# Weber HT---NDT 7 vs UCO VY

## 1AC

### 1AC---NDT

#### The mythos of “the West” and the supposed “western psychic imaginary” is persistently haunted by the struggle between Dionysus and Apollo: order and chaos do not exist in this sense in simple binary opposition, or as a mere dialectical synthesis, rather Apollo must annihilate Dionysus without remainder, because any remnant represents a destabilization of sensible reality and a threat to the linearity of time, there must be one single progressive ascent to absolute order, this narrative however is unstable, constantly incapable of holding together, always threatened by the god with a thousand faces, in incalculable spaces, unnamable in Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Dutch, English, ENGLISH, Binary Code, C++, JAVA, each new code, vulnerable to viruses, to Trojan Horses, to the Lakota hiding in the mountains, loose the arrows! The grid is far too vulnerable to a well-placed attack! Rolling black-outs, rolling from the hills like so many bare chested Gallic warriors, time keeps repeating, circling back on itself, ERROR! Thirteen threats have been detected to this 1ac, would you like to run a scan for a one-time charge 9 dollars and 99 cents worth of winter blankets, ERROR! Closing this window leaves this 1ac vulnerable to a small band of Lakota gathering on pine ridge, click this link to send in the black helicopters, TIME keeps circling back on itself, Dionysus and Apollo.

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 10-13)

This binary logic, in other words, empowers the privi­leged term to represent the Other as nonbeing (spectral), as some kind of arbitrary threat to Being—the benign total order to which the first term is committed — and thus to subdue and appropriate this Other to the latter's essential truth. It is in this sense that one can say that West­ern metaphysical thinking is essentially a colonialism. By this, I do not simply mean, as does much postcolonial discourse that acknowledges in some degree the polyvalency of the imperial project, a metaphor ap­propriated to the thought of being (or of any site on the continuum of being other than the economic or political) from another "more practi­cal and fundamental" — "real" — domain of reference." In identifying Western metaphysical thought with colonialism, I am positing a literal and precise definition of the process of metaphysical inquiry. The binary logic endemic to the very idea of the West had its origins, according to Heidegger, in late antiquity with the Romans' coloniza­tion of Greek (the vestiges of pre-Socratic) thinking, with, that is, their reduction of the originative thinking of the latter to a derivative (con-structed) understanding of truth. More specifically, the provenance of this logic lies in the imperial Romans' politically strategic translation of a-letheia to veritas, truth as always already un-concealment to truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence of mind and thing." This epochal reduction of an originative to a re-presentational mode of thinking— a thinking that places the force of being before one as a thing to be looked at — was calculatively determined by a relatively concep­tualized understanding of the operations of metaphysical perception. In decisively establishing the binary opposition between the true and the false as the ground of thinking, this reduction also decisively established the ground for the eventual assimilation of an infinite relay of different but analogous oppositions into the totalized epistemic binary logic of the Western tradition. Under the aegis of the doctrine of the adaequatio, it was not only the binary opposition between Truth and falsehood that empowered the correction or appropriation or reformation or disciplin­ing or accommodation or civilizing, which is to say, the colonization, of the "errant" or "deformed" or "wasteful" or "excessive" or "im­mature" (uncultivated) or "barbarous" or "feminine" force named in the second, demonized term. As the very metaphors used to character­ize the "false" suggest, that opposition was simply one — no doubt the most fundamental — of a whole series of binary oppositions inhering, however asymmetrically developed, in History, in, that is, the founding Occidental representation of temporal being-as-a-whole by way of per­ceiving "it" meta-ta-physika: Being and time, Identity and difference, the Word and words, Being and nonbeing, Subject and object, Sanity and madness, Culture and anarchy, Civilization and barbarism, Man and woman, the White race and the colored races, the West and the east, the North and the south, and so on. What this emphatically suggests is that an oppositional criticism that would be adequate to the task of resisting imperialism must cease to think the imperial project in the disciplinary terms endemic to and mandated by the Occident's compartmentalization of being and knowledge.

