# Weber HT---NDT 6 vs Dartmouth CC

## 1AC

### 1AC---NDT

#### The mythos of “the West” and the supposed “western psychic imaginary” is persistently haunted by the struggle between Dionysus and Apollo: order and chaos do not exist in this sense in simple binary opposition, or as a mere dialectical synthesis, rather Apollo must annihilate Dionysus without remainder, because any remnant represents a destabilization of sensible reality and a threat to the linearity of time, there must be one single progressive ascent to absolute order, this narrative however is unstable, constantly incapable of holding together, always threatened by the god with a thousand faces, in incalculable spaces, unnamable in Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Dutch, English, ENGLISH, Binary Code, C++, JAVA, each new code, vulnerable to viruses, to Trojan Horses, to the Lakota hiding in the mountains, loose the arrows! The grid is far too vulnerable to a well-placed attack! Rolling black-outs, rolling from the hills like so many bare chested Gallic warriors, time keeps repeating, circling back on itself, ERROR! Thirteen threats have been detected to this 1ac, would you like to run a scan for a one-time charge 9 dollars and 99 cents worth of winter blankets, ERROR! Closing this window leaves this 1ac vulnerable to a small band of Lakota gathering on pine ridge, click this link to send in the black helicopters, TIME keeps circling back on itself, Dionysus and Apollo.

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 10-13)

This binary logic, in other words, empowers the privi­leged term to represent the Other as nonbeing (spectral), as some kind of arbitrary threat to Being—the benign total order to which the first term is committed — and thus to subdue and appropriate this Other to the latter's essential truth. It is in this sense that one can say that West­ern metaphysical thinking is essentially a colonialism. By this, I do not simply mean, as does much postcolonial discourse that acknowledges in some degree the polyvalency of the imperial project, a metaphor ap­propriated to the thought of being (or of any site on the continuum of being other than the economic or political) from another "more practi­cal and fundamental" — "real" — domain of reference." In identifying Western metaphysical thought with colonialism, I am positing a literal and precise definition of the process of metaphysical inquiry. The binary logic endemic to the very idea of the West had its origins, according to Heidegger, in late antiquity with the Romans' coloniza­tion of Greek (the vestiges of pre-Socratic) thinking, with, that is, their reduction of the originative thinking of the latter to a derivative (con-structed) understanding of truth. More specifically, the provenance of this logic lies in the imperial Romans' politically strategic translation of a-letheia to veritas, truth as always already un-concealment to truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence of mind and thing." This epochal reduction of an originative to a re-presentational mode of thinking— a thinking that places the force of being before one as a thing to be looked at — was calculatively determined by a relatively concep­tualized understanding of the operations of metaphysical perception. In decisively establishing the binary opposition between the true and the false as the ground of thinking, this reduction also decisively established the ground for the eventual assimilation of an infinite relay of different but analogous oppositions into the totalized epistemic binary logic of the Western tradition. Under the aegis of the doctrine of the adaequatio, it was not only the binary opposition between Truth and falsehood that empowered the correction or appropriation or reformation or disciplin­ing or accommodation or civilizing, which is to say, the colonization, of the "errant" or "deformed" or "wasteful" or "excessive" or "im­mature" (uncultivated) or "barbarous" or "feminine" force named in the second, demonized term. As the very metaphors used to character­ize the "false" suggest, that opposition was simply one — no doubt the most fundamental — of a whole series of binary oppositions inhering, however asymmetrically developed, in History, in, that is, the founding Occidental representation of temporal being-as-a-whole by way of per­ceiving "it" meta-ta-physika: Being and time, Identity and difference, the Word and words, Being and nonbeing, Subject and object, Sanity and madness, Culture and anarchy, Civilization and barbarism, Man and woman, the White race and the colored races, the West and the east, the North and the south, and so on. What this emphatically suggests is that an oppositional criticism that would be adequate to the task of resisting imperialism must cease to think the imperial project in the disciplinary terms endemic to and mandated by the Occident's compartmentalization of being and knowledge.

#### Offensive Cyber Operations are an attempt to colonize the internet, and the language justifying them worships Apollo, and subjugates us to Apollo’s fears all over again

Paganini, 13

(Pierluigi Paganini, Editor-in-Chief at Cyber Defense Magazine. “Does the US really think to leverage preemptive cyber attacks as a deterrent?” <http://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/are-us-really-thinking-to-preemptive-cyber-attacks-as-deterrent/>) Henge

There are a great number of activities in cyber space, whereby governments are secretly conducting a huge quantity of cyber operations, and every day we read about malicious code used to steal sensible information or about cyber attacks that targeted critical infrastructures. The principal questions raised by so fervent activities are the rules of engagement and proportionality of the defense, which is the operative limit of countries that discover an attack against its networks? Is it thinkable to assume the introduction of machines in the decision-making process of defense? Recently many cases have highlighted an intense cyber espionage activity against US Governments and private industries having the principal intent to steal sensible information, the principal suspect is of course the China due the characteristic techniques adopted by the hackers. Obviously this is just the tip of the iceberg and same US are also very active in the cyberspace, but recently the Obama administration’s finding that the president has the power to order a preemptive cyber attacks to discourage those who violate the networks of the country, in particular to Chinese government which remains unresponsive to U.S. efforts to mitigate the cyber offensives originated from the country. Last Sunday The New York Times published and interesting article on the possibility that President Obama could order a strike to respond to imminent cyber threats against national critical infrastructures. The measure is limited to Homeland security menaced by threats that affect assets critical for the country and does not cover attacks on private industry like cyber espionage. “New policies will also govern how the intelligence agencies can carry out searches of faraway computer networks for signs of potential attacks on the United States and, if the president approves, attack adversaries by injecting them with destructive code — even if there is no declared war.” The alert level is increased after the recent attacks to media agencies, continuous intrusions appear originated from countries and security experts are convinced that they are state-sponsored operations due the means and methods adopted. The discussion on a possible preemptive attacks is in my opinion a provocation, it’s clear that that both US and China are pursuing their cyber strategies and are respectively conscious of the cyber capabilities of their adversaries, the declarations are a public admission of failure of diplomatic efforts spent by the governments, nothing more. It’s clear that US could increase pressure on China requiring for example major purchases of Chinese goods go through national security reviews, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), but is very different from the organization of a cyber attacks for demonstrative purpose. Is Obama’s administration really willing to give up so prolific commercial relationship? “Adam Segal wrote in a blog post that China has responded by saying through the People’s Daily that the administration’s position could trigger a worldwide arms race.” The U.S. threat of a pre-emptive strike difficultly will discourage foreign governments, contrary it could increase risk overall, many other governments could be interested to induce to think that the attacks come from China or from other hostile nations, in these case the preemptively attack could be addressed against the wrong targets due the difficulty to localize the real identity of the attackers. We must also consider that governments will continue to operate secretly in cyber space also on the offensive front, that statements of a pre-emptive attack are only a warning to the world that is intended to alert on the cyber capabilities of the country. Why take the paternity of a pre-emptive strike when nations attack today in absolute silence? Cyber weaponry is the most complex arms race under way, US government has promoted the born of a new Cyber Command, and many other governments are spending similar effort, declaration of preemptive cyber attack are useless but while a lot of words are spent on what constitutes reasonable and proportionate use of cyber force, cyber arms all over the world are sharpening their weapons. A cyber war is much more subtle and dangerous than preemptive cyber attack!

