# Wake Rd 1 vs. Georgetown EM

## 1NC

### Politics

#### **Will pass – bipartisan support is key**

11/14/13 David Sherfinski November 14, 2013- Schumer: Immigration reform still possible this year http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/14/sen-charles-schumer-immigration-reform-still-possi/

Sen. Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat, said Thursday that he’d bet “quite a bit” that comprehensive immigration reforming will pass Congress and that he wouldn’t rule out something happening by the end of the year. “I still think it’s possible this year,” he said at the Washington Ideas Forum hosted by The Atlantic. “But if it’s not, I think we have a real good chance to do it in the first half of next year. … If I had to bet money, we’re going to have an immigration reform bill on the president’s desk.” Mr. Schumer was part of a bipartisan group that wrote a bill the Senate passed earlier this year to provide a pathway to citizenship for millions of people currently living in the country illegally. House Speaker John A. Boehner, Ohio Republican, firmly rejected the Senate’s approach Wednesday, which called for quick legal status for most illegal immigrants, though it withheld a full pathway to citizenship until after the Homeland Security Department invested in more Border Patrol agents, doubled the length of pedestrian fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and purchased more equipment and technology. The Senate bill also would revamp the legal immigration system to let in more foreigners based on job skills or deep family ties. Mr. Schumer said in a statement Wednesday that he thought the Republican-dominated House would “come to its senses and realize that we have to fix our immigration system in a bipartisan way.” “They have to do something, and the Republican leadership in the House knows that — Speaker Boehner knows that,” Mr. Schumer said Thursday. “At the same time, they can’t do it without Democrats.” Top House Republicans have rejected the Senate’s broad approach and said they would write a series of bills dealing with immigration in piecemeal fashion. House committees have cleared bills dealing with border security, interior enforcement and guest-worker programs, and leaders were working on a bill that would have legalized young illegal immigrants.

#### Plan kills bipart—huge support for drone authority

Rayfield 2/11 (Jillian, Assistant News Editor focused on politics, Salon, “Congress takes sides on drones”, <http://www.salon.com/2013/02/11/congress_takes_sides_on_drones/>) AO

Unconditional Defenders: House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called the use of drones “a lawful act of national self-defense” in an initial statement last week, and argued on Sunday that the program already has enough oversight. “Monthly I have my committee go to the CIA to review them. I as chairman review every single airstrike we use in the war on terror, both on the civilian and the military side when it comes to terrorist strikes,” he said. “There’s plenty of oversight here.” During a press conference on Feb. 6, House Speaker John Boehner agreed with Rogers’ initial statement that the use of drones is legal and necessary. “That’s all,” Boehner said. “The process of being targeted I think is legal, quite frankly laborious and should reside in the commander in chief to determine who an enemy combatant is and what kind of force to use,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who went so far as to call the drone program one of the “highlights” of Obama’s presidency so far. “If you take up arms against America and you fight in a terrorist training camp or on the front lines in Pakistan or Afghanistan or Yemen, you shouldn’t be surprised if America reaches out and exacts justice against you,” said Rep. Tom Cotton, R-Ark. Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., dismissed the “liberal hand-wringing” over the program. “I fully support targeted operations that have been carried out,” he said in a recent appearance on MSNBC. “I think the president has done the right thing.” Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said an oversight panel would be “an encroachment on the powers of the president of the United States.” He added that he does take issue with the program being in “the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency,” when it should reside within the Department of Defense. “Since when is the intelligence agency supposed to be an air force of drones that goes around killing people? I believe that it’s a job for the Department of Defense.”

#### **Immigration reform is key to the economy**

METZLER 2013 (By REBEKAH State house writer/Staffwriter/ July 29, 2013 / White House: Immigration Reform Helps the Economy <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/29/white-house-immigration-reform-helps-the-economy> MT

The agriculture industry is hampered by a broken immigration system that fails to support a predictable and stable workforce," said a White House press release. The provisions in the bipartisan Senate-passed bill would allow for an estimated 1.5 million farm workers and their families to earn legal status, after agreeing to pay a fine and back taxes, the Obama administration report says. "Coupled with a decline in native-born rural populations, the strength and continuity of rural America is contingent on common sense immigration reform that improves job opportunity, provides local governments with the tools they need to succeed and increases economic growth," the White House release said. Citing a 2008 analysis, provisions to expand the guest worker program similar to those included in the Senate bill, the White House report says the legislation "would raise GDP by approximately $2 billion in 2014 and $9.79 billion in 2045. And it would increase total employment by nearly 17,000 jobs in 2014 and nearly 40,000 jobs in 2045."

#### Causes global war

Royal ‘10 director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Exec. Restraint CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should restrict the use of war power in targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### Solves the case

Kuyers 13

(Josh Kuyers, Legal Extern at U.S. Department of StateSenior Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy GroupResearch Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group, “CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate” Apr 4, 2013, http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/, KB)

Ultimately, as many of the recent editorials note, any shift in the operational authority over drone strikes from the CIA to the DoD may have little practical effect. This posting explains that the intended increase in accountability and transparency may actually be prevented by the Title 10-Title 50 legal framework meant to provide congressional oversight over drone operations. This is because Congress’ Title 50 oversight functions are meant to provide limited, yet timely information for those operations that, if made public, would prove damaging to U.S. national security or foreign relations. In contrast, Congress’ Title 10 oversight is less stringent because did not envision the military engaging in ongoing hostilities against a global terrorist threat. Given the legal framework governing operational oversight, the Obama Administration might consider providing more transparency and accountability through regularly scheduled, voluntary briefings rather than shifting operational command and control.

#### Sole prez action avoids politics

Fleishman 76

Joel Fleishman (Professor of Law & Policy Sciences at Duke University) 1976 Law & Contemporary Problems, Summer p. 38

Several related factors, in particular, make executive orders especially attractive policymaking tools for a President. First is speed. Even if a President is reasonably confident of securing desired legislation from congress, he must wait for congressional deliberations to run their course. Invariably, he can achieve far faster, if not immediate, results by issuing an executive order. Moreover, when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate. Second is flexibility. Executive orders have the force of law. Yet they differ from congressional legislation in that a President can alter any executive order simply with the stroke of his pen-merely by issuing another executive order. As noted earlier, Presidents have developed the system of classifying national security documents in precisely this manner. Finally, executive orders allow the President, not only to evade hardened congressional opposition, but also to preempt potential or growing opposition-to throw Congress off balance, to reduce its ability to formulate a powerful opposing position.

### TK PIC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should restrict the executive’s war power authority to murder as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### Targeted killing is a euphemism that sanitizes and bureaucratizes a policy of sovereign violence and permanent war

Healy 12

(Gene, VP of Cato Inst., "Drone-War Double-Think", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dronewar-doublethink)

“Political language,” George Orwell wrote in 1946, “is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable.” When government action can only be defended by arguments “too brutal for most people to face,” governments reliably brutalize the language, resorting to “euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness.”¶ The Bush administration introduced any number of such fuzz words to the political lexicon: “regime change,” “enhanced interrogation,” and “self-injurious behavior incidents” (Pentagon jargon for suicide attempts by Gitmo prisoners — sorry, “enemy combatants.”)¶ And who can forget the Obama national security team’s insistence last year that pounding Libya with Tomahawk missiles and Predator drone strikes wasn’t “war,” but rather, “kinetic military action?” (As opposed to “static” action?)¶ The Obama team has lately added a new term to the doublespeak lexicon, “the disposition matrix.” This soporific word-cloud replaces the admirably frank “kill or capture list.”¶ Killing or capturing terrorists with the means and the intent to kill Americans is eminently defensible, but a Washington Post investigative report published last week raises questions about whether bureaucratic “mission creep” has cut the program loose from its original justification. “Obama has institutionalized the highly classified practice of targeted killing,” the Post’s Greg Miller writes, “transforming ad-hoc elements into a counterterrorism infrastructure capable of sustaining a seemingly permanent war.” He reports “broad consensus” among Obama terror-warriors that “such operations are likely to be extended at least another decade.”