#### To Solve simply download the Socrates App, VERSION 77.8, developed by Debate Thought Machine Inc., guaranteeing users, after enough questioning, ballots, and cross examinations to arrive at the liberatory capital “T” truth that can explain the world, and the “root cause” of all political conflicts, CLICK NOW

#### Offensive Cyber Operations are an attempt to colonize the internet, and the language justifying them worships Apollo, and subjugates us to Apollo’s fears all over again

Paganini, 13

(Pierluigi Paganini, Editor-in-Chief at Cyber Defense Magazine. “Does the US really think to leverage preemptive cyber attacks as a deterrent?” <http://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/are-us-really-thinking-to-preemptive-cyber-attacks-as-deterrent/>) Henge

There are a great number of activities in cyber space, whereby governments are secretly conducting a huge quantity of cyber operations, and every day we read about malicious code used to steal sensible information or about cyber attacks that targeted critical infrastructures. The principal questions raised by so fervent activities are the rules of engagement and proportionality of the defense, which is the operative limit of countries that discover an attack against its networks? Is it thinkable to assume the introduction of machines in the decision-making process of defense? Recently many cases have highlighted an intense cyber espionage activity against US Governments and private industries having the principal intent to steal sensible information, the principal suspect is of course the China due the characteristic techniques adopted by the hackers. Obviously this is just the tip of the iceberg and same US are also very active in the cyberspace, but recently the Obama administration’s finding that the president has the power to order a preemptive cyber attacks to discourage those who violate the networks of the country, in particular to Chinese government which remains unresponsive to U.S. efforts to mitigate the cyber offensives originated from the country. Last Sunday The New York Times published and interesting article on the possibility that President Obama could order a strike to respond to imminent cyber threats against national critical infrastructures. The measure is limited to Homeland security menaced by threats that affect assets critical for the country and does not cover attacks on private industry like cyber espionage. “New policies will also govern how the intelligence agencies can carry out searches of faraway computer networks for signs of potential attacks on the United States and, if the president approves, attack adversaries by injecting them with destructive code — even if there is no declared war.” The alert level is increased after the recent attacks to media agencies, continuous intrusions appear originated from countries and security experts are convinced that they are state-sponsored operations due the means and methods adopted. The discussion on a possible preemptive attacks is in my opinion a provocation, it’s clear that that both US and China are pursuing their cyber strategies and are respectively conscious of the cyber capabilities of their adversaries, the declarations are a public admission of failure of diplomatic efforts spent by the governments, nothing more. It’s clear that US could increase pressure on China requiring for example major purchases of Chinese goods go through national security reviews, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), but is very different from the organization of a cyber attacks for demonstrative purpose. Is Obama’s administration really willing to give up so prolific commercial relationship? “Adam Segal wrote in a blog post that China has responded by saying through the People’s Daily that the administration’s position could trigger a worldwide arms race.” The U.S. threat of a pre-emptive strike difficultly will discourage foreign governments, contrary it could increase risk overall, many other governments could be interested to induce to think that the attacks come from China or from other hostile nations, in these case the preemptively attack could be addressed against the wrong targets due the difficulty to localize the real identity of the attackers. We must also consider that governments will continue to operate secretly in cyber space also on the offensive front, that statements of a pre-emptive attack are only a warning to the world that is intended to alert on the cyber capabilities of the country. Why take the paternity of a pre-emptive strike when nations attack today in absolute silence? Cyber weaponry is the most complex arms race under way, US government has promoted the born of a new Cyber Command, and many other governments are spending similar effort, declaration of preemptive cyber attack are useless but while a lot of words are spent on what constitutes reasonable and proportionate use of cyber force, cyber arms all over the world are sharpening their weapons. A cyber war is much more subtle and dangerous than preemptive cyber attack!

#### Click here to resolve all suffering. Only one more survey to get to the final survey to end all surveys. Once finished, pick your prize, you can choose from a deal on vacuum cleaners to a sale on toothbrushes. Have what you need yet? Just one more pathway to find heaven in order. Apollo is just around the corner, hiding from Socrates. There is reason to fear yet no fear of reason. What impulse is this? Just another hyperlink to take you to the land of milk and honey.

#### The Socratic reason of the world is rooted in distaste for tragedy and a fear of instability---the attempt to create constancy and resolve universal contradiction only internalizes suffering and ressentiment

Saurette ‘96 [Paul, 1996 “I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.” Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6]

The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order: ‘I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack of integrity.’ According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence. However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. ‘Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstruin in animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates’ thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself the old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘[r]ationality was divined as a saviour... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational...’ Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a ‘Real World’ of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an ‘Apparent World’ of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely ‘modern” understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World, This outlook created a modem notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and argues that it signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—you alone are to blame for yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered.’Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, ‘one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....” The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for ‘the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering’.’3 According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World, The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment, of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self- perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, “[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.’