#### The Socratic reason of the world is rooted in distaste for tragedy and a fear of instability---the attempt to create constancy and resolve universal contradiction only internalizes suffering and ressentiment

Saurette ‘96 [Paul, 1996 “I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.” Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6]

The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order: ‘I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack of integrity.’ According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence. However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. ‘Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstruin in animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates’ thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself the old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘[r]ationality was divined as a saviour... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational...’ Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a ‘Real World’ of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an ‘Apparent World’ of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely ‘modern” understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World, This outlook created a modem notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and argues that it signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—you alone are to blame for yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered.’Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, ‘one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....” The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for ‘the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering’.’3 According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World, The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment, of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self- perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, “[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.’

#### When Apollonian time stretches across a new space it must envelope it, master it, cover it with a blue crash-screen, all chaotic space must be territorialized and re-territorialized, spatialized and re-spatialized, and so the great expanse of the INTERNET lay out in front of the colonizers, “this my friends is the West, some call it wild, some call it dangerous, I see the future, shining and paved, orderly, with all of the necessary fences, but first it must be cleared of all ‘undesirables,’ it is our destiny,” then a man with a thick Spanish accent exclaimed, “ from this vantage point I can see everything, we must identify each unique user, track their activity and identify their allegiances, unless otherwise cleared, consider each an enemy, all threats must be immediately dealt with pre-emptively”

Bittarello 2009

(Maria Beatrice, independent scholar and PHD in cultural/religious studies, “Spatial Metaphors describing the Internet and religious Websites: sacred Space and sacred Place” Observatorio Journal, 11, 2009, odekirkian)

Ratzan (2000) mentions several spatial metaphors used to define the Internet, such as "information superhighway"5, “wild west”, or frontier. Other spatial metaphors involve the concept of travel; these include descriptions of the Internet as 'wide endless road' (Ratzan 2000), or expressions such as "travels in cyberspace", or "net-surfing". As Wertheim (1999,24) notes, in the expression "surfing the Net", the Internet is likened to the Ocean, suggesting that it is a space where there are neither boundaries nor stability. The image of the Internet as Ocean is also suggested by the terms used in other languages to indicate the "net-surfing": in Italian, for instance, the favourite expression is "navigare" (to navigate a ship). And, one of the first browsers was called 'Navigator' (i.e. steerman). Superhighway, wild west, frontier, or cyberspace all allude to a 'physical' space, which is defined in generic terms, and presented as open to exploration (or conquest)6.¶ Other metaphors point to a representation of the Internet, or of its 'components' as a static, fixed, and well delimited space. For instance, on the Internet we find websites, and each of them may be formed by web-pages. Also, some websites constitute focal points of the Internet structure and are called nodes, which is a synonym of knots. The term "web-site" suggests the idea of localised space, of web-place; web- page suggests that such spaces are nothing else than the pages of a book; node could be connected to the 'spider-web' metaphor, as links connect in nodes. A further spatial metaphor indicating a well- delimited space is 'home-page', the expression used to indicate the initial page of a website. All pages have a top and a bottom, thus indicating precise spatial coordinates (high/low). Of course, there are chat- rooms on the Internet, and surfers can open or close windows, and jump from a page to the next.¶ Some metaphors hint to a representation of the Internet as a 'space beyond', or as an 'other dimension': on the Internet we find portals, and gateways through which we can access other websites (i.e. further 'spaces'). These metaphors point to the definition of the Internet as space for access and communication, but also as structured and complex space. Metaphors such as firewall, instead, suggest that communication can be controlled and 'physically' blocked; a metaphor such as blogo-sphere alludes to a specific, well-rounded space, distinct from other spaces devoted to different activities.¶ Ratzan (2000) notes that users have also described the Internet as bookstore or library, and, as Rollason (2004) has pointed out, some commentators have indeed represented the Internet as the incarnation of the Babel Library originally described by Jorge Louis Borges in 1941. Borges (1970, 78) describes the Babel Library as a "universe" and as a sort of labyrinth of “galleries", whose number could even be infinite. As Dawson & Hennebry report (2004, 152), the Internet has indeed been described as a labyrinth of “electronic tunnels" in an article by the New York Times. The metaphor of the labyrinth is particularly interesting, because, just like Borges's Library, the Web (as well as the digital databases it hosts) has been conceived as the space where human knowledge is physically stored (library), and even as the summa of the human knowledge to date (cf. Colombo 1986).¶ In describing cyberspace, Gibson (1984, 67-68) uses primarily the metaphor of the matrix, but also other metaphors that accumulate images of natural and artificial (i.e. human-built) spaces, such as forest, ferns, clusters, spyral, constellations, stepped pyramid . Metaphors adopted by Internet users, and reported by Palmquist (2000), such as those describing the Internet as town hall, village, or marketplace point to a representation of the Internet as urban setting, where human beings live, and human activities take place. The term forum hints to another well-delimited public space, where exchanges can take place--forum comes from a Latin word indicating a public place that hosted several political and productive activities. Leigh (2000) notes that the Internet can be described as global and virtual city. All the metaphors used by Gibson, as well as the labyrinth and city metaphor present the Internet as a complex, well-articulated space, which needs to be interpreted (labyrinth), and mapped (city), because it is formed by a number of different places (such as a ferns, a forest, and clusters), which could even possess an esoteric meaning (pyramid, constellation, and labyrinth).¶ If cyberspace is a space, it can be 'mapped'. Dodge and Kotchin (2001, 3) have significantly entitled their interesting book Atlas of Cyberspace, even if, as the authors make clear, cyberspace is not a space, but a variety of media, which can be programmed to “adopt the formal qualities of geographic (Euclidean) space”.¶ Internet as mythical sacred space¶ Once the immaterial reality of the Internet is conceptualised as space, this space can also be presented as a mythical sacred space, even in academic analyses. As Graham (2002, 65-80) has highlighted, in the late 1990s some scholars have metaphorically spoken of the Internet as a new kind of sacred space (Davis), a "place of salvation and transcendence" (Robins), a "heavenly city of Revelation" (Benedikt); others have defined it a "charmed site" (Kroker Wenstein), or a "portal to another world" (Lieb). Childress (1999) has noted that the Internet can be compared to the Celtic 'otherworld'--i.e. as a world completely detached from the dimension where real life takes place. As Davis (1995) and Hume (1998) have documented, Technopagans have sometimes conceptualized the Internet as a magical plane that gives access to other realities. In conclusion, several scholars and commentators have often ascribed to the Internet, in the 1990s, the features of a mythical sacred space (heaven, otherworld, or magical plane). This is an especially interesting aspect because, as Ratzan (2000) notes, 'expert' users tend to adopt spatial metaphors with a metaphysical content, metaphors that connect the Internet to transcendence, such as, for example, 'new dimension', or 'world' that does not exist in physical space, but 'in consciousness'. Nonetheless, whereas some academics such as Brasher (2001) appear to (implicitly) support such conceptualizations of the Internet, other scholars, such as, for example, Cowan (2005, 54ff) and Flichy (2007) have pointed out how this is a rhetoric heavily pushed by the industry, and one that serves precise economic and political interests. This aspect deserves attention, because it is consistent with Jameson's argument that the postmodern stress on space is the expression of a specific cultural imperialism.¶ There is a further conception of the Internet that seems to be closely connected to its conceptualization as 'mythical sacred space'. This is the representation of the Internet as "technological sublime". Bingham(1999) has taken into account several studies on the technological sublime, its connections with the Romantic movement, and its adoption to describe a number of new media, especially in the early stages of their introduction. As Bingham (1999) points out, such representation has an ideological connection with the Western, masculinist concepts of transcendence and of a monolithic Self, who can observe the world from an external, privileged and detached position—the position of the surfer, who travels in the new space.

