and transformations outside of the law, at the threshold, and between the borders, altering what it means to be political, revising what it means to be human.Become-animal constitutes another version of the outlaw that I elsewhere took up as the ‘unbecoming girl’ and werewolf. What is distinctive about becoming animal is that the concept brings a sense of multiplicity to conceptualizations of outlawry, unlike the werewolf and becoming girl, who were discussed in their singularity. For however singular an urge for becoming may be, becoming animal-minoritarian-revolutionary is qualitatively affective: becomings pull beings together, one to the other, without binding them under conditions of sameness. Deleuze and Guattari write: “[T]he affect is not a153personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of the power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. Who has not known the power of these animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant.... A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings” (240). The affect pulls us into a becoming that is a critical de-subjectivation (like the unbecoming girl); it launches into a border position (like the werewolf). But these alterations of the conditions of our subjectivity exceed the transformation of singular beings. We are a gang of girls, a pack of wolves, a swell of revolutionaries. The series of becomings produce a revolutionary humanity, or more precisely a revolutionary post-humanity.Becoming-animal thus brings us to a form of revolutionary philosophy, but not in the precise sense derived from Enlightenment politics, nor from Marxism, as transfers of power from one group to another. As Buchanen explicates, traditional revolutions, those that focus on securing power, are counter-revolutionary: they don’t change the institutions and ideologies in which power is invested; they merely transfer power from one class to another (14). But what would a revolutionary dispersal of power look like? Deleuze and Guattari propose a form of “revolutionary becoming” which Deleuze contends in his interview with Negri is “the only way of casting off ... shame or responding to what is intolerable.” Paul Patton notes that what these authors are after is a “resistance to the present” (178). Becoming-revolutionary transforms our social and collective identities. The impetus for change is derived from the diffusion of molar political forms, through a myriad of minoritarian-becomings (182). If these minoritarian- becomings constitute another version of outlawry, than revolutionary-becoming must as well. But what kind of politics does this portend? If it involves a dispersal, rather than a transfer of power, does becoming-revolutionary undo all molar forms and dismantle all identities, leaving us in a wild realm of outlaw chaos? Is this a return to the state of nature, in its brute Hobbesian form, or Rousseau’s idyllic version? Is becoming-outlaw nothing but an assault against any form of structure or authority? Not necessarily. Outlawry is a critique of molar political forms that allows for some creative processes of re-invention. It is a critique of the present, so to speak, that launches us toward that justice-to-come that Derrida promises. As such, outlawry, as I have conceptualized it, informs (by resisting) the political structures of the present, such as democracy.

#### Marxism fails: they’ll just put the bourgeoisie up against the wall.

Agamben, 98

(Giorgio, philosopher and bad ass, “Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.” 1998, Stanford University Press, MB)

Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty ("Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception") became a commonplace even before there was any understanding that what was at issue in it was nothing less than the limit concept of the doctrine of law and the State, in which sovereignty borders (since every limit concept is always the limit between two concepts) on the sphere of life and becomes indistinguishable from it. As long as the form of the State constituted the fundamental horizon of all communal life and the political, religious, juridical, and economic doctrines that sustained this form were still strong, this "most extreme sphere" could not truly come to light. The problem of sovereignty was reduced to the question of who within the political order was invested with certain powers, and the very threshold of the political order itself was never called into question. Today, now that the great State structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the time is ripe to place the problem of the originary structure and limits of the form of the State in a new perspective. The weakness of anarchist and Marxian critiques of the State was precisely to have not caught sight of this structure and thus to have quickly left the *arcanum imperii*'aside, as if it had no substance outside of the simulacra and. the ideologies invoked to justify it. But one ends up identifying with an enemy whose structure one does not understand, and the theory of the State (and in particular of the state of exception, which is to say, of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the transitional phase leading to the stateless society) is the reef on which the revolutions of our century have been shipwrecked.This book, which was originally conceived as a response to the bloody mystification of a new planetary order, therefore had to reckon with problems—first of all that of the sacredness of life— which the author had not, in the beginning, foreseen. In the course of the undertaking, however, it became clear that one cannot, in such an area, accept as a guarantee any of the notions that the social sciences (from jurisprudence to anthropology) thought they had defined or presupposed as evident, and that many of these notions demanded—in the urgency of catastrophe—to be revised without reserve.

#### Becoming is a three part liberation from humanism and capitalism, by changing the representation, reconfiguring desire, and breaks from capitalisms instrumentilization of life. Through becoming animal can the capitalist system be abandoned and true revolution be achieved.

