### Off

Text: The President of the United States should restrain his use of war power by restraining his use of offensive cyber operations.

#### Obama supports self-restraint on cyber operations- empirics

Bob 3/22/13 ([YONAH JEREMY BOB](http://www.jpost.com/Authors/AuthorPage.aspx?id=170) 03/22/2013 Yonah Jeremy Bob is The Jerusalem Post's legal affairs correspondent. He primarily writes about major Supreme Court decisions, significant criminal trials, constitutional issues and international law matters. Prior to the Post, he worked on hasbara and international security law issues in the IDF Legal Division, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice International Law Division. Yonah has been interviewed and provided legal analysis multiple times for both the BBC and Skynews. Rule of Law: Obama, Israel and cyber warfare <http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/The-cyber-partys-over-307367>)

If the US and Israel were patting themselves on the backs in the first round of cyber warfare, putting off questions about clear rules of engagement and grappling with possible international law limits, the party is over. With US President Barack Obama in the neighborhood and several recent more defensive-minded moves being taken by Israel, it is worth noting a recent major leaked-announcement the US made about its cyber warfare rules of engagement, which will restrict its attack posture – and possibly Israel’s – in the future, if it hasn’t already. Before jumping into the maze of cyber warfare law, it is important to state that how and to what extent the law of armed conflict applies and what rules there should be for cyber warfare is highly disputed. In this vacuum, the US and Israel have launched highly aggressive and successful cyber warfare attacks on Iran, which have been largely credited for slowing down the country’s believed clandestine nuclear weapons program significantly and buying more time for sanctions and diplomacy to handle the issue. That is why Obama’s new potential rules of restraint with cyber warfare are surprising and may significantly impact Israel’s ability to act aggressively in the future. Unnamed senior US officials involved in developing the first set of US cyber warfare rules of engagement (essentially self-enforced legal limitations) leaked aspects of the new rules to*The New York Times* in February. A few of the rules were highly significant because they impose restrictions not required by the laws of armed conflict. First, the new rules of engagement state that almost no cyber attack can be carried out without presidential approval – though the law of armed conflict does not stipulate when approval for use of a particular weapon must be made by the head of state. There are some very limited exceptions, such as shutting off an adversary’s air-defense network prior to an attack on that adversary, but the rule appears to be pretty broad. Limiting the use of cyber warfare to presidential approval is an extremely restrictive approach, normally limited only to use of nuclear weapons, as getting presidential approval takes time – something that can have a serious cost in warfare. It also sets a tone of taking a more conservative and defensive approach, sending the message to US cyber operatives that aggressiveness and results may not be as appreciated and may not even be supported if procedures are not carefully followed. In addition to the more general rule, the US has specifically ruled out automatic counterattacks pending US efforts to more carefully determine where the attack emanated from. Again, this restraint is not required per se by the law of armed conflict, which limits how aggressive US cyber warfare operatives can be and sends a message to adversaries of US restraint. To the extent that experts are trying to decide how to apply the law of armed conflict to cyber warfare, attempts which have been hotly debated, the more careful “wait and see” approach of the new US rules seems to show a desire to find ways to employ the rule of proportionality. The slower and less rushed the response is to an attack, the more likely it can be proportional. Why does this more conservative approach matter to Israel? First, in most areas where Israel has received tolerant and patient legal reactions to more controversial warfare tactics, it has been where these tactics overlapped with newly aggressive American tactics. In other words, few are ready to try to sanction or boycott the US and, when the US is fighting asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq using aggressive methods and interpretations of the laws of armed conflict, the pressure on Israel is also somewhat reduced. Similarly, Israel might or might not have engaged in aggressive and offensive cyber warfare tactics against Iran without US cover, but US cover again certainly blunts criticism of such preemptive covert methods as violating international law. But all of this can work against Israel if the US acts more conservatively. Despite the success of the cyber warfare attacks on Iran, the US appears to be signaling a strategic retreat in offensive cyber warfare to a more defensive posture. Now, if Israel goes it alone in a cyber warfare attack, it may have significantly less cover from legal criticism. This is a problem because, while there is no accepted set of rules for cyber warfare law aside from the attempt to apply general rules of armed conflict like necessity and proportionality, any time that a state takes any preemptive action, whether using its air force, drones or cyber warfare, there is significant legal controversy. This does not mean that Israel will not go it alone, but the likelihood of such offensive uses of cyber warfare – whether against Iran or others – is reduced, as there is always a diplomatic price and, with the International Criminal Court up and running, possibly a concrete legal price as well. There are signs that Israel is following the US’s lead, with several recent statements by Israeli officials emphasizing its defensive cyber warfare capabilities instead of the offensive capabilities it was emphasizing not long ago. In mid-February, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that the IDF has introduced its cyber defense control center into service. Staffed by 20 soldiers and operating 24/7, the center was put forth as a nerve center for defense, command and coordination abilities against cyber warfare attacks. Then, last week, the Defense Ministry announced that it was setting up a new cyber body to support Israeli defense industries in coping with cyber threats, focusing on vulnerabilities from data storage, laptops and from use of Windows’s operating system, since many components are made abroad and can be tampered with. What is the purpose of announcements of defensive cyber warfare capabilities, as opposed to the IDF and former defense minister Ehud Barak emphasizing offensive capabilities in June 2012 and after US-Israeli cyber success against Iran? It seems that the US, and possibly Israel as well, is trying to signal to China, Iran, North Korea and other possible attackers that they are willing to take their hand off the offensive cyber trigger and that their increased defensive capabilities may render attacks on the US and Israel less likely to succeed and not worth the cost and time investment. International relations experts emphasize the importance of conveying a message convincingly to deter an adversary from attacking, such as the US’s public threats against the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here, the US’s leaked announcement of its new restrictive cyber warfare rules of engagement, which appear in some areas to be even stricter than what the laws of armed conflict would require, may suggest a different tactic: alleviating adversaries’ insecurity about being attacked while changing the cost/benefit analysis of adversaries’ attacking. Why have the US, and possibly Israel, decided to go more defensive? Put simply, the US and Israel, with their hyper hotwired economies and societies, have far more vulnerabilities and far more to lose than their adversaries do. On Wednesday, the world took note of what appeared to be a North Korean cyber attack on hotwired South Korea. In mid-February China was accused of hitting the US with cyber attacks, and both Israel and the US claim to have been victims recently – in Israel there are also allegations that many banks, telecoms and others have been hit but kept it quiet – with a noticeable increase after the attacks on Iran. So one explanation may be that, with weak international law norms, a low probability of a multi-lateral treaty on reducing cyber attacks in sight and an increase in attacks on the US, the US is trying to unilaterally create new standards in the hope that its adversaries will reciprocate.

