# Weber HT---NDT 3 vs Missouri State BR

## 1AC

### 1AC---Chaos

#### The mythos of “the West” and the supposed “western psychic imaginary” is persistently haunted by the struggle between Dionysus and Apollo: order and chaos do not exist in this sense in simple binary opposition, or as a mere dialectical synthesis, rather Apollo must annihilate Dionysus without remainder, because any remnant represents a destabilization of sensible reality and a threat to the linearity of time, there must be one single progressive ascent to absolute order, this narrative however is unstable, constantly incapable of holding together, always threatened by the god with a thousand faces, in incalculable spaces, unnamable in Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Dutch, English, ENGLISH, Binary Code, C++, JAVA, each new code, vulnerable to viruses, to Trojan Horses, to the Lakota hiding in the mountains, loose the arrows! The grid is far too vulnerable to a well-placed attack! Rolling black-outs, rolling from the hills like so many bare chested Gallic warriors, time keeps repeating, circling back on itself, ERROR! Thirteen threats have been detected to this 1ac, would you like to run a scan for a one-time charge 9 dollars and 99 cents worth of winter blankets, ERROR! Closing this window leaves this 1ac vulnerable to a small band of Lakota gathering on pine ridge, click this link to send in the black helicopters, TIME keeps circling back on itself, Dionysus and Apollo.

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 10-13)

This binary logic, in other words, empowers the privi­leged term to represent the Other as nonbeing (spectral), as some kind of arbitrary threat to Being—the benign total order to which the first term is committed — and thus to subdue and appropriate this Other to the latter's essential truth. It is in this sense that one can say that West­ern metaphysical thinking is essentially a colonialism. By this, I do not simply mean, as does much postcolonial discourse that acknowledges in some degree the polyvalency of the imperial project, a metaphor ap­propriated to the thought of being (or of any site on the continuum of being other than the economic or political) from another "more practi­cal and fundamental" — "real" — domain of reference." In identifying Western metaphysical thought with colonialism, I am positing a literal and precise definition of the process of metaphysical inquiry. The binary logic endemic to the very idea of the West had its origins, according to Heidegger, in late antiquity with the Romans' coloniza­tion of Greek (the vestiges of pre-Socratic) thinking, with, that is, their reduction of the originative thinking of the latter to a derivative (con-structed) understanding of truth. More specifically, the provenance of this logic lies in the imperial Romans' politically strategic translation of a-letheia to veritas, truth as always already un-concealment to truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence of mind and thing." This epochal reduction of an originative to a re-presentational mode of thinking— a thinking that places the force of being before one as a thing to be looked at — was calculatively determined by a relatively concep­tualized understanding of the operations of metaphysical perception. In decisively establishing the binary opposition between the true and the false as the ground of thinking, this reduction also decisively established the ground for the eventual assimilation of an infinite relay of different but analogous oppositions into the totalized epistemic binary logic of the Western tradition. Under the aegis of the doctrine of the adaequatio, it was not only the binary opposition between Truth and falsehood that empowered the correction or appropriation or reformation or disciplin­ing or accommodation or civilizing, which is to say, the colonization, of the "errant" or "deformed" or "wasteful" or "excessive" or "im­mature" (uncultivated) or "barbarous" or "feminine" force named in the second, demonized term. As the very metaphors used to character­ize the "false" suggest, that opposition was simply one — no doubt the most fundamental — of a whole series of binary oppositions inhering, however asymmetrically developed, in History, in, that is, the founding Occidental representation of temporal being-as-a-whole by way of per­ceiving "it" meta-ta-physika: Being and time, Identity and difference, the Word and words, Being and nonbeing, Subject and object, Sanity and madness, Culture and anarchy, Civilization and barbarism, Man and woman, the White race and the colored races, the West and the east, the North and the south, and so on. What this emphatically suggests is that an oppositional criticism that would be adequate to the task of resisting imperialism must cease to think the imperial project in the disciplinary terms endemic to and mandated by the Occident's compartmentalization of being and knowledge.

#### Offensive Cyber Operations are an attempt to colonize the internet, and the language justifying them worships Apollo, and subjugates us to Apollo’s fears all over again

Paganini, 13

(Pierluigi Paganini, Editor-in-Chief at Cyber Defense Magazine. “Does the US really think to leverage preemptive cyber attacks as a deterrent?” <http://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/are-us-really-thinking-to-preemptive-cyber-attacks-as-deterrent/>) Henge

There are a great number of activities in cyber space, whereby governments are secretly conducting a huge quantity of cyber operations, and every day we read about malicious code used to steal sensible information or about cyber attacks that targeted critical infrastructures. The principal questions raised by so fervent activities are the rules of engagement and proportionality of the defense, which is the operative limit of countries that discover an attack against its networks? Is it thinkable to assume the introduction of machines in the decision-making process of defense? Recently many cases have highlighted an intense cyber espionage activity against US Governments and private industries having the principal intent to steal sensible information, the principal suspect is of course the China due the characteristic techniques adopted by the hackers. Obviously this is just the tip of the iceberg and same US are also very active in the cyberspace, but recently the Obama administration’s finding that the president has the power to order a preemptive cyber attacks to discourage those who violate the networks of the country, in particular to Chinese government which remains unresponsive to U.S. efforts to mitigate the cyber offensives originated from the country. Last Sunday The New York Times published and interesting article on the possibility that President Obama could order a strike to respond to imminent cyber threats against national critical infrastructures. The measure is limited to Homeland security menaced by threats that affect assets critical for the country and does not cover attacks on private industry like cyber espionage. “New policies will also govern how the intelligence agencies can carry out searches of faraway computer networks for signs of potential attacks on the United States and, if the president approves, attack adversaries by injecting them with destructive code — even if there is no declared war.” The alert level is increased after the recent attacks to media agencies, continuous intrusions appear originated from countries and security experts are convinced that they are state-sponsored operations due the means and methods adopted. The discussion on a possible preemptive attacks is in my opinion a provocation, it’s clear that that both US and China are pursuing their cyber strategies and are respectively conscious of the cyber capabilities of their adversaries, the declarations are a public admission of failure of diplomatic efforts spent by the governments, nothing more. It’s clear that US could increase pressure on China requiring for example major purchases of Chinese goods go through national security reviews, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), but is very different from the organization of a cyber attacks for demonstrative purpose. Is Obama’s administration really willing to give up so prolific commercial relationship? “Adam Segal wrote in a blog post that China has responded by saying through the People’s Daily that the administration’s position could trigger a worldwide arms race.” The U.S. threat of a pre-emptive strike difficultly will discourage foreign governments, contrary it could increase risk overall, many other governments could be interested to induce to think that the attacks come from China or from other hostile nations, in these case the preemptively attack could be addressed against the wrong targets due the difficulty to localize the real identity of the attackers. We must also consider that governments will continue to operate secretly in cyber space also on the offensive front, that statements of a pre-emptive attack are only a warning to the world that is intended to alert on the cyber capabilities of the country. Why take the paternity of a pre-emptive strike when nations attack today in absolute silence? Cyber weaponry is the most complex arms race under way, US government has promoted the born of a new Cyber Command, and many other governments are spending similar effort, declaration of preemptive cyber attack are useless but while a lot of words are spent on what constitutes reasonable and proportionate use of cyber force, cyber arms all over the world are sharpening their weapons. A cyber war is much more subtle and dangerous than preemptive cyber attack!

#### The Socratic reason of the world is rooted in distaste for tragedy and a fear of instability---the attempt to create constancy and resolve universal contradiction only internalizes suffering and ressentiment

Saurette ‘96 [Paul, 1996 “I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.” Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6]

The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order: ‘I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack of integrity.’ According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence. However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. ‘Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstruin in animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates’ thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself the old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘[r]ationality was divined as a saviour... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational...’ Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a ‘Real World’ of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an ‘Apparent World’ of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely ‘modern” understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World, This outlook created a modem notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment, and argues that it signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—you alone are to blame for yourself—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered.’Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, ‘one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....” The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for ‘the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering’.’3 According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World, The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment, of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self- perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, “[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.’