#### The vicious ressentiment of counterterror preemption obliterates all of life’s value

Siemens and Shapiro in 2008

(Herman, Assistant Professor for the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Leiden, and Gary, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Richmond, “What Does Nietzsche Mean for Contemporary Politics and Political Thought?”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 35/36, Spring/Autumn, pMUSE, rcheek)

Does Fukuyama offer a genuine alternative on the questions of the “one” and the “direction of the earth”—or does the “end of history” thesis fall under Nietzsche’s geophilosophical critique of modernist, Eurocentric metanarratives issuing in technocratic utopias? There are certainly reasons for reading the end of history as a triumphalist metanarrative that advances the hegemony of the last man—in spite of Fukuyama. A good deal depends on what we make of the resources he locates and mobilizes against the narrative of the last man. Do they represent an alternative, a real source of resistance, or just an endless repetition of the fully functionalized worker/consumer? Fukuyama’s exemplars of megalothymia seem to be not only “tame,” as Sheikh concedes, but radically impoverished in comparison with Nietzsche’s “higher men” or “good Europeans,” whose signature features are hybridity, (inner and outer) multiplicity, and mobility. More importantly, Fukuyama’s identification of liberal democracy as a site of isothymia looks like wishful thinking when set against Nietzsche’s strongest formulations of contemporary nihilism. In an important Nachlass note Nietzsche argues that under modern economic-technological conditions of exploitation, human life suffers an overall loss of value, worth, or quality: “der Mensch wird geringer” (KSA 12:10[17]). The loss of commanding and sense-giving powers that accompanies the democratic processes of “contraction” and “leveling” signifies a value reduction (Werth-Verringerung) of the human type, that is, a loss of intrinsic human value or worth. Clearly, this thesis undermines the conditions for isothymia, understood as mutual recognition of intrinsic worth. If nihilism signifies this loss of intrinsic human value or worth for Nietzsche, its sources lie in a problem of the will—the loss of commanding and sense-giving powers. The thymiotic accounts of the last man and the correctives proposed by Fukuyama seem to overlook this problem completely. As Sheikh remarks in closing, the question of nihilism is the battleground for the endgame between Fukuyama and Nietzsche.¶ Tracy Strong’s article articulates the deep structure of Nietzsche’s political thought by exploring the connections of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy. If philosophy is itself a tyrannizing force by imposing its meanings on the world and blinding itself to the limits of this imposition, then tragedy can balance this tendency by disclosing the impossibility of the tyrannical project, whether [End Page 6] political or philosophical. Strong shows how Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity is about a world in which tragedy is no longer part of the public sphere (itself a replacement for the agon of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy). If tragedy is a way of fending off tyranny, Socratic rationalism, which constitutes tragedy’s death and rules in its aftermath, opens the door once more to the pursuit of a total explanation, in other words, to the search for the tyrant. Thus, the modern world sets itself up for a succession of tyrannical projects. Confirmation of Strong’s assessment of George W. Bush as a tyrant can be found in current U.S. policy of preemptive war as a new realization of the tyrannical fixation of meaning. The view that war is justified as the elimination of threats that might materialize in the future, of virtual or possible threats, presupposes a strange sense of the future as already visible. The future that preemption fears or anticipates may be brought into existence by the act of preemption itself in Iraq; preemptive war creates its own evidence by assembling terrorists enabled by a “war on terrorism.” Here we might be reminded of the ironic relation that the Greeks saw between tyrants and oracles (consider the stories of Herodotus as a commentary on the uses of “intelligence”). Thinking they knew the future, tyrants and despots launched disastrous wars and occupations in which they were both protagonist and victim. As Strong emphasizes in an allegorical reading of John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance and in his remarks on the current Bush presidency, the project of overcoming tyranny requires a renewed sense of community tempered by tragic wisdom.¶ In “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the ‘Innocence of Becoming’: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the ‘Falling Man,’” Joanne Faulkner takes up the question of agency that Strong invites when he closes his essay by saying, “[t]hat murder is not possible does not mean that we must be helpless.” Faulkner argues that the hegemonic first-person post–9/11 narrative in the United States revolves around the concept of a victimized innocence, a self-image that is then used to support projects of revenge (however arbitrary and costly in life and treasure) and accepts the authority of a state of exception wherein real liberties are sacrificed for promised security. Why, she asks, were images of those who fell or jumped from the Twin Towers quickly suppressed in the media? Because, she answers, they could be read as exhibiting a moment of decision and the possibility of agency even in the most desperate and limited circumstances. The jumpers complicate the image of innocence and victimhood. Faulkner interprets the dominant U.S. narrative in terms of Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment; if we are innocent victims, then we gladly seek revenge by ceding our powers to a higher authority. Nietzsche’s alternative concept of the Unschuld des Werdens suggests the possibility of acting outside the cycle of debt and guilt. Here innocence—Unschuld—is understood as freedom from that kind of moral thinking; accepting the innocence of becoming is “integral to the skillful exercise of agency” and [End Page 7] to making “a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment.” Faulkner shows how Nietzsche’s thought on agency can contribute to the critical analysis of the rhetoric of good and evil, the suspension of constitutional liberties, and the abrogation of international agreements that characterize the “global war on terror.”

#### Attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

#### Risk-assessment of future threats is based in incomplete information---this temporal logic devalues the present to preserve the future

Stockdale, 10

(Liam Stockdale, Ph.D. in International Relations, Department of Political Science, McMaster University. “Securitizing the Future? A Critical Interrogation of the Pre-emptive Turn in the Theory and Practice of Contemporary Security” <https://www.academia.edu/430468/Securitizing_the_Future_A_Critical_Interrogation_of_the_Pre-Emptive_Turn_In_the_Theory_and_Practice_of_Contemporary_Security>) Henge

As mentioned above, an utexplicitly temporal element has underwritten the development of security practices in the post-9/11 era, and this trend is particularly evident in the activities of what are popularly termed “liberal” or “Western” states.2 Indeed, empirically speaking, the majority of the pre-emptive practices with which I am here concerned take place either within the context of the WOT—such as the indefinite detention of terror suspects without charge (Mutimer 2007)—or vis-à-vis the purported threat of large inflows of migrants—exemplified by the myriad detention centres on the periphery of the EU and by Australia’s so-called “pacific solution” of mandatory pre-emptive detention (Isin & Rygiel 2007, L. Weber 2007). These issues represent top security concerns for states that are conventionally identified as liberal democratic polities, and therefore the pre-emptive practices upon which I focus most often originate from the sovereign decisions undertaken by the governments and security agents of such states. This is important in theoretical terms because the fact that it is precisely states which are “avowedly liberal democratic states, openly committed to the rule of law” (Mutimer 2007) that are behind the types of pre-emptive practices I seek to problematize renders the logic underlying such acts—and perhaps even the concept of the liberal polity itself in the current security moment—quite problematic. This latter point will be central to the second half of the paper—and will be discussed in greater depth below in relation to Derrida’s notion of autoimmunity—and thus a more detailed discussion of pre-emption as it is practiced by contemporary liberal polities is warranted at this juncture. While the idea of pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine in US foreign policymaking—most clearly exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption— is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations alone. Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, the logic of pre-emption can be seen to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment, to the point where the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption” (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of safeguarding the future from what may occur by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus pursued by attempting to “police the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will no longer be of concern (Bigo 2007: 31). Accordingly, the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over the temporal dimension of human existence. Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008: 149). The crucial point is that a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in instrumental terms as a site of intervention through which this ultimate aim might be realized. As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption, the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). The result is that the proverbial door is opened for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the present, since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/ precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be ensured. Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus generating “an insatiable quest for knowledge” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information related to potential future dangers (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts, however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de Goede 2008). This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of risk management premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” whereby sovereign decisions relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken are made solely on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion or highly arbitrary (and often highly racialized) calculations regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102). Accordingly, the pre-emptive practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an crucial component of the pursuit of security. The securitization of the future thus necessitates the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

