# Off

#### First, restraining executive war powers whitewashes a long history of extreme racism and bloody U.S. imperialism

Street in 2008

(Paul, doctorate in U.S. History at Binghamton University, “The Audacity of Imperial Airbrushing: Barack Obama’s Whitewashed History of U.S. Foreign Policy and Why it Matters”, <http://www.zcommunications.org/the-audacity-of-imperial-airbrushing-barack-obama-s-whitewashed-history-of-u-s-foreign-policy-and-why-it-matters-by-paul-street.html>, July 5th, 2008, rcheek)

“IT NEVER HAPPENED”¶ ¶ Under the rules of “mainstream” political discourse in the United States, crimes are committed by evil others, never by noble “America.” Bad things are done by “them,” but not by “us.” “They” often have malevolent intent but “we” are fundamentally good, driven by the highest and most noble objectives: peace, democracy, and liberty. ¶ ¶ From the end of World War Two through the present, the U.S. Empire has caused “the extinction and suffering of countless human beings. The United States,” John Pilger notes, “attempted to overthrow fifty governments, many of them democracies, and to crush thirty popular movements fighting tyrannical regimes. In the process, twenty-five countries were bombed, causing the loss of several million lives and the despair of millions more” (John Pilger, Freedom Next Time: Resisting the Empire [New York: Nation Books, 2007], pp. 4-5]. ¶ ¶ The leading imperial crimes include a massive U.S. assault on the peasant nation of Vietnam – an epic attack that killed 3 million Indochinese – and a continuing illegal invasion of oil-rich Mesopotamia. The latter attack has led to the premature death of 1.2 million Iraqis. .¶ ¶ But in the U.S, and indeed across much of the West, the record of this ongoing criminality is airbrushed out from official history and the mass culture. It is tossed down George Orwell’s “memory hole,” consistent with Big Brother’s dictum in Nineteen Eighty Four: “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.” As Harold Pinter noted in his biting acceptance of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Literature, dominant Western cultural authorities behave as if “it never happened.” When it comes to America’s saga of monumental transgression against civilized norms and international law, “nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening,” Pinter added, “it never happened. It didn’t matter. It was of no interest” (quoted in Pilger, Freedom Next Time, p. 4).¶ ¶ Dominant U.S.-led Western cultural codes mandate that the only victims worthy of acknowledgement and compassion are those assaulted by officially designated enemies. The larger number victimized by us and our clients and allies (e.g., the Palestinians suffering under Israeli occupation and apartheid) do not merit consideration, sympathy, or even acknowledgement. They didn’t happen. They don’t exist.¶ ¶ Beyond the question of historical accuracy, the problem here is that powerful nations who deny the occurrence of past transgressions are likely to commit new ones.¶ ¶ ¶ DENONCING WRIGHT, PRAISING GEORGE I’S WAR ON IRAQ¶ ¶ Which brings us to the avowed “American exceptionalist” [1] Barack Obama, who enjoys support from a large number of so-called left-liberal voters who want very badly to believe that he is a “progressive” opponent of American war, imperialism and militarism. As he has shown in his comments denouncing Reverend Jeremiah Wright and praising the military “service” of John McCain, Obama is more than ready to wipe “magical” America’s historical slate clean when it comes to imperial crimes. Obama denounces Wright because the good Reverend dares to acknowledge and denounce the bloody and dangerous – for states that practice terrorism abroad must expect to face terrorism there and at home – and living American history of imperial atrocity, illegality, and arrogance. McCain is lauded as “American war hero” despite the fact that he was an eager participant in a massive imperial assault on the men, women, and children of a poor peasant nation posed no danger to the people of America.¶ ¶ Speaking in a high school gymnasium in Greensburg, Pa. last April, Obama said he wanted to return America to the more “traditional” foreign policy of such past presidents as “George Bush’s father, or John F. Kennedy,” and “in some respects, Ronald Reagan.” He spoke in flattering and favorable terms of the way George H.W. Bush handled the supposedly virtuous first Persian Gulf War. The Associated Press article reporting this comment was titled “Obama Align Foreign Policy With GOP” – a rebuke to left-liberal writers who argue that the centrist Obama stands to the recognizably progressive side of Hillary Clinton at least on foreign policy. ¶ ¶ Nobody in the mainstream commentariat acted on (or likely even remotely felt ) the urge to point out that Bush I’s assault on Iraq involved heinous Superpower butchery, including the bombing and bulldozing to death of thousands of surrendered Iraqi soldiers and the decision to let Saddam Hussein slaughter Kurds and Shiites the U.S. had initially encouraged to rebel. Iraq is still dealing with epidemic cancers caused by American deployment of depleted uranium in the first one-sided Iraq “war,” described by many participants as a one-sided “turkey shoot.” ¶ ¶ As Obama knows, such crimes never happened. They are of no interest.¶ ¶ ¶ “THE HOPE OF A YOUNG LIEUTENANT BRAVELY PATROLLING THE MEKONG DELTA”¶ ¶ Obama’s eagerness to whitewash the dark record of U.S. foreign policy is hardly just a 2008 thing. Take a look at the following passage from his instantly famous Keynote Address to the 2004 Democratic Convention (the one that catapulted him to overnight celebrity), where he said the following about his repeatedly invoked concept of "hope:"¶ ¶ “I'm not talking about blind optimism here - the almost willful ignorance that thinks unemployment will go away if we just don't talk about it, or the health care crisis will solve itself if we just ignore it. I'm talking about something more substantial. It's the hope of slaves sitting around a fire singing freedom songs; the hope of immigrants setting out for distant shores; the hope of a young naval lieutenant bravely patrolling the Mekong Delta; the hope of a mill worker's son who dares to defy the odds; the hope of a skinny kid with a funny name who believes that America has a place for him, too...In the end, that is God's greatest gift to us, the bedrock of this nation; a belief in things not seen; a belief that there are better days ahead.”