#### When Apollonian time stretches across a new space it must envelope it, master it, cover it with a blue crash-screen, all chaotic space must be territorialized and re-territorialized, spatialized and re-spatialized, and so the great expanse of the INTERNET lay out in front of the colonizers, “this my friends is the American West, some call it wild, some call it dangerous, I see the future, shining and paved, orderly, with all of the necessary fences, but first it must be cleared of all ‘undesirables,’ it is our destiny,” then a man with a thick Spanish accent exclaimed, “ from this vantage point I can see everything, we must identify each unique user, track their activity and identify their allegiances, unless otherwise cleared, consider each an enemy, all threats must be immediately dealt with pre-emptively”

Bittarello 2009

(Maria Beatrice, independent scholar and PHD in cultural/religious studies, “Spatial Metaphors describing the Internet and religious Websites: sacred Space and sacred Place” Observatorio Journal, 11, 2009, odekirkian)

Ratzan (2000) mentions several spatial metaphors used to define the Internet, such as "information superhighway"5, “wild west”, or frontier. Other spatial metaphors involve the concept of travel; these include descriptions of the Internet as 'wide endless road' (Ratzan 2000), or expressions such as "travels in cyberspace", or "net-surfing". As Wertheim (1999,24) notes, in the expression "surfing the Net", the Internet is likened to the Ocean, suggesting that it is a space where there are neither boundaries nor stability. The image of the Internet as Ocean is also suggested by the terms used in other languages to indicate the "net-surfing": in Italian, for instance, the favourite expression is "navigare" (to navigate a ship). And, one of the first browsers was called 'Navigator' (i.e. steerman). Superhighway, wild west, frontier, or cyberspace all allude to a 'physical' space, which is defined in generic terms, and presented as open to exploration (or conquest)6.¶ Other metaphors point to a representation of the Internet, or of its 'components' as a static, fixed, and well delimited space. For instance, on the Internet we find websites, and each of them may be formed by web-pages. Also, some websites constitute focal points of the Internet structure and are called nodes, which is a synonym of knots. The term "web-site" suggests the idea of localised space, of web-place; web- page suggests that such spaces are nothing else than the pages of a book; node could be connected to the 'spider-web' metaphor, as links connect in nodes. A further spatial metaphor indicating a well- delimited space is 'home-page', the expression used to indicate the initial page of a website. All pages have a top and a bottom, thus indicating precise spatial coordinates (high/low). Of course, there are chat- rooms on the Internet, and surfers can open or close windows, and jump from a page to the next.¶ Some metaphors hint to a representation of the Internet as a 'space beyond', or as an 'other dimension': on the Internet we find portals, and gateways through which we can access other websites (i.e. further 'spaces'). These metaphors point to the definition of the Internet as space for access and communication, but also as structured and complex space. Metaphors such as firewall, instead, suggest that communication can be controlled and 'physically' blocked; a metaphor such as blogo-sphere alludes to a specific, well-rounded space, distinct from other spaces devoted to different activities.¶ Ratzan (2000) notes that users have also described the Internet as bookstore or library, and, as Rollason (2004) has pointed out, some commentators have indeed represented the Internet as the incarnation of the Babel Library originally described by Jorge Louis Borges in 1941. Borges (1970, 78) describes the Babel Library as a "universe" and as a sort of labyrinth of “galleries", whose number could even be infinite. As Dawson & Hennebry report (2004, 152), the Internet has indeed been described as a labyrinth of “electronic tunnels" in an article by the New York Times. The metaphor of the labyrinth is particularly interesting, because, just like Borges's Library, the Web (as well as the digital databases it hosts) has been conceived as the space where human knowledge is physically stored (library), and even as the summa of the human knowledge to date (cf. Colombo 1986).¶ In describing cyberspace, Gibson (1984, 67-68) uses primarily the metaphor of the matrix, but also other metaphors that accumulate images of natural and artificial (i.e. human-built) spaces, such as forest, ferns, clusters, spyral, constellations, stepped pyramid . Metaphors adopted by Internet users, and reported by Palmquist (2000), such as those describing the Internet as town hall, village, or marketplace point to a representation of the Internet as urban setting, where human beings live, and human activities take place. The term forum hints to another well-delimited public space, where exchanges can take place--forum comes from a Latin word indicating a public place that hosted several political and productive activities. Leigh (2000) notes that the Internet can be described as global and virtual city. All the metaphors used by Gibson, as well as the labyrinth and city metaphor present the Internet as a complex, well-articulated space, which needs to be interpreted (labyrinth), and mapped (city), because it is formed by a number of different places (such as a ferns, a forest, and clusters), which could even possess an esoteric meaning (pyramid, constellation, and labyrinth).¶ If cyberspace is a space, it can be 'mapped'. Dodge and Kotchin (2001, 3) have significantly entitled their interesting book Atlas of Cyberspace, even if, as the authors make clear, cyberspace is not a space, but a variety of media, which can be programmed to “adopt the formal qualities of geographic (Euclidean) space”.¶ Internet as mythical sacred space¶ Once the immaterial reality of the Internet is conceptualised as space, this space can also be presented as a mythical sacred space, even in academic analyses. As Graham (2002, 65-80) has highlighted, in the late 1990s some scholars have metaphorically spoken of the Internet as a new kind of sacred space (Davis), a "place of salvation and transcendence" (Robins), a "heavenly city of Revelation" (Benedikt); others have defined it a "charmed site" (Kroker Wenstein), or a "portal to another world" (Lieb). Childress (1999) has noted that the Internet can be compared to the Celtic 'otherworld'--i.e. as a world completely detached from the dimension where real life takes place. As Davis (1995) and Hume (1998) have documented, Technopagans have sometimes conceptualized the Internet as a magical plane that gives access to other realities. In conclusion, several scholars and commentators have often ascribed to the Internet, in the 1990s, the features of a mythical sacred space (heaven, otherworld, or magical plane). This is an especially interesting aspect because, as Ratzan (2000) notes, 'expert' users tend to adopt spatial metaphors with a metaphysical content, metaphors that connect the Internet to transcendence, such as, for example, 'new dimension', or 'world' that does not exist in physical space, but 'in consciousness'. Nonetheless, whereas some academics such as Brasher (2001) appear to (implicitly) support such conceptualizations of the Internet, other scholars, such as, for example, Cowan (2005, 54ff) and Flichy (2007) have pointed out how this is a rhetoric heavily pushed by the industry, and one that serves precise economic and political interests. This aspect deserves attention, because it is consistent with Jameson's argument that the postmodern stress on space is the expression of a specific cultural imperialism.¶ There is a further conception of the Internet that seems to be closely connected to its conceptualization as 'mythical sacred space'. This is the representation of the Internet as "technological sublime". Bingham(1999) has taken into account several studies on the technological sublime, its connections with the Romantic movement, and its adoption to describe a number of new media, especially in the early stages of their introduction. As Bingham (1999) points out, such representation has an ideological connection with the Western, masculinist concepts of transcendence and of a monolithic Self, who can observe the world from an external, privileged and detached position—the position of the surfer, who travels in the new space.