### Buddhism K

#### The harms of the 1AC are merely subsets of an unawakened anxiety that exists at our core—panic over death prevents us from living

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 19-20) Henge

“Suffering,” the usual English translation for dukkha, is not very enlightening, especially today, when those of us who live in wealthy countries have many ways to entertain and distract ourselves. The point of the Buddhist term is that we nonetheless experience a basic dissatisfaction, a dis-ease, which continues to fester. That there is something inherently frustrating about our lives is not accidental or coincidental. It is the nature of an unawakened mind to be bothered about something. At the core of our being we feel a free-ﬂoating anxiety, which has no particular object but can plug into any problematic situation. We may try to evade this anxiety by dulling ourselves with alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, television, consumerism, sex, and so forth, or we may become preoccupied with various goals we pursue, but the anxiety is always there; and when we slow down enough to become sensitive to what is occurring in our minds, we become aware of it—which is one reason we do not like to slow down. This implies that everything we normally understand as suffering is only a subset—for some of us a relatively small subset—of dukkha. The Pali sutras distinguish dukkha into three different types.10 The ﬁrst, dukkha-dukkhata, includes everything that we usually think of as suffering: all physical, emotional, and mental pain or discomfort, including being separated from people we like to be with, and being stuck with those we do not. This also includes the types of social dukkha mentioned above. A second and different type is viparinama-dukkhata, the dukkha that arises from impermanence, from knowing that nothing lasts forever and most things do not last long. Even when we are thoroughly enjoying ourselves, we know the moment will not last, and there is something frustrating about that awareness. However delicious that ice cream may taste, we know the last bite is coming soon—and even if we buy another cone, it does not taste as good because we begin to feel sated. The most problematic dukkha of this type is, of course, death: not the physical pain of dying (that is included in the ﬁrst type of dukkha) but the awareness that I will die. This awareness of our inevitable end often pervades and colors everything we do—so thoroughly that it poisons life. Insofar as I am afraid to die, I also become unable to live. To live fully is not possible when we are hypersensitive to the fact that danger and maybe death lurk around every corner, because any little accident could be our last.

#### This anxious egoism makes violence inevitable

Ikeda 07 (Daisaku Ikeda President, Soka Gakkai International January 26, 2007 “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace” http://www.sgi-usa.org/newsandevents/docs/peace2007.pdf) Dabo

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.” Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.” When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons.

#### The anger and hatred of egoism causes us to view life as hell

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 7-8) Henge

There are other important dimensions to karma, aside from those pertaining to psychical and bodily rebirth. Whether or not the law of karma is a moral law of the universe—a kind of psychic equivalent to Newton’s third law of motion, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction—the Buddhist emphasis on no-self and intentional action points to a more subtle aspect of karma: that we construct ourselves by what we choose to do. My sense of self is a precipitate of my habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food I eat, so my character is built by my conscious decisions. According to this approach, people are “punished” or “rewarded” not for what they have done but for what they have become, and what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. This does not necessarily involve an afterlife. According to Spinoza, happiness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself. In more Buddhist terms, we do not live a certain way for the recompense our meritorious actions will bring us, either in this lifetime or in a future one. Rather, to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a different kind of way. The six realms of samsara have usually been understood as distinct worlds or planes of existence through which we transmigrate according to our karma, yet they can also describe the different ways we experience this world as our attitude toward it changes. The hell realm is not necessarily a place I will be reborn into, due to my hatred and evil actions. It can be the way this world is experienced when my mind is dominated by anger and hate. The twelve interlinked factors of pratitya samutpada (interdependent origination) do not necessarily refer to different lifetimes; that teaching can be understood as describing the various causes and effects of “my” mental processes right now. When karma is understood along these lines, the Buddhist emphasis on our constructedness, instead of being an example of premodern supernatural thinking, becomes quite consistent with the postmodern insight. That does not mean this is the only way to interpret karma and samsara; my reﬂections are merely one example of the possibilities that must be addressed for the contemporary relevance of Buddhism to become more apparent. The challenge, of course, is discriminating between the baby and the bathwater, and that will not be easy. If a contemporary Buddhism is to mature, however, this task cannot be evaded.

#### Vote negative to shed the ego

#### This is a path of self-transformation that recognizes the interpermeation of all beings

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 4-6) Henge

In contrast, the early Buddhist teachings focus almost exclusively on the path of self-transformation, with a minimum of dogma or metaphysics—in other words, with a rather ﬂimsy canopy, at best, to shelter beneath. These original teachings not only deny a creator God and the salviﬁc value of rituals such as sacriﬁces, they also emphasize the constructed nature of both the self and the world. For Buddhism there are no self-existing things, since everything, including you and me, ~~interpenetrates~~ (interpermeates) everything else, arising and passing away according to causes and conditions. This interconnectedness—not just an intellectual insight but an experience—was an essential aspect of the Buddha’s awakening, and it is congruent with the essential postmodern realization. Even more radical then than now, the original Buddhist teachings, not surprisingly, eventually became elaborated into another sacred canopy, focused on a transcendental liberation from this world. What is more surprising is that early Buddhism should have had such deconstructive insights and that they have been preserved in recognizable form for two and a half millennia. This perspective on the Buddha’s awakening deserves our attention because no other religious tradition foregrounds so clearly this crucial insight into our constructedness. There are some parallels with the philosophical realization in ancient Greece that society is a construct that can and should be reconstructed (e.g., Plato’s Republic). The history of the West since then has incorporated and developed the Greek concern for social transformation. Yet none of the important Greek philosophers proposed what Shakyamuni Buddha taught— the deconstruction and reconstruction of the ﬁctive sense of self. These resonances between postmodern theory and Buddhist teachings provide the basis for a comparison that is more than merely interesting. Today the postmodern realization about the constructed nature of our canopies, sacred and otherwise, contributes to global crises that we are far from resolving. Indeed, Nietzsche’s prescient prediction of a coming age of nihilism suggests that the world’s destabilization may be far from over. Some people and perhaps a few institutions are beginning to assimilate the postmodern insight, but although we are becoming more aware of its implications and dangers, we do not yet have a good grasp of the possibilities it opens up. For the West, the postmodern perspective grows out of, and depends upon, a secular modernity that privileges empirical rationalism over religious superstition. In this regard, too, our attitude derives from the Greeks, whose philosophy originated as a critique of the Olympian deities and the rites associated with them. The Indian situation was quite different. According to one’s sympathies, one can see that Indian (including Buddhist) philosophy never quite escaped the orbit of religious concerns or, more sympathetically, that Indian thought never felt the Western need to differentiate between them.

### 1NC—Allies

#### Strikes fuel terrorism

Blum and Heyman 10, (Gabriella Blum, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Philip Heymann, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1, June 27, 2010, https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/BlumHeymannLawPolicy.pdf)

An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace them. The decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah‘s leader in Lebanon, in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more.¶ Targeted killing may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence. The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure.¶ The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists.

#### Terrorism won’t go nuclear and they can’t attack the US—several warrants

Mearsheimer 11,(January, John J., Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He’s an internationally-acclaimed IR theorist, “Imperial by Design,”http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=3)

The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

#### No risk of accidents or miscalc

Quinlan, ‘9 – Sir Michael, Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State UK Ministry of Defense, 40 years experience in policy about nuclear weapons at senior levels close to Britain and NATO. Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p. 63-69.

