## Case

### Case extension

#### Targeted killing under the AUMF has resurrected the banishment of identities considered to be outside the law for crimes of potential crime or rebellion against the state. This serves to make being different a crime, as deviating from the majoritarian is to rebel against the state. In these instances the president then serves as judge, jury and executioner as he exterminates lives that present little value and risk any danger to the state. That’s Cole and Chong

#### The impact is elimination of difference: The majoritarian seeks to control and destroy identities that are seen as different. This destruction of fracture and is an ongoing genocide against the Other, seen in the war on terror, drone strikes, and indefinite detainment. That’s Agamben.

#### Becoming outlaw resolves this in two ways:

#### 1. Continual forfeiture of majoritarianism- Those in the majoritarian should continually recognize and forfeit their privilege like Sisyphus pushing the boulder up the hill.

#### 2. Universal Recognition of Worth - The universal recognition of beings as having intrinsic worth and reliability by the recognition that at some point or another we all operate outside of the law.

#### Finally put Ethics of the Self first- There is nothing an individual can do to force the world to change, nor can we change power structures without changing the ethics in which we operate with. We must change the ethics that we ourselves use first, before the world can change. That’s Lawor and Bunch

## Off case

### Black Fem 2ac

#### Role of the ballot: Who has the best ethical relationship to beings?

#### First, Case out weights -Just having identity and saying it’s a good thing isn’t enough. This only serves identity up to be cleansed and tamed. This leads to ressentiment of the minoritarian and majoritarian- that’s Tubbs

#### Second, Ethics come first, Our bunch evidence says that we’re most unethical to those we find devalued. We must create a site of politics be refusing the state, and moving out to the periphery

#### Third, We solve the K in two ways

#### Universal recognition of being-

#### Forfeiture of majoritarian status-

#### Fourth- The goal is flawed, those in the minority or oppressed will never be a part of the majority because of the bench marks set by the center group. There must be an overhaul of static identities and how we conceptualize politics.

#### Line by line

#### Fifth- The root cause of race is a desire that predates any of the slave trade, colonialism. This desire cannot be overcome by bolstering the static identity of race, but only as seeing each other as a multiplicity, otherwise it risks reinforcing the squo.

Nesbitt 13

[Nick Nesbitt, Prof @ Princeton University, State University Ch. “Escaping Race” Book- “DELEUZE CONNECTIONS: Deleuze and Race”, pg 8-9, 2013, \\wyo-bb]

A focus on race also summons some of the most controversial questions relating to human-being impelling most thinkers between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari are not afraid of asking whether inequality is located in bodies (it is, but not genetically); like both Nietzsche and Freud, they ask what is wrong with civilization itself (it overcodes filiation). Reaching into the deep recesses of culture, an archaic and convoluted logic of differentiating civilization from savagery and barbarism is exposed. This logic preceded European colonialism by centuries (see Han chauvinism, Brahmanism, Arab–black relations and so on). Though not European in origin, this logic formed the basis for a retrospective Judeo-Christian narcissism, for the oceanic slave trade, nationalism and fascism. Far from ‘naturalising’ race, Deleuze’s nomadological and biophilosophical geology of morals can demonstrate that race is built upon fully contingent territorialisations of power and desire which could be disassembled and differently reassembled. That race is immanent to the machinics of bodies and flows does not mean it is automatic, any more than that it is autonomous in relation to, for example, capital or sexual difference. The immanence of race does suggest, however, that an end to racism is an always already incipient reality. My contention is that Deleuze and Guattari’s two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia present a hitherto undeveloped theory of biopower and hence of race. This is not to argue against existing interpretations but to recast desire, territory and capital towards the category of race. Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of biopower has a much greater historical and geographical scope than what Foucault (2003 and 2008) introduced roughly during the same period. If Foucault famously states in his foreword to Anti-Oedipus that it is a guide for antifascist living, I contend that countering fascism means, above all, delving into the machinic depths of civilisation’s intrinsic racism. Sidestepping the pitfalls of biological reductionism Deleuze and Guattari not only argue that there is a materiality of race, but also forge an affirmative kind of antiracism quite different from the liberal–democratic kinds prevalent today. Supplementing Deleuze and Guattari with Sylvain Lazarus, my suggested antiracism consists in naming, accelerating and staying true to the bastard and mixed-blood probe-heads escaping the global faciality machine.