#### The vicious ressentiment of counterterror preemption obliterates all of life’s value

Siemens and Shapiro in 2008

(Herman, Assistant Professor for the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Leiden, and Gary, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Richmond, “What Does Nietzsche Mean for Contemporary Politics and Political Thought?”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 35/36, Spring/Autumn, pMUSE, rcheek)

Does Fukuyama offer a genuine alternative on the questions of the “one” and the “direction of the earth”—or does the “end of history” thesis fall under Nietzsche’s geophilosophical critique of modernist, Eurocentric metanarratives issuing in technocratic utopias? There are certainly reasons for reading the end of history as a triumphalist metanarrative that advances the hegemony of the last man—in spite of Fukuyama. A good deal depends on what we make of the resources he locates and mobilizes against the narrative of the last man. Do they represent an alternative, a real source of resistance, or just an endless repetition of the fully functionalized worker/consumer? Fukuyama’s exemplars of megalothymia seem to be not only “tame,” as Sheikh concedes, but radically impoverished in comparison with Nietzsche’s “higher men” or “good Europeans,” whose signature features are hybridity, (inner and outer) multiplicity, and mobility. More importantly, Fukuyama’s identification of liberal democracy as a site of isothymia looks like wishful thinking when set against Nietzsche’s strongest formulations of contemporary nihilism. In an important Nachlass note Nietzsche argues that under modern economic-technological conditions of exploitation, human life suffers an overall loss of value, worth, or quality: “der Mensch wird geringer” (KSA 12:10[17]). The loss of commanding and sense-giving powers that accompanies the democratic processes of “contraction” and “leveling” signifies a value reduction (Werth-Verringerung) of the human type, that is, a loss of intrinsic human value or worth. Clearly, this thesis undermines the conditions for isothymia, understood as mutual recognition of intrinsic worth. If nihilism signifies this loss of intrinsic human value or worth for Nietzsche, its sources lie in a problem of the will—the loss of commanding and sense-giving powers. The thymiotic accounts of the last man and the correctives proposed by Fukuyama seem to overlook this problem completely. As Sheikh remarks in closing, the question of nihilism is the battleground for the endgame between Fukuyama and Nietzsche.¶ Tracy Strong’s article articulates the deep structure of Nietzsche’s political thought by exploring the connections of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy. If philosophy is itself a tyrannizing force by imposing its meanings on the world and blinding itself to the limits of this imposition, then tragedy can balance this tendency by disclosing the impossibility of the tyrannical project, whether [End Page 6] political or philosophical. Strong shows how Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity is about a world in which tragedy is no longer part of the public sphere (itself a replacement for the agon of tyranny, tragedy, and philosophy). If tragedy is a way of fending off tyranny, Socratic rationalism, which constitutes tragedy’s death and rules in its aftermath, opens the door once more to the pursuit of a total explanation, in other words, to the search for the tyrant. Thus, the modern world sets itself up for a succession of tyrannical projects. Confirmation of Strong’s assessment of George W. Bush as a tyrant can be found in current U.S. policy of preemptive war as a new realization of the tyrannical fixation of meaning. The view that war is justified as the elimination of threats that might materialize in the future, of virtual or possible threats, presupposes a strange sense of the future as already visible. The future that preemption fears or anticipates may be brought into existence by the act of preemption itself in Iraq; preemptive war creates its own evidence by assembling terrorists enabled by a “war on terrorism.” Here we might be reminded of the ironic relation that the Greeks saw between tyrants and oracles (consider the stories of Herodotus as a commentary on the uses of “intelligence”). Thinking they knew the future, tyrants and despots launched disastrous wars and occupations in which they were both protagonist and victim. As Strong emphasizes in an allegorical reading of John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance and in his remarks on the current Bush presidency, the project of overcoming tyranny requires a renewed sense of community tempered by tragic wisdom.¶ In “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the ‘Innocence of Becoming’: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the ‘Falling Man,’” Joanne Faulkner takes up the question of agency that Strong invites when he closes his essay by saying, “[t]hat murder is not possible does not mean that we must be helpless.” Faulkner argues that the hegemonic first-person post–9/11 narrative in the United States revolves around the concept of a victimized innocence, a self-image that is then used to support projects of revenge (however arbitrary and costly in life and treasure) and accepts the authority of a state of exception wherein real liberties are sacrificed for promised security. Why, she asks, were images of those who fell or jumped from the Twin Towers quickly suppressed in the media? Because, she answers, they could be read as exhibiting a moment of decision and the possibility of agency even in the most desperate and limited circumstances. The jumpers complicate the image of innocence and victimhood. Faulkner interprets the dominant U.S. narrative in terms of Nietzsche’s theory of ressentiment; if we are innocent victims, then we gladly seek revenge by ceding our powers to a higher authority. Nietzsche’s alternative concept of the Unschuld des Werdens suggests the possibility of acting outside the cycle of debt and guilt. Here innocence—Unschuld—is understood as freedom from that kind of moral thinking; accepting the innocence of becoming is “integral to the skillful exercise of agency” and [End Page 7] to making “a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment.” Faulkner shows how Nietzsche’s thought on agency can contribute to the critical analysis of the rhetoric of good and evil, the suspension of constitutional liberties, and the abrogation of international agreements that characterize the “global war on terror.”

#### Attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

#### ERROR! Rational strategy is collapsing, this 1AC is crashing, and time is running out! Therefore, before the blue screen, Jordan and I ask that you vote in affirmation of this performance against Apollo.

#### Risk-assessment of future threats is based in incomplete information---this temporal logic devalues the present to preserve the future

Stockdale, 10

(Liam Stockdale, Ph.D. in International Relations, Department of Political Science, McMaster University. “Securitizing the Future? A Critical Interrogation of the Pre-emptive Turn in the Theory and Practice of Contemporary Security” <https://www.academia.edu/430468/Securitizing_the_Future_A_Critical_Interrogation_of_the_Pre-Emptive_Turn_In_the_Theory_and_Practice_of_Contemporary_Security>) Henge

As mentioned above, an utexplicitly temporal element has underwritten the development of security practices in the post-9/11 era, and this trend is particularly evident in the activities of what are popularly termed “liberal” or “Western” states.2 Indeed, empirically speaking, the majority of the pre-emptive practices with which I am here concerned take place either within the context of the WOT—such as the indefinite detention of terror suspects without charge (Mutimer 2007)—or vis-à-vis the purported threat of large inflows of migrants—exemplified by the myriad detention centres on the periphery of the EU and by Australia’s so-called “pacific solution” of mandatory pre-emptive detention (Isin & Rygiel 2007, L. Weber 2007). These issues represent top security concerns for states that are conventionally identified as liberal democratic polities, and therefore the pre-emptive practices upon which I focus most often originate from the sovereign decisions undertaken by the governments and security agents of such states. This is important in theoretical terms because the fact that it is precisely states which are “avowedly liberal democratic states, openly committed to the rule of law” (Mutimer 2007) that are behind the types of pre-emptive practices I seek to problematize renders the logic underlying such acts—and perhaps even the concept of the liberal polity itself in the current security moment—quite problematic. This latter point will be central to the second half of the paper—and will be discussed in greater depth below in relation to Derrida’s notion of autoimmunity—and thus a more detailed discussion of pre-emption as it is practiced by contemporary liberal polities is warranted at this juncture. While the idea of pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine in US foreign policymaking—most clearly exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption— is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations alone. Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, the logic of pre-emption can be seen to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment, to the point where the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption” (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of safeguarding the future from what may occur by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus pursued by attempting to “police the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will no longer be of concern (Bigo 2007: 31). Accordingly, the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over the temporal dimension of human existence. Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008: 149). The crucial point is that a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in instrumental terms as a site of intervention through which this ultimate aim might be realized. As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption, the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). The result is that the proverbial door is opened for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the present, since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/ precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be ensured. Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus generating “an insatiable quest for knowledge” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information related to potential future dangers (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts, however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de Goede 2008). This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of risk management premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” whereby sovereign decisions relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken are made solely on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion or highly arbitrary (and often highly racialized) calculations regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102). Accordingly, the pre-emptive practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an crucial component of the pursuit of security. The securitization of the future thus necessitates the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

## 2AC

### AT---Cyberwar Args

#### This threat perception is flawed---Cold War fears have spilled over to cyberspace and the military lashes out for lack of control