¶ The “young naval lieutenant line" was a reference to John F. Kerry's participation in the invasion of South Vietnam. It took no small chutzpah for Obama to lump African-American slaves' struggles and spirituality with the racist U.S. “crucifixion of Southeast Asia” (Noam Chomsky) under the image of noble Americans wishing together for a better future. Perhaps "God" gave Nazi executioners and Nazi victims the shared gift of hoping for “better days ahead.” ¶ It was not clear who or what told Obama that the Mekong Delta was Kerry and his superiors’ territory to "patrol.” Perhaps it was the same arrogant, nationalist and racist sensibilities that gave 19th century white Americans permission to own slaves and murder and steal land from Mexico and the indigenous first “American” nations and which allowed the Bush administration to attempt to seize Iraq as a colonial possession. ¶ THE WONDERFUL WORK OF THOSE WISE WHITE WILSONIANS¶ ¶ Obama’s eager willingness to whitewash U.S. foreign policy history in accord with the Orwellian requirements of dominant imperial canon was demonstrated in the foreign relations chapter of his bestselling 2006 campaign book “The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream” (New York: Crown, 2006). Bearing the grandiose title “The World Beyond Our Borders,” this chapter displayed rigid acceptance of the doctrinal notion that the United States’ foreign policies have long and consistently advanced “shared ideas of freedom” and the “rule of law” and “international institutions.” It praised the wonderful (for Obama) “post-[World War Two] leadership of president Truman, Dean Acheson, George Marshall and George Kennan” for “craft[ing]...a new...order that married [Woodrow] Wilsonian idealism to hardheaded realism, an acceptance of American power with a humility regarding America’s ability to control events around the world” (Obama, Audacity of Hope, p. 284). The benevolent, wise “Wilsonian” architects of the postwar Pax Americana, Obama claimed in “Audacity,” sought a “democratic” world order in which the U.S. countered the limitless “totalitarian” Soviet threat and “signaled a willingness to show restraint in the exercise of its power” (Obama, Audacity of Hope, p. 285).¶ ¶ This was remarkably sterile and reactionary commentary on such memorable moments in American “humility” as the arch-criminal atom-bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (mass-murderous shots across the bow of the emerging Cold War), the enormous imperial assaults on Korea and Indochina (millions of “enemy” civilians dead), the U.S. restoration of fascist power in “liberated” Italy, the intervention against popular social revolution in Greece (smeared as a Soviet export by U.S. policymakers in order to “Scare the Hell out of the American people” to garner support for massive new imperial “defense” expenditures) and the U.S. subversion of democracy and national independence across the planet. Iran (1953), Dominican Republic (1965), Guatemala (1954), Chile (1970-1973), Indonesia (1965) are just some of the more spectacular examples in a list that goes on and on.¶ ¶ Washington consistently justified its remarkable record of global criminality after World War II with a great enabling myth that Obama eagerly embraces: the existence of a Soviet Union willing and able “to spread [in Obama’s words] its totalitarian brand of communism” (Obama, Audacity of Hope, p. 204). Under the guise of protecting the world from that imperially useful but non-existent threat – honest U.S. assessments acknowledged that the real Soviet danger was that USSR modeled the possibility of independent national development outside the parameters of U.S.-led world-capitalist supervision and indicating an impermissible refusal “to complement the industrial economies of the West” (William Yandell Elliot, ed., The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy [New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1955], p. 42; Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy [New York: Hill and Wang, 1991], p.26) – Obama’s “hardheaded” “Wilsonians” ordered the murder (preferably via proxy agents like the Indonesian Suharto regime and the Shah of Iran) of untold “Third World” millions.¶ ¶ Humble “restraint” in the “exercise of [U.S.] power” is not the first description that comes into the mind of one who takes an honest and comprehensive look at that troubling record.¶ ¶ It was all very consistent with the “idealistic” history of the actual (Woodrow) Wilson administration, whose “extreme racism” (Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New [New York: Columbia University Press, 1996], p. 44) found grisly expression in the brutal U.S. invasions of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As Noam Chomsky observes, “Wilson’s troops murdered, destroyed, reinstituted virtual slavery and demolished the constitutional system in Haiti.” These actions followed in accord with Wilson Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s belief that “the African race are devoid of any capacity for political organization” and possessed “an inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization which are irksome to their physical nature.” As Chomsky notes, “while supervising the takeover of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Wilson built his reputation as a lofty idealist defending self-determination and the rights of small nations with impressive oratory. [But] there is no contradiction [because] Wilsonian doctrine was restricted to people of the right sort: those ‘at a low stage of civilization’ need not apply” for the rights of democracy and self-determination (Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues [Boston, MA: South End, 1993], pp. 202-203).¶ ¶ Racism aside, Lansing said that the effective meaning of the Monroe Doctrine was simply that “the United States considers its own interests. The integrity of other American nations is an incident, not an end” (Lansing is quoted in Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants [Berkeley, CA: 1992], p. 11). Wilson agreed, but found it politically unwise to say so publicly.¶ ¶ Such high “idealistic” sentiments certainly informed a noble Wilsonian intervention against the Russian Revolution in 1918 and 1919.¶ ¶ Of course, none of this non-existent history prevents Obama from praising Wilson for seeing that “it was in America’s interest to encourage the self-determination of all peoples and provide the world a legal framework that could help avoid future conflicts” (Obama, Audacity, p. 283).

