### Off

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue a Presidential Policy Directive to restrain his use of war power by restricting targets of targeted killing operations using pilotless aircraft units outside declared zones of conflict to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States

#### Definitional: “The” means all parts – they’re definitionally bound to defending all branches

Merriam-Webster'sOnline Collegiate Dictionary, No Date,

http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

**This is key to neg ground and is a voter for fairness.**

#### PPDs are confidential and perceived only by a limited group of advisors close to the president, NOT congress

[**Aftergood**](http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/author/saftergood/) **13** ([Steven Aftergood](http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/author/saftergood/) July 12 2013, Federation of American Scientists Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy FAS's Secrecy News reports on new developments in government secrecy and provides public access to documentary resources on secrecy, intelligence and national security policy)LC

However, **the White House presidential directive non-disclosure policy extends beyond homeland security.**  Recently, **the** non-profit[**Center for Effective Government**](http://www.foreffectivegov.org/)**(CEG) sought to obtain a copy of Presidential Policy Directive 6 on Global Development.  Though unclassified, the Administration refused to release the document,** which it says is privileged. **In**[**response**](http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/ceg-ppd/points.pdf)**to a pending Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by CEG, the Administration said last month that the 2010 directive was exempt from disclosure because it is “a confidential communication from the President to a select and limited group of senior foreign policy advisors, cabinet officials, and agency heads concerning the global development policy of the United States.”**

While unclassified Obama presidential directives are mostly unavailable to the public, at least one highly classified Obama directive is posted online for anyone who wishes to read it. [Presidential Policy Directive 20](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/07/obama-cyber-directive-full-text) on U.S. Cyber Operations Policy was apparently leaked by Edward Snowden and was published by the Guardian newspaper ([“Obama orders US to draw up overseas target list for cyber-attacks”](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/07/obama-china-targets-cyber-overseas) by Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, June 7).

### Off

#### **Budget proposal will pass – political focus key**

Cohen 9/26/13 Tom Cohen, CNN Thu September 26, 2013 Boehner signals GOP focus now on debt ceiling <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/politics/shutdown-showdown/?hpt=po_c1>) MT

In the Senate, tea party conservatives led by GOP Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas reversed themselves on Wednesday by joining colleagues from both parties in a 100-0 procedural vote to take up the House spending plan expected to be revised to fund Obamacare. Cruz supported the move after he spent more than 21 straight hours railing against any government money for the health care reforms. The rare unanimous vote on a procedural step signaled that Senate Democrats would be able to amend the plan to restore the Obamacare funding. On Thursday, Reid made clear that if the House then made further changes to the revised spending proposal sent back by the Senate, it would cause at least a short-term government shutdown because of the time it would take the Senate to reconsider the measure. Cruz had led a group of tea party conservatives in trying to block Senate consideration of the spending legislation. However, he came under strong criticism from fellow Republicans including Senate GOP leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and other influential veterans such as Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Bob Corker of Tennessee for that strategy, which called for GOP senators to filibuster the House measure that -- in its original form -- would defund programs under the Affordable Care Act.

#### **Restricting presidential war powers crushes credibility with congress and causes debt ceiling not to pass**

Seeking Alpha 9/10/13 Seeking Profits 2013 - Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight

Sep 10 2013 <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight> MT

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability. I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four. While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues. Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight. I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011. As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event. Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time. Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade. I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks. The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama. Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

#### **Failure to solve budget crisis causes economic collapse**

Davidson 9/10 Adam, co-founder of NPR’s "Planet Money," Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all> MT

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Royal ‘10

(director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Off

#### First, policymaking methods are structured by the assumptions of white, male elites. Their analysis is predicated on an instrumental rationality that glosses over gender, race, class and sexuality as being tied to the prevailing relations of power and systemic oppression

Shaw in 2004

(Kathleen M., “Using Feminist Critical Policy Analysis in the Realm of Higher Education: The Case of Welfare Reform as Gendered Educational Policy”, Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 75, Issue 1, rcheek)

