# USC Rd 3—Weber AH

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### The aff must defend the instrumental enactment of a policy proposal by the United States federal government

#### “Should” proves that’s most predictable

Ericson, 3

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The 1AC instead discusses a past event, and determines that were it not to have happened, identities would be changed and the world would be different

#### Their failure to do so prevents effective democratic deliberation **by precluding debate over controversial issues—the non-falsifiability of their position destroys profitable argumentation—it’s impossible to repudiate the horrors of genocide**

Steinberg and Freeley, 8  
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4 ) MT

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate “Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms.” That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as “We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with.” Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements “Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program” more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about “homelessness” or “abortion” or “crime” or “global warming” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does “effectiveness” mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### And, democratic deliberation is the cornerstone of solving all existential global problems **Lundberg 10** [Christian O. Lundberg, Professor of Communications at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311, Ssanchez] The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. **But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier**, debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue thatthese conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate** provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. T**he merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy**. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim **that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively**, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a **technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement andnew articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of **terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, **an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### **And, absent political simulations we become passive spectators in the world—switch side is key**

Joyner 1999 – Christopher C Joyner Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University Spring, 1999 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

### 1NC

#### The aff’s commitment to selfless ethics is a destruction of the self—it results in sacrificial annihilation of personal values

Bernstein, 8

(Andrew Bernstein, professor of philosophy at Marist College and SUNY Purchase. “Objectivism in One Lesson” pg. 17-19) Henge

Selflessness is any moral code that exhorts a man to place something-be it God, other people, the state, etc.-above his own self. Altruism-the doctrine that a man must sacrifice himself specifically for other people-is one dominant version of the ethics of selflessness. But Ayn Rand's egoist ethics unconditionally repudiates selflessness in any and all of its manifestations, regardless of the purported beneficiary. Ayn Rand's repudiation of any self-sacrificial moral code is based on her revolutionary identification that a man's self is his mind, his thinking, the judgment he deploys to choose his personal values. If he sacrifices his values for any reason, then he necessarily sacrifices his mind to whoever promulgates those reasons. In expunging the effect-his values-he effaces their cause-his thinking. So, to revert to a previous example: if a man loves a woman and chooses her to be his wife, but renounces his desire to satisfy his family, he abjures more than his love relationship; he betrays his soul, his consciousness, his mind-his judgment by means of which he chose her. The value judgments-and hence, the beliefs-of other people then necessarily control his life. In The Fountainhead, Peter Keating perfectly exemplifies this lamentable principle. Early in life, he does occasionally think and value independently. In his youth, for instance, he cherishes painting; as a young man, he loves Catherine Halsey-but he yields both of these budding passions to satisfy his mother, Ellsworth Toohey, and society more broadly. It is his own mind Keating thereby treats as expendable or inconsequential-a faculty that can be discarded in favor of uncritical obedience. It is his very survival instrument (as we will study in detail in subsequent chapters) that Keating or any other forlorn conformist treats as dispensable jetsam. Similarly, in real life, a politician who compromises his principles because they are not popular with the voters-or a businessman who sells a product that, in his judgment, is debased, because it is craved by the consumers-or a high school student who surrenders clean living because his "friends" are drug users- or anyone of countless other examples-has betrayed more than his specific values. To the extent that he sacrifices those ideals or goals dearest to him, to that extent he has repudiated his mind; to that extent, he will then be a mindless drone, unquestioningly following the judgment of others, who are thereby granted omnipotence in his life. In light of such a deplorable truth, it must be understood that, according to the code urging selflessness, the greater the value surrendered, the more "noble" the sacrifice. (It is not a sacrifice to relinquish something that one values only marginally-or not at all.) But a man's mind is more fundamental than his highest value; it is that by means o/which he values, that which makes valuing and thereby life possible. To surrender it is to surrender the very possibility of valuing. -The appalling truth regarding the moral code of self-sacrifice is that it constitutes unremitting war on a man's mind. "It is your mind that they want you to surrender-all those who preach the creed of sacrifice, whatever their tags or their motives ... Those who start by saying: "It is selfish to pursue your own wishes, you must sacrifice them to the wishes of others"-end up by saying: "It is selfish to uphold your convictions, you must sacrifice them to the convictions of others. This much is true: the most selfish of all things is the independent mind that recognizes ... no value higher than its judgment of truth.,,7 Altruism does not merely demand the surrender of values-that which brings meaning to a man's life-but worse: it requires the surrender of the mind, the source of his values. By analogy, altruism does not merely dig up flourishing plants by their roots; it poisons the soil in which they grow, rendering impossible the flowering of robust life. There are two main points in this chapter, each with its contrasting negative: one is that personal values provide the meaning of life-and that to surrender them is to empty life of all meaning. The second is that the source of a man's values is his independent thinking-and that to sacrifice his values is to thereby surrender his mind. But Ayn Rand's theory of egoism repudiates more than merely altruism. It also differs sharply from the code that has conventionally been contrasted with all forms of self-sacrifice; the theory that claims it is morally permissible for a man-in pursuit of his own interest-to victimize others; that the attempt to attain personal happiness involves and justifies the sacrifice of others to self; that selfishness, in short, entails the exploitation of other people. Let us now turn to that view.

#### Egoism is the root of life’s every value

Bernstein, 8

(Andrew Bernstein, professor of philosophy at Marist College and SUNY Purchase. “Objectivism in One Lesson” pg. 11-13) Henge