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decision-makers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which drive modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgment that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacker possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor’s own first use, this judgment would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial probability of the aggressor leaders’ concluding that their initial judgment had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country’s survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgment and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can be only surrender. But a more hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the Cold War, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defused in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary; a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare —particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle ‘When in doubt, lash out’, the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is ‘if this goes on to the end, we are all ruined’. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALS incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level at strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. [Continues no text deleted]It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general tail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armory of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working nut of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. The customary shorthand fur this desirable posture used to be ‘escalation dominance’.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extremer it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years.) But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh the reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further nested that the mechanisms needed to set of such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidtental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments immure widespread arid diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear weapon processor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase of caution. In was occasion conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

#### The explanation for the motivation of terrorists taints their scholarship and means their aff must be rejected. This model makes the Other radically monstrous, and justifies imperialism as we attempt to master our anxiety in the face of the monster terrorist fag

Puar and Rai 02

Jasbir and Amit "Monster terrorist fag"

To begin, !ci us consider the monster. Why, in what way, has monstrosity¶ come to organize the discourse on terrorism? First, we could merely¶ glance at the language used by the dominant media in its interested depic-¶ tions of Islamic militancy. So, as an article in the Nttv York Times points¶ out, "Osama bin Laden, according to Fox News Channel anchors, ana-¶ lysts and correspondents, is 'a dirtbag,' 'a monster' overseeing a 'web of¶ hate.' His followers in Al Qacda arc 'terror goons.' Taliban fighters arc¶ 'diabolical' and 'henchmen.'"3 Or, in another Web article, we read: "It is¶ important to realize that the Taliban docs not simply tolerate the presence¶ of bin Laden and his terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. It is part and¶ parcel of the same evil alliance. Al-Qa'ida and the Taliban arc two differ-¶ ent heads of the same monster, and they share the same fanatical obses-¶ sion: imposing a strict and distorted brand of Islam on all Muslims and¶ bringing death to all who oppose him."5¶ In these invocations of terrorist-monsters an absolute morality sepa-¶ rates good from a "shadowy evil."4 As if caught up in its own shadow¶ dance with the anti-Western rhetoric of radical Islam,5 this discourse¶ marks off a figure, Osama bin 1 a den, or a government, the Taliban, as the¶ opposite of all that is just, human, and good. The terrorist-monster is¶ pure evil and must be destroyed, according to this view.6 But docs the¶ monster have a mind? This begs another question: Do such figures and¶ such representational strategics have a history? We suggest this language¶ of terrorist-monsters should be read by considering how the monster has¶ been used throughout history in Western discourses of normality. We¶ could begin by remembering, for instance, that the monster was one of¶ three elements that Foucault linked to the formation of the "abnormals."¶ The group of abnormals was formed out of three elements whose own for-¶ mation was not exactly synchronic. I. The human monster. An Ancient¶ notion whose frame of reference is law. A juridical notion, then, but in the¶ broad sense, as it referred not only to social laws but to natural laws as well;¶ the monster's field of appearance is a juridico-biological domain. "ITie figures¶ of the half-human, half-animal being .... of double individualities . ... of¶ herniaphrodites ... in turn represented that double violation; what makes a¶ human monster a monster is not just its exceptionality relative to the speciesform; ii is ihc disturbance it brings to juridical regularities (whether it is a¶ question of marriage laws, canons of baptism, or rules of inheritance). The¶ human monster combines the impossible and the forbidden. ... 2. The¶ individual to be corrected. This is a more recent figure than the monster. It¶ is the correlative not so much of the imperatives of the law as of training¶ techniques with their own requirements. The emergence of the "incorrigi-¶ btcs" is contemporaneous with the putting into place of disciplinary tech-¶ niques during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the army, the¶ schools, the workshops, then, a little later, in families themselves- The new¶ procedures for training the body, behavior, and aptitudes open up the prob-¶ lem of those who escape that normativity which is no longer the sovereignty¶ of the law.'¶ According to Foucault. the monster can be both half an animal and a¶ hybrid gender (later in this text Foucault will go on to position the onanist¶ as the third of the abnormals). But crucially the monster is also to be dif-¶ ferentiated from the individual to be corrected on the basis of whether¶ power operates on it or through it. In other words, the absolute power that¶ produces and quarantines the monster finds Its dispersal in techniques of¶ normalization and discipline. What Foucault docs, we believe, is enable an¶ analysis of monstrosity within a broader history of sexuality. This geneal-¶ ogy is crucial to understanding the historical and political relays, reinvest-¶ ments, and resistances between the monstrous terrorist and the discourse¶ of hctcronormalivity And that is because monsters and abnormals have¶ always also been sexual deviants. Foucault tied monstrosity to sexuality¶ through specific analyses of the deployment of gendered bodies, the reg-¶ ulation of proper desires, the manipulation of domestic spaces, and the¶ taxonomy of sexual acts such as sodomy. As such, the scxualizcd monster¶ was that figure that called forth a form of juridical power but one that was¶ tied to multiform apparatuses of discipline as well.8¶ \*wc use Foucault's concept of monstrosity to elaborate what we con-¶ sider to be central to the present war on terrorism: monstrosity as a regu-¶ latory construct of modernity that imbricates not only sexuality, but also¶ questions of culture and race. Before we tic these practices to contempo-¶ rary politics, let us note two things: First, the monster is not merely an¶ other; it is one category through which a multiform power operates. As¶ such, discourses that would mobilize monstrosity as a screen for otherness¶ arc always also involved in circuits of normalizing power as wcD: the mon-¶ ster and the person to be corrected arc close cousins. Second, if the mon-¶ ster is part of the West\*s family of abnormals, questions of race and sexu-¶ ality will have always haunted its figuration. The category of monstrosity¶ is also an implicit index of civilizational development and cultural adapt-¶ ability. As the machines of war begin to narrow the chokes and lifechances people have here in America and In decidedly more bloody ways¶ abroad, H seems a certain grid of civilizational progress organized by such¶ keywords as "democracy," "freedom," and "humanity" have come to¶ superintend the figure of the monster. We turn now to this double deploy-¶ ment of the discourse of monstrosity in "terrorism studies ""Monster terrorist fag"¶ Today, we find the two figures of the monster and the person to be cor-¶ rected in some ways converging in the discourse of the terrorist-monster.¶ Which is to say that the terrorist has become both a monster to be quar-¶ antined and an individual to be corrected. It is in the strategic analyses of¶ terrorism that these two figures come together. For the past thirty years,¶ since 1968, the "western academy has been involved in the production and¶ implementation of a body of knowledge that took the psyche of the terror-¶ ist as its object and target: "terrorism studies." The strategic analysis of¶ what in the intelligence community is known as "violent substatc activism"¶ is at the moment a highly sought-after form of knowledge production.¶ And it has direct policy rclcvarKci hence its uneven integration into the¶ broader field of what Edward Said once named as the disciplinary home¶ of Orientalism: "policy studies.""" Our own analysis has been usefully¶ informed by the pioneering wo it of scholars and activists such as Said,¶ Cynthia Knloc. Ann Tickncr, Noam Chomsky, Shirin M. Rai, Edward¶ Herman. Helen Caldicott, Philip Agcc. 'falal Asad. and others.10 These¶ writers have opened a space of critique that brings the cpistemological¶ and ethical claims of terrorism studies to crisis; their rigorous and impas-¶ sioned interrogation of U.S. foreign policy has not only enabled subse-¶ quent writers to make connections to ongoing domestic wars against peo-¶ ple of color and the working poor but crucially, their critiques have enabled¶ the countcrmcmory of other genealogies, histories, and modes of power:¶ for example, sexuality, colonialism, and normalization. So, for instance, in¶ the discourse of countcrtcrrorism the shared modernity of the monster¶ and the delinquent comes together in the knowledge of cultures, nations,¶ and races. As one editorial in the magazine Ivreign Policy put it. "The¶ Global Positioning System, unmanned drones, unrivaled databases, and¶ handheld computers—much has been made of the technological resources¶ available to the U.S. military and diplomatic establishments. But what do¶ you do if you're trying to wage war in or against a country where you don't¶ know the locals, can't speak the language, and can't find any reliable maps?