Feminist critical policy analysis has been most clearly articulated in the work of Catherine Marshall, whose two edited volumes both lay out the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this approach to policy research and also provide examples of the ways in which it can be used to examine both secondary and postsecondary education (Marshall, 1997a, 1997b). Feminist critical policy analysis melds critical theory and feminism in a way that is designed to challenge the traditional, mainstream approaches to policy analysis that have dominated policy research for the last fifty years (Marshall, 1997a). The methods and theoretical frameworks that dominate current policy analysis have been developed and implemented by those in power who, particularly in the world of policy formation and analysis, are overwhelmingly white, male, and well educated. Thus, traditional policy research has, according to Marshall, reflected the assumptions, worldview, and values of this group.¶ As is the case with much mainstream research in the social sciences, traditional policy analysis can be characterized by the following elements. Among the most important are a belief in a single concept of truth (truth with a capital "T"); the assumption that objectivity on the part of the researcher is both achievable and desirable; the assumption that all research subjects share the same relationship to their social environment, thereby rendering such particularities as gender, race, social class, and sexuality unimportant; and the practice of evaluating women on the basis of male norms (Bensimon & Marshall, 1997, p. 7-8). Since this positivist paradigm is so widely accepted in the policy world, it allows policy analysts to assume a dispassionate, objective stance and at the same time encourages the broader policy community to perceive the research enterprise in this way. Thus, traditional policy analysis will-fully ignores the inherently political nature of all research, and policy research in particular. As Marshall states, "Traditional policy analysis is grounded in a narrow, falsely objective, overly instrumental view of rationality that masks its latent biases and allows policy elites and technocrats to present analyses and plans as neutral and objective when they are actually tied to prevailing relations of power" (1997a, p. 3).

#### And, roleplaying a state policymaker colludes with an imperialist agenda that maintains status quo power, privilege, and oppression by distancing debaters from real world participation in the political contexts we debate about.

Reid-Brinkley in 2008

(Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008)

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### The alternative is to reject policymaking.

#### Their method reproduces exceptionalist violence and oppression. Vote negative to join a revolution in debate capable of instigating the critical consciousness necessary to avert immanent global disaster.

Spanos in 2004

(William V., professor @ Binghamton, printed in Joe Millers’ book “Cross-X” (pg. 467) 2004 and on edebate)

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "deterring democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

### Norms

#### 1. China won’t use drones to resolve territorial disputes – fears international backlash and creating a precedent for U.S. strikes in the area

Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 (Andrew and Austin, China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13) PC

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

#### 2. Restricting the use of drones is impossible – unrestrained use is inevitable.

Steigerwald ‘13 (Lucy, “The Inevitability of Drones in the US and Abroad”, Anti War, 4-29-13, <http://antiwar.com/blog/2013/04/29/the-inevitability-of-drones-in-the-u-s-and-abroad/>, RSR)

The proliferation of drones will not long be an American issue alone. “The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress,” USA Today reported in January.¶ In spite of some heartening legislative attempts to rein in drones here at home, as well as protests over their international use, they cannot be fully put back into the box. That’s why endlessly rehashing the concerns that are fundamentally tied in with this technology is a good thing to do, even if it brings up a sense of Deja Vu for anyone even halfway paying attention. The RCP article contains no breaking news about drones, but the moment that such articles disappear, we’re in real trouble. That’s when drones have been fully accepted as the most efficient killing machines abroad, and the ideal mechanisms for surveillance at home.

#### 3. Targeted killing does not violate human rights

Paust 10 [Jordan J, Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor at the University of Houston, “Self-defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones In Pakistan”, Spring 2010, <http://law-wss-01.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol19_2/paust.pdf>, p. 263-265]AM

An otherwise lawful targeted killing in self-defense during relative peace or during war would not constitute a violation of the human right to life, which merely guarantees freedom from being “arbitrarily” deprived of life,65 since it would be rational with re-spect to a person actively participating in and taking a direct part in armed attacks (including a person who is planning or directing such attacks), policy-serving, and reasonably necessary. With respect to the application of protections under human rights law, there is an additional requirement that too many textwriters overlook. For example, under Article 2, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the critical question is whether a person being targeted by a drone flying in the airspace of a foreign country is within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of the state using the drone.66 Such a person is clearly not within the territorial jurisdiction of the state responding in self-defense (unless the person is within territory that is occupied by the responding state and is, therefore, within a related form of territorial jurisdiction) and such a person does not appear to be within the actual “power or effective control” of the responding state.67 It is evident, therefore, that human rights protections do not pertain and that a human rights paradigm is not directly relevant.