Readers of Ayn Rand's novels generally notice how purposeful, proud, and fulfilled her heroes are. These readers often raise the question: How realistic is it for her men and women to be so happy in a world torn by moral and psychological conflict? For example, in the current day, anti-heroes dominate serious literature and film; leading public figures are often guilty of crimes and/or serious moral transgressions; and some men's lives are fraught with psychological problems, including struggles with alcohol and drugs. And yet, in The Fountainhead Howard Roark proceeded purposefully and serenely forward, overcoming daunting obstacles, reaching his goals, gaining everything he desired. Readers wonder: Is this possible in real life? Are human beings capable of achieving such exalted moral stature? Can one live in the same manner as an Ayn Rand hero? To answer this question, let's consider several passages from her novels, scenes that dramatize the ennobled stature of Ayn Rand's heroes, and then proceed to extract from them some explanatory principles. In savoring and analyzing her heroes, it is helpful to remember this: she often pointed out that she became a philosopher as a necessary means of understanding the deeper principles animating her characters. In the first passage, the hero of The Fountainhead, the uncompromising architect, Howard Roark, witnesses the opening of his innovative apartment complex, the Enright House. Roark, who earlier had to close his office and work in a granite quarry because of lack of support for his revolutionary designs, savors his triumph. Hatless, standing at a parapet overlooking the East River in New York City, head thrown back and face uplifted toward the sun, he experiences the joyous pride of his accomplishment. A photographer, there to cover the opening for a local paper, sees Roark. The newsman thinks of something that has long puzzled him: "he had always wondered why the sensations one felt in dreams were so much more intense than anything one could experience in waking reality-why the horror was so total and the ecstasy so complete-and what was the extra quality which could never be recaptured afterward; the quality of what he felt when he walked down a path through tangled green leaves in a dream, in an air full of expectation, of causeless, utter rapture-and when he awakened he could not explain it, it had been just a path through some woods." The photographer thinks of it now because, for the first time, he sees that additional quality in a waking moment sees it in Roark's face uplifted toward his building. l One more scene will provide sufficient information to draw an important conclusion. As Roark's new ideas gradually caught hold, he worked on three major projects simultaneously: the Cord Building-an office tower in midtown Manhattan; the Aquitania Hotel on Central Park South; and the Stoddard Temple- a shrine to the human spirit-far to the north on the bluffs overlooking the Hudson River. His lover, Dominique Francon, posed for the statue for his temple. Roark arrived one night at the Temple's construction site to find the sculptor, Steven Mallory, and Dominique working late. Mallory, who knew nothing of Roark's relationship with Dominique, told the architect that they were not doing well, that Dominique could not quite capture the quality he sought. Dominique got dressed but took no part in the conversation. She stood and gazed at Roark. Suddenly, she threw off her robe and posed naked again. Then Mallory saw what he had struggled to see all day. "He saw her body standing before him straight and tense, her head thrown back ... but now her body was alive, so still that it seemed to tremble, saying what he had wanted to hear: a proud, reverent, enraptured surrender to a vision of her own ... ,,2 There are numerous similar scenes in The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. What they show is that the essence of Ayn Rand's heroes is to burn with passion for values. Howard Roark is ecstatic at the completion of his building. Dominique experiences such reverence for Roark's achievements and character that the mere sight of him fills her with inspiration. In Atlas Shrugged, Dagny Taggart's love for her railroad, and Hank Rearden's for both his steel mills and Dagny herself, illustrate an identical theme. These men and women create deep meaning in their lives, which are then filled with joyous excitement. Further, they recognize that value achievement is a means to an end-their life and happiness. They understand that in order to live well, to flourish, to experience joy and exultation, they must pursue values that will, in fact, lead to these outcomes. In subsequent chapters, we will explore the specific values Ayn Rand held every individual should pursue, the means by which he should pursue them, and the reason such values are objective, i.e., derived fundamentally from facts, from reality, and not from subjective whim. But here, the preliminary point is that a rational man sees something as a value because he understands it improves his wellbeing-it contributes to both the sustenance and the enjoyment of his time on earth. Architecture, for example, is both the means by which Roark productively supports his life-and the most fundamental source of meaning in it. Therefore, the initial questions to be discussed are: What does it mean to actually value something? And, related: What role do personal values play in promoting an individual's happiness? To these questions Ayn Rand'!!\ answer is that values are those things or persons that fill a man's life with significance and purpose, those things that he considers worthy, valuable, important, the things he is willing to work for-to get or to keep. In Ayn Rand's words: '''Value' is that which one acts to gain and/or keep." Perhaps the key term in that definition is "acts." Values are always the object of an action. Whether a man loves education or money or art or a beautiful home or a particular man or woman or children or any and all of the above, his values are those things he considers so important that they impel him to purposeful, goal-directed action. In this regard, values must be carefully distinguished from dreams, wishes, and fantasies·3 For example, if a man states that five million dollars would be an enormous benefit to his life, but takes no practical steps to earn it, the money cannot properly be said to be one of his values; rather, it is no more than a wish or a pleasant fantasy. What it would take to transform this dream into a value would be action. If the individual gets a job and starts to earn money; if he works out a budget and begins to save; if he accepts a second job and saves all of the money he earns from it; if he invests his money and carefully monitors his gains; if he does all of this, then it can truthfully be claimed that wealth is a value to this man. An old saying states that actions speak louder than words, and nowhere is this as true as in the realm of values. Every man can identify his actual values and those of others-by identifying what each individual pursues in action. Ayn Rand's theory is one that proudly upholds personal values and a life filled with the things and persons an individual loves. For example, an individual might esteem an education in computer science, or a career in teaching, or a love relationship with a particular man or woman, or starting a family and rearing children, or one of a hundred other life-affirming goals. Whatever positive values an individual holds, he should indefatigably pursue them. Human beings, Ayn Rand argues, should seek their own happiness. They are not obligated to serve the needs of their family, to offer selfless service to God, or to sacrifice themselves for society. They should not renounce personal values. Rather, they should live and act selfishly. To be self-ish, in Ayn Rand's theory, is to hold and pursue meaningful, life-enhancing values. If a man were to be truly unselfish, and actually attempt to practice a self-sacrifice code, then he would have to renounce his personal values; the more urgent the value(s) he surrendered, the more "noble" his sacrifice would be considered. So, for example, if a young man surrenders the woman he loves to satisfy his mother's expectations, by these standards he is virtuous; if he additionally relinquishes career aspirations, his own apartment, and an independent life to stay home and care for her, the conventional code deems him even more "saintly." But after sacrificing his love, his career, and his autonomy, his life will be empty, drained of personal meaning, filled with only resentment and bitterness.