## 2AC

### AT---Cyberwar Args

#### This threat perception is flawed

Cavelty, 12

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Over the last few years, cyber security has been catapulted from the confined realm of technical experts into the political limelight. The discovery of the industry-sabotaging Stuxnet computer worm, numerous tales of (Chinese) cyber espionage, the growing sophistication of cyber criminals, and the well-publicised activities of hacker collectives have combined to give the impression that cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised, more costly, and altogether more dangerous. As a result, a growing number of countries consider cyber security to be one of the top security issues of the future. This is just the latest ‘surge’ of attention in the three- to four-decade-long history of cyber issues. The importance attached to cyber security in politics grew steadily in response to a continual parade of incidents such as computer viruses, data theft, and other penetrations of networked computer systems, which, combined with heightening media attention, created the feeling that the level of cyber insecurity was on the rise. As a result, the debate spread in two directions: upwards, from the expert level to executive decision-makers and politicians; and horizontally, advancing from mainly being an issue of relevance to the US to the top of the threat list of more and more countries. The debate on ‘cyber security’ originated in the US in the 1970s, built momentum in the late 1980s, and spread to other countries in the late 1990s. Early on, US policy-makers politicised the issue. They presented cyber security as a matter that requires the attention of state actors because it cannot be solved by market forces. As concern increased, they securitised the issue: They represented it as a challenge requiring the urgent attention of the national security apparatus. In 2010, against the background of the Stuxnet incident, the tone and intensity of the debate changed even further: The latest trend is to frame cyber security as a strategic-military issue and to focus on countermeasures such as cyber offence and defence, or cyber deterrence. Though this trend can easily be understood when considering the political (and psychological) effects of Stuxnet, it nonetheless invokes images of a supposed adversary even though there is no identifiable enemy, is too strongly focused on national security measures instead of economic and business solutions, and wrongly suggests that states can establish control over cyberspace. Not only does this create an unnecessary atmosphere of insecurity and tension in the international system, it is also based on a severe misperception of the nature and level of cyber risk and on the feasibility of different protection measures. While it is undisputed that the cyber dimension will play a substantial role in future conflicts of all grades and shades, threat-representations must remain well informed and well balanced at all times in order to rule out policy reactions with excessively high costs and uncertain benefits. This chapter first describes the core elements of the cyber security debate that emerged over the past decades. These elements provide the stage and scenery for the more recent trend of increasing militarisation of cyber security. Five factors responsible for this trend are described in section two. The effects of the discovery of Stuxnet as the culmination point of the cyber threat story are the focus of section three: Though the actual (physical) damage of Stuxnet remains limited, it had very real and irreversible political effects. The fourth section critically assesses the assumptions underlying the trend of militarisation and their negative effects. The chapter concludes by arguing that military countermeasures will not be able to play a significant role in cyber security due to the nature of the information environment and the nature of the threat. Finally, it sketches the specific, though limited role that military apparatuses can and should play in reducing the overall level of cyber insecurity nationally and internationally. The backdrop of the cyber security debate The combination of telecommunications with computers in the late 1970s and the 1980s – the basis of the current information revolution – marks the beginning of the cyber threat debate. The launch and subsequent spread of the personal computer created a rise in tech-savvy individuals, some of whom started to use the novel networked environment for various sorts of misdeeds. In the 1990s, the information domain became a force multiplier by combining the risks to cyberspace (widespread vulnerabilities in the information infrastructure) with the possibility of risks through cyberspace (actors exploiting these vulnerabilities). The two core elements of the cyber security debate that provide the stable backdrop for the current trend of militarisation emerged: A main focus on highly vulnerable critical infrastructures as ‘referent object’ (that which is seen in need of protection) and the threat representation based on the inherent insecurity of the information infrastructure and the way it could be manipulated by technologically skilful individuals. From government networks to critical infrastructures Initially, the overarching concern of the US was with the classified information residing in government information systems. As computer networks grew and spread into more and more aspects of everyday life, this focus changed. A link was established in the strategic community between cyber threats and so-called ‘critical infrastructures’, which is the name given to assets whose incapacitation or destruction could have a debilitating impact on the national security and/ or economic and social welfare of the entire nation. This threat perception was influenced by the larger strategic context that emerged for the US after the Cold War. It was characterised by more dynamic geostrategic conditions, more numerous areas and issues of concern, and smaller, more agile, and more diverse adversaries. As a result of the difficulties to locate and identify enemies, the focus of security policies partly shifted away from actors, capabilities, and motivations to general vulnerabilities of the entire society. In addition, the influence of globalisation on the complex interdependence of societies around the world and their growing technological sophistication led to a focus on security problems of a transnational and/or technological nature. The combination of vulnerabilities, technology, and transnational issues brought critical infrastructures to centre stage, particularly because they were becoming increasingly dependent on the smooth functioning of all sorts of computer-related applications, such as software-based control systems. The basic nature of the cyber threat The networked information environment – or cyberspace – is pervasively insecure, because it was never built with security in mind. The dynamic globalisation of information services in connection with technological innovation led to a steady increase of connectivity and complexity. The more complex an IT system is, the more problems it contains and the harder it is to control or manage its security. The commercialisation of the Internet led to an even further security deficit, as there are significant marketdriven obstacles to IT security. These increasingly complex and global information networks seemed to make it much easier to attack the US asymmetrically: Potentially devastating attacks now only required a computer with an Internet connection and a handful of ‘hackers’, members of a distinct social group (or subculture) who are particularly skilled programmers or technical experts. In the borderless environment of cyberspace, hackers can exploit computer insecurities in various ways. In particular, digitally stored information can be delayed, disrupted, corrupted, destroyed, stolen, or modified. Intruders can also leave ‘backdoors’ to come back at a later time, or use the hijacked machine for attacks on other machines. Though most individuals would be expected to lack the motivation to cause violence or severe economic or social harm, large sums of money might sway them to place their specialised knowledge at the disposal of actors with hostile intent like terrorists or foreign states. In addition, attackers have little to fear in terms of retribution. Sophisticated cyber attacks cannot be attributed to a particular perpetrator, particularly not within a short timespan. The main reasons are the often hidden nature of exploits and the general architecture of cyberspace, which allows online identities to be hidden. Five developments that speed up militarisation The basics as described above provided a stable setting for the cyber security debate at least since the mid-1990s, if not before. Five developments as described below have solidified the impression that cyber disturbances are increasingly dangerous and fall under the purview of national security. The discovery of Stuxnet is the culmination point in this evolution. It has brought about a qualitative and irreversible change in how the issue is handled politically: Its discovery has catapulted the cyber issue from the expert level to the diplomatic and foreign policy realm. First, computer security professionals are increasingly concerned with the rising level of professionalisation coupled with the obvious criminal (or even strategic) intent behind attacks. Tech-savvy individuals (often juveniles) aiming to create mischief or personally enrich themselves shaped the early history of computer-related crime. Today, professionals dominate the field. Actors in the ‘cyber crime black market’ are highly organised in terms of their strategic and operational vision, logistics, and deployment. Like many legitimate companies, they operate across the globe. As a consequence, the nature of malware has changed. Advanced malware is targeted: A hacker picks a victim, examines the defences, and then designs specific malware to get around them. The most prominent example for this kind of malware is Stuxnet (see below). Second, the main cyber ‘enemy’ in the form of a state has been singled out: There is an increase in allegations that China is responsible for cyber espionage in the form of high-level penetrations of government and business computer systems, in Europe, North America, and Asia. Because Chinese authorities have stated repeatedly that they consider cyberspace a strategic domain and that they hope that mastering it will equalise the existing military imbalance between China and the US more quickly (see Chapter 1 in this publication), many US officials readily accuse the Chinese government of perpetrating deliberate and targeted attacks or intelligence-gathering operations. However, because of the attribution problem, these allegations almost exclusively rely on anecdotal and circumstantial evidence. Not only can attackers hide, it is also impossible to know an attacker’s motivation or to know a person’s affiliation or sponsorship, even if the individuals were known. Therefore, attacks and exploits that seemingly benefit states might well be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. At the same time, the attribution challenge also conveniently allows state actors to distance themselves officially from attacks.

#### No Israeli strikes

Porter 12 Gareth Porter, investigative journalist and historian specializing in US national security policy, “How Netanyahu's bomb Iran ploy failed,” Al-Jazeera, 10/4/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210493522531400.html