#### When Apollonian time stretches across a new space it must envelope it, master it, cover it with a blue crash-screen, all chaotic space must be territorialized and re-territorialized, spatialized and re-spatialized, and so the great expanse of the INTERNET lay out in front of the colonizers, “this my friends is the West, some call it wild, some call it dangerous, I see the future, shining and paved, orderly, with all of the necessary fences, but first it must be cleared of all ‘undesirables,’ it is our destiny,” then a man with a thick Spanish accent exclaimed, “ from this vantage point I can see everything, we must identify each unique user, track their activity and identify their allegiances, unless otherwise cleared, consider each an enemy, all threats must be immediately dealt with pre-emptively”

Bittarello 2009

(Maria Beatrice, independent scholar and PHD in cultural/religious studies, “Spatial Metaphors describing the Internet and religious Websites: sacred Space and sacred Place” Observatorio Journal, 11, 2009, odekirkian)

Ratzan (2000) mentions several spatial metaphors used to define the Internet, such as "information superhighway"5, “wild west”, or frontier. Other spatial metaphors involve the concept of travel; these include descriptions of the Internet as 'wide endless road' (Ratzan 2000), or expressions such as "travels in cyberspace", or "net-surfing". As Wertheim (1999,24) notes, in the expression "surfing the Net", the Internet is likened to the Ocean, suggesting that it is a space where there are neither boundaries nor stability. The image of the Internet as Ocean is also suggested by the terms used in other languages to indicate the "net-surfing": in Italian, for instance, the favourite expression is "navigare" (to navigate a ship). And, one of the first browsers was called 'Navigator' (i.e. steerman). Superhighway, wild west, frontier, or cyberspace all allude to a 'physical' space, which is defined in generic terms, and presented as open to exploration (or conquest)6.¶ Other metaphors point to a representation of the Internet, or of its 'components' as a static, fixed, and well delimited space. For instance, on the Internet we find websites, and each of them may be formed by web-pages. Also, some websites constitute focal points of the Internet structure and are called nodes, which is a synonym of knots. The term "web-site" suggests the idea of localised space, of web-place; web- page suggests that such spaces are nothing else than the pages of a book; node could be connected to the 'spider-web' metaphor, as links connect in nodes. A further spatial metaphor indicating a well- delimited space is 'home-page', the expression used to indicate the initial page of a website. All pages have a top and a bottom, thus indicating precise spatial coordinates (high/low). Of course, there are chat- rooms on the Internet, and surfers can open or close windows, and jump from a page to the next.¶ Some metaphors hint to a representation of the Internet as a 'space beyond', or as an 'other dimension': on the Internet we find portals, and gateways through which we can access other websites (i.e. further 'spaces'). These metaphors point to the definition of the Internet as space for access and communication, but also as structured and complex space. Metaphors such as firewall, instead, suggest that communication can be controlled and 'physically' blocked; a metaphor such as blogo-sphere alludes to a specific, well-rounded space, distinct from other spaces devoted to different activities.¶ Ratzan (2000) notes that users have also described the Internet as bookstore or library, and, as Rollason (2004) has pointed out, some commentators have indeed represented the Internet as the incarnation of the Babel Library originally described by Jorge Louis Borges in 1941. Borges (1970, 78) describes the Babel Library as a "universe" and as a sort of labyrinth of “galleries", whose number could even be infinite. As Dawson & Hennebry report (2004, 152), the Internet has indeed been described as a labyrinth of “electronic tunnels" in an article by the New York Times. The metaphor of the labyrinth is particularly interesting, because, just like Borges's Library, the Web (as well as the digital databases it hosts) has been conceived as the space where human knowledge is physically stored (library), and even as the summa of the human knowledge to date (cf. Colombo 1986).