Goodchild 10

[Philip Goodchild, Professor of Religion and Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK

Volume 39, Number 1, 2010 (Issue 121), “Philosophy as a Way of Life Deleuze on Thinking and Money”, Project Muse, \\wyo-bb]

In what sense, then, can one suppose that Deleuze understood philosophy as a way of life? Deleuze has a formula for the immanentist reversal: "Life will no longer be made to appear before the categories of thought; thought will be thrown into the categories of life" (1989: 189). In reading Spinoza, what mattered for Deleuze was not the first principle, but the plane of immanence, the single nature shared by all the modes, so that to think is "to install oneself on this plane – which implies a mode of living, a way of life" (1988: 122). Deleuze shared Foucault's concern for "an art of living" (1995: 11). This is perhaps why Foucault described the [End Page 24] Anti-Oedipus as "a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time."3 Immanence means ethos, a life. Deleuze's distinction between morality and ethics is, of course, crucial here (1988, 17-29). Instead of subjecting the body to conscious ideas represented in the mind, the life of the body and the mind escapes representation. Ethics is a matter of experimentation rather than representation in an attempt to discover what the mind and the body can do. Once one has put aside the moral image of thought, such experimentation becomes an art of living. Deleuze described the most important point of Nietzsche's philosophy as its radical transformation of the image of thought: Nietzsche snatches thought from the element of truth and falsity. He turns it into an interpretation and an evaluation, interpretation of forces, evaluation of power. – It is a thought-movement … in the sense that thought itself must produce movements. (1983: xiii). Thinking itself is an intervention: what demands attention is "that difference that thinking makes to thought" (1994: 265). Thinking itself is ethical. The mind is already involved in ethical evaluations – evaluation is the element in which it moves. Deleuze's immanent understanding of evaluation is that they are "not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate. This is why we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or style of life" (1983: 1). This suggests that philosophy is less the art of judging, or of disciplining the body to conform to the mind, but a formation of a "way of being or style of life". The mode of existence is the phenomenon that replaces the function of the idea. Yet philosophy remains a cultivation of ideas. It is not simply a matter of habit, lifestyle or character. Indeed, such ideas are, for Deleuze, objectivities. There is a second reversal that constitutes in some ways a return of metaphysics. The mode of existence belongs to an element, a time and a place: it is territorial, and inseparable from movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The philosopher, far from finding ideas deep within, has to enter the place where thoughts are found: We only find truths where they are, at their time and in their element. Every truth is a truth of an element, of a time and a place: the minotaur does not leave the labyrinth. … We are not going to think unless we are forced to go where the forces which give food for thought are, where the forces that make thought something active and affirmative are made use of. Thought does not need a method but a paideia, a formation, a culture. … It is up to us to go to extreme places, to extreme times, where the highest and deepest truths live and rise up. (1983: 110) [End Page 25] Hence philosophy is a way of life, but a dangerous one. "We need both to cross the line, and make it endurable, workable, thinkable. To find in it, as far as possible, and as long as possible, an art of living" (1995: 111). Hence thinking implies a sort of "groping experimentation," resorting to measures that are not very reasonable: "To think is always to follow the witch's flight" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 41). It is here, where thought is at its most amoral, that we meet Deleuze's recurrent fascination with the occult as means of experimentation with what thought can do (see Kerslake, 2007, and Delpech-Ramey, forthcoming). In Deleuze's thought, then, there is a culture, formation and ethic that can be divided into two stages: in the first place, it is a matter of liberating thought from morality, representation and judgement. It is a question of transforming the image of thought, removing the identity of any origin, concept or ground for thinking, so that the difference that thinking makes in thought is affirmed. Difference is indistinguishable from a certain depth of thought, an emergence from what is unthought. Moreover, all negation in thought takes the process back to front, as though consciousness were able to determine thought, rather than vice-versa. Under the moral image of thought, all evaluations are inverted and appear upside-down. The consequent response is a complete affirmation of thinking as such, in all its multiplicity and plurality. Nevertheless, this first stage is merely a preparation for "the most important task, that of determining problems and realizing in them our power of creation and decision" (1994: 267). Affirmation, or attention to thinking is displaced in favor of attention to thought itself. Ideas emerge that are independent of the conditions of the thinker, and that express an irrationality, groundlessness, "stupidity" or "animality" particular to thought itself: thought thinks only when it is constrained or forced to do so (1994: 275). Far from thought being indifferent in such affirmation, thought is difference in itself, a difference in depth, in intensity, in relation to the thinker and the thinking. It is only an illusion of representation that groundlessness lacks differences, "when in fact it swarms with them. What, after all, are Ideas, with their constitutive multiplicity, if not these ants which enter and leave through the fracture in the I?" (1994: 277). It is at this level that there is no longer any difference between the concept and life: thoughts enter with a sudden "flash," an illumination (1988: 129). Thought itself is decision and evaluation, and it decides and affirms itself: "There are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 174). In essence, such an ethic outlines the pedagogy of the philosopher in preparation for the properly philosophical work of the creation