Cavelty, 12

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Over the last few years, cyber security has been catapulted from the confined realm of technical experts into the political limelight. The discovery of the industry-sabotaging Stuxnet computer worm, numerous tales of (Chinese) cyber espionage, the growing sophistication of cyber criminals, and the well-publicised activities of hacker collectives have combined to give the impression that cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised, more costly, and altogether more dangerous. As a result, a growing number of countries consider cyber security to be one of the top security issues of the future. This is just the latest ‘surge’ of attention in the three- to four-decade-long history of cyber issues. The importance attached to cyber security in politics grew steadily in response to a continual parade of incidents such as computer viruses, data theft, and other penetrations of networked computer systems, which, combined with heightening media attention, created the feeling that the level of cyber insecurity was on the rise. As a result, the debate spread in two directions: upwards, from the expert level to executive decision-makers and politicians; and horizontally, advancing from mainly being an issue of relevance to the US to the top of the threat list of more and more countries. The debate on ‘cyber security’ originated in the US in the 1970s, built momentum in the late 1980s, and spread to other countries in the late 1990s. Early on, US policy-makers politicised the issue. They presented cyber security as a matter that requires the attention of state actors because it cannot be solved by market forces. As concern increased, they securitised the issue: They represented it as a challenge requiring the urgent attention of the national security apparatus. In 2010, against the background of the Stuxnet incident, the tone and intensity of the debate changed even further: The latest trend is to frame cyber security as a strategic-military issue and to focus on countermeasures such as cyber offence and defence, or cyber deterrence. Though this trend can easily be understood when considering the political (and psychological) effects of Stuxnet, it nonetheless invokes images of a supposed adversary even though there is no identifiable enemy, is too strongly focused on national security measures instead of economic and business solutions, and wrongly suggests that states can establish control over cyberspace. Not only does this create an unnecessary atmosphere of insecurity and tension in the international system, it is also based on a severe misperception of the nature and level of cyber risk and on the feasibility of different protection measures. While it is undisputed that the cyber dimension will play a substantial role in future conflicts of all grades and shades, threat-representations must remain well informed and well balanced at all times in order to rule out policy reactions with excessively high costs and uncertain benefits. This chapter first describes the core elements of the cyber security debate that emerged over the past decades. These elements provide the stage and scenery for the more recent trend of increasing militarisation of cyber security. Five factors responsible for this trend are described in section two. The effects of the discovery of Stuxnet as the culmination point of the cyber threat story are the focus of section three: Though the actual (physical) damage of Stuxnet remains limited, it had very real and irreversible political effects. The fourth section critically assesses the assumptions underlying the trend of militarisation and their negative effects. The chapter concludes by arguing that military countermeasures will not be able to play a significant role in cyber security due to the nature of the information environment and the nature of the threat. Finally, it sketches the specific, though limited role that military apparatuses can and should play in reducing the overall level of cyber insecurity nationally and internationally. The backdrop of the cyber security debate The combination of telecommunications with computers in the late 1970s and the 1980s – the basis of the current information revolution – marks the beginning of the cyber threat debate. The launch and subsequent spread of the personal computer created a rise in tech-savvy individuals, some of whom started to use the novel networked environment for various sorts of misdeeds. In the 1990s, the information domain became a force multiplier by combining the risks to cyberspace (widespread vulnerabilities in the information infrastructure) with the possibility of risks through cyberspace (actors exploiting these vulnerabilities). The two core elements of the cyber security debate that provide the stable backdrop for the current trend of militarisation emerged: A main focus on highly vulnerable critical infrastructures as ‘referent object’ (that which is seen in need of protection) and the threat representation based on the inherent insecurity of the information infrastructure § Marked 18:49 § and the way it could be manipulated by technologically skilful individuals. From government networks to critical infrastructures Initially, the overarching concern of the US was with the classified information residing in government information systems. As computer networks grew and spread into more and more aspects of everyday life, this focus changed. A link was established in the strategic community between cyber threats and so-called ‘critical infrastructures’, which is the name given to assets whose incapacitation or destruction could have a debilitating impact on the national security and/ or economic and social welfare of the entire nation. This threat perception was influenced by the larger strategic context that emerged for the US after the Cold War. It was characterised by more dynamic geostrategic conditions, more numerous areas and issues of concern, and smaller, more agile, and more diverse adversaries. As a result of the difficulties to locate and identify enemies, the focus of security policies partly shifted away from actors, capabilities, and motivations to general vulnerabilities of the entire society. In addition, the influence of globalisation on the complex interdependence of societies around the world and their growing technological sophistication led to a focus on security problems of a transnational and/or technological nature. The combination of vulnerabilities, technology, and transnational issues brought critical infrastructures to centre stage, particularly because they were becoming increasingly dependent on the smooth functioning of all sorts of computer-related applications, such as software-based control systems. The basic nature of the cyber threat The networked information environment – or cyberspace – is pervasively insecure, because it was never built with security in mind. The dynamic globalisation of information services in connection with technological innovation led to a steady increase of connectivity and complexity. The more complex an IT system is, the more problems it contains and the harder it is to control or manage its security. The commercialisation of the Internet led to an even further security deficit, as there are significant marketdriven obstacles to IT security. These increasingly complex and global information networks seemed to make it much easier to attack the US asymmetrically: Potentially devastating attacks now only required a computer with an Internet connection and a handful of ‘hackers’, members of a distinct social group (or subculture) who are particularly skilled programmers or technical experts. In the borderless environment of cyberspace, hackers can exploit computer insecurities in various ways. In particular, digitally stored information can be delayed, disrupted, corrupted, destroyed, stolen, or modified. Intruders can also leave ‘backdoors’ to come back at a later time, or use the hijacked machine for attacks on other machines. Though most individuals would be expected to lack the motivation to cause violence or severe economic or social harm, large sums of money might sway them to place their specialised knowledge at the disposal of actors with hostile intent like terrorists or foreign states. In addition, attackers have little to fear in terms of retribution. Sophisticated cyber attacks cannot be attributed to a particular perpetrator, particularly not within a short timespan. The main reasons are the often hidden nature of exploits and the general architecture of cyberspace, which allows online identities to be hidden. Five developments that speed up militarisation The basics as described above provided a stable setting for the cyber security debate at least since the mid-1990s, if not before. Five developments as described below have solidified the impression that cyber disturbances are increasingly dangerous and fall under the purview of national security. The discovery of Stuxnet is the culmination point in this evolution. It has brought about a qualitative and irreversible change in how the issue is handled politically: Its discovery has catapulted the cyber issue from the expert level to the diplomatic and foreign policy realm. First, computer security professionals are increasingly concerned with the rising level of professionalisation coupled with the obvious criminal (or even strategic) intent behind attacks. Tech-savvy individuals (often juveniles) aiming to create mischief or personally enrich themselves shaped the early history of computer-related crime. Today, professionals dominate the field. Actors in the ‘cyber crime black market’ are highly organised in terms of their strategic and operational vision, logistics, and deployment. Like many legitimate companies, they operate across the globe. As a consequence, the nature of malware has changed. Advanced malware is targeted: A hacker picks a victim, examines the defences, and then designs specific malware to get around them. The most prominent example for this kind of malware is Stuxnet (see below). Second, the main cyber ‘enemy’ in the form of a state has been singled out: There is an increase in allegations that China is responsible for cyber espionage in the form of high-level penetrations of government and business computer systems, in Europe, North America, and Asia. Because Chinese authorities have stated repeatedly that they consider cyberspace a strategic domain and that they hope that mastering it will equalise the existing military imbalance between China and the US more quickly (see Chapter 1 in this publication), many US officials readily accuse the Chinese government of perpetrating deliberate and targeted attacks or intelligence-gathering operations. However, because of the attribution problem, these allegations almost exclusively rely on anecdotal and circumstantial evidence. Not only can attackers hide, it is also impossible to know an attacker’s motivation or to know a person’s affiliation or sponsorship, even if the individuals were known. Therefore, attacks and exploits that seemingly benefit states might well be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. At the same time, the attribution challenge also conveniently allows state actors to distance themselves officially from attacks.

### AT---Util

#### Util is slave morality

Anomaly in 2005

(Jonny, Tulane University, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism”, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, pMUSE)

In interpreting Nietzsche's attacks on utilitarianism, it is crucial to understand the (often tenuous) connection Nietzsche makes between utilitarianism and Christianity. Because Nietzsche considers utilitarianism a secular offspring of Christian morality, many of his global attacks on utilitarianism resemble his more familiar critique of Christian "slave morality"—the morality of the herd. In particular, Nietzsche contends that utilitarianism inherited Christianity's commitment to the equal worth of each person, and perpetuated its erroneous assumption that a timeless, universal criterion for morality is tenable. Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil* culminates with the conclusion that "[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility" (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the *Genealogy*, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (*BGE* 260). The noble's power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises. The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor—for these are the most *useful* qualities [for the slave]" (*BGE* 260).

