# Weber AH—Chico Rd 6 vs. Fullerton RS

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### The aff must defend the instrumental enactment of a policy proposal by the United States federal government

#### “Should” proves that’s most predictable

Ericson, 3

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Their failure to do so prevents effective democratic deliberation **by precluding debate over controversial issues—the non-falsifiability of their position destroys profitable argumentation**

Steinberg and Freeley, 8  
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4 ) MT

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a fact or value or policy, there is no need for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate “Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms.” That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as “We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with.” Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements “Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program” more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about “homelessness” or “abortion” or “crime” or “global warming” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does “effectiveness” mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### And, democratic deliberation is the cornerstone of solving all existential global problems **Lundberg 10** [Christian O. Lundberg, Professor of Communications at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311, Ssanchez] The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. **But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier**, debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue thatthese conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate** provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. T**he merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy**. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim **that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively**, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a **technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement andnew articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of **terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, **an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### **And, absent political simulations we become passive spectators in the world—switch side is key**

Joyner 1999 – Christopher C Joyner Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University Spring, 1999 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

### 1NC

#### The government has a fundamental obligation to fight Islamic totalitarianism no matter the costs—the aff rejects this in favor of altruistic selflessness

Peikoff, 1

(Leonard Peikoff, former professor of philosophy, heir of Ayn Rand and founder of the Ayn Rand Institute. “End States Who Sponsor Terrorism” <http://www.peikoff.com/essays_and_articles/end-states-who-sponsor-terrorism/>) Henge \*Ableist lang. modified

October 2, 2001—Fifty years of increasing American appeasement in the Mideast have led to fifty years of increasing contempt in the Muslim world for the U.S. The climax was September 11, 2001. Fifty years ago, Truman and Eisenhower surrendered the West’s property rights in oil, although that oil rightfully belonged to those in the West whose science, technology, and capital made its discovery and use possible. The first country to nationalize Western oil, in 1951, was Iran. The rest, observing our frightened silence, hurried to grab their piece of the newly available loot. The cause of the U.S. silence was not practical, but philosophical. The Mideast’s dictators were denouncing wealthy egotistical capitalism. They were crying that their poor needed our sacrifice; that oil, like all property, is owned collectively, by virtue of birth; and that they knew their viewpoint was true by means of otherworldly emotion. Our Presidents had no answer. Implicitly, they were ashamed of the Declaration of Independence. They did not dare to answer that Americans, properly, were motivated by the selfish desire to achieve personal happiness in a rich, secular, individualist society. The Muslim countries embodied in an extreme form every idea—selfless duty, anti-materialism, faith or feeling above science, the supremacy of the group—which our universities, our churches, and our own political Establishment had long been upholding as virtue. When two groups, our leadership and theirs, accept the same basic ideas, the most consistent side wins. After property came liberty. “The Muslim fundamentalist movement,” writes Yale historian Lamin Sanneh, “began in 1979 with the Iranian [theocratic] revolution . . .” (New York Times 9/23/01). During his first year as its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, urging a Jihad against “the Great Satan,” kidnapped 52 U.S. diplomatic personnel and held them hostage; Carter’s reaction was [inaction] fumbling paralysis. About a decade later, Iran topped this evil. Khomeini issued his infamous Fatwa aimed at censoring, even outside his borders, any ideas uncongenial to Muslim sensibility. This was the meaning of his threat to kill British author Rushdie and to destroy his American publisher; their crime was the exercise of their right to express an unpopular intellectual viewpoint. The Fatwa was Iran’s attempt, reaffirmed after Khomeini’s death, to stifle, anywhere in the world, the very process of thought. Bush Sr. looked the other way. After liberty came American life itself. The first killers were the Palestinian hijackers of the late 1960s. But the killing spree which has now shattered our soaring landmarks, our daily routine, and our souls, began in earnest only after the license granted by Carter and Bush Sr. Many nations work to fill our body bags. But Iran, according to a State Department report of 1999, is “the most active state sponsor of terrorism,” training and arming groups from all over the Mideast, including Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Nor is Iran’s government now “moderating.” Five months ago, the world’s leading terrorist groups resolved to unite in a holy war against the U.S., which they called “a second Israel”; their meeting was held in Teheran. (Fox News 9/16/01) What has been the U.S. response to the above? In 1996, nineteen U.S. soldiers were killed in their barracks in Saudi Arabia. According to a front-page story in The New York Times (6/21/98): “Evidence suggesting that Iran sponsored the attack has further complicated the investigation, because the United States and Saudi Arabia have recently sought to improve relations with a new, relatively moderate Government in Teheran.” In other words, Clinton evaded Iran’s role because he wanted what he called “a genuine reconciliation.” In public, of course, he continued to vow that he would find and punish the guilty. This inaction of Clinton’s is comparable to his action after bin Laden’s attack on U.S. embassies in East Africa; his action was the gingerly bombing of two meaningless targets. Conservatives are equally responsible for today’s crisis, as Reagan’s record attests. Reagan not only failed to retaliate after 241 U.S. marines in Lebanon were slaughtered; he did worse. Holding that Islamic guerrillas were our ideological allies because of their fight against the atheistic Soviets, he methodically poured money and expertise into Afghanistan. This put the U.S. wholesale into the business of creating terrorists. Most of them regarded fighting the Soviets as only the beginning; our turn soon came. For over a decade, there was another guarantee of American impotence: the notion that a terrorist is alone responsible for his actions, and that each, therefore, must be tried as an individual before a court of law. This viewpoint, thankfully, is fading; most people now understand that terrorists exist only through the sanction and support of a government. We need not prove the identity of any of these creatures, because terrorism is not an issue of personalities. It cannot be stopped by destroying bin Laden and the al-Qaeda army, or even by destroying the destroyers everywhere. If that is all we do, a new army of militants will soon rise up to replace the old one. The behavior of such militants is that of the regimes which make them possible. Their atrocities are not crimes, but acts of war. The proper response, as the public now understands, is a war in self-defense. In the excellent words of Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, we must “end states who sponsor terrorism.” A proper war in self-defense is one fought without self-crippling [limiting] restrictions placed on our commanders in the field. It must be fought with the most effective weapons we possess (a few weeks ago, Rumsfeld refused, correctly, to rule out nuclear weapons). And it must be fought in a manner that secures victory as quickly as possible and with the fewest U.S. casualties, regardless of the countless innocents caught in the line of fire. These innocents suffer and die because of the action of their own government in sponsoring the initiation of force against America. Their fate, therefore, is their government’s moral responsibility. There is no way for our bullets to be aimed only at evil men.

#### Egoism is the root of life’s every value

Bernstein, 8

(Andrew Bernstein, professor of philosophy at Marist College and SUNY Purchase. “Objectivism in One Lesson” pg. 11-13) Henge

Readers of Ayn Rand's novels generally notice how purposeful, proud, and fulfilled her heroes are. These readers often raise the question: How realistic is it for her men and women to be so happy in a world torn by moral and psychological conflict? For example, in the current day, anti-heroes dominate serious literature and film; leading public figures are often guilty of crimes and/or serious moral transgressions; and some men's lives are fraught with psychological problems, including struggles with alcohol and drugs. And yet, in The Fountainhead Howard Roark proceeded purposefully and serenely forward, overcoming daunting obstacles, reaching his goals, gaining everything he desired. Readers wonder: Is this possible in real life? Are human beings capable of achieving such exalted moral stature? Can one live in the same manner as an Ayn Rand hero? To answer this question, let's consider several passages from her novels, scenes that dramatize the ennobled stature of Ayn Rand's heroes, and then proceed to extract from them some explanatory principles. In savoring and analyzing her heroes, it is helpful to remember this: she often pointed out that she became a philosopher as a necessary means of understanding the deeper principles animating her characters. In the first passage, the hero of The Fountainhead, the uncompromising architect, Howard Roark, witnesses the opening of his innovative apartment complex, the Enright House. Roark, who earlier had to close his office and work in a granite quarry because of lack of support for his revolutionary designs, savors his triumph. Hatless, standing at a parapet overlooking the East River in New York City, head thrown back and face uplifted toward the sun, he experiences the joyous pride of his accomplishment. A photographer, there to cover the opening for a local paper, sees Roark. The newsman thinks of something that has long puzzled him: "he had always wondered why the sensations one felt in dreams were so much more intense than anything one could experience in waking reality-why the horror was so total and the ecstasy so complete-and what was the extra quality which could never be recaptured afterward; the quality of what he felt when he walked down a path through tangled green leaves in a dream, in an air full of expectation, of causeless, utter rapture-and when he awakened he could not explain it, it had been just a path through some woods." The photographer thinks of it now because, for the first time, he sees that additional quality in a waking moment sees it in Roark's face uplifted toward his building. l One more scene will provide sufficient information to draw an important conclusion. As Roark's new ideas gradually caught hold, he worked on three major projects simultaneously: the Cord Building-an office tower in midtown Manhattan; the Aquitania Hotel on Central Park South; and the Stoddard Temple- a shrine to the human spirit-far to the north on the bluffs overlooking the Hudson River. His lover, Dominique Francon, posed for the statue for his temple. Roark arrived one night at the Temple's construction site to find the sculptor, Steven Mallory, and Dominique working late. Mallory, who knew nothing of Roark's relationship with Dominique, told the architect that they were not doing well, that Dominique could not quite capture the quality he sought. Dominique got dressed but took no part in the conversation. She stood and gazed at Roark. Suddenly, she threw off her robe and posed naked again. Then Mallory saw what he had struggled to see all day. "He saw her body standing before him straight and tense, her head thrown back ... but now her body was alive, so still that it seemed to tremble, saying what he had wanted to hear: a proud, reverent, enraptured surrender to a vision of her own ... ,,2 There are numerous similar scenes in The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. What they show is that the essence of Ayn Rand's heroes is to burn with passion for values. Howard Roark is ecstatic at the completion of his building. Dominique experiences such reverence for Roark's achievements and character that the mere sight of him fills her with inspiration. In Atlas Shrugged, Dagny Taggart's love for her railroad, and Hank Rearden's for both his steel mills and Dagny herself, illustrate an identical theme. These men and women create deep meaning in their lives, which are then filled with joyous excitement. Further, they recognize that value achievement is a means to an end-their life and happiness. They understand that in order to live well, to flourish, to experience joy and exultation, they must pursue values that will, in fact, lead to these outcomes. In subsequent chapters, we will explore the specific values Ayn Rand held every individual should pursue, the means by which he should pursue them, and the reason such values are objective, i.e., derived fundamentally from facts, from reality, and not from subjective whim. But here, the preliminary point is that a rational man sees something as a value because he understands it improves his wellbeing-it contributes to both the sustenance and the enjoyment of his time on earth. Architecture, for example, is both the means by which Roark productively supports his life-and the most fundamental source of meaning in it. Therefore, the initial questions to be discussed are: What does it mean to actually value something? And, related: What role do personal values play in promoting an individual's happiness? To these questions Ayn Rand'!!\ answer is that values are those things or persons that fill a man's life with significance and purpose, those things that he considers worthy, valuable, important, the things he is willing to work for-to get or to keep. In Ayn Rand's words: '''Value' is that which one acts to gain and/or keep." Perhaps the key term in that definition is "acts." Values are always the object of an action. Whether a man loves education or money or art or a beautiful home or a particular man or woman or children or any and all of the above, his values are those things he considers so important that they impel him to purposeful, goal-directed action. In this regard, values must be carefully distinguished from dreams, wishes, and fantasies·3 For example, if a man states that five million dollars would be an enormous benefit to his life, but takes no practical steps to earn it, the money cannot properly be said to be one of his values; rather, it is no more than a wish or a pleasant fantasy. What it would take to transform this dream into a value would be action. If the individual gets a job and starts to earn money; if he works out a budget and begins to save; if he accepts a second job and saves all of the money he earns from it; if he invests his money and carefully monitors his gains; if he does all of this, then it can truthfully be claimed that wealth is a value to this man. An old saying states that actions speak louder than words, and nowhere is this as true as in the realm of values. Every man can identify his actual values and those of others-by identifying what each individual pursues in action. Ayn Rand's theory is one that proudly upholds personal values and a life filled with the things and persons an individual loves. For example, an individual might esteem an education in computer science, or a career in teaching, or a love relationship with a particular man or woman, or starting a family and rearing children, or one of a hundred other life-affirming goals. Whatever positive values an individual holds, he should indefatigably pursue them. Human beings, Ayn Rand argues, should seek their own happiness. They are not obligated to serve the needs of their family, to offer selfless service to God, or to sacrifice themselves for society. They should not renounce personal values. Rather, they should live and act selfishly. To be self-ish, in Ayn Rand's theory, is to hold and pursue meaningful, life-enhancing values. If a man were to be truly unselfish, and actually attempt to practice a self-sacrifice code, then he would have to renounce his personal values; the more urgent the value(s) he surrendered, the more "noble" his sacrifice would be considered. So, for example, if a young man surrenders the woman he loves to satisfy his mother's expectations, by these standards he is virtuous; if he additionally relinquishes career aspirations, his own apartment, and an independent life to stay home and care for her, the conventional code deems him even more "saintly." But after sacrificing his love, his career, and his autonomy, his life will be empty, drained of personal meaning, filled with only resentment and bitterness.

#### Vote negative as an act of heroism

#### The hero is committed to rational, life-promoting values—the choice is key

Bernstein, 8

(Andrew Bernstein, professor of philosophy at Marist College and SUNY Purchase. “Objectivism in One Lesson” pg. 57-59) Henge

That reason is man's means of survival has profound impact on the life of each individual. Based on this fundamental truth, Ayn Rand looks at man and observes a being who can control his own life and destiny. She does not see a being helplessly buffeted by social forces, as do contemporary Behaviorists and Marxists. She does not see a creature doomed by fate or tragic flaws, as did Sophocles and Shakespeare. Nor does she see a being wracked by repressed urges and torn by inner psychological conflicts, as do Freud and his heirs. She does not observe what other thinkers have claimed to observe. Ayn Rand looks at man and sees the possibility of towering heroism. The main characters of her novels make this abundantly clear. Observe how each is distinctively etched as a variation on a central theme. Howard Roark, for example, is an architectural genius who struggles for years against a conservative society antagonistic to his revolutionary designs. Hank Rearden is a superbly productive industrialist and innovative thinker who develops a new metal alloy-Rearden Metal-that is as superior to steel as steel is to iron. Oagny Taggart is a brilliant engineer who expertly runs a transcontinental railroad, who recognizes the merits of Rearden Metal before anyone else, and who stands against virtually an entire society to rebuild her railroad with the new substance rather than with steel. John Galt is a towering intellect-an exalted scientist, inventor, philosopher, statesman-a man whose accomplishments are so prodigious he could be compared only to such real-life geniuses as Aristotle, Leonardo da Vinci, and Isaac Newton. Ayn Rand's view of man's nature in one word is that he is a thinker. He is a being whose nature requires him to live by his own judgment, to never allow others dominance in his life, to neither conform nor rebel but to use his own mind. This, we have seen, is The Lesson of Objectivism: the mind is man's tool of survival and the deepest core of his nature. But the mind does not function automatically. Man is a being who must choose to be rational. This is what Ayn Rand means when she describes man as "a being of volitional consciousness." He must choose reason, he must choose reality, he must choose to live and function as man. 1 Human beings have free will. On Ayn Rand's distinctive theory, to say men have free will is to claim that they possess the power of choice, the capacity to govern the outcome of their own lives by means of the choices they make and the actions they perform based on them. It is to state that men are in charge of their own destinies, that they can select life-promoting values, enact the cause(s) requisite to achieve them, and thereby attain success and happiness. To a significant degree-despite such uncontrollable factors as physical make-up, the choices of others, and more-men can make their lives turn out the way they want. Put negatively, to possess free will means that there is no external power controlling a man's life, no outside agency necessitating its result. Over the centuries, numerous thinkers, known as determinists, have argued that man is a helpless puppet, controlled by a higher power, be it God or Satan or Fate-or today, in a more scientific era, by his genetic coding, "environmental conditioning" or "socialization." To support free will is to argue that determinism, in any and all of its variants, is false. On Ayn Rand's view. a man can achieve. survive and prosper on earth because his survival instrument is under his direct. volitional. individual control. The most fundamental choice possessed by human beings is: to think or not. Thinking does not occur automatically. It is not like sensory perception. For example, when the wind blows or the sun shines brightly, a man feels it on his skin whether he chooses to or not. Similarly, the noise of a car in the street or a television in the next room is heard involuntarily, with no special act of focus required on an individual's part. But reasoning requires a volitional act, a turning on of the cognitive apparatus, a process of focusing the mind. For example, an entrepreneur does not involuntarily, automatically think about the problems of production his firm faces; he must choose to do so. In any given moment, he is free to evade his responsibilities and turn off the mental switch. Similarly, a college student must voluntarily initiate his research and studying; he must choose to enter the library, open his books and concentrate on their meaning; in any moment, he is able to turn the mind off and let his studies lapse. To think is an act of choice ... Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not. In any hour and issue of your life, you are free to think or to evade that effort. But you are not free to escape from your nature, from the fact that reason is your means of survival-so that for you, who are a human being, the question "to be or not to be" is the question "to think or not to think.,,2 Man, as Ayn Rand explains him, is a being of volitional consciousness. Knowledge of the existence of one's own free will is achieved by direct introspective awareness. An individual can direct his mental attention inward and observe himself in the very act of choosing. The college student, for example, may introspectively watch as he lets his mind wander to daydreams of his girlfriend, but then re-focuses it on his physics textbook. The application of one's mind is under one's own voluntary control-and the processes of powering the mind's attention levels up or down are directly apparent to an individual's examination of his own internal mental states.

### Case

#### Evaluate consequences

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring 2002

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Drones are key to effective heg

Shafi 13

Jonathon Shafi is a Journalist for for International Socialist Group “The drone wars and US strategy” <http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/analysis/15928-the-drone-wars-and-us-strategy>, JA

In this context, China’s rise is also threatening, as although it may not be a comparable military force, its growing economic strength at a time in which world economic crisis was initially centred upon Wall Street, throws question marks up about US hegemony in the world. Of course America won’t go without a fight. They have various options in which to re-establish control. One is to generate joint initiatives through imperial alliances like NATO. The intervention in Libya gave US imperialism a root back into the Arab world after the destabilisation of the Arab Spring. The civil war in Syria is being utilised to gain a further foothold and reshape the revolutions towards US geopolitical interests. The question of Iran is still up in the air, as an improvement in diplomatic relations between the US and Ahmadinejad must be countenanced by the fact that there has been a build up of military force in the Gulf over recent weeks. Drone warfare is part of this wider imperial strategy. The use of proxy and covert warfare through drones asserts a sense of domination over key areas of strategic importance. The drones provide a mobile American presence which flaunts technological and military supremacy in a very direct way. They want to say that America is there, watching and striking at will, regardless of official protest. There are parallels here with Israeli strategy in Palestine: we will kill at will, and we will humiliate you while doing so. Imagine if China or Russia used drones in the same way as the US. The US would be the first, alongside the Western media, to declare it to be unacceptable. The point is that the significance of drone strikes go beyond the terror they create amongst Pakistani communities, they are part of an overarching narrative of re-affirming US hegemony.

#### Pursuit of heg inevitable—only a question of effectiveness

Tellis ‘9 Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at the National Bureau of Asian Research, “Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” Global Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2009, <http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley_J._Tellis.pdf>

This hegemony is by no means fated to end any time soon, however, given that the United States remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future will thus remain an issue of concern both within the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the juvenescence of the United States’ “unipolar moment,” combined with the disorientation produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to restrain any premature generalization that the imperial activism begun by the Clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some way come to define the permanent norm of US behavior in the global system. In all probability, it is much more likely that the limitations on US power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power, neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic — is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon. Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for its policies.

#### Heg key to stability—transition causes war

Zhang and Shi 11 [Yuhan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” [**http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry), January 22, 2011, SSanchez]

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Drones solve terrorism

Byman, 2013 (Daniel, Foreign Affairs, The Case for Washington’s¶ Weapon of Choice, Why Drones Work, Volume 92 Number 4, July/August 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139453/daniel-byman/why-drones-work bs)

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation,¶ since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced. In¶ 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman,¶ who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of¶ Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the¶ result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as¶ the former leaders” and who are prone to errors and miscalculations.¶ And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised¶ militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and¶ “avoid gathering in open areas.” Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structure into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

#### Nuclear terrorism risks global nuclear exchange

Ayson ‘10 Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, informaworld

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

**Butler’s politics of vulnerability is based on an abstract notion of the suffering white, American subject. Her appeals to a universal “we” or global community can only reinscribe whiteness.**

**Thobani 2007**

(Sunera, Professor at the University of British Columbia.  White wars: Western feminisms and the `War on Terror' - Feminist Theory 2007; 8; 169 – Sage Publications)

**Butler’s analytic frame begins with the injury done to the US by the 9/11 attacks**: **‘That U.S. boundaries were breached, that an unbearable vulnerability was exposed, that a terrible toll on human life was taken, were, and are, cause for fear and mourning**; **they are also instigations for patient political reflection’** (2004: xi). **The breaching by the US of the boundaries of other countries in the decades preceding the attacks, including Afghanistan and Iraq, are mentioned in passing, but do not shape the discursive field**, although Butler does note that ‘others have suffered arbitrary violence at the hands of the U.S.’ (p. xiv). **But this suffering of others, concretized most pertinently in the bodies of the Iraqi and Afghan populations prior to 9/11, and the many, many other well-known victims of US aggression, is not the starting point for her analysis** (Mamdani, 2004; Johnson, 2000). **Instead, a particular attack on the US, from which she attends to the generalized suffering of a generic humanity, shapes the frame**. **This framing foregrounds, however unintentionally, the experience of the (white) American subject**, **who has suddenly and graphically discovered its own vulnerability, as it does the imperialist perspective** articulated by the Bush Administration. **That this subject neither revels in nor denies the violence done by the US** state, complicates, but **does not contest, the imperial perspective**. **Butler seems to be deeply disturbed by the US violence in this War because of the violent *response* it is likely to engender, and which will likely threaten US populations in the future.** Butler searches for an understanding of the injury done to the self and to the Other by positing a vulnerability that shapes the experience of human beings: ‘[t]o be injured means that one has the chance to reflect upon injury, to find out the mechanisms of its distribution, to find out who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected violence, dispossession, and fear, and in what ways’ (2004: xii). **Although she allows that** this **vulnerability is not equally distributed, her analysis nevertheless proceeds on just such an assumption as she reflects on the possibility of a political community based on this shared experience of vulnerability and loss.** **Such a community becomes the ‘we’ of her text: ‘Despite our differences in location and history’**, she argues, . . . my guess is that it is possible to appeal to a “we,” for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody. Loss has made a tenuous “we” of us all. And if we have lost, then it follows that we have had, that we have desired and loved, that we have struggled to find the conditions for our desire. (Butler, 2004: 20) **In the absence of a discussion of the particularities of the loss of others, the (white) subject’s experience of loss becomes the ground on which this community is to be identified.** Although **Butler repeatedly and explicitly** cautions against the assumption of a universally shared human condition, her analysis also repeatedly and explicitly **reproduces the notion of a universalized human experience**: I am referring to violence, vulnerability, and mourning, but there is a more general conception of the human with which I am trying to work here, one in which we are, from the start, even prior to individuation itself, and by virtue of bodily requirements, given over to some set of primary others: this conception means that we are vulnerable to those we are too young to know and to judge, and hence, vulnerable to violence; but also vulnerable to another range of touch, a range that includes the eradication of our being at the one end, and the physical support for our lives at the other. (2004: 31)

**Butler is just wrong. When compared to the bodies of Afghani, Egyptian, Syria, and host of other peoples, we in the US are not vulnerable. She ignores the historical differences between different peoples to assert a universal humanity, which means a white, American, imperialist humanity.**

**Thobani 2007**

(Sunera, Professor at the University of British Columbia.  White wars: Western feminisms and the `War on Terror' - Feminist Theory 2007; 8; 169 – Sage Publications)

**The analysis of the current destruction of sovereignties by the US, its invasions and occupations, becomes grounded in a shared primal, preindividuated psycho-existential experience of vulnerability that elides the alterity historically instantiated between those doing the occupying and those being occupied.** The common experience of vulnerability that Butler’s conceptualization of the human subject foregrounds may be relevant in some phenomenological, existential sense. But **the use of such ‘primal vulnerability’ as the primary lens for an examination of an imperialist war places her discussion in a liberal-individualist frame so abstract as to severely hinder understandings of how geo-political power relations are being restructured by the US** through this War. Indeed, **the specific vulnerabilities created by imperialist relations become secondary to the primary vulnerability of the infant condition**. **Consequently, Butler’s imposition of the collective ‘we’ in prioritizing a condition of infancy assumes the primacy of this condition as also the ontological point of departure for the Other** (if they are to beincluded in her conception of the human). **The implication is that the experiences of occupied peoples can be approached as being essentially the same as those of imperial subjects**. **Such a commonality of experience**,I argue, **is practicably impossible in the absence of the transformation of the conditions of imperialist domination**. **Butler seems to reject humanist assumptions** *and* **yet applies them to develop her analysis of violence. Her generic ‘human’ subject relies on an implicit denial of the recognition that the injuries, violence and losses suffered by occupied populations are significantly different, and that these peoples are immensely more threatened with violence and injury than are the subjects of imperialist powers**. **In making the racialized distinctions between the forms and degrees of violence experienced by Afghans, Iraqis and other Muslims and white subjects disappear through her resort to humanist assumptions**, **the experience and perspective of the (imperial) white subject is restored to centrality.** Richard Dyer points out that one way in which **whiteness is reproduced** is **through the treatment of whites as a human norm**. He argues that **it is racial power that enables white subjects to claim this position of the human: ‘There is no more powerful position than that of being “just” human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race’** (Dyer, 1997: 2). **Butler reproduces a classic feature of racial power by making whiteness invisible, even as the definition of the human is claimed by the white subject.**

#### Drones ensure Afghan stability

Riedel, 13

Riedel, Bruce. Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, senior advisor to presidents on South as and the Middle East. January 29th, 2013. Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Pg. 269 271 --Veeder

To effectively promote and encourage border stabilization, the United States and NATO have to stay in Afghanistan and continue to lead the International Security Assistance Force there. Americans are rightly frustrated that this has become the longest war in U.S. history, with no end in sight. Obama inherited a disaster there from Bush, and he has spent four years trying to build an Afghan army that can cope with the Taliban without foreign combat troops. Obama has developed a strategy to dramatically draw down the NATO force in Afghanistan by 2014; however, he has also signed a long-term strategic agreement with Kabul to maintain an American military presence in Afghanistan to back up the Afghan army for at least another ten years, until 2025, and to use Afghan bases for counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So the United States is planning to be in Afghanistan for the long haul. What actually transpires in Afghanistan over the next few years could, of course, be very different from what the United States has planned. It needs Afghanistan to be able continue the drone war against al Qaeda for the indefinite future; it also needs access to Afghan bases for SEAL raids like the one in which bin Laden was killed. If that operation had been launched from an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea, it would have failed as disastrously as the 1980 mission to rescue the Iran hostages. Geography matters. But it is unclear whether the Afghan government and army will be able to withstand the pressure of the Taliban and the ISI when American and other NATO forces leave. It is a gamble. If the government succeeds, it will have a stabilizing impact. If it fails, the region will be further destabilized and the most extreme Islamists will have achieved a great victory. Yet America and NATO cannot and should not stay indefinitely. It is time to see whether the Afghans can manage—with extensive help, but without thousands of foreign boots on the ground. The best solution would be a political process that brings at least some of the Taliban into an accommodation with the legitimate government in Kabul.

#### Instability from Afghanistan causes nuclear Indo-Pak conflict

Dalrymple, 13

Dalrymple, William. Author, reporter for the New