#### Legislative and Judicial checks on the executive prevent effective responses to nuclear terrorism and prolif

Li 2009 (ZHEYAO LI, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, Winter, 2009¶ The Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy¶ 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, lexis, bs)

Another tenet of the Congressionalist position is "balanced institutional participation in foreign affairs." n25 Professor Koh, for example, advocates the implementation of a national security charter to reflect what he sees as the needed restoration of the separation and balance of powers between all three branches of government. This charter would be "[c]onsistent with the guiding principle of balanced institutional participation," prescribing a foreign affairs decision-making apparatus in which all three branches play important roles: "in a Congress that enacts a framework statute defining institutional responsibilities in foreign affairs; in a president who helps draft and apply the statute; and in courts who construe the charter and draw boundaries between lawful and unlawful conduct." n26 One of the most troubling features of Professor Koh's proposal is the involvement of the judicial branch.¶ Professor Koh fails to adequately discuss the objection that judicial intervention in the formulation of foreign policy would constitute an inherently political act. For, indeed, as Carl von Clausewitz once wrote, "[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means" and "[w]hen whole communities go to war--whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples--the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object." n27 Thus, to call for judicial review of the constitutionality or even [\*380] statutory legality of war actions is to invite judicial second-guessing in the policymaking motivations and processes of the political branches, and to weigh the wisdom of the legislature against the wisdom of the executive. A federal district court in Massachusetts was conscious of this exact problem when confronted, in a suit filed by six members of Congress, with the issue of whether President George W. Bush legally used force in committing troops to Iraq in 2003. The court ruled that, "[a]bsent a clear abdication of this constitutional responsibility by the political branches, the judiciary has no role to play." n28 The district court's holding was subsequently affirmed by the First Circuit on appeal, and the plaintiffs refrained from petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. n29¶ Another shortcoming of Professor Koh's proposal to introduce new institutional checks and balances on the war powers through statutory enactment is revealed when he quotes, but quickly dismisses, the concerns of Professor Paul Kennedy, who wrote even before the end of the Cold War that the United States¶ "may not always be assisted by its division of constitutional and decision-making powers, deliberately created when it was geographically and strategically isolated from the rest of the world two centuries ago . . . but which may be harder to operate when it has become a global superpower, often called upon to make swift decisions vis-a-vis countries which enjoy far fewer constraints." n30¶ While Koh is absolutely correct when he argues that, simply because other nation-states might not abide by the same constitutional or democratic constraints, that does not entitle America to freely disregard her own Constitution, n31 this tautology does not provide a satisfactory conclusion to the inquiry, especially when American lives are at stake.¶ Specifically, Professor Koh fails to foresee the unique problems presented by the rise of non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups. He writes that "[e]xpecting, perhaps, a response to a nuclear strike, the occasions are exceedingly rare when the president would jeopardize the nation by considering legality before committing the nation to a course of international action." n32 This statement is true when considered solely in the context of non-nuclear, state-based threats. In the modern age of international terrorism and rogue states, however, considering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ease and low cost with which WMDs may be deployed, the President may not have the luxury to [\*381] wait on congressional debate and approval before acting to prevent the loss of American lives.