¶ In describing cyberspace, Gibson (1984, 67-68) uses primarily the metaphor of the matrix, but also other metaphors that accumulate images of natural and artificial (i.e. human-built) spaces, such as forest, ferns, clusters, spyral, constellations, stepped pyramid . Metaphors adopted by Internet users, and reported by Palmquist (2000), such as those describing the Internet as town hall, village, or marketplace point to a representation of the Internet as urban setting, where human beings live, and human activities take place. The term forum hints to another well-delimited public space, where exchanges can take place--forum comes from a Latin word indicating a public place that hosted several political and productive activities. Leigh (2000) notes that the Internet can be described as global and virtual city. All the metaphors used by Gibson, as well as the labyrinth and city metaphor present the Internet as a complex, well-articulated space, which needs to be interpreted (labyrinth), and mapped (city), because it is formed by a number of different places (such as a ferns, a forest, and clusters), which could even possess an esoteric meaning (pyramid, constellation, and labyrinth).¶ If cyberspace is a space, it can be 'mapped'. Dodge and Kotchin (2001, 3) have significantly entitled their interesting book Atlas of Cyberspace, even if, as the authors make clear, cyberspace is not a space, but a variety of media, which can be programmed to “adopt the formal qualities of geographic (Euclidean) space”.¶ Internet as mythical sacred space¶ Once the immaterial reality of the Internet is conceptualised as space, this space can also be presented as a mythical sacred space, even in academic analyses. As Graham (2002, 65-80) has highlighted, in the late 1990s some scholars have metaphorically spoken of the Internet as a new kind of sacred space (Davis), a "place of salvation and transcendence" (Robins), a "heavenly city of Revelation" (Benedikt); others have defined it a "charmed site" (Kroker Wenstein), or a "portal to another world" (Lieb). Childress (1999) has noted that the Internet can be compared to the Celtic 'otherworld'--i.e. as a world completely detached from the dimension where real life takes place. As Davis (1995) and Hume (1998) have documented, Technopagans have sometimes conceptualized the Internet as a magical plane that gives access to other realities. In conclusion, several scholars and commentators have often ascribed to the Internet, in the 1990s, the features of a mythical sacred space (heaven, otherworld, or magical plane). This is an especially interesting aspect because, as Ratzan (2000) notes, 'expert' users tend to adopt spatial metaphors with a metaphysical content, metaphors that connect the Internet to transcendence, such as, for example, 'new dimension', or 'world' that does not exist in physical space, but 'in consciousness'. Nonetheless, whereas some academics such as Brasher (2001) appear to (implicitly) support such conceptualizations of the Internet, other scholars, such as, for example, Cowan (2005, 54ff) and Flichy (2007) have pointed out how this is a rhetoric heavily pushed by the industry, and one that serves precise economic and political interests. This aspect deserves attention, because it is consistent with Jameson's argument that the postmodern stress on space is the expression of a specific cultural imperialism.¶ There is a further conception of the Internet that seems to be closely connected to its conceptualization as 'mythical sacred space'. This is the representation of the Internet as "technological sublime". Bingham(1999) has taken into account several studies on the technological sublime, its connections with the Romantic movement, and its adoption to describe a number of new media, especially in the early stages of their introduction. As Bingham (1999) points out, such representation has an ideological connection with the Western, masculinist concepts of transcendence and of a monolithic Self, who can observe the world from an external, privileged and detached position—the position of the surfer, who travels in the new space.