#### 4. No Asian conflict- empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism.

Carlson ’13(Allen Carlson is an Associate Professor in Cornell University’s Government Department. He was granted his PhD from Yale University’s Political Science Department. His undergraduate degree is from Colby College. In 2005 his Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era was published by Stanford University Press. He has also written articles that appeared in the Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Affairs, Asia Policy, and Nations and Nationalism. In addition, he has published monographs for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the East-West Center Washington. Carlson was a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Peking University during the 2004-2005 academic year. In 2005 he was chosen to participate in the National Committee’s Public Intellectuals Program, and he currently serves as an adviser to Cornell’s China Asia Pacific Studies program and its East Asia Program. Carlson is currently working on a project exploring the issue of nontraditional security in China’s emerging relationship with the rest of the international system. His most recent publications are the co-edited Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and New Frontiers in China’s Foreign Relations (Lexington, 2011). China Keeps the Peace at Sea China Keeps the Peace at Sea Why the Dragon Doesn't Want War Allen Carlson February 21, 2013

At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the **Senkaku** (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. **Yet,** months later,nothing has happened. And **despite** their **aggressive posturing** in the disputed territory, **both** sides **now show** glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability**.** Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, **China** cannot afford military conflict **with** any of its **Asian neighbors.** It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However**, Chinese officials see** thateven the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damagethat such a use of force would cause **to Beijing's** two most fundamental national interests **--** economic **growth and preventing the escalation of** radical **nationalist sentiment at home.** These constraints, rather than any external deterrent**, will keep** Xi Jinping, **China's new leader, from** authorizing the use of deadly **force** in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, **Beijing has promoted** peace and stability **in Asia** to facilitate conditions amenable to **China's** **economic** **development**. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, **although** often seen as **a promoter of conflict**, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. **Ever since** the **Tiananmen Square** massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, **successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance** between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the **coming months it will quietly** seek a way to **shelve the dispute in return for** securing **regional stability**, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

#### 5. China can’t challenge the US—the war will be quick

Reed 11 [John Reed= news correspondent, “PLA: Chinese Military Doesn’t Compare to U.S. Military”, May 19, 2011, http://defensetech.org/2011/05/19/pla-chinese-military-doesnt-compare-to-u-s-military/]

This is interesting. The PLA’s top officer, **Gen**. Chen **Bingde, announced during his recent visit to Washington that China’s is no where close to matching the United States’ in terms of military capability**. Yes, we’re fretting over China’s rise as an economic power, but according to the general, his nation has a long way to go before it catches the U.S. militarily. From Fox News: “Through my visit over the past couple of days in the United States, **I am surprised by the sophistication of the U.S. military, including its weapons and equipment and doctrines and so on,”** People’s Liberation Army leader General Chen Bingde said. “**I can tell you that China does not have the capability to challenge the United States**. As a matter of fact, the reconnaissance activities along China’s coast by U.S. military aircraft and vessels are seen in China as deterrents.” For emphasis, the general added, “What I’m trying to say is that we do not have the capability to challenge the United States.” He even went so far as to try to answer the question that’s long been on U.S. defense officials minds: What do Chinese officials mean when they says they want to ‘defend what is theirs’ with their new military might? “As it is known to all, the United States is a super-power in the world today; how can China easily have the ability to challenge it? That is simply not part of Chinese culture and we do not have that capability. We would strive for world peace, civility and development and well being of the whole humankind…**The United States has far more advanced weapons and equipment**.” Chen took some exception to the accusation, insisting the routine test flight was not targeted at Gates’ visit, and questioned why similar issues were frequently raised to China but not the United States. The general insisted, “After 30 years of reform and opening up, China’s economy has made tremendous progress and we are now the world’s second-largest economy…**Our efforts to grow our economy is to ensure that the 1.3 billion people are better off. We do not want to use the money to buy equipment or advanced weapons systems to challenge the United States**.” From the general’s answer, it sounds like China has no intention of getting into Cold War II with the United States. **Arms races can be notoriously expensive and distracting from the buildup of other sectors needed to support a healthy economy; something China is strongly focused on**. For now, it seems like **China wants to be the big military power in the region while focusing more on the long-term growth of its economy**. This reminds me of how the U.S. overtook Britain as the world’s most powerful economy decades before it overtook the empire in terms of military and global political might. However, once China overtakes the U.S. as the world’s largest economy (predicted to happen sometime in the next 20 years if current trends hold) who knows what kind of military investments it will make?