#### This act of becoming counteracts white male hegemonic acts- Outlawry is becoming and the destruction of static identity this act counters the hegemony of the white male that is the standard of western metaphysics

Bunch, 2010

[Mary, PHD in philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, OUTLAWRY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE (IM)POSSIBLE: DECONSTRUCTING BIOPOLITICS, Doctoral Thesis] /Wyo-MB

Becoming-animal is a version of bare life that replaces the subject as the figure of political agency. This anti-identity political actor signals a movement toward outlawry: as bare life, becoming animal is vulnerable in her exclusion from the polis, but she nevertheless acts to counter the law. Such revolutionary becoming is ethical, in Levinas’ sense, because of its relationship to Otherness, and the disruption of finitude that constitutes it. But it is quite different from Levinasian ethics, because the ethics does not arise through facial recognition (identity). Where for Levinas it is recognition of the Other that constitutes one as a subject, for Deleuze and Guattari one literally becomes147 Other in a dispersal away from subjectivity. Where Levinasian ethics is an ethics of hospitality in which the subject (understanding the self to be an other amongst others) welcomes the other. But the authors of A Thousand Plateaus are not concerned with hospitality; they are not concerned with welcoming in those that are on the outside. They are interested instead in a movement toward the outside, leaving the safety of the familiar and the similar, and casting off of privilege and dominance. It is an ethics of self- transformation, alliance, and exteriority, not hospitality. Deleuze and Guattari write: “As Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to become- black” (292).Minoritarian politics is a politics of the Other, evoked through an ‘Anomalous’ phenomenon of bordering. The Anomalous (anomal) refers to “that which is outside rules or goes against the rules” and moreover “an-omalie...designates unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization” (244). The concept dislodges the dominant subject-position of the “self-conscious white male of the occident” and dismantles the human ideal inherited from western metaphysics (Günzel 9). As Stephan Günzel phrases it in “Immanence and Deterritorialization,” “the only way to realize what is hidden in the idea of justice within ‘human rights’ ... is exactly ‘a becoming-inhuman’” (9). Becoming- animal thus expresses a politics of the post-subject, a revolutionary politics of those who exceed or fall short of the law. But the mechanics and motivations for such peripheral revolutionary movement is perplexing. It is obvious why those who are outside of the law might want a new law. But why would anyone who inhabits a dominant subject position move out toward a minority position, which we know to be disenfranchised? How would this be revolutionary? It seems as though it would simply expand the space of disenfranchisement. Moreover it would appear to limit the ethical capacity of becoming- minoritarian to those that first have status in major political structures, much like the ethics of hospitality does (i.e. to men, but not women, to straights but not queers, to white majorities but not racialized minorities). If one is already a minority, dispossessed of subject status, is one barred from processes of becoming? Must one first assimilate to the majority in order to then dismantle it?148For Deleuze and Guattari, populations are not divided into simple categories such as included/excluded or majority/minority. We are always already both at once. What differentiates us, one from the other, as ethical beings is not our degree of inclusion or exclusion, nor precisely our orientation toward others (although the latter is important). Ethics is expressed through our becoming-ness, our movement away from generalizations toward the specificity of the outside in all of its multiplicity and otherness. Ethics is criticism, that is, self criticism and criticism of the general, from the perspective of the particular. Becoming-animal specifies the direction of the flow between those aspects of ourselves that are part of the majority (our sense of belonging, our sense of self) and our affiliation with the minute particular. A becoming always begins in the majority, until one meets that dispersive detail that launches the entity outward toward the margins.64 Deleuze and Guattari write: “Yes, all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower or stone one becomes are molecular collectivities, haeccities, not molar subjects, objects, or form that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or by habit” (275). However the apparent primacy of majoritarianism (primacy in the sense of coming first, which carries the implication of greater importance in western metaphysics) may be a problem on at least two counts. The first is the assumption that one is always already a subject, which returns us to the quandaries of the post-structural subject: the fiction that the subject comes before the law that hails it into being. The second is based on the risks of misreading Deleuze and Guattari’s specific uses of common terms such as ‘minority’ and ‘majority,’ which lends itself to a romanticization of disenfranchisement, and the erasure of the very real oppression experienced by some populations.For Deleuze and Guattari, one does not become a subject. Becoming is limited to a deconstruction of subjectivity, since becoming is a process of dispersal, not consolidation. While the authors specify that one’s engagement in molar politics may be necessary for survival, this does not constitute a becoming. With regard to identity feminism, for instance, they write: “It is of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as women’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation” (TP 276). But they find the revolutionary potential restricted in such identity politics, because149 the approach tends toward stasis rather than movement. Its criteria are confining. As they continue: “But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow” (276).