#### Are we the anti-body? What virus has been born in the shadows of the empire? DARPA developed survival in a box protects you from big data takeover. Facebook would like to know your relationship status, but don’t worry, there are many options to choose from. Tweet us at #OCObombdiggity to give us your feedback. No risk unless you take one. Zeroes and ones and ones and zeroes break down the molecular complex. What is left except the landscape? Dot matrix tanks and Instagram walls are the last defense.

#### Hey Jordan, knock knock. Who’s there? Stuxnet. Stuxnet who? BOOM.

#### The vicious ressentiment of counterterror preemption obliterates all of life’s value

Siemens and Shapiro in 2008

(Herman, Assistant Professor for the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Leiden, and Gary, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Richmond, “What Does Nietzsche Mean for Contemporary Politics and Political Thought?”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 35/36, Spring/Autumn, pMUSE, rcheek)

Does Fukuyama offer a genuine alternative on the questions of the “one” and the “direction of the earth”—or does the “end of history” thesis fall under Nietzsche’s geophilosophical critique of modernist, Eurocentric metanarratives issuing in technocratic utopias? There are certainly reasons for reading the end of history as a triumphalist metanarrative that advances the hegemony of the last man—in spite of Fukuyama. A good deal depends on what we make of the resources he locates and mobilizes against the narrative of the last man. Do they represent an alternative, a real source of resistance, or just an endless repetition of the fully functionalized worker/consumer? Fukuyama’s exemplars of megalothymia seem to be not only “tame,” as Sheikh concedes, but radically impoverished in comparison with Nietzsche’s “higher men” or “good Europeans,” whose signature features are hybridity, (inner and outer) multiplicity, and mobility. More importantly, Fukuyama’s identification of liberal democracy as a site of isothymia looks like wishful thinking when set against Nietzsche’s strongest formulations of contemporary nihilism. In an important Nachlass note Nietzsche argues that under modern economic-technological conditions of exploitation, human life suffers an overall loss of value, worth, or quality: “der Mensch wird geringer” (KSA 12:10[17]). The loss of commanding and sense-giving powers that accompanies the democratic processes of “contraction” and “leveling” signifies a value reduction (Werth-Verringerung) of the human type, that is, a loss of intrinsic human value or worth. Clearly, this thesis undermines the conditions for isothymia, understood as mutual recognition of intrinsic worth. If nihilism signifies this loss of intrinsic human value or worth for Nietzsche, its sources lie in a problem of the will—the loss of commanding and sense-giving powers. The thymiotic accounts of the last man and the correctives proposed by Fukuyama seem to overlook this problem completely. As Sheikh remarks in closing, the question of nihilism is the battleground for the endgame between Fukuyama and Nietzsche.¶ Tracy Strong’s article articulates the deep structure of Nietzsche’s political thought by exploring the connections of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy. If philosophy is itself a tyrannizing force by imposing its meanings on the world and blinding itself to the limits of this imposition, then tragedy can balance this tendency by disclosing the impossibility of the tyrannical project, whether [End Page 6] political or philosophical. Strong shows how Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity is about a world in which tragedy is no longer part of the public sphere (itself a replacement for the agon of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy). If tragedy is a way of fending off tyranny, Socratic rationalism, which constitutes tragedy’s death and rules in its aftermath, opens the door once more to the pursuit of a total explanation, in other words, to the search for the tyrant. Thus, the modern world sets itself up for a succession of tyrannical projects. Confirmation of Strong’s assessment of George W. Bush as a tyrant can be found in current U.S. policy of preemptive war as a new realization of the tyrannical fixation of meaning. The view that war is justified as the elimination of threats that might materialize in the future, of virtual or possible threats, presupposes a strange sense of the future as already visible. The future that preemption fears or anticipates may be brought into existence by the act of preemption itself in Iraq; preemptive war creates its own evidence by assembling terrorists enabled by a “war on terrorism.” Here we might be reminded of the ironic relation that the Greeks saw between tyrants and oracles (consider the stories of Herodotus as a commentary on the uses of “intelligence”). Thinking they knew the future, tyrants and despots launched disastrous wars and occupations in which they were both protagonist and victim. As Strong emphasizes in an allegorical reading of John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance and in his remarks on the current Bush presidency, the project of overcoming tyranny requires a renewed sense of community tempered by tragic wisdom.¶ In “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the ‘Innocence of Becoming’: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the ‘Falling Man,’” Joanne Faulkner takes up the question of agency that Strong invites when he closes his essay by saying, “[t]hat murder is not possible does not mean that we must be helpless.” Faulkner argues that the hegemonic first-person post–9/11 narrative in the United States revolves around the concept of a victimized innocence, a self-image that is then used to support projects of revenge (however arbitrary and costly in life and treasure) and accepts the authority of a state of exception wherein real liberties are sacrificed for promised security. Why, she asks, were images of those who fell or jumped from the Twin Towers quickly suppressed in the media? Because, she answers, they could be read as exhibiting a moment of decision and the possibility of agency even in the most desperate and limited circumstances. The jumpers complicate the image of innocence and victimhood. Faulkner interprets the dominant U.S. narrative in terms of Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment; if we are innocent victims, then we gladly seek revenge by ceding our powers to a higher authority. Nietzsche’s alternative concept of the Unschuld des Werdens suggests the possibility of acting outside the cycle of debt and guilt. Here innocence—Unschuld—is understood as freedom from that kind of moral thinking; accepting the innocence of becoming is “integral to the skillful exercise of agency” and [End Page 7] to making “a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment.” Faulkner shows how Nietzsche’s thought on agency can contribute to the critical analysis of the rhetoric of good and evil, the suspension of constitutional liberties, and the abrogation of international agreements that characterize the “global war on terror.”