¶ "welcome to the front lines of the war against terrorism, likely to be waged¶ primarily in 'swamp states\* about which the United States knows little."'11¶ The writer ends the piece by drawing a particular lesson from Sun Tzu's¶ The An ofttbr. "Tf you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory¶ gained you will also suffer a defeat." If any war on terrorism is to succeed,¶ the United States has some serious learning to do.'"¶ Terrorism studies is at the forefront of this knowledge production. In¶ an article in the Rand Corporation-funded journal. Studies In Conflict and¶ Terrorism. Richard Falkcnrath notes:¶ The literature on terrorism is vast. Most of this work focuses on the practi-¶ tioners of terrorism, that is. on the terrorists themselves. Different strands¶ within terrorism studies consider, for example, the motivations or belief sys-¶ tems of individual terrorists: the external strategies or... internal dynamics¶ of particular terrorist organizations: or the interaction of terrorist move-¶ ments with other entities, such as governments, the media, or social sub-¶ groups. ... Terrorism studies aspires not just to scholastic respectability but¶ to policy relevance. ... It has helped organize and inform governmental¶ counter-terrorism practices."¶ Countcrtcrrorlsm is a form of racial, civilizational knowledge- but¶ now also an academic discipline that is quite explicitly tied to the exercise¶ of state power. This knowledge, moreover- takes the psyche as its privi-¶ leged site of investigation. As another article in Studies In Conflict and¶ Terrorism put it.¶ Models based on psychological concerns typically hold that 'terrorist\* vio-¶ lence is not so much a political instrument as an end in itself: it is not con-¶ tingent on rational agency but is the result of compulsion or psychopath-¶ ology. Over the years scholars of this persuasion have suggested that¶ 'terrorists\* do what they do because of (variously and among other things)¶ self-destructive urges, fantasies of cleanliness, disturbed emotions combined¶ with problems with authority and the Self, and inconsistent mothering.¶ Articulate attempts at presenting wider, vaguer, and (purportedly) general-¶ izabie psychological interpretations of terrorism have been made by, among¶ others. Jerrold M. Post, who has proposed that"... political terrorists are¶ driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces,¶ and .. . their special psychologic is constructed to rationalize acts they are¶ psychologically compelled to commit.""¶ We should note how white mythologies such as "inconsistent mothering"¶ (and hence the bad family structure apparently common in the West) arc¶ presented as psychological compulsions that effectively determine and fix¶ the mind of the terrorist.¶ In this way, psychologists working within terrorism studies have been¶ able to determine and taxonomizc the terrorist mind. In a recent article in¶ the journal Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy\* Charles L. Ruby has¶ noted that there arc two dominant frameworks in the interpretation of¶ the terrorist "mindset": "The first camp includes theories that portray ter-¶ rorism as the result of defects or disorders in one's personality structure.¶ This first group of theories uses a broadly psychodynamK model. The¶ second camp consists of theories that approach the phenomenon of ter-¶ rorist behavior as a form of political violence perpetrated by people who¶ do not have sufficient military resources to carry out conventional forms¶ of political violence."14 The personality defect model of terrorism holds¶ that terrorists have fundamental and pathological defects in "their per-¶ sonality structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self." Moreover,¶ these defects result from "unconscious forces in the terrorist's psyche."¶ And, of course, the psyche is the site of a familiar family romance: "Ter-¶ rorism is a reflection of unconscious feelings of hostility toward parents¶ and . . . this feeling is an outgrowth of childhood abuse or adolescent¶ rebellion. The terrorist's hostile focus is so great during childhood and¶ adolescence that it continues into adulthood and becomes very narrow¶ and extreme, ostensibly explaining the terrorist's absolutist mindset and¶ dedication."¶ As a leading light in the constellation of "terrorism experts," Jcrrold¶ Post has proposed that terrorists suffer from pathological personalities¶ that emerge from negative childhood experiences and a damaged sense of¶ self." Post argues for two terrorist personality types, depending on the¶ specific quality of those childhood experiences. First, Post suggests, there¶ is the "anarchic-ideologue." This is the terrorist who has experienced¶ serious family dysfunction and maladjustment, which lead to rebellion¶ against parents, especially against the father. Anarchic-ideologues fight¶ "against the society of their parents ... an act of dissent against parents¶ loyal to the regime." Second, there is the terrorist personality type known¶ as the "nationalist-secessionist"—apparendy the name indicates "a sense¶ of loyalty to authority and rebellion against external enemies." During¶ childhood, a terrorist of this personality type experienced a sense of com-¶ passion or loyalty toward his or her parents. According to Post, nationalist-¶ secessionists have pathologically failed to differentiate between themselves¶ and the other (parental object). ConscqucnUy, they rebel "against society¶ for the hurt done to their parents ... an act of loyalty to parents damaged¶ by the regime." Both the anarchic-ideologue and nationalist-secessionist¶ find "comfort in joining a terrorist group of rebels with similar experi-¶ ences."16 The personality defect model views terrorists as suffering from¶ personality defects that result from excessively negative childhood experi-¶ ences, giving the individual a poor sense of self and a resentment of¶ authority. As Ruby notes, "Its supporters differ in whether they propose¶ one (Kaplan), two (Post and Jones & Fong), or three (Strentz) personal-¶ ity types.""¶ What all these models and theories aim to show is how an otherwise¶ normal individual becomes a murderous terrorist, and that process time¶ and again is tied to the failure of the normal(izcd) psyche. Indeed, an¶ implicit but foundational supposition structures this entire discourse: the¶ very notion of the normal psyche, which is in fact part of the West's own¶ heterosexual family romance—a narrative space that relics on the nor-¶ malized, even if perverse, domestic space of desire supposedly common in¶ the West. Icrrorism, in this discourse, is a symptom of the deviant psyche,¶ the psyche gone awry, or the failed psyche; the terrorist enters this dis-¶ course as an absolute violation. So when Billy Collins (the 2001 poet lau-¶ reate) asserted on National Public Radio immediately after September¶ 11: "Now the U.S. has lost its virginity," he was underscoring this fraught¶ relationship between (hctcro)scxuality, normality, the nation, and the vio-¶ lations of terrorism.¶ Not surprisingly, then, coming out of this discourse, we find that¶ another very common way of trying to psychologize the monster-terrorist¶ is by positing a kind of failed hctcroscxuality. So we hear often the idea¶ that sexually frustrated Muslim men arc promised the heavenly reward of¶ sixty, sixty-seven, or sometimes even seventy virgins if they arc martyred¶ in jihad. But As'ad Abu Khalil has argued, "In reality, political—not sex-¶ ual—frustration constitutes the most important factor in motivating¶ young men, or women, to engage in suicidal violence. The tendency to¶ dwell on the sexual motives of the suicide bombers belittles these socio-¶ political causes."'8 Now of course, that is precisely what terrorism studies¶ intends to do: to reduce complex social, historical, and political dynamics¶ to various psychic causes rooted in childhood family dynamics. As if the¶ Palestinian Intifada or the long, brutal war in Afghanistan can be simply¶ boiled down to bad mothering or sexual frustration! In short, these¶ explanatory models and frameworks function to (1) reduce complex his-¶ tories of struggle, intervention, and (non)dcvclopmcnt to Western psychic¶ models rooted in the bourgeois heterosexual family and its dynamics; (2)¶ systematically exclude questions of political economy and the problems of¶ cultural translation; and (3) attempt to master the fear, anxiety, and¶ uncertainty of a form of political dissent by resorting to the banality of a¶ taxonomy."¶ Our contention is that today the knowledge and form of power that is¶ mobilized to analyze, taxonomizc, psychologize, and defeat terrorism has¶ a genealogical connection to the Wests abnormals, and specifically those¶ prcmodcrn monsters that Western civilization had seemed to bury and lay¶ to rest long ago. The monsters that haunt the prose of contemporary¶ counter terror ism emerge out of figures in the eighteenth and nineteenth¶ centuries that have always been racializcd, classed, and scxualizcd. The¶ undesirable, the vagrant, the Gypsy, the savage, the Hottentot Venus, or¶ the sexual depravity of the Oriental torrid zone shares a basic kinship¶ with the terrorist-monster. As we know, in the twentieth century these¶ disparate monsters became case studies, objects of ethnographies, and¶ interesting psychological cases of degeneracy. The same Western, colonial¶ modernity that created the psyche created the racial and sexual monster.¶ In other words, what links the monster-terrorist to the figure of the indi-¶ vidual to be corrected is first and foremost the racialized and deviant¶ psyche. Isn't that why there is something terrifyingly uncanny in the¶ terrorist-monster? As one specifically liberal article in the Rand journal¶ put it, "Members of such groups are not infrequently prepared to kill and¶ die for their struggles and, as sociologists would attest, that presupposes¶ a sort of conviction and mindset that has become uncommon in the mod-¶ ern age. Thus, not only the acts of 'terrorism' but also the driving forces¶ behind them often appear incomprehensible and frightening to outsiders.¶ Terrorism studies emerged as a subcategory within the social sciences in¶ the early 1970s seeking to explain the resurgence of the seemingly inex-¶ plicable.'™¶ It is the figure of the inexplicable that continues to haunt all the civi-¶ lizational grids that the Western war machine would deploy in its attempt¶ to "understand the terrorist psyche." We now turn to consider more¶ explicitly the relationship between this will to knowledge and the practices¶ and rituals of heteronormativity.