#### 6. No risk of escalation- China will only retaliate if US strikes first

Tilford, 12– Wichita Military Affairs Examiner (Robert, “Chinese General warns US ‘we will not attack - unless we are attacked’!”, The Examiner, June 5, http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese-general-warns-us-we-will-not-attack-unless-we-are-attacked)//VP

"**We will** also **improve our military strategy**, our national defense and the PLA's fighting ability. We will not attack unless we are attacked," the General told reporters. "**We have the measures to strike back when fundamental national interests are under threat,**" he said. "We still face a very complex, sometimes severe, situation. **We will be prepared for all complexities.** There's a saying: work for the best and prepare for the worst," said Lt. General Haiquan. These comments are seen as a warning to certain members of Congress and the entire US military industrial establishment - "don't mess with us in China." In the China Daily report, Chinese officials indicated **it would "improve" the capability of its forces** and has the capacity to "strike back" **when its "fundamental interests" are under threat.**

### Pakistan

#### . Drones irrelevant to Pakistan stability- multiple alternatives cause.

Javaid ’11 (Umbreen, Director Center of Asian Studies & Chairperson Department of political science University of Punjab, “Thriving Fundamentalism and Militancy in Pakistan An Analytical Overview of their Impact on the Society,” South Asian Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1. Pg. 16-17)  
 ‘The recent increase of violence by jihadi groups, including suicide bombing of ¶ innocent bystanders as well attacks on the police and military, has perhaps brought ¶ more Pakistanis to consider how to strike a new balance between Islam and ¶ politics’ (Oldenburg, 2010: 158). ‘The Pakistani people also need to change their ¶ attitude, especially their outlook on religion. Suffered with anti-Americanism and ¶ religious fervor, Pakistanis are filtering their worldview through the prism of ¶ religion and the tensions between Islam and the West, making them to the radical ¶ propaganda and paralyzing their will to act against forces of extremism’ (Hussain, ¶ 2009: 11). mbreen Javaid Thriving Fundamentalism and ¶ 17¶ It is not only the task of the government to control this growing ¶ fundamentalism but the whole society needs to completely shun off these ¶ extremists. The political parties, intellectuals, sectarian and religious parties and ¶ the masses all have to openly condemn the extremists, so that they do not find any ¶ space to flourish. ‘Much still needs to be done on the home front curb religious ¶ zealotry and sectarianism, policies towards minorities, revision of school curricula, ¶ reconstructing ‘official’ history, promotion of universal education, and ¶ overhauling of the madrassah system’ (Niaz, 2011: 181). The best way to curtail the thriving fundamentalism in Pakistan is to look ¶ deeply into its causes. The whole society and especially the government needs to ¶ put in serious efforts in controlling on checking the causes if not diminishing ¶ them. It should also be understand that the issue of fundamentalism is very ¶ complex which entails number of factors which are playing their part. These ¶ include economic disparity, lack of education, religious ignorance, unemployment, ¶ extremism, judicial system, poor governance, ethnicity and sectarianism, ¶ corruption and alignment with United States, each of these have played their role ¶ separately and also a combined mix of all in flourishing militant fundamentalism ¶ in Pakistan. To control fundamentalism is not an easy task especially when it is ¶ now combined with militancy. Another major challenge for the government is that ¶ earlier the various militant extremist groups were operating separately and had ¶ divergent aims and objectives from each other but lately various local groups, AlQaeda and Taliban have all joined hands and helping each other irrespective of ¶ their particular objectives. These alignments have made these militant groups more ¶ lethal, thus making things more difficult for the government. ¶ Militant fundamentalism not only has the ability to destabilize Pakistan but it ¶ can, if not controlled, bring about serious security concerns for the region and also ¶ towards the global security and peace.

