# Wake Rd 3 vs. Northwestern OP

## 1NC

### Topicality

#### “Restriction” means limiting

Words and Phrases 04 (Volume 37A, p. 406)

Miss. 1927. To “restrict” is to **restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine; and** does not mean to destroy or prohibit**.** Dart v. City of Gulfport, 113 So. 441, 147 Miss. 534.

#### They don’t restrict war powers—they only change post-strike factors

#### Vote negative—

#### Predictable Limits—infinite number of ways to tweak the drone process post-strikes

#### Education—no longer a discussion of presidential authority—bad for topic education

### Targeted Killing PIC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should limit the President's war powers authority to assert, on behalf of the United States, immunity from judicial review by establishing a cause of action allowing civil suits brought against the United States by those unlawfully injured by murderous operations, their heirs, or their estates in security cleared legal proceedings.

#### Targeted killing is a euphemism that sanitizes and bureaucratizes a policy of sovereign violence and permanent war

Healy 12

(Gene, VP of Cato Inst., "Drone-War Double-Think", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dronewar-doublethink)

“Political language,” George Orwell wrote in 1946, “is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.” When government action can only be defended by arguments “too brutal for most people to face,” governments reliably brutalize the language, resorting to “euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.”¶ The Bush administration introduced any number of such fuzz words to the political lexicon: “regime change,” “enhanced interrogation,” and “self-injurious behavior incidents” (Pentagon jargon for suicide attempts by Gitmo prisoners — sorry, “enemy combatants.”)¶ And who can forget the Obama national security team’s insistence last year that pounding Libya with Tomahawk missiles and Predator drone strikes wasn’t “war,” but rather, “kinetic military action?” (As opposed to “static” action?)¶ The Obama team has lately added a new term to the doublespeak lexicon, “the disposition matrix.” This soporific word-cloud replaces the admirably frank “kill or capture list.”¶ Killing or capturing terrorists with the means and the intent to kill Americans is eminently defensible, but a Washington Post investigative report published last week raises questions about whether bureaucratic “mission creep” has cut the program loose from its original justification. “Obama has institutionalized the highly classified practice of targeted killing,” the Post’s Greg Miller writes, “transforming ad-hoc elements into a counterterrorism infrastructure capable of sustaining a seemingly permanent war.” He reports “broad consensus” among Obama terror-warriors that “such operations are likely to be extended at least another decade.”

### Buddhism K

#### The harms of the 1AC are merely subsets of an unawakened anxiety that exists at our core—panic over death prevents us from living

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 19-20) Henge

“Suffering,” the usual English translation for dukkha, is not very enlightening, especially today, when those of us who live in wealthy countries have many ways to entertain and distract ourselves. The point of the Buddhist term is that we nonetheless experience a basic dissatisfaction, a dis-ease, which continues to fester. That there is something inherently frustrating about our lives is not accidental or coincidental. It is the nature of an unawakened mind to be bothered about something. At the core of our being we feel a free-ﬂoating anxiety, which has no particular object but can plug into any problematic situation. We may try to evade this anxiety by dulling ourselves with alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, television, consumerism, sex, and so forth, or we may become preoccupied with various goals we pursue, but the anxiety is always there; and when we slow down enough to become sensitive to what is occurring in our minds, we become aware of it—which is one reason we do not like to slow down. This implies that everything we normally understand as suffering is only a subset—for some of us a relatively small subset—of dukkha. The Pali sutras distinguish dukkha into three different types.10 The ﬁrst, dukkha-dukkhata, includes everything that we usually think of as suffering: all physical, emotional, and mental pain or discomfort, including being separated from people we like to be with, and being stuck with those we do not. This also includes the types of social dukkha mentioned above. A second and different type is viparinama-dukkhata, the dukkha that arises from impermanence, from knowing that nothing lasts forever and most things do not last long. Even when we are thoroughly enjoying ourselves, we know the moment will not last, and there is something frustrating about that awareness. However delicious that ice cream may taste, we know the last bite is coming soon—and even if we buy another cone, it does not taste as good because we begin to feel sated. The most problematic dukkha of this type is, of course, death: not the physical pain of dying (that is included in the ﬁrst type of dukkha) but the awareness that I will die. This awareness of our inevitable end often pervades and colors everything we do—so thoroughly that it poisons life. Insofar as I am afraid to die, I also become unable to live. To live fully is not possible when we are hypersensitive to the fact that danger and maybe death lurk around every corner, because any little accident could be our last.

#### Realism is egoistic, self-centered IR

Snauwaert, 9

(Dale Snauwaert, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity” <http://www.academia.edu/537918/The_Ethics_and_Ontology_of_Cosmopolitanism_Education_for_a_Shared_Humanity>) Henge