### Off

#### Every problem of the 1AC is rooted in the Will that drives every facet of existence—to live is to want, and to want is to suffer—the fundamental premise of nature is the Will to live—acting through the Will can only ever perpetuate our sorrows

Young, 3

(Julian Young, PhD from Pitt and Jr. Professor of Humanities at Wake Forest. “The Death of God and the Meaning of Life” pg. 35-38) Henge

This universal, metaphysically necessary, feature is, of course, ‘will’. Every being in the phenomenal world is, in its innermost nature, will. This fact inexorably condemns it to suffering. How so? Consider, first, non-human life, the lives of the animals. Every animal has, as its most fundamental impulse, the will to survive. (Since survival is the fundamental goal of every will, Schopenhauer often refers to the will as ‘the will to live’.) Yet in order to survive, he observes (anticipating by some fifty years central aspects of Darwin’s Origin of Species), life must feed on life. The way, that is to say, that nature preserves her system of species is through overpopulation. She produces enough members of one species – antelopes – so that, in the first place, there are enough antelopes to ensure the survival of that species, but, in the second, a surplus left over adequate to ensure the survival of another species – lions. What follows from this, however, is that fear, terror, pain and death are not accidental or occasional malfunctions of a mainly benign order of things. They are, rather, written into, essential or structural features of, the order of things that is nature. Nature, that is to say, cares not a fig for the individual, but only for the species. The suffering and death of individuals are the horrendous means she has chosen in order to preserve her system of species (WR I sections 27–9, WR II chapter 28). We are, perhaps, not generally accustomed to look on nonhuman nature with a moral eye. But if we do – as, of course, the Christian apologist’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds invites us to – then, says Schopenhauer, we are forced to the very opposite of the Christian judgement. Viewed with an honest eye, nature must be adjudged a morally disgusting phenomenon, something that ‘ought not exist’. Schopenhauer finds the endless and pointless horror of animal life personified in the report of an early nineteenth-century visitor to Java, F. W. Junghuhn. Junghuhn records, says Schopenhauer (re-presenting the traveller’s report in his own language), how he saw an immense field covered with skeletons, and took it to be a battlefield. However, they were nothing but skeletons of large turtles, five feet long, three feet broad, and of equal height. These turtles come this way from the sea, in order to lay their eggs, and are then seized by wild dogs (canis rutilans); with their united strength, these dogs lay them on their backs, tear open their lower armour, the small scales of the belly, and devour them alive. But then a tiger often pounces on the dogs. Now all this misery is repeated thousands and thousands of times, year in, year out. For this, then, are these turtles born. For what offence must they suffer this agony? What is the point of this whole scene of horror? The only answer is that the will-to-live thus objectifies [expresses] itself.4 (WR II p. 354) Animal life is, then, bellum omnium contra omnes, war, all against all. The will-to-live in one individual is locked in mortal combat with the will in another. It is the same with plants competing for light in the jungle, and the same even on the so-called inorganic level. Centrifugal force must overcome centripetal force in order to maintain itself, rigidity must overcome gravity in order to survive. Turning now to human life, we find the same fundamental phenomenon of war, all against all, that pulsates through the rest of nature. Nations are either overtly or covertly at war with each other, individuals must strive to become overdogs to avoid becoming underdogs. As the ancients observed, homo homini lupus, man is a wolf for man (WR II p. 577). Schopenhauer’s principal and most interesting argument for pessimism with respect to the human condition – I shall call it the ‘stress or boredom’ argument – has to do, however, not with our interaction with others but rather with our own internal