#### Vote negative as an act of heroism

#### The hero is committed to rational, life-promoting values—the choice is key

Bernstein, 8

(Andrew Bernstein, professor of philosophy at Marist College and SUNY Purchase. “Objectivism in One Lesson” pg. 57-59) Henge

That reason is man's means of survival has profound impact on the life of each individual. Based on this fundamental truth, Ayn Rand looks at man and observes a being who can control his own life and destiny. She does not see a being helplessly buffeted by social forces, as do contemporary Behaviorists and Marxists. She does not see a creature doomed by fate or tragic flaws, as did Sophocles and Shakespeare. Nor does she see a being wracked by repressed urges and torn by inner psychological conflicts, as do Freud and his heirs. She does not observe what other thinkers have claimed to observe. Ayn Rand looks at man and sees the possibility of towering heroism. The main characters of her novels make this abundantly clear. Observe how each is distinctively etched as a variation on a central theme. Howard Roark, for example, is an architectural genius who struggles for years against a conservative society antagonistic to his revolutionary designs. Hank Rearden is a superbly productive industrialist and innovative thinker who develops a new metal alloy-Rearden Metal-that is as superior to steel as steel is to iron. Oagny Taggart is a brilliant engineer who expertly runs a transcontinental railroad, who recognizes the merits of Rearden Metal before anyone else, and who stands against virtually an entire society to rebuild her railroad with the new substance rather than with steel. John Galt is a towering intellect-an exalted scientist, inventor, philosopher, statesman-a man whose accomplishments are so prodigious he could be compared only to such real-life geniuses as Aristotle, Leonardo da Vinci, and Isaac Newton. Ayn Rand's view of man's nature in one word is that he is a thinker. He is a being whose nature requires him to live by his own judgment, to never allow others dominance in his life, to neither conform nor rebel but to use his own mind. This, we have seen, is The Lesson of Objectivism: the mind is man's tool of survival and the deepest core of his nature. But the mind does not function automatically. Man is a being who must choose to be rational. This is what Ayn Rand means when she describes man as "a being of volitional consciousness." He must choose reason, he must choose reality, he must choose to live and function as man. 1 Human beings have free will. On Ayn Rand's distinctive theory, to say men have free will is to claim that they possess the power of choice, the capacity to govern the outcome of their own lives by means of the choices they make and the actions they perform based on them. It is to state that men are in charge of their own destinies, that they can select life-promoting values, enact the cause(s) requisite to achieve them, and thereby attain success and happiness. To a significant degree-despite such uncontrollable factors as physical make-up, the choices of others, and more-men can make their lives turn out the way they want. Put negatively, to possess free will means that there is no external power controlling a man's life, no outside agency necessitating its result. Over the centuries, numerous thinkers, known as determinists, have argued that man is a helpless puppet, controlled by a higher power, be it God or Satan or Fate-or today, in a more scientific era, by his genetic coding, "environmental conditioning" or "socialization." To support free will is to argue that determinism, in any and all of its variants, is false. On Ayn Rand's view. a man can achieve. survive and prosper on earth because his survival instrument is under his direct. volitional. individual control. The most fundamental choice possessed by human beings is: to think or not. Thinking does not occur automatically. It is not like sensory perception. For example, when the wind blows or the sun shines brightly, a man feels it on his skin whether he chooses to or not. Similarly, the noise of a car in the street or a television in the next room is heard involuntarily, with no special act of focus required on an individual's part. But reasoning requires a volitional act, a turning on of the cognitive apparatus, a process of focusing the mind. For example, an entrepreneur does not involuntarily, automatically think about the problems of production his firm faces; he must choose to do so. In any given moment, he is free to evade his responsibilities and turn off the mental switch. Similarly, a college student must voluntarily initiate his research and studying; he must choose to enter the library, open his books and concentrate on their meaning; in any moment, he is able to turn the mind off and let his studies lapse. To think is an act of choice ... Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not. In any hour and issue of your life, you are free to think or to evade that effort. But you are not free to escape from your nature, from the fact that reason is your means of survival-so that for you, who are a human being, the question "to be or not to be" is the question "to think or not to think.,,2 Man, as Ayn Rand explains him, is a being of volitional consciousness. Knowledge of the existence of one's own free will is achieved by direct introspective awareness. An individual can direct his mental attention inward and observe himself in the very act of choosing. The college student, for example, may introspectively watch as he lets his mind wander to daydreams of his girlfriend, but then re-focuses it on his physics textbook. The application of one's mind is under one's own voluntary control-and the processes of powering the mind's attention levels up or down are directly apparent to an individual's examination of his own internal mental states.

### 1NC

#### Views of the past In imagination of the future necessitate norms of reproduction that always exclude the queer body—the exclusion of the Other becomes necessary to the identity of the included

Edelman ’98 (Lee, English Prof @ Tufts University, The Ohio State University Press, Narrative, Vol. 6, No. 1, January, p. 18-30, “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification and the Death Drive”, JSTOR, AO)

In what follows I want to interrogate the politics that informs the pervasive trope of the child as figure for the universal value attributed to political futurity and to pose against it the impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests the energy of resistance the characteristically perverse resistance informing the work of queer theory to the substantialization of identities, especially as defined through opposition, as well as to the political fantasy of shaping history into a narrative in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself, as itself, through time. By attempting to resist that coercive faith in political futurity, while refusing as well any hope for the sort of dialectical access to meaning that such resistance, as quintessential political gesture, holds out, I mean to insist that politics is always a politics of the signifier, and that queer theory's interventions in the reproduction of dominant cultural logics must never lose sight of its figurai relation to the vicissitudes of signification. Queer theory, as a particular story of where storytelling fails, one that takes the value and burden of that failure upon itself, occupies, I want to suggest, the impossible "other" side where narrative realization and derealization overlap. The rest of this paper as pires to explain the meaning and implications of that assertion, but to do so it must begin by tracing some connections between politics and the politics of the sign. Like the network of signifying relations Lacan described as the symbolic, politics may function as the register within which we experience social reality, but only insofar as it compels us to experience that reality in the form of a fantasy: the fantasy, precisely, of form as such, of an order, an organization, assuring the stability of our identities as subjects and the consistency of the cultural structures through which those identities are reflected back to us in recognizable form. Though the material conditions of human experience may indeed be at stake in the various conflicts by means of which differing political perspectives vie for the power to name, and by naming to shape, our collective reality, the ceaseless contestation between and among their competing social visions expresses a common will to install as reality itself one libidinal-subtended fantasy or another and thus to avoid traumatically confronting the emptiness at the core of the symbolic "reality" produced by the order of the signifier. To put this otherwise: politics designates the ground on which imaginary relations, relations that hark back to a notion of the self-misrecognized as en joying an originary fullness an undifferentiated presence that is posited retroactively and therefore lost, one might say, from the start compete for symbolic fulfillment within the dispensation of the signifier. For the mediation of the signifier alone allows us to articulate these imaginary relations, though always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: the distance inherent in the chain of ceaseless deferrals and mediations to which the very structure of the linguistic system must give birth. The signifier, as alienating and meaningless token of our symbolic construction as subjects, as token, that is, of our subjectification through subjection to the prospect of meaning; the signifier, by means of which we always inhabit the order of the Other, the order of a social and linguistic reality articulated from somewhere else; the signifier, which calls us into meaning by seeming to call us to ourselves, only ever confers upon us a sort of promissory identity, one with which we never succeed in fully coinciding because we, as subjects of the signifier, can only be signifiers ourselves: can only ever aspire to catch up, to close the gap that divides and by dividing calls forth ourselves as subjects. Politics names those processes, then, through which the social subject attempts to secure the conditions of its consolidation by identifying with what is outside it in order to bring it into the presence, deferred perpetually, of itself.

#### Predictions and risk analysis in debate is not accurate forecasting. Rather, it’s a way to imagine and harness the uncertain future, allowing imagined scenarios to call the shots of the present.

De Goede 08 (Marieke, Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. “Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination” Security Dialogue Vol. 39, no. 2-3, April)

Premediation is a promising term to denote the discursive economies through which terrorist futures are imagined, because it draws attention to the cultural practices of mediation at work. It draws attention to the cultural work performed by news media and entertainment industries, as well as by security ‘experts’, consultants and policymakers – whom Didier Bigo calls the ‘managers of unease’ – in envisioning possible terrorist futures (Bigo, 2002; see also Huysmans, 2006). The close conjunction between the Hollywood culture industry and these ‘managers of unease’ has long been noted by authors like James Der Derian (2001), who coined the term ‘military–industrial–media– entertainment network’ to denote this nexus. For example, Der Derian (2005: 30) notes how, shortly after 9/11, the Institute for Creative Technologies in California – which, according to its website, is dedicated to ‘building partnerships between the entertainment industry, army, and academia’ – began to gather Hollywood screenwriters and directors in order to ‘create possible terrorist scenarios that could be played out in their Marina del Rey virtual reality facilities’ (see also Campbell, 2003: 59–64; Boggs & Pollard, 2006). Security premediation is enabled through a broader turn to risk management as a security technology in diverse domains of modern life (Simon, 2007; O’Malley, 2004). In the ‘war on terror’, technologies of risk management foster new security initiatives, such as automated passenger screening at borders and the risk-based detection of suspicious financial transactions (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Amoore, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Zureik & Salter, 2005). This deployment of risk in the ‘war on terror’ articulates two worlds of post-9/11 globalization: the world of legitimate and productive movement that is to be fostered and expedited, and the world of illegitimate and suspect movement that is to be stopped, questioned and detained. It is on the basis of risk assessment and calculation that ‘legitimate’ flows of money, goods and people are to be separated from the suspect, illegitimate and underground. As Sparke (2006: 13) writes of risk-based ‘smart border’ technologies, their promise is to deliver ‘economic liberty and homeland security with a hightech fix’. Risk and premediation, then, proceed from a shared desire: to imagine, harness and commodify the uncertain future. They share a technological history through their appeal to uncertainty as both a source of threat *and* a spur to creativity. As Pat O’Malley (2004: 4) shows in his exploration of particular representations of risk in management literatures**,** uncertainty was never *just* a threat to be subdued or eradicated, but was always celebrated for fostering ‘entrepreneurial creativity’ and ‘transformative power’. According to O’Malley (2004: 5), Uncertainty . . . is to be the fluid art of the possible. It involves techniques of flexibility and adaptability, requires a certain kind of ‘vision’ that may be thought of as intuition but is nevertheless capable of being explicated at great length in terms such as . . . ‘governing with foresight.’ Both premediation and (particular forms of) risk management straddle the paradox of celebrating uncertainty while desiring to eradicate it – fostering booming business practices in the process (see Baker & Simon, 2002b; Lobo- Guerrero, 2007). At the same time however, there are substantial differences between risk assessment and what Grusin calls premediation. Most importantly, premediation is not chiefly in the business of *forecasting*. As Grusin (2004: 28) argues, ‘premediation . . . is not necessarily about *getting the future right* as much as it is about trying to imagine or map out as many possible futures as could plausibly be imagined’ (emphasis added). Thus, whereas the logic of risk and forecasting centres on *prediction* of the future, premediation is more selfconsciously ‘creative’ in imagining a variety of futures – some thought likely, others far-fetched, some thought imminent, others long-haul – in order to *enable action in the present.* This is a difference not just in logic or purpose, but also in method: as Grusin (2004: 29) puts it, ‘a weather map does not premediate tomorrow’s storm in the way in which it will be mediated after it strikes’. Instead of the disembodied, statistical and at least seemingly objective method of the forecast, premediation scripts and mediates multiple futures ‘in ways that are almost indistinguishable from the way the future will be mediated when it happens’ (Grusin, 2004: 29). Arguably then, premediation is not about the future *at all*, but about enabling action in the present by visualizing and drawing on multiple imagined futures (Amoore, 2007b). Indeed, as we have seen above, the 9/11 Commission emphasizes precisely this call to action in the present when it understands the challenge of imagination to be ‘to figure out a way to turn a scenario into constructive action’ (9/11 Commission, 2004: 346, emphasis added). Through its selfconscious deployment of imagination, premediation can be understood to address itself to *risk beyond risk* (Ewald, 2002: 249). The imagined catastrophe driving premediation is seen to be simultaneously incalculable *and* demanding new methodologies of calculation and imagination. In this sense, it is akin to a politics of precaution, which, according to Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster (2007, 2008) is the dispositif through which the ‘war on terror’ has to be understood. ‘Precautionary risk’, write Aradau & van Munster (2007: 101) ‘introduces within the computation of the future its very limit, the infinity of uncertainty and potential damage.’ It is in this very computation of the future at the limit, of course, that financial practices are historically experienced. Indeed, Melinda Cooper (2006: 119) draws out this affinity with speculation when she writes of the logic of precaution: ‘If the catastrophe befalls us, it is from a future without chronological continuity with the past. Though we might suspect something is wrong with the world . . . no mass of information will help us pin-point the precise when, where and how of the coming havoc. *We can only speculate’* (emphasis added).

#### Futurism necessitates violence. The queer must be exterminated in order to achieve harmony.

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis, Lacanian Psychoanalyst, Lacan and the Political, p. 99-101, Questia,)

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism—a universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies. 1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio-political sphere: ‘utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being’ (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneri’s book Journey through Utopia, warn—taking into account experiences like the Second World War—of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being ‘how can we realise our utopias?’, the crucial question has become ‘how can we prevent their final realisation?…. [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free’ (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309). 2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way. 3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Let’s start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis. 4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131). 5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958).

#### Voting negative is an identification with death, queerness, and negativity in the face of a politics that is only valuable through some reconciled, future order

Schotten 09 (C. Heike, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Nietzsche’s Revolution: Decadence, Politics, and Sexuality, p. 203-6)IAA

Instead of falling prey to the logic of the Child, however, and its imperatives of protection, sacrifice, futurity, and hope, Edelman encourages queers to embrace our stigmatized positioning as the negativity, death, and futurelessness of social life. He boldly admits that this means, in the case of feminists and gay people, adopting the conservative Right's belief that abortion and nonprocreative sexual pleasure lead to the undoing of social life and the downfall of civilization. But this is because social conservatives are right in their insistence that civilization itself depends on the Child or, more generally, in the hope and belief in a future that will validate all present human activity. Queerness, then, undermines this future, and indeed threatens to annihilate its very possibility in its nihilistic excesses. In this analysis, then, "queer" is the name of what threatens the integrity and coherence of social life, a nimble and capacious designation that can encompass far more and disparate numbers of people than simply "homosexuals." If, for example, Reaganites are correct in seeing welfare benefits as stimuli to procreation on the part of helplessly dependent and drug-addicted mothers of color, then Edelman's proposal amounts to demanding that queer politics align and identify itself with these welfare queens (a move that would productively double and ironize the "queen" of this otherwise derogatory term). If Puar's analysis of homonationalism is correct, and if George W. Bush is to be believed that one is either with the U.S. government or one is with the terrorists, then this means that a revolutionary queer project of no future must necessarily align itself with the terrorists as well."' Edelman correctly characterizes this position as "oppositional to the structural logic of opposition"" 8 (a Nietzschean tactic, to be sure), insofar as it refuses to consider childlessness or the lack of futurity— that is, the abyss into which queers would be thrown—an objection. In short, Edelman's suggestion amounts to saying, "More abyss, please!" I think the militancy of Edelman's rhetoric belies a revolutionary desire that augurs liberation from precisely such stultifying heteronormativity. In a superb display of revolutionary rhetoric, for example, Edelman declares: Queers must respond . . . not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order's prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what [Bernard] Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws with both capital /s and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. 120 This is an emancipatory commitment he would surely deny. Edelman insists that he offers no such liberatory hope, since any and all futurity— even revolutionary futurity—is already co-opted by the cult of the Child in whose name the future is always wagered and promised, and from which queers are necessarily prohibited. To hope is thus, in Edelman's view, the political version of "Smearing the Queer." Indeed, Edelman gleefully notes that this choice to own and occupy the space of no future deliberately overcomes the need or possibility for anything like hope. As he says, "we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future." 12 ' The future of queer politics, then, is no future at all—it is rather the very narcissistic, future-sacrificing, self-indulgent jouissance for its own sake to which queers are condemned, anyway. I think Edelman is right that we queers—again, an expansive term that includes "all so stigmatized for failing to comply with heteronormative mandates" 122—ought to embrace the very position of nihilistic future assassins to which culture and politics consign us. Where Edelman goes awry, however, is in his conclusion that this signifies the death of hope as well. While it is true that hope is routinely—perhaps even uniquely— symbolized in and by this logic of the Child (a logic we see even in Nietzsche with his redemptive emphasis on self-birthing and Zarathustra's final metamorphosis of the spirit into the child), it still seems to me that if we embrace Edelman's proposal, this is nothing less than the embrace of an explicitly revolutionary politics which lacks dogma but is inextricable from gratification. Indeed, Edelman suggests that we accept the dictates of politics that identifies jouissance with self-indulgence, that sees sex (or insistent presentism) and politics as opposed, and impolitic sex (or carnality) as death. And while this undermining of the very terms of politics is indeed nihilistic, this undermining is also not nihilistic, or else Edelman could not, by definition, advocate it as such. Indeed, unbeknownst to him, Edelman occupies the contradictory and thus revolutionary Nietzschean position of affirming negation. For it is not the Child per se—that is, futurity per se—that is the problem, but [is] the Christian structures of meaning-making that insist that life have a future other than death, that we sacrifice ourselves on the cross of something greater than ourselves. In this sense, Edelman may be diagnosing our current moment of modernity as beholden to the cross of the Child—perhaps this is the next installment in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality: first Christianity, then modern science, and now, reproductive futurity. But Edelman cannot help but perform for us that even a politics of no future is both a politics and a future. For, unless we are already dead, death is the future, for all of us. His demand that we not sacrifice ourselves prematurely to it, that we not forsake the present for the future, nor demand that this present wallow in the determinations of the past, is quite undeniably a political proscription, one bent on undermining and in fact undoing the entire social order, the goal of all revolutionaries, last I checked. Unflagging commitment to liberatory political transformation is thus strangely compatible with post-structuralist critique, and I think Edelman (like Nietzsche, and despite Edelman's own protestations) embodies this discordant harmony himself. His longing for a total eradication of the very structures of meaning and temporality that make politics intelligible is nothing less than a desire for the overthrow of everything existing. He is clear, at many points, that this structure is an oppressive one, one that functions on the basis of a binary division imposed on humanity between those selfless people who sacrifice themselves for the future and those selfish ones who, in their endless pursuit of their own gratification, are responsible for the decay of morality, the dissolution of the social order, teen pregnancy, skyrocketing delinquency, and the AIDS epidemic— much less the vulnerability of the United States to those terrorists, illegal immigrants, and welfare dependents who threaten the freedom, health, and economic strength of the nation. That this dichotomy is not simply a false one, but in fact an imposition of power, and indeed the enabling condition of politics itself, suggests that Edelman has a clearly revolutionary analysis. Edelman's declaration that he is going beyond the politics of opposition by embracing its constitutive outside and declaring it his home is also Nietzsche's position, and it is, I think, the only possible meaning we can ascribe to the word "queer." As Edelman says, "Queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one." 123 But Edelman and Marxist critics alike would be wrong to ascribe to this perpetual resistance an apolitical character—or instead, as Puar warns, as itself a normative idealization of resistance in an implicitly voluntarist model of agency. 124 For queer is contradiction, the both/and, the refusal to be singularly determinate: in the case of gender and sexuality in particular, it is the refusal of the will to truth precisely in the realms of life believed to be the most natural, the most immune to "deconstruction"—the body, its desire, and its sex. That this in-between position, this both/and continues to be the space of the abject and the unthinkable, the futurelessness of desire with no telos and the death of civilization—refugees and other stateless people also raise these fundamental, discomfiting dilemmas—suggests that for revolution to remain revolutionary it must queer itself. It cannot remain wedded to a particular domain of truth or materiality as the foundation for the future, for this is itself a violation of its own radical credentials. Nor can it any longer hope for a salvific future wherein all corruption and dissatisfaction have been eliminated. This is quite different from either the dogmatic moralizing of revolutionaries past or the valorization of resistance as the only appropriate mode of subjectivity. Rather, it is not so far from what Puar recommends we adopt in thinking through the consequences of queer politics—allowing for "complicities" with power that do not signal "the failure of the radical, resistant, or oppositional potential of queernesses."'25 This means that both Nietzsche's revolution and his revolutionary posturing are positions of no future. Or, rather, that queered revolutionary commitment stakes its future on the eradication of the past, not its preservation. It is a position built not on the foundation of the Child, but on the ground of the graveyard. But it is also not a refusal of hope, as Edelman suggests, nor is it a tacitly Christian incitement of a revolutionary desire that cannot, and ought not, go ungratified, as Brown proposes. It is rather a recognition that hope is contradictorily compatible with death, with the insistent presentism of revolutionary commitment and futureless gratification of affirmation (or the futureless affirmation of gratification). Which concludes this book almost exactly where it started: for Nietzsche, our only choices are revolution or death, as Christianity poses the greatest threat to human existence thus far dreamed up. I think it is clear he wanted us to choose revolution, but I think it is also clear that he knew the choice was a setup—like all dichotomies, false.

## 2NC—Framework

### 2NC—Dem Delib OV

#### And, democratic deliberation is an all-powerful praxis empirically proven to help citizens become appreciative of the collective problems we face—the only way to revive politics is to align debate with the model we propose

Gundersen 2000

(Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9m, Dil)

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens apprecia­tion of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the ab­sence of the institutional interdependence established by the US con­stitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' apprecia­tion of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that deci­sion-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their rep­resentatives. One can add to these theoretical considerations a length­ening list of empirical findings which suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the prob­lems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if deliberation will of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time en­hance interdependence. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more demo­cratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collec­tive choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reason­able, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, citizens must borrow a page from the participa­tory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as their responsi­bility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are, after all, under direct and constant pressure to act rather than deliberate. Politics, in other words, must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.

### 2NC—Decision Making

#### **The critical thinking of our model is necessary for reasoned decisionmaking**

Steinberg and Freeley 2008  
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4) MT

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California’s requirement states: Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly competitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring out solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking “entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.” Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves the thinking of those involved.

### Predictability

#### The negative is prepared debate an affirmative that answers the resolution – this increases our critical thinking skills because of pre-round research and strategy – resolution focus is necessary

Goodin and Niemeyer 2003 Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

### Topicality Good

#### **Topicality/Framework is necessary to debate – we have to limit the meaning of words so we can have effective communication**

Kemerling 1997 (Garth, professor of philosophy at Newberry College, <http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm> )

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher [John Locke](http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/lock.htm) pointed out three centuries ago, the achievementof human knowledgeis often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts: Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences. Merely [verbal disputes](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#verbal), on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief. Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can. Kinds of Definition The most common way of preventingor **eliminating** differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the [definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/d2.htm#def) of our terms**.** Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds: A [lexical definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/l5.htm#lexi) simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, a [stipulative definition](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/s9.htm#stip) freely assigns meaningto a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it, and the definition is always correct (though it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless). If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition. Combining these two techniques is **often** an effective way to reduce the [vagueness](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/v.htm#vag) of a word or phrase. These [precising definitions](http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p7.htm#prec) begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use**. Here,** the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness**.** If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

### Topic Good

**Academics have an obligation to engage in politics to address issues like war and the War on Terror**

**Breiner 4** [Peter Breiner is associate professor of political science at the State University of New York at Albany. He is the author of Max Weber and Democratic Politics and articles on Weber and other German theorists, “Distance and Engagement in a Time of War: Comments on ‘Social Science and Liberal Values’”, Vol. 2/No 3, Pg 485, September 2004, Ssanchez]

In “Social Science and Liberal Values in a Time of War,” Jeffrey Isaac urges us to discuss “**the responsibilities of social scientists during wartime**.” He focuses specifically on **the**¶ **ethics of responsibility appropriate to the university-based scholar when political authority attacks the values, both moral and non-moral, that we implicitly presuppose when we func- tion as academics in general, and political scientists in particular.** Isaac invokes the authority of Max Weber to elucidate the precise boundaries of these obligations as well as to find a notion of responsibility on which all political scientists, what- ever their partisan commitments, can agree.¶ Of course, Isaac rightly notes that the context in which he writes is quite different from Weber’s. Weber was also trying to find a kind of impartiality that all academics could agree on, regardless of partisan stances. But he pursued this aim **in an academic environment in which using the lectern to impose one’s partisan position on an audience was the norm.**1 He further assumed that his audience was deeply committed to a wide range of political parties, programs, and goals, and was expecting judgment about right and wrong political commit- ments, which, at least on surface, he claimed a social scientist as such was not in a position to provide. **Isaac,** on the other hand, **wants academics, especially political scientists, to con- sider their public responsibilities, given their tendency to ignore the dangers to the values of academic freedom—such as free inquiry, free speech, free dissemination of one’s work, and free exchange—that war, and the political invocations of “war,” might have.** Unlike Weber, he is not worried about an over- politicized relation of the political scientist to his or her audi- ence; rather his **concern is with the under-politicized relation of political scientists to the values presupposed by all who engage in scholarship.** Nonetheless, even though Weber, in his famous vocational lectures, was not overly troubled by the question of why the scholar should defend free speech and public discussion, Isaac is right in claiming that Weber’s account of what social science might provide in clarifying political com- mitments presupposes these values.¶ Isaac’s account of **scholarly values and obligations takes the form of two sets of arguments,** both derived from Weber. **The first,** which he claims is his central concern, **focuses on defend- ing a list of civil liberties presupposed by the academic role as it applies to political scientists. The second,** which he finds peripheral to his argument, **focuses on the particular responsibility of the political or social scientist in critically clarifying politics to a wider audience.** In what follows, I suggest that the two arguments are not separable in the way that Isaac claims they are; in fact, **if we take our role as students of politics as well as academics seriously, the obligation to clarify politics in a time of war (or peace) should be considered just as pressing as the defense of civil liberties**; indeed, it follows from it.¶ Isaac’s first argument, which forms the bulk of his article, is fairly uncontroversial. Agreeing with Stanley Fish, he contends that as scholars we have a duty to defend academic values when they are attacked, though not to take partisan political stances. **It would be self-defeating, the reasoning goes, to separate our activity of engaging in inquiry from the (liberal) values that sup- port it. That is, as much as we would like to, we cannot simply disentangle our scholarly work from the conditions that enable us to do it**. Our awareness of this duty becomes more pressing during times when political authority is more than usually inclined to attack these values in the name of national security and fear of enemies. (One could add this is never more true when the war is seen as an endless struggle of good versus evil and the enemy is viewed not as an agent but an amorphous “ism” like terrorism.) **Whatever our partisan political positions on war and peace,** according to Isaac, we all can agree to respect and defend the liberal values that make free inquiry possible.¶ Isaac’s motivation for presenting this minimal argument rests on the observation that most academics show little interest in the organizations and institutions that make it their business to defend academic freedom—a complacency that is, perhaps, especially egregious for political scientists.