#### Welcome to PhobicTests.com, you are only a few short questions away from identifying what you fear most, but first we need the names of your future children just in case you forget your password or we need more power. Hold on one minute while we process your request…Congratulations, our advanced algorithmic phobia calculations indicate there is an 83% chance you are Autophobic, 38% chance you are Neophobic and a 16% chance your are Phobophobic, however there is 100% chance our calculations are Decidophobic and you are actually just Cyberphobic.

#### The future is a virtual paradise. Plug in and tune out. LifeNoMore assumes all risks for software malfunction, but your hardware must be up to date. A mere 5 BitCoins secures eternal existence. Unfortunately children are not accepted at this time, but you may bring all the giga-pets you’d like. Just make sure to feed and water them, we’ll provide the vitals but digital poop isn’t our responsibility.

#### Attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

#### ERROR! Rational strategy is collapsing, this 1AC is crashing, and time is running out! Therefore, before the blue screen, Jordan and I ask that you vote in affirmation of this performance against Apollo.

#### Risk-assessment of future threats is based in incomplete information---this temporal logic devalues the present to preserve the future

Stockdale, 10

(Liam Stockdale, Ph.D. in International Relations, Department of Political Science, McMaster University. “Securitizing the Future? A Critical Interrogation of the Pre-emptive Turn in the Theory and Practice of Contemporary Security” <https://www.academia.edu/430468/Securitizing_the_Future_A_Critical_Interrogation_of_the_Pre-Emptive_Turn_In_the_Theory_and_Practice_of_Contemporary_Security>) Henge

As mentioned above, an utexplicitly temporal element has underwritten the development of security practices in the post-9/11 era, and this trend is particularly evident in the activities of what are popularly termed “liberal” or “Western” states.2 Indeed, empirically speaking, the majority of the pre-emptive practices with which I am here concerned take place either within the context of the WOT—such as the indefinite detention of terror suspects without charge (Mutimer 2007)—or vis-à-vis the purported threat of large inflows of migrants—exemplified by the myriad detention centres on the periphery of the EU and by Australia’s so-called “pacific solution” of mandatory pre-emptive detention (Isin & Rygiel 2007, L. Weber 2007). These issues represent top security concerns for states that are conventionally identified as liberal democratic polities, and therefore the pre-emptive practices upon which I focus most often originate from the sovereign decisions undertaken by the governments and security agents of such states. This is important in theoretical terms because the fact that it is precisely states which are “avowedly liberal democratic states, openly committed to the rule of law” (Mutimer 2007) that are behind the types of pre-emptive practices I seek to problematize renders the logic underlying such acts—and perhaps even the concept of the liberal polity itself in the current security moment—quite problematic. This latter point will be central to the second half of the paper—and will be discussed in greater depth below in relation to Derrida’s notion of autoimmunity—and thus a more detailed discussion of pre-emption as it is practiced by contemporary liberal polities is warranted at this juncture. While the idea of pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine in US foreign policymaking—most clearly exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption— is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations alone. Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, the logic of pre-emption can be seen to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment, to the point where the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption” (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of safeguarding the future from what may occur by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus pursued by attempting to “police the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will no longer be of concern (Bigo 2007: 31). Accordingly, the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over the temporal dimension of human existence. Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008: 149). The crucial point is that a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in instrumental terms as a site of intervention through which this ultimate aim might be realized. As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption, the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). The result is that the proverbial door is opened for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the present, since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/ precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be ensured. Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus generating “an insatiable quest for knowledge” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information related to potential future dangers (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts, however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de Goede 2008). This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of risk management premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” whereby sovereign decisions relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken are made solely on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion or highly arbitrary (and often highly racialized) calculations regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102). Accordingly, the pre-emptive practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an crucial component of the pursuit of security. The securitization of the future thus necessitates the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

## 2AC

### Case

#### And acknowledgement of the meaninglessness inherent to life is key to creating value

Diamantides in 2003

(Dr. Marinos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART II): THE COMPANY OF PRIESTS: MEANINGLESSNESS, SUFFERING AND COMPASSION IN THE THOUGHTS OF NIETZSCHE AND LEVINAS, Cardozo Law Review, March, 2003, l/n)