natures. According to this argument, even if we were to emigrate to an uninhabited South Sea Island (with a stock of good books, CDs and an unlimited supply of fine New Zealand wines) we would still suffer. As with all living things, the essence of human existence is will. As human beings, what we are is ‘objectified’ (i.e. physiologically expressed) will: ‘teeth, gullet and intestinal canal are objectified hunger, the genitals objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the more indirect strivings of the will’ (WR I p. 108). Since will is our essence, what we do – all of the time save when we are sleeping, and sometimes even then – is to will. Always, restlessly and tirelessly, we are needing, wanting, desiring, striving for and against things. Our willing, says Schopenhauer, ‘can be fully compared to an unquenchable thirst’. ‘The basis of all willing, however’, he continues, is need, lack, and hence pain, and by its very nature and origin it [the human being] is therefore destined to pain. If on the other hand it lacks objects of willing, because it is . . . deprived of them by . . . satisfaction, a fearful emptiness and boredom comes over it; in other words, its being and its existence itself becomes an intolerable burden for it. Hence its life swings like a pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom, and these two are, in fact, its ultimate constituents. (WR I p. 312) Schopenhauer is the first – and almost only – major Western philosopher to have paid serious attention to boredom. And he has some insightful things to say about it. Boredom, he suggests – not the child’s momentary tantrum but real, adult boredom (‘depression’ as we call it these days) – is marked by three essential characteristics. The first concerns the look of things, the look not of this or that, but rather of everything, of the world as a whole. In boredom, the world as a whole loses colour, becomes stale, flat and unprofitable, ‘dreary’ (WR I p. 314) and ‘dead’ (WR I p. 164). The second mark of boredom concerns the will. In unbored existence one experiences, always, the ‘pressure of the will’. This pressure, however, continues when one is bored. But, since it can find no goal to latch on to, one experiences a terrible frustration, the suffering of ‘a longing without any definite object’ (WR I p. 164). (I think this observation must be understood as pointing out that, in boredom, we experience a second-order desire, a ‘will to will’ – a will to be engaged in, and therefore have targets of, first-order willing – which is unsatisfied.) The third mark of boredom is philosophical in character. Deprived of the ability to act, expelled, as it were, from the ‘game’ (ibid.) of life, one sees life as precisely that: like tiddlywinks, draughts, Go or golf, a set of moves which are entirely without point or purpose save that of filling in the tedious interval between now and death.5 In boredom, life presents itself as an alien, meaningless phenomenon. Boredom is, then, suffering – indeed, the most terrible of all forms of suffering, since, paradoxically, the suffering of unsatisfied desire, of the unsatisfied will to will, is incorporated into the suffering of satisfied desire. But life is either unsatisfied desire – ‘stress’ – or satisfied desire, boredom. Hence, life is suffering: it ‘swings like a pendulum’ between the suffering of stress and the suffering of boredom. (The former, observes Schopenhauer, is most commonly the fate of the poor, the latter of the rich. Hence it is among the latter, he says, that one usually finds addiction to time-killing devices such a card games, cigar smoking and drumming on the table with one’s thumbs (WR I p. 313).) For Schopenhauer, the paradigm of life’s oscillation between stress and boredom is sexual love. Under the influence of the sexual instinct we magnify the virtues of the beloved out of all proportion to reality. He or she becomes the most perfect, desirable, beautiful object in existence; no other goal is worth pursuing. We suffer the agonies of unrequited love. Should, however, the beloved relent and at last smile on us so that finally we attain our goal, then, afterwards, she or he seems so ordinary that we wonder what all the fuss was about. ‘Everyone is disappointed after sex,’ runs the Roman proverb (WR I section 60, WR II chapter 44).