#### The Western man has relegated himself to the level of a God creating the non-being of the colonized—this normalizes violence in the colonial death world of the Middle East

Craun 13 [Dustin Craun writer, community organizer, an anti-racist educator and a communications strategist. "Exploring Pluriversal Paths Toward Transmodernity: From the Mind-Centered Egolatry of Colonial Modernity to Islam’s Epistemic Decolonization through the Heart." Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 11.1 (2013): 9.//Blackmagic]

Here, I will look at the work of Nelson Maldonado-Torres, as it relates to the construction of the overrepresentation of Man. According to him, from the beginning of global modernity the ego conquiro emerges as the “paradigm of war,”29 and becomes the central facet of human life. In his book Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, Maldonado-Torres centrally argues that since 1492 European modernity has become, …inextricably linked with the experience of the warrior and conqueror and the modern colonization, racism, and other forms of social and geopolitical dynamics in the modern world can be understood in terms of the naturalization of the paradigm of war.30 It is within this paradigm of existence where war has become naturalized that, according to Maldonado-Torres, ethics as applicable to Western Man are replaced by what he calls the “death ethic of war,”31 or the “non-ethics of war.”32 As a radical project of “de-colonial love,”33 Maldonado-Torres uses Emanuel Levinas, Frantz Fanon, and Enrique Dussel as philosophers of the “de-colonial reduction” while making his own theoretical contributions towards a “philosophy of liberation.”34 He chooses to use these three philosophers together because, Levinas, Fanon, and Dussel respond critically to the realities of war as they encounter them in the context of Nazism, French imperialism, intolerable Eurocentrism, and the menace of U.S. Americanism and its salvific mission of freedom, all of which are preceded if not tied to each other by a long history of racialization and colonization that goes back to at least 1492.35 I think Maldonado-Torres’ understanding of the “paradigm of war” has made an important philosophical contribution to our understanding of Man. Most important to my discussion here are the first of two chapters on Frantz Fanon at the center of the book titled, “God and the Other in the Self-Recognition of Imperial Man.”36 In the anti-black colonial world in which Fanon was writing, the Manichean opposition characterized for him “modern/colonial thinking and power”37—a modern/colonial world where the pathological became normal as the colonial and racist context in which he lived in its totality was “a metaphysical transformation of the world.”38 In this transformed world “Imperial Man” would hold itself up as God, while its colonial subjects would be relegated to the realm of “non-being.” It is here that the “non-beings” of colonialism would experience the “colonial death world” which would become, the ethical limit of human reality. It is a context in which violence and war are no longer extraordinary, but become instead ordinary features of human existence. This perverse expression of the conversion of the extraordinary into the ordinary represents a “limit” situation, or perhaps even a post-limit situation in the sense that the excess of abnormality goes beyond its climax and begets another reality in which it comes to define the normal.39 As the status of “non-being” had become normal, the question then became hows did the white colonizers recognize themselves as the ‘supreme beings at the center of the universe.’ While Fanon did not take up a serious analysis of white consciousness until The Wretched of the Earth,40 to address his argument pertaining to white consciousness Maldonado-Torres begins with a discussion of the “dialectics of lordship and bondage.” Here Maldonado-Torres, taking his lead from Fanon,41 discusses Hegel’s understanding of the “struggle for recognition” which, “takes the form of a dialectic whose terms are those of lordship and bondsman, or master and slave.”42 In this discussion he points out that while the slave must look to the master for recognition, and thus his humanity, “In an Imperial World lordship is the position of a privileged self that does not even turn toward the slave to achieve recognition.”43 The ultimate question then, that also has relevance for us today, is If the master/slave dialectic is not overcome by other forms of Spirit but remains a constant explicative factor of human relations defined by the experience of imperialism and colonialism, then we must ask how is it that the master, who in the colonial relation does not look for recognition from the slave, achieves recognition and sustains his position as master?44According To Suha Sabbagh, it was not until Wretched of the Earth that Fanon focused on this understanding of white consciousness, but it is through this text that we understand that, The West was able to do without the recognition of the ‘non-whites’ because it has created an image of this native as an inferior entity within the confines of Western discourse. Against the other, Western positional superiority and identity could be established.45 It is here through the continuous Manichean production of negative and positive images that the picture of the self and the Other is constructed. According to Maldonado- Torres, this “imperial self-assertion” is constructed through what he calls “the positive.”46 This positive image of the self— or what I call white benevolent innocence47— is taken to its height in the imperial world where, “In empire, God becomes the privileged other who alone can provide authentic recognition to the imperial self.”48 So in this construction, consciousness of God becomes knowledge of the superior self, and thus the making of God in the image of man, as in the imperial Christian form, which takes on great significance in the production of the modern/colonial self. As Maldonado- Torres understands, in one of his many important contributions to the theory, this form of recognition produces the “egolatry” of Imperial man. He writes, A logic of sub-alteration is contained in the process of recognition of Imperial Man. God recognizes Man, Man takes the shape of God, and then others come to be seen as the very incarnation of evil. This logic does not respond so much to interests in the conciliation with nature as, more fundamentally, to interests in the subordination of other human beings. Modern imperial man is no pagan. He does not divinize nature, but rather becomes himself God with the sole purpose of enslaving others. Idolatry becomes egolatry, a perverse egolatry that works in the function of the rejection of otherness. At the end, narcissism becomes homicidal, and the command “Thou shall not kill” is transformed into a project of identity based on the principle “I kill, therefore I am.49 Despite secularism becoming the center of Western life, according to Maldonado- Torres, Imperial Man through race, the nation-state, and free market capitalism, is able to sustain, “the position of the master as the one and only lord.”50 Despite the shift from a religious center to a mostly secular space, the production of Western/white lordship is still produced through a constant bombardment of Manichean images of the West and the non-West.

#### The alternative is to position ourselves around the oneness of God

#### In order to reach a true unity we must embrace a transcendental ethic—rather than attempting to reverse whiteness we must center community around the oneness of God and creation

Salahuddin 1995 [Abubakr Ben Ishmael Salahuddin ; black American religious author“The Afrocentric Myth or Islam: The Liberator of the American People”//BlackMagic]

If a homogenous nation of 1.2 billion people is forced to integrate "outside" philosophies, then isolation is now impossible for everyone else also, especially if there does not exist a strong and transcendent belief system. The above examples demonstrate that communism has proven itself weak, as has Black Cultural Nationalism. Any sustainable world-view developed will have to be based on the single most important concept in the universe—unity. This involves a concept of the unity (oneness) of God as well as the unity of human beings. It is said that we are all part of one global village. This condition makes it more than obvious that a universal world-view is needed which can accommodate the needs of everyone. That universal world view will unfold within the religion of Islam. It is my belief that natural and spiritual forces, though they are being viciously opposed by many human beings, are leading the world toward unity. This unity will be achieved in earnest once a reconciliation between God and humans occurs. In my view, whoever achieves the development of a sustainable world-view based on unity will be the leaders of the future. The preparation needed for that leadership in the coming world involves reconciliation with God as well as acquiring a mastery of the principle of unity. I am not speaking merely of some superficial practice of unity as in "let's all hold hands" on the "international day of unity." I'm speaking of the true realization of unity. In 1978 the internationally renowned scientist, Professor Abdus Salaam, won a Nobel prize in physics precisely for proving that three forces within the atom which were previously thought of as "separate" are manifestations of one force. So from the atomic level, to the information highway, to the ever increasing interaction between human beings on this earth, everything is pointing to the principle of unity. It is sad that sectors of human society are fighting this principle so vigorously, holding to their tribal identities, not realizing what is on the horizon. White Supremacists definitely do not want unity because the concept of what Muslims call Ummah ("community") destroys race-based identity. Without "white" as identity, what would be left? The dominance of "whites" in this society is not due to the fact that they possess a fundamentally "strong and cohesive" identity, as has been suggested by some Black Cultural Nationalists in defense of their stand on race-based identity. Whites do not possess a strong and cohesive identity. They possess, in fact, a false and weak identity. Though their identity is fundamentally false and weak, it has held together because of an historical tacit "agreement" regarding the validity of the notion of race—perhaps the largest sociological myth of all times—and the idea of racial superiority. Until recently, that "agreement" has held strong. But the fact that "white" as true identity is fundamentally false and weak is being demonstrated in the increased social interaction between people of different "races" in this country, despite the false perception that there exists an unchallenged trend toward a more balkanized "multiculturalism." There is, for example, a growing number of "interracial" organizations (69 nationally) and moderate interracial magazines, such as the increasingly influential Interrace magazine and the newer New People magazine. There are also a growing number of radical journals such as Race Traitor, edited by Harvard-based Noel Ignatiev. That journal, whose motto is "treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity," has made the controversial claim that, "the key to solving the social problems of our age is to abolish the white race." This is very controversial indeed, especially considering that most of the editors and contributors to that magazine are white! The Monitor, published by the Center for Democratic Renewal, The Race Mixer, published by Communities Against Hate, and Turning the Tide, published by People Against Racist Terror are other examples of publications which challenge what some of them term as "whiteness." The myth is breaking down and revealing the fundamental weakness and falsity of the "white" identity [it should be understood that "whiteness" is a condition which many non-Caucasians suffer from also].