In relation to the classical philosophical problem posed by suffering there is, as the two quotes above indicate, an intriguing common emphasis on meaninglessness in the works of Nietzsche and Levinas, which renders fertile the reading together of their two distinct philosophies. The difference is that for Levinas, the acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of suffering without resentment is only the "least one can say." Indeed, Nietzsche exposed man's denial of absurd suffering "only" in order to support his case against the sentimentalism of Christian ethics and deontological and utilitarian moralities, which either attribute meaning to suffering or seek to rid life of it, ultimately denying life itself - for to live is also to suffer. Levinas, on the other hand, argued the inevitability of events of senseless suffering breaching from within the hermeneutically ordered world of meaning. Moreover, he viewed this as proof of the inevitability of the idea of infinity in a non-metaphysical sense, for it is "included" into the finite world of being as what cannot be matched by experience or representation, leaving a surplus of awe, astonishment, obsession. Immanence, therefore, is all there is, but to that we add that it cannot cease undergoing the idea of infinity, like an ill man who undergoes his condition. In Levinas' ethical discourse, infinity gets expressed in the "face of the other" and is transformed into obsession with providing succors for meaningless suffering. Suffering, left to its own devices, ridicules experience by always being "too much." In turn, it takes another being that comes to the rescue, thinking itself "infinitely responsible" for all the suffering it encounters, for suffering to be given an appropriate response. With this quasi-transcendental possibility in mind, this paper introduces and critically analyzes Nietzsche's notion of "affirmative compassion," as distinct from moral pity and, gradually, suggests the need for its reformulation as both an instance of will to power and as submission to the ethical imperative to care for the other. Given the un-saintly reputation of Nietzsche, however, the paper cannot but begin by paying tribute to his famous critique of pity, that "morbid emotion" that accompanies the denial of the senselessness of suffering and ultimately compels the nihilistic rejection of life itself. This is done in the first section in which I basically report on my law students' take on Nietzsche in the context of a course on medical law and moral reasoning. In sum, I report that Nietzsche's ideas help one critique the extensions of  [\*1277]  traditional legal doctrines of responsibility for man-made harm - sustained by the beliefs in the causal understanding of the world, in moral autonomy and agency - in relation to litigation that raises questions over the meaning of, and standard of care for, suffering that no one has caused. These doctrinal extensions are, arguably, instances of a hypertrophy of legal consciousness, indicating lack of understanding of the chaotic nature of the world of human affects in the face of absurd suffering and denial of the passion, obsession and delirium that correlate to the dis-equilibrium, meaninglessness and anarchy of suffering. In this connection, I offer a number of examples, often involving judgments that concern kinds of beings that blatantly manifest this senselessness, ranging from insensate beings in coma to the unborn. In the second section, I examine Nietzsche's views on how meaningless suffering affects the man of power. Because of Nietzsche's conviction that cruelty and indifference are no longer options for contemporary man, I focus on Nietzsche's formulation of a "noble compassion" that would be "affirmative" or "life-enhancing" - compassion within a meaningless universe. Such compassion is part of the becoming of beings with a "surplus of power," as opposed to morally submissive or hedonistic beings. Crucially, this is compassion that does not relinquish self-love in the process, and does not lead to the self becoming physically or emotionally "contaminated" by the suffering it witnesses.

### 2AC---Natives

#### PDB---perspectivism means regardless of a link we can affirm different stuff

Solomon, 96

(Robert C. Solomon was a professor of Continental philosophy at the University of Texas. “Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality and Ressentiment” pg. 203-204)

Nietzsche is not an "immoralist" — as he occasionally likes to bill himself. He is instead the defender of a richer kind of morality, a broader, more varied perspective (or, rather, an indefinitely large number of perspectives) in which the gifts and talents of each individual count first and foremost. Nietzsche doesn't advocate immorality; he rather points out how minimal and inadequate is a morality of "Thou shalt not." Ultimately, it is a denial of life, a denial of our best talents, our energies, and our ambitions. It is not that we ought to break those standard moral imperatives against stealing, killing, and lying. It is rather that we should see how little and how pathetic it is just to obey such rules in the absence of any other virtues of character or excellence. How presumptuous it is for morality to give itself "trump" status at the expense of any number of other "nonmoral" virtues such as heroism, wit, charm, and devotion. Do we really want to celebrate the "good" man when we might have a great one instead? - Perspectivism in morals means that there is no one scale of values and no single way of measuring people and their virtues, but that does not mean that there is no comparing perspectives or that some perspectives cannot be seen as preferable to others. Of course, that preference will be based on the kind of people who occupy it and, of course, on the person whose preference it is. But when we compare the self-confident perspective of the master with the reactive perspective of the slave, do we really want to say that there is no reason to prefer one to the other? ("Submission to morality can be slavish or vain or selfish or resigned or obtusely enthusiastic or thoughtless or an act of desperation, like submission to a prince: in itself it is nothing moral."56)