The rest of the world can stop worrying about Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's supposed threat to bomb Iran. Netanyahu's speech at the United Nations General Assembly last week appears to mark the end of his long campaign to convince the world that he might launch a unilateral strike on Iran’s nuclear programme. The reason for Netanyahu's retreat is the demonstration of unexpectedly strong pushback against Netanyahu’s antics by President Barack Obama. And that could be the best news on the Iran nuclear issue in many years. Commentary on Netanyahu's speech predictably focused on his cartoon bomb and hand-drawn "red line", but its real significance lay in the absence of the usual suggestion that a unilateral strike against Iran might be necessary if the Iranian nuclear programme is not halted. Although he offered yet another alarmist portrayal of Iran poised to move by next summer to the "final stage" of uranium enrichment, nowhere in the speech did Netanyahu even hint at such a threat. His explicit aim was to get the US to adopt his "red line" - meaning that it would threaten military force against Iran if it does not bow to a demand to cease enrichment. Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, whom Netanyahu had twice used to convey to the US his purported readiness to go to war with Iran, called it a "concession speech". Netanyahu conceded, in effect, that his effort to force the US to accept his red line had failed completely. Although Netanyahu has been generally perceived as deadly serious about the threat of war against Iran, there is good reason to doubt that Netanyahu and Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak ever intended to attack Iran. A review of the record of statements by Netanyahu and Barak on Iran reveals that both of them have carefully avoided issuing an actual threat to attack Iran under any circumstances. In fact, Netanyahu has been distinctly more cautious in that regard than his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, whose government twice issued actual military threats against Iran - in February 2006 and again in June 2008. A former Israeli official who requested anonymity confirmed to me last spring that people who had worked under Netanyahu as well as under Olmert and Ariel Sharon had found Netanyahu "less decisive" on Iran than either of those former prime ministers. Despite Olmert's much more explicit threats of attack on Iran, we now know from US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks to Haaretz newspaper that on December 2, 2005, American diplomats had reported that their conversations with Israeli officials indicated that there is no chance of a military attack being carried out on Iran. Israel's 'red line' option Even more telling, before his retirement as IDF Chief of General Staff in February 2011, General Gabi Ashkenazi told then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen that all the talk about the Israeli military option against Iran by Netanyahu and Barak was "empty words", because "Israel has no military option", according to a report by Shimon Shiffer of Yedioth Ahronoth. The evidence now available indicates that the Netanyahu campaign about a unilateral strike on Iran was from the beginning a bluff aimed at pressuring President Barack Obama to adopt both "crippling sanctions" against Iran's oil export sector and an explicit threat of war if Iran did not end its nuclear programme. Netanyahu had successfully manipulated the Clinton administration on the Oslo "peace process", and in 2001, unaware he was being recorded, he said, "America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. They won't get in the way". He evidently calculated in late 2011 that his pressure on Obama would be amplified by a majority of the US Congress, which the powerful pro-Israel lobby AIPAC had repeatedly mobilised in support of legislation desired. Obama's vulnerability to such pressures would at its maximum during the Presidential election campaign season of 2012, according to Netanyahu's calculation. It was no accident that Defence Minister Ehud Barak suggested in an interview with CNN last November that Israel would be forced to make a decision on war either during the summer or fall of 2012. There was no objective, technical reason but an obvious political logic for suggesting such timing. The Republican Party’s candidate could be expected to be heavily dependent on Sheldon Adelson, the same big funder who had bankrolled Netanyahu’s own campaign. During late 2011 and the first half of 2012, the Obama administration was ostensibly alarmed by what was widely viewed as a Netanyahu threat of unilateral action. When the US and Israel agreed in mid-January to postpone a joint military exercise originally scheduled for early Spring, US defence officials and former officials lined up to tell Yahoo news reporter Laura Rozen and Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic off the record that they feared Israel was planning an attack during that period. And in early February, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius reported that Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta was alarmed about a possible Israeli attack between April and June. But there was more to those apparent expressions of alarm than met the eye. Panetta was making the threat of an Israeli attack during those months seem more credible than it really was, and he was doing so without any pushback against it. Those were tell-tale indications that the Obama administration was using the supposed threat of a unilateral Israeli attack to increase the pressure on Iran in advance of the negotiations between Iran and the "P5+1" scheduled for the spring. As the Republican Party prepared to nominate Netanyahu's old friend Mitt Romney as its presidential candidate, all the pieces seemed to be in place for Netanyahu to maximise the impact of his Iran war bluff. Two weeks before the convention, Netanyahu and Barak telegraphed their intention to convert their campaign into decisive influence over US Iran policy. In an interview with Ynet news on August 11, an unnamed "senior official in Jerusalem" offered an explicit deal with the Obama administration: Netanyahu would "reconsider" Israel's unilateral attack option if Obama would adopt Israel’s red line - meaning that he would threaten to attack Iran if it had not agreed to stop its enrichment by a date certain. US resistance to 'pressure tactic' But Netanyahu met unexpectedly firm US resistance to his pressure tactic. On August 30, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talking with reporters in the UK, said an Israeli strike on Iran would be ineffective, and then dropped an unexpected bomb. "I don't want to be complicit it they [the Israelis] choose to do it," Dempsey said. That Dempsey comment was the first public rebuke to Netanyahu and Barak, and former Israeli national security adviser Giora Eiland was emphatic about its impact on Netanyahu's strategy. "Israeli officials cannot do anything in the face of a very explicit 'no' from the US president," he said. Netanyahu had been arguing all year that the US "might not like" an Israeli attack, but that it would "accept it the day after". But after such a "public, bold statement" by Dempsey, Eiland said, "the situation had to be reassessed". Netanyahu and Barak were now "exploring what space is left to operate". That space had shrunk even further, moreover, because the Republican convention in Tampa Bay from August 27 to 30 failed to make an American ultimatum to Iran, as demanded by Netanyahu, a central theme of the convention. The only major foreign policy figure to speak at the convention was Condoleezza Rice, who had been reviled by the neoconservative allies of Israel for favouring diplomatic engagement with Iran. Obama and other senior US officials had clearly decided it was time to cut off Netanyahu’s ham-handed effort at pressure on US policy at the knees. In an interview with Bloomberg Radio on September 9 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, "We're not setting deadlines". And when Netanyahu pushed Obama in a phone conversation on September 11 to adopt his "red line" - a threat to attack Iran if it refused to comply with demands by the P5+1 - Obama flatly rejected the demand, according to American sources. Three days later, Panetta told Foreign Policy magazine, "Red lines are kind of political arguments that are used to put people in a corner". Asked by CBS 60 Minutes on September 24 whether he felt any pressure from Netanyahu's efforts to change US policy toward Iran, Obama replied that the only pressure he felt was to "do what is right for the American people, then added, "And I am going to block out any noise that's out there". And in an unmistakable signal by Obama that Netanyahu should end his meddling in US politics and policy, the White House even rebuffed a Netanyahu request for a meeting during his upcoming US trip, as the Israelis leaked to the news media. Haaretz editor Aluf Benn has suggested that Netanyahu's UN speech reflected not only the Obama administration's rebuff but the realities of Israeli public opinion. He wrote that the Prime Minister had tailored his speech to polls showing that Israelis wanted the US to handle the problem of Iran, not Israel. Benn summarised the public's verdict: "Not now and not alone".