Cosmopolitans posit the existence of ethical values and principles that are universally applicable to all human beings, regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion, or nationality. They maintain that our shared humanity carries with it a moral imperative to respect and care for the dignity of every human being, an imperative that takes precedence over local and national political and moral values and principles. In a political sense, as Martha Nussbaum (1996) suggests, cosmopolitanism mandates that “we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the community made up of the humanity of all human beings (p. 7).” In turn, cosmopolitans call for the education of citizens who can morally and politically respond to all human beings in ways consistent with the inherent dignity of a shared humanity. It is argued that Cosmopolitan theory and its main competitor, Realism, issue from fundamentally different presuppositions. Realists presuppose that communal/national identity overrides a shared humanity to the degree that the moral consideration of others stops at the border of the society. Based upon this presupposition, Realists also assume the existence of a perpetual state of war between nations. In contrast, on the basis of a shared humanity Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings. They argue that if the fundamental moral value of a shared humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows. They argue that this duty morally requires nations to conduct their relations with each other in accordance with ethical principles consistent with the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. In addition, as exemplified in Gandhi’s philosophy, Cosmopolitans posit particular ontological beliefs that require moral agents to engage in processes of internal self-transformation. They believe that internal self-transformation is necessary in order to develop the internal capacities to morally respond to the human dignity of others. It will be argued that the aims of a cosmopolitan education logically follow from this ontological perspective. This paper is a work of philosophy, and is written in a normative voice. Realism and Cosmopolitanism Realism is a theory of international relations that denies the existence of morality in the international arena. It maintains that relations between nation-states are purely political, in the sense that they exclusively concern interests and power, not what is right or good per se (Cady, 1989; Doyle, 1997; Smith, 1986). This moral skepticism in the Realist tradition is based upon the absence of international sovereignty, rendering the international system an anarchy. Realism assumes that the interstate arena is an anarchy, a state of relations without the existence of a sovereign power to enforce morality and law (Hinsley, 1986). Realists argue that adherence to moral principle, law, and even mutual promises, such as contracts, agreements, covenants, and treaties, is contingent upon the existence of an overarching authority. This authority requires a sovereign power that is capable of enforcing obligation. States will abide by morality and law, not on principle, but out of fear of retaliation. In the absence of a sovereign, it is rational to use any means necessary, including violence, to pursue one’s own interests, as long as one is in a position of superior power. This is the condition of anarchy, a Hobbesian state of nature; it is inherently “a war of all against all.” Power (and fear) takes precedence over law and morality under the conditions of anarchy. War is always imminent in the international anarchical system. Under the conditions of anarchy, self-defense is rational. Others will respond out of self-defense with an increase in arms, not knowing one’s intentions with certainty. The result is escalation, leading to an increased probability of the outbreak of conflict. This phenomena is referred to as the security dilemma: to defend one’s self is to increase the probability of conflict; defense, pursued in order to be secure, leads to insecurity (Jervis, 1991). Therefore an inevitable and perpetual state of insecurity is generated. It is then argued that under these conditions the only way to maintain a state of cold war, a state of relations free from actual fighting, is through a balance of power. If power is balanced between states, wherein no one state or group of states is dominant, then a state of cold war or negative peace can be maintained without the actual outbreak of hostility, for the balance of power deters aggression by posing a significant retaliatory threat (Doyle, 1997; Keohane & Nye, 1977; Smith, 1986). From the perspective of Realism, morality is grounded in and confined within the boundaries of the polis, and given that there does not exist an international community per se, morality and law cannot exist beyond the borders of the nation-state (Brown, 1992). However, Realism does posit the existence of a moral community existing within the borders of the nation-state. There exists a national interest, which state agents are obligated to protect. Fundamentally, there exists a moral imperative to provide security for the people of the nation. Security is first and foremost the basic obligation of the State. Security is a basic human right, basic in the sense that it is necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights (Shue, 1980). If one’s security of person is not ensured, then any semblance of a good life is undermined. The State, whose sovereign power is derived from the people (Sharp, 1973), is therefore obligated, since all rights entail obligations, to provide security for all individuals under its jurisdiction. Security is so fundamental that one could argue that it is the core organizing principle of the State. The State’s claim to a monopoly control of the means of violence is based upon this security obligation. The monopoly control of the means of violence in turn rests on its claims of sovereignty and self-determination (Held, 1991, 1995). If nations are sovereign, then they have a prima facie obligation to protect the security of their own citizens. This is a powerful and seemingly irrefutable claim: the State is obligated to provide security of the people under its jurisdiction. From a Realist perspective, given this basic obligation, the national interest and the security of the people are to be pursued through the prudent exercise of power, including the deployment of lethal force. If state agents are charged with the protection of their citizens, then the pursuit of security through the exercise of power becomes morally justified, for the nation is pursuing what is right: the security of its citizens and the preservation and advancement of the national interest (Brown, 1992). The question is whether the nation-state and its citizens also have a “natural duty” to non-nationals outside its borders. In other words, in providing security to its own people, does it have any moral obligation to those outside the boundaries of the national moral and political community? Is the pursuit of one’s national interest a legitimate justification for inflicting harm, and even death, onto the citizens of other societies? Can partiality to the good of one’s community, and the citizens that comprise it, be so exclusive to the point of a complete denial of concern for the well-being of other human beings? Are all human beings deserving of mutual moral consideration? Should we educate citizens to able to morally respond to all human beings? These questions demarcate the dividing line between Realists and Cosmopolitans. They issue from fundamentally different presuppositions. Realists presuppose that communal/national identity overrides a shared humanity to the degree that moral consideration stops at the border of the society. This presupposition in turn generates a corollary assumption of the existence a state of perpetual war.

#### This anxious egoism makes violence inevitable

Ikeda 07 (Daisaku Ikeda President, Soka Gakkai International January 26, 2007 “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace” http://www.sgi-usa.org/newsandevents/docs/peace2007.pdf) Dabo

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.” Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.” When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons.

#### Karma is the way we construct ourselves by our intentional actions—habitual thoughts determine the way we view every experience—the anger and hatred of egoism causes us to view life as hell

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 7-8) Henge

There are other important dimensions to karma, aside from those pertaining to psychical and bodily rebirth. Whether or not the law of karma is a moral law of the universe—a kind of psychic equivalent to Newton’s third law of motion, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction—the Buddhist emphasis on no-self and intentional action points to a more subtle aspect of karma: that we construct ourselves by what we choose to do. My sense of self is a precipitate of my habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food I eat, so my character is built by my conscious decisions. According to this approach, people are “punished” or “rewarded” not for what they have done but for what they have become, and what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. This does not necessarily involve an afterlife. According to Spinoza, happiness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself. In more Buddhist terms, we do not live a certain way for the recompense our meritorious actions will bring us, either in this lifetime or in a future one. Rather, to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a different kind of way. The six realms of samsara have usually been understood as distinct worlds or planes of existence through which we transmigrate according to our karma, yet they can also describe the different ways we experience this world as our attitude toward it changes. The hell realm is not necessarily a place I will be reborn into, due to my hatred and evil actions. It can be the way this world is experienced when my mind is dominated by anger and hate. The twelve interlinked factors of pratitya samutpada (interdependent origination) do not necessarily refer to different lifetimes; that teaching can be understood as describing the various causes and effects of “my” mental processes right now. When karma is understood along these lines, the Buddhist emphasis on our constructedness, instead of being an example of premodern supernatural thinking, becomes quite consistent with the postmodern insight. That does not mean this is the only way to interpret karma and samsara; my reﬂections are merely one example of the possibilities that must be addressed for the contemporary relevance of Buddhism to become more apparent. The challenge, of course, is discriminating between the baby and the bathwater, and that will not be easy. If a contemporary Buddhism is to mature, however, this task cannot be evaded.

#### Vote negative to shed the ego

#### This is a self-transformative recognition of the interpermeation of all beings

Snauwaert, 9

(Dale Snauwaert, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity” <http://www.academia.edu/537918/The_Ethics_and_Ontology_of_Cosmopolitanism_Education_for_a_Shared_Humanity>) Henge

Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings on the basis of a shared humanity. What is universal in, and definitive of, cosmopolitanism is the presupposition of the shared inherent dignity of humanity. As Martha Nussbaum states: [Human good can] be objective in the sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognized in local traditions. (Perry, 1998, p. 68) If a shared humanity is presupposed, and if humanity is understood to possess an equal inherent value and dignity, then a shared humanity possesses a fundamental moral value. If the fundamental moral value of humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows, for to deny moral consideration to any human being is to ignore (not recognize) their intrinsic value, and thereby, to violate their dignity. The duty of moral consideration in turn morally requires nations and peoples to conduct their relations in accordance with ethical principles that properly instantiate the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. If valid, the fundamental aims of the education of citizens should be based upon this imperative. In order to further explicate this cosmopolitanism perspective, the philosophy of one of history’s greatest cosmopolitans, Mohandas K. Gandhi, is explored below. Reflections on Gandhi’s Cosmopolitan Philosophy While most commentators focus on Gandhi’s conception and advocacy of nonviolence, it is generally recognized that his core philosophical beliefs regarding the essential unity of humanity and the universal applicability of nonviolence as a moral and political ideal places Gandhi in the cosmopolitan tradition as broadly understood (Iyer, [1973] 1983; Kumar Giri, 2006). At the core of Gandhi’s philosophy are the interdependent values of Satya (Truth) and Ahimsa (nonviolence). Gandhi’s approach to nonviolent social transformation, Satyagraha, is the actualization in action of these two values (Bondurant, 1965; Iyer, [1973] 1983; Naess, 1974). Gandhi’s Satya is multifaceted. Its most fundamental meaning pertains to Truth as self-realization. Satya is derived from sat, Being. Truth is Being; realizing in full awareness one’s authentic Being. Truth, in this sense, is the primary goal of life. Gandhi writes: What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization . . . I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end. (Naess 1974, p. 35) Self-realization, for Gandhi, requires “shedding the ego,” “reducing one self to zero” (cited in Naess 1974, p. 37). The ego per se is not the real self; it is a fabrication. This egoic self must be transcended. As the egoic self loosens and one becomes increasingly self-aware, one deepens the realization of one’s authentic being, and that being is experienced as unified with humanity and all living things. Scholars normally understand human identity in terms of personality, which is a socially constructed self-concept constituted by a complex network of identifications and object relations. This construction is what we normally refer to as the ego or self-identity. Our egoic self-identity is literally a construction, based upon psychological identifications (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Batchelor, 1983). From this perspective, the ego is a socially constructed entity, ultimately a fabrication of the discursive formations of culture; from this point of view, the self is exclusively egoic. This perspective has its origins in the claim that consciousness is solely intentional: the claim that consciousness is always consciousness of some object. From this presupposition, the socially constructed, discursive nature of the self is inferred. If consciousness is solely intentional, then the self is a construction, and, if the self is a construction, then it is always discursive – a pre-discursive self cannot exist. It can be argued, however, that intentionality itself presupposes pre-intentional awareness. A distinction can be made between intentional consciousness and awareness. Intentional consciousness presupposes awareness that is always implicit in intentional consciousness. If intentional consciousness does not presuppose a pre-intentional awareness, if there is only consciousness of, then there is always a knower-known duality, and that duality leads to an infinite regress. To be conscious of an object X, one has to be conscious of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X . . . ad infinitum¾reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, there must be implicit in intentional consciousness a level of awareness that is pre-intentional, pre-discursive, and non-positional (Forman, 1999). To be conscious of anything presupposes pre-intentional self-awareness, and being pre-intentional, awareness must be in turn pre-discursive and non-positional (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Aurobindo, 1989, 2001; Batchelor, 1983; Buber, 1970; Forman, 1999; Fromm, 1976). When the ego is shed, a pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness is revealed. One can be reflexively aware of one’s consciousness. Gandhi held that pre-discursive self-awareness, the core of our being, is unified and interdependent with all living things. He writes: “I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives (Naess 1974, p. 43).” In an ontological sense, Gandhi maintains that Satya, Truth, is self-realization, a realization of one’s self-awareness as essentially unified with and thereby existing in solidarity with all human beings and with all living things. Pre-discursive self-awareness is experienced as non-positional, and, being non-positional, it is unbounded; it exists as a field of awareness that is interconnected with all sentient beings. This state is an experience and is only known experientially. Therefore, the assertion of a shared humanity is based upon a common level of being. Human intentional consciousness is expressed in a vast plurality of cultural expressions; implicit within this plurality, existing as its ground, is a shared level of awareness of being that unites us. From the perspective of ontological Truth, nonviolence follows from the unity and interdependence of humanity and life; violence damages all forms of life, including one’s self. Nonviolence uplifts all. Gandhi writes: I do not believe . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in advaita (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man (humankind) and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore, I believe that if one man (person) gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him (them) and, if one man (person) falls, the whole world falls to that extent. (Naess 1974, p. 43) In this experience, one becomes aware of the interrelated and interdependent nature of being. On an existential level, there exists a fundamental interconnection between one’s self and other beings. As Buber suggests, “we live in the currents of universal reciprocity (Buber, 1970, p. 67).” From the perspective of this experience—and this is a direct experience—to harm the other is to harm one’s self. From the perspective of existential interconnection, nonviolence, the essence of morality, rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection.

### 1NC—Accountability

#### All strikes fuel terrorism

Blum and Heyman 10, (Gabriella Blum, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Philip Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, June 27, 2010, https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/BlumHeymannLawPolicy.pdf)

An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace them. The decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah‘s leader in Lebanon, in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more.¶ Targeted killing may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence. The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure.¶ The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists.

#### ME war won’t escalate—empirics and deterrence checks

Ferguson ‘6 (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole**.** This crisis is not going to trigger another world war.Indeed,I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over.Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

#### No Pakistan collapse

Bandow ‘9 Doug Bandow, most-read libertarian in debate, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Cato, 10/31/2009, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/recognizing-limits-american-power-afghanistan

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### The impact constructs the Middle East as inherently violent and chaotic, which feeds Orientalism and racism

Halabi in 1999

(Yakub, Doctoral Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, 1999, Sage Publications, “Orientalism and US Democratization Policy in the Middle East”, http://isq.sagepub.com/content/36/4/375.citation, pg. 388, Jikeda)

The truth is that the attack of Western scholars, orientalists and neo-orientalists is directed against the entire Middle Eastern society and not just against the radical and marginal Islamic groups. They regard it as a highly religious and consequently irrational, society which is drifting towards religious fundamentalism. In addition it is characterized by a hierarchical social structure, particularistic values, low level of social mobility, and elementary specialization and division of labour. The hierarchical social structure facilitates the development of patriarchal social relations and places effective command in the hands of those at the top of the social pyramid. Modern society, on the contrary, is highly universalistic, with a great degree of social mobility, a high degree of organic division of labour and specialization, and an individualistic social structure. As a result, the Middle Eastern traditional society is perceived as the very antithesis of the modern western society.48 Although these characteristics obtain in many other traditional, non-Muslim societies as well, western scholars regard only Muslim societies as anti-Western, anti-secular, and anti-modernist.49 They feel that while developing, non-Muslim countries could grow on Western lines. Muslim societies reject them completely choosing a Muslim civilization over the West. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, moreover, is perceived in the west as the primary threat to the stability of the ME and consequently as a major destablizing element in the world. The declaration of jihad against Israel and the public announcements for the elimination of the Jewish state by countries like Iran and organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah, the call to renounce the peace treaty with Israel by Gama’al’s Islamiya in Egypt, the Iranian anti-western revolution, the capture of Americans as hostages by Iran and Lebanon, slogans like “death to America” and “Islam is the solution",50 are all signs of an inevitable collision between the west and the Muslim civilization. The west fears the possibility of the emergence of a homogeneous Islamic empire that could extend from the Atlantic to the Gulf, include more than 250 million Muslims, and surround Israel. In the words of two experts: Second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States. . . by 2000 it [Arab Empire] would have more people than either of the two superpowers. This state would contain almost two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development.’