#### The only efficacious response to the Will is to fundamentally deny it at its core—our alternative is to accept death, letting ourselves starve for the very lack of Will to eat—nothingness is the true meaning of life

Young, 3

(Julian Young, PhD from Pitt and Jr. Professor of Humanities at Wake Forest. “The Death of God and the Meaning of Life” pg. 39-40) Henge

What are we to do about life’s suffering? Though claiming to have arrived at his conclusions independently, Schopenhauer had an intense admiration for Buddhism.6 And, in fact, his pessimism is identical with one of the major doctrines of Buddhism: the first of the Four Noble Truths in which the Buddha summed up his life’s teaching is ‘Life is suffering (dhukka)’. The second Truth is ‘The origin of suffering is craving [i.e. willing]’, which, as we have seen, is precisely Schopenhauer’s analysis. The Buddha’s third Truth maintains that ‘The cessation of suffering is possible through the cessation of craving’. (The fourth, the ‘eightfold path’ to the cessation of craving, does not concern us here.) This, too, is precisely Schopenhauer’s answer to the question of what we are to do about life’s suffering, what we are to do in the face of the truth of pessimism. Since the source of suffering is willing, the solution to the ‘riddle’ of life (WR II chapter 17 passim), says Schopenhauer, lies in ‘denial of the will’. In the first instance, the transition from ‘affirmation’ to ‘denial’ of the will consists in a ‘transition . . . to asceticism’ (WR I p. 380). Someone who has seen the Schopenhauerian truth of things will turn from the life of ambitious striving to a life of as little willing as possible. The characteristics of such a life will be the traditional monastic virtues: poverty, chastity and obedience. (Notice, here, echoes of Plato’s ‘philosophical life’ (see pp. 15–16 above).) But though, perhaps surprisingly, Schopenhauer rejects suicide,7 the ultimate and complete solution to the problem of life consists in death, the most enlightened death being that of the ascetic who starves, not by a deliberate act, but simply because he has become too will-less to eat. (This should not be confused with anorexia, which, on most accounts, is a powerful affirmation of the will.) But is this not the most abject nihilism? Is not death the entry into a mere ‘nothingness’? And is not Schopenhauer, therefore, offering nothingness, becoming nothing, as the goal and meaning of life? To be sure, Schopenhauer replies, to our finite minds ‘what remains after the complete abolition of the will is . . . assuredly nothing’ (WR I p. 412). But we only have to observe the ‘deep tranquillity’, the ‘ocean-like calmness of the spirit’ in the face of the mystic to ‘banish the dark impression of that nothingness, which as the final goal hovers behind all virtue and holiness’ (WR I p. 411). The mystics, in other words, know something that is inaccessible to ordinary minds. They know that what seems to us to be nothing is, in fact, a ‘better place’. (Schopenhauer thinks that we can sometimes share in the mystics’ insight through music. As did Franz Schubert who, in ‘To Music’, praises his ‘blessed art’ as that which ‘transport[s] us to a better place’.) As we have seen, Schopenhauer despises Christianity. What he in fact despises, however, is not Christianity as such but rather the idea of our world as the creation of an omnipotent God of love. Other aspects of Christianity, the idea that this world is a ‘veil of tears’ from which we need other-worldly ‘salvation’, he completely endorses. Surprisingly, therefore, Schopenhauer turns out to be, in the end, yet another ‘true-world’ theorist. Salvation consists in transcendence of the world of the principium individuationis, in breaking through the ‘web of Mâyâ’ (WR I p. 17), so as to achieve unification – or reunification – with the absolute. (Transcendence of individuality must be unification, because, remember, beyond the phenomena there is no plurality.) The only real difference between Schopenhauer and Christianity is that his true world is not populated by God and the angels, but is the a-theistic true world of Buddhism, in other language, nirvana. In the end, to use what the later Nietzsche deploys as a term of disparagement, Schopenhauer turns out to be a ‘European Buddhist’.

### Case

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Another tenet of the Congressionalist position is "balanced institutional participation in foreign affairs." n25 Professor Koh, for example, advocates the implementation of a national security charter to reflect what he sees as the needed restoration of the separation and balance of powers between all three branches of government. This charter would be "[c]onsistent with the guiding principle of balanced institutional participation," prescribing a foreign affairs decision-making apparatus in which all three branches play important roles: "in a Congress that enacts a framework statute defining institutional responsibilities in foreign affairs; in a president who helps draft and apply the statute; and in courts who construe the charter and draw boundaries between lawful and unlawful conduct." n26 One of the most troubling features of Professor Koh's proposal is the involvement of the judicial branch.¶ Professor Koh fails to adequately discuss the objection that judicial intervention in the formulation of foreign policy would constitute an inherently political act. For, indeed, as Carl von Clausewitz once wrote, "[w]ar is merely the continuation of policy by other means" and "[w]hen whole communities go to war--whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples--the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object." n27 Thus, to call for judicial review of the constitutionality or even [\*380] statutory legality of war actions is to invite judicial second-guessing in the policymaking motivations and processes of the political branches, and to weigh the wisdom of the legislature against the wisdom of the executive. A federal district court in Massachusetts was conscious of this exact problem when confronted, in a suit filed by six members of Congress, with the issue of whether President George W. Bush legally used force in committing troops to Iraq in 2003. The court ruled that, "[a]bsent a clear abdication of this constitutional responsibility by the political branches, the judiciary has no role to play." n28 The district court's holding was subsequently affirmed by the First Circuit on appeal, and the plaintiffs refrained from petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. n29¶ Another shortcoming of Professor Koh's proposal to introduce new institutional checks and balances on the war powers through statutory enactment is revealed when he quotes, but quickly dismisses, the concerns of Professor Paul Kennedy, who wrote even before the end of the Cold War that the United States¶ "may not always be assisted by its division of constitutional and decision-making powers, deliberately created when it was geographically and strategically isolated from the rest of the world two centuries ago . . . but which may be harder to operate when it has become a global superpower, often called upon to make swift decisions vis-a-vis countries which enjoy far fewer constraints." n30¶ While Koh is absolutely correct when he argues that, simply because other nation-states might not abide by the same constitutional or democratic constraints, that does not entitle America to freely disregard her own Constitution, n31 this tautology does not provide a satisfactory conclusion to the inquiry, especially when American lives are at stake.¶ Specifically, Professor Koh fails to foresee the unique problems presented by the rise of non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups. He writes that "[e]xpecting, perhaps, a response to a nuclear strike, the occasions are exceedingly rare when the president would jeopardize the nation by considering legality before committing the nation to a course of international action." n32 This statement is true when considered solely in the context of non-nuclear, state-based threats. In the modern age of international terrorism and rogue states, however, considering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ease and low cost with which WMDs may be deployed, the President may not have the luxury to [\*381] wait on congressional debate and approval before acting to prevent the loss of American lives.