**The fight against terrorism is a fight against the uncivilized, irrational danger—this justifies endless war and intervention to protect the masculine order**

**Wilcox** 3 (Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”)

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them.In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles.The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.

### 1NC—Norms

#### Afghanistan drawdown shifts the USAF away from drone use

Reed 9/19/2013 (John Reed, degree in international affairs and history., National security reporter for Foreign Policy, citing the Chief of the USAF ACC, Thursday, September 19, 2013, Predator Drones 'Useless' in Most Wars, Top Air Force General Says <http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/19/predator_drones_useless_in_most_wars_top_air_force_general_says>, bs)

The Air Force's top spy, Lt. Gen. Bob Otto, echoed Hostage's comments, saying that after the war in Afghanistan ends, he wants the Air Force to get rid of a number of Predators and Reapers and replace them with stealthier spy planes.¶ "My argument would be, we can't afford to keep all of this capability, so we're going to have to bring some of it down," said Otto while discussing the 65 Predator and Reaper CAPs after a speech at the same conference.¶ This will free cash to invest in high-end drones and other spy gear that can be used against heavily defended targets, according to Otto.¶ "I think the place to take risk is in the permissive environment," said Otto of where he wants the service to spend its limited cash for buying new intelligence-gathering tools such as drones.¶ Once major U.S. involvement in Afghanistan ends in 2014, Otto may scale back the service's intelligence-gathering efforts -- including its drones -- from the fight against terrorism and refocus much of it on high-end threats posed by other nations. This will leave much of the service's anti-terrorism intelligence work to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and its fleet of Predators and Reapers, according to the three-star general.¶ This shift in intelligence resources may allow Hostage, who is in charge of the forces that fly the majority of the Air Force's drones, to be free to focus on replacing the Predators and Reapers.¶ "I need to shift the demographics of the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet," said Hostage.¶ "We have ways" of doing that, added Hostage, of his plans to modernize the unmanned spy-plane fleet.

#### US action won’t change anything—other countries find drone use logical

Wittes & Singh 2013 (Benjamin Wittes and Ritika Singh, Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,

How Drones Are Changing Warfare, January 11, 2013, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity, bs)

The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.¶ Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### No drone prolif—multiple barriers

Singh, 12

(Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race” <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>) Henge

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

## 2NC—Buddhism

### AT—Util/Consequences

#### Suffering and morals are complex—we must first discuss intentions, because those ground action—the alternative is a path, not a prescription

Garfield, ND

(Jay Garfield, Smith College, the University of Melbourne, and the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. “Buddhist Ethics” <http://www.academia.edu/2833485/Buddhist_Ethics>) Henge

While many, following the traditional Tibetan classification of three trainings, focus specifically on correct speech, action and livelihood as the specifically ethical content of the path, this is in fact too narrow, and misses the role of the path in Buddhist practice and in the overall moral framework through which Buddhism recommends engagement with the world. The eightfold path identifies not a set of rights or duties, nor a set of virtues, but a set of areas of concern or of dimensions of conduct. The path indicates the complexity of human moral life and the complexity of the sources of suffering. To lead a life conducive to the solution of the problem of suffering is to pay close heed to these many dimensions of conduct. Our views matter morally. It is not simply an epistemic fault to think that material goods guarantee happiness, that narrow self-interest is the most rational motivation, that torture is a reasonable instrument of national policy or that women are incapable of rational thought. Such views are morally problematic. To hold such views is not to commit a morally neutral cognitive error, like thinking that Florida is south of Hawai’’i. It is to be involved in a way of taking up with the world that is at the very root of the suffering we all wish to alleviate. It is not only what we do that matters, but what we intend. Intention grounds action, and even when it misfires, it matters to who we are and to what we become what we intend to do. The eightfold path, which represents the earliest foundation of Buddhist ethical thought, must always be thought of as a path, and not as a set of prescriptions. That is, it comprises a set of areas of concern, domains of life on which to reflect, respects in which one can improve one’s life, and in sum, a way of moving cognitively, behaviorally and affectively from a state in which one is bound by and causative of suffering to one in which one is immune from suffering and in which one’s thought, speech and action tends to alleviate it. The eightfold path may be represented as broadly consequentialist, but it is certainly not utilitarian, and it is consequentialist only in a thin sense——that is, what makes it a path worth following is that things work out better to the extent that we follow it. By following this path, by attending to these areas of concern in which our actions and thought determine the quality of life for ourselves and others, we achieve greater individual perfection, facilitate that achievement for those around us, and reduce suffering. There is no boundary drawn here that circumscribes the ethical dimensions of life; there is no distinction between the obligatory, the permissible and the forbidden; there is no distinction drawn between the moral and the prudential; the public and the private; the self-regarding and the other-regarding. Instead, there is a broad indication of the complexity of the solution to the problem of suffering.