#### Group the next two cards-

#### Permutation do both, Nomadic politics help create lines of flight in times of crisis and are helpful thought experiments.

Tamboukou 04

[MARIA TAMBOUKOU, Professor of Feminist Studies, co-director of the Centre for Narrative Research and co-editor of Gender and Education, “Nomadic Trails in the Unfolding of the Self”, http://www.uel.ac.uk/cnr/NomadicTrailsintheUnfoldingoftheSelf.htm, \\wyo-bb]

I have argued that rhizomes offer more effective models of making sense of young black women’s lives, drives, decisions and/or choices. What was identified in their narratives, which were first deployed within the restrictions of the family / community / college triangle, were "lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories as its dimensions, but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification" (1998, 3). Revisiting the three social settings of the arborescent triangle, what was brought into play was both the contingency of its construction as well as the continuous crises these social settings are nowadays undergoing. Whether we speak of late or post-modernity, globalisation, the new gender order, the liquidation of our lives, we cannot but see these transformations radically changing the ways we have used to theorise them. In Deleuze and Guattari’s thought it is at the time of crisis that new lines of flights emerge, no matter whether they will soon be inserted into new arborescent structures of the state machine. In following lines of flight we were interested in transitions, and this is where the concept of nomadism became so relevant in the analyses of these processes of becoming. Nomadism is, of course, only one of a myriad ways to look at these transitions, and it is by no means exhaustive. The young women’s narratives, seen from the nomadic perspective, throw new light on the processes of their subjectification, the ways they act upon themselves to cease being what they are and attempt to become other. In addition, we have looked at these becomings while we as analysts are in the process of experimenting with our own thinking, thus becoming part of the rhizomes we attempt to construct and put on the map. There are lines of flight criss-crossing each other as well as intersecting with roots and lines of segmentation in the maps we are making. In Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, arborescent structures coexist with rhizomes and often intersect. The arborescent structures of the triangle create fictitious, but very strong relations, interpellating these young black women to fixed gendered, racialized and classed identities. We cannot downplay the importance of these hailings and how they function to keep these young women in their spheres of belonging. Perhaps this is why nomadism is so relevant. Following nomadic passages these women can come and go incessantly, at least within the discursive terrain that their narratives have opened up for us to look at. In the rhizomatic model as applied to the interviews of these young black women, questions like Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? cannot generate any consistent answer. After all, according to Deleuze and Guattari, these are totally useless questions. Thinking in terms of nomadism, we can thus point to "other ways of travelling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, coming and going, rather than starting and finishing" (1988, 25). Why do that? What can be the political implications of using nomadism? I will leave the answer to Braidotti 's pithy statement:¶ The nomadic subject is a myth, that is to say a political fiction, that allows you to think through and move across established categories and levels of experience: blurring boundaries without burning bridges. Implicit in [the choice of this figuration] is the belief in the potency and relevance of the imagination, of myth-making, as a way to step out of the political and intellectual stasis of these postmodern times. Political fictions may be more effective, here and now, than theoretical systems. (Braidotti, 1994, from the cover)

#### Your focus is a humanist standpoint that reinforces the human non human binary, this enables violence on the non human which undermines the whole non violence agenda.