of concepts. It is the spiritual exercise that renders one capable of giving life to the idea. What is notable is that such a spiritual exercise takes place outside of [End Page 26] morality: what matters ultimately is not the character of the philosopher formed by a culture and pedagogy, but the character of the created idea. Moreover, if it is a question of living in this way, then ideas, concerning multiplicities, conduct the creative work of composition: thought is a matter of sociabilities and communities (Deleuze, 1988: 126). In place of an "ethics", therefore, thought has more to do with art and politics. Why is it that Deleuze, in a discussion of transcendental illusions particular to thought, will suddenly switch to the political issue of revolution? History progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding problems and affirming differences. That is why real revolutions have the atmosphere of fetes. Contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat … (1994: 267) While Deleuze's philosophy does not recommend a particular political programme, it is concerned with revolution as the liberation of life, wherever it may be found. In essence, Deleuze's philosophy is at once a spiritual and political exercise, an exercise in the emancipation of life: it is a spiritual politics. Thinking is itself a political intervention. The forces that shape sociabilities and communities are themselves released in the creation of ideas. In the first place, the thinker must be installed amidst these forces on a plane of immanence, the single nature shared by all the modes. It is a question of orienting oneself in relation to what is at once a presupposition about the nature of thought and a material of being (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 38). This orientation is achieved through a kind of askesis , a stripping away of all that is "too-much-to-be-perceived": "complaint and grievance, unsatisfied desire, defense or pleading, everything that roots each of us … in ourselves" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 279). One has to be most perilously exposed to naked social forces in order to perceive them in their pure state. One has to journey to the extreme place, if only in order to be like everything else, so as to make the constitution of everything visible. Politics requires a change in perception (ibid., 282). Only subsequently do the ideas spring up, as moments of creation or decision. Nevertheless, what is illuminated in the lightning flash of the idea is merely the world once more. Yet the world seen afresh is the world transformed. Deleuze quotes Henry Miller: You see, to me it seems as though the artists, the scientists, the philosophers were grinding lenses. It's all a grand preparation for something that never comes off. Someday the lens is going to be perfect and then we're all going to see clearly, see what a staggering, wonderful, beautiful world it is … (Deleuze 1988: 14) [End Page 27] Deleuze and Guattari's Political Thought What, according to Tarde, is a flow? It is belief or desire (the two aspects of every assemblage); a flow is always of belief and of desire. Beliefs and desires are the basis of every society, because they are flows and as such are "quantifiable." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 219). This approach to philosophy can be clarified by observing how Deleuze and Guattari construct their political thought. For them, the problem is less one of constituting a subject, in control of or opposition to a state, but rather one of the absolute deterritorialization of desire. They address Capital in the ontological dimension appropriate to it. It is rare for commentators to realize the implications of this change. Those who interpret the liberation of desire in terms of Spinoza's and Nietzsche's battles against the residually theological form of the State are still perpetuating the humanistic, bourgeois revolution: they rarely appreciate the extent to which the unlimited productivity and desire they seek is made possible by the capitalist mode of production. When have God, the State, or Capital ever repressed a desire? Are these not great objects and catalysts of desire? For a truly positive and affirmative ontology, even the negative and the transcendent are immanent productions of desire.4 Deleuze and Guattari's thought effects a triple liberation from humanism. In the first place, political assemblages are no longer associations of humans for the mastery of nature; they are heterogeneous multiplicities, composed of material, semiotic, territorial and incorporeal components. Their functioning and interaction is not determined by conscious design and rational planning, according to a technological model, but is shaped by transversal communication between the living and nonliving. There is no longer any distinction between nature and artifice; mastery over nature is replaced by intervention within an immanent process. As a result, political thought becomes an "ontological pragmatics" concerned with generating events. It cannot be undertaken without a map of the capitalist machine, a diagram of its components and their operation, and measurements of its fields of force or potential, including its capacity to integrate or generate new components. One has to know how it works, where its strengths and weak points are, what kinds of power are brought to bear in particular cases, and what powers complement and evoke each other. It is a matter of political ecology, or "ecosophy." In the second place, thought is liberated from the model of representation or reflective knowledge to become a practice of immanent critique. The aim is no longer to master or control a physical or social field, but to experiment, to intervene. It is to play capitalism at its own game, but to learn to play it better. It is to modify fields of potential, to generate new [End Page 28] beliefs and desires. Whenever one encounters a stratified institution, value, or concept, it is a question of cracking open its unity and identity in favor of locating it in its field of immanence: under what conditions is it produced, and by what machine? And in every case it is a question of determining which minimal modifications can exert the maximum of leverage. It is a matter of political economy. In practice, analyses of political ecology and political economy lead one to Deleuze and Guattari's third and most significant liberation from humanism: their theory of capital.It is capital that exerts a