#### The university space is point of intersection of power-effects - Academics shape regimes of truth and intermediate strategies of racism, sexism and capitalism - problematization of modes of knowledge formation instead of prophesying action within the realm of mundane politics is the best role for intellectuals

Deacon 2003

(Roger Alan, Political Science Researcher w/a Doctorate from U of Natal – Durban. Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals. P 102-105)

And in The Order of Things he suggested that the disciplines of psychoanalysis and ethnology, seemingly privileged but mythologizing ‘counter-sciences’ which call into question the more established human sciences and their object of ‘Man’, were inherently particularistic and as such perhaps most conducive to the emergence of the speciﬁc intellectual (OT: 376). The category of the speciﬁc intellectual brings together the erstwhile universal intellectual—Voltaire’s just ‘man of letters’—with those who once were merely “competent instances in the service of the State or Capital—technicians, magistrates, teachers” (Foucault 1980a: 127; emphasis in the original). In this respect, there is little difference between Foucault’s ‘speciﬁc intellectual’ and Gramsci’s “new type of [modern] intellectual” (Gramsci 1971: 9-10). As a result of the massive expansion of the white-collar and service sectors, it is possible for psychiatrists, social workers, lawyers, doctors, judges, academics or engineers to both do their jobs and also carry out ‘intellectual’ or ‘critical’ work once reserved for the writer(Foucault 1988a: 107). Whereas biology and physics (Darwin and Oppenheimer) were the privileged zones of formation of the speciﬁc intellectual (Foucault 1980a: 129), today the university and the academic have emerged, if not as principal elements, at least as ‘exchangers’, privileged points of intersection. If the universities and education have become politically ultrasensitive areas, this is no doubt the reason why**.** And what is called the crisis of the universities should not be interpreted as a loss of power, but on the contrary as a multiplication and reinforcement of their power-effects as centres in a polymorphous ensemble of intellectuals who virtually all pass through and relate themselves to the academic system (Foucault 1980a: 127; see also Gramsci 1971: 10-11). In this context, the work of the intellectual—for perhaps one ought no longer to speak of the task or the role of the intellectual—is no longer to prophesy, to legislate, to “shape others’ political will”, but to isolate, “in their power of constraint but also in the contingency of their historical formation”, the systems of thought that we take for granted (Foucault 1989: 282); it is, through the analyses he carries out in his own ﬁeld, to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and on the basis of this reproblematization (in which he carries out his speciﬁc task as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has his role as citizen to play) (Foucault 1988a: 265). This “reproblematization” of what we take for granted is aimed at dismantling the existing coordinates of experience in order to change the self and, consequently, the selves of others: reproblematization is “an experience in which one risks oneself in the sense that one emerges from it transformed not only in what and how one thinks, but thereby in how one is or might possibly be” (Burchell 1993: 277). The function of the intellectual no longer has as its object the con scientisation of the masses, though it deeply concerns them, nor can it claim to avoid the blandishments of the state or capital. However, speciﬁc intellectuals occupy strategic positions, and the extent to which they propagate scientiﬁc ideologies is secondary to their capacity to ‘produce effects proper to true discourses’ (Foucault 1980a: 131). There are, of course, many dangers associated with this new conception of the intellectual, of being unable to move beyond the local and the particular, to generate outside support, to develop a global strategy or to avoid being manipulated by local networks of power (Foucault 1980a: 130; 1984a: 46-7). Foucault was well aware that purely partial and local criticisms and struggles could leave us defenceless and bewildered in the face of global structures of domination. ‘Hardly feeling capable’ of doing more than merely “contribut[ing] to changing certain things in people’s ways of perceiving and doing things” (Foucault 1981f: 12), he was under no illusion about the difﬁculties inherent in this process, accepting that “we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and deﬁnitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits” (Foucault 1984a: 47) and realising “how much all this can remain precarious, how easily it can all lapse back into somnolence” (Foucault 1981f: 12). Nevertheless, Foucault rejected what he referred to as “this whole intimidation with the bogy of reform” (Foucault 1980a: 145), that criticisms and struggles which are speciﬁc and localised will tend to be superﬁcial and recuperable, rather than fundamental and transcendent as associated with the universal intellectual. Such criticisms, he suggested, are “linked to the lack of a strategic analysis appropriate to political struggle” which ignores the fact that any balance of forces depends upon intermediate strategies and tactics (Foucault 1980a:145); that is, that even global forms of domination like racism, capitalism and patriarchy are precariously grounded upon multiple and constantly shifting local relations of power (see Chapter Four). He also argued that the apparent dangers of abandoning a prophetic intellectual function are outweighed by its advantages, since, on the basis of the speciﬁcity of the politics of truth, combined with mutual support and politicisation, the position of the speciﬁc intellectual “can take on a general signiﬁcance and ... his local, speciﬁc struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectoral”, but which can engage with the battle for or around the regime of truth, namely, “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and speciﬁc effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault 1980a: 132). Here Foucault’s work links up with that of Bourdieu, who argued that the greater intellectuals’ independence from mundane politics due to their speciﬁc locations, the greater their inclination to assert this independence and the greater their symbolic effectiveness (Bourdieu 1989: 100).

#### Policymakers attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 # We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66

# Off

#### The harms of the 1AC are merely subsets of an unawakened anxiety that exists at our core—panic over death prevents us from living

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 19-20) Henge

“Suffering,” the usual English translation for dukkha, is not very enlightening, especially today, when those of us who live in wealthy countries have many ways to entertain and distract ourselves. The point of the Buddhist term is that we nonetheless experience a basic dissatisfaction, a dis-ease, which continues to fester. That there is something inherently frustrating about our lives is not accidental or coincidental. It is the nature of an unawakened mind to be bothered about something. At the core of our being we feel a free-ﬂoating anxiety, which has no particular object but can plug into any problematic situation. We may try to evade this anxiety by dulling ourselves with alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, television, consumerism, sex, and so forth, or we may become preoccupied with various goals we pursue, but the anxiety is always there; and when we slow down enough to become sensitive to what is occurring in our minds, we become aware of it—which is one reason we do not like to slow down. This implies that everything we normally understand as suffering is only a subset—for some of us a relatively small subset—of dukkha. The Pali sutras distinguish dukkha into three different types.10 The ﬁrst, dukkha-dukkhata, includes everything that we usually think of as suffering: all physical, emotional, and mental pain or discomfort, including being separated from people we like to be with, and being stuck with those we do not. This also includes the types of social dukkha mentioned above. A second and different type is viparinama-dukkhata, the dukkha that arises from impermanence, from knowing that nothing lasts forever and most things do not last long. Even when we are thoroughly enjoying ourselves, we know the moment will not last, and there is something frustrating about that awareness. However delicious that ice cream may taste, we know the last bite is coming soon—and even if we buy another cone, it does not taste as good because we begin to feel sated. The most problematic dukkha of this type is, of course, death: not the physical pain of dying (that is included in the ﬁrst type of dukkha) but the awareness that I will die. This awareness of our inevitable end often pervades and colors everything we do—so thoroughly that it poisons life. Insofar as I am afraid to die, I also become unable to live. To live fully is not possible when we are hypersensitive to the fact that danger and maybe death lurk around every corner, because any little accident could be our last.

#### This anxious egoism makes violence inevitable

Ikeda 07 (Daisaku Ikeda President, Soka Gakkai International January 26, 2007 “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace” http://www.sgi-usa.org/newsandevents/docs/peace2007.pdf) Dabo

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.” Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.” When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons.