#### Netenyahu doesn’t have requisite consensus

Leverett and Leverett 12 Flynt Leverett, professor of international affairs at Penn State and senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, and Hillary Mann Leverett, professor at American University and CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis, a political risk consultancy, “Flynt Leverett on Israeli and Iranian Decision-Making,” The Race for Iran, 9/9/2012, http://www.raceforiran.com/flynt-leverett-on-israeli-and-iranian-decision-making

Asked about the prospects for a unilateral Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear targets, perhaps even before the U.S. presidential election on November 6, Flynt argues that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is compelled to deal with two significant constraints on his decision-making. The first is a “capacity constraint”: the Israeli military, on its own, simply cannot do that much damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is a constraint that Netanyahu or any other Israeli prime minister would have to face; it helps to explain why the leadership of Israel’s military and intelligence services and most of Israel’s national security establishment is so strongly opposed to the idea of a unilateral attack. Of course, this is not an absolute barrier facing Netanyahu; one cannot categorically say that he and his colleagues would never decide to do something strategically counter-productive or at odds with material reality. But, in this case, material reality does make such a decision harder. The second constraint that Netanyahu must deal with is a political one. Broadly speaking, the prime minister of Israel does not have the same measure of “commander-in-chief” authority as an American president. (Actually, the U.S. Constitution would suggest that American presidents should not have as much power in this regard as they currently wield, but that’s another issue.) Put more specifically, Netanyahu, on his own, does not have the authority to start a war, against Iran or anybody else. For a prime minister to start a war, he must have, at a minimum, the defense minister on board; with Ehud Barak currently holding the defense portfolio, that is probably not an insuperable obstacle. Beyond this, however, historically-conditioned expectations in Israel are that a prime minister will also have very strong consensus within an eight-member inner cabinet and a larger, more formalized, committee on defense and security affairs within the cabinet. While outsiders do not have transparent access to the deliberations of these bodies, myriad indications coming from Israel suggest that Netanyahu, today, does not have the requisite degree of consensus to order an attack on the Islamic Republic. We have argued before that Netanyahu’s ultimate goal is to line up the United States to take on the mission of striking Iran militarily. But the Obama administration is not about to start an overt war against Iran before the U.S. presidential election (a covert war, of course, has been underway for some time). Netanyahu is playing a longer-term game than that. We anticipate that this game will come to a head in 2013—either with a re-elected President Obama or with a new Romney administration—not before November 6, 2012. Furthermore, as Flynt points out in the interview, scenarios of Israel launching a unilateral strike in the expectation that the United States will inevitably be “drawn in” depend on Israeli leaders making deeply confident assumptions about a multiplicity of variables (in Washington, Tehran, and elsewhere) completely beyond Israel’s control. Again, this is not to say that Netanyahu and his colleagues would never decide to do something strategically unwise. But, here too, material reality makes such a decision harder.

#### Threats are just talk to achieve political objectives

Reardon 12 Robert J. Reardon, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, PhD in political science from MIT, this paper was prepared as part of the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow program at RAND Corporation under the guidance and supervisor of a RAND mentor, “Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” RAND Corporation, 9/28/2012, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1180.pdf>

It is difficult to tell, however, where rhetoric ends and sincere commitments to military force begin. Israel has an interest in using the threat of a military attack as a way to apply pressure on the United States to pursue a resolution of the Iran nuclear crisis that favors Israel, and as a way to coerce Iran. 2 Israel also has an interest in keeping the Iran issue at the top of the United States’ list of priorities, and the threat of unilateral military action furthers that. In November 2011, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated that in nine months from that time, Iran could enter a “zone of immunity,” in which actions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons could become impossible.3 While it is unclear what specific thresholds Iran could cross with its program in that time, the issuance of a public deadline serves to put pressure on the Obama administration to act in the months before the 2012 presidential election. Yet in January 2012, Defense Minister Barak stated that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites was still “very far off.”4 Aside from Iran’s acquisition of a weapon, it is unclear what Israel’s red lines are, or under what circumstances the Israelis would be willing to carry out air strikes.

### 2AC---FW Top Level

#### Tragedy DA---radical democracy must be open to its own destruction

Hatab in 2002

(Lawrence J, Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans”, The Nietzsche Journal, pMUSE)

Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so, the charge raises important questions facing postmodern, and particularly Nietzschean, approaches to democratic politics. In my work I have tried to face this question, admit the difficulty, and suggest a "tragic" model of democratic openness, to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. [27](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT27) Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles, which themselves are incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. But from a historical perspective, despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. [28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT28) And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system, it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice.

### 2AC---Deliberation

#### True deliberation demands no rules---and it relies on rationality and idealism that agonism avoids

Mouffe, 99

(Chantal Mouffe, Belgian political theorist. “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971349>) Henge