determining role over political ecology; it is capital that exerts a maximal leverage through a non-expenditure of effort; it is capital that is neutral in the social field and becomes invulnerable through its very impotence. For in the Anti-Oedipus , capital is announced as a new social machine based on a new mode of representation: the schiz-flow. It is difficult to appreciate the radical significance of this transition: we are no longer concerned with assemblages of power, as encountered under imperial representation, but assemblages of desire (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 531 n39). All the discourses on imperial representation, and resistance to it, from theology to politics, become relativized: the construction of society no longer passes through such social representation. Of course, capitalism cannot function without the State, it intensifies and proliferates the regulatory function of the State (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 252); but this is precisely the point--faster than the State can wither away under communism, it is reborn under capitalism. Capitalism is the immanent social field of potential in which states spring up like weeds--nation-states, corporate empires, disciplinary micro-regimes, new religious movements--in each case, these are not founded by power, which is merely the competition between states, but by desire. Capital generates the State, generates power, just as it generates the proletariat, the multitude or productivity; but it does so through its own impotence, through its own vulnerability. Power politics is replaced by a politics of desire. In capitalism, the imperial subjects of the signifying regime and the sovereign subjects of the post signifying regime are both reproduced and undermined by the schizophrenic subject. Capitalism, as a new social machine and new mode of representation, produces a post-humanist subjectivity. Just as the syntheses of desire in the Anti-Oedipus produce both immanent and transcendent syntheses, effects of schizophrenia and paranoia, so the schiz-flow of capital is self-differentiating or dual. On the one hand, money is a determinate quantity, entered on bank statements and balance sheets, circulating in finite units; on the other hand, capital is a rate of profit or credit, a differential rate, value in motion, independent of the material form of value that it assumes (ibid., 227-29). Ontological [End Page 29] commitments may arise from perceiving only part of this story: on the one hand, the world can be measured and counted in terms of finite sets of determinate values;5 on the other hand, the world can be entered as an ever-changing flux of continuous modulation.6 In their mature work, Deleuze and Guattari opt for both. Exchange money and credit money, segmented line and quantum flow: this unique self-differentiation and re-conjugation is the schiz-flow that structures the capitalist social field, generating all the dualisms of Capitalism and Schizophrenia --representation or production, molar or molecular, striated or smooth, State or war-machine, neurosis or psychosis, extensive or intensive multiplicities, being or becoming, organization or consistency, transcendence or immanence--in each case, we are informed that it is not an exclusive disjunction or a value judgement, but that one term is continually passing into the other.7 Schiz and flow. To desire is to cut off a flow. In each case, it is useless to try to mobilize one term of a dualism independent of the other.8 The volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia , themselves rhizomatic schiz-flows, map the world according to capitalist (or schizoanalytic) representation, measuring intensive quantities, making writing itself an intensive quantity, which, like capital, always measures the quantity of something else (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 4).We are in a different regime of writing here. Now, under normal conditions of capitalist representation, all knowledge is segmented: science and management are purely a matter of bookkeeping, as though the world were under the sovereign control of the rational subject. All movement, all creation, happens elsewhere. A discourse on arts and cultures can concern itself with representing flows, but it does not make thought itself into a flow. On the whole, universities are delirious, irrational and unlimited processes of bookkeeping. They are portions of rationality cut out of the irrational.9 Every step of the construction of knowledge may be rational; but the whole enterprise is entirely delirious, governed by desires, fashions and flows. The extraordinary theoretical breakthrough achieved by Deleuze and Guattari is in seizing the capitalist mode of representation to construct a new alliance of science and philosophy, of bookkeeping and financing, so as to place thought within the field of immanence of desire. "Flows, who doesn't desire flows, and relationships between flows, and breaks in flows?"--all of which Deleuze and Guattari were able to mobilize and break under these hitherto unknown conditions of theory.10 The gamble involved here is that it will be possible to accelerate the production of flows, to intensify desire, to outplay capitalism at its own game. But which is more deterritorialized, the book or the credit card? Which is most easily convertible for segmented portions of satisfaction? Which gives a more credible promise of one's heart's desire? "How could philosophy, an old [End Page 30] person, compete against young executives in a race for the universals of communication for determining the marketable form of the concept?" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 10-11). For those who seek a new social machine, a new configuration of desire, what is required is a new mode of representation. This is a lot to ask, given that the capitalist mode of representation is barely understood. Moreover, it is not a matter of creating something new, something elsewhere, which lacks conditions of emergence and consistency. Instead, revolution can only be accomplished by a mutation of the schiz-flow itself that constitutes the very texture of society: in practice, by a modification of the structure of money. This is the meaning of the politics of desire: to modify desire and the structure of its investments at the very site where it invests the social field as a whole. This is the task of a spiritual politics. There is but a single urgent ontological problem: what is money?11

### 2AC HM Institutions DA-

#### A. Praxis- Even if adopting historical materialism is good in the abstract, there’s no mechanism for how this can be translated to praxis-

Bunge 12

(Mario, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Evaluating Philosophies, Chapter 9: “Marxist Philosophy: Promise and RealityChapter 9 Marxist Philosophy: Promise and Reality,” 2012, pgs. 90-91//wyo-mm)

However, Marx did not put his Thesis XI into practice, since he undertook the Herculean task, pursued by Engels, of investigating the capitalist economy of his time. The same cannot be said of all his disciples: In the course of the last century, the social sciences ﬂ ourished mainly outside the Marxist box—though, alas, often mixed with pseudoscience. The exceptions were the Russian anthropologists and archaeologist (see Trigger 2006 ) , and the British Marxist historians of the second half of the last century (see Barraclough 1979 ) . But none of those scholars crafted an original economic theory or cultivated sociology or politology. As a consequence, the Communist leadership, both inside and outside the Soviet bloc, lacked a guide based on solid and up to date social science research: it muddled through using simplistic slogans improvised by undisputed leaders. That was a case of uncritical thinking on a world scale. In particular, the sudden crumbling of the Soviet bloc took all Marxists by surprise, because they had specialized in criticizing capitalism instead of investigating the traits of the so-called “really existing socialism”. That is, the dogmatic adherence to ideas that had been original a century earlier blinded them to what was happening under their noses. What more tragic case of mismatch between theory and reality?

#### Having blind faith in material factors inevitably ensures the reproduction of more capitalist leaders.

Atlantis 12

(News from Atlantis, “Marx was Right; Marx was Wrong,” January 16, 2012, <http://newsfromatlantis.blogspot.com/2012/01/marx-was-right-marx-was-wrong.html//wyo-mm>)

Marx may have been 100% right in identifying the problem, and even in predicting the manner of the implosion of the Capitalist System, but he was 100% wrong when he described his vision of the Marxist post-Capitalist system as a solution which was beneficial to humanity. Marx argued for the primacy of economics over all other factors. There are those who would argue that Marx's vision has never been realised, and that the regimes in the USSR and Communist China never advanced beyond the Private Capitalist system they claimed to overturn, and were in fact State Capitalist. This argument borders on the religious and is held as a Faith in Marxism, rather than an adherence to ideology. The argument is fundamentally flawed: The failure to see beyond pure materialism leads to the inevitable substitution of bureaucratic State despots in place of private despots. This could well be called an inherent contradiction of communism, which condemns the post-Capitalist Marxist State to be governed by the same factors it purports to stand against. How is it that Marx could be so right when it came to exposing the inbuilt failings of Capitalism, but so wrong in the solutions he offered? How? Because Marxism is not a solution to Capitalism, but a continuation of it. It is not designed to take power from the ruling class and give it to the people, but in reality it ensures that the hidden rulers are protected from the people and that their power is strengthened, rather than diminished. In exactly the same manner as 'representative democracy' is a front, so Marxism transfers power in theory, but in practice the Establishment prevails.