#### Speed is good – democracy checks the impact AND reclamation is necessary

Armitage 2k

John Armitage University of Northumbria politics and media studies lecturer,“Beyond Postmodernism? Paul Virilio's Hypermodern Cultural Theory” <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=133#bio>,

Virilio's cultural theory and numerous activities have courted controversy since the 1960s. When Virilio and Parent built their 'bunker church' — and which has to be seen to be believed — the bishop who consecrated it was, according to Virilio, muttering to himself the following words: 'what a ghastly thing! Amen! What a ghastly thing! Amen!' As Virilio tells the story: 'the priest turned towards the bishop and said: "Monsignor, this is not an exorcism! It is a consecration!"' (Armitage, 2001a: forthcoming.) Religious criticisms of Virilio and Parent's architecture aside, there have also been a number of recent academic critiques of Virilio's ideas concerning the state, technology, and speed. Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 351-423), for instance, attempted what Crogan (1999) calls a problematic effort to 'subsume' Virilio's thought into their own poststructuralist approach to cultural theory. But, as Crogan suggests, Deleuze and Guattari's 'static, ahistorical model' of the state and technology cannot easily be combined with Virilio's writings without undoing 'its own coherency in the process'. In turn, Virilio's The Aesthetics of Disappearance has outraged the neo-Marxian geographer Harvey (1989: 293, 299, and 351; 2000: 88). For Harvey, Virilio's 'response' to what the former recently called the 'theme of time-space compression' 'has been to try and ride the tiger of time-space compression through construction of a language and an imagery that can mirror and hopefully command it'. Harvey places the 'frenetic writings' of Virilio (and Baudrillard) in this category because 'they seem hell-bent on fusing with time-space compression and replicating it in their own flamboyant rhetoric'. Harvey, of course, has 'seen this response before, most specifically in Nietzsche's extraordinary evocations in The Will To Power'. Yet, in The Aesthetics of Disappearance, Virilio's unfolding and wholly intentional reactions to the emergence of the dromocratic condition are actually concerned with 'the importance of interruption, of accident, of things that are stopped as productive' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997 [1983]: 44. Original emphasis.) As Virilio told Lotringer: 'It's entirely different from what Gilles Deleuze does in Milles Plateaux. He progresses by snatches, whereas I handle breaks and absences. The fact of stopping and saying, "let's go somewhere else" is very important for me' (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997 [1983]: 45.) What Virilio's 'frenetic writings' actually substantiate throughout the 1980s are the material and, crucially, the immaterial consequences of dromological changes in aesthetics, military power, space, cinema, politics, and technology. In an era increasingly eclipsed by the technologically produced disappearance of cultural life, war, matter, and human perception, this is a very significant achievement. In the contemporary era, though, the limitations of Virilio's cultural theory are likely to rest not — as Harvey suggests — with his similarities but with his differences from Nietzsche. As Waite (1996: 381-2. Original emphases.), quoting the American performance artist Laurie Anderson, has argued: Virilio still desperately holds on to a modicum of modernist critique of postmodern military tactics, strategies, and technologies, whereas Nietzsche basically would have been impatient with mere critique, moving quickly to appropriate them for his own use, at least conceptually and rhetorically, as metaphors and techniques of persuasion to preserve power for elites over corpses — 'now that the living outnumber the dead'.

#### Virilio ‘s theory was based on post ww2 and cold war assumptions

Kellner no date

(George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair Division of Social Sciences & Comparative Education Graduate School of Education & Information Studies, UCLA, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections” <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm> SIN)

Virilio thus emerges as a highly useful theorist of the post-World War Two and Cold War era of the military with the domination of military technology and military capitalism, but he never analyses the complicity of capitalism and those economic forces that deploy technology for power and profit, instead putting all blame for contemporary problems on technology and its deployment by the military and perhaps the state. But against Virilio, it should be recognized that new technologies are part of the capitalist project, that capital recognizes, along with Marx, that surplus value is gained by productive deployment of new technologies, and that technology provides powerful weapons of profit and social control.