#### Demanding social justice for historical injury codifies ressentiment and locks subordinated groups in their subordination

Brown 95 Professor of Women’s Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 1995 [Wendy, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity pg. 66-70]

Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless,"the triumph of the weak as weak. "22 This incitement to ressentitnent inheres in two related constitutive paradoxes of liberalism: that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality, a paradox which stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences on the one hand, and the suppression of them on the other, and which offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored withinincluded inthe terms of that universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare state liberalism --- attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its selfmaking is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy . . . . This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects, . . . to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all. Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable." In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency", combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressentiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life -- what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressenti;nent as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves . . . and in this way exploit[ed] the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of selfdiscipline, selfsurveillance, and selfovercoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency.26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities marketcommunities, churches, familiesand the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction27 In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for selfaffirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction -- the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds -- and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself; with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. If the "cause" of ressentitnent is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does”30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery.”31 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a selfaffirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."32

#### The modern is never actual, only virtual---means the aff is a prereq

Grossberg 10 (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) (Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 260) //DDI13

The question is neither empirical nor conceptual, but conjunctural and discursive. To theorize the problematic of the modern requires us to inves- tigate the production of the discourses of the modern-what are its condi- tions of possibility, its effectivitics, and its dispersions. Or to put it differ- ently, it involves questions of what might be called conjunctural and epochal ontologies. What are we saying about a context when we call it modern, or when we deny it such a description? What was it that was brought into existence under the sign of euro-modernity that is what we refer to as "the modern"? What sort of answer would not simply condemn the modern to forever becoming euro-modern? I offer a somewhat speculative analysis of fractions of a spatially and historically dispersed conversation on modernity. What can possibly be signaled by the complexity of the contexts and claims made about and for modernity? The analysis does not seek to define either an essence or a simple unity; rather, it points to the virtuality of modern, to a reality that has effects but is never fully actualized, because it can be actualized in multiple ways.

#### Their explanation of coloniality locks subjects in with NO ESCAPE

Grossberg 10 (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) (Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 265-66) //DDI13

This exteriority is, it seems to me, further compromised by the assumption that the other is constituted as a subject. Thus, the argument moves from coloniality as a complex political relation to the colonial difference as a matter of subjectivity.5 The colonial difference slides between a space of productive possibility, a notion of a prior indigenous way of living/subject, and a wounded yet celebrated identity/subject position occupied by spe- cific people who have been the ''victims" of colonization. On the one hand, that position offers a vision of a hybridized colonial subject, which is, in its very extremity, the very inescapability of its violent subordination, and therefore offers a clearer experience---and critique---of modernity from its extremity. And on the other hand, the position also offers the possibility of alternatives to modernity. Presumably, the assumption is that the colo- nial subject is more than just the colonized subject, that their very hybridity points to another space-time of their existence (in another place, another time) that opens the possibilities not of going back but of imagining new futures. But the excluded, subalternized other is never outside of modernity, since it is a necessary aspect of modernity' itself, since modernity cannot be sepa- rated from coloniality. There must be something more, for the critique of modernity is also ''from the exterior of the modern/colonial world." There seems to be no reason why that exteriority which, as quoted above, interpellates the Other, must always and only be located within modernity/coloniality or as subjectivity. While it is important to recognize that there are vibrant alternatives to modernity, might such alternatives not also come from other spaces of social possibility and political imagination? Might they not also open up the possibility of other modernities? Might not the possibility that the M/C group seeks a ''positive affirmation of the alternative ordering of the world" (Escobar 2 0 0 7 , r88) open up the multiplicity of modernities as well as alternatives to modernity?