### 1NC—Norms

#### Afghanistan drawdown shifts the USAF away from drone use

Reed 9/19/2013 (John Reed, degree in international affairs and history., National security reporter for Foreign Policy, citing the Chief of the USAF ACC, Thursday, September 19, 2013, Predator Drones 'Useless' in Most Wars, Top Air Force General Says <http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/19/predator_drones_useless_in_most_wars_top_air_force_general_says>, bs)

The Air Force's top spy, Lt. Gen. Bob Otto, echoed Hostage's comments, saying that after the war in Afghanistan ends, he wants the Air Force to get rid of a number of Predators and Reapers and replace them with stealthier spy planes.¶ "My argument would be, we can't afford to keep all of this capability, so we're going to have to bring some of it down," said Otto while discussing the 65 Predator and Reaper CAPs after a speech at the same conference.¶ This will free cash to invest in high-end drones and other spy gear that can be used against heavily defended targets, according to Otto.¶ "I think the place to take risk is in the permissive environment," said Otto of where he wants the service to spend its limited cash for buying new intelligence-gathering tools such as drones.¶ Once major U.S. involvement in Afghanistan ends in 2014, Otto may scale back the service's intelligence-gathering efforts -- including its drones -- from the fight against terrorism and refocus much of it on high-end threats posed by other nations. This will leave much of the service's anti-terrorism intelligence work to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its fleet of Predators and Reapers, according to the three-star general.¶ This shift in intelligence resources may allow Hostage, who is in charge of the forces that fly the majority of the Air Force's drones, to be free to focus on replacing the Predators and Reapers.¶ "I need to shift the demographics of the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet," said Hostage.¶ "We have ways" of doing that, added Hostage, of his plans to modernize the unmanned spy-plane fleet.

#### US action won’t change anything—other countries find drone use logical

Wittes & Singh 2013 (Benjamin Wittes and Ritika Singh, Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,

How Drones Are Changing Warfare, January 11, 2013, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>, bs)

The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.¶ Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### No drone prolif—multiple barriers

Singh, 12

(Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race” <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>) Henge

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### No China war—economic globalization

Xuetong and Haixia ’12 Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, he has his own Wikipedia page, Qi Haixia, Lecturer Ph.D in the Institute of International Studies , Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(2): 105-127, Summer 2012, 10.1093/cjip/pos007

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China.

#### Their impact is rooted in a securitizing discourse that makes violence inevitable

Pan in 2004

(Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, Vol. 29, Issue 3, rcheek)

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist. ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo) realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo) realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other,"''5 and "All other states are potential threats."'•^ In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other."^^ The (neo) realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself. ""^^ As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."''^ Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo) realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in inter- national relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy."50 And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability. "5' Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result? "^2 Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger.s^ In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely. . . . Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences. . . . U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all.54 The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"55 argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)."56

#### Heg is unsustainable and declining—plethora of warrants

Mazarr 2012 (Michael J. Mazarr, professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College. The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j FALL 2012, <https://dev.csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf>, bs)

To be clear, a significant U.S. leadership role in world politics remains important and viable. But the current paradigm suffers from cracks in a number of key foundational areas. This essay briefly summarizes five: disappearing finances; rising alternative power centers; declining U.S. military predominance; a lack of efficacy of key non-military instruments of power; and reduced domestic patience for global adventures. These threats to U.S. strategic solvency have existed for decadesbut they are accelerating, and maturing, in new and decisive ways. The first threat is budgetary. Debt is set to rise significantly over the next decade, in some scenarios approaching 100 percent of GDP shortly after 2020, along with interest paymentsby one estimate, rising from $146 billion in 2010 to over $800 billion in 2020.8 This has already raised fears of downgraded U.S. credit ratings and threats to the dollar as a reserve currency. The corresponding social austerity and financial pressures at all levels of government, as well as a public hostility to taxes, mean that spending cuts will bear the burden of deficit reduction.9 In recognition of this, several bipartisan budget proposals include major defense cuts. Groups pushing for serious deficit control have aimed for $800 billion to over $1 trillion in ten-year defense reductions, and even those may be just a down payment on a larger bill to follow. Further, the defense budget faces its own internal budget issues: for example, Tricare, the military’s health program, costs the Department of Defense triple the amount of just a decade ago, and the annual costs of the military pension program may balloon from just over $52 billion in 2011 to as much as $117 billion by 2035.10 This is putting further pressure on those components of the defense budget essential to global strategy and power projection. A second trend is the rise of alternative centers of power: states and influential non-state actors are clamoring to set the global affairs agenda and determine key outcomes.11 A fundamental reality of the last two or more decades has been an emerging reaction against U.S. primacymany others desire that U.S. influence decline and contrary centers of power strengthen.12 This trend is now accelerating, and the coming decade seems certain to represent the full emergence of an international system of more assertive powers who are less interested in dominant U.S. leadership. More and more nations, from Brazil to Turkey to India, while far from ‘‘anti-American’’ in their foreign policy or hostile to American leadership per se, have become disaffected with the idea of a U.S.-centric world order, and are determined to squeeze out U.S. influence on certain issues to claim greater influence for themselves. Related to this is a set of geopolitical trends reducing the perceived salience of American power: The end of the Cold War reduced the perceived urgency for U.S. protection; the Arab Spring and other developments have brought to power governments uninterested in U.S. sponsorship; and the reaction to globalization, including reaffirmations of ethnic, religious, and national identity, has in some places spilled over into a resentment of American social and cultural hegemony. A third trend is declining U.S. military predominance and a fast-approaching moment when the United States will be unable to project power into key regions of the world. The reasons are partly technologicalrising actors have burgeoning capabilities in anti-ship missiles, drones, or other ‘‘area denial’’ structures.13 Moreover, actors have also found other ways to counter American power: major states like China or Russia now possess the abilitythrough financial, space, or energy meansto threaten massive global consequences in response to unwanted U.S. force. This includes cyber mayhem: as one recent survey concluded, cyber weapons ‘‘allow, for the first time in history, small states with minimal defense budgets to inflict serious harm on a vastly stronger foe at extreme ranges,’’ a new form of vulnerability that would ‘‘greatly constrain America’s use of force abroad.’’14 An important new RAND report by Paul Davis and Peter Wilson warns of an ‘‘impending crisis in defense planning’’ arising ‘‘from technology diffusion that is leveling aspects of the playing field militarily, geostrategic changes, and the range of potential adversaries.’’15 These challenges are exacerbated by a crisis of defense procurement; America’s leading-edge military systems are becoming less affordable and reliable. Aircraft carriers, for example, have become prohibitively expensive, with costs set to break through congressionally-imposed limits next year.16 The systems that undergird U.S. military primacy are being whittled down to a small handful that no president will readily risk in anything but the most essential of crises. A fourth threat to U.S. global strategy is that America’s non-military tools of influence have proven incapable of achieving key U.S. goals in the areas nominated as the leading security challenges of the futuretransnational, substate threats, and the risks emanating from fragile states. While states have well-established theories for pursuing traditional political-military ends with diplomacy and force, the United States possesses no proven models for achieving progress in the social, psychological, and environmental costs of an integrating globeareas such as regional instability, terrorism, the complexities of development, radicalism, aggressive nationalism, organized crime, resource shortages, and ecological degradation.17 For half a century, the United States was a dominant global power which identified challenging core goals and tasks deterring military adventurism, building political-military alliances, erecting mutually-beneficial institutions of tradebut to which Washington could apply established models and techniques. U.S. leadership and power becomes much more problematic in a world of complex problems which generate no broad agreement and which subject themselves to no clear solutions. Fifth and finally, even as America’s power projection instruments have become less usable and effective, the American people have grown less willing to use them. A 2009 poll by the Pew Research Center found that 49 percent of those surveyed, an all-time record, said that the United States should ‘‘mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.’’ That number jumped from 30 percent in 2002.18 Those who favor a powerful American leadership role in the world have also declined in Gallup polling. For example, the percentage fell from 75 in 2009 to 66 in mid-2011, while the percentage advocating a far more minimal U.S. role grew from 23 percent to 32 percent.19 Over 40 percent of Americans now say the country spends too much on defense, compared with less than a quarter who say it spends too little.20 Many Americans want their nation to remain a global leader,21 but the public is less enamored with the massive expenditures and national efforts necessary to sustain the existing paradigm.