#### CST proves Virilio is wrong

Kellner no date

(George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair Division of Social Sciences & Comparative Education Graduate School of Education & Information Studies, UCLA, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections” <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm> SIN)

By eschewing critical social theory, Virilio does not have the resources to theorize the complex relations between capital, technology, the state, and military in the present age, substituting a highly elusive and evocative method for systematic theoretical analysis and critique. Virilio himself acknowledges his elusive and suggestive approach to writing, noting: "I don't believe in explanations. I believe in suggestions, in the obvious quality of the implicit. Being an urbanist and architect, I am too used to constructing clear systems, machines that work well. I don't believe it's writing's job to do the same thing. I don't like two-and-two-is-four-type writing. That's why, finally, I respect Foucault more than I like him" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 38-39). Indeed, Virilio's style is extremely telescopic, leaping from topic to topic with alacrity, juxtaposing defuse elements and themes, proliferating images, quotes, and ideas which rapidly follow each other, often overwhelming the reader and making it difficult to grasp the thrust of Virilio's argument.

#### Speed is good—we must accelerate warfare to win the war on terrorism and reduce casualties on both sides

PETERS 2006 (Ralph, fmr US intelligence officer and best-selling author, Never Quit the Fight, 154-156)

Real atrocities aren’t required. Everything American soldiers do is portrayed as an atrocity. World opinion is outraged, no matter how judiciously we fight. With each passing day—sometimes with each hour—the pressure builds on our government to halt combat operations, to offer the enemy a pause, to negotiate…in essence, to give up. We saw it in Fallujah, where slow-paced tactical success led only to cease-fires that comforted the enemy and gave the global media time to pound us even harder. Those cease-fires were worrisomely reminiscent of the bombing halts during the Vietnam War—except that everything happens faster now. Even in Operation Desert Strom, the effect of images trumped reality and purpose. The exaggerated carnage of the “highway of death” north from Kuwait City led us to stop the war before we had sufficiently punished the truly guilty—Saddam’s Republican Guard and the regime’s leadership. We’re still paying for that mistake. In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape us—despite promising that we would bring them to justice. We stopped because we were worried about what already hostile populations might think of us. The global media disrupted the U.S. and Coalition chains of command. Foreign media reporting even sparked bureaucratic infighting within our own government. The result was a disintegration of our will—first from decisive commitment to worsening hesitation, then to a “compromise” that returned Sunni-Arab Ba’athist officers to power. That deal not only horrified Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a Arabs, it inspired expanded attacks by Muqtada al Sadr’s Shi’a thugs hoping to rival the success of the Sunni-Arab murderers at Fallujah. We could have won militarily. Instead, we surrendered politically and called it a success. Our enemies won the information war. We literally didn’t know what hit us. The implication for tactical combat—war at the bayonet level—is clear: We must direct our doctrine, training, equipment, organization, and plans toward winning low-level fights much faster—before the global media can do what enemy forces cannot do and stop us short. We can still win the big campaigns. But we’re apt to lose thereafter, in the dirty end-game fights. We have to speed the kill. For two decades, our military has concentrated on deploying forces swiftly around the world, as well as on fighting fast-paced conventional wars—with the positive results we saw during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But at the infantry level, we’ve lagged behind—despite the unrivaled quality of our troops. We’ve concentrated on critical soldier skills but ignored the emerging requirements of battle. We’ve worked on almost everything except accelerating urban combat—because increasing the pace is dangerous and very hard to do. Now we have no choice. We must learn to strike much faster at the ground-truth level, to accomplish the tough tactical missions at speeds an order of magnitude faster than in past conflicts. If we can’t **win** the Fallujahs of the future **swiftly**, we will **lose them**. Our military must rise to its responsibility to reduce the pressure on the National Command Authority—in essence, the president—by rapidly and effectively executing orders to root out enemy resistance or nests of terrorists. To do so, we must develop the capabilities to fight within the “media cycle,” before journalists sympathetic to terrorists and murderers can twist the facts and portray us as the villains. Before the combat encounter is politicized globally. Before allied leaders panic. And before such reporting exacerbates bureaucratic rivalries within our own system. Fighting faster at the dirty-boots level is going to be tough. As we develop new techniques, we’ll initially see higher casualties in the short term, perhaps on both sides. But we should have learned long ago, if we are not willing to face up to casualties sooner, the cumulative tally will be much, much higher later. We’re bleeding in Iraq now because a year ago we were unwilling even to shed the blood of our enemies. The Global War on Terror is going to be a decades-long struggle. The military will not always be the appropriate tool to apply. But when a situation demands a military response, our forces must bring to bear such **focused, hyperfast power** that our enemies are **overwhelmed and destroyed** before hostile cameras can defeat us. **If we do not learn to kill very, very swiftly, we will continue to lose slowly.**

#### Critiquing the social forces around technology encourages Luddism and rejection of progress—they throw out the good with the bad

**HUGHES 2006** (James, Ph.D., Public Policy Studies at Trinity College, “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0,” Last Mod Jan 26, http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm)

First, left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle. Most new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them, articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, and find liberatory uses for the technologies. If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected. The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support.

#### Technological advancement solves its own impact—accelerated progress will make us more likely to prevent accidents

**BOSTROM 2003** (Nick, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, “Transhumanism FAQ,” October,

http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/68/)

Superintelligence is an example of a technology that seems especially worth promoting because it can help reduce a broad range of threats. Superintelligent systems could advise us on policy and make the progress curve for nanotechnology steeper, thus shortening the period of vulnerability between the development of dangerous nanoreplicators and the deployment of effective defenses. If we have a choice, it seems preferable that superintelligence be developed before advanced nanotechnology, as superintelligence could help reduce the risks of nanotechnology but not vice versa. Other technologies that have wide risk-reducing uses include intelligence augmentation, information technology, and surveillance. These can make us smarter individually and collectively or make enforcement of necessary regulation more feasible. A strong prima facie case therefore exists for pursuing these technologies as vigorously as possible. Needless to say, we should also promote non-technological developments that are beneficial in almost all scenarios, such as peace and international cooperation.

#### We have already developed maximum capacity for destruction—further progress can only be good

**WALKER 2009** (Mark, assistant professor at New Mexico State University and holds the Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization ,” The Global Spiral, Feb 5, http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx)

This line of thinking is further reinforced when we consider that there is a limit to the downside of creating posthumans, at least relatively speaking. That is, one of the traditional concerns about increasing knowledge is that it seems to always imply an associated risk for greater destructive capacity. One way this point is made is in terms of ‘killing capacity’: muskets are a more powerful technology than a bow and arrow, and tanks more powerful than muskets, and atomic bombs even more destructive than tanks. The knowledge that made possible these technical advancements brought a concomitant increase in capacity for evil. Interestingly, we have almost hit the wall in our capacity for evil: once you have civilization destroying weapons there is not much worse you can do. There is a point in which the one-upmanship for evil comes to an end—when everyone is dead. If you will forgive the somewhat graphic analogy, it hardly matters to Kennedy if his head is blown off with a rifle or a cannon. Likewise, if A has a weapon that can kill every last person there is little difference between that and B’s weapon which is twice as powerful. Posthumans probably won’t have much more capacity for evil than we have, or are likely to have shortly. So, at least in terms of how many persons can be killed, posthumans will not outstrip us in this capacity. This is not to say that there are no new worries with the creation of posthumans, but the greatest evil, the destruction of civilization, is something which we now, or will soon, have. In other words, the most significant aspect that we should focus on with contemplating the creation of posthumans is their upside. They are not likely to distinguish themselves in their capacity for evil, since we have already pretty much hit the wall on that, but for their capacity for good.

#### Tech is key to space colonization

**HUGHES 2006** (James, Ph.D., Public Policy Studies at Trinity College, “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0,” Last Mod Jan 26, http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm)

Third, Left Luddism is boring and depressing; it has no energy to inspire movements to create a new and better society. The Left was built by people inspired by millenial visions, not by people who saw a hopeless future of futile existential protest. Most people do not want to live in a future without telecommunications, labor-saving devices, air travel and medicine. The Next Left needs to rediscover its utopian imagination if it is to renew itself, reconnect with the popular imagination, and remain relevant. The Next Left needs visionary projects worthy of a united transhuman world, such as guaranteeing health and longevity for all, eliminating work, and colonizing the Solar System.

#### Space colonization means we survive global nuclear war, bioweapon use, and environmental destruction.

**Koschara, 01** – Major in Planetary Studies

(Fred, L5 Development Group, http://www.l5development.com/fkespace/financial-return.html)

Potentially one of the greatest benefits that may be achieved by the space colonies is nuclear survival, and the ability to live past any other types of mass genocide that become available. We have constructed ourselves a house of dynamite, and now live in fear that someone might light a match. If a global nuclear war were to break out, or if a deadly genetic experiment got released into the atmosphere, the entire human race could be destroyed in a very short period of time. In addition, many corporate attitudes seem concerned with only maximizing today's bottom line, with no concern for the future. This outlook leads to dumping amazingly toxic wastes into the atmosphere and oceans, a move which can only bring harm in the long run. Humanity has to diversify its hold in the universe if it is to survive. Only through space colonization is that option available, and we had all best hope we're not to late.