#### 2. Crackdowns prevent serious instability.

Bandow 09– Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, 11/31/09, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924>, MMarcus)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### 3. Won’t escalate -- Paki loose nukes aren’t a threat.

Innocent 10 - foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute (Malou, “Away from McChrystal and Back to the Basics,” Huffington Post, 6/28/10, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11934>, MMarcus)

Pakistan has an elaborate command and control system in place that complies with strict Western standards, and the country's warheads, detonators, and missiles are not stored fully-assembled, but are scattered and physically separated throughout the country. In short, the danger of militants seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons in some Rambo-like scenario remains highly unlikely.

#### 4. No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### 5. Ayson flips neg- terrorism is not an existential risk

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, Francis & Taylor)//VP

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the ﬁrst place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in signiﬁcant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-ﬁrst century might bring would fade into insigniﬁcance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves.

#### 6. Pakistan is stable. Their only warrant is increased terrorism due to the new government but a reset in relations and increased security should mean stability is at an all time high

#### . No indo-pak war

Wright 13 (January 16, 2013, 11:59 AM Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties By TOM WRIGHT WSJ Asia Economics Editor.http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/)

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations.Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated.“If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.”It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies.Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down.Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses.Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.”There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries.The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem.Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them.Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.

#### 2. Their Fick and Kerr evidence are based on loose nukes. After a long history of hiding nukes, the evidence gives no reason why terrorists or another other actor could steal the nuclear weapons or would have incentives to use them on India or Pakistan

#### 3. A long history of Indo-Pak tension and attacks prove no risk of escalation

Thakur 11 (Chandra, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation and Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Glendon School of Public and International Affairs, Global Brief February 18th 2011, www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/handle/10072/51641, page 2)

Islamabad’s record of double-dealing, deceit and denial of Pakistan-based attacks, in Afghanistan and India alike, has been based on four degrees of separation – between the government, the army, the ISI and terrorists – the plausibility of which is fading as it is exploited as a convenient alibi to escape accountability. That Pakistanis in general might harbour goodwill and friendships toward India is irrelevant if they have little say in making policy. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh – by instinct circumspect – has said that, “given the sophistication and military precision,” the Mumbai attacks “must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” The combination of training, selection and advance reconnaissance of targets, diversionary tactics, discipline, munitions, cryptographic communications, false IDs, and damage inflicted is more typically associated with special forces units than with terrorists.

#### Terror attack probability high now.

Zimmerman 9/25 (Katherine, senior analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project., “Al-Qaeda’s African Surge Threatens the U.S.” AEI, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/zimmerman-al-qaedas-african-surge-threatens-us-september-25-2013> -Veeder)

U.S. intelligence officials fear that the score or so of American passport holders believed to be members of al Shabaab might return to the U.S. to commit terrorism. Al Shabaab's leadership has not espoused attacks on America, but security experts fear that recruitment targeting Americans increases the probability of an attack. Last month, al Shabaab released a video featuring what it called its "Minnesota Martyrs." Minnesota is home to the largest U.S. population of Somalis. The 40-minute video, the first in a promised series, featured three Americans. The video glorified the three young men, saying they had given their lives on what is now a global battlefield. Although some within the group may see Africa as their battleground, those who have cemented the relationship with al Qaeda understand that jihad stretches from Morocco to the Philippines, from Tanzania to Iraq. And as al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri has made clear, to the United States. If reports now surfacing regarding Americans involved in the Nairobi attack—al Shabaab's response to the Kenyan military presence in Somalia—are confirmed, it will be difficult for the Obama administration to continue claiming that al Shabaab is purely local. The terror group has the means for a major attack, and al Qaeda's focus on the U.S. provides the motive. From the triumphalism after Osama bin Laden's death to the president's most recent speeches trumpeting an end to the war on terror, the Obama administration continues to proclaim al Qaeda's demise. Implicit in this claim is that the Obama counterterrorism strategy is succeeding and "the tide of war is receding," which in turn underpin substantial cuts to security spending and retreat from foreign entanglements. Alas, reciting a mantra does not make it true. Far from defeated, al Qaeda is stronger now than ever.

#### Drones have effectively killed terrorists in Pakistan and their There is a significant risk that terrorist groups in Pakistan could obtain a nuclear weapon.