## 1NR—Edelman

### AT: Kray Et Al

#### Identity politics reinscribes the oppression it attempts to solve. By historicizing oppression through identity they create a nostalgia for the past that is used to ensure a salvific future.

Schotten 09 (C. Heike, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Nietzsche’s Revolution: Decadence, Politics, and Sexuality, p. 199-201)

Critics have long complained that the post-structuralist turn authorized by Nietzsche, popularized by Foucault, and widely taken up in Left scholarship today, destroys the possibility of liberatory politics. Worried about the eradication of the category “women,” the erasure of queer identificatory specificity, or the obscuring of the material basis of exploitation, critics see the indeterminacy of a postmodern politics as undermining the foundation of Left political commitment, inaugurating a dangerous apathy that unwittingly colludes with the status quo.99 In academia, for example, feminist critics have claimed it is “too soon” for a post-identity politics. While the logical force of a philosophical argument like Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble may perhaps “prove” there is no such thing as a woman, critics argue this does nothing to alleviate actual women’s suffering or eradicate patriarchal domination in the “real” world.100 Similarly, the translation of Butler’s post-structuralist approach into the political activism of groups like the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, an organization that, in their words, “works to ensure that classrooms, communities, and workplaces are safe for everyone to learn, grow, and succeed—whether or not they meet expectations for masculinity and femininity,”101has been protested by queer activists who decry the erasure of specifically transsexual experience in the “mainstreaming” of gender norms as oppressive of all people, regardless of trans-status.102 Finally, Marxian-influenced critics insist that post-structuralist politics neglects the materiality of class relations and exploitation in favor of an abstracted and highly intellectualized “play” of bodies and pleasures that is divorced from the realities of capitalist domination. In each of these complaints, the claim is that there is some reality or other—whether of suffering or of the body or of relations of domination—to which post-structural analysis is willfully, naïvely, or destructively blind. In the first, it is the reality of women-as-a-group and the fact of their oppression; in the second, it is the specificity of transsexuals’ experience; in the third, it is the reality of class and class domination, as epitomized by the exploitation of the worker’s labor. These critical demands for unflagging commitment to some particular political reality, when coupled with the post-structuralist critique of the dogmatism of such demands, leaves us in a quandary: how to remain committed to liberatory politics without becoming implicated in the very domination we seek to challenge. I come to this quandary both as a student of Friedrich Nietzsche, who I see as an important intellectual progenitor of post-structuralism,103 and as an activist with incorrigible revolutionary tendencies. Nietzsche’s Revolution is my attempt to bring these two seemingly irreconcilable pieces together. Thus far, I have argued that Nietzsche himself is a revolutionary in his attempt to overthrow the domination of Christianity in European civilization. Like Rousseau and Marx before him, Nietzsche pronounces all of modernity to be shot through with corruption and decay and, in his case, declares Christianity to blame for it. Also like his revolutionary predecessors, Nietzsche seeks to overthrow his (Christian) antagonist through what he calls a revaluation of all values. Thus far, this would seem to be a particularly tidy, modern revolutionary narrative. A story of decay that is overcome through a radical break or rupture that will establish the new seems to fit squarely within the parameters of modern political thought, which is fixated on the problem of beginnings (having forsaken Christianity and God as the proper origins of politics) and regards human power as the only means by which social progress is secured.104 Yet Nietzsche is not simply a modern thinker, but also an inaugurator of a time and place often referred to as postmodernity. For even as Nietzsche declares Christianity responsible for every travesty hitherto visited upon Western civilization and demands its violent overthrow, he also repeatedly undercuts the validity and truth of these very revolutionary proclamations. This is because Nietzsche knows and shows that the logic of revolutionary desire is itself Christian. The promise of liberation from existing conditions of corruption and decay betrays a transparently Christian promise of a salvific future. The coherence of the diagnosis itself, of the corruption and decay which are hidden by the lies of an outside, damaging force—in this case, Christianity (for Marx, capitalism; for Rousseau, inequality or dependence)—is possible only on the basis of an equally religious belief in the truth of one’s own revolutionary critique. Thus, revolutionary desire replicates two basic elements of Christianity— dogmatism and salvational teleology. It is Nietzsche himself who points out that these are by-products of Christianity and that anyone who advocates in their name is not to be trusted. Nietzsche is thus the first revolutionary to fundamentally undercut his own revolutionary authority. In his demand that we unite with him to overthrow Christianity, he invites us to undermine him as the leader of this revolution and overthrow him, too, insofar as he is also ill with the sickness of Christianity. We can see why it is, then, that critics are so concerned with poststructuralist critique—it seems to eradicate the possibility of revolution once and for all.105 However, I want to hold out hope for the possibility of committing to revolution in a non-Christian way. I want to reject the arguments of those who insist we retain a dogmatic commitment to the “truth” of identity or materiality in order to be either revolutionaries or leftists. I want to reject the claim that utopia or another kind of salvific promise is essential to the logic of revolution. I want to insist that liberatory political commitment does not conflict with rigorous and unrelenting post-structuralist critique. The challenge, then, is to think the possibility of revolution that forsakes neither its liberatory commitment nor its radical transformative promise, yet does not itself become another dogma or oppressive prescription. As we have seen, many are concerned that if “women” or “transsexuals” or “labor” are dissolved as stable or material referents, then the basis for opposing oppression is lost. It seems to me, however, that each of these claims betrays an anxiety about the future; namely, that there will not be one without a clear and determinate articulation of the present. This is what Wendy Brown argues we have lost with the decay of revolution—we have lost a vision of the future, a “utopian imaginary” that can structure and animate our critique of the present.106 But the present, as these critics define it, is irretrievably rooted in the past. For identificatory categories like woman, transsexual, and worker are the by-products of relations of power that produce these categories as the very names of “difference,” names which then function to justify the domination that instituted them in the first place. So the fear of post-structuralist critique is a fear that the future will be lost if we do not maintain or hold onto the past, a strangely nostalgic anxiety. In order to preserve the future and our hope for a brighter tomorrow, then, we must justify ourselves in the present, which is only intelligible through recourse to an oppressive past that, in this schema, is not allowed to pass away.107 The past is thus never fully past; it weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. The critical leftist demand for commitment to some “reality” or other, then, is a purchasing of our present legitimacy on the promise of an unseen but redemptive future, an avoidance of the realization that, on these terms, the future will be merely a repetition compulsion, a revisiting of the past to which it is inextricably tethered.