### 2NC—FW

#### Chaos DA—policymakers’ attempts to impose order and certainty on the world result in constant war and violence

Burke in 2007

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, pMUSE, cheek)

# At the same time, **Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation**, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, **order and mastery were harder to define and impose**. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. **Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience'** (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 **Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony**: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. **Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design.** Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 **Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words.** Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; **Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery**.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. **In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists** like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- **was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order**. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 **Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality**...**does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'**.61 # **We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine**. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 # **This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty** -- **the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge**. As Kissinger's claims about **the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there**. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, **Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths**. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 **Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics**, **which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb.** Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: **as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy**.66

#### Ontological claims come first—they provide the foundation for all claims—the aff’s claims about solving war are rooted in egocentric mind-world dualism

Jackson, 11

(Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Dean for Undergraduate Education and Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations” pg. 41-42) Henge

Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are “founda - tional”—not in the sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of claims that are founded on them, but “foundational” in the sense that they provide the conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a researcher (Habermas 1990, 321). A claim such as “democratic states do not go to war with one another” implicitly makes a number of ontological presuppositions. The claim makes scientific-ontological presupposi - tions that a state’s “democracy-ness” is a conceptually separable attribute of that state and most likely also presupposes that a state’s standing as a democracy is something that is visible to external scholarly observers and specifiable in an abstract fashion.1 The claim also makes philosophical-ontological presuppositions, although these are somewhat further removed from the individual claim and pertain more to the overall intellectual context within which the claim makes sense; hence one needs to know something about the broader body of scholarly literature within which a claim has standing in order to explicate the philosophical-ontological commitments that it tacitly presumes. The academic study of the democratic peace has been almost completely dominated by a neopositivist methodology. Neopositivism, although neutral with respect to the truth-value of specific empirical propositions, sets the contours of the research design within which claims about the democratic peace—and, quite frankly, claims about many of the other empirical phenomena regularly studied within academic IR—are evaluated. Before scholars can engage in debates about whether the democratic peace is best measured and assessed as a dyadic or as a monadic phenomenon (for example, Rousseau et al. 1996), it is first necessary for those scholars to agree on some basic methodological principles, such as the notion that a causal connection shows itself in systematic cross-case correlations between specific factors (in this case, variable attributes such as “being a democ - racy” and “going to war with another democracy”), and the notion that knowledge is constructed through the successive proposing and testing of hypothetical guesses about the character of the world. The fact that these assumptions are so widely shared, both within the democratic peace research community and within the field of IR more generally, does not make them any less philosophical—or any less philosophically contentious. Hypothesis testing and covariation-causality2 are more or less direct consequences of the pair of philosophical-ontological commitments on which neopositivism stands: mind–world dualism and phenomenalism. Mind–world dualism enables hypothesis testing, inasmuch as testing a hypothetical guess to see whether it corresponds to the world makes little sense in the absence of a mind-independent world against which to test that hypothesis. Phenomenalism enables covariation-causality, since the limitation of knowledge to those aspects of the world that can be empirically grasped and directly experienced implies that the only confidence that observers can have about a causal relationship—which must be inferred rather than abduced or counterfactually ideal-typified—must be founded on its systematicity.3 In the absence of these philosophical-ontological commitments, testing hypotheses in order to arrive at reliable statements about robust correlations would make little sense, and if we were interested in knowing about how democracy was connected to questions of war and peace, we would have to engage in some other kinds of knowledge-production procedures. In this chapter I will expand on these claims with an eye to fleshing out the profound interconnections between these two wagers in philosophical ontology and the neopositivist methodological procedures to which they give rise.4 This is somewhat more challenging to do in the case of neopositivism than it is in the other methodologies in my typology, simply because neopositivism is in many ways more commonsensical in IR at the present time than the other philosophical ontologies I am discussing. What is understood among the parties to a conversation need not be explicitly discussed in the course of that conversation—indeed, its not being discussed is a large part of what enables it to work, to use John Searle’s (1995) terminology, in the background of our efforts to make sense of the world— but it does not follow that any particular set of commonsensical presumptions is therefore justified or justifiable. Common sense is by no means conceptually neutral; nor is the content of common sense constant over time. What we, both as a scholarly field and as inhabitants of the planet at the present time, take for granted in conducting our knowledge-producing activities has both a history and a future, and the fact that our history has brought us here does not necessitate, or even prescriptively mandate, that our future look the same way.

### AT—Perm

#### The desire for attachment coopts the permutation—only the genuine awakening of the alternative can solve

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 22-23) Henge

Nevertheless, after awakening one’s mental predispositions (samskaras) do not necessarily or immediately lose their attraction. A liberated smoker will not automatically lose the physical desire for a cigarette. A genuine awakening should make it much easier, of course, to ignore that urge, but the desire will arise. This point reflects on long-standing debates about whether enlightenment is instantaneous or gradual, all-or-nothing or in stages. Realizing the unbounded nature of one’s attention may or may not be dramatic, but it happens suddenly. It is not something that I do, nor does it happen to me, for both of those ways of understanding are dualistic; rather, there is a letting go. Of what? Not simply of whatever I am grasping, but of grasping. Yet habitual tendencies do not simply evaporate. One’s attention still tends to assume familiar forms, and this highlights the importance of continued practice: the more gradual process of making intrinsically free awareness more effectively free. This also touches on the problem with comprehending Buddhism philosophically, or taking it as a philosophy. I can understand (and write about?) all of this conceptually, without it making much difference in my daily life, in how my attention actually functions. Grasping the implications of these concepts is very different from letting go of grasping. So far, I have made no reference to any “object of consciousness,” preferring the notion of “attention or awareness taking form.” Especially in a Mahayana context, any mention of form evokes the central claim of the Heart Sutra that “form (rupa) is no other than emptiness (shunyata), emptiness no other than form.” So far, too, this chapter has not mentioned shunyata, largely because of the baggage that accompanies that overused term. For Madhyamaka shunyata, “the absence of self-existence,” is a shorthand way of referring to the interconditionality of all phenomena, the fact that every phenomenon arises in dependence on others. In terms of my basic claim— delusion as attention bound, awakening as attention unbound—the Heart Sutra’s famous equation gains a somewhat different significance. Awareness unbound is shunya, having no form or any other qualities of its own. More precisely, awareness whether bound or unbound is shunya, although bound awareness is unaware of its intrinsic nature because it is too busy grasping and too afraid to let go. Attention in itself can be characterized only by its characteristiclessness: being formless and colorless, “it” is nothing, which is why it can become any-thing, according to circumstances. Emptiness is not other than form, because nothing-in-itself attention is always assuming one or another form—not only visual and tactile ones, but sounds, tastes, smells, thoughts, and so on. Then perhaps the many statements in the Heart Sutra that “X (the five skandhas, the twelve nidanas, etc.) is shunya” are not making (or denying) an ontological claim about the nature of X-in-itself, but rather pointing out the nature of the relationship between empty-in-itself awareness and the various forms it assumes.10