### 1NC—Solvency

#### Congress doesn’t enforce the aff

Druck 2012 (Judah A., DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION¶ AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF¶ TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE,, Dec 6, 2012 <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf0> bs)

Of course, despite these various suits, Congress has received¶ much of the blame for the WPR’s treatment and failures. For example, Congress has been criticized for doing little to enforce the WPR in using other Article I tools, such as the “power of the purse,”76 or byclosing the loopholes frequently used by presidents to avoid the WPR in the first place.77 Furthermore, in those situations where Congress¶ has decided to act, it has done so in such a disjointed manner as to¶ render any possible check on the President useless. For example, during President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada, Congress failed to reach¶ an agreement to declare the WPR’s sixty-day clock operative,78 and¶ later faced similar “deadlock” in deciding how best to respond to President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf, eventually settling for a bill¶ that reflected congressional “ambivalence.”79 Thus, between the lack¶ of a “backbone” to check rogue presidential action and general ineptitude when it actually decides to act,80 Congress has demonstrated its¶ inability to remedy WPR violations.¶ Worse yet, much of Congress’s interest in the WPR is politically¶ motivated, leading to inconsistent review of presidential military decisions filled with post-hoc rationalizations. Given the political risk associated with wartime decisions,81 Congress lacks any incentive to act¶ unless and until it can gauge public reaction—a process that often¶ occurs after the fact.82 As a result, missions deemed successful by the¶ public will rarely provoke “serious congressional concern” about presidential compliance with the WPR, while failures will draw scrutiny.83¶ For example, in the case of the Mayaguez, “liberals in the Congress¶ generally praised [President Gerald Ford’s] performance” despite the¶ constitutional questions surrounding the conflict, simply because thpublic deemed it a success.84 Thus, even if Congress was effective at¶ checking potentially unconstitutional presidential action, it would¶ only act when politically safe to do so. This result should be unsurprising: making a wartime decision provides little advantage for politicians, especially if the resulting action succeeds.85 Consequently,¶ Congress itself has taken a role in the continued disregard for WPR¶ enforcement.

#### Neither do the courts

Druck 2012 (Judah A., DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE, Dec 6, 2012 <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf0> bs)

To be sure, the judiciary’s unwillingness to review cases arising from WPR disputes arguably carries some merit. Two examples illustrate this point. First, although a serviceperson ordered into combat might have standing to sue, congressional standing is less clear.59 Indeed, debates rage throughout war powers literature concerning whether congressional suits should even be heard on their merits.60 And though some courts have held that a member of Congress can have standing when a President acts unilaterally, holding that such unauthorized actions amount to “disenfranchisement,”61 subsequent decisions and commentators have thrown the entire realm of legislative standing into doubt.62 Though the merits of this debate are beyond the scope of this Note, it is sufficient to emphasize that a member of Congress arguably suffers an injury when a President violates the WPR because the presidential action prevents the congressperson from being able to vote (namely, on whether to authorize hostilities),63 thereby amounting to disenfranchisement by “preclu[ding] . . . a specific vote . . . by a presidential violation of law . . . .”64 As such, under the right circumstances, perhaps the standing doctrine should not be as problematic as history seems to indicate when a congressperson attempting to have a say on military action brings a WPR suit. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is arguably unclear what, if any, remedy is available to potential litigants. Unlike a private lawsuit, where a court can impose a simple fine or jail sentence, suits against the executive branch carry a myriad of practical issues. For example, if the remedy is an injunction, issues concerning enforcement arise: Who enforces it and how? 65 Or, if a court makes a declaratory judgment stating that the President has acted illegally, it might invite open defiance, thereby creating unprecedented strife among branches.

## 2NC—Buddhism

### Link Top Level

#### The 1AC is a symptom of the aff’s anxiety over mortality—they created a narrative of saving us from death in order to cope—our sanity becomes tied to compulsively searching for transcendence

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 11-12) Henge

In his last two books, the Pulitzer Prize–winning The Denial of Death and the posthumous Escape from Evil, Becker located the roots of this ﬁction in our inability to accept the inevitability of our death. Daniel Liechty summarizes this perspective: We are born into cultures that provide us with immortality narratives and symbols, and we tame the terror of mortality consciousness by vicarious identiﬁcation with these narratives and symbols of transcendence. . . . But to keep ourselves from noticing that these transcending symbols themselves are human artefacts, we begin to treat the artefact as if it really had the power to bestow immortality upon us. It is the only way to keep from consciously doubting its ability to do so.6 Traditionally, the most important immortality narratives and symbols have been religious. We cope with the awareness of mortality by collectively reassuring ourselves that we will survive death in a different form or realm. What happens, then, when a whole civilization begins to doubt such afterlife? The most important element in maintaining the intactness and plausibility of any particular cultural immortality ideology is the fact that everyone around you also believes in it. In modern societies, the constant confrontation with competing and contradictory cultural immortality ideologies creates inevitable suspicion and doubt about the transcendent veracity of any one of them. Hence arises in such societies a cultural malaise or anomie on one hand, and a frantic, meaning-grabbing compulsiveness on the other hand, as the cultural immortality ideologies no longer function to keep mortality anxiety at bay.7 This crucial insight does not need much tweaking to resonate with the essential teachings of Buddhism, but, as Liechty reminds us, the breakthrough that Becker celebrates is a problematic one, because it hurts too much. In Buddhist terms, it involves dukkha (suffering) and how we try to evade it. Without a shared immortality ideology—even if only the pursuit of wealth— the meaning of our lives is called into question, people become desperate, and society begins to fall apart. It remains to be seen how liberating this insight of Becker’s will be for us, or how crazy we will become in trying to deny it.