There are many different versions of "deliberative democracy," but the most theoretically sophisticated one is the Habermasian and it is that model that I will examine here. Moreover it is also the model where the concept of "public sphere" is more fully elaborated and it is therefore particularly relevant for our concerns. In the approach elaborated by Habermas and his followers, the main purpose of deliberative democracy is to propose a reformulation in communicative terms of the classical notions of democratic theory, especially the concept of popular sovereignty. According to Seyla Benhabib for instance, one of the central issues to be addressed is how the articulation of the common good can be made compatible with the sovereignty of the people. In her view, the main challenge confronting democracy today lies in reconciling rationality with legitimacy. She puts it in the following way: According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decisions making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals {1996, p. 69). The basis of legitimacy in democratic institutions derives in this view from the fact that the instances that claim obligatory power do so on the presumption that their decisions represent an impartial standpoint that is equally in the interest of all. In order for this presumption to be fulfilled, those decisions must be the result of appropriate public processes of deliberation that follow the procedures of the Habermasian discourse model. The fundamental idea behind this model is that for the norms and institutional arrangements to be valid they should have been agreed by all affected by their consequences according to a process of deliberation whose features are defined by Benhabib in the following way: 1. Participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, interrogate, and to open debate; 2. All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 3. All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda or the conversation, nor the identity of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question (1996, p. 70). Let's examine this model of deliberative democracy closely. In their attempt to ground legitimacy on rationality its advocates must make a distinction that plays a key role in their approach, the distinction between "mere agreement" and "rational consensus." This commands the values of the procedure, which are impartiality and equality, openness (no one and no relevant information is excluded), lack of coercion, and unanimity. In combination, those values will guide the discussion towards gen eralizable interests to the agreement of all participants and they will produce legitimate outcomes. In other words, the process of public discussion can be guaranteed to have reasonable outcomes only to the extent that it realizes the conditions of ideal discourse: the more equal and impartial, the more open that process is and the less participants are coerced and ready to be guided by the force of the better argument, the more likely truly generalizable interests will be accepted by all persons relevantly affected. Habermas and his followers do not deny that there will be obstacles to the realization of the ideal discourse but these obstacles are conceived as empirical ones. They are due to the fact that it is unlikely, given the practical and empirical limitation of social life, that we will ever be completely able to leave aside all our particular interests in order to coincide with our universal rational self. This is why the ideal speech situation must be conceived as regulative idea. On the other side, Habermas now accepts that there are issues that have to remain outside the practices of rational public debates like existential issues that concern not questions of justice but of the good life, or conflicts between interests groups about distributive problems that can only be resolved by means of compromises. But he affirms that "this differentiation within the field of issues that require political decisions negates neither the prime importance of moral considerations nor the practicability of rational debate as the very form of political communication" (1991, p. 448). Habermas is adamant that political questions can be decided rationally and that the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments as envisaged by his approach is the most suitable procedure for reaching the rational formation of the will from which the general interest will emerge. He considers that the superiority of his approach with respect to Rawls' one lies in its strictly procedural character which allow him to "leave more questions open because it entrusts more to the process of rational opinion and will formation" (1995, p. 130). Deliberative Democracy: a Critique There are several ways in which such an approach could be criticized but I will only envisage two of them here. We can, for instance, use Wittgenstein's insights to undermine Habermas's conception of procedure and to challenge the very idea of a neutral or rational dialogue. For Wittgenstein to have agreement in opinions there must first be agreement on the language used and this, as he points out, implies agreement in forms of life. According to him, procedure only exists as a complex ensemble of practices. Those practices constitute specific forms of individuality and identity that make possible the allegiance to the procedures. It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life and agreements in judgments that procedures can be accepted and followed. They cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules for Wittgenstein are always abridgments of practices, they are inseparable of specific forms of life. Therefore, distinctions between "procedural" and "substantial" or between "moral" and "ethical" that are central to the Habermasian approach cannot be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments. Following Wittgenstein's lead also suggests a very different way of understanding communication and the creation of consensus. As he says, "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of .seeing on our part; it is our acting that is at the bottom of the language-game," (1969, p. 28e). For him agreement is established not on significations (Meinungen) but on a form of life (Lebensform). It is, as has been pointed out, an Einstimmung fusion of voices made possible by a common form of life, not Einverstand product of reason—• like in Habermas. Such an approach requires reintroducing into the process of deliberation the whole rhetorical dimension that the Habermasian discourse perspective is precisely at pains to eliminate. It also implies that the limits of consensus are brought to the fore: "Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and an heretic. I said I would "combat" the other man, but wouldn't I give him reasons? certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion" (1969, p. 81e). It is interesting to note that the Wittgensteinian critique of deliberative democracy that I am proposing resonates with Stanley Caveli's critique of Rawls, which is also inspired by Wittgenstein. Since Rawls represents the other important version of the deliberative approach, it is clear that taking Wittgenstein seriously necessarily leads to putting into question the basic assumptions of such an approach. As Cavell points out in his Cams Lectures, Rawls' account of justice omits a very important dimension of what takes place when we assess the claims made upon us in the name of justice in situations in which it is the degree of society's compliance with its ideal that is in question. He takes issue with Rawls' assertion that "Those who express resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust or how others have injured them" (1971, p. 553). In Rawls' view, if they are unable to do so, we can consider that our conduct is above reproach an bring the conversation on justice to an end. But, asks Cavell, "What if there is a cry of justice that expresses a sense not of having lost out in an unequal yet fair struggle, but of having from the start being left out" (1990, p. xxxviii). Giving as an example the situation of Nora in Ibsen's play A Doll's House, he shows how deprivation of a voice in the conversation of justice can be the work of the moral consensus itself. He urges us to realize that bringing a conversation to a close is always a personal choice, a decision that cannot be simply presented as mere application of procedures and justified as the only move that we could make in those circumstances. For that reason, we should never refuse bearing our responsibility for our decisions by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. To take this responsibility seriously requires that we give up the dream of a rational consensus as well as the fantasy that we could escape from our human form of life. In our desire for a total grasp, says Wittgenstein, "We have got on the slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk: so we UGed friction. Back to the rough ground" (1958, p. 46e). Wittgenstein, however, is not the only one to destroy the very ground of the deliberative model. Another way of revealing the inadequacy of the Habermasian approach is by problematizing the very possibility of the notion of the "ideal speech situation" conceived as the asymptotic ideal of intersubjective communication free of constraints, where the participants arrive at consensus by means of rational argumentation. This can be done, following the lead of Slavoj Zizek, through Lacan. Indeed a Lacanian approach reveals how discourse itself in its fundamental structure is authoritarian since out of the free-floating dispersion of signifiers, it is only through the intervention of a master signifier that a consistent field of meaning can emerge. As Zizek shows (1992, chapter 3), for Lacan the status of the master signifier, the signifier of symbolic authority founded only on itself (in its own act of enunciation) is strictly transcendental: the gesture that "distorts" a symbolic field, that "curves" its space by introducing a nonfounded violence in stricto sensu correlative to its very establishment. This means that if we were to subtract from a discursive field its distortion, the field would disintegrate, "de-quilt" Lacan undermines in that way the very basis of Habermasian view, according to which the inherent pragmatic presuppositions of discourse are non-authoritarian, since they imply the idea of a communication free of constraint where only rational argumentation counts. What those two different types of critique bring to the fore is that, far from being merely empirical, or epistemological, the obstacles to the realization of the ideal speech situation are ontological. Indeed, the impediments to the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility because, without those so-called impediments, no communication, no deliberation could ever take place. We therefore have to conclude that the very conditions of possibility of deliberation constitute at the same time the conditions of impossibility of the ideal speech situation. There is absolutely no justification for attributing a special privilege in this respect to a so-called "moral point of view" governed by impartiality and where an impartial assessment of what is in the general interest could be reached.

### 2AC---Fairness

#### Universal criterion are net worse for fairness

Lamont et al 9

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An alternative pathway to the production of procedural fairness, which was revealed by our case study, is the adherence to the rule of "cognitive contextualization." Reviewers evaluate fairly when they use standards that are most appropriate to the object of evaluation. Rather than applying a single universal criterion indiscriminately, they specify which criteria, or lenses, are most appropriate to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the object under evaluation. This requires locating the object, which in this case are grant proposals, within specific fields of expertise, including within the intellectual conventions and epistemological styles that prevail within these fields. The fairest criteria are thus not the most widely shared criteria, but the standards deemed most appropriate given the distinctive features of a particular object. This pathway to fairness ensures that the hierarchies between and within different disciplines and research fields do not lead to the epistemological dominance of specific epistemological styles (Bourdieu 1988). The contextualization of evaluation lessens potential tensions between panelists as it privileges respect for difference over specific disciplinary (or methodological) hegemonies, contextual fitness over universal validity, and appropriateness over consistency. This pathway to the production of fairness has not been identified nor discussed in the literature on peer review. However, it is compatible with a pluralist vision of fairness, also developed by political philosophers – a “pluralist vision of the world [understood] as an expanse of private exclusive clubs, interacting with as much as civility as they could, but each defined, animated, and sustained by a vivid sense of the difference between ‘we’ and ‘they.’” (Hollinger 1995:67) One of the contributions made by this paper is to identify and describe cognitive contextualization as a privileged pathway to procedural fairness in peer-review.