Deckha ‘10

[Maneesha Deckha, Associate Professor at the University of Victoria Faculty of Law. “It’s time to abandon the idea of ‘human’ rights,” The Scavenger, December 13, 2010, \\wyo-bb]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans, writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

#### The only way to solve those desires it to break down identity through becoming

Nesbitt 13

[Nick Nesbitt, Prof @ Princeton University, State University Ch. “Escaping Race” Book- “DELEUZE CONNECTIONS: Deleuze and Race”, pg 3-5, 2013, \\wyo-bb]

Above all, perhaps, a Deleuzian critique of race and colonial exploitation would work to escape from the logic of identity and identification with one’s political and existential subjection at the heart of the Hobbesian narrative of political modernity. Deleuze’s critique of identity, above all in the fi rst chapter of Difference and Repetition, ‘Difference in Itself’, addresses the common(-sensical) distribution of beings according to (Aristotelian, Leibnizian and Hegelian) categories and hierarchies, and the cognitive judgment of the propriety of any distribution or attribution of identity. In this conservative, sedentary distribution of roles and identities, ‘difference is in effect fully subject to the identity of the concept, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgment and the resemblance of perception’ (1994: 52). Instead, Deleuze compels us to think identity not as illusory attribution (including racial categorisation), but rather as the repetition of pure difference, to think the singularity of any entity in terms of its protean powers of transformation. Here, Deleuze envisages not only or even principally the transformation of any determinate being as a subtraction from actualised identities, but as the event he calls differentiation, the transformation of the virtual itself. Disidentification, in other words, is for Deleuze always and necessarily a critical process, in the Spinozian, Kantian and even Marxian sense (I am thinking here of the Marx of the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’), aiming at no less than the radical reformulation of the transcendental operators governing any world. The world-historical importance of the Haitian Revolution lies in its transcendence of any identity-based politics to politicize instead the Idea of the universal human right to be free from enslavement. This Idea of 1804 must be emphatically distinguished from any conscious articulation of a political doctrine by individual participants in the various revolts from 1791 on. Instead, universal emancipation, the idea of the Haitian Revolution, like any true Idea in Deleuze’s precise use of the concept, is preconscious, independent of its representation under the aegis of a refl exive cogito (1994: 214–79). The Idea of the Haitian Revolution as the pure multiplicity of a swarming war machine was arguably first actualized as a disembodied claim of absolute equality in the Bois Caïman ceremony and in Boukman’s famous call to the slaves to ‘Koute libete li pale nan kè nou tous’ (Listen to the voice of liberty that speaks in all our hearts’). The call for libete sparked a non-localisable chain of connections within an anonymous, enslaved multitude that enjoyed no place in their post-1789 world. Libete’s multiplicity linked up to a series of adjunct fi elds that further informed this pure Idea (including the unfulfilled promise of the incomplete and partial French and American Revolutions and the political implications of voodoo), and moved to operate a specific condensation or actualization of the singular nature of their claim. This claim, as ideal, finding no identity or place in the world of Saint Domingue, focused around signifiers such as the creole libete. At the same time, it evinced an unsuspected power to enact, to unfold, and to dramatize on the world stage the implications of this Idea. This Idea was, in 1791, preconscious in Deleuze’s sense, literally a dream, in the way that we recall Martin Luther King’s celebrated phrase ‘I have a dream.’ This proto-Haitian multiplicity was self-defining. On the night of 29 August 1791, a massive uprising of some half-million slaves first began to actualize this pre-individual idea as a complex, unfolding differentiation of relationships and elements. In fact, it would doubtless be more accurate to contrast in Deleuzian terms the formalised concept of 1804 (as the independent state of Haiti and its constitution) to the properly virtual Idea of the initial uprising of 1791, and, moreover, to conclude that 1804 represented, inevitably, an impoverishment of the Idea of 1791. The idea of universal emancipation was at first only a pure problem (inherent to that of actual slavery prior to the 1791 uprising), but quickly became the struggle to instantiate a real solution to that problem. This subtractive politics, one that violently withdrew from the Atlantic world-system of plantation slavery in a manner analogous to the Brazilian quilombos, culminated in the 1804 declaration of Haitian independence and the universal right of all humans to freedom from enslavement and racial subjection. To think with Deleuze the destruction of racial identity, of law, of subjection, and to trace and follow through the immanent lines of flight from those various regimes is in this sense to unfold the extraordinary potentiality of any pure differentiation and becoming beyond the actual state of our human, all-too human, racialised being.