#### Vote negative to shed the ego

#### This is a path of self-transformation that recognizes the interpermeation of all beings

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 4-6) Henge

In contrast, the early Buddhist teachings focus almost exclusively on the path of self-transformation, with a minimum of dogma or metaphysics—in other words, with a rather ﬂimsy canopy, at best, to shelter beneath. These original teachings not only deny a creator God and the salviﬁc value of rituals such as sacriﬁces, they also emphasize the constructed nature of both the self and the world. For Buddhism there are no self-existing things, since everything, including you and me, ~~interpenetrates~~ (interpermeates) everything else, arising and passing away according to causes and conditions. This interconnectedness—not just an intellectual insight but an experience—was an essential aspect of the Buddha’s awakening, and it is congruent with the essential postmodern realization. Even more radical then than now, the original Buddhist teachings, not surprisingly, eventually became elaborated into another sacred canopy, focused on a transcendental liberation from this world. What is more surprising is that early Buddhism should have had such deconstructive insights and that they have been preserved in recognizable form for two and a half millennia. This perspective on the Buddha’s awakening deserves our attention because no other religious tradition foregrounds so clearly this crucial insight into our constructedness. There are some parallels with the philosophical realization in ancient Greece that society is a construct that can and should be reconstructed (e.g., Plato’s Republic). The history of the West since then has incorporated and developed the Greek concern for social transformation. Yet none of the important Greek philosophers proposed what Shakyamuni Buddha taught— the deconstruction and reconstruction of the ﬁctive sense of self. These resonances between postmodern theory and Buddhist teachings provide the basis for a comparison that is more than merely interesting. Today the postmodern realization about the constructed nature of our canopies, sacred and otherwise, contributes to global crises that we are far from resolving. Indeed, Nietzsche’s prescient prediction of a coming age of nihilism suggests that the world’s destabilization may be far from over. Some people and perhaps a few institutions are beginning to assimilate the postmodern insight, but although we are becoming more aware of its implications and dangers, we do not yet have a good grasp of the possibilities it opens up. For the West, the postmodern perspective grows out of, and depends upon, a secular modernity that privileges empirical rationalism over religious superstition. In this regard, too, our attitude derives from the Greeks, whose philosophy originated as a critique of the Olympian deities and the rites associated with them. The Indian situation was quite different. According to one’s sympathies, one can see that Indian (including Buddhist) philosophy never quite escaped the orbit of religious concerns or, more sympathetically, that Indian thought never felt the Western need to differentiate between them.

# Case

### Regimes

#### Their assumption that China is a “knowable” object is dangerous and disinterested scholarship. The description of China as a threat creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes their impact inevitable

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China pre- cisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often con- flicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, sug- gests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."^ Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.\* Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics.^ It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

#### Their impact is rooted in a securitizing discourse that makes violence inevitable

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in inter- national relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

#### Threat construction makes your impact inevitable

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main­stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a posi­tivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post–Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted coun­try but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of con­tainment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93

#### Be skeptical of their evidence- “expertise” on China is rooted in an Orientalist discourse that privileges Western subjects

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV net- works) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy— or, more precisely, the enemy. . . . How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetori- cally.5'^ For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government's propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously.^^ Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bern- stein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand- year history. "59 In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia. . . . China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony. . . . China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy."^^ Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island. . . . This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to pro- ject power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while los- ing a war in the technical, military sense.\*>'

#### The Orientalist framing of their experts renders predictions of China’s behavior futile

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security con­cerns in the current debate."62 At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves.63 "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinc­tion between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. "64

**Status quo legal practices is marred in the rejection of newcoming forms of knowledge. Your political framing entrenches systems of oppression and the exclusion of those who would challenge the system.**

Delgado 92 (Richard, professor at the Seattle University School of Law, “The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140(92), April , 1992)IAA

Since I began writing The Imperial Scholar ten years ago, however**, newcomers have arrived on the scene**. Many of these are white; most are males; some have brought reputations achieved in other areas of the law. This Part examines these new writers and their citation practices. As with the old-line group, I find that a few of the new scholars are relatively egalitarian in their scholarship, citing Critical Race Theorists and radical feminists about as frequently as one might fairly expect.45 Some new scholars, however, steadfastly rely on Frank Michelman, Owen Fiss, and other familiar stalwarts.46 A third group is for my purposes the most fascinating. T**his group, the neo-imperialist scholars, has deployed an almost baroque variety of ways to minimize, marginalize, co-opt, soften, miss the point of, selectively ignore, or generally devalue the new insurgent writers.**¶ Mechanisms four and five: The hero, the zero. As with the original inner-circle scholars, the new majority-race writers have their heroes and zeroes. Duncan Kennedy, Alan Freeman, Alex Aleinikoff, and Gary Peller cite the new voices appropriately, sometimes agreeing and sometimes taking issue with them.47 Other **new entrants, however, either ignore the insurgent scholars or treat their work diffidently**. One dynamic young, majority-race writer, for example, in a long, heavily footnoted article refers to dozens of white male writers, but collects works by women and minority authors in a single footnote, making little effort to distinguish, quote, or refer to particular passages from them.48 ¶ Another author offers two "special interest" references, one for feminists and one for Critical Race Theorists.49 In an article on slavery and slave law, a third entrant only once cites to Bell's Race, Racism and American Law, a standard work50-she cites Sunstein, Tushnet, Tribe, and Bickel more-and at no time mentions Leon Higginbotham's well-regarded history, In the Matter of Color.51 A fourth wrote a stinging footnote chastising a number of the new-voice authors for dangerous reliance on notions of class-based harm and redress.52 Unlike some, this author at least cited oppositional scholars for a proposition, if only to attack it.¶ ¶ Mechanism six: "Yeah,yeah ..,. No need to tell me more. **Many of the new writers in the field of civil rights cite work by women and minorities as perfunctorily as the old-timers do,**5!1 but with a difference. That difference consists of citing an early page of an article or book-for example, page three, not 403. When an author • does this regularly, it raises the suspicion that he has not bothered to read the entire article or book, but has merely leafed through the article's preface or introduction in search of a general proposition he can cite with a minimum of effort.54 **The author discharges his obligation to refer to the new voices but avoids the hard work of reading the entire piece and dealing with it seriously.** The number of references to the middle or latter pages of Catharine MacKin­ non 's writing on pornography is much smaller than the number of references to its opening pages, a treatment some other radical feminists receive as well.55 Women will recognize this treatment as a conversational gambit many men use-interruption. The male listens to a woman's opening words, then bursts in to finish her sentence, saying "Yeah, yeah. I get it; no need to go on . . . now, what do you think about my idea?"56 Derrick Bell also garners references of this sort.57¶ Mechanism seven: "I know": Thefacile (and safe) translation. **This mechanism translates a novel, hard-edged, and discomfiting thesis by an outside writer so that it becomes familiar, safe, and tame.** Often the translation forces the thesis into liberal-legalist terms that were intended to be avoided. For example, some scholars translate MacKinnon's work on pornography into an intriguing First Amendment question.58 MacKinnon does not consider pornogra­ phy a First Amendment question, but a near-crime, a civil rights offense against women.59 Once translated into a First Amendment framework her proposal loses much of its urgency and original character.60¶ Mechanism eight: "I loved Dan's idea. " A number of the new writers show familiarity with ideas feminists and Critical Race Theory scholars have been proposing, but either forget where they heard them, 61 or cite a derivative source-a critic, or a majority­ race commentator- to summarize outsider views. For example, some scholars rely on Randall Kennedy, a critic of Critical Race Theory, for a summary of Critical Race Theory positions; 62 others cite men such as Cass Sunstein for radical feminist views developed by Catharine MacKinnon and others.63 One writer cited Deborah Rhode for "reasoning from the bottom, "64 a view associated at least as much with Mari Matsuda. 65\\¶ **This approach corresponds to another experience familiar to most women: co-optation. A woman proposes an idea; no one in the group reacts**. **Twenty minutes later, a male restates and puts forward the same suggestion, which immediately wins widespread praise and thereafter becomes "Dan's idea."66**¶ Mechanism nine: "I know just how you must have felt": Co-optation of others' experience. Some of the new writers, and a few of the original ones, make an effort to identify with the stories and accounts the outsider narrativists are offering, but in a way that co­ opts or minimizes these stories.67 The majority-race author draws a parallel between something in the experience of the outsider author and something that happened to him.68 **There is nothing wrong with using analogies and metaphors to deal with the experience of others for that is how we extend our sympathies.** **If,** however, **we analogize to refocus a conversation or an article towards ourselves exclusively, something is wrong,** **especially if the experience to which we liken another's is manifestly less serious**. For example, the author of one article on campus racial harassment observes that everyone experiences "insulting" or "upsetting" speech at one time or another, so what is so special about the racist version?69¶ Mechanism ten: "Pure poetry": How poignant, touching, or moving­ Placing outsider writing on a pedestal **. Some writers of majority race praise the new writing for its passionate or emotional quality**. The writing is so personal, so colorful, so poetic, so "moving."70 **This approach can marginalize outsider writing by placing it in a category of its own.** Women and minority writers feel more deeply than we; they have "soul."71 The writing is evaluated as a journal of the author's individual thoughts and feelings, not as an article that delivers uncomfortable insights and truths about society and injustice.72¶ Mechanism eleven**: Assimilation/ co-optation- "We have been saying this all along. " This mechanism dismisses the feminists and Critical Race Theorists as saying little new; we have been making the same points about brotherhood, equality, and civility for hundreds, if not thousands, of years**. Plato, Aquinas, Austin, Unger, and any favorite male author urged that society be arranged justly and that all should be treated with respect.73 On some level, every truth is foreshad­ owed by or included in every other. Yet one might argue that earlier authorities wrote inadequately and spoke poorly to our condition because that condition persists today. **If outsider voices are addressing new or old grievances in new ways, one ought not dismiss what they are saying merely because someone else previous­ ly said something remotely similar.74**¶ Mechanism twelve: "She wrote just one" (And I'll cite it, too). Some of the mainstream authors treat the new voices as though each of them had written exactly one article or book.**7**5 Susan Estrich is¶ cited for her book on rape, 76 Mari Matsuda for Looking to the Bottom,71 Derrick Bell for And We Are Not Saved ,18 me for The Imperial Scholar.79 Each of these writers has written many works, arguably of comparable merit to the one cited .80 Routinized, stereotypical citation to one work gives the impression the author wrote only the one. It also conveys the message that insurgent writers can only write one work, probably an anomaly, the result of a gigantic effort or internal convulsion that they are capable of producing only once in a lifetime.81¶ Mechanism thirteen: The all-purpose citation. The author has a¶ flash of insight, into the way constitutional equality works, for example. Midway through the article it dawns on the author that he had better cite a minority. What better place to do so than for the proposition that ( I) racism is terrible, (2) discrimination still exists, or (3) we all must work really hard at dealing with it. Most authors of color surely say these things somewhere, so the author chooses one-how about Crenshaw?82¶ III. "AT THE MARGIN": WHY WE ALWAYS FAIL To RECOGNIZE NEW STORIES¶ **Even though the new voices are finding their way into the pages of the top reviews and journals, they are not being quickly and easily integrated into the conversations and dialogues of traditional legal scholarship.** Some of the resistance may be intentional and mean-spirited- why should Icite that outsider, after the nasty things she said about me or my friends?**85 Resistance may also be the product of inflexibility and an unwillingness to entertain new positions-I'm forty-five years old;** why do I have to read all these new authors anyway?84¶ But most mainstream legal writers are neither mean-spirited nor lazy. I think the most likely explanation for most of the mechanisms I have detailed lies elsewhere. Legal scholarship is currently radically transforming itself.85 Formalism and case-crunching notes and articles running 100 pages or more, littered with hundreds of footnotes, are passing into history.86 **Even legal process and interdisciplinary "law and" scholarship have lost much of their momentum.** In their places a subtler yet audacious form of legal writing has appeared, with roots in postmodernism, critical thought, and narrative theory.87 The authors, format, and authori­ ties cited are radically different from those that came before. **If not a full-fledged paradigm shift, something similar seems to be happening. As sociologists of knowledge have pointed out, such shifts are at first resisted by those steeped in the old regime; the paradigm changes only when the costs of resisting it become unacceptable compared to the gains of adopting the new one.88**¶ **Resistance to the new voices, then, may be as natural as that which the Langdellians and "mechanical jurisprudes" raised to legal realism early in this century. All change is costly**. What more natural reaction than postponing dealing with it as long as possi­ ble?89¶ A second, related explanation applies insights from narrative theory.90 **As many have pointed out, reality comes to us not as a given but in terms of narratives, mindsets, or stories-interpretive structures by which we construct and come to terms with the world of reality.**91 Each of us is the product of a large number of such understandings, or "stories," by which we reduce the diversity of daily life to manageable proportions. In a sense, we are our stock of stories and they us.92¶ **When a feminist or Critical Race Theorist offers a radically new story, we evaluate it in terms of the one we currently hold. If it seems too different, we are apt to reject it as extreme, coercive, political, harsh, or untrue**.93 Imagine, for example, the reaction¶ of most liberal law students on hearing Derrick Bell's interest­ convergence hypothesis for the first time.94 The fi**rst response to Bell's hypothesis is re-interpretation- softening or qualifying it¶ because Bell could not have intended to interpret the search for racial justice in such a scathing way.** Yet for many radical race reformers, the hypothesis seems commonplace and true.¶ Both mechanisms lead to a melancholy truth. We postpone confronting novelty and change until they acquire enough momen­ tum that we are swept forward. **We take seriously new social thought only after hearing it so often that its tenets and themes begin to seem familiar, inevitable, and true.**95 **We then adopt the new paradigm, and the process repeats itself. We escape from one mental and intellectual prison only into a larger slightly more expansive one. Each jail-break is seen as illegitimate. We reject new thought until, eventually, its hard edges soften, its suggestions seem tame and manageable, and its proponents are "elder states­ persons," to be feared no longer.96 By then, of course, the new thought has lost its radically transformative character. We reject the medicine that could save us until, essentially, it is too late.97**

#### The law itself is a rhetorical activity-the way they choose to engage its discussion actually shapes the legal systems function and who is allowed to participate

White 85

(James Boyd. Professor of Law and Professor of English Language and Literature, University of Michigan. “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), Pg. 688-692 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1599632>. –Veeder)

I shall sketch out a somewhat different way of conceiving of law, and indeed of governmental processes generally: not as a bu- reaucratic but as a rhetorical process. In doing this, I shall also be suggesting a way to think about rhetoric, especially that kind of rhetoric-I call it "constitutive rhetoric"-of which law can I think be seen as a species. I want to start by thinking of law not as an objective reality in an imagined social world, not as a part of a constructed cosmology, but from the point of view of those who actually engage in its processes, as something we do and something we teach. This is a way of looking at law as an activity, and in particular as a rhetori- cal activity. I want to direct attention to three related aspects of the law- yer's work. The first is the fact that the lawyer, like any rhetori- cian, must always start by speaking the language of his or her audience, whatever it may be. This is just a version of the general truth that to persuade anybody you must in the first instance speak a language that he or she regards as valid and intelligible. If you are a lawyer, this means that you must speak either the technicalan- guage of the law-the rules, cases, statutes, maxims, and so forth, that constitute the domain of your professional talk-or, if you are speaking to jurors or clients or the public at large, some version of the ordinary English of your time and place. Law is in this sense always culture-specific. It always starts with an external, empiri- cally discoverable set of cultural resources into which it is an intervention. This suggests that one (somewhat circular) definition of the law might be the particular set of resources made available by a culture for speech and argument on those occasions, and by those speakers, we think of as legal. These resources include rules, stat- utes, and judicial opinions, of course, but much more as well: max- ims, general understandings, conventional wisdom, and all the other resources, technical and nontechnical, that a lawyer might use in defining his or her position and urging another to accept it.4 To define "the law" in this way, as a set of resources for thought and argument, is an application of Aristotle's traditional definition of rhetoric, for the law in this sense is one set of those "means of persuasion" that he said it is the art of rhetoric to discover.5 In the law (and I believe elsewhere as well), these means of persuasion can be described with some degree of accuracy and completeness, so that most lawyers would agree that such-and- such a case or statute or principle is relevant, and another is not. But the agreement is always imperfect: one lawyer will see an anal- ogy that another will deny, for example. And when attention shifts to the value or weight that different parts of the material should have, disagreement becomes widespread and deep. Ultimately, then, the identity, the meaning, and the authority of the materials are always arguable, always uncertain. There is a sense in which the materials can be regarded in the first instance as objective, ex- ternal to the self; but they are always remade in argument. Their discovery is, in a sense, an empirical process, their reformulation and use an inventive or creative one. This suggests that the lawyer's work has a second essential el- ement, the creative process to which I have just alluded. For in speaking the language of the law, the lawyer must always be ready to try to change it: to add or to drop a distinction, to admit a new voice, to claim a new source of authority, and so on. One's performance is in this sense always argumentative, not only about the re- sult one seeks to obtain but also about the version of the legal dis- course that one uses-that one creates-in one's speech and writing. That is, the lawyer is always saying not only, "Here is how this case should be decided," but also, "Here-in this language-is the way this case and similar cases should be talked about. The language I am speaking is the proper language of justice in our culture." The legal speaker always acts upon the language that he or she uses, to modify or rearrange it; in this sense legal rhetoric is always argumentatively constitutive of the language it employs. The third aspect of legal rhetoric is what might be called its ethical or communal character, or its socially constitutive nature. Every time one speaks as a lawyer, one establishes for the moment a character-an ethical identity, or what the Greeks called an ethos-for oneself, for one's audience, and for those one talks about, and in addition one proposes a relation among the charac- ters one defines. One creates, or proposes to create, a community of people, talking to and about each other. The lawyer's speech is thus always implicitly argumentative not only about the re- sult-how should the case be decided?-and about the lan- guage-in what terms should it be defined and talked about?-but also about the rhetorical community of which one is at that mo- ment a part. The lawyer is always establishing in performance a response to the questions, "What kind of community should we, who are talking the language of the law, establish with each other, with our clients, and with the rest of the world? What kind of con- versation should the law constitute, should constitute the law?" Each of the three aspects of the lawyer's rhetorical life can be analyzed and criticized: the discourse one is given by one's culture to speak; the argumentative reconstitution of it; and the argumen- tative constitution of a rhetorical community in one's speech or writing. The study of this process-of constitutive rhetoric-is the study of the ways we constitute ourselves as individuals, as com- munities, and as cultures, whenever we speak. To put this another way, the fact that the law can be understood as a comprehensibly organized method of argument, or what I call a rhetoric, means that it is at once a social activity-a way of acting with others-and a cultural activity-a way of acting with a certain set of materials found in the culture. It is always communal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a social context and in the sense that it is always constitutive of the community by which it works. Both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world in which their language and community are not fixed and certain but fluid, constantly remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested. The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its per- suasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it commends. This means that the process of law is at once creative and edu- cative. Those who use this language are perpetually learning what can and cannot be done with it as they try-and fail or suc- ceed-to reach new formulations of their positions. It also means that both the identity of the speakers and their wants are in per- petual transformation. If this is right, the law cannot be a tech- nique, as the bureaucratic model assumes, by which "we" get what we "want," for both "'we" and our "wants" are constantly remade in the rhetorical process. The idea of the legal actor as one who is either making policy choices himself (or herself) or obeying the choices made by others is inadequate, for he is a participant in the perpetual remaking of the language and culture that determines who he is and who we are. The law is not merely a bureaucracy or a set of rules, but a community of speakers of a certain kind: a culture of argument, perpetually remade by its participants. All three of these aspects of the lawyer's work flow from the fact that the law is what I have called culture-specific, that is, that it always takes place in a cultural context into which it is always an intervention. But it is in a similar way socially specific: it always takes place in a particular social context, into which it is also an intervention. By this I mean nothing grand but simply that the lawyer responds to the felt needs of others, who come to him or her for assistance with an actual difficulty or problem. (These felt needs may of course be partly the product of the law itself, and the very "intervention" of the law can create new possibilities for meaning, for motive, and for aspiration.) From this point of view, the law can be seen, as it is experienced, not as a wholly indepen- dent system of meaning, but as a way of talking about real events and actual people in the world. It is a way of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by writing an ending to it. The lawyer is repeatedly saying, or imagin- ing himself or herself saying: "Here is 'what happened,' here is 'what it means,' and here is 'why it means what I claim.'" The process is at heart a narrative one because there cannot be a legal case without a real story about real people actually located in time and space and culture. Some actual person must go to a lawyer with an account of the experience upon which he or she wants the law to act, and that account will always be a narrative. The client's narrative is not simply accepted by the lawyer but subjected to questioning and elaboration, as the lawyer sees first one set of legal relevances, then another. In the formal legal process, that story is then retold, over and over, by the lawyer and by the client and by others, in developing and competing versions, until by judgment or agreement an authoritative version is achieved. This story will in the first instance be told in the language of its actors. That is where the law begins; in a sense that is also where it ends, for its object is to provide an ending to that story that will work in the world. And since the story both begins and ends in ordinary language and experience, the heart of the law is the process of translation by which it must work, from ordinary language to legal lan- guage and back again. The language that the lawyer uses and remakes is a language of meaning in the fullest sense. It is a language in which our per- ceptions of the natural universe are constructed and related, in which our values and motives are defined, and in which our methods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted. By defining roles and actors, and by establishing expectations as to the propriety of speech and conduct, it gives us the terms for constructing a social universe. Law always operates through speakers located in particu- lar times and places speaking to actual audiences about real peo- ple; its language is continuous with ordinary language; it always operates by narrative; it is not conceptual in its structure; it is per- petually reaffirmed or rejected in a social process; and it contains a system of internal translation by which it can reach a range of hearers. All these things mark it as a rhetorical system