#### The permutation traps us by attaching us to the affirmative—only the alternative can create a formless mind

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 13-15) Henge

Do we miss the nature of liberated mind, not because it is too obscure or profound to understand, but because it is too obvious? Perhaps, like Edgar Allen Poe’s purloined letter, we keep overlooking it: rummaging around hither and thither, we cannot find what we are searching for because it is in plain sight. Or, to employ a better metaphor, we look for the spectacles that rest unnoticed on our nose. Unable to see her reflection in the well, Enyadatta wanders about looking for her head. Mind seeks for mind. Such, at least, has been a central claim of the Mahayana tradition. How central? How much insight might be gained by taking seriously and literally the many Buddhist admonitions about “not settling down in things” and the importance of wandering freely “without a place to rest.” Although a few qualifications will need to be made later, my basic thesis is simple: Delusion (ignorance, samsara): attention/awareness is fixated (attached to forms) Liberation (enlightenment, nirvana): attention/awareness is liberated from grasping Although the true nature of awareness is formless, it becomes “trapped” when we identify with particular things, which include mental objects (e.g., ideologies, one’s self-image) as well as physical ones. Such identifications happen due to ignorance of the basic “nondwelling” nature of our awareness. The familiar words “attention” and “awareness” are used to emphasize that the distinction being drawn refers not to some abstract metaphysical entity (“Mind” or “Consciousness”) but simply to how our everyday awareness functions.1 To appropriate Hakuin’s metaphor in Zazen Wasan, the difference between Buddhas and other beings is that between water and ice: without water there is no ice, without Buddha no sentient beings—which suggests that deluded beings might simply be “frozen” Buddhas. I hope to show that this straightforward distinction is not only consistent with basic Buddhist teachings but also gives us insight into some of the more difficult ones. Moreover, this perspective may illuminate some aspects of our contemporary life-world, especially the particular challenges of modern technology and economics. Before developing the above claim about awareness, bound and unbound, it is necessary to emphasize how widespread and important it is within the Mahayana tradition, for it is found in many other canonical and commentarial texts besides the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Thus, the most-quoted line from a better-known Prajnaparamita text, the Diamond Sutra, encapsulates the central doctrine of the Ashtasahasrika Sutra in one phrase: “Let your mind come forth without fixing it anywhere.” According to the Platform Sutra of the sixth Ch’an patriarch Hui-neng, this verse precipitated his great awakening, and certainly his teachings make and remake the same point: “When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to ‘come’ or to ‘go,’ we attain liberation.” Such a mind “is everywhere present, yet it ‘sticks’ nowhere.” § Marked 09:50 § Hui-neng emphasized that he had no system of Dharma to transmit: “What I do to my disciples is to liberate them from their own bondage with such devices as the case may need” (Yampolsky 133).2 Po-chang Hui-hai, another Chan master who lived about a century later, elaborated on the nature of liberated mind: Should your mind wander away, do not follow it, whereupon your wandering mind will stop wandering of its own accord. Should your mind desire to linger somewhere, do not follow it and do not dwell there, whereupon your mind’s questing for a dwelling place will cease of its own accord. Thereby, you will come to possess a non-dwelling mind—a mind that remains in the state of non-dwelling. If you are fully aware in yourself of a non-dwelling mind, you will discover that there is just the fact of dwelling, with nothing to dwell upon or not to dwell upon. This full awareness in yourself of a mind dwelling upon nothing is known as having a clear perception of your own mind, or, in other words, as having a clear perception of your own nature. A mind which dwells upon nothing is the Buddha-mind, the mind of one already delivered, Bodhi-Mind, Un-created Mind . . . (Huihai, in Blofeld 1969, 56)

### 2NC—Link OV

#### The anxiety of the aff is intrinsic to the ego as a suspicion of its own nothingness—the self cannot grasp itself, thus we attach our anxiety to things to ground ourselves in the world

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 21-23) Henge

That third type is sankhara-dukkhata, dukkha “from conditioned states,” although in this case the meaning is not as clear in the early Buddhist texts. “Conditioned states” apparently refers to the skandhas, the ﬁve components of the self—or, more precisely, those physical and mental processes whose interaction creates our sense of self. So this dukkha has something to do with the doctrine of anatta, the strange but essential Buddhist claim that our sense of subjectivity does not correspond to any real ontological self—or in the (post)modern terms I have been using, the claim that the sense of self is a construct. Contemporary psychology makes such a doctrine seem somewhat less perverse by providing some homegrown handles on what remains a very counterintuitive claim. In this regard Buddhism seems to have anticipated the more recent and reluctant conclusions of psychoanalysis: guilt and anxiety are not adventitious but intrinsic to the ego. Anatta suggests that our dukkha ultimately derives from a repression even more immediate than death-fear: the suspicion that I am not real. For Buddhism, the ego is not a self-existing consciousness but a fragile sense of self that suspects and dreads its own no-thing-ness. This third type of dukkha motivates our conditioned consciousness to try to ground itself—that is, I want to make myself real. Since the sense of self is a construct, however, it can real-ize itself (or rather, try to realize itself) only by objectifying itself (securing itself as an object) in the world. That makes the ego-self, in effect, a never ending project to objectify itself in some way—something that, unfortunately, our conditioned, ever changing consciousness cannot do, anymore than a hand can grasp itself or an eye see itself. The consequence of this perpetual failure is that the sense of self is shadowed by a sense of lack. What Freud called “the return of the repressed” in the distorted form of a symptom links this basic yet hopeless project with the symbolic ways we try to make ourselves feel real in the world. We experience this deep sense of lack as the feeling that “there is something wrong with me,” yet that feeling manifests, and we respond to it, in many different ways: I’m not rich enough, not loved enough, not powerful enough, not published enough (for academics!), and so forth. Our root anxiety is eager to objectify into fear of something, because then we have particular ways to cope with particular feared things. The difficulty, however, is that no objectiﬁcation can ever satisfy us if it is not really an object we want. In this way Buddhism shifts our focus from the terror of death (our primal repression, according to Becker) to the anguish of a groundlessness experienced here and now. The problem is not so much that we will die, but that we do not feel real now. If so, what does this third type of dukkha imply socially? Is there a communal version of sankhara-dukkhata? In Escape from Evil Becker argues that society is a collective immortality project. Can it also be understood as a collective reality project, a group effort to ground ourselves? That issue, among others, is addressed in chapter 8. An affirmative answer casts a somewhat different light on the loss of our sacred canopies. If religious worldviews provide us with transcendentally validated projects that promise to make us real (i.e., various types of supernatural salvation), the decline of faith in such collective canopies can only lead to more frantic and desperate attempts to real-ize ourselves.

### Realism Link

#### Realism is egoistic, self-centered IR

Snauwaert, 9

(Dale Snauwaert, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity” <http://www.academia.edu/537918/The_Ethics_and_Ontology_of_Cosmopolitanism_Education_for_a_Shared_Humanity>) Henge