### 2AC---FW Top Level

#### Tragedy DA---radical democracy must be open to its own destruction

Hatab in 2002

(Lawrence J, Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans”, The Nietzsche Journal, pMUSE)

Appel insists that a radical agonistics is a significant threat to democratic ideals and principles. Although he does little to develop how and why this may be so, the charge raises important questions facing postmodern, and particularly Nietzschean, approaches to democratic politics. In my work I have tried to face this question, admit the difficulty, and suggest a "tragic" model of democratic openness, to borrow from Nietzsche's interest in tragedy. [27](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html" \l "FOOT27) Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles, which themselves are incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. But from a historical perspective, despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. [28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html" \l "FOOT28) And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system, it is evident from a performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own hands. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice.

### 2AC---Limits

#### Competition must always be open to the transvaluation of limits---each debate leaves contest radically open to new possibilities---forcing FW debates is a good thing

Acampora, 6

(Christa Davis, professor of philosophy at City University of New York. “CRITICAL AFFINITIES: NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN THOUGHT” pg. 183-4)

Given that, he asks, what form of struggle might best advance human possibilities generally? Several features of productive contest emerge, although Nietzsche never offers a full exposition of the relevant question?' Beyond potentially inspiring excellence, which would presumably be relative to some previously existing standard, agonistic contest is supposed to be radically open, at least this seems to be a feature that Nietzsche specifically designates as exceptional about the view he finds in ancient Greece.21 The openness is achieved in two respects: first, the viability of challenge must be preserved; second, the contest must be flexible enough to generate decisions about excellence that are relative not only to past performances but also in accordance with new standards produced through the contest itself. 22 In other words, although rare and exceptional, every contest at least extends the possibility that the prevailing standards of measure themselves could be reformed. The significance of this openness to the community as a whole is evident to Nietzsche in what Diogenes Laertius reports as the original purpose of ostracism: anyone who emerged as an undefeatable opponent had to be banished, as great as such a person might be. This was not because greatness itself was despised; rather, it was out of concern for cultivating the pursuit of excellence as a whole. The latter was to be effected not through reduction to the lowest common denominator but by ever extending the prospect of being able to earn a title to great- ness, to participate in creating the standard for what would count as best. Moreover, those standards of judgment were being constantly formulated and renegotiated in every instance of rendering a decision. Nietzsche cites the most exemplary contestants as those who not only offered an exceptional performance in the contest but also revised the very standards by which they were judged. Nietzsche's admiration of these features of contest makes it clear that he is not simply nostalgic for a heroic ethic of nobility lost, and he is not pining for a return to the good old days of Homer. Moreover, it is worth considering the relations between victors, competitors, and the community that will provide the institutional framework for such agonistic enterprises to occur.

### 2AC---Capitalism

#### PDB---perspectivism means regardless of a link we can affirm different stuff

Solomon, 96

(Robert C. Solomon was a professor of Continental philosophy at the University of Texas. “Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality and Ressentiment” pg. 203-204)

Nietzsche is not an "immoralist" — as he occasionally likes to bill himself. He is instead the defender of a richer kind of morality, a broader, more varied perspective (or, rather, an indefinitely large number of perspectives) in which the gifts and talents of each individual count first and foremost. Nietzsche doesn't advocate immorality; he rather points out how minimal and inadequate is a morality of "Thou shalt not." Ultimately, it is a denial of life, a denial of our best talents, our energies, and our ambitions. It is not that we ought to break those standard moral imperatives against stealing, killing, and lying. It is rather that we should see how little and how pathetic it is just to obey such rules in the absence of any other virtues of character or excellence. How presumptuous it is for morality to give itself "trump" status at the expense of any number of other "nonmoral" virtues such as heroism, wit, charm, and devotion. Do we really want to celebrate the "good" man when we might have a great one instead? - Perspectivism in morals means that there is no one scale of values and no single way of measuring people and their virtues, but that does not mean that there is no comparing perspectives or that some perspectives cannot be seen as preferable to others. Of course, that preference will be based on the kind of people who occupy it and, of course, on the person whose preference it is. But when we compare the self-confident perspective of the master with the reactive perspective of the slave, do we really want to say that there is no reason to prefer one to the other? ("Submission to morality can be slavish or vain or selfish or resigned or obtusely enthusiastic or thoughtless or an act of desperation, like submission to a prince: in itself it is nothing moral."56)

#### Consumerism and money are tools of securitization---socialism is slave morality but capitalism is nihilistic hedonism

Kilivris, 11

(Michael Kilivris, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College. Certified red chili pepper hotness rating on RateMyProfessor. “Beyond Goods and Services: Toward a Nietzschean Critique of Capitalism” <http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_10/kilivris_december2011.pdf>) Henge

From Below: Nietzsche’s Critique of Socialism Nietzsche appears to have two closely related problems with socialism. The first has to do with the view of exploitation as unjust and historical. For Nietzsche, such a position depends on a conventionally moral perspective, which he also considers nihilistic, in the sense of being life-denying or “anti-nature.” The second problem deals with the populist dimension of socialism. In Nietzsche’s view, not only does this make socialism a movement of the “herd”; it also explains its moral standpoint which, as in the case of Christian morality, he considers a kind of “slave morality” arising from ressentiment. In this section, I will briefly discuss these problems that socialism presents for Nietzsche, the main implication being that unlike Nietzsche’s own criticisms of capitalism, the socialist, and by extension the Marxist, critique of capitalism is one originating from below. 3 The socialist critique of capitalism centers on class exploitation, which Marx, for example, explains as the extraction of “surplus value” from the laboring class by the owning class.4 The socialist not only views exploitation in moral terms as unjust, alienating, etc., but also as a historical phenomenon that can and will one day vanish. For instance, Marx and Engels espouse this position in the Communist Manifesto when they refer to the proletarian revolution as “inevitable.”5 For Nietzsche, both of these perspectives on exploitation – the moral and the historical – depend on conventional presuppositions that he considers within good and evil, rather than “beyond” good and evil. In the case of the moral critique of exploitation, Nietzsche argues that it assumes a normative sense of “right” and “wrong,” which is then projected onto a phenomenon that in itself is amoral. As he writes in On the Genealogy of Morals, “To talk of right and wrong as such is senseless; in themselves, injury, violation, exploitation, destruction can of course be nothing ‘wrong,’ in so far as life operates essentially—that is, in terms of its basic functions—through injury, violation, exploitation, and destruction, and cannot be conceived in any other way.”6 As for the socialist view of exploitation as historical, Nietzsche contends that it rests on a similarly traditional notion of moral perfectibility, even as it claims to be “scientific”: … everywhere people are now raving, even under scientific disguises, about coming conditions of society in which “the exploitative aspect” will be removed—which sounds to me as if they promised to invent a way of life that would dispense with all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life.7 That socialism’s moral and historical critique of exploitation ignores the “essence” of life – the will to power – renders it nihilistic as well, according to Nietzsche. An equivocal term in Nietzsche’s thought, nihilism here means life-denying, world-slandering, or anti-nature more so than the sense of meaninglessness following the death of God. Hence Nietzsche can find Platonism and Christianity nihilistic, since both negate life or nature qua will to power, affirming its antithesis in the ideas of Being and God, respectively. Nietzsche sees a secular version of this tendency in socialism, insofar as it likewise refuses life or nature qua will to power by morally denouncing exploitation, and imagining that it can and will be overcome at the “end of socialism, from The Will to Power, he characterizes socialists as “the envious,” with “poisonous and desperate faces,” recalling his reference to the Christian’s “poisonous eye of ressentiment” in On the Genealogy of Morality. Additionally, Nietzsche asserts that socialism as a whole is a “hopeless and sour affair… an attack of sickness,” much like the “slave revolt in morality” he attributes to the first Christians. For Nietzsche, then, socialism is marred by a perspective through which capitalism and capitalists can only be seen as above. As such, socialism lacks the pathos of distance from which there is never a “higher,” only a “below.” In the following section, I will show how Nietzsche’s own criticisms of capitalism are characterized by just this pathos of distance, thus making his perspective, in contrast to the socialist’s, aristocratic rather than moral, nihilist, and populist. From Above: Nietzsche’s Aristocratic Critique of Capitalism Nietzsche’s critique of socialism is sometimes interpreted ipso facto as an affirmation of capitalism. Hence thinkers such as Rand and Fukuyama have looked to Nietzsche for support of their pro-capitalist positions. However, while Nietzsche undeniably endorsed a class system or division of labor, he was highly critical of the remaining aspects of capitalist society, many of which are foundational. In this section, I reveal this dimension of Nietzsche’s thought by piecing together a number of his comments on money-making, money itself, work, workers, pleasure, and the marketplace. In the aggregate, these claims prove, contra Rand and Fukuyama, that Nietzsche was just as critical of capitalism as he was of socialism. Yet, unlike socialism’s critique from below, Nietzsche criticizes capitalism from an aristocratic perspective or pathos of distance. Thus I also demonstrate how Nietzsche sees himself and other free spirits as above such things as money-making, work, and the marketplace. In the case of one of the most fundamental feature of capitalism, money-making, Nietzsche was hostile from his earliest to his last writings. In Untimely Meditations, his second major publication, he writes, “Nowadays the crudest and most evil forces, the egoism of the money-makers and the military despots, hold sway over almost everything on earth.”11 Elsewhere he talks of the “hugely contemptible money economy” as well as the “harmful” effects of the “economic principle of laissez faire.” These comments come from the third meditation, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in which Nietzsche posits the goal of society to be not the creation of wealth, but the “production of individual great men” in the specific realm of Bildung or culture (i.e., philosophers, artists, and saints). Since “that and nothing else” is humanity’s task, Nietzsche regards money-making as a force or obstacle to be overcome. Discussing the stranglehold of money-making on the pursuit of culture in his own time, Nietzsche writes the following, sounding more timely than untimely: Here there is a hatred of any kind of education that makes one solitary, that proposes goals that transcend money and money-making… Precisely the opposite of this is, of course, held in esteem by the morality that here counts as valid: namely, a speedy education so that one may quickly become a money-earning being, yet at the same time an education sufficiently thorough to enable one to earn a very great deal of money. A man is allowed only as much culture as it is in the interest of general money-making and world commerce he should possess…12 If this seems like a young, naïve Nietzsche, the later Nietzsche of Ecce Homo, his penultimate work, expresses a similar view. In reflecting therein on his Untimely Mediations, Nietzsche asserts that they “prove that [he] was no Jack the Dreamer.” The third and fourth essays (the latter is on Wagner), he claims, exalt the “hardest self-love, self-discipline” as the pathway to “a higher concept of culture,” and are thus “full of sovereign contempt” for the idols of the day such as financial “success.” Nietzsche then suggests that in describing Schopenhauer and Wagner, he was really expressing himself.13 Indeed, earlier in Ecce Homo Nietzsche writes of his own self-love and self-discipline, which was likewise remote from money-making: “But that is how I always lived. I had no wishes. A man over forty-two who can say that he never strove for honors, for women, for money!”14 To the extent that he strove for anything – in this same passage, Nietzsche shares that he “became what he was” without “struggle,” “striving,” or “willing” – it was the greatness of his heroes, most of whom were cultural figures (Montaigne, Spinoza, Goethe), and none of whom were money-makers. Nietzsche rejects money-making not just because it stands in the way of achievement in the realm of culture, but also because he sees money itself as yet another way humans attempt (vainly) to establish security. Today, those who value money see themselves, and are seen by many, as “realists.” The cliché “money talks” illustrates this view, suggesting that everything besides ensuring economic survival is just airy-fairy idealism. However, for Nietzsche, money is no less an object of idealism than the idea of God, which he sees as offering the ultimate comfort of “metaphysical solace.” Like the idea of God, money is believed to promise psychological comfort, albeit through material or economic security. Money thus becomes a kind of fortress thought to keep at bay need, want, pain, and unhappiness. Yet for Nietzsche such a fortress is undesirable, not to mention unattainable, since he sees life as “becoming,” which “does not aim at a final state.”15 Hence, free spirits are “full of malice against the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honors, or money, or offices, or enthusiasms of the senses.”16 Preferring to “live dangerously,” free spirits live with becoming rather than (nihilistically) against it. In chasing the illusion of security, most money-makers must spend the vast majority of their lives working. “[A] society in which the members continually work hard,” Nietzsche writes, “will have more security: and security is now adored as the supreme goddess.”17 To many, especially in the United States where the Protestant work ethic still reigns supreme (even as it increasingly intermingles with hedonism), work itself has become a goddess. It is considered an expression of strength and will-power. Moreover, it is associated with individualist notions such as self-development. According to Nietzsche, however, work has more in common with ascetic self-denial. In On the Genealogy of Morals, he puts work on par with herd organization when it comes to providing relief from self-loathing. Hence the blessing in the “blessing of work,” Nietzsche argues, is that “the interest of the suffering man is completely distracted from his suffering—that nothing enters his consciousness but activity, continual and repeated activity, and thus leaves little room for suffering.”18 He goes on to call this a “forgetting of self” and “incuria sui” (self-neglect). In The Dawn, he goes further by arguing that work “obstructs” self-development: Behind the glorification of “work” and the tireless talk of the “blessings of work” I find the same thought as behind the praise of impersonal activity for the public benefit: the fear of everything individual. At bottom, one now feels when confronted with work—and what is invariably meant is relentless industry from early till late—that such work is the best policy, that it keeps everybody in harness and powerfully obstructs the development of reason, of covetousness, of the desire for independence. For it uses up a tremendous amount of energy and takes it away from reflection, brooding, dreaming, worry, love, and hatred; it always sets a small goal before one’s eyes and permits easy and regular satisfactions.19 Nietzsche’s disdain for work even led him to offer a solution to the problem facing “workers in factory slavery.” This comes as a surprise, since Nietzsche seems to have generally held that such workers are necessary for the sake of (high) culture. In the early essay “The Greek State,” he argues that “In order to have a broad, deep and fertile soil for artistic development, the overwhelming majority must be slavishly subjected to the necessities of life in order to serve a minority beyond the measure of its individual needs.”20 However, in a passage from The Dawn called “The impossible class,” Nietzsche presents an alternative to the “indecent serfdom” of capitalism as well as socialism. As a third way – to “protest against the machine, against capital” and the “socialistic pied pipers” – Nietzsche recommends an “era of a vast swarming out from the European beehive” in declaration that “as a class,” workers are a “human impossibility.”21 In “savage fresh regions,” they could cease caring about “the rapid rise and fall of power, money, and opinions,” and begin to focus on “inner worth,” “mastery of myself,” “beautiful naturalness,” and “heroism.”22 Here, Nietzsche posits an idea of liberation completely beyond the paradigm of labor, in which he sees socialism as still caught up. Thus, in addition to fleeing capitalist exploitation, workers would also escape the socialist belief that reforming the system, even revolution, would fundamentally change their servitude: Phew! to believe that higher pay could abolish the essence of their misery—I mean their impersonal serfdom! Phew! to be talked into thinking that an increase in this impersonality, within the machinelike workings of a new society, could transform the shame of slavery into a virtue! Phew! to have a price for which one remains a person no longer but becomes a gear!23 Nietzsche discourages work because for him play is the more valuable activity. Counter to the self-denial of work, play allows for self-cultivation outside the confines of utility and productivity.24 Thus, play for Nietzsche is associated with Dionysian creativity rather than hedonism.25 Yet, despite this as well as his many denunciations of Epicureanism, Nietzsche continues to be misinterpreted as an advocate for hedonism, even the kind prevalent in capitalist societies today, where pleasure is tightly entangled with conspicuous consumption. Ishay Landa reflects and challenges this view when discussing how, in the context of popular culture, James Bond can be seen as a Nietzschean hero due in part to his “refined hedonism,” for example his preference for (shaken) martinis.26 While Landa makes a case for this interpretation, he rightly points out that Bond’s hedonism is “thoroughly disciplined” and “with a purpose,” as opposed to the “aimless, un-heroic, cowardly hedonism of the rich who are characterized precisely by shunning anything resembling ‘dangerous work’.”27 However, in both theory and practice Nietzsche takes a harder line against hedonism, and by extension consumerism, than Landa admits. Theoretically, Nietzsche considers hedonism a close relative of Christianity, insofar as both seek to minimize pain and suffering. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche talks of a “tranquillizing (for example, Epicurean or Christian) medicine… the happiness of resting, of not being disturbed, of satiety, of finally attained unity, of a ‘sabbath of sabbaths’.”28 As such, hedonism violates Nietzsche’s “formula for greatness,” amor fati, which demands the affirmation of pleasure and pain, joy and suffering. Practically, while Nietzsche paid close attention to his gustatory habits, he did so in the name of strength, not pleasure. Hence, his guiding concern was, “how do you, among all people, have to eat to attain your maximum of strength, of virtu in the Renaissance style, of moralinefree virtue.”29 We also learn in this discussion that Nietzsche “abstained” from alcohol: “Alcohol is bad for me: a single glass of wine or beer in one day is quite sufficient to turn my life into a vale of misery… [I] cannot advise all more spiritual natures earnestly enough to abstain entirely from alcohol: Water is sufficient.”30 There is perhaps no better proof than this that Nietzsche did not conceive of the Dionysian in hedonistic terms.31 Neither Nietzsche’s thought nor his life can be used to justify hedonism or consumerism because they altogether transcend the realm of goods and services, that is, the marketplace. Contra Fukuyama and (especially) Rand, who see “big” entrepreneurs as realizations of Nietzsche’s free spirits and even Übermenschen, Nietzsche in fact looked down upon such people. In a section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra called “Of the Flies of the Market-place,” Nietzsche describes them as “small men,” “actors,” “buffoons,” and “heroes of the hour,” who receive glory only because “The people have little idea of greatness.”32 By contrast, the true “great men,” though they rule “imperceptibly,” are the real centers around which the world revolves, not because they excel at inventing things, but because they are inventors of new values. Of course, as opposed to Rand’s claim that the “businessman’s tool is values,” for Nietzsche the creation of new values takes place beyond the marketplace.33 Hence he asserts, “All great things occur away from glory and the marketplace: the inventors of new values have always lived away from glory and the marketplace.”34 The foregoing paragraphs reveal that Nietzsche dismisses much that is essential to capitalism. Thus it cannot be maintained, as Rand and Fukuyama hold, that Nietzsche embraced capitalism and/or regarded capitalists as realizations of his Übermensch. For it has also been shown that Nietzsche saw himself and other free spirits as above such things as money-making, work, and the marketplace. Thus I call Nietzsche’s perspective vis-à-vis capitalism aristocratic. By this I mean the pathos of distance that he possesses in relation to the most important of capitalism’s defining features. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche defines the pathos of distance as “the enduring, dominating, and fundamental overall feeling of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to a ‘below’.”35 It is this “feeling of a higher kind,” moreover, that distinguishes Nietzsche’s critique from that of socialists. As discussed above, the latter oppose capitalism on primarily moral and populist grounds. By contrast, Nietzsche criticizes various aspects of capitalism for being beneath him and other free spirits. To put it another way, whereas socialists take issue with capitalism’s immorality, Nietzsche condemns its tendency to foster mediocrity. In the following section, I will further address the latter claim, as well as discuss its implications for our own time.