### Modeling

#### US action won’t change anything—other countries find drone use logical

Wittes & Singh 2013 (Benjamin Wittes and Ritika Singh, Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,

How Drones Are Changing Warfare, January 11, 2013, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>, bs)

The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.¶ Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### The US has tried to diplomatically influence drone prolif—doesn’t work

GAO, 12

(Government Accountability Office. MTCR=Missile Technology Control Regime. “Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports” <http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/us-gao-_-noproliferation-of-uavs.pdf>) Henge

The United States has used multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address UAV technology advances and proliferation concerns. For instance, to address advances in UAV technology, the United States proposed several changes to the MTCR; however, MTCR members agreed to only one change. Moreover, nonmembers continue to acquire, develop, and export UAV technology. In addition to multilateral diplomacy, the United States used bilateral diplomacy in the form of demarches to foreign governments to address specific UAV proliferation concerns with countries.23 The United States proposed changes to address how the MTCR applies to UAVs, but MTCR members only reached a consensus to accept one of the changes. The United States principally focused these efforts through the MTCR because it addresses the potential use of UAVs to deliver weapons of mass destruction, according to State. According to documents provided by State and State officials, the United States proposed six UAV-related changes to the MTCR Annex and members accepted one.

#### No drone prolif—multiple barriers prevent widespread usage—even then they don’t change the landscape of war

Singh, 12

(Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race” <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>) Henge

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Zero risk of drone wars – technology is too difficult and even if it won’t escalate

Gill and Gill 2013 (Andrea Gilli, PhD Candidate, Department of Social and Political Science, European University Institute, and Mauro Gilli, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 9-3-2013, “Attack of the Drones: Should we fear the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles?”, <http://www.academia.edu/4331462/Attack_of_the_Drones_Should_We_Fear_The_Proliferation_of_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicles>) MT

The development of unmanned platforms requires designing the architecture, integrating its different components and developing the integrated core processing system. An industrial architecture is a map of how the different systems, subsyste research and the assessment of different solutions aimed to optimize the platform’s overall performance.82 The development of the integrated core processing system refers to the production of the hardware and, most important, the software, that permit the various systems, subsystems and components to work together as a whole.83 Given the lack of an onboard pilot, as the platform increases in complexity (number of components and missions), performance (range, endurance, altitude, etc.) or mission tasks, autonomous capabilities become a necessity. Future drones will be in fact able to conduct autonomously many more tasks, thus affecting both their overall military capabilities and thus their design.84 When we look at the four mission-specific types of drones we have identified, we can see that the challenges related to the production of the platforms grow exponentially as its tasks increase in difficulty and in number. In the case of small, unsophisticated drones, like those that could be used for asymmetric tactics, the technical and industrial challenges are relatively limited: even amateurs can develop such UAVs – for which, in fact, there is a burgeoning global market.85 However, for the other three types of drones, the challenges are significant and more difficult to overcome. We can observe them already at play for the least sophisticated of our three types of drones – UAVs to be employed in swarms tactics. Such UAVs must be able to fly faster and for longer time, with enhanced capacity to evade enemy jamming, carrying more powerful sensors while meeting strict size and weight constraints.86 As a result, both the design of the architecture, the development of the core integrated processor and the integration of the different systems are inherently more complicated activities. For instance, in order to operate in swarm tactics, the individual platforms must be endowed with autonomous capabilities that permit the swarming drones to coordinate their flight: this does not only prevent aerial accidents but also permits the drones to continue into their coordinated movement if signals temporarily disappears or if some platforms are lost. Medium-to-big platforms pose even bigger challenges as they must meet superior aerodynamic requirements (range, speed, altitude, endurance), their systems are more complex, and they require more advanced artificial intelligence and robotics capabilities.88 This is even more so in the case of UCAVs: producing these types of platforms pose technical difficulties that are analogous, and possibly bigger, to those faced when developing traditional combat aircrafts. In fact, if the removal of the pilot from the cockpit simplifies the aerodynamic design, on the other hand it calls for significantly more sophisticated autonomous capabilities that, in turn, complicate both the initial design and the systems integration process.

#### Alt cause to their impact scenario, US pivot to Asia makes that conflict inevitable.

Hickey 2013 (Dennis Van Vranken Hickey is a ¶ professor of political science and director ¶ of the graduate program in global studies ¶ at Missouri State University. The U.S. Pivot to ¶ the Asia-Pacific: ¶ Implications for Taiwan, Taiwan and the U.S. Pivot to Asia:¶ New Realities in the Region?, Report of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’¶ Conference on U.S.-Taiwan Relations¶ February 26, 2013, <http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_130308_Taiwan%20US%20web%20FOR%20WEB_0.pdf>. Bs)

To be sure, it appears that Taiwan stands to benefit in some ways from ¶ the pivot. But the change in policy may also represent challenges for the ¶ ROC. The new U.S. strategy could generate unintended consequences. ¶ Paradoxical as it may seem, some warn that the pivot—an initiative intended to promote stability—might increase the likelihood for conflict and ¶ turmoil in the Western Pacific. ¶ As Robert S. Ross observed, the current administration has junked longstanding policy and “directly inserted the U.S.” into “legally complex disputes” over a number of “inconsequential islands” located in South China ¶ Sea.32 Washington is also leaning toward Tokyo in a row over uninhabited ¶ islands in the East China Sea. At the same time, the United States has ¶ “unnecessarily challenged Beijing by boosting its military presence on the ¶ East Asian mainland” and by inking numerous military agreements with ¶ China’s neighbors.33¶ Not surprisingly, China has “pushed back” against U.S. policies, and ¶ could refuse to cooperate “on crucial issues from trade to global economic ¶ stability.”34 This may represent a worrisome problem for the global community. Moreover, an overt or highly visible increase in U.S. support for ¶ Taiwan might also lead Beijing to “push back” against both Washington ¶ and Taipei. After all, the Chinese mainland is watching developments ¶ closely. As one editorial in a PRC newspaper opined, “we should be alert to ¶ any change in the U.S. policy toward Taiwan.”35¶ In the final analysis, it would be difficult to predict how the U.S. pivot ¶ to the Asia-Pacific plays out. It could conceivably benefit Taiwan. On the ¶ other hand, like other Asian governments, Taipei might suffer some “collateral damage” if present trends in U.S.-China relations continue. It is ¶ possible that the U.S. pivot might prove to be yet another problem—not a ¶ solution to regional difficulties.

#### No SCS war

Gupta ’11 Rukmani Gupta, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way,” The Diplomat, 23 October 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/2/>

These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.