### Impact Level

#### important in terms of its place in the future.

Edelman 04 (Lee, Prof @ Tuffman University, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, P. 47-9**)**

The death drive as which the.queer figures, then, refuses the calcification of form that is reproductive futurism, since the Lacanian death drive, as 2iiek observes, "is precisely the ultimate Freudian name for the dimension traditional metaphysics designated as that of immortality for a drive, a 'thrust,' which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of generation and corruption, beyond the 'way of all flesh.' In other words, in the death drive, the concept 'dead' functions in exactly the same way as heimlich' in the Freudian unheimlich, as coinciding with its negation: the 'death drive' designates the dimension of what honor fiction calls the `undead,' a strange, immortal, indestructible life that persists beyond death." 27 Such immortality pertains to what the Symbolic constitutively forecloses: not reality, not the subject, not the future, not the Child, but the substance of jouissance itself, the Lacanian lamella, on which the sinthomosexual lives and against which social organization wields the weapon of futurity to keep the place of life empty—merely a hollow, inanimate form—the better to sustain the fantasy of its endurance in time to come. The death drive's "immortality," then, refers to a persistent negation that offers assurance of nothing at all: neither identity, nor survival, nor any promise of a future. Instead, it insists both on and as the impossibility of Symbolic closure, the absence of any Other to affirm the Symbolic order's truth, and hence the illusory status of meaning as defense against the self-negating substance of jouissance. Make no mistake, then: Tiny Tim survives at our expense in a culture that always sustains itself on the threat that he might die. And we, the sinthomosexuals who, however often we try to assert that we're "more" than what we do with our genitals, are nonetheless convicted from the outset of stealing his childhood, endangering his welfare, and, ultimately, destroying his life, must respond by insisting that Tiny Tim is always already dead, mortified into a fetish animated only by the collective fantasy wherein he doesn't rise up and ask in reproach, "Father, don't you see I'm burning?" 28 Because there isn't now, and never has been, much doubt about who killed him, because his death can always be traced to the sinthomosexual's jouissance, why not acknowledge our kinship at last with the Scrooge who, unregenerate, refuses the social imperative to grasp futurity in the form of the Child, for the sake of whom, as the token of accession to Imaginary wholeness, everything else in the world, by force if needed, must give way?

#### The social order will always project images of potential suffering and violence which necessitate positive actions to avoid catastrophes. Our foremost ethical duty is to challenge this forced choice: to take make the impossible decision and say yes to all their threats.

Edelman 04 (Lee, Prof @ Tuffman University, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, P. 108-9)

On the face of Mount Rushmore, as he faces the void to which he himself offers a face, Leonard gestures toward such an unbinding by committing himself to the sinthomosexual's impossible ethical act: by standing resolutely at, and on, and for that absolute limit. Alenka Zupan'dle, in Ethics of the Real, notes that what Kant called the ethical act "is denounced as `radically evil' in every ideology," and then describes how ideology typically manages to defend against it: "The gap opened by an act (i.e., the unfamiliar, 'out-of-place' effect of an act) is immediately linked in this ideological gesture to an image. As a rule this is an image of suffering, which is then displayed to the public alongside this question: Is this what you want? And this question already implies the answer: It would be impossible, inhuman, for you to want this!" 55 The image of suffering adduced here is always the threatened suffering of an image: an image onto which the face of the human has coercively been projected such that we, by virtue of losing it, must also lose the face by which we (think we) know ourselves. For "we are, in effect," as Lacan ventriloquizes the normative understanding of the self, "at one with everything that depends on the image of the other as our fellow man, on the similarity we have to our ego and to everything that situates us in the imaginary register." 56 To be anything else—to refuse the constraint, the inertia, of the ego as form— would be, as Zupana rightly says, "impossible, inhuman." As impossible and inhuman as a shivering beggar who asks that we kill him or fuck him; as impossible and inhuman as Leonard, who responds to Thornhill by crushing his hand; as impossible and inhuman as the sinthomosexual, who shatters the lure of the future and, for refusing the call to compassion, finally merits none himself. To embrace the impossibility, the inhumanity of the sinthomosexual: that, I suggest, is the ethical task for which queers are singled out. Leonard affords us no lesson in how to follow in his footsteps, but calls us, beyond desire, to a sinthomosexuality of our own—one we assume at the price of the very identity named by "our own." To those on whom his ethical stance, his act, exerts a compulsion, Leonard bequeaths the irony of trying to read him as an allegory, as one from whom we could learn how to act and in whom we could find the sinthomosexual's essential concretization: the formalization of a resistance to the constant conservation of forms, the substantialization of a negativity that dismantles every substance. He leaves us, in short, the impossible task of trying to fill his shoes—shoes that were empty of anything human even while he was wearing them, but that lead us, against our own self-interest and in spite of our own desire, toward a jouissance from which everything "human," to have one, must turn its face.