Costello, Ryan. Policy Fellow at National Iranian American Council, Program Coordinator Fissle Materials Working Group at Connect U.S. Fund, Researcher at Center for the Study of Threat Convergence at the Fund for Peace. 2011. “Threat Convergence in Pakistan.” Fund for Peace. Pg. 5 --Veeder

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a ¶ significant ¶ proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating ¶ within the country and in neighboring countries, such as ¶ Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the ¶ context of state instability and fragility, the legacy o¶ f ¶ the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the ¶ government and Islamist militants. The possibility ¶ that ¶ terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials, ¶ either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with ¶ internal assistance, should not be underestimated. ¶ Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal estimated ¶ to contain more than 100 nuclear weapons. This ¶ nuclear stockpile is likely to continue to expand as ¶ Pakistan develops new nuclear-capable missiles and ¶ increases its capacity to produce weapons-grade ¶ material. An expansion will require supplementary ¶ security to guard the additional nuclear material, ¶ facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more¶ vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that ¶ Pakistan’s nuclear security could break down. ¶ There are several terrorist groups operating within ¶ Pakistan that have challenged and weakened the ¶ Pakistani state. For example, as part of an upsurge of ¶ violence within Pakistan, suicide bombings have ¶ increased from two in 2002 to eighty-nine in 2009. In ¶ addition, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have utilized ¶ the mountainous, semi-autonomous Federally ¶ Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as a safe ¶ haven in order to launch local, regional, and ¶ international attacks. Al-Qaeda has also expressed its ¶ desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, demonstrated by the ¶ reported meeting between two Pakistani nuclear ¶ scientists and Osama bin-Laden prior to the September¶ 11¶ th¶ attacks. The scientists allegedly provided bin-¶ Laden with a “rough sketch” of how to construct a ¶ nuclear weapon. ¶ Given the numerous terrorist groups threatening the ¶ Pakistani state and its nuclear materials, Pakistan ¶ remains one of the world’s greatest nuclear security ¶ vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nu¶ clear ¶ facilities is high, and there is a strong potential f¶ or ¶ collaboration between terrorist groups and rogue ¶ elements within the Pakistani security services. Th¶ e ¶ threat of insider collaboration with terrorist groups ¶ is ¶ enhanced by the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network and ¶ allegations that elements of the Pakistani government ¶ support Islamist militants. Over the long-term, th¶ ere is ¶ a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could ¶ collapse or weaken to the point that nuclear safeguard¶ s ¶ would be unable to protect Pakistan’s nuclear ¶ weapons. However, the threats of external attack and ¶ internal collaboration are partially addressed by ¶ current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely,¶ particularly if the United States and the international ¶ community remain engaged in the region. ¶ Nevertheless, nuclear Pakistan is a state confronting ¶ multiple internal and external threats to its security ¶ from rogue and terrorist entities and, as such, remains¶ at significant risk for exploitation and proliferation.

### Solvency

#### The only likely drone proliferation is small unarmed UAV’s, most countries can’t afford expensive drones.

Franke 2013 (Ulrike Esther Franke University of Oxford, Just the new hot thing? The diffusion of UAV technology worldwide and its popularity among democratic states April 2013<http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/4269932e782d47248d5269ad381ca6c7.pdf>, bs)

“Drones are hot”,50 they are a symbol of modernity, technological sophistication and military superiority. A modern army, it seems, needs UAVs to be part of the “big-boys club”. Fortunately for would-be modern and capable militaries, acquiring low-tech drones or building them is relatively easy. As director of RAND Project Air Force, Ted Harshberger points out: “it is very difficult to build long-endurance, highly automated, multi-role unmanned systems of the sort often purchased by the United States and its allies. [However,] it is extremely easy to produce modest-endurance, partially automated, single-purpose unmanned systems”.51 Even if adding a handful of small tactical drones to a state’s arsenal might not do much to increase its military capability – it can still show off its new technological gadgets. This explains why in so many countries the acquisition of UAVs is a job for the boss – i.e. the President or head of state/government. It was Hugo Chavez who unveiled Venezuela’s first UAV,52 and it was Russian President Vladimir Putin who proclaimed that Russia would invest $12 billion on UAVs before year 2020.53 How eager some states are to portray themselves as capable UAV users can be seen by means of the following anecdote: In 2012, Iranian media presented an – allegedly Iranian-made – new, vertical take-off drone to the public. The photos of the UAV however turned out to be photoshopped pictures of a Japanese design.54 “It’s a prestige thing,” Micah Zenko, analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations agrees. Possessing UAVs has a positive impact even if “[i]t doesn’t provide you with much additional combat capability.”55