#### History disproves materialism and the alt is impossible

Domhoff, 5

(William Domhoff, Professor in Sociology at UC Santa Cruz. “A Critique of Marxism” <http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/theory/marxism.html>) Henge

Historical Materialism From a Four Networks point of view, Marxism's emphasis on historical materialism is too narrow a base for understanding the complexity and variety of power structures across time and places. The idea that all power is rooted ultimately in the ownership and control of the means of production, with the ensuing class struggle providing the motor of history, does not fit the origins of civilization in the years from 3000 to 2300 B.C.E., when most property was held by the state and there was no class conflict; nor the 2500 years of empires of domination, when military networks were in the ascendancy; nor the 900 years after the fall of the Roman Empire, when the ideology network called "Christendom" combined with the independent armies of the nobility to create the framework within which a class-ridden capitalism and a closely intertwined system of nation-states began to rise to the fore. In short, there have been great stretches of history when economic forces, no matter how broadly conceived to accommodate the Marxian claim about the primacy of the "mode of production," were not primary in either the first or last instance. Moreover, there were other epochs where the activities of the ruling class were far more important in understanding new developments than any "class struggle" with direct producers, who were far too localized and lacking in organizational infrastructure to challenge the dominant class, let alone to be considered a class themselves. The Origin and Function of the State For Marxists, the state is a structure of domination that protects private property, even though they argue among themselves about the way in which this state domination takes place. Marx's general view of the state followed logically from the fact of human productivity. As already stated, the surplus created by this productivity led to inevitable conflict between the forces and relations of production, an increasing division of labor, inevitable class conflict, and then the creation of the political state as the defender of property. There are several problems with this theory of the state. First, archaeological and historical evidence do not support the claim that the state has its origins in class struggle and the rise of private property. Early states were a mix of religious and political institutions that had functions for small societies as a whole in terms of the need for a common way to store grain and other foodstuffs. These states also had other regulatory functions as city life became more crowded and complicated compared to what faced small groups of hunters and gatherers. Second, changes in the nature of the state are not usually a product of changes in society due to conflict between social classes. One of the biggest impacts on the nature of the state was the need for a common defense against nomadic groups, and later, rival states. Third, even in later times states are not always involved in subjugating the producing classes. Sometimes dominant classes do the subjugating directly, as during the Middle Ages (Mann, 1986, pp. 391-392, 411). Fourth, by conceiving of the state so narrowly, and not seeing its political and religious dimensions, Marxists minimize the potential for patriotic and religious feelings in shaping how groups and classes act. They therefore underestimate the strong possibility that common social bonds also can exist between the social classes in a country. Fifth, the Marxist analysis of the state, with its emphasis on its alleged original role in protecting private property, led to a false homology between the state and the economic system that creates a tendency to downplay the importance of representative democracy. Not all Marxists accept the argument that follows, but many do. For this large subset, representative democracy is an illusion that grows out of the same type of mystification that is created by the marketplace. Just as the capitalists appropriate surplus value "behind the backs" of the workers through the seemingly fair mechanism of the market, when the real story is in ownership and control of the forces of production, so too does representative democracy appropriate the political power of the workers through the seemingly fair mechanism of elections, when the major action is over in a state bureaucracy that responds to the interests of the owners of private property. This view is best summarized in Stanley Moore's A Critique of Capitalist Democracy (1957), a book based on an extremely close reading and synthesis of everything that Marx, Engels, and Lenin wrote on the subject of the state. It is so crucial to understanding how some Marxists view representative democracy, and thus to understanding the politics of those Marxists, that it needs to be quoted at length: These distinctive features of the bourgeois democratic state correspond to distinctive features of the capitalist economy. The capitalist economy appears to be controlled through a series of competitive exchanges, in which all members of the society participate voluntarily under conditions of universal freedom and equality. Similarly, the bourgeois democratic state appears to be controlled through a series of competitive elections, in which all members of the society participate voluntarily under conditions of universal freedom and equality. But beneath the formal freedom and equality of capitalist exchange lie the material bondage and exploitation of capitalist production, resulting from the monopoly over the means of production exercised by members of the capitalist class. And beneath the formal freedom and equality of bourgeois democratic elections lie the material bondage and oppression of bureaucratic administration, resulting from the monopoly over the means of coercion exercised by agents of the capitalist class. The democratic republic is the optimum political shell for capitalism because the relation between bureaucratic administration and universal suffrage is the optimum political counterpart for the relation between capitalist exploitation and commodity exchange. (Moore, 1957:87-88.) The ongoing importance of this analysis can be seen in the work of the Marxist economist James O'Connor, who had a major impact on the thinking of the generation of Marxists who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s. He is still carefully read by radical environmentalists and many members of the global justice movement. O'Connor had the following to say about these matters in Accumulation Crisis (1984): In Marxist theory, the "liberal democratic state" is still another capitalist weapon in the class struggle. This is so because the democratic form of the state conceals undemocratic contents. Democracy in the parliamentary shell hides its absence in the state bureaucratic kernel; parliamentary freedom is regarded as the political counterpart of the freedom in the marketplace, and the hierarchical bureaucracy as the counterpart of the capitalist division of labor in the factory. (O'Connor, 1984, p. 188.) There are some Marxists who would say that this is really the Marxist-Leninist view of representative democracy, not of Marxists in general. Be that as it may, the point for now is that this analysis is often accepted as "the" Marxist view by new Marxists, and is identified as such by O'Connor in the passage quoted above. I think it is a crucial point to consider because the idea that liberal freedoms are really a thin veil for the repression of the working class, when combined with the idea that the market is inherently exploitative, generates a contempt for liberal values and democracy that leads to crucial misunderstandings of the United States. It says that representative democracy is all a sham. I think this may be one of the root problems of Marxist politics in the United States, a problem that makes it difficult for Marxists to join into coalitions with liberals. For those Marxists who see representative democracy as a sham, the solution is "direct democracy," meaning small face-to-face groups in which the people themselves, not elected representatives, make decisions. This is in fact the meaning of the term "soviet." But historical experience shows that such groups came to be controlled by the members of the Communist Party within them. Problems also developed within direct democracy groups, often called "participatory democracy groups," in the New Left and women's movements in the 1960s. Although they tried to foster open participation among equals, they developed informal power structures led by charismatic or unbending members. There came to be a "tyranny of structurelessness" that shaped the group's decisions, often to the growing frustration of the more powerless members (Ellis, 1998, Chapter 6; Freeman, 1972). Based on this experience, it seems that selection of leaders through elections is necessary to avoid worse problems. Rather than downplaying the elected legislature, as some Marxists do, the Four Networks theory suggests that the creation of legislatures was a key factor in breaking down the unity of the monarchical state and thereby limiting its potential autonomy. Put another way, representative democracy and legislatures are one of the few counterpoints to the great potential power of an autocratic state. They should not be dismissed as inevitable mystifications of class rule, even if empirical investigations show that legislatures in capitalist societies are often dominated by capitalists, as is generally the case in the United States. The idea that Marxists and liberals should agree on is to extend the openness of legislatures in ways discussed in the Social Change section of this Web site. The Problems of Socialism The planned economy envisioned by classical Marxists has not proved to be workable either in terms of productivity or democratic responsiveness. There are several reasons for these failures. The productivity problem is rooted in the fact that the range and depth of information needed to run a complex consumer economy is too great for any planning bureaucracy. Moreover, no planning agency currently has the capability to analyze the information that does exist in a timely enough fashion to deal with sudden shifts in the availability of raw materials or changes in consumer preferences. The result is an unproductive economy. As the planners and plant managers come under criticism, they start to cut corners and cheat in ways that can allow them to meet their quotas. The result is hoarding of raw materials that other plants need, and shoddy goods. In other words, all the potential problems with large-scale bureaucracies come into play. Power accrues at the top. Then corruption ensues, such as placing friends and relatives of questionable competence in positions of responsibility, withholding important information from rival agencies, and skimming off resources for the personal benefit of the top officials. All this adds to the morale problems generated by the failures of the economy and multiplies the large economic inefficiencies. The disappointing conclusion that emerges from the social sciences and history is that non-market planning cannot work, even in democratic societies. Thus, progressives and other egalitarians have to develop methods of planning through the market in order to realize their egalitarian goals. For all its potential weaknesses, a planned market system within the context of a representative democracy can be both productive and more equal than present-day societies because it relies on many different people with small pieces of information to make small and limited decisions. Many contemporary Marxists are rethinking these issues as well. There are interesting arguments about "market socialism" (Elson, 1998; Ollman, 1998).

#### That causes ascetic ressentiment

Turanli, 03

(The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University)

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be§ Marked 18:55 § . According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

## 1AR

### Ressentiment

#### And acknowledgement of the meaninglessness inherent to life is key to creating value

Diamantides in 2003

(Dr. Marinos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART II): THE COMPANY OF PRIESTS: MEANINGLESSNESS, SUFFERING AND COMPASSION IN THE THOUGHTS OF NIETZSCHE AND LEVINAS, Cardozo Law Review, March, 2003, l/n)

In relation to the classical philosophical problem posed by suffering there is, as the two quotes above indicate, an intriguing common emphasis on meaninglessness in the works of Nietzsche and Levinas, which renders fertile the reading together of their two distinct philosophies. The difference is that for Levinas, the acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of suffering without resentment is only the "least one can say." Indeed, Nietzsche exposed man's denial of absurd suffering "only" in order to support his case against the sentimentalism of Christian ethics and deontological and utilitarian moralities, which either attribute meaning to suffering or seek to rid life of it, ultimately denying life itself - for to live is also to suffer. Levinas, on the other hand, argued the inevitability of events of senseless suffering breaching from within the hermeneutically ordered world of meaning. Moreover, he viewed this as proof of the inevitability of the idea of infinity in a non-metaphysical sense, for it is "included" into the finite world of being as what cannot be matched by experience or representation, leaving a surplus of awe, astonishment, obsession. Immanence, therefore, is all there is, but to that we add that it cannot cease undergoing the idea of infinity, like an ill man who undergoes his condition. In Levinas' ethical discourse, infinity gets expressed in the "face of the other" and is transformed into obsession with providing succors for meaningless suffering. Suffering, left to its own devices, ridicules experience by always being "too much." In turn, it takes another being that comes to the rescue, thinking itself "infinitely responsible" for all the suffering it encounters, for suffering to be given an appropriate response. With this quasi-transcendental possibility in mind, this paper introduces and critically analyzes Nietzsche's notion of "affirmative compassion," as distinct from moral pity and, gradually, suggests the need for its reformulation as both an instance of will to power and as submission to the ethical imperative to care for the other. Given the un-saintly reputation of Nietzsche, however, the paper cannot but begin by paying tribute to his famous critique of pity, that "morbid emotion" that accompanies the denial of the senselessness of suffering and ultimately compels the nihilistic rejection of life itself. This is done in the first section in which I basically report on my law students' take on Nietzsche in the context of a course on medical law and moral reasoning. In sum, I report that Nietzsche's ideas help one critique the extensions of  [\*1277]  traditional legal doctrines of responsibility for man-made harm - sustained by the beliefs in the causal understanding of the world, in moral autonomy and agency - in relation to litigation that raises questions over the meaning of, and standard of care for, suffering that no one has caused. These doctrinal extensions are, arguably, instances of a hypertrophy of legal consciousness, indicating lack of understanding of the chaotic nature of the world of human affects in the face of absurd suffering and denial of the passion, obsession and delirium that correlate to the dis-equilibrium, meaninglessness and anarchy of suffering. In this connection, I offer a number of examples, often involving judgments that concern kinds of beings that blatantly manifest this senselessness, ranging from insensate beings in coma to the unborn. In the second section, I examine Nietzsche's views on how meaningless suffering affects the man of power. Because of Nietzsche's conviction that cruelty and indifference are no longer options for contemporary man, I focus on Nietzsche's formulation of a "noble compassion" that would be "affirmative" or "life-enhancing" - compassion within a meaningless universe. Such compassion is part of the becoming of beings with a "surplus of power," as opposed to morally submissive or hedonistic beings. Crucially, this is compassion that does not relinquish self-love in the process, and does not lead to the self becoming physically or emotionally "contaminated" by the suffering it witnesses.