Cosmopolitans posit the existence of ethical values and principles that are universally applicable to all human beings, regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion, or nationality. They maintain that our shared humanity carries with it a moral imperative to respect and care for the dignity of every human being, an imperative that takes precedence over local and national political and moral values and principles. In a political sense, as Martha Nussbaum (1996) suggests, cosmopolitanism mandates that “we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the community made up of the humanity of all human beings (p. 7).” In turn, cosmopolitans call for the education of citizens who can morally and politically respond to all human beings in ways consistent with the inherent dignity of a shared humanity. It is argued that Cosmopolitan theory and its main competitor, Realism, issue from fundamentally different presuppositions. Realists presuppose that communal/national identity overrides a shared humanity to the degree that the moral consideration of others stops at the border of the society. Based upon this presupposition, Realists also assume the existence of a perpetual state of war between nations. In contrast, on the basis of a shared humanity Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings. They argue that if the fundamental moral value of a shared humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows. They argue that this duty morally requires nations to conduct their relations with each other in accordance with ethical principles consistent with the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. In addition, as exemplified in Gandhi’s philosophy, Cosmopolitans posit particular ontological beliefs that require moral agents to engage in processes of internal self-transformation. They believe that internal self-transformation is necessary in order to develop the internal capacities to morally respond to the human dignity of others. § Marked 08:56 § It will be argued that the aims of a cosmopolitan education logically follow from this ontological perspective. This paper is a work of philosophy, and is written in a normative voice. Realism and Cosmopolitanism Realism is a theory of international relations that denies the existence of morality in the international arena. It maintains that relations between nation-states are purely political, in the sense that they exclusively concern interests and power, not what is right or good per se (Cady, 1989; Doyle, 1997; Smith, 1986). This moral skepticism in the Realist tradition is based upon the absence of international sovereignty, rendering the international system an anarchy. Realism assumes that the interstate arena is an anarchy, a state of relations without the existence of a sovereign power to enforce morality and law (Hinsley, 1986). Realists argue that adherence to moral principle, law, and even mutual promises, such as contracts, agreements, covenants, and treaties, is contingent upon the existence of an overarching authority. This authority requires a sovereign power that is capable of enforcing obligation. States will abide by morality and law, not on principle, but out of fear of retaliation. In the absence of a sovereign, it is rational to use any means necessary, including violence, to pursue one’s own interests, as long as one is in a position of superior power. This is the condition of anarchy, a Hobbesian state of nature; it is inherently “a war of all against all.” Power (and fear) takes precedence over law and morality under the conditions of anarchy. War is always imminent in the international anarchical system. Under the conditions of anarchy, self-defense is rational. Others will respond out of self-defense with an increase in arms, not knowing one’s intentions with certainty. The result is escalation, leading to an increased probability of the outbreak of conflict. This phenomena is referred to as the security dilemma: to defend one’s self is to increase the probability of conflict; defense, pursued in order to be secure, leads to insecurity (Jervis, 1991). Therefore an inevitable and perpetual state of insecurity is generated. It is then argued that under these conditions the only way to maintain a state of cold war, a state of relations free from actual fighting, is through a balance of power. If power is balanced between states, wherein no one state or group of states is dominant, then a state of cold war or negative peace can be maintained without the actual outbreak of hostility, for the balance of power deters aggression by posing a significant retaliatory threat (Doyle, 1997; Keohane & Nye, 1977; Smith, 1986). From the perspective of Realism, morality is grounded in and confined within the boundaries of the polis, and given that there does not exist an international community per se, morality and law cannot exist beyond the borders of the nation-state (Brown, 1992). However, Realism does posit the existence of a moral community existing within the borders of the nation-state. There exists a national interest, which state agents are obligated to protect. Fundamentally, there exists a moral imperative to provide security for the people of the nation. Security is first and foremost the basic obligation of the State. Security is a basic human right, basic in the sense that it is necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights (Shue, 1980). If one’s security of person is not ensured, then any semblance of a good life is undermined. The State, whose sovereign power is derived from the people (Sharp, 1973), is therefore obligated, since all rights entail obligations, to provide security for all individuals under its jurisdiction. Security is so fundamental that one could argue that it is the core organizing principle of the State. The State’s claim to a monopoly control of the means of violence is based upon this security obligation. The monopoly control of the means of violence in turn rests on its claims of sovereignty and self-determination (Held, 1991, 1995). If nations are sovereign, then they have a prima facie obligation to protect the security of their own citizens. This is a powerful and seemingly irrefutable claim: the State is obligated to provide security of the people under its jurisdiction. From a Realist perspective, given this basic obligation, the national interest and the security of the people are to be pursued through the prudent exercise of power, including the deployment of lethal force. If state agents are charged with the protection of their citizens, then the pursuit of security through the exercise of power becomes morally justified, for the nation is pursuing what is right: the security of its citizens and the preservation and advancement of the national interest (Brown, 1992). The question is whether the nation-state and its citizens also have a “natural duty” to non-nationals outside its borders. In other words, in providing security to its own people, does it have any moral obligation to those outside the boundaries of the national moral and political community? Is the pursuit of one’s national interest a legitimate justification for inflicting harm, and even death, onto the citizens of other societies? Can partiality to the good of one’s community, and the citizens that comprise it, be so exclusive to the point of a complete denial of concern for the well-being of other human beings? Are all human beings deserving of mutual moral consideration? Should we educate citizens to able to morally respond to all human beings? These questions demarcate the dividing line between Realists and Cosmopolitans. They issue from fundamentally different presuppositions. Realists presuppose that communal/national identity overrides a shared humanity to the degree that moral consideration stops at the border of the society. This presupposition in turn generates a corollary assumption of the existence a state of perpetual war.

## 1NR—Case

### Masculinization

#### Their threat construction scholarship locks in flawed gender politics, turning the terrorist into a feminized subhuman, their fear of the terrorist other is really about hostility towards femininity and the preservation of the masculine agent

#### Ramazani 2001

Vaheed Ramazani. “September 11: Masculinity, Justice and the Politics of Empathy”

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What we might call the implied author of Bush's narrative is an imaginary construct that exceeds the immediate text and permeates the discourse of our culture at large. **Masculine-gendered and misogynistic,** "pro-life" and yet pro-war, **this invisibly normative narrative persona is equally available to women and men. Our women-in-uniform, Newsweek proudly reports, are assertive, competitive, masculinized warriors, Amazons who say pithy things like "Get out of my way."27 Terrorists, on the other hand, are feminine-gendered,28 "cowards" who go after "soft," not "hardened," targets. "When we perceive a threat to locations we can protect,"** says one impressively hard marine brigadier general, **"we are there with increased vigilance and a really bad attitude."29 What this kind of threat display is intended to do is not only to establish, once and for all, which country is in the position of global alpha-male, but also to restore to health and security the mutilated body of that reigning superpower.** "Our wounds as a people," says President Bush, "are recent and unhealed" (14 September). "I will not," he insists, "forget this wound to our country" (20 September). And therein lies the magic of the fetish: **we remember our wounds to heal our wounds; we keep our wounds open not the better to remember the similar wounds we inflict around the world, but the better to forget, belittle, or ignore them. The president's refrain, "We will come together"** (20 September), **performs rhetorically this collective "healing," transforming the incomplete body of the nation**—a cracked and bleeding female form—**into a sturdy and purposeful masculine agent.w "[T]his country will define our times, not be defined by them"** (20 September). **With these words,** too, **the president turns the nation-state from the passive (female) recipient of a violating aggression into the virile progenitor of world solidarity.** Healing requires a sex-change operation.This change does not merely compensate for feminine lack, shoring up an unsound and effluent surface; it fulfills, in the process, a hygienic function, purging the body politic of foreign impurities. **The tight fit between normative gender stereotypes and the American fantasy of moral and physical purity is cogently summarized by a navy photograph showing antigay graffiti on one of the many bombs destined to fall on the Taliban "fags."30 These bombs may initially**, the president warns, **cause the verminous or rodent-like terrorists to "burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places"** (7 October).31 **But terrorists, like weeds, will be mercilessly "rooted out"; like household pests, they will be exterminated as we "rid the world of evil"** (14 September). Like metastasizing cancer cells or a deadly contagion from which, we suddenly realize, "we are not immune" (20 September), **the "enemies of freedom"** (20 September) **are a subhuman life form, devoid, by definition, of the capacity to reason. Terrorists are not people with political grievances, and terrorism is not a symptom of anything but itself** ("terrorism is terrorism," quips President Bush); **it is best treated, then, by radical surgery, by technologically antiseptic military "operations."This kind of pathologizing, dehumanizing rhetoric facilitates escalation rather than understanding, sweeping ultimatum rather than "patient justice": "These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. ... Every nation, every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists"** (20 September). This is the language of "conflict dissolution," which Wai Chee Dimock, in discussing the concept of rights, counterpoises as follows to "conflict resolution":This conflict dissolution, **the reduction of every conflict to a nonconflict, the reduction of every opposing claim to a nonclaim,...confers on the concept of rights not just a coercive authority but what appears to be a moral authority, making it 'morally legitimate for one human being to determine by his choice how another should act.' The triumph of rights is**, above all, **an epistemological triumph, one that confers reality on one claim, one body of evidence and one line of reasoning, over that of its opponent. And the undoing of the losing claim, the erasure of its evidence and the dismissal of its reasoning, is perhaps the necessary basis for the authority granted the right holder, an authority which, to be seen as moral authority, must appear to issue not from the successful demolition of its opponent, but from a Reason immanent in the nature of things.**32

### Perpetual War

#### Turn: this guarantees global destruction – this strategic worldview can only conceive others as targets for American bombs, making it the logic of perpetual war.

CHOW 6 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Modern Culture & Media Studies at Brown University, “The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work,” p. 40-42)

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war – if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes – is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipresence of the sovereign “self” / “eye” – the “I” that is the United States, the other will have no choice but to remain just that – a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual world-ing that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber – such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter – will never receive the attention that is due to them.