# USC Rd 1—Weber AH

## 1NC

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#### The prioritization of discussions on human-centered oppression naturalizes a dualism between the human and nonhuman, justifying endless consumption of nature

Rose ‘06 (Rebecca, Lecturer in Literature for Trinity College Foundation Studies, The University of Melbourne, “COLLOQUY text theory critique”, <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy_issue_12_november_2006/issue12.pdf>, AO)

Arguing that nonhumans are inherently valuable, that is, nonhumans have rights independent of human interest or human resemblance, is met with general resistance, which is exceedingly powerful when coming from a dominant modern culture. Consumption by humans is a core tenet of this dominant modern culture. Recognising the inherent value and rights of nonhumans leads to recognising the necessary responsibility and care of humans towards nonhumans, and threatens the ideal, or rather the ideology, of unconditional consumption, because it is nonhumans who are being consumed excessively and without respect.15 That a foremost cause of humans violating other humans’ rights follows directly from this culture supporting a slight minority of humans who consume excessively and indifferently at the expense of all others, is an established criticism that I will not address directly.16 For now, I am skeptical of any reasoning which suggests that showing care towards nonhumans compromises human wellbeing. If at all, it is the human-centric theories for admitting nonhumans into ethical consideration that are likely to be accepted within the dominating modern culture. Even then, such acceptance of an ethical code is irregularly or improperly conducted into practice. As for valuing nonhumans for their inherent selves – this possible social development is at the farthest peripheries of theoretical ethical consideration, let alone being a code evident in practice within the human-nonhuman relationship typical of the dominant culture. An argument for human rights may be drawn by examining the foundations of present human rights work. A fundamental cause of the failure of human rights work to achieve an enduring and positive difference can be identified in its underlying reasoning. It seems sound: strengthen human rights by targeting those who appear to violate them. Nearly all human rights work is based upon bettering the human-human relationship. The ideal human-human relationship, the kind envisioned by the Universal Declaration, has been established as the theoretical foundation of world peace. By implication we perceive real human-human relationship as the basic problem. Supposedly, if we fix the way humans treat each other, then the ░ Human Rights 143 world’s problems will disappear. I partly agree. Without doubt, human beings are today an unprecedented and fierce force. The immediate future of earthly life does appear to be dependent upon what we humans do. However, I would disagree that what we humans do to each other is the essential determinant of peace. I am not sure, in other words, that the mistreatment of humans by humans is the foremost problem. The centralization of human-human relationships continues into the burgeoning work for nonhuman rights, which is largely developing as secondary to human rights: either as a reinforcement or extension of human rights. It is significant that work for nonhuman rights follows on from work for human rights. The ideal human-human relationship is constructed as a pre-existent, or a priori ethical ideal for the human-nonhuman relationship. Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethical development. Although I might proceed by bringing nonhuman rights solely into the foreground, my specific intention here is to develop human rights. Orientating discussion towards the development of human rights specifically does not undermine my belief that human and nonhuman rights cannot be treated as exclusive subjects or forked ethical paths. Continual and inevitable recourse to the subject of nonhuman rights will attest this. My rejection of human-centric ethical development is not driven entirely by the failure of human-centrism to really recognise nonhuman rights. Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethical theory and practice to the detriment of nonhumans and humans. The rest of this discussion aims to clarify how recognizing nonhuman rights independent from human interest lays a true foundation for human rights. Arguably, an ethical human-nonhuman relationship is a prerequisite for an ethical human-human relationship. To support this argument, I’ll start by drawing attention to epistemological processes within human-nonhuman abuse, and will continue by considering how violations of human rights by humans originate in human-nonhuman abuse in the context of contemporary war, including terrorism. If reflecting upon how we relate to others is constitutive of human rights work, then understanding why we practice those relations, or thinking about the epistemological foundation of our selves, is critical. The dominant modern relationship between human self and other is shaped by an epistemology of hyperseparation. Modern paradigms of rationality and objectification have constructed others as radically other. We might note how common and standard are the critiques that expose modern technoscience, politics and economics as socially powerful and potentially selfish agents that may act to disengage from, marginalise, exclude and control that which gets otherized.17 There is nothing unfamiliar about humans regarding themselves as exceptional and superior to the ‘other’. History is a chronicle of human mistreatment of the ‘other’ predominantly identified as nonhuman nature: the human/nature dualism appears in classical epistemology.18

#### The human non-human divide is a prerequisite understanding to identity

Pugliese 2013 (Joseph, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitcal Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones*. 2013; Law and the Postcolonial, AO)

In his *Lectures at the College de France,* Foucault examines the category of race in an in-depth manner that is strikingly absent from his previously published corpus. Race, indeed, assumes a fundamental role in his theorizing of biopolitics. In his analysis of early nineteenth-century European culture, Foucault identifies a decisive break with the past in relation to the uses and abuses of race and the 'discourse of race struggle': It [the discourse of race struggle] will become the discourse of a centered, centralized, and centralizing power. It will become the discourse of battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage. At this point, we have all those biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, but also all those institutions within the social body which make the discourse of race struggle function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society.1\* Foucault identifies the resultant 'race wars' that this discourse of race struggle nables as what is 'articulated with European policies of colonization.'3 The biopolitics of race in the context of colonialism as theorized by Foucault is, in fact, nderpinned by a governing biopolitical category that remains at once unspoken and untheorized: speciesism - understood in all of its anthropocentric dimensions. The entire apparatus of the biopolitics of race - its colonial and imperial dimen­sions' its discriminatory, exclusionary and necropolitical effects - are, I propose, all rendered culturally intelligible and biopolitically enabled by the category of the absolute non-human other: the animal - and I deploy the problematic definite article here precisely in order to underscore the violent operations of homogeniza-tion, totalization and genericity that are operative in the binary logic of anthropo­centrism. The critical dependency of the biopolitics of racism on the category of non-human animals can be traced back to the 'prehistoricaP human enslavement ('domestication') of animals. The enslavement of animals must be seen as supplying the template for the consequent enslavement of humans as the fungibility of animals was historically transposed to human slaves - with, as I elaborate below, one critical intraspecies prohibition. Biopolitical arguments of race and 'the norm,' 'the biological heritage,' and the threats of 'degeneracy' are all premised, in the first instance, on the unspoken assumption of an anthropocentrism that has assiduously labored to construct and consolidate species hierarchies and their attendant knowledge/power effects in terms of the valuation, fungibility and governance of diverse life forms. If, as Foucault suggests, biopolitics was princi­pally 'focused on the species body,' then what remains unsaid in his work is the critical relation between the human species and its animal others. In his reflection on the manner in which the definite article designating 'the animal' has been wielded by Western philosophers throughout history, Jacques Derrida writes that: all philosophers have judged the limit to be single and indivisible, considering that on the other side of that limit there is an immense group, a single and fundamentally homogeneous set that one has the right, the theoretical or philosophical right, to distinguish and mark as opposite, namely, the set of the Animal in general, the Animal spoken of in the general singular. It applies to the whole animal kingdom with the exception of the human.'

#### Vote negative to endorse the global suicide of humanity

#### Our total rejection of human centered agency and the continuation of human life functions as a valuable thought experiment that allows us to break free from anthropocentric epistemology

Kochi and Ordan 08 – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands)

**How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence?** **While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question – the question of modern action itself – as residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem.** In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself**. The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm.**For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a **practice** of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. **For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune.** Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? **In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’.** While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] **The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman**. **While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism**. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. **By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world.** If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. **Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others.** **It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant.** What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm**. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others?** Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go

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#### Identity is constructed by the ego—we must see through the human self to discover the fictitious nature of existence

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 10-11 \*Gender Modified) Henge

The earliest ethnographers in the South Paciﬁc—many of them Christian missionaries—encountered non-Western cultures they were unable to understand. This forced them to become more aware of the conceptual categories that they themselves had been taking for granted. The contrast had radical implications. They and their successors could not help but become more self-conscious about the constructed nature of their own cultures—and therefore about the constructed nature of their own selves. Without quite understanding what they were doing, they became engaged in a collective project “amounting to the invention of a new subjectivity, the basis of which appears to be an impulse to experience a state of radical instability of value—or even the instability of selfhood itself.”2 Edmund Leach began his inﬂuential Rethinking Anthropology by emphasizing the necessity for the cultural anthropologist to undergo “an extremely personal traumatic kind of experience” in order to escape the prejudices of his or her own culture and be able to enter into another.3 Roy Wagner’s version of this reproduces what countless Buddhist teachers have said about realizing the Buddhist teachings: “The anthropologist cannot simply ‘learn’ the new culture, but must rather ‘take it on’ so as to experience a transformation of ~~his~~ (their) own world.”4 What does this ability to take on another world tell us about our own? The cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker focused on this issue, but his writings have not received the attention they deserve, perhaps because his insights make us too uncomfortable: The world of human aspiration is largely ﬁctitious, and if we do not understand this we understand nothing about ~~man~~ (humankind). It is a largely symbolic creation by an ego-controlled animal that permits action in a psychological world, a symbolic-behavioral world removed from the boundaries of the present moment, from the immediate stimuli which enslave all lower organisms. ~~Man’s~~ (humankind’s) freedom is a fabricated freedom, and ~~he~~ (they) pays a price for it. ~~He~~ (They) must at all times defend the utter fragility of ~~his~~ (their) delicately constituted fiction, deny its artificiality. That’s why we can speak of “joint theatrical staging,” “ritual formulas for social ceremonial,” and “enhancing of cultural meaning,” with utmost seriousness.... The most astonishing thing of all, about ~~man’s~~ (human’s) ﬁctions, is not that they have from prehistoric times hung like a ﬂimsy canopy over ~~his~~ (their) social world, but that ~~he~~ (they) should have come to discover them at all. It is one of the most remarkable achievements of thought, of self-scrutiny, that the most anxiety-prone animal of all could come to see through ~~himself~~ (itself) and discover the ﬁctional nature of ~~his~~ (it’s) action world. Future historians will probably record it as one of the great, liberating breakthroughs of all time, and it happened in ours.5

#### Their anxious egoism makes violence and nuclear war inevitable

Ikeda 07 (Daisaku Ikeda President, Soka Gakkai International January 26, 2007 “Restoring the Human Connection: The First Step to Global Peace” http://www.sgi-usa.org/newsandevents/docs/peace2007.pdf) Dabo

The challenge of preventing any further proliferation of nuclear weapons is just such a trial in the quest for world peace, one that cannot be achieved if we are defeated by a sense of helplessness. The crucial element is to ensure that any struggle against evil is rooted firmly in a consciousness of the unity of the human family, something only gained through the mastery of our own inner contradictions. It is this kind of reconfiguration of our thinking that will make possible a skilled and restrained approach to the options of dialogue and pressure. The stronger our sense of connection as members of the human family, the more effectively we can reduce to an absolute minimum any application of the hard power of pressure, while making the greatest possible use of the soft power of dialogue. Tragically, the weighting in the case of Iraq has been exactly the reverse. The need for such a shift has been confirmed by many of the concerned thinkers I have met. Norman Cousins (1915–90), the writer known as the “conscience of America” with whom I published a dialogue, stated with dismay in his work Human Options: “The great failure of education—not just in the United States but throughout most of the world—is that it has made people tribe-conscious rather than species-conscious.” Similarly, when I met with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in November of last year, he declared powerfully: “… we continue to emphasize our differences instead of what we have in common. We continue to talk about ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Only when we can start to talk about ‘us’ as including all of humanity will we truly be at peace….” In our correspondence, Joseph Rotblat posed the question, “Can we master the necessary arts of global security and loyalty to the human race?”9 Three months after writing these words to me, Dr. Rotblat passed away. I believe his choice to leave this most crucial matter in the form of an open question was an expression of his optimism and his faith in humanity. When our thinking is reconfigured around loyalty to the human race—our sense of human solidarity—even the most implacable difficulties will not cause us to lapse into despair or condone the panicked use of force. It will be possible to escape the snares of such shortsighted thinking. We will be empowered to engage in the kind of persistent exertion that Max Weber viewed as the ideal of political action, and the door will be open to the formation of consensus and persuasion through dialogue. The function of anger When my mentor Josei Toda used the words “a devil incarnate, a fiend, a monster,” he was referring to a destructiveness inherent in human life. It is a function of this destructiveness to shred our sense of human solidarity, sowing the seeds of mistrust and suspicion, conflict and hatred. Those who would use nuclear weapons capable of instantaneously killing tens of millions of people exhibit the most desperate symptoms of this pathology. They have lost all sense of the dignity of life, having fallen prey to their own inner demons. Buddhism classifies the underlying destructive impulses that give rise to such behavior as “the three poisons” (Jpn: san-doku) of greed, anger and ignorance. “The world of anger” can be thought of as the state of life of those in whom these forces have been directed outward toward others. Buddhism analyzes the inner state of human life in terms of the following ten categories, or “worlds”: Hell, Hunger, Animality, Anger, Humanity, Rapture, Learning, Realization, Bodhisattva and Buddhahood. Together these worlds constitute an interpenetrating functional whole, referred to as the inherent ten worlds. It is the wisdom and compassion of the world of Buddhahood that bring out the most positive aspect of each of the other worlds. In the Buddhist scriptures we find the statement “anger can function for both good and evil,”10 indicating that just and righteous anger, the kind essential for countering evil, is the form of the world of anger that creates positive value. The anger that we must be on guard against is that which is undirected and unrestrained relative to the other nine worlds. In this case, anger is a rogue and renegade force, disrupting and destroying all in its path. In this form, the world of anger is a condition of “always seeking to surpass, unable to countenance inferiority, disparaging others and overvaluing oneself.” When in the world of anger, we are always engaged in invidious comparisons with others, always seeking to excel over them. The resulting distortions prevent us from perceiving the world accurately; we fall easily into conflict, locking horns with others at the slightest provocation. Under the sway of such anger, people can commit unimaginable acts of violence and bloodshed. Another Buddhist text portrays one in the world of anger as “84,000 yojanas tall, the waters of the four oceans coming only up to his knees.”12 A yojana was a measure of distance used in ancient India; there are various explanations as to what the specific distance may be, but “84,000 yojanas” represents an immeasurable enormity. This metaphor indicates how the self-perception of people in the life-state of anger expands and swells until the ocean deeps would only lap their knees. The inner distortions twisting the heart of someone in this state prevent them from seeing things in their true aspect or making correct judgments. Everything appears as a means or a tool to the fulfillment of egotistical desires and impulses. In inverse proportion to the scale of this inflated arrogance, the existence of others—people, cultures, nature—appears infinitely small and insignificant. It becomes a matter of no concern to harm or even kill others trivialized in this way. It is this state of mind that would countenance the use of nuclear weapons; it can equally be seen in the psychology of those who would advocate the use of such hideously cruel weapons as napalm, or, more recently, depleted uranium and cluster bombs. People in such a state of life are blinded, not only to the horrific suffering their actions wreak but also to the value of human life itself. For the sake of human dignity, we must never succumb to the numbing dehumanization of the rampant world of anger. When the atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima, not only military personnel but also many scientists were thrilled by the “success” of this new weapon. However, the consciences of genuinely great scientists were filled with anguish. Einstein greeted this news with an agonized cry of woe, while Rotblat told me he was completely overcome with hopelessness. Their feelings were no doubt intensely resonant with the sentiments that motivated Josei Toda to denounce nuclear weapons. When Toda spoke of “declawing” the demonic nature of nuclear weapons, he had in mind the struggle to prevent the inner forces of anger from disrupting the ten worlds and going on an unrestrained rampage. He was calling for the steady and painstaking work of correctly repositioning and reconfiguring the function of anger in an inner world where wisdom and harmony prevail. This is the true meaning of “declawing.” For SGI members in particular it is thus vital we remember that not only our specific activities for peace and culture but the movement for “human revolution” based on the daily endeavor to transform our lives from within is a consistent and essential aspect of the historic challenge of nuclear disarmament and abolition. Unless we focus on this inner, personal dimension, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by the structural momentum of a technological civilization, which in a certain sense makes inevitable the birth of such demonic progeny as nuclear weapons.

#### The anger and hatred of egoism causes us to view life as hell

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 7-8) Henge

There are other important dimensions to karma, aside from those pertaining to psychical and bodily rebirth. Whether or not the law of karma is a moral law of the universe—a kind of psychic equivalent to Newton’s third law of motion, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction—the Buddhist emphasis on no-self and intentional action points to a more subtle aspect of karma: that we construct ourselves by what we choose to do. My sense of self is a precipitate of my habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food I eat, so my character is built by my conscious decisions. According to this approach, people are “punished” or “rewarded” not for what they have done but for what they have become, and what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. This does not necessarily involve an afterlife. According to Spinoza, happiness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself. In more Buddhist terms, we do not live a certain way for the recompense our meritorious actions will bring us, either in this lifetime or in a future one. Rather, to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a different kind of way. The six realms of samsara have usually been understood as distinct worlds or planes of existence through which we transmigrate according to our karma, yet they can also describe the different ways we experience this world as our attitude toward it changes. The hell realm is not necessarily a place I will be reborn into, due to my hatred and evil actions. It can be the way this world is experienced when my mind is dominated by anger and hate. The twelve interlinked factors of pratitya samutpada (interdependent origination) do not necessarily refer to different lifetimes; that teaching can be understood as describing the various causes and effects of “my” mental processes right now. When karma is understood along these lines, the Buddhist emphasis on our constructedness, instead of being an example of premodern supernatural thinking, becomes quite consistent with the postmodern insight. That does not mean this is the only way to interpret karma and samsara; my reﬂections are merely one example of the possibilities that must be addressed for the contemporary relevance of Buddhism to become more apparent. The challenge, of course, is discriminating between the baby and the bathwater, and that will not be easy. If a contemporary Buddhism is to mature, however, this task cannot be evaded.

#### Vote negative to shed the ego

#### This is a self-transformative recognition of the interpermeation of all beings

Snauwaert, 9

(Dale Snauwaert, University of Toledo. “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity” <http://www.academia.edu/537918/The_Ethics_and_Ontology_of_Cosmopolitanism_Education_for_a_Shared_Humanity>) Henge

Cosmopolitans assert the existence of a duty of moral consideration to all human beings on the basis of a shared humanity. What is universal in, and definitive of, cosmopolitanism is the presupposition of the shared inherent dignity of humanity. As Martha Nussbaum states: [Human good can] be objective in the sense that it is justifiable by reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions and are there to be seen whether or not they are in fact recognized in local traditions. (Perry, 1998, p. 68) If a shared humanity is presupposed, and if humanity is understood to possess an equal inherent value and dignity, then a shared humanity possesses a fundamental moral value. If the fundamental moral value of humanity is acknowledged, then a universal duty of moral consideration follows, for to deny moral consideration to any human being is to ignore (not recognize) their intrinsic value, and thereby, to violate their dignity. The duty of moral consideration in turn morally requires nations and peoples to conduct their relations in accordance with ethical principles that properly instantiate the intrinsic value and dignity of a shared humanity. If valid, the fundamental aims of the education of citizens should be based upon this imperative. In order to further explicate this cosmopolitanism perspective, the philosophy of one of history’s greatest cosmopolitans, Mohandas K. Gandhi, is explored below. Reflections on Gandhi’s Cosmopolitan Philosophy While most commentators focus on Gandhi’s conception and advocacy of nonviolence, it is generally recognized that his core philosophical beliefs regarding the essential unity of humanity and the universal applicability of nonviolence as a moral and political ideal places Gandhi in the cosmopolitan tradition as broadly understood (Iyer, [1973] 1983; Kumar Giri, 2006). At the core of Gandhi’s philosophy are the interdependent values of Satya (Truth) and Ahimsa (nonviolence). Gandhi’s approach to nonviolent social transformation, Satyagraha, is the actualization in action of these two values (Bondurant, 1965; Iyer, [1973] 1983; Naess, 1974). Gandhi’s Satya is multifaceted. Its most fundamental meaning pertains to Truth as self-realization. Satya is derived from sat, Being. Truth is Being; realizing in full awareness one’s authentic Being. Truth, in this sense, is the primary goal of life. Gandhi writes: What I want to achieve . . . is self-realization . . . I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to this same end. (Naess 1974, p. 35) Self-realization, for Gandhi, requires “shedding the ego,” “reducing one self to zero” (cited in Naess 1974, p. 37). The ego per se is not the real self; it is a fabrication. This egoic self must be transcended. As the egoic self loosens and one becomes increasingly self-aware, one deepens the realization of one’s authentic being, and that being is experienced as unified with humanity and all living things. Scholars normally understand human identity in terms of personality, which is a socially constructed self-concept constituted by a complex network of identifications and object relations. This construction is what we normally refer to as the ego or self-identity. Our egoic self-identity is literally a construction, based upon psychological identifications (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Batchelor, 1983). From this perspective, the ego is a socially constructed entity, ultimately a fabrication of the discursive formations of culture; from this point of view, the self is exclusively egoic. This perspective has its origins in the claim that consciousness is solely intentional: the claim that consciousness is always consciousness of some object. From this presupposition, the socially constructed, discursive nature of the self is inferred. If consciousness is solely intentional, then the self is a construction, and, if the self is a construction, then it is always discursive – a pre-discursive self cannot exist. It can be argued, however, that intentionality itself presupposes pre-intentional awareness. A distinction can be made between intentional consciousness and awareness. Intentional consciousness presupposes awareness that is always implicit in intentional consciousness. If intentional consciousness does not presuppose a pre-intentional awareness, if there is only consciousness of, then there is always a knower-known duality, and that duality leads to an infinite regress. To be conscious of an object X, one has to be conscious of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X, and one would have to be conscious of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of one’s consciousness of X . . . ad infinitum¾reductio ad absurdum. Therefore, there must be implicit in intentional consciousness a level of awareness that is pre-intentional, pre-discursive, and non-positional (Forman, 1999). To be conscious of anything presupposes pre-intentional self-awareness, and being pre-intentional, awareness must be in turn pre-discursive and non-positional (Almaas, 1986a, 1986b; Aurobindo, 1989, 2001; Batchelor, 1983; Buber, 1970; Forman, 1999; Fromm, 1976). When the ego is shed, a pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness is revealed. One can be reflexively aware of one’s consciousness. Gandhi held that pre-discursive self-awareness, the core of our being, is unified and interdependent with all living things. He writes: “I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, of all that lives (Naess 1974, p. 43).” In an ontological sense, Gandhi maintains that Satya, Truth, is self-realization, a realization of one’s self-awareness as essentially unified with and thereby existing in solidarity with all human beings and with all living things. Pre-discursive self-awareness is experienced as non-positional, and, being non-positional, it is unbounded; it exists as a field of awareness that is interconnected with all sentient beings. This state is an experience and is only known experientially. Therefore, the assertion of a shared humanity is based upon a common level of being. Human intentional consciousness is expressed in a vast plurality of cultural expressions; implicit within this plurality, existing as its ground, is a shared level of awareness of being that unites us. From the perspective of ontological Truth, nonviolence follows from the unity and interdependence of humanity and life; violence damages all forms of life, including one’s self. Nonviolence uplifts all. Gandhi writes: I do not believe . . . that an individual may gain spiritually and those who surround him suffer. I believe in advaita (non-duality), I believe in the essential unity of man (humankind) and, for that matter, of all that lives. Therefore, I believe that if one man (person) gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him (them) and, if one man (person) falls, the whole world falls to that extent. (Naess 1974, p. 43) In this experience, one becomes aware of the interrelated and interdependent nature of being. On an existential level, there exists a fundamental interconnection between one’s self and other beings. As Buber suggests, “we live in the currents of universal reciprocity (Buber, 1970, p. 67).” From the perspective of this experience—and this is a direct experience—to harm the other is to harm one’s self. From the perspective of existential interconnection, nonviolence, the essence of morality, rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection.

### Case

#### Decoloniality can’t explain the dynamic and multi-faceted processes that determine the international system—it also idealizes violent epistemology and concedes colonial modernity is inevitable

Cheah, 6

(Pheng Cheah, Professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley. “The Limits of Thinking in Decolonial Strategies” <http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies>) Henge

What I would like to focus on are not the details of Mignolo’s polemical criticisms, but instead the account of power implied by his understanding of the epistemic. What is put forward here is a logocentrism of power. For Mignolo, power, whether it is oppressive or liberatory, has a logic that we can chart, decipher, and ultimately correct. There is a logic of coloniality and it has to be counteracted by a logic of decoloniality. Delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not seek to reject modernity and its conceptual system because this is so widespread. It requires instead, Mignolo believes, “border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous.” Coloniality is ultimately always a failure of thought, of knowledge, or of a logic that is dangerous. This is also, in many respects, a top-down theory of power, where power is repressive and emanates from a totalizing source according to a logical design or plan. Events and occurrences up to and including the present are grounded in a logic that is dangerous or mistaken and that needs to be corrected by the intervention of other logics that emanate from the various subjects that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. It is at this point that the question of the re-embodiment and relocation of knowledge becomes crucial. For Mignolo admits that the project of epistemic delinking may sound “somewhat messianic.” I would say perhaps “idealistic” in the colloquial sense. However, he immediately asserts that it is “an orientation that in the first decade of the 21st century has shown its potential and its viability,” for example, in the various World Social Forums. Many historical examples of liberation are also adduced: the Amaru rising in Peru, the Hatian revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa. As opposed to the false other that modernity has invented as its exteriority or outside, the outside that it has excluded in order to create itself, these truly other voices introduce “other cosmologies into the dominance and hegemony of Western cosmological variations within the same rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality.” The logic of decoloniality was then explicitly thematized in the thought of radical Arabo-Islamic thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Ayatollah Khomeini and by philosophy of liberation in Latin America and by first-nation intellectuals. The stress is placed on the importance of “other” languages that have been negated by colonial modernity. The argument here is similar to the epistemology of location in feminist theory and critical race theory (for example, Luce Irigaray). I would like to end by posing two questions concerning the two main limbs of Mignolo’s argument: the primacy of the epistemic and the urgency of embodying and locating knowledge. First, does power in fact operate according to a logic and from a totalizing source that represses and subjugates those it has excluded in contemporary globalization? Is the link between modernity and coloniality primarily epistemic in character? It is interesting to note from this perspective that when Mignolo attempts to establish the epistemic link between modernity and coloniality, he relies on a historical biography and the fiction of a collective will or intention to dominate and colonize: “The rhetoric of modernity has been predominantly put forward by European men of letters, philosophers, intellectuals, officers of the state. The modern/colonial power differential was, of course, structured at all levels (economic, political, epistemological, militarily), but it was at the epistemological level that the rhetoric of modernity gained currency. If we had time to go into the biography of the main voices that conceived ‘modernity’ as the series of historical events….all of them would originate in one of the six European countries leading the Renaissance, the colonial expansion and capitalist formation, and the European Enlightenment.” In this view, development in the postcolonial world would be an ideological ruse of the logic of coloniality that forecloses the voices of marginalized peoples. Yet, one might argue that exploitative development in contemporary globalization operates not by racist techniques of exclusion and marginalization, but precisely by including, integrating, and assimilating every being into the circuit of the international division of labor. This is done by transforming them into reserve labor power through techniques of what Foucault called biopower. But we would here need to understand biopower in a different way from Mignolo’s understanding of biopolitics or body-politics, a difference that he also acknowledges. This different understanding of power as productive as opposed to repressive seems especially important in contemporary globalization where the flows of transnational capital fabricate the economic well-being of nation-states and their individual citizens. First, at the macrological level of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. In other words, the current state of power relations is an effect of multiple processes that are dynamic, heterogeneous, and unstable, processes that cannot be reduced to a single logic of coloniality, although the latter can emerge as their effect. What is the relation between these two different conceptions of biopolitics? Do they contradict each other? How would the wretched of the earth fit into this alternative cartography of global power that I have sketched? This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so.

#### Views of the future necessitate norms of reproduction that always exclude the queer body—the exclusion of the Other becomes necessary to the identity of the included

Edelman ’98 (Lee, English Prof @ Tufts University, The Ohio State University Press, Narrative, Vol. 6, No. 1, January, p. 18-30, “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification and the Death Drive”, JSTOR, AO)

In what follows I want to interrogate the politics that informs the pervasive trope of the child as figure for the universal value attributed to political futurity and to pose against it the impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say, that would oppose itself to the logic of opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests the energy of resistance the characteristically perverse resistance informing the work of queer theory to the substantialization of identities, especially as defined through opposition, as well as to the political fantasy of shaping history into a narrative in which meaning succeeds in revealing itself, as itself, through time. By attempting to resist that coercive faith in political futurity, while refusing as well any hope for the sort of dialectical access to meaning that such resistance, as quintessential political gesture, holds out, I mean to insist that politics is always a politics of the signifier, and that queer theory's interventions in the reproduction of dominant cultural logics must never lose sight of its figurai relation to the vicissitudes of signification. Queer theory, as a particular story of where storytelling fails, one that takes the value and burden of that failure upon itself, occupies, I want to suggest, the impossible "other" side where narrative realization and derealization overlap. The rest of this paper as pires to explain the meaning and implications of that assertion, but to do so it must begin by tracing some connections between politics and the politics of the sign. Like the network of signifying relations Lacan described as the symbolic, politics may function as the register within which we experience social reality, but only insofar as it compels us to experience that reality in the form of a fantasy: the fantasy, precisely, of form as such, of an order, an organization, assuring the stability of our identities as subjects and the consistency of the cultural structures through which those identities are reflected back to us in recognizable form. Though the material conditions of human experience may indeed be at stake in the various conflicts by means of which differing political perspectives vie for the power to name, and by naming to shape, our collective reality, the ceaseless contestation between and among their competing social visions expresses a common will to install as reality itself one libidinal-subtended fantasy or another and thus to avoid traumatically confronting the emptiness at the core of the symbolic "reality" produced by the order of the signifier. To put this otherwise: politics designates the ground on which imaginary relations, relations that hark back to a notion of the self-misrecognized as en joying an originary fullness an undifferentiated presence that is posited retroactively and therefore lost, one might say, from the start compete for symbolic fulfillment within the dispensation of the signifier. For the mediation of the signifier alone allows us to articulate these imaginary relations, though always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: the distance inherent in the chain of ceaseless deferrals and mediations to which the very structure of the linguistic system must give birth. The signifier, as alienating and meaningless token of our symbolic construction as subjects, as token, that is, of our subjectification through subjection to the prospect of meaning; the signifier, by means of which we always inhabit the order of the Other, the order of a social and linguistic reality articulated from somewhere else; the signifier, which calls us into meaning by seeming to call us to ourselves, only ever confers upon us a sort of promissory identity, one with which we never succeed in fully coinciding because we, as subjects of the signifier, can only be signifiers ourselves: can only ever aspire to catch up, to close the gap that divides and by dividing calls forth ourselves as subjects. Politics names those processes, then, through which the social subject attempts to secure the conditions of its consolidation by identifying with what is outside it in order to bring it into the presence, deferred perpetually, of itself.

#### Voting negative is an identification with death, queerness, and negativity in the face of a politics that is only valuable through some reconciled, future order

Schotten 09 (C. Heike, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Boston, Nietzsche’s Revolution: Decadence, Politics, and Sexuality, p. 203-6)IAA

Instead of falling prey to the logic of the Child, however, and its imperatives of protection, sacrifice, futurity, and hope, Edelman encourages queers to embrace our stigmatized positioning as the negativity, death, and futurelessness of social life. He boldly admits that this means, in the case of feminists and gay people, adopting the conservative Right's belief that abortion and nonprocreative sexual pleasure lead to the undoing of social life and the downfall of civilization. But this is because social conservatives are right in their insistence that civilization itself depends on the Child or, more generally, in the hope and belief in a future that will validate all present human activity. Queerness, then, undermines this future, and indeed threatens to annihilate its very possibility in its nihilistic excesses. In this analysis, then, "queer" is the name of what threatens the integrity and coherence of social life, a nimble and capacious designation that can encompass far more and disparate numbers of people than simply "homosexuals." If, for example, Reaganites are correct in seeing welfare benefits as stimuli to procreation on the part of helplessly dependent and drug-addicted mothers of color, then Edelman's proposal amounts to demanding that queer politics align and identify itself with these welfare queens (a move that would productively double and ironize the "queen" of this otherwise derogatory term). If Puar's analysis of homonationalism is correct, and if George W. Bush is to be believed that one is either with the U.S. government or one is with the terrorists, then this means that a revolutionary queer project of no future must necessarily align itself with the terrorists as well."' Edelman correctly characterizes this position as "oppositional to the structural logic of opposition"" 8 (a Nietzschean tactic, to be sure), insofar as it refuses to consider childlessness or the lack of futurity— that is, the abyss into which queers would be thrown—an objection. In short, Edelman's suggestion amounts to saying, "More abyss, please!" I think the militancy of Edelman's rhetoric belies a revolutionary desire that augurs liberation from precisely such stultifying heteronormativity. In a superb display of revolutionary rhetoric, for example, Edelman declares: Queers must respond . . . not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order's prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what [Bernard] Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws with both capital /s and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. 120 This is an emancipatory commitment he would surely deny. Edelman insists that he offers no such liberatory hope, since any and all futurity— even revolutionary futurity—is already co-opted by the cult of the Child in whose name the future is always wagered and promised, and from which queers are necessarily prohibited. To hope is thus, in Edelman's view, the political version of "Smearing the Queer." Indeed, Edelman gleefully notes that this choice to own and occupy the space of no future deliberately overcomes the need or possibility for anything like hope. As he says, "we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future." 12 ' The future of queer politics, then, is no future at all—it is rather the very narcissistic, future-sacrificing, self-indulgent jouissance for its own sake to which queers are condemned, anyway. I think Edelman is right that we queers—again, an expansive term that includes "all so stigmatized for failing to comply with heteronormative mandates" 122—ought to embrace the very position of nihilistic future assassins to which culture and politics consign us. Where Edelman goes awry, however, is in his conclusion that this signifies the death of hope as well. While it is true that hope is routinely—perhaps even uniquely— symbolized in and by this logic of the Child (a logic we see even in Nietzsche with his redemptive emphasis on self-birthing and Zarathustra's final metamorphosis of the spirit into the child), it still seems to me that if we embrace Edelman's proposal, this is nothing less than the embrace of an explicitly revolutionary politics which lacks dogma but is inextricable from gratification. Indeed, Edelman suggests that we accept the dictates of politics that identifies jouissance with self-indulgence, that sees sex (or insistent presentism) and politics as opposed, and impolitic sex (or carnality) as death. And while this undermining of the very terms of politics is indeed nihilistic, this undermining is also not nihilistic, or else Edelman could not, by definition, advocate it as such. Indeed, unbeknownst to him, Edelman occupies the contradictory and thus revolutionary Nietzschean position of affirming negation. For it is not the Child per se—that is, futurity per se—that is the problem, but [is] the Christian structures of meaning-making that insist that life have a future other than death, that we sacrifice ourselves on the cross of something greater than ourselves. In this sense, Edelman may be diagnosing our current moment of modernity as beholden to the cross of the Child—perhaps this is the next installment in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality: first Christianity, then modern science, and now, reproductive futurity. But Edelman cannot help but perform for us that even a politics of no future is both a politics and a future. For, unless we are already dead, death is the future, for all of us. His demand that we not sacrifice ourselves prematurely to it, that we not forsake the present for the future, nor demand that this present wallow in the determinations of the past, is quite undeniably a political proscription, one bent on undermining and in fact undoing the entire social order, the goal of all revolutionaries, last I checked. Unflagging commitment to liberatory political transformation is thus strangely compatible with post-structuralist critique, and I think Edelman (like Nietzsche, and despite Edelman's own protestations) embodies this discordant harmony himself. His longing for a total eradication of the very structures of meaning and temporality that make politics intelligible is nothing less than a desire for the overthrow of everything existing. He is clear, at many points, that this structure is an oppressive one, one that functions on the basis of a binary division imposed on humanity between those selfless people who sacrifice themselves for the future and those selfish ones who, in their endless pursuit of their own gratification, are responsible for the decay of morality, the dissolution of the social order, teen pregnancy, skyrocketing delinquency, and the AIDS epidemic— much less the vulnerability of the United States to those terrorists, illegal immigrants, and welfare dependents who threaten the freedom, health, and economic strength of the nation. That this dichotomy is not simply a false one, but in fact an imposition of power, and indeed the enabling condition of politics itself, suggests that Edelman has a clearly revolutionary analysis. Edelman's declaration that he is going beyond the politics of opposition by embracing its constitutive outside and declaring it his home is also Nietzsche's position, and it is, I think, the only possible meaning we can ascribe to the word "queer." As Edelman says, "Queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one." 123 But Edelman and Marxist critics alike would be wrong to ascribe to this perpetual resistance an apolitical character—or instead, as Puar warns, as itself a normative idealization of resistance in an implicitly voluntarist model of agency. 124 For queer is contradiction, the both/and, the refusal to be singularly determinate: in the case of gender and sexuality in particular, it is the refusal of the will to truth precisely in the realms of life believed to be the most natural, the most immune to "deconstruction"—the body, its desire, and its sex. That this in-between position, this both/and continues to be the space of the abject and the unthinkable, the futurelessness of desire with no telos and the death of civilization—refugees and other stateless people also raise these fundamental, discomfiting dilemmas—suggests that for revolution to remain revolutionary it must queer itself. It cannot remain wedded to a particular domain of truth or materiality as the foundation for the future, for this is itself a violation of its own radical credentials. Nor can it any longer hope for a salvific future wherein all corruption and dissatisfaction have been eliminated. This is quite different from either the dogmatic moralizing of revolutionaries past or the valorization of resistance as the only appropriate mode of subjectivity. Rather, it is not so far from what Puar recommends we adopt in thinking through the consequences of queer politics—allowing for "complicities" with power that do not signal "the failure of the radical, resistant, or oppositional potential of queernesses."'25 This means that both Nietzsche's revolution and his revolutionary posturing are positions of no future. Or, rather, that queered revolutionary commitment stakes its future on the eradication of the past, not its preservation. It is a position built not on the foundation of the Child, but on the ground of the graveyard. But it is also not a refusal of hope, as Edelman suggests, nor is it a tacitly Christian incitement of a revolutionary desire that cannot, and ought not, go ungratified, as Brown proposes. It is rather a recognition that hope is contradictorily compatible with death, with the insistent presentism of revolutionary commitment and futureless gratification of affirmation (or the futureless affirmation of gratification). Which concludes this book almost exactly where it started: for Nietzsche, our only choices are revolution or death, as Christianity poses the greatest threat to human existence thus far dreamed up. I think it is clear he wanted us to choose revolution, but I think it is also clear that he knew the choice was a setup—like all dichotomies, false.

#### The idea of unifying particular identities is rooted in violence and prevents effective solutions to oppression

Devadas and Mummery, 7

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1. The idea of community and identity formation has had a vexed history within critical theory. It has come under critique from various fronts: traditional Marxists are critical of its focus on culture not economics; postcolonial studies is critical of its appeal to a romanticized view of community; and it has been criticized, specifically by the poststructuralists, because of the essentialism and politics of othering that takes place in the affirmation of community and identity. These criticisms or interventions are highly instructive as they call on us to rethink the terms of community by asking for a re-consideration of the ways in which notion of community is conceived, how it is constituted, and what are the implications of constituting the discourse of community in specific ways? What does it mean to say, as Agamben (1993: 1) puts it, "to a concept, for example: being red, being French, being Muslim"? What does it mean to say to a concept like community? 2. To articulate such an idea, in terms of the various interventions, begins by first rejecting or challenging conceptions of community that reproduce a collectivity that is built upon, engenders and fosters a sense of closure, continuity, unity and universalism. In other words, we must reject the kinds of assumptions that prevail in the work of Benedict Anderson's (1983) Imagined Communities (as well as those that unproblematically draw upon Anderson's conception of community) precisely because this contribution is premised upon the notion of community as collectivity that is unified, continuous and enclosed. As Anderson says clearly, the community that he imagines, within the auspices of the idea of nation, "regardless of the actual inequalities and exploitation that may prevail ... is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1983: 16). In other words, the idea of community that is manifested here not only enacts a closure of potential and possible forms of collectivization, but more crucially proposes that such an idea of community breaks down the complex relations and networks of power that constitute the notion of community. In a certain sense, one could perhaps argue that Anderson's idea of community is highly egalitarian, especially if we take this up through the Subaltern Studies route and its commitment to producing a politics of "horizontal affiliations" (Chakrabarty, 2000: 16). But such an attempt to rescue Anderson cannot be sustained. For Subaltern Studies, the reorganization of community through horizontal affiliations opens up an alternative form of affiliation that disrupts established and nationally sanctioned means of conceiving community. In short, the idea of horizontal affiliation as a means of community formation opens up other potential and possible forms of association: this is an opening up of the idea of community. For Anderson however, it is not the same thing because he sees horizontal affiliation as a way of producing a community whose fraternity is premised upon a shared and undifferentiated sense of belonging to the nation: this is a closing down operation that seeks to silence differences, inconsistencies and contradictions within the idea of community. Anderson is not alone in this: Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer for instance in Sources of the Self and Interpretation and Social Criticism respectively, in seeking to appeal to shared understanding as the foundation for values idealise modern society as a harmonious, non-conflictual community. 3. The idea of community that Anderson (and Taylor and Walzer) conceptualise is built on closure or closing down multiple forms of affiliations. In other words, it is premised upon a foundational violence (Derrida, 1992). And here the foundational violence of the collective, unified community erases differences, contradictions, and forms of being and belonging that do not necessarily align with the constitution of the idea of community. Against this idea of community, we wish to recuperate the potential of community informed by the poststructuralist tradition. While there are various scholars in this tradition who have intervened in the notion of community (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and so on) we will keep to two - Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben - to reclaim the idea of community in these terms: as "community without unity" (Nancy, 1991), a "coming community" (Agamben, 1993). This rethinking of community not only marks a turn in the way we might conceive of the constitution of the idea of community, but also a shift in the way in which we might mobilise community as a means of rethinking the terms of solidarity.

#### The affirmative’s failure to analyze structural and historical class politics is the crisis of liberalism—it particularizes the oppressions of capitalism and naturalizes the system they criticize

Brown, 93

[Wendy, professor, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, Aug. p. 392-394//wyo-tjc]

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### Identities are relational; we live the effects of them as understood by others. Anything else essentializes and staticizes identity

Boys 08 (Jos, Head of Learning and StudentExpierence, Northumbria University, Phd, works with disability groups. “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks” Design. <http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging>. –Veeder)

How then can disability help us re-think about embodiment? Authors such as Samells, Erevelles, Davies and Corker argue, in different ways, that the disabled body/disability/ abnormality continues to be central in its role as a reflective trope/metaphor/ stereotype/figure which ‘shores up’ the categories of the normal/able-bodied, despite its invisibility in most contemporary cultural theory. This occurs through two simultaneous processes. First, the disabled body is perceived as a containable, figurable concept – an unproblematic category in opposition to non-disablement which functions to reproduce particular everyday social and spatial practices as ‘normal’. Second, disability generates enormous anxiety as a ‘problem’ which seems to have in it the potential to be uncontainable/uncontrollable, threatening the ‘normal’ by calling its assumptions into question. the figure of the alien reminds us that what is ‘beyond limit’ is subject to representation: indeed what is beyond representation is, at the same-time, over represented. Ahmed 2000, p2 But Ahmed also argues that to move beyond these stereotypes of able/disabled normal/abnormal we have to move beyond an idea of identity as representation – as almost literally written on the body. Our bodies and their relationships to each other and to objects and spaces are centrally relational practices: each of us through our bodies, lives what Judith Butler calls a performativity that simultaneously re-inscribes and calls into question matters of embodied identity in our everyday practices. We don’t live the essentialist stereotypes of being a Woman, Man, White, Black, Able-bodied or Disabled, we live our relationships to them through a wide range of potential interpretative strategies, both conceptually and through our lived actions.

## 2NC—Case

### Identity

#### Defining ourselves by an identity removes our exemplary value—we must be as a singularity

Agamben, 93

(Giorgio Agamben is an Italian continental philosopher. *The Coming Community*, pg. 8-10) Henge

One concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal and the particular has long been familiar to us: the example. In any context where it exerts its force, the example is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for example: para-deig;ma, that which is shown alongside (like the German Bei-spiel, that which plays alongside). Hence the proper place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space in which its undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds. This life is purely linguistic life. Only life in the word is undefinable and unforgettable. Exemplary being is purely linguistic being. Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, except by being-called. Not being-red, but being-called-red; not being-Jakob, but being-called-Jakob defines the example. Hence its ambiguity, just when one has decided to take it really seriously. Being-called-the property that establishes all possible belongings (being-called-Italian, -dog, -Communist)-is also what can bring them all back radically into question. It is the Most Common that cut:; off any real community. Hence the impotent omnivalence of whatever being. It is neither apathy nor promiscuity nor resignation. These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity. They are expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself, the sign e. Tricksters or fakes, assistants or 'toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community.

## 2NC—Buddhism

### 2NC—Alt (S) Desire

#### Realizing the nonduality of existence allows us to quit striving to fill the void—we become like a refreshing spring that gushes out of our core—this liberation from the lack is true freedom and enlightenment

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 30-31) Henge

Perhaps the meaning of “blown out” is better understood in terms of what has already been said about our sense of lack, the “black hole” at the core of our being. The third truth reassures us that something can happen to our black hole, that we are not fated to forever trying to ﬁll a bottomless pit. Although we cannot get rid of the hollowness at our core, we can experience it differently. It turns out that our hollowness is not so awful after all; it is not something that needs to be ﬁlled up. We cannot make our selves real in the ways we have been trying—the bottomless pit swallows up all our efforts—but we can realize something about the nature of the hole that frees us from trying to ﬁll it up. We do not need to make ourselves real, because we have always been real. I do not need to ground myself, because I have always been grounded: not, however, as a separate, skin-encapsulated ego somewhere behind my eyes or between my ears and looking out at the world—for there has never been such a self. Rather, the bottomless, festering black hole can transform into a fountain and become a refreshing spring gushing up at the core of my being. The bottomlessness of this spring means something quite different than before. Now it refers to the fact that I can never understand the source of this spring, for the simple reason that I am this spring. It is nothing other than my true nature. And my inability to reﬂexively grasp that source, to ground and realize myself by ﬁlling up that hole, is no longer a problem, because there is no need to grasp it. The point is to live that spring, to let my fountain gush forth. My thirst (the second noble truth) is “blown out” because a letting go at the core of my being means my sense of lack evaporates as this fountain springs up. Instead of being a constant anxiety that haunts me, the nothingness at my core turns out to be my freedom to be this, to do that. This liberation reveals my true nature to be formless. Sometimes the fountain is just this. Sometimes it becomes just that. The origin of the fountain itself always remains unfathomable, because that source is never ﬁxated or bound by any particular form or activity that I engage in. There is a problem, however, with this metaphor: the image of a fountain at our core is still dualistic. Our core, our formless ground, seems to become even more separate from the world “outside.” The actual experience is just the opposite, because the duality between inside and outside disappears when “I” do not need to try to ground myself by grasping at some phenomenon in the world. Of course there are still thoughts, feelings, and so forth, yet they are not the attributes of a self “inside.” The fountain gushes forth as the spontaneity of words and acts—not so much as “my” spontaneity as a characteristic of the world of which my particular fountain is an inseparable part. This transformation includes another aspect of the awakening experience especially emphasized in Mahayana Buddhism: the spontaneous wish for others to wake up and realize their formless true nature. On the one hand, awakening includes the realization that there is nothing that needs to be gained, for nothing has ever been lacking. My bottomless pit never needed ﬁlling, inasmuch as my groundlessness just needed to be realized as a different kind of grounding. On the other hand, however, I awaken from my own lack—from my dukkha, from my futile preoccupation with trying to make myself real— into a world full of beings similarly empty but suffering from their delusions of self and from their vain attempts to ground themselves and feel more real. A liberated person naturally wants to help the world, because he or she does not feel separate from it. This point is essential because it also provides the foundation for Buddhist social engagement. As Joanna Macy puts it, there is no need to ask why you take care of your own body.19

### AT—Do Both

#### The desire for attachment coopts the permutation—only the genuine awakening of the alternative can solve

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 22-23) Henge

Nevertheless, after awakening one’s mental predispositions (samskaras) do not necessarily or immediately lose their attraction. A liberated smoker will not automatically lose the physical desire for a cigarette. A genuine awakening should make it much easier, of course, to ignore that urge, but the desire will arise. This point reflects on long-standing debates about whether enlightenment is instantaneous or gradual, all-or-nothing or in stages. Realizing the unbounded nature of one’s attention may or may not be dramatic, but it happens suddenly. It is not something that I do, nor does it happen to me, for both of those ways of understanding are dualistic; rather, there is a letting go. Of what? Not simply of whatever I am grasping, but of grasping. Yet habitual tendencies do not simply evaporate. One’s attention still tends to assume familiar forms, and this highlights the importance of continued practice: the more gradual process of making intrinsically free awareness more effectively free. This also touches on the problem with comprehending Buddhism philosophically, or taking it as a philosophy. I can understand (and write about?) all of this conceptually, without it making much difference in my daily life, in how my attention actually functions. Grasping the implications of these concepts is very different from letting go of grasping. So far, I have made no reference to any “object of consciousness,” preferring the notion of “attention or awareness taking form.” Especially in a Mahayana context, any mention of form evokes the central claim of the Heart Sutra that “form (rupa) is no other than emptiness (shunyata), emptiness no other than form.” So far, too, this chapter has not mentioned shunyata, largely because of the baggage that accompanies that overused term. For Madhyamaka shunyata, “the absence of self-existence,” is a shorthand way of referring to the interconditionality of all phenomena, the fact that every phenomenon arises in dependence on others. In terms of my basic claim— delusion as attention bound, awakening as attention unbound—the Heart Sutra’s famous equation gains a somewhat different significance. Awareness unbound is shunya, having no form or any other qualities of its own. More precisely, awareness whether bound or unbound is shunya, although bound awareness is unaware of its intrinsic nature because it is too busy grasping and too afraid to let go. Attention in itself can be characterized only by its characteristiclessness: being formless and colorless, “it” is nothing, which is why it can become any-thing, according to circumstances. Emptiness is not other than form, because nothing-in-itself attention is always assuming one or another form—not only visual and tactile ones, but sounds, tastes, smells, thoughts, and so on. Then perhaps the many statements in the Heart Sutra that “X (the five skandhas, the twelve nidanas, etc.) is shunya” are not making (or denying) an ontological claim about the nature of X-in-itself, but rather pointing out the nature of the relationship between empty-in-itself awareness and the various forms it assumes.10

#### The permutation traps us by attaching us to the affirmative—only the alternative can create a formless mind

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 13-15) Henge

Do we miss the nature of liberated mind, not because it is too obscure or profound to understand, but because it is too obvious? Perhaps, like Edgar Allen Poe’s purloined letter, we keep overlooking it: rummaging around hither and thither, we cannot find what we are searching for because it is in plain sight. Or, to employ a better metaphor, we look for the spectacles that rest unnoticed on our nose. Unable to see her reflection in the well, Enyadatta wanders about looking for her head. Mind seeks for mind. Such, at least, has been a central claim of the Mahayana tradition. How central? How much insight might be gained by taking seriously and literally the many Buddhist admonitions about “not settling down in things” and the importance of wandering freely “without a place to rest.” Although a few qualifications will need to be made later, my basic thesis is simple: Delusion (ignorance, samsara): attention/awareness is fixated (attached to forms) Liberation (enlightenment, nirvana): attention/awareness is liberated from grasping Although the true nature of awareness is formless, it becomes “trapped” when we identify with particular things, which include mental objects (e.g., ideologies, one’s self-image) as well as physical ones. Such identifications happen due to ignorance of the basic “nondwelling” nature of our awareness. The familiar words “attention” and “awareness” are used to emphasize that the distinction being drawn refers not to some abstract metaphysical entity (“Mind” or “Consciousness”) but simply to how our everyday awareness functions.1 To appropriate Hakuin’s metaphor in Zazen Wasan, the difference between Buddhas and other beings is that between water and ice: without water there is no ice, without Buddha no sentient beings—which suggests that deluded beings might simply be “frozen” Buddhas. I hope to show that this straightforward distinction is not only consistent with basic Buddhist teachings but also gives us insight into some of the more difficult ones. Moreover, this perspective may illuminate some aspects of our contemporary life-world, especially the particular challenges of modern technology and economics. Before developing the above claim about awareness, bound and unbound, it is necessary to emphasize how widespread and important it is within the Mahayana tradition, for it is found in many other canonical and commentarial texts besides the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Thus, the most-quoted line from a better-known Prajnaparamita text, the Diamond Sutra, encapsulates the central doctrine of the Ashtasahasrika Sutra in one phrase: “Let your mind come forth without fixing it anywhere.” According to the Platform Sutra of the sixth Ch’an patriarch Hui-neng, this verse precipitated his great awakening, and certainly his teachings make and remake the same point: “When our mind works freely without any hindrance, and is at liberty to ‘come’ or to ‘go,’ we attain liberation.” Such a mind “is everywhere present, yet it ‘sticks’ nowhere.” Hui-neng emphasized that he had no system of Dharma to transmit: “What I do to my disciples is to liberate them from their own bondage with such devices as the case may need” (Yampolsky 133).2 Po-chang Hui-hai, another Chan master who lived about a century later, elaborated on the nature of liberated mind: Should your mind wander away, do not follow it, whereupon your wandering mind will stop wandering of its own accord. Should your mind desire to linger somewhere, do not follow it and do not dwell there, whereupon your mind’s questing for a dwelling place will cease of its own accord. Thereby, you will come to possess a non-dwelling mind—a mind that remains in the state of non-dwelling. If you are fully aware in yourself of a non-dwelling mind, you will discover that there is just the fact of dwelling, with nothing to dwell upon or not to dwell upon. This full awareness in yourself of a mind dwelling upon nothing is known as having a clear perception of your own mind, or, in other words, as having a clear perception of your own nature. A mind which dwells upon nothing is the Buddha-mind, the mind of one already delivered, Bodhi-Mind, Un-created Mind . . . (Huihai, in Blofeld 1969, 56)

### 2NC—Link

#### Everything interpermeates everything else­—only the self-transformation of the alternative can come to terms with it

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 4-6) Henge

In contrast, the early Buddhist teachings focus almost exclusively on the path of self-transformation, with a minimum of dogma or metaphysics—in other words, with a rather ﬂimsy canopy, at best, to shelter beneath. These original teachings not only deny a creator God and the salviﬁc value of rituals such as sacriﬁces, they also emphasize the constructed nature of both the self and the world. For Buddhism there are no self-existing things, since everything, including you and me, ~~interpenetrates~~ (interpermeates) everything else, arising and passing away according to causes and conditions. This interconnectedness—not just an intellectual insight but an experience—was an essential aspect of the Buddha’s awakening, and it is congruent with the essential postmodern realization. Even more radical then than now, the original Buddhist teachings, not surprisingly, eventually became elaborated into another sacred canopy, focused on a transcendental liberation from this world. What is more surprising is that early Buddhism should have had such deconstructive insights and that they have been preserved in recognizable form for two and a half millennia. This perspective on the Buddha’s awakening deserves our attention because no other religious tradition foregrounds so clearly this crucial insight into our constructedness. There are some parallels with the philosophical realization in ancient Greece that society is a construct that can and should be reconstructed (e.g., Plato’s Republic). The history of the West since then has incorporated and developed the Greek concern for social transformation. Yet none of the important Greek philosophers proposed what Shakyamuni Buddha taught— the deconstruction and reconstruction of the ﬁctive sense of self. These resonances between postmodern theory and Buddhist teachings provide the basis for a comparison that is more than merely interesting. Today the postmodern realization about the constructed nature of our canopies, sacred and otherwise, contributes to global crises that we are far from resolving. Indeed, Nietzsche’s prescient prediction of a coming age of nihilism suggests that the world’s destabilization may be far from over. Some people and perhaps a few institutions are beginning to assimilate the postmodern insight, but although we are becoming more aware of its implications and dangers, we do not yet have a good grasp of the possibilities it opens up. For the West, the postmodern perspective grows out of, and depends upon, a secular modernity that privileges empirical rationalism over religious superstition. In this regard, too, our attitude derives from the Greeks, whose philosophy originated as a critique of the Olympian deities and the rites associated with them. The Indian situation was quite different. According to one’s sympathies, one can see that Indian (including Buddhist) philosophy never quite escaped the orbit of religious concerns or, more sympathetically, that Indian thought never felt the Western need to differentiate between them.

#### Anxiety—they will never fulfill the emptiness of being unreal—the aff is an attempt trying to ground themselves in the world that creates a constant condition of panic and anger

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 27) Henge

According to Shakyamuni, the cause of our individual dukkha is tanha, usually translated as “craving” but more literally as “thirst.” Nothing we drink can ever assuage our tanha, because that thirst is due to an emptiness at the core of our being. It is as if that core were a bottomless pit, something like the black holes that astronomers believe lie at the center of most galaxies. No matter how much we try to ﬁll up our own black hole with this or that, everything is swallowed up and disappears into it. It is bottomless because our sense of self is an ungroundable construct. Notice, however, that the second noble truth does not identify our problem as groundlessness. The problem is “thirst”—not the emptiness at the core of our being but our incessant efforts to ﬁll that hole up, because we experience it as a sense of lack that must be ﬁlled up. The problem is not that I am unreal but that I keep trying to make myself real in ways that never work. This implies that there might be another way to experience our groundlessness. The Buddha taught tanha as a general truth about the human condition, yet the speciﬁc ways we try to make ourselves feel more real are culturally conditioned. Traditionally, religion fulﬁlls the role of telling us what our lack is and how to resolve it. For example, Christianity explains it as due to our sins, including the Original Sin that each of us inherits from Adam. The solution to sin is variously understood, but for Christians it involves accepting Christ, who reassures us that our sense of lack will be resolved when we are reunited with God. Whether or not that story persuades us, it has become less important in the modern world, in which we are inclined to seek this-worldly solutions to our sense of lack.

### Solves Colonialism

#### Alt solves foreign imperialism

Loy, 9

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “Awareness Bound and Unbound” pg. 151-152) Henge

We have supported constitutionalism, human rights, liberty, the rule of law, and democracy in other countries when those values have produced leaders amenable to our own national interests. Those same values evidently resonate less loudly for us when they produce leaders who have different ideas, such as Chávez in Venezuela. In 1954, for example, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Guatemala, which over the following years led to the deaths of over one hundred thousand peasants. In 1965 the United States overthrew the government of the Dominican Republic and helped to kill some three thousand people in the process. In 1973, the United States sponsored a coup against the democratically elected government of Chile that murdered or “disappeared” several thousand people. In the 1980s the United States sponsored a terrorist war by the contras against the government of Nicaragua, which led to the deaths of over thirty thousand innocent people and to a World Court declaration that the U.S. government was a war criminal for mining Nicaragua’s harbors. Another U.S.-supported war in the 1980s, against El Salvador, resulted in the deaths of eighty thousand more innocent people. Lots of “collateral damage.” All those recent examples are from Latin America alone. In 1965 the United States also sponsored or assisted a military coup in Indonesia that led to the deaths of over half a million people, and the military dictatorship of Suharto, who invited Western corporations back into the country. When President Bush declares that Iran is part of a new “axis of evil,” we should remember why many Iranians return the compliment, viewing the U.S. government as “the Great Satan.” When Western oil interests in that country were challenged by a democratically elected prime minister in the early 1950s, the CIA helped to sponsor a brutal coup that installed the widely detested shah of Iran, whose notorious Savak secret service then proceeded to torture and kill over seventy thousand Iranians between 1952 and 1979. There are many more examples, unfortunately, yet the point is made. Clearly the problem here is something more than not quite living up to our own ideals. It is not that we just keep making mistakes, such as innocently backing the wrong sort of people. Once can be a mistake, twice may be stupidity, but this pattern of repeated violations of our own self-declared values amounts to something more sinister. “By their fruits shall you know them,” as someone once put it. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our so-called values are not really our values, at least not when it comes to international relations. The basic problem is not a clash between our values and theirs, but between our (declared) values and our (short-term) interests.

### Solves Objectivism

#### Knowledge is constructed by the ego

Loy, 3

(David Robert Loy is a professor, writer, and Zen teacher in the Sanbo Kyodan tradition of Japanese Zen Buddhism. “The Great Awakening” pg. 24-26) Henge

This nomadic conception of theory continues to discomfort many in the social sciences. Less known is that a very similar conception of theory as self-reﬂexive and self-negating has been important to Buddhism from its beginnings, and essential to Buddhist philosophy since at least the time of Nagarjuna (second century c.e.), the most important Buddhist philosopher and arguably the most important ﬁgure in the Buddhist tradition after Shakyamuni himself. Since it emphasized the contemplative need to let go of concepts, Buddhism could not avoid self-consciousness about its own employment of theoretical constructs. We have already noticed that Shakyamuni compared his own teachings to a raft that, once we have used it to cross the river of birth and death to the far shore of nirvana, we should then abandon. Nagarjuna went further by declining to present any view of his own. His chapter on the nature of nirvana in the Mulamadhyamikakarika concludes that “ultimate serenity is the coming to rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things; no truth has been taught by a Buddha for anyone, anywhere.”15This applies even to the crucial concept of shunyata (emptiness), which Nagarjuna used to deconstruct the self-existence of things. Shunyata too is relative to those supposed things; it is a heuristic term, nothing more than a way to demonstrate “the exhaustion of all theories and views,” and those who insist on making shunyata into a theory about the nature of things are said to be incurable.16 Nagarjuna’s self-negating conception of conception reverberates through subsequent Buddhism. The sixth Zen ancestor Huineng, revered as the greatest of all Zen masters, also refused to offer Buddhism as a transparent, mirrorlike teaching about reality: “If I tell you that I have a system of Dharma [teaching] to transmit to others, I am cheating you. What I do to my disciples is to liberate them from their own bondage with such devices as the case may need.”17 Suitable answers are given according to the temperament of the inquirer. Insofar as truth is a matter of grasping the categories that accurately and ﬁnally reﬂect some objective reality, all truth is error on the Buddhist path. The crucial issue is whether or not our search for truth—be it the personal, subjective claim about my own “nature” or some structural truth in the human sciences—is an attempt to ground ourselves by ﬁxating on certain concepts. When there is such a compulsion to grasp the truth that grasps reality, certain ideas tend to become seductive—that is, ideologies. The difference between samsara and nirvana is that samsara is the world experienced as a sticky web of attachments that seem to offer something we lack—a grounding for our groundless sense of self. Intellectually, that seductive quality manifests as a battleground of conﬂicting ideologies (social theories as much as religious beliefs) competing for our allegiance, each of which purports to provide the mind with a sure grasp on the world. In other words, ideology is another attempt to objectify ourselves, by understanding ourselves objectively. On this account, the need for theory, and the difficulty many have with unanchored critique, is the intellectual’s version of the dialectic noticed earlier between security and freedom. The Buddhist alternative, as Huineng makes clear, is not to rid oneself of all thought but to think in a different way, without needing to ground oneself thereby. Such a “non-abiding” wisdom can wander freely among an overlapping plurality of truths without needing to ﬁxate on any of them. As in the traditional Zen dialogues, our inquiry becomes a mobile, nomadic play that works to undo both the supposed objectivity of the objects studied and the supposed selfidentities of those subjects—us—who study them.

### 2NC—Suffering

#### Suffering exists as a consequence of aversion to admit the emptiness of this life—the alternative is a pragmatic elimination of the vices that cause suffering

Garfield, ND

(Jay Garfield, Smith College, the University of Melbourne, and the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. “Buddhist Ethics” <http://www.academia.edu/2833485/Buddhist_Ethics>) Henge

The Buddha then argued that suffering does not just happen. It arises as a consequence of actions conditioned by attachment and aversion, each of which in turn is engendered by confusion regarding the nature of reality. This triune root of suffering is represented in the familiar Buddhist representation of the Wheel of Life with the pig, snake and rooster at the hub, the six realms of transmigration (or aspects of the phenomenology of suffering as we might understand them less cosmologically) turning around them, structured by the twelve links of dependent origination (a detailed psychology of perception and action), all of which is depicted as resting in the jaws of death, the great fear of which propels so much of our maladaptive psychology and moral failure. Attention to the second noble truth allows us to begin to see how very different Buddhist moral thought is from most Western moral thought: the three roots of suffering are each regarded as moral defilements, and are not seen as especially heterogeneous in character. None of them is seen is especially problematic in most Western moral theory, and indeed each of the first two——attachment and aversion—— is valourised in at least some contexts in some systems, particularly that of Aristotle. The third, confusion, is rarely seen in the West as a moral matter, unless it is because one has a duty to be clear about things. But this is far from the issue in Buddhist moral theory. Buddhism is about solving a problem; the problem is suffering; the three root vices are vices because they engender the problem. The moral theory here is not meant to articulate a set of imperatives, nor to establish a calculus of utility through which to assess actions, nor to assign responsibility, praise or blame, but rather to solve a problem. The problem is that the world is pervaded by unwanted suffering. The diagnosis of the cause of the problem sets the agenda for its solution. The third truth articulated at Sarnath is that, because suffering depends upon confusion, attraction and aversion, it can be eliminated by eliminating these causes. And the fourth, which starts getting the ethics spelled out in a more determinate form, presents the path to that solution. The eightfold path is central to an articulation of the moral domain as it is seen in Buddhist theory, and careful attention to reveals additional respects in which Buddhists develop ethics in a different way than do Western moral theorists. The eightfold path comprises correct view, correct intention, correct speech, correct propriety, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct mindfulness and correct meditation.

## 1NR—Anthro

#### Discussion of humans first ignore all non-human suffering

Rose ‘06 (Rebecca, Lecturer in Literature for Trinity College Foundation Studies, The University of Melbourne, “COLLOQUY text theory critique”, <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy_issue_12_november_2006/issue12.pdf>, AO)

In recent decades concern for the human-human relationship has brought attention to the human-nonhuman relationship. The argument that the crises faced by humans do not exist in isolation but are inseparable from environmental crises is seldom rejected outright.5 It is clear to many that humans and nonhumans live interdependently – a conviction at the heart of the environmental movement. In 1982 ‘The World Charter for Nature’ was adopted by the UN General Assembly and in 1997 an Earth Charter Commission was formed to oversee a “worldwide, cross-cultural conversation” that produced the ‘Earth Charter’ document.6 The Earth Charter is a declaration of fundamental principles “to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace.”7 It appears similar in form and purpose to the Universal Declaration. Both documents share the same visionary quality and both resonate with a determination to initiate positive change for the future. A crucial difference is the extent to which the Earth Charter’s vision for world peace centralizes environmental ethics. Rockefel░ Human Rights 141 ler describes the Earth Charter as “a declaration of global interdependence and universal responsibility.”8 Despite the soft legal status of the ideals articulated within the Earth Charter and the Universal Declaration, they may be regarded as sets of principles which influence disciplines and practices that provide direction for humanity, including ethics and international law. They help establish internationally shared principles essential for international or cross-cultural dialogue. For example, the principles of the Earth Charter underlay the World Summit for Sustainable Development, which ostensibly promoted the interdependence of humankind and the natural environment.9 The roles of the Earth Charter and Universal Declaration do not extend to identifying “the mechanisms and instruments required to implement [their] ethical and strategic vision.”10 Acting upon ideals in order to change reality is a collaborative task to be undertaken by the plurality of subjects and their knowledges which construct human culture. I am considering here the contribution of a perspective based in ecophilosophy and environmental ethics. Ecophilosophy and environmental ethics are raising understanding of human-nonhuman interdependence, and nonhuman value, in an effort to end denial and inaction. Three distinct modes of recognizing nonhuman rights have developed and may be summarized as follows. One approach views nonhuman rights through the condition of human benefit; the perceived worth of nonhuman life is derived from human interest. For example, we should value and prevent the destruction of the river, the fish, the soil, or else we shall destroy ourselves.11 This is a reconfiguration of working to prevent humans abusing humans, but here the abuse is manifested through abuse of the earth. Human responsibility towards the nonhuman is indirect and the value of nonhuman rights precarious. Another mode for developing nonhuman rights has been to extend human rights. Basic human rights are modified, or partly or fully extended to certain nonhumans that are compared to humans. For example, many people understand that animals may possess significant consciousness and are able to suffer from cruelty, and therefore animals should not be subjected to cruel treatment.12 Nonhuman rights are conferred according to a qualification process that is biased towards human qualities and against nonhuman qualities, so many nonhumans are not recognised or treated by humans as significant beings with rights. Mick Smith is critical of popular animal rights ethicist Peter Singer for this reason: “Singer’s thesis of the expanding circle, and moral extensionism in general, is a graphic representation of anthropocentrism. Humanity sits at the center of a concentrically ordered nature, as the archetype of ethical value – both the measure and the measurer of all things.”