### ‘Murica

#### The goal of spreading American ideals is an egoistic drive to pursue US interests in the name of values

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 151-152) Henge

We have supported constitutionalism, human rights, liberty, the rule of law, and democracy in other countries when those values have produced leaders amenable to our own national interests. Those same values evidently resonate less loudly for us when they produce leaders who have different ideas, such as Chávez in Venezuela. In 1954, for example, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Guatemala, which over the following years led to the deaths of over one hundred thousand peasants. In 1965 the United States overthrew the government of the Dominican Republic and helped to kill some three thousand people in the process. In 1973, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Chile that murdered or “disappeared” several thousand people. In the 1980s the United States sponsored a terrorist war by the contras against the government of Nicaragua, which led to the deaths of over thirty thousand innocent people and to a World Court declaration that the U.S. government was a war criminal for mining Nicaragua’s harbors. Another U.S.-supported war in the 1980s, against El Salvador, resulted in the deaths of eighty thousand more innocent people. Lots of “collateral damage.” All those recent examples are from Latin America alone. In 1965 the United States also sponsored or assisted a military coup in Indonesia that led to the deaths of over half a million people, and the military dictatorship of Suharto, who invited Western corporations back into the country. When President Bush declares that Iran is part of a new “axis of evil,” we should remember why many Iranians return the compliment, viewing the U.S. government as “the Great Satan.” When Western oil interests in that country were challenged by a democratically elected prime minister in the early 1950s, the CIA helped to sponsor a brutal coup that installed the widely detested shah of Iran, whose notorious Savak secret service then proceeded to torture and kill over seventy thousand Iranians between 1952 and 1979. There are many more examples, unfortunately, yet the point is made. Clearly the problem here is something more than not quite living up to our own ideals. It is not that we just keep making mistakes, such as innocently backing the wrong sort of people. Once can be a mistake, twice may be stupidity, but this pattern of repeated violations of our own self-declared values amounts to something more sinister. “By their fruits shall you know them,” as someone once put it. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our so-called values are not really our values, at least not when it comes to international relations. The basic problem is not a clash between our values and theirs, but between our (declared) values and our (short-term) interests.

### Terrorism

#### Claims to solving terrorism are rooted in a broader problem of self-insecurity

Hershock 03 (Peter D, East-West Center Asian-Studies Development Program ISSN 1076-9005 From Vulnerability to Virtuosity: Buddhist Reflections on Responding to Terrorism and Tragedy Journal of Buddhist Ethics ISSN 1076-9005)

From a Buddhist perspective, although they are in many ways unique, terror and tragedy are nevertheless instances of the broader problem of dukkha As with all forms of trouble or suffering, they arise through patterns of relationship that have gone awry. Terrorism and the tragedies resulting from it have their roots specifically in conflicted patterns of change and violent objections to them. In this way they differ in distinctive ways from the kinds of suffering that are rooted, for example, in the compulsive satisfaction of lust

### AT—No Spillover/Self-Transfo Key

#### The self o/w—we can accept multiple arrangements

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 34) Henge

What is perhaps most remarkable about this process of letting go of illusions, including the illusion of selfhood, is that when we do it, or rather when we practice in such a way that it happens to us, then extraordinary changes occur in our lives without our trying to ﬁt into some idealized model of what we think we should be. Would the same be true collectively? Perhaps this attitude is consistent with certain anarchist and Green approaches that would remove external authority over local communities and empower them to restructure themselves more spontaneously. In other words, Buddhist teachings do not imply any particular or detailed vision of the new political and economic relationships that will remedy our institutionalized dukkha. Certain principles are more or less obvious—for example, nonviolence, a basic level of social welfare, emphasis on education— yet these allow for many possible social structures. Even as there is little reason to think that one form of Buddhism will supplant all others in the West, so there is little reason to expect all the world’s cultures to follow one model of human development—unless it is forced upon them. Awakened people, and people who value awakening, are free to accept or reconstruct a variety of political and economic arrangements that are consistent with a personal and social emphasis on spiritual awakening.

### AT—Extinction

#### We are already dead

Bahder in 2007

(Paul, Medical Doctor, “We Are Already Dead”, <http://www.homeopathyusa.com/we_are_already_dead.htm>, rcheek)

What we call “our life” is really the experience that takes place in time and space. The ever-changing character of our physical experience has led the Buddha to formulate the Law of Impermanence and Jesus to say, “My kingdom is not of this world.” The underlying commonality between these pointers to truth is the realization that the physical experience of being alive is temporary, changing and in a deeper way not the ground reality of what is. It is the realization that behind this world of appearances there exists a realm, a context that is changeless, not limited by time or space.¶ When we are fixated and bound by the impermanent flow of experience we are in fact unaware of the changeless context of consciousness. The relentless passing of what we see, hear, taste, touch, smell, of what we imagine or think means that we are already possessed by time and dead to the timeless. It means that time, the condition of passing on and ending everything without an exception is really the realm of death – the end of what we know.¶ We are in fact already dead and it is only our unresolved issues that keep us attached to the world of images and sounds that we know. Our family, the places we know, the settings that have served as the background to the story of our life – these are the emotional attachment points keeping us in the past and preventing us from recognizing that this past is in fact already GONE. We are already dead to the past. The past is no longer here. It is gone as we know it. It exists only as reflections in our mind bringing up emotional content and drawing us into the dream we call “our life.”¶ The future likewise is not here. We do not have life in the future simply because the future is not here. We cannot live in the future. We cannot eat, or kiss or cry in the future. Our experience is always now even if it involves images symbolic of another time. The past is gone, the future is not yet here. Time removes us from living to dreaming. “Don’t look back. Move on. You are already dead.” This is the priceless advice we receive about our experience in the physical realm.¶ Tibetan Book of the Dead is in fact the book of the living. It calls adepts to awake into a higher sense of reality, out of the temporal to life eternal. It reminds us over and over again saying, “You are dead. Keep moving toward the light. Do not look back. Recognize you are already dead.” It assures us that the sensory-mental experience we may be having is a delusion, a mirage engaging out attention in empty, lifeless images. True life lies ahead, in the unknown. True life is being revealed to us in the present moment. It is timeless and it cannot exist in time. That is why it has no duration. Its appearance is signaling at the same time its dissolution and end. Time does not exist in the eternal. The eternal is timeless. The eternal is not a whole lot of time. Time has no entrance into eternal even though eternal permeates time.

### AT—Util/Consequences

#### Suffering and morals are complex—we must first discuss intentions, because those ground action—the alternative is a path, not a prescription

Garfield, ND

(Jay Garfield, Smith College, the University of Melbourne, and the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. “Buddhist Ethics” <http://www.academia.edu/2833485/Buddhist_Ethics>) Henge