#### 2. Drones kill the least amount of civilians compared to other methods

Byman 13 (Daniel, Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy, July/August 2013, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice”, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>) KB

The truth is that all the public numbers are unreliable. Who constitutes a civilian is often unclear; when trying to kill the Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, for example, the United States also killed his doctor. The doctor was not targeting U.S. or allied forces, but he was aiding a known terrorist leader. In addition, most strikes are carried out in such remote locations that it is nearly impossible for independent sources to verify who was killed. In Pakistan, for example, the overwhelming majority of drone killings occur in tribal areas that lie outside the government’s control and are prohibitively dangerous for Westerners and independent local journalists to enter. Thus, although the New America Foundation has come under fire for relying heavily on unverifiable information provided by anonymous U.S. officials, reports from local Pakistani organizations, and the Western organizations that rely on them, are no better: their numbers are frequently doctored by the Pakistani government or by militant groups. After a strike in Pakistan, militants often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves. The U.S. media often then draw on such faulty reporting to give the illusion of having used multiple sources. As a result, statistics on civilians killed by drones are often inflated. One of the few truly independent on-the-ground reporting efforts, conducted by the Associated Press last year, concluded that the strikes “are killing far fewer civilians than many in [Pakistan] are led to believe.” But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.

#### 3. Decapitation fails – no discernable effects.

Arquilla 13 (John, received a PhD in International Relations from Stanford in 1991. He worked at RAND for several years, before joining the faculty of the US Naval Postgraduate School in 1993, March 25, “Use an Axe not a Scalpel” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/25/use\_an\_axe\_not\_a\_scalpel)

Remote-controlled weapons, the hot new tools of war, have had the perverse effect of shoring up an old pattern of strategic thought about going after enemy leaders. Wildly popular with the Air Force, there are now more pilots in cubicles than there are in cockpits. Their primary purpose: act swiftly and on the basis of good, timely intelligence to strike with great precision at terrorist leaders. Thus the longstanding strategic concept of counter-leadership targeting — “decapitation” was the less euphemistic term of an earlier era — has been revivified. The problem, though, is that when the principal foe is a network, the importance of any individual leader is low because these organizations are capable of a high degree of self-direction. Drones have played key roles in the killing of about 20 of al Qaeda’s “No. 3s” over the past decade, but in a network everybody is No. 3.¶ This focus on taking out the leaders of essentially leaderless networks (that is, interconnected cells that are highly self-organizing and at least semi-autonomous) has led to serious difficulties in the field. For example, many intelligence operatives and military servicemembers who plan and conduct drone operations have found that, all too often, the occasional strike from the sky inflicts damage that the networks can work around and quickly repair. In the meantime, the connections that the killed “leader” had are no longer discernible. Which means, in practical terms, that the slow attrition of drone campaigns, though it may hurt the enemy, does even more harm to the counter-terrorists’ store of knowledge about these networks. The more damage done in this slow-paced manner — there have been just over 400 drone strikes over the past decade, an average of 3-4 per month — the less is known. This phenomenon is a curious aspect of “netwar” — the term that my longtime research partner David Ronfeldt and I use to describe how networks fight, and how to fight networks.¶ [...]¶ Shortly before leaving office, Leon Panetta reaffirmed the traditional view when he said that loss of leaders had put al Qaeda “on the verge of strategic defeat.” This is outmoded thinking. One need only look to the many fronts on which al Qaeda is operating today — even in Iraq, where we are gone, the terrorists are back, and the country is burning — to see that the global war on terror has morphed into terror’s war on the world. If one side is closer to “strategic defeat” after a decade of this first great war between nations and networks, it is the nations. Networks are simply not dependent on a few key leaders — as even the death of Osama bin Laden has shown.¶ So, what’s his alternative?¶ For David Ronfeldt and me, this means operating in concentrated bursts of action, striking networks not at a single “decisive point” — they don’t have such — but rather at several points at once — what we call “swarming.” Far better to go after al Qaeda by doing a lot more surveillance, for longer periods, prior to attacking. Then, when the network node or cell has been sufficiently illuminated, it can be eliminated in a series of simultaneous strikes that give the enemy little or no chance to hide or flee.¶ This makes sound strategic sense. Interestingly, given the longstanding “war” vs. “law enforcement” debate on counterterrorism, it’s pretty much the approach the FBI takes to organized crime.¶ Politically, however, this is easier said than done. We’ve been at war a long time and being able to announce “progress” in the form of killed or captured senior leaders is excellent for maintaining troop morale and public support. Ironically, it may contribute to needing to sustain those much longer than would otherwise have been necessary.

#### 4. Their Daskal evidence flows neg. It says that “those involved in the active planning or operationalization of specific, imminent, and externally focused attacks, regardless of their relative hierarchical position in the organization” should be targeted. It also indicates that any soldier should be killed if they are supposedly planning against another nation.

#### **5. Decapitation is counter-productive for religious and terrorist groups—studies prove**

Mannes 08 (Aaron, author of Profiles in Terror: A Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (2004), has written for Policy Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, National Review Online, The Forward, Middle East Insight, and The Journal of International Security Affairs, former Director of Research at the Middle East Media Research Institute, The Journal of International Policy Solutions, Spring “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?” http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/017/7167.pdf)

Based on this preliminary survey, it is difficult to assess the utility of decapitation strategies. The general decline in incidents when groups are subject to decapitation strikes indicates that this strategy may be useful in certain circumstances. However, the limited effect of the decapitation strategy, particularly on fatal attacks by terrorist groups, raises doubts about its overall efficacy. It is interesting to note that the communist/socialist groups, which other surveys have identified as vulnerable t o decapitation strategies, do not show strong indicat ions of vulnerability to decapitation in this study. This may be due to the relatively small dataset or to the declines of smaller ideological terrorist groups being offset by larger and more robust ideological terrorist groups. The result that consistently stood out from this research was the propensity of decapitation strikes to cause religious organizations to become substantially more deadly. There are several possible reasons to explain this outcome. Many religious organizations are robust, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which is an important criterion for surviving the loss of a leader as well as having the resources to strike back. By contrast, some of the nationalist‑separatist groups, such as the IRA and ETA, restricted their violence when subjected to the decapitation strategy. Revenge plays a role in the upsurge in deadly violence after a decapitation strike. Another reason might be that the organizations that become more deadly are often in the midst of large‑scale insurgencies; the death of the leader is therefore a component in causing the insurgency to enter a more deadly phase. Another explanation might be that during periods of extreme violence in which leaders are likely to be removed, the most violent elements within a religious terrorist group will also rise to the fore. The indication that killing religious organization’s leaders rather than arresting them is more likely to lead to a surge of deadly violence may be worth further exploration . An imprisoned religious leader may continue to be a source of authority that prevents a new leader from taking charge. In addition, some imprisoned leaders, either in the hopes of gaining clemency or due to true changes of heart, have renounced violence. Based on this data, decapitation strikes are not a silver bullet against terrorist organizations. In the case of religious groups, they may even be counter‑productive. However, since the most violent religious organizations operate on a large‑scale and have extensive bases of support among the population, comparing these organizations to the relatively small terrorist radicals in Europe during the Cold War may not be appropriate. Different organizations may have different vulnerabilities to decapitation. Small self‑starting Islamist terror cells may be more akin to the European radical groups and more vulnerable to decapitations and crackdowns. Another question to explore is how decapitation strikes work in conjunction with other counter‑terror strategies, such as fomenting internal dissent, addressing terrorist gr oup grievances, and attacking the terrorist group’s support base. Several of the examples of killed terrorist group leaders included in this study were actually killed by other terrorists. If more data were present, this would be an interesting direction in which to conduct further research.

#### 6. Their Johnson evidence indicates that Decapitation stops attacks on the US mainland and can help end counterinsurgencies but says nothing about stopping terrorism in their native land or stopping organizations like AQAP or Al Qaeda