# Wake Rd 8 vs. Clarion BC

## 1NC

### Targeted Killing PIC

#### Congress should restrict the murdering of individuals who are engaged in direct participation in hostilities. “Direct participation in hostilities” should be defined as proof of: (1) geographic proximity of service provided to units in contact with the enemy, (2) proximity of relationship between services provided and harm resulting to enemy, and (3) temporal relation of support to enemy contact or harm resulting to enemy.

#### “Targeted killing” is a euphemism that sanitizes and bureaucratizes a policy of sovereign violence and permanent war

Healy 12

(Gene, VP of Cato Inst., "Drone-War Double-Think", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dronewar-doublethink)

“Political language,” George Orwell wrote in 1946, “is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.” When government action can only be defended by arguments “too brutal for most people to face,” governments reliably brutalize the language, resorting to “euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.”¶ The Bush administration introduced any number of such fuzz words to the political lexicon: “regime change,” “enhanced interrogation,” and “self-injurious behavior incidents” (Pentagon jargon for suicide attempts by Gitmo prisoners — sorry, “enemy combatants.”)¶ And who can forget the Obama national security team’s insistence last year that pounding Libya with Tomahawk missiles and Predator drone strikes wasn’t “war,” but rather, “kinetic military action?” (As opposed to “static” action?)¶ The Obama team has lately added a new term to the doublespeak lexicon, “the disposition matrix.” This soporific word-cloud replaces the admirably frank “kill or capture list.”¶ Killing or capturing terrorists with the means and the intent to kill Americans is eminently defensible, but a Washington Post investigative report published last week raises questions about whether bureaucratic “mission creep” has cut the program loose from its original justification. “Obama has institutionalized the highly classified practice of targeted killing,” the Post’s Greg Miller writes, “transforming ad-hoc elements into a counterterrorism infrastructure capable of sustaining a seemingly permanent war.” He reports “broad consensus” among Obama terror-warriors that “such operations are likely to be extended at least another decade.”

### Buddhism

#### The harms of the 1AC are merely subsets of an unawakened anxiety that exists at our core—panic over death prevents us from living

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 19-20) Henge

“Suffering,” the usual English translation for dukkha, is not very enlightening, especially today, when those of us who live in wealthy countries have many ways to entertain and distract ourselves. The point of the Buddhist term is that we nonetheless experience a basic dissatisfaction, a dis-ease, which continues to fester. That there is something inherently frustrating about our lives is not accidental or coincidental. It is the nature of an unawakened mind to be bothered about something. At the core of our being we feel a free-ﬂoating anxiety, which has no particular object but can plug into any problematic situation. We may try to evade this anxiety by dulling ourselves with alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, television, consumerism, sex, and so forth, or we may become preoccupied with various goals we pursue, but the anxiety is always there; and when we slow down enough to become sensitive to what is occurring in our minds, we become aware of it—which is one reason we do not like to slow down. This implies that everything we normally understand as suffering is only a subset—for some of us a relatively small subset—of dukkha. The Pali sutras distinguish dukkha into three different types.10 The ﬁrst, dukkha-dukkhata, includes everything that we usually think of as suffering: all physical, emotional, and mental pain or discomfort, including being separated from people we like to be with, and being stuck with those we do not. This also includes the types of social dukkha mentioned above. A second and different type is viparinama-dukkhata, the dukkha that arises from impermanence, from knowing that nothing lasts forever and most things do not last long. Even when we are thoroughly enjoying ourselves, we know the moment will not last, and there is something frustrating about that awareness. However delicious that ice cream may taste, we know the last bite is coming soon—and even if we buy another cone, it does not taste as good because we begin to feel sated. The most problematic dukkha of this type is, of course, death: not the physical pain of dying (that is included in the ﬁrst type of dukkha) but the awareness that I will die. This awareness of our inevitable end often pervades and colors everything we do—so thoroughly that it poisons life. Insofar as I am afraid to die, I also become unable to live. To live fully is not possible when we are hypersensitive to the fact that danger and maybe death lurk around every corner, because any little accident could be our last.

#### This anxious egoism makes violence inevitable

Ikeda 07 (Daisaku Ikeda President, Soka Gakkai International January 26, 2007 “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace” http://www.sgi-usa.org/newsandevents/docs/peace2007.pdf) Dabo

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.” Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.” When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons.

#### The anger and hatred of egoism causes us to view life as hell

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 7-8) Henge

There are other important dimensions to karma, aside from those pertaining to psychical and bodily rebirth. Whether or not the law of karma is a moral law of the universe—a kind of psychic equivalent to Newton’s third law of motion, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction—the Buddhist emphasis on no-self and intentional action points to a more subtle aspect of karma: that we construct ourselves by what we choose to do. My sense of self is a precipitate of my habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food I eat, so my character is built by my conscious decisions. According to this approach, people are “punished” or “rewarded” not for what they have done but for what they have become, and what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. This does not necessarily involve an afterlife. According to Spinoza, happiness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself. In more Buddhist terms, we do not live a certain way for the recompense our meritorious actions will bring us, either in this lifetime or in a future one. Rather, to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a different kind of way. The six realms of samsara have usually been understood as distinct worlds or planes of existence through which we transmigrate according to our karma, yet they can also describe the different ways we experience this world as our attitude toward it changes. The hell realm is not necessarily a place I will be reborn into, due to my hatred and evil actions. It can be the way this world is experienced when my mind is dominated by anger and hate. The twelve interlinked factors of pratitya samutpada (interdependent origination) do not necessarily refer to different lifetimes; that teaching can be understood as describing the various causes and effects of “my” mental processes right now. When karma is understood along these lines, the Buddhist emphasis on our constructedness, instead of being an example of premodern supernatural thinking, becomes quite consistent with the postmodern insight. That does not mean this is the only way to interpret karma and samsara; my reﬂections are merely one example of the possibilities that must be addressed for the contemporary relevance of Buddhism to become more apparent. The challenge, of course, is discriminating between the baby and the bathwater, and that will not be easy. If a contemporary Buddhism is to mature, however, this task cannot be evaded.

#### Vote negative to shed the ego

#### This is a self-transformative recognition of the interpermeation of all beings

Snauwaert, 9

(Dale Snauwaert, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity” <http://www.academia.edu/537918/The_Ethics_and_Ontology_of_Cosmopolitanism_Education_for_a_Shared_Humanity>) Henge

Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings on the basis of a shared humanity. What is universal in, and definitive of, cosmopolitanism is the presupposition of the shared inherent dignity of humanity. As Martha Nussbaum states: [Human good can] be objective in the sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognized in local traditions. (Perry, 1998, p. 68) If a shared humanity is presupposed, and if humanity is understood to possess an equal inherent value and dignity, then a shared humanity possesses a fundamental moral value. If the fundamental moral value of humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows, for to deny moral consideration to any human being is to ignore (not recognize) their intrinsic value, and thereby, to violate their dignity. The duty of moral consideration in turn morally requires nations and peoples to conduct their relations in accordance with ethical principles that properly instantiate the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. If valid, the fundamental aims of the education of citizens should be based upon this imperative. In order to further explicate this cosmopolitanism perspective, the philosophy of one of history’s greatest cosmopolitans, Mohandas K. Gandhi, is explored below. Reflections on Gandhi’s Cosmopolitan Philosophy While most commentators focus on Gandhi’s conception and advocacy of nonviolence, it is generally recognized that his core philosophical beliefs regarding the essential unity of humanity and the universal applicability of nonviolence as a moral and political ideal places Gandhi in the cosmopolitan tradition as broadly understood (Iyer, [1973] 1983; Kumar Giri, 2006). At the core of Gandhi’s philosophy are the interdependent values of Satya (Truth) and Ahimsa (nonviolence). Gandhi’s approach to nonviolent social transformation, Satyagraha, is the actualization in action of these two values (Bondurant, 1965; Iyer, [1973] 1983; Naess, 1974). Gandhi’s Satya is multifaceted. Its most fundamental meaning pertains to Truth as self-realization. Satya is derived from sat, Being. Truth is Being; realizing in full awareness one’s authentic Being. Truth, in this sense, is the primary goal of life. Gandhi writes: What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization . . . I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end. (Naess 1974, p. 35) Self-realization, for Gandhi, requires “shedding the ego,” “reducing one self to zero” (cited in Naess 1974, p. 37). The ego per se is not the real self; it is a fabrication. This egoic self must be transcended. As the egoic self loosens and one becomes increasingly self-aware, one deepens the realization of one’s authentic being, and that being is experienced as unified with humanity and all living things. Scholars normally understand human identity in terms of personality, which is a socially constructed self-concept constituted by a complex network of identifications and object relations. This construction is what we normally refer to as the ego or self-identity. Our egoic self-identity is literally a construction, based upon psychological identifications (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Batchelor, 1983). From this perspective, the ego is a socially constructed entity, ultimately a fabrication of the discursive formations of culture; from this point of view, the self is exclusively egoic. This perspective has its origins in the claim that consciousness is solely intentional: the claim that consciousness is always consciousness of some object. From this presupposition, the socially constructed, discursive nature of the self is inferred. If consciousness is solely intentional, then the self is a construction, and, if the self is a construction, then it is always discursive – a pre-discursive self cannot exist. It can be argued, however, that intentionality itself presupposes pre-intentional awareness. A distinction can be made between intentional consciousness and awareness. Intentional consciousness presupposes awareness that is always implicit in intentional consciousness. If intentional consciousness does not presuppose a pre-intentional awareness, if there is only consciousness of, then there is always a knower-known duality, and that duality leads to an infinite regress. To be conscious of an object X, one has to be conscious of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X . . . ad infinitum¾reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, there must be implicit in intentional consciousness a level of awareness that is pre-intentional, pre-discursive, and non-positional (Forman, 1999). To be conscious of anything presupposes pre-intentional self-awareness, and being pre-intentional, awareness must be in turn pre-discursive and non-positional (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Aurobindo, 1989, 2001; Batchelor, 1983; Buber, 1970; Forman, 1999; Fromm, 1976). When the ego is shed, a pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness is revealed. One can be reflexively aware of one’s consciousness. Gandhi held that pre-discursive self-awareness, the core of our being, is unified and interdependent with all living things. He writes: “I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives (Naess 1974, p. 43).” In an ontological sense, Gandhi maintains that Satya, Truth, is self-realization, a realization of one’s self-awareness as essentially unified with and thereby existing in solidarity with all human beings and with all living things. Pre-discursive self-awareness is experienced as non-positional, and, being non-positional, it is unbounded; it exists as a field of awareness that is interconnected with all sentient beings. This state is an experience and is only known experientially. Therefore, the assertion of a shared humanity is based upon a common level of being. Human intentional consciousness is expressed in a vast plurality of cultural expressions; implicit within this plurality, existing as its ground, is a shared level of awareness of being that unites us. From the perspective of ontological Truth, nonviolence follows from the unity and interdependence of humanity and life; violence damages all forms of life, including one’s self. Nonviolence uplifts all. Gandhi writes: I do not believe . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in advaita (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man (humankind) and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore, I believe that if one man (person) gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him (them) and, if one man (person) falls, the whole world falls to that extent. (Naess 1974, p. 43) In this experience, one becomes aware of the interrelated and interdependent nature of being. On an existential level, there exists a fundamental interconnection between one’s self and other beings. As Buber suggests, “we live in the currents of universal reciprocity (Buber, 1970, p. 67).” From the perspective of this experience—and this is a direct experience—to harm the other is to harm one’s self. From the perspective of existential interconnection, nonviolence, the essence of morality, rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection.

#### Ontological claims come first—they provide the foundation for all claims—the aff’s claims about solving war are rooted in egocentric mind-world dualism

Jackson, 11

(Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Dean for Undergraduate Education and Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations” pg. 41-42) Henge

Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are “founda - tional”—not in the sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of claims that are founded on them, but “foundational” in the sense that they provide the conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a researcher (Habermas 1990, 321). A claim such as “democratic states do not go to war with one another” implicitly makes a number of ontological presuppositions. The claim makes scientific-ontological presupposi - tions that a state’s “democracy-ness” is a conceptually separable attribute of that state and most likely also presupposes that a state’s standing as a democracy is something that is visible to external scholarly observers and specifiable in an abstract fashion.1 The claim also makes philosophical-ontological presuppositions, although these are somewhat further removed from the individual claim and pertain more to the overall intellectual context within which the claim makes sense; hence one needs to know something about the broader body of scholarly literature within which a claim has standing in order to explicate the philosophical-ontological commitments that it tacitly presumes. The academic study of the democratic peace has been almost completely dominated by a neopositivist methodology. Neopositivism, although neutral with respect to the truth-value of specific empirical propositions, sets the contours of the research design within which claims about the democratic peace—and, quite frankly, claims about many of the other empirical phenomena regularly studied within academic IR—are evaluated. Before scholars can engage in debates about whether the democratic peace is best measured and assessed as a dyadic or as a monadic phenomenon (for example, Rousseau et al. 1996), it is first necessary for those scholars to agree on some basic methodological principles, such as the notion that a causal connection shows itself in systematic cross-case correlations between specific factors (in this case, variable attributes such as “being a democ - racy” and “going to war with another democracy”), and the notion that knowledge is constructed through the successive proposing and testing of hypothetical guesses about the character of the world. The fact that these assumptions are so widely shared, both within the democratic peace research community and within the field of IR more generally, does not make them any less philosophical—or any less philosophically contentious. Hypothesis testing and covariation-causality2 are more or less direct consequences of the pair of philosophical-ontological commitments on which neopositivism stands: mind–world dualism and phenomenalism. Mind–world dualism enables hypothesis testing, inasmuch as testing a hypothetical guess to see whether it corresponds to the world makes little sense in the absence of a mind-independent world against which to test that hypothesis. Phenomenalism enables covariation-causality, since the limitation of knowledge to those aspects of the world that can be empirically grasped and directly experienced implies that the only confidence that observers can have about a causal relationship—which must be inferred rather than abduced or counterfactually ideal-typified—must be founded on its systematicity.3 In the absence of these philosophical-ontological commitments, testing hypotheses in order to arrive at reliable statements about robust correlations would make little sense, and if we were interested in knowing about how democracy was connected to questions of war and peace, we would have to engage in some other kinds of knowledge-production procedures. In this chapter I will expand on these claims with an eye to fleshing out the profound interconnections between these two wagers in philosophical ontology and the neopositivist methodological procedures to which they give rise.4 This is somewhat more challenging to do in the case of neopositivism than it is in the other methodologies in my typology, simply because neopositivism is in many ways more commonsensical in IR at the present time than the other philosophical ontologies I am discussing. What is understood among the parties to a conversation need not be explicitly discussed in the course of that conversation—indeed, its not being discussed is a large part of what enables it to work, to use John Searle’s (1995) terminology, in the background of our efforts to make sense of the world— but it does not follow that any particular set of commonsensical presumptions is therefore justified or justifiable. Common sense is by no means conceptually neutral; nor is the content of common sense constant over time. What we, both as a scholarly field and as inhabitants of the planet at the present time, take for granted in conducting our knowledge-producing activities has both a history and a future, and the fact that our history has brought us here does not necessitate, or even prescriptively mandate, that our future look the same way.

#### Only self-transformation matters

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 34) Henge

What is perhaps most remarkable about this process of letting go of illusions, including the illusion of selfhood, is that when we do it, or rather when we practice in such a way that it happens to us, then extraordinary changes occur in our lives without our trying to ﬁt into some idealized model of what we think we should be. Would the same be true collectively? Perhaps this attitude is consistent with certain anarchist and Green approaches that would remove external authority over local communities and empower them to restructure themselves more spontaneously. In other words, Buddhist teachings do not imply any particular or detailed vision of the new political and economic relationships that will remedy our institutionalized dukkha. Certain principles are more or less obvious—for example, nonviolence, a basic level of social welfare, emphasis on education— yet these allow for many possible social structures. Even as there is little reason to think that one form of Buddhism will supplant all others in the West, so there is little reason to expect all the world’s cultures to follow one model of human development—unless it is forced upon them. Awakened people, and people who value awakening, are free to accept or reconstruct a variety of political and economic arrangements that are consistent with a personal and social emphasis on spiritual awakening.

### 1NC—Drone Wars

#### Afghanistan drawdown shifts the USAF away from drone use

Reed 9/19/2013 (John Reed, degree in international affairs and history., National security reporter for Foreign Policy, citing the Chief of the USAF ACC, Thursday, September 19, 2013, Predator Drones 'Useless' in Most Wars, Top Air Force General Says <http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/19/predator_drones_useless_in_most_wars_top_air_force_general_says>, bs)

The Air Force's top spy, Lt. Gen. Bob Otto, echoed Hostage's comments, saying that after the war in Afghanistan ends, he wants the Air Force to get rid of a number of Predators and Reapers and replace them with stealthier spy planes.¶ "My argument would be, we can't afford to keep all of this capability, so we're going to have to bring some of it down," said Otto while discussing the 65 Predator and Reaper CAPs after a speech at the same conference.¶ This will free cash to invest in high-end drones and other spy gear that can be used against heavily defended targets, according to Otto.¶ "I think the place to take risk is in the permissive environment," said Otto of where he wants the service to spend its limited cash for buying new intelligence-gathering tools such as drones.¶ Once major U.S. involvement in Afghanistan ends in 2014, Otto may scale back the service's intelligence-gathering efforts -- including its drones -- from the fight against terrorism and refocus much of it on high-end threats posed by other nations. This will leave much of the service's anti-terrorism intelligence work to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its fleet of Predators and Reapers, according to the three-star general.¶ This shift in intelligence resources may allow Hostage, who is in charge of the forces that fly the majority of the Air Force's drones, to be free to focus on replacing the Predators and Reapers.¶ "I need to shift the demographics of the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet," said Hostage.¶ "We have ways" of doing that, added Hostage, of his plans to modernize the unmanned spy-plane fleet.

#### US action won’t change anything—other countries find drone use logical

Wittes & Singh 2013 (Benjamin Wittes and Ritika Singh, Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,

How Drones Are Changing Warfare, January 11, 2013, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>, bs)

The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.¶ Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### Empirics prove no modeling

Wright 2012 ROBERT WRIGHT NOV 14 2012, The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate Robert Wright is the author of, most recently, the New York Times bestseller The Evolution of God and a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. He is a former writer and editor at The Atlantic. MORE http://www.theatlantic.com/robert-wright/MT

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond. Boot started out with this observation: I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.

#### Their China discourse is rooted in securitization that makes violence inevitable

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in inter- national relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

#### Russian threat construction is the root cause of their impacts

Sakwa in 2008

(Richard, Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, “‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics”, International Affairs, 82:2, 241-267)

The list of problematic issues could be continued indefinitely. On question after question, the absence of trust and constant struggle for geopolitical and geo-economic advantage between Russia and western states has led to a steady deterioration in relations. This was reflected in Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on 10 February 2007, which revealed deep disap- pointment that his new realist policy was disintegrating. He stressed the ‘universal, indivisible character of security’, and noted that ‘the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking … ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War thinking’. He also warned against the dangers of establishing a ‘unipolar world’, ‘a world in which there is one master, one sovereign’, and warned: ‘At the end of the day this is pernicious not only for those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within’, while noting that ‘those who teach us [about democracy] do not want to learn themselves’. ‘Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems’, Putin argued, and he went on to list a range of strategic problems, including the marginalization of the UN, failure to ratify the CFE Treaty, the remilitarization of Europe through missile defence development, NATO enlargement (which represented ‘a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’), the weakening of the non-proliferation regime and the attempt ‘to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries’.71 The tone of the speech was as important as its content. Many of the issues had been raised earlier: in particular, in his address to the German Bundestag on 25 September 2001 Putin had noted that ‘Not long ago it appeared that a real common home would appear on the conti- nent, where Europeans would not be divided into Eastern or Western, Northern or Southern. However, these “lines of division” will continue, primarily because we were unable completely to free ourselves from many of the stereotypes and clichés of the “Cold War”.’72 The harsh tone of 2007 reflected the Russian leader’s accumulating frustration that such issues had not been resolved, and his disillusionment with a West that he had hoped would act in good faith. Russian concerns had too often been discounted as illegitimate, and the West appeared to act with a reckless impunity that now provoked a Russian backlash. For Lavrov, ‘The primary importance of Putin’s Munich speech is that it helped foil a conspiracy of silence on fundamental issues concerning the global security architecture.’ The western response on the whole failed to engage with the substantive issues, simply intensifying criticism of Putin’s regime and dismissing its concerns.74

### 1NC—Reconstruction

#### Their discourse of nuclear proliferation is Orientalist and racist.

Gusterson in 1999

(Hugh, Professor of Anthropology, George Mason University , “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology, pg. 114)

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to severthe two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split offthe "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals **(**the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem."Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideologyisa specialized variant within a broader system of colonial andpostcolonial discourse that takesas its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our ownhas**,** in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism"by Edward Said (1978). Said argues thatorientalist discourse constructs the world interms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West:where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where"we" are modern and flexible**, "**they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. Whilethe blatantly racist orientalismof the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologiesendurein contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be foundin U.S. national security discourse.

#### Use of proliferation rhetoric makes the spread and use of nuclear weapons more likely

Mutimer in 1994

(David, Associate Professor, Political Science, Arts, Deputy Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, “Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation”, YCISS Occasional Paper Number 25, August 1994)

There is a third, and rather ironic, entailment to the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they can lead to the promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of states. The logic of the 'balance' between the superpowers, it has been argued, is that mutual assured destruction with nuclear weapons introduces a caution conducive to 'stability'. If the metaphors of the Cold War are adopted to imagine the new international security environment, there seems little way to escape the conclusions of this argument, that nuclear weapons can be stabilisers. Indeed, it has led John Mearsheimer to argue: If complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe proves unavoidable, the West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolar Europe. Three policy prescriptions are in order. First, the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope for avoiding war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. [Emphasis added.]62 As part of the 'managed proliferation' of nuclear weapons in Europe, Mearsheimer suggests provision of nuclear arms to Germany. On this and on other points Mearsheimer's argument has been widely, and justifiably, attacked. But what is interesting about it is the way in which it makes the entailments of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors so clear. What is important is to assure that the numbers of weapons are distributed so that the balance among them is stable — regardless of who holds the weapons. The problems of history and politics which would be raised by German nuclear weapons are blithely ignored, because the metaphors informing Mearsheimer's conceptualisation hide them entirely. Most of us are sufficiently sensitive to these problems that Mearsheimer's argument is jarringly uncomfortable. However, the problem persists in all uses of the PROLIFERATION image, and yet it is only when the problems are as dramatic as in this case that the implications of the image are widely rejected.

#### The explanation for the motivation of terrorists taints their scholarship and means their aff must be rejected. This model makes the Other radically monstrous, and justifies imperialism as we attempt to master our anxiety in the face of the monster terrorist fag

Puar and Rai 02

Jasbir and Amit "Monster terrorist fag"

To begin, !ci us consider the monster. Why, in what way, has monstrosity¶ come to organize the discourse on terrorism? First, we could merely¶ glance at the language used by the dominant media in its interested depic-¶ tions of Islamic militancy. So, as an article in the Nttv York Times points¶ out, "Osama bin Laden, according to Fox News Channel anchors, ana-¶ lysts and correspondents, is 'a dirtbag,' 'a monster' overseeing a 'web of¶ hate.' His followers in Al Qacda arc 'terror goons.' Taliban fighters arc¶ 'diabolical' and 'henchmen.'"3 Or, in another Web article, we read: "It is¶ important to realize that the Taliban docs not simply tolerate the presence¶ of bin Laden and his terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. It is part and¶ parcel of the same evil alliance. Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban arc two differ-¶ ent heads of the same monster, and they share the same fanatical obses-¶ sion: imposing a strict and distorted brand of Islam on all Muslims and¶ bringing death to all who oppose him."5¶ In these invocations of terrorist-monsters an absolute morality sepa-¶ rates good from a "shadowy evil."4 As if caught up in its own shadow¶ dance with the anti-Western rhetoric of radical Islam,5 this discourse¶ marks off a figure, Osama bin 1 a den, or a government, the Taliban, as the¶ opposite of all that is just, human, and good. The terrorist-monster is¶ pure evil and must be destroyed, according to this view.6 But docs the¶ monster have a mind? This begs another question: Do such figures and¶ such representational strategics have a history? We suggest this language¶ of terrorist-monsters should be read by considering how the monster has¶ been used throughout history in Western discourses of normality. We¶ could begin by remembering, for instance, that the monster was one of¶ three elements that Foucault linked to the formation of the "abnormals."¶ The group of abnormals was formed out of three elements whose own for-¶ mation was not exactly synchronic. I. The human monster. An Ancient¶ notion whose frame of reference is law. A juridical notion, then, but in the¶ broad sense, as it referred not only to social laws but to natural laws as well;¶ the monster's field of appearance is a juridico-biological domain. "ITie figures¶ of the half-human, half-animal being .... of double individualities . ... of¶ herniaphrodites ... in turn represented that double violation; what makes a¶ human monster a monster is not just its exceptionality relative to the speciesform; ii is ihc disturbance it brings to juridical regularities (whether it is a¶ question of marriage laws, canons of baptism, or rules of inheritance). The¶ human monster combines the impossible and the forbidden. ... 2. The¶ individual to be corrected. This is a more recent figure than the monster. It¶ is the correlative not so much of the imperatives of the law as of training¶ techniques with their own requirements. The emergence of the "incorrigi-¶ btcs" is contemporaneous with the putting into place of disciplinary tech-¶ niques during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the army, the¶ schools, the workshops, then, a little later, in families themselves- The new¶ procedures for training the body, behavior, and aptitudes open up the prob-¶ lem of those who escape that normativity which is no longer the sovereignty¶ of the law.'¶ According to Foucault. the monster can be both half an animal and a¶ hybrid gender (later in this text Foucault will go on to position the onanist¶ as the third of the abnormals). But crucially the monster is also to be dif-¶ ferentiated from the individual to be corrected on the basis of whether¶ power operates on it or through it. In other words, the absolute power that¶ produces and quarantines the monster finds Its dispersal in techniques of¶ normalization and discipline. What Foucault docs, we believe, is enable an¶ analysis of monstrosity within a broader history of sexuality. This geneal-¶ ogy is crucial to understanding the historical and political relays, reinvest-¶ ments, and resistances between the monstrous terrorist and the discourse¶ of hctcronormalivity And that is because monsters and abnormals have¶ always also been sexual deviants. Foucault tied monstrosity to sexuality¶ through specific analyses of the deployment of gendered bodies, the reg-¶ ulation of proper desires, the manipulation of domestic spaces, and the¶ taxonomy of sexual acts such as sodomy. As such, the scxualizcd monster¶ was that figure that called forth a form of juridical power but one that was¶ tied to multiform apparatuses of discipline as well.8¶ \*wc use Foucault's concept of monstrosity to elaborate what we con-¶ sider to be central to the present war on terrorism: monstrosity as a regu-¶ latory construct of modernity that imbricates not only sexuality, but also¶ questions of culture and race. Before we tic these practices to contempo-¶ rary politics, let us note two things: First, the monster is not merely an¶ other; it is one category through which a multiform power operates. As¶ such, discourses that would mobilize monstrosity as a screen for otherness¶ arc always also involved in circuits of normalizing power as wcD: the mon-¶ ster and the person to be corrected arc close cousins. Second, if the mon-¶ ster is part of the West\*s family of abnormals, questions of race and sexu-¶ ality will have always haunted its figuration. The category of monstrosity¶ is also an implicit index of civilizational development and cultural adapt-¶ ability. As the machines of war begin to narrow the chokes and lifechances people have here in America and In decidedly more bloody ways¶ abroad, H seems a certain grid of civilizational progress organized by such¶ keywords as "democracy," "freedom," and "humanity" have come to¶ superintend the figure of the monster. We turn now to this double deploy-¶ ment of the discourse of monstrosity in "terrorism studies ""Monster terrorist fag"¶ Today, we find the two figures of the monster and the person to be cor-¶ rected in some ways converging in the discourse of the terrorist-monster.¶ Which is to say that the terrorist has become both a monster to be quar-¶ antined and an individual to be corrected. It is in the strategic analyses of¶ terrorism that these two figures come together. For the past thirty years,¶ since 1968, the "western academy has been involved in the production and¶ implementation of a body of knowledge that took the psyche of the terror-¶ ist as its object and target: "terrorism studies." The strategic analysis of¶ what in the intelligence community is known as "violent substatc activism"¶ is at the moment a highly sought-after form of knowledge production.¶ And it has direct policy rclcvarKci hence its uneven integration into the¶ broader field of what Edward Said once named as the disciplinary home¶ of Orientalism: "policy studies.""" Our own analysis has been usefully¶ informed by the pioneering wo it of scholars and activists such as Said,¶ Cynthia Knloc. Ann Tickncr, Noam Chomsky, Shirin M. Rai, Edward¶ Herman. Helen Caldicott, Philip Agcc. 'falal Asad. and others.10 These¶ writers have opened a space of critique that brings the cpistemological¶ and ethical claims of terrorism studies to crisis; their rigorous and impas-¶ sioned interrogation of U.S. foreign policy has not only enabled subse-¶ quent writers to make connections to ongoing domestic wars against peo-¶ ple of color and the working poor but crucially, their critiques have enabled¶ the countcrmcmory of other genealogies, histories, and modes of power:¶ for example, sexuality, colonialism, and normalization. So, for instance, in¶ the discourse of countcrtcrrorism the shared modernity of the monster¶ and the delinquent comes together in the knowledge of cultures, nations,¶ and races. As one editorial in the magazine Ivreign Policy put it. "The¶ Global Positioning System, unmanned drones, unrivaled databases, and¶ handheld computers—much has been made of the technological resources¶ available to the U.S. military and diplomatic establishments. But what do¶ you do if you're trying to wage war in or against a country where you don't¶ know the locals, can't speak the language, and can't find any reliable maps?¶ "welcome to the front lines of the war against terrorism, likely to be waged¶ primarily in 'swamp states\* about which the United States knows little."'11¶ The writer ends the piece by drawing a particular lesson from Sun Tzu's¶ The An ofttbr. "Tf you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory¶ gained you will also suffer a defeat." If any war on terrorism is to succeed,¶ the United States has some serious learning to do.'"¶ Terrorism studies is at the forefront of this knowledge production. In¶ an article in the Rand Corporation-funded journal. Studies In Conflict and¶ Terrorism. Richard Falkcnrath notes:¶ The literature on terrorism is vast. Most of this work focuses on the practi-¶ tioners of terrorism, that is. on the terrorists themselves. Different strands¶ within terrorism studies consider, for example, the motivations or belief sys-¶ tems of individual terrorists: the external strategies or... internal dynamics¶ of particular terrorist organizations: or the interaction of terrorist move-¶ ments with other entities, such as governments, the media, or social sub-¶ groups. ... Terrorism studies aspires not just to scholastic respectability but¶ to policy relevance. ... It has helped organize and inform governmental¶ counter-terrorism practices."¶ Countcrtcrrorlsm is a form of racial, civilizational knowledge- but¶ now also an academic discipline that is quite explicitly tied to the exercise¶ of state power. This knowledge, moreover- takes the psyche as its privi-¶ leged site of investigation. As another article in Studies In Conflict and¶ Terrorism put it.¶ Models based on psychological concerns typically hold that 'terrorist\* vio-¶ lence is not so much a political instrument as an end in itself: it is not con-¶ tingent on rational agency but is the result of compulsion or psychopath-¶ ology. Over the years scholars of this persuasion have suggested that¶ 'terrorists\* do what they do because of (variously and among other things)¶ self-destructive urges, fantasies of cleanliness, disturbed emotions combined¶ with problems with authority and the Self, and inconsistent mothering.¶ Articulate attempts at presenting wider, vaguer, and (purportedly) general-¶ izabie psychological interpretations of terrorism have been made by, among¶ others. Jerrold M. Post, who has proposed that"... political terrorists are¶ driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces,¶ and .. . their special psychologic is constructed to rationalize acts they are¶ psychologically compelled to commit.""¶ We should note how white mythologies such as "inconsistent mothering"¶ (and hence the bad family structure apparently common in the West) arc¶ presented as psychological compulsions that effectively determine and fix¶ the mind of the terrorist.¶ In this way, psychologists working within terrorism studies have been¶ able to determine and taxonomizc the terrorist mind. In a recent article in¶ the journal Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy\* Charles L. Ruby has¶ noted that there arc two dominant frameworks in the interpretation of¶ the terrorist "mindset": "The first camp includes theories that portray ter-¶ rorism as the result of defects or disorders in one's personality structure.¶ This first group of theories uses a broadly psychodynamK model. The¶ second camp consists of theories that approach the phenomenon of ter-¶ rorist behavior as a form of political violence perpetrated by people who¶ do not have sufficient military resources to carry out conventional forms¶ of political violence."14 The personality defect model of terrorism holds¶ that terrorists have fundamental and pathological defects in "their per-¶ sonality structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self." Moreover,¶ these defects result from "unconscious forces in the terrorist's psyche."¶ And, of course, the psyche is the site of a familiar family romance: "Ter-¶ rorism is a reflection of unconscious feelings of hostility toward parents¶ and . . . this feeling is an outgrowth of childhood abuse or adolescent¶ rebellion. The terrorist's hostile focus is so great during childhood and¶ adolescence that it continues into adulthood and becomes very narrow¶ and extreme, ostensibly explaining the terrorist's absolutist mindset and¶ dedication."¶ As a leading light in the constellation of "terrorism experts," Jcrrold¶ Post has proposed that terrorists suffer from pathological personalities¶ that emerge from negative childhood experiences and a damaged sense of¶ self." Post argues for two terrorist personality types, depending on the¶ specific quality of those childhood experiences. First, Post suggests, there¶ is the "anarchic-ideologue." This is the terrorist who has experienced¶ serious family dysfunction and maladjustment, which lead to rebellion¶ against parents, especially against the father. Anarchic-ideologues fight¶ "against the society of their parents ... an act of dissent against parents¶ loyal to the regime." Second, there is the terrorist personality type known¶ as the "nationalist-secessionist"—apparendy the name indicates "a sense¶ of loyalty to authority and rebellion against external enemies." During¶ childhood, a terrorist of this personality type experienced a sense of com-¶ passion or loyalty toward his or her parents. According to Post, nationalist-¶ secessionists have pathologically failed to differentiate between themselves¶ and the other (parental object). ConscqucnUy, they rebel "against society¶ for the hurt done to their parents ... an act of loyalty to parents damaged¶ by the regime." Both the anarchic-ideologue and nationalist-secessionist¶ find "comfort in joining a terrorist group of rebels with similar experi-¶ ences."16 The personality defect model views terrorists as suffering from¶ personality defects that result from excessively negative childhood experi-¶ ences, giving the individual a poor sense of self and a resentment of¶ authority. As Ruby notes, "Its supporters differ in whether they propose¶ one (Kaplan), two (Post and Jones & Fong), or three (Strentz) personal-¶ ity types.""¶ What all these models and theories aim to show is how an otherwise¶ normal individual becomes a murderous terrorist, and that process time¶ and again is tied to the failure of the normal(izcd) psyche. Indeed, an¶ implicit but foundational supposition structures this entire discourse: the¶ very notion of the normal psyche, which is in fact part of the West's own¶ heterosexual family romance—a narrative space that relics on the nor-¶ malized, even if perverse, domestic space of desire supposedly common in¶ the West. Icrrorism, in this discourse, is a symptom of the deviant psyche,¶ the psyche gone awry, or the failed psyche; the terrorist enters this dis-¶ course as an absolute violation. So when Billy Collins (the 2001 poet lau-¶ reate) asserted on National Public Radio immediately after September¶ 11: "Now the U.S. has lost its virginity," he was underscoring this fraught¶ relationship between (hctcro)scxuality, normality, the nation, and the vio-¶ lations of terrorism.¶ Not surprisingly, then, coming out of this discourse, we find that¶ another very common way of trying to psychologize the monster-terrorist¶ is by positing a kind of failed hctcroscxuality. So we hear often the idea¶ that sexually frustrated Muslim men arc promised the heavenly reward of¶ sixty, sixty-seven, or sometimes even seventy virgins if they arc martyred¶ in jihad. But As'ad Abu Khalil has argued, "In reality, political—not sex-¶ ual—frustration constitutes the most important factor in motivating¶ young men, or women, to engage in suicidal violence. The tendency to¶ dwell on the sexual motives of the suicide bombers belittles these socio-¶ political causes."'8 Now of course, that is precisely what terrorism studies¶ intends to do: to reduce complex social, historical, and political dynamics¶ to various psychic causes rooted in childhood family dynamics. As if the¶ Palestinian Intifada or the long, brutal war in Afghanistan can be simply¶ boiled down to bad mothering or sexual frustration! In short, these¶ explanatory models and frameworks function to (1) reduce complex his-¶ tories of struggle, intervention, and (non)dcvclopmcnt to Western psychic¶ models rooted in the bourgeois heterosexual family and its dynamics; (2)¶ systematically exclude questions of political economy and the problems of¶ cultural translation; and (3) attempt to master the fear, anxiety, and¶ uncertainty of a form of political dissent by resorting to the banality of a¶ taxonomy."¶ Our contention is that today the knowledge and form of power that is¶ mobilized to analyze, taxonomizc, psychologize, and defeat terrorism has¶ a genealogical connection to the Wests abnormals, and specifically those¶ prcmodcrn monsters that Western civilization had seemed to bury and lay¶ to rest long ago. The monsters that haunt the prose of contemporary¶ counter terror ism emerge out of figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth¶ centuries that have always been racializcd, classed, and scxualizcd. The¶ undesirable, the vagrant, the Gypsy, the savage, the Hottentot Venus, or¶ the sexual depravity of the Oriental torrid zone shares a basic kinship¶ with the terrorist-monster. As we know, in the twentieth century these¶ disparate monsters became case studies, objects of ethnographies, and¶ interesting psychological cases of degeneracy. The same Western, colonial¶ modernity that created the psyche created the racial and sexual monster.¶ In other words, what links the monster-terrorist to the figure of the indi-¶ vidual to be corrected is first and foremost the racialized and deviant¶ psyche. Isn't that why there is something terrifyingly uncanny in the¶ terrorist-monster? As one specifically liberal article in the Rand journal¶ put it, "Members of such groups are not infrequently prepared to kill and¶ die for their struggles and, as sociologists would attest, that presupposes¶ a sort of conviction and mindset that has become uncommon in the mod-¶ ern age. Thus, not only the acts of 'terrorism' but also the driving forces¶ behind them often appear incomprehensible and frightening to outsiders.¶ Terrorism studies emerged as a subcategory within the social sciences in¶ the early 1970s seeking to explain the resurgence of the seemingly inex-¶ plicable.'™¶ It is the figure of the inexplicable that continues to haunt all the civi-¶ lizational grids that the Western war machine would deploy in its attempt¶ to "understand the terrorist psyche." We now turn to consider more¶ explicitly the relationship between this will to knowledge and the practices¶ and rituals of heteronormativity.

**The fight against terrorism is a fight against the uncivilized, irrational danger—this justifies endless war and intervention to protect the masculine order**

**Wilcox** 3 (Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”)

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them.In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles.The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.

### 1NC—Solvency

#### Congress doesn’t enforce the aff

Druck 2012 (Judah A., DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION¶ AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF¶ TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE,, Dec 6, 2012 <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf0> bs)

Of course, despite these various suits, Congress has received¶ much of the blame for the WPR’s treatment and failures. For example, Congress has been criticized for doing little to enforce the WPR in using other Article I tools, such as the “power of the purse,”76 or byclosing the loopholes frequently used by presidents to avoid the WPR in the first place.77 Furthermore, in those situations where Congress¶ has decided to act, it has done so in such a disjointed manner as to¶ render any possible check on the President useless. For example, during President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada, Congress failed to reach¶ an agreement to declare the WPR’s sixty-day clock operative,78 and¶ later faced similar “deadlock” in deciding how best to respond to President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf, eventually settling for a bill¶ that reflected congressional “ambivalence.”79 Thus, between the lack¶ of a “backbone” to check rogue presidential action and general ineptitude when it actually decides to act,80 Congress has demonstrated its¶ inability to remedy WPR violations.¶ Worse yet, much of Congress’s interest in the WPR is politically¶ motivated, leading to inconsistent review of presidential military decisions filled with post-hoc rationalizations. Given the political risk associated with wartime decisions,81 Congress lacks any incentive to act¶ unless and until it can gauge public reaction—a process that often¶ occurs after the fact.82 As a result, missions deemed successful by the¶ public will rarely provoke “serious congressional concern” about presidential compliance with the WPR, while failures will draw scrutiny.83¶ For example, in the case of the Mayaguez, “liberals in the Congress¶ generally praised [President Gerald Ford’s] performance” despite the¶ constitutional questions surrounding the conflict, simply because thpublic deemed it a success.84 Thus, even if Congress was effective at¶ checking potentially unconstitutional presidential action, it would¶ only act when politically safe to do so. This result should be unsurprising: making a wartime decision provides little advantage for politicians, especially if the resulting action succeeds.85 Consequently,¶ Congress itself has taken a role in the continued disregard for WPR¶ enforcement.

#### Neither do the courts

Druck 2012 (Judah A., DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE, Dec 6, 2012 <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf0> bs)

To be sure, the judiciary’s unwillingness to review cases arising from WPR disputes arguably carries some merit. Two examples illustrate this point. First, although a serviceperson ordered into combat might have standing to sue, congressional standing is less clear.59 Indeed, debates rage throughout war powers literature concerning whether congressional suits should even be heard on their merits.60 And though some courts have held that a member of Congress can have standing when a President acts unilaterally, holding that such unauthorized actions amount to “disenfranchisement,”61 subsequent decisions and commentators have thrown the entire realm of legislative standing into doubt.62 Though the merits of this debate are beyond the scope of this Note, it is sufficient to emphasize that a member of Congress arguably suffers an injury when a President violates the WPR because the presidential action prevents the congressperson from being able to vote (namely, on whether to authorize hostilities),63 thereby amounting to disenfranchisement by “preclu[ding] . . . a specific vote . . . by a presidential violation of law . . . .”64 As such, under the right circumstances, perhaps the standing doctrine should not be as problematic as history seems to indicate when a congressperson attempting to have a say on military action brings a WPR suit. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is arguably unclear what, if any, remedy is available to potential litigants. Unlike a private lawsuit, where a court can impose a simple fine or jail sentence, suits against the executive branch carry a myriad of practical issues. For example, if the remedy is an injunction, issues concerning enforcement arise: Who enforces it and how? 65 Or, if a court makes a declaratory judgment stating that the President has acted illegally, it might invite open defiance, thereby creating unprecedented strife among branches.

## 2NC—Buddhism

### 2NC—Assorted DAs [FW]

#### Chaos DA—policymakers’ attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

### Self-Change

#### The true battle is inside the self—the aff mishandles where we ought to focus

Khema 94(Sister Ayya, a [Buddhist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism) [teacher](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teacher), was born as Ilse Kussel in [Berlin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin), [Germany](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany), to [Jewish](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jew) parents. All of Us Beset by birth, decay, and death by Sister Ayya Khema)

If you have ever read Don Quixote, you'll remember that he was fighting windmills. Everybody is doing just that, fighting windmills. Don Quixote was the figment of a writer's imagination, a man who believed himself to be a great warrior. He thought that every windmill he met was an enemy and started battling with it. That's exactly what we are doing within our own hearts and that's why this story has such an everlasting appeal. It tells us about ourselves. Writers and poets who have survived their own lifetimes have always told human beings about themselves. Mostly people don't listen, because it doesn't help when somebody else tells us what's wrong with us and few care to hear it. One has to find out for oneself and most people don't want to do that either. What does it really mean to fight windmills? It means fighting nothing important or real, just imaginary enemies and battles. All quite trifling matters, which we build into something solid and formidable in our minds. We say: "I can't stand that," so we start fighting, and "I don't like him," and a battle ensues, and "I feel so unhappy," and the inner war is raging. We hardly ever know what we're so unhappy about. The weather, the food, the people, the work, the leisure, the country, anything at all will usually do. Why does this happen to us? Because of the resistance to actually letting go and becoming what we really are, namely nothing. Nobody cares to be that. Everybody wants to be something or somebody even if it's only Don Quixote fighting windmills. Somebody who knows and acts and will become something else, someone who has certain attributes, views, opinions and ideas. Even patently wrong views are held onto tightly, because it makes the "me" more solid. It seems negative and depressing to be nobody and have nothing. We have to find out for ourselves that it is the most exhilarating and liberating feeling we can ever have. But because we fear that windmills might attach, we don't want to let go. Why can't we have peace in the world? Because nobody wants to disarm. Not a single country is ready to sign a disarmament pact, which all of us bemoan. But have we ever looked to see whether we, ourselves, have actually disarmed? When we haven't done so, why wonder that nobody else is ready for it either? Nobody wants to be the first one without weapons; others might win. Does it really matter? If there is nobody there, who can be conquered? How can there be a victory over nobody? Let those who fight win every war, all that matters is to have peace in one's own heart. As long as we are resisting and rejecting and continue to find all sorts of rational excuses to keep on doing that there has to be warfare. War manifests externally in violence, aggression and killing. But how does it reveal itself internally? We have an arsenal within us, not of guns and atomic bombs, but having the same effect. And the one who gets hurt is always the one who is shooting, namely oneself. Sometimes another person comes within firing range and if he or she isn't careful enough, he or she is wounded. That's a regrettable accident. The main blasts are the bombs which go off in one's own heart. Where they are detonated, that's the disaster area. The arsenal which we carry around within ourselves consists of our ill will and anger, our desires and cravings. The only criterion is that we don't feel peaceful inside. We need not believe in anything, we can just find out whether there is peace and joy in our heart. If they are lacking, most people try to find them outside of themselves. That's how all wars start. It is always the other country's fault and if one can't find anyone to blame then one needs more "Lebensraum," more room for expansion, more territorial sovereignty. In personal terms, one needs more entertainment, more pleasure, more comfort, more distractions for the mind. If one can't find anyone else to blame for one's lack of peace, then one believes it to be an unfulfilled need. Who is that person, who needs more? A figment of our own imagination, fighting windmills. That "more" is never ending. One can go from country to country, from person to person. There are billions of people on this globe; it's hardly likely that we will want to see every one of them, or even one-hundredth, a lifetime wouldn't be enough to do so. We may choose twenty or thirty people and then go from one to the next and back again, moving from one activity to another, from one idea to another. We are fighting against our own dukkha and don't want to admit that the windmills in our heart are self-generated. We believe somebody put them up against us, and by moving we can escape from them. Few people come to the final conclusion that these windmills are imaginary, that one can remove them by not endowing them with strength and importance. That we can open our hearts without fear and gently, gradually let go of our preconceived notions and opinions, views and ideas, suppressions and conditioned responses. When all that is removed, what does one have left? A large, open space, which one can fill with whatever one likes. If one has good sense, one will fill it with love, compassion and equanimity. Then there is nothing left to fight. Only joy and peacefulness remain, which cannot be found outside of oneself. It is quite impossible to take anything from outside and put it into oneself. There is no opening in us through which peace can enter. We have to start within and work outward. Unless that becomes clear to us, we will always find another crusade.

### 2NC—Link

#### The self cannot grasp itself, thus we attach our anxiety to things to ground ourselves in the world

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 21-23) Henge

That third type is sankhara-dukkhata, dukkha “from conditioned states,” although in this case the meaning is not as clear in the early Buddhist texts. “Conditioned states” apparently refers to the skandhas, the ﬁve components of the self—or, more precisely, those physical and mental processes whose interaction creates our sense of self. So this dukkha has something to do with the doctrine of anatta, the strange but essential Buddhist claim that our sense of subjectivity does not correspond to any real ontological self—or in the (post)modern terms I have been using, the claim that the sense of self is a construct. Contemporary psychology makes such a doctrine seem somewhat less perverse by providing some homegrown handles on what remains a very counterintuitive claim. In this regard Buddhism seems to have anticipated the more recent and reluctant conclusions of psychoanalysis: guilt and anxiety are not adventitious but intrinsic to the ego. Anatta suggests that our dukkha ultimately derives from a repression even more immediate than death-fear: the suspicion that I am not real. For Buddhism, the ego is not a self-existing consciousness but a fragile sense of self that suspects and dreads its own no-thing-ness. This third type of dukkha motivates our conditioned consciousness to try to ground itself—that is, I want to make myself real. Since the sense of self is a construct, however, it can real-ize itself (or rather, try to realize itself) only by objectifying itself (securing itself as an object) in the world. That makes the ego-self, in effect, a never ending project to objectify itself in some way—something that, unfortunately, our conditioned, ever changing consciousness cannot do, anymore than a hand can grasp itself or an eye see itself. The consequence of this perpetual failure is that the sense of self is shadowed by a sense of lack. What Freud called “the return of the repressed” in the distorted form of a symptom links this basic yet hopeless project with the symbolic ways we try to make ourselves feel real in the world. We experience this deep sense of lack as the feeling that “there is something wrong with me,” yet that feeling manifests, and we respond to it, in many different ways: I’m not rich enough, not loved enough, not powerful enough, not published enough (for academics!), and so forth. Our root anxiety is eager to objectify into fear of something, because then we have particular ways to cope with particular feared things. The difficulty, however, is that no objectiﬁcation can ever satisfy us if it is not really an object we want. In this way Buddhism shifts our focus from the terror of death (our primal repression, according to Becker) to the anguish of a groundlessness experienced here and now. The problem is not so much that we will die, but that we do not feel real now. If so, what does this third type of dukkha imply socially? Is there a communal version of sankhara-dukkhata? In Escape from Evil Becker argues that society is a collective immortality project. Can it also be understood as a collective reality project, a group effort to ground ourselves? That issue, among others, is addressed in chapter 8. An affirmative answer casts a somewhat different light on the loss of our sacred canopies. If religious worldviews provide us with transcendentally validated projects that promise to make us real (i.e., various types of supernatural salvation), the decline of faith in such collective canopies can only lead to more frantic and desperate attempts to real-ize ourselves.

#### The goal of spreading American ideals is an egoistic drive to pursue US interests in the name of values

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 151-152) Henge

We have supported constitutionalism, human rights, liberty, the rule of law, and democracy in other countries when those values have produced leaders amenable to our own national interests. Those same values evidently resonate less loudly for us when they produce leaders who have different ideas, such as Chávez in Venezuela. In 1954, for example, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Guatemala, which over the following years led to the deaths of over one hundred thousand peasants. In 1965 the United States overthrew the government of the Dominican Republic and helped to kill some three thousand people in the process. In 1973, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Chile that murdered or “disappeared” several thousand people. In the 1980s the United States sponsored a terrorist war by the contras against the government of Nicaragua, which led to the deaths of over thirty thousand innocent people and to a World Court declaration that the U.S. government was a war criminal for mining Nicaragua’s harbors. Another U.S.-supported war in the 1980s, against El Salvador, resulted in the deaths of eighty thousand more innocent people. Lots of “collateral damage.” All those recent examples are from Latin America alone. In 1965 the United States also sponsored or assisted a military coup in Indonesia that led to the deaths of over half a million people, and the military dictatorship of Suharto, who invited Western corporations back into the country. When President Bush declares that Iran is part of a new “axis of evil,” we should remember why many Iranians return the compliment, viewing the U.S. government as “the Great Satan.” When Western oil interests in that country were challenged by a democratically elected prime minister in the early 1950s, the CIA helped to sponsor a brutal coup that installed the widely detested shah of Iran, whose notorious Savak secret service then proceeded to torture and kill over seventy thousand Iranians between 1952 and 1979. There are many more examples, unfortunately, yet the point is made. Clearly the problem here is something more than not quite living up to our own ideals. It is not that we just keep making mistakes, such as innocently backing the wrong sort of people. Once can be a mistake, twice may be stupidity, but this pattern of repeated violations of our own self-declared values amounts to something more sinister. “By their fruits shall you know them,” as someone once put it. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our so-called values are not really our values, at least not when it comes to international relations. The basic problem is not a clash between our values and theirs, but between our (declared) values and our (short-term) interests.

#### All knowledge is constructed by our own views about the world—the circulation of the symbolic denies stable meaning

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 9-10) Henge

The last few centuries have been a steep downhill slide for human hubris. Copernicus discovered that our planet is not the center of the universe. Darwin realized that Homo sapiens can be understood as a result of the same evolutionary process that continues to produce other species, a natural selection that does not require any creator God. And, although Freud’s legacy is more controversial, his theory of repression implies that we are not even the masters of our own minds: our supposedly self-suﬃcient ego-consciousness is not autonomous but irremediably split, buffeted by psychic forces that it cannot control because our consciousness itself is a function of them. And that was only the beginning. More recently, poststructuralist critiques by Jacques Derrida and others have demonstrated the constructed nature of the subject by emphasizing the differences inherent in language. Our conciousness, like our texts, can never attain a stable self-presence because the continual circulation of signiﬁers denies meaning any ﬁxed foundation. Michel Foucault has argued quite convincingly that reason itself is mortal: each new epoch ﬁnds that the basic framework of its predecessor has become unintelligible; and, furthermore, what we have understood to be knowledge cannot be understood apart from its role in systems of human control. Some of the postmodern claims remain controversial, but many of them are consistent with developments in other disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion. The discovery that the world contains multiple worldviews, that each of those views has its own logic, and that there is no “master” worldview that subsumes all the others, has led to the realization that knowledge about the world—including our own knowledge about our own individual worlds—is not discovered but constructed. This shifts the focus to the truth about truth. Why do we construct the world in the ways that we do? As we become more aware of the factors that inﬂuence our constructions, what other constructs become possible?

### AT—Perm

#### The desire for attachment coopts the permutation—only the genuine awakening of the alternative can solve

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 22-23) Henge

Nevertheless, after awakening one’s mental predispositions (samskaras) do not necessarily or immediately lose their attraction. A liberated smoker will not automatically lose the physical desire for a cigarette. A genuine awakening should make it much easier, of course, to ignore that urge, but the desire will arise. This point reflects on long-standing debates about whether enlightenment is instantaneous or gradual, all-or-nothing or in stages. Realizing the unbounded nature of one’s attention may or may not be dramatic, but it happens suddenly. It is not something that I do, nor does it happen to me, for both of those ways of understanding are dualistic; rather, there is a letting go. Of what? Not simply of whatever I am grasping, but of grasping. Yet habitual tendencies do not simply evaporate. One’s attention still tends to assume familiar forms, and this highlights the importance of continued practice: the more gradual process of making intrinsically free awareness more effectively free. This also touches on the problem with comprehending Buddhism philosophically, or taking it as a philosophy. I can understand (and write about?) all of this conceptually, without it making much difference in my daily life, in how my attention actually functions. Grasping the implications of these concepts is very different from letting go of grasping. So far, I have made no reference to any “object of consciousness,” preferring the notion of “attention or awareness taking form.” Especially in a Mahayana context, any mention of form evokes the central claim of the Heart Sutra that “form (rupa) is no other than emptiness (shunyata), emptiness no other than form.” So far, too, this chapter has not mentioned shunyata, largely because of the baggage that accompanies that overused term. For Madhyamaka shunyata, “the absence of self-existence,” is a shorthand way of referring to the interconditionality of all phenomena, the fact that every phenomenon arises in dependence on others. In terms of my basic claim— delusion as attention bound, awakening as attention unbound—the Heart Sutra’s famous equation gains a somewhat different significance. Awareness unbound is shunya, having no form or any other qualities of its own. More precisely, awareness whether bound or unbound is shunya, although bound awareness is unaware of its intrinsic nature because it is too busy grasping and too afraid to let go. Attention in itself can be characterized only by its characteristiclessness: being formless and colorless, “it” is nothing, which is why it can become any-thing, according to circumstances. Emptiness is not other than form, because nothing-in-itself attention is always assuming one or another form—not only visual and tactile ones, but sounds, tastes, smells, thoughts, and so on. Then perhaps the many statements in the Heart Sutra that “X (the five skandhas, the twelve nidanas, etc.) is shunya” are not making (or denying) an ontological claim about the nature of X-in-itself, but rather pointing out the nature of the relationship between empty-in-itself awareness and the various forms it assumes.10

#### The permutation traps us by attaching us to the affirmative—only the alternative can create a formless mind

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 13-15) Henge

Do we miss the nature of liberated mind, not because it is too obscure or profound to understand, but because it is too obvious? Perhaps, like Edgar Allen Poe’s purloined letter, we keep overlooking it: rummaging around hither and thither, we cannot find what we are searching for because it is in plain sight. Or, to employ a better metaphor, we look for the spectacles that rest unnoticed on our nose. Unable to see her reflection in the well, Enyadatta wanders about looking for her head. Mind seeks for mind. Such, at least, has been a central claim of the Mahayana tradition. How central? How much insight might be gained by taking seriously and literally the many Buddhist admonitions about “not settling down in things” and the importance of wandering freely “without a place to rest.” Although a few qualifications will need to be made later, my basic thesis is simple: Delusion (ignorance, samsara): attention/awareness is fixated (attached to forms) Liberation (enlightenment, nirvana): attention/awareness is liberated from grasping Although the true nature of awareness is formless, it becomes “trapped” when we identify with particular things, which include mental objects (e.g., ideologies, one’s self-image) as well as physical ones. Such identifications happen due to ignorance of the basic “nondwelling” nature of our awareness. The familiar words “attention” and “awareness” are used to emphasize that the distinction being drawn refers not to some abstract metaphysical entity (“Mind” or “Consciousness”) but simply to how our everyday awareness functions.1 To appropriate Hakuin’s metaphor in Zazen Wasan, the difference between Buddhas and other beings is that between water and ice: without water there is no ice, without Buddha no sentient beings—which suggests that deluded beings might simply be “frozen” Buddhas. I hope to show that this straightforward distinction is not only consistent with basic Buddhist teachings but also gives us insight into some of the more difficult ones. Moreover, this perspective may illuminate some aspects of our contemporary life-world, especially the particular challenges of modern technology and economics. Before developing the above claim about awareness, bound and unbound, it is necessary to emphasize how widespread and important it is within the Mahayana tradition, for it is found in many other canonical and commentarial texts besides the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Thus, the most-quoted line from a better-known Prajnaparamita text, the Diamond Sutra, encapsulates the central doctrine of the Ashtasahasrika Sutra in one phrase: “Let your mind come forth without fixing it anywhere.” According to the Platform Sutra of the sixth Ch’an patriarch Hui-neng, this verse precipitated his great awakening, and certainly his teachings make and remake the same point: “When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to ‘come’ or to ‘go,’ we attain liberation.” Such a mind “is everywhere present, yet it ‘sticks’ nowhere.” Hui-neng emphasized that he had no system of Dharma to transmit: “What I do to my disciples is to liberate them from their own bondage with such devices as the case may need” (Yampolsky 133).2 Po-chang Hui-hai, another Chan master who lived about a century later, elaborated on the nature of liberated mind: Should your mind wander away, do not follow it, whereupon your wandering mind will stop wandering of its own accord. Should your mind desire to linger somewhere, do not follow it and do not dwell there, whereupon your mind’s questing for a dwelling place will cease of its own accord. Thereby, you will come to possess a non-dwelling mind—a mind that remains in the state of non-dwelling. If you are fully aware in yourself of a non-dwelling mind, you will discover that there is just the fact of dwelling, with nothing to dwell upon or not to dwell upon. This full awareness in yourself of a mind dwelling upon nothing is known as having a clear perception of your own mind, or, in other words, as having a clear perception of your own nature. A mind which dwells upon nothing is the Buddha-mind, the mind of one already delivered, Bodhi-Mind, Un-created Mind . . . (Huihai, in Blofeld 1969, 56)

#### The struggle demands individual peace as the process of change—no violent revolution is possible, merely a spiritual transformation

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 35-36) Henge

From a Buddhist perspective, there is nothing surprising about that. If I do not struggle with the greed in my own heart, it is quite likely that, once in power, I too will be inclined to take advantage of the situation to serve my own interests. If I do not acknowledge the ill will in my own heart, I am more than likely to project it onto those who obstruct me. If I remain unaware that my sense of duality is a dangerous delusion, I will understand the problem of social change as the need for me to dominate the sociopolitical order. Add a conviction of my good intentions, along with a conviction of my superior understanding of the situation, and one has a recipe for disaster. This suggests a social principle—the commitment to nonviolence—that for Buddhism is vital, for several reasons. Emphasis on transience implies another nonduality, that between means and ends. Peace is not only the goal, it must also be the way; or as Thich Nhat Hanh and Mahaghosananda have put it, peace is every step. We ourselves must be the peace we want to create. A model here is Gandhi, who with some justice may be considered a twentieth-century Buddha. There is another good reason to be nonviolent: it is more likely to be effective. The people who administer our economic and political institutions, and who also happen to beneﬁt (in the narrow sense) the most from those arrangements, control an awesomely destructive military power and the instruments of police surveillance. Fantasies of a violent revolution that would replace them with a just social order need to be replaced with the revolutionary realization that the struggle for social change is primarily a spiritual one, a clash of worldviews and moral visions. It is important to avoid the violent backlash that violence invites and, even more imperative to preclude the “moral backlash” that occurs when the focus of a challenge shifts from an untenable worldview to the violence used to challenge it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the violent posturing of radical groups such as the Weathermen and the Black Panthers was suicidal. We should not have any illusions that nonviolence will make this struggle easy. Our leaders—who might more accurately be called our “rulers”—also have powerful media and persuasive public relations machines to inculcate their worldview. How quickly the presidential coup d’etat in the 2000 U.S. elections was forgotten in the aftermath of September 11! How quickly, again, corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, which threatened to implicate the White House, were forgotten as the focus shifted to invading Saddam’s Iraq!

### AT—Extinction

#### We are already dead

Bahder in 2007

(Paul, Medical Doctor, “We Are Already Dead”, <http://www.homeopathyusa.com/we_are_already_dead.htm>, rcheek)

What we call “our life” is really the experience that takes place in time and space. The ever-changing character of our physical experience has led the Buddha to formulate the Law of Impermanence and Jesus to say, “My kingdom is not of this world.” The underlying commonality between these pointers to truth is the realization that the physical experience of being alive is temporary, changing and in a deeper way not the ground reality of what is. It is the realization that behind this world of appearances there exists a realm, a context that is changeless, not limited by time or space.¶ When we are fixated and bound by the impermanent flow of experience we are in fact unaware of the changeless context of consciousness. The relentless passing of what we see, hear, taste, touch, smell, of what we imagine or think means that we are already possessed by time and dead to the timeless. It means that time, the condition of passing on and ending everything without an exception is really the realm of death – the end of what we know.¶ We are in fact already dead and it is only our unresolved issues that keep us attached to the world of images and sounds that we know. Our family, the places we know, the settings that have served as the background to the story of our life – these are the emotional attachment points keeping us in the past and preventing us from recognizing that this past is in fact already GONE. We are already dead to the past. The past is no longer here. It is gone as we know it. It exists only as reflections in our mind bringing up emotional content and drawing us into the dream we call “our life.”¶ The future likewise is not here. We do not have life in the future simply because the future is not here. We cannot live in the future. We cannot eat, or kiss or cry in the future. Our experience is always now even if it involves images symbolic of another time. The past is gone, the future is not yet here. Time removes us from living to dreaming. “Don’t look back. Move on. You are already dead.” This is the priceless advice we receive about our experience in the physical realm.¶ Tibetan Book of the Dead is in fact the book of the living. It calls adepts to awake into a higher sense of reality, out of the temporal to life eternal. It reminds us over and over again saying, “You are dead. Keep moving toward the light. Do not look back. Recognize you are already dead.” It assures us that the sensory-mental experience we may be having is a delusion, a mirage engaging out attention in empty, lifeless images. True life lies ahead, in the unknown. True life is being revealed to us in the present moment. It is timeless and it cannot exist in time. That is why it has no duration. Its appearance is signaling at the same time its dissolution and end. Time does not exist in the eternal. The eternal is timeless. The eternal is not a whole lot of time. Time has no entrance into eternal even though eternal permeates time.

## 1NR—Case

### Middle East

#### Their Afghanistan impact constructs the Middle East as inherently violent and chaotic, which feeds Orientalist racism

Halabi in 1999

(Yakub, Doctoral Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, 1999, Sage Publications, “Orientalism and US Democratization Policy in the Middle East”, http://isq.sagepub.com/content/36/4/375.citation, pg. 388, Jikeda)

The truth is that the attack of Western scholars, orientalists and neo-orientalists is directed against the entire Middle Eastern society and not just against the radical and marginal Islamic groups. They regard it as a highly religious and consequently irrational, society which is drifting towards religious fundamentalism. In addition it is characterized by a hierarchical social structure, particularistic values, low level of social mobility, and elementary specialization and division of labour. The hierarchical social structure facilitates the development of patriarchal social relations and places effective command in the hands of those at the top of the social pyramid. Modern society, on the contrary, is highly universalistic, with a great degree of social mobility, a high degree of organic division of labour and specialization, and an individualistic social structure. As a result, the Middle Eastern traditional society is perceived as the very antithesis of the modern western society.48 Although these characteristics obtain in many other traditional, non-Muslim societies as well, western scholars regard only Muslim societies as anti-Western, anti-secular, and anti-modernist.49 They feel that while developing, non-Muslim countries could grow on Western lines. Muslim societies reject them completely choosing a Muslim civilization over the West. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, moreover, is perceived in the west as the primary threat to the stability of the ME and consequently as a major destablizing element in the world. The declaration of jihad against Israel and the public announcements for the elimination of the Jewish state by countries like Iran and organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah, the call to renounce the peace treaty with Israel by Gama’al’s Islamiya in Egypt, the Iranian anti-western revolution, the capture of Americans as hostages by Iran and Lebanon, slogans like “death to America” and “Islam is the solution",50 are all signs of an inevitable collision between the west and the Muslim civilization. The west fears the possibility of the emergence of a homogeneous Islamic empire that could extend from the Atlantic to the Gulf, include more than 250 million Muslims, and surround Israel. In the words of two experts: Second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States. . . by 2000 it [Arab Empire] would have more people than either of the two superpowers. This state would contain almost two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development.’