While many, following the traditional Tibetan classification of three trainings, focus specifically on correct speech, action and livelihood as the specifically ethical content of the path, this is in fact too narrow, and misses the role of the path in Buddhist practice and in the overall moral framework through which Buddhism recommends engagement with the world. The eightfold path identifies not a set of rights or duties, nor a set of virtues, but a set of areas of concern or of dimensions of conduct. The path indicates the complexity of human moral life and the complexity of the sources of suffering. To lead a life conducive to the solution of the problem of suffering is to pay close heed to these many dimensions of conduct. Our views matter morally. It is not simply an epistemic fault to think that material goods guarantee happiness, that narrow self-interest is the most rational motivation, that torture is a reasonable instrument of national policy or that women are incapable of rational thought. Such views are morally problematic. To hold such views is not to commit a morally neutral cognitive error, like thinking that Florida is south of Hawai’’i. It is to be involved in a way of taking up with the world that is at the very root of the suffering we all wish to alleviate. It is not only what we do that matters, but what we intend. Intention grounds action, and even when it misfires, it matters to who we are and to what we become what we intend to do. The eightfold path, which represents the earliest foundation of Buddhist ethical thought, must always be thought of as a path, and not as a set of prescriptions. That is, it comprises a set of areas of concern, domains of life on which to reflect, respects in which one can improve one’s life, and in sum, a way of moving cognitively, behaviorally and affectively from a state in which one is bound by and causative of suffering to one in which one is immune from suffering and in which one’s thought, speech and action tends to alleviate it. The eightfold path may be represented as broadly consequentialist, but it is certainly not utilitarian, and it is consequentialist only in a thin sense——that is, what makes it a path worth following is that things work out better to the extent that we follow it. By following this path, by attending to these areas of concern in which our actions and thought determine the quality of life for ourselves and others, we achieve greater individual perfection, facilitate that achievement for those around us, and reduce suffering. There is no boundary drawn here that circumscribes the ethical dimensions of life; there is no distinction between the obligatory, the permissible and the forbidden; there is no distinction drawn between the moral and the prudential; the public and the private; the self-regarding and the other-regarding. Instead, there is a broad indication of the complexity of the solution to the problem of suffering.

### 2NC—FW Top Level

#### Ontological claims come first—they provide the foundation for all claims—the aff’s claims about solving war are rooted in egocentric mind-world dualism

Jackson, 11

(Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Dean for Undergraduate Education and Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations” pg. 41-42) Henge

Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are “founda - tional”—not in the sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of claims that are founded on them, but “foundational” in the sense that they provide the conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a researcher (Habermas 1990, 321). A claim such as “democratic states do not go to war with one another” implicitly makes a number of ontological presuppositions. The claim makes scientific-ontological presupposi - tions that a state’s “democracy-ness” is a conceptually separable attribute of that state and most likely also presupposes that a state’s standing as a democracy is something that is visible to external scholarly observers and specifiable in an abstract fashion.1 The claim also makes philosophical-ontological presuppositions, although these are somewhat further removed from the individual claim and pertain more to the overall intellectual context within which the claim makes sense; hence one needs to know something about the broader body of scholarly literature within which a claim has standing in order to explicate the philosophical-ontological commitments that it tacitly presumes. The academic study of the democratic peace has been almost completely dominated by a neopositivist methodology. Neopositivism, although neutral with respect to the truth-value of specific empirical propositions, sets the contours of the research design within which claims about the democratic peace—and, quite frankly, claims about many of the other empirical phenomena regularly studied within academic IR—are evaluated. Before scholars can engage in debates about whether the democratic peace is best measured and assessed as a dyadic or as a monadic phenomenon (for example, Rousseau et al. 1996), it is first necessary for those scholars to agree on some basic methodological principles, such as the notion that a causal connection shows itself in systematic cross-case correlations between specific factors (in this case, variable attributes such as “being a democ - racy” and “going to war with another democracy”), and the notion that knowledge is constructed through the successive proposing and testing of hypothetical guesses about the character of the world. The fact that these assumptions are so widely shared, both within the democratic peace research community and within the field of IR more generally, does not make them any less philosophical—or any less philosophically contentious. Hypothesis testing and covariation-causality2 are more or less direct consequences of the pair of philosophical-ontological commitments on which neopositivism stands: mind–world dualism and phenomenalism. Mind–world dualism enables hypothesis testing, inasmuch as testing a hypothetical guess to see whether it corresponds to the world makes little sense in the absence of a mind-independent world against which to test that hypothesis. Phenomenalism enables covariation-causality, since the limitation of knowledge to those aspects of the world that can be empirically grasped and directly experienced implies that the only confidence that observers can have about a causal relationship—which must be inferred rather than abduced or counterfactually ideal-typified—must be founded on its systematicity.3 In the absence of these philosophical-ontological commitments, testing hypotheses in order to arrive at reliable statements about robust correlations would make little sense, and if we were interested in knowing about how democracy was connected to questions of war and peace, we would have to engage in some other kinds of knowledge-production procedures. In this chapter I will expand on these claims with an eye to fleshing out the profound interconnections between these two wagers in philosophical ontology and the neopositivist methodological procedures to which they give rise.4 This is somewhat more challenging to do in the case of neopositivism than it is in the other methodologies in my typology, simply because neopositivism is in many ways more commonsensical in IR at the present time than the other philosophical ontologies I am discussing. What is understood among the parties to a conversation need not be explicitly discussed in the course of that conversation—indeed, its not being discussed is a large part of what enables it to work, to use John Searle’s (1995) terminology, in the background of our efforts to make sense of the world— but it does not follow that any particular set of commonsensical presumptions is therefore justified or justifiable. Common sense is by no means conceptually neutral; nor is the content of common sense constant over time. What we, both as a scholarly field and as inhabitants of the planet at the present time, take for granted in conducting our knowledge-producing activities has both a history and a future, and the fact that our history has brought us here does not necessitate, or even prescriptively mandate, that our future look the same way.

### 2NC—Assorted DAs

#### Chaos DA—policymakers’ attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

### AT—Perm

#### The desire for attachment coopts the permutation—only the genuine awakening of the alternative can solve

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 22-23) Henge

Nevertheless, after awakening one’s mental predispositions (samskaras) do not necessarily or immediately lose their attraction. A liberated smoker will not automatically lose the physical desire for a cigarette. A genuine awakening should make it much easier, of course, to ignore that urge, but the desire will arise. This point reflects on long-standing debates about whether enlightenment is instantaneous or gradual, all-or-nothing or in stages. Realizing the unbounded nature of one’s attention may or may not be dramatic, but it happens suddenly. It is not something that I do, nor does it happen to me, for both of those ways of understanding are dualistic; rather, there is a letting go. Of what? Not simply of whatever I am grasping, but of grasping. Yet habitual tendencies do not simply evaporate. One’s attention still tends to assume familiar forms, and this highlights the importance of continued practice: the more gradual process of making intrinsically free awareness more effectively free. This also touches on the problem with comprehending Buddhism philosophically, or taking it as a philosophy. I can understand (and write about?) all of this conceptually, without it making much difference in my daily life, in how my attention actually functions. Grasping the implications of these concepts is very different from letting go of grasping. So far, I have made no reference to any “object of consciousness,” preferring the notion of “attention or awareness taking form.” Especially in a Mahayana context, any mention of form evokes the central claim of the Heart Sutra that “form (rupa) is no other than emptiness (shunyata), emptiness no other than form.” So far, too, this chapter has not mentioned shunyata, largely because of the baggage that accompanies that overused term. For Madhyamaka shunyata, “the absence of self-existence,” is a shorthand way of referring to the interconditionality of all phenomena, the fact that every phenomenon arises in dependence on others. In terms of my basic claim— delusion as attention bound, awakening as attention unbound—the Heart Sutra’s famous equation gains a somewhat different significance. Awareness unbound is shunya, having no form or any other qualities of its own. More precisely, awareness whether bound or unbound is shunya, although bound awareness is unaware of its intrinsic nature because it is too busy grasping and too afraid to let go. Attention in itself can be characterized only by its characteristiclessness: being formless and colorless, “it” is nothing, which is why it can become any-thing, according to circumstances. Emptiness is not other than form, because nothing-in-itself attention is always assuming one or another form—not only visual and tactile ones, but sounds, tastes, smells, thoughts, and so on. Then perhaps the many statements in the Heart Sutra that “X (the five skandhas, the twelve nidanas, etc.) is shunya” are not making (or denying) an ontological claim about the nature of X-in-itself, but rather pointing out the nature of the relationship between empty-in-itself awareness and the various forms it assumes.10

#### The permutation traps us by attaching us to the affirmative—only the alternative can create a formless mind

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 13-15) Henge

Do we miss the nature of liberated mind, not because it is too obscure or profound to understand, but because it is too obvious? Perhaps, like Edgar Allen Poe’s purloined letter, we keep overlooking it: rummaging around hither and thither, we cannot find what we are searching for because it is in plain sight. Or, to employ a better metaphor, we look for the spectacles that rest unnoticed on our nose. Unable to see her reflection in the well, Enyadatta wanders about looking for her head. Mind seeks for mind. Such, at least, has been a central claim of the Mahayana tradition. How central? How much insight might be gained by taking seriously and literally the many Buddhist admonitions about “not settling down in things” and the importance of wandering freely “without a place to rest.” Although a few qualifications will need to be made later, my basic thesis is simple: Delusion (ignorance, samsara): attention/awareness is fixated (attached to forms) Liberation (enlightenment, nirvana): attention/awareness is liberated from grasping Although the true nature of awareness is formless, it becomes “trapped” when we identify with particular things, which include mental objects (e.g., ideologies, one’s self-image) as well as physical ones. Such identifications happen due to ignorance of the basic “nondwelling” nature of our awareness. The familiar words “attention” and “awareness” are used to emphasize that the distinction being drawn refers not to some abstract metaphysical entity (“Mind” or “Consciousness”) but simply to how our everyday awareness functions.1 To appropriate Hakuin’s metaphor in Zazen Wasan, the difference between Buddhas and other beings is that between water and ice: without water there is no ice, without Buddha no sentient beings—which suggests that deluded beings might simply be “frozen” Buddhas. I hope to show that this straightforward distinction is not only consistent with basic Buddhist teachings but also gives us insight into some of the more difficult ones. Moreover, this perspective may illuminate some aspects of our contemporary life-world, especially the particular challenges of modern technology and economics. Before developing the above claim about awareness, bound and unbound, it is necessary to emphasize how widespread and important it is within the Mahayana tradition, for it is found in many other canonical and commentarial texts besides the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Thus, the most-quoted line from a better-known Prajnaparamita text, the Diamond Sutra, encapsulates the central doctrine of the Ashtasahasrika Sutra in one phrase: “Let your mind come forth without fixing it anywhere.” According to the Platform Sutra of the sixth Ch’an patriarch Hui-neng, this verse precipitated his great awakening, and certainly his teachings make and remake the same point: “When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to ‘come’ or to ‘go,’ we attain liberation.” Such a mind “is everywhere present, yet it ‘sticks’ nowhere.” Hui-neng emphasized that he had no system of Dharma to transmit: “What I do to my disciples is to liberate them from their own bondage with such devices as the case may need” (Yampolsky 133).2 Po-chang Hui-hai, another Chan master who lived about a century later, elaborated on the nature of liberated mind: Should your mind wander away, do not follow it, whereupon your wandering mind will stop wandering of its own accord. Should your mind desire to linger somewhere, do not follow it and do not dwell there, whereupon your mind’s questing for a dwelling place will cease of its own accord. Thereby, you will come to possess a non-dwelling mind—a mind that remains in the state of non-dwelling. If you are fully aware in yourself of a non-dwelling mind, you will discover that there is just the fact of dwelling, with nothing to dwell upon or not to dwell upon. This full awareness in yourself of a mind dwelling upon nothing is known as having a clear perception of your own mind, or, in other words, as having a clear perception of your own nature. A mind which dwells upon nothing is the Buddha-mind, the mind of one already delivered, Bodhi-Mind, Un-created Mind . . . (Huihai, in Blofeld 1969, 56)

## 1NR—Case

### Middle East

#### Indo-Pakistani conflict is constructed by Orientalist discourse

Navak in 2002

(Meghana V., Political Science Department Macarthur Scholar Phd Candidate University Of Minnesota press, The Links – Orientalism Of Mapping Bodies And Borders: Postcolonial (In) Security And Feminist Contentions On The India-Pakistan Border http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf)

**In the contemporary Indian** electoral **scene,** voter banks are no longer beefed up by accommodating minorities but by promises to teach Pakistan tough lessons and to insist on the political construction of religious minorities as Hindu citizens. **India‘s security imaginary is under constant threat by scheming, lurking Muslims who emerged during Partition. The politics of mapping the Indo-Pakistan border, then, participates in and draws upon Orientalist logic.** I would go so far as to say that **the mapping of the border would not be possible without Orientalism.**

#### Threat construction is modeled, makes escalation and war inevitable

Navak in 2002

(Meghana V., Political Science Department Macarthur Scholar Phd Candidate University Of Minnesota press, The Links – Orientalism Of Mapping Bodies And Borders: Postcolonial (In) Security And Feminist Contentions On The India-Pakistan Border http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/pdf/2003bwp-nayak.pdf)

The December 13, 2001 attack on India‘s Parliament took on an especially charged symbolism, smacking of war-mongering and nationalist chauvinism, and explicitly invoking George W. Bush‘s claim that any country (namely Pakistan) that harbors or supports terrorist will be considered a hostile regime. India expressed fear of the ―Talibanization‖ of Pakistan and Kashmir, to invoke the same dangers as those producing U.S. foreign policy and to accordingly justify any military border intervention. Pakistan, in turn, quickly attempted to keep up with India‘s cartographic practices. When India blamed two Pakistan-based groups, Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, for invading its territory and attacking the Parliament, Pakistan's military spokesman alleged that Indian intelligence agencies engineered the attack to justify an attack on Pakistan‘s territory. By late December, both countries had mobilized massive troop movements to the border. As the countries shut down interstate train travel, mournful relatives on both sides of the contentious border recalled the pain of the Partition.

#### Western depictions of “Arab” culture feeds Orientalist scholarship

Sered in 1996

(Danielle, Rhodes Scholar in Postcolonial Studies at Emory, “Orientalism,” <http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Orientalism.html>, rcheek)

Said argues that Orientalism can be found in current Western depictions of "Arab" cultures. The depictions of "the Arab" as irrational, menacing, untrustworthy, anti-Western, dishonest, and--perhaps most importantly--prototypical, are ideas into which Orientalist scholarship has evolved. These notions are trusted as foundations for both ideologies and policies developed by the Occident. Said writes: "The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. The system now culminates into the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force." He continues, "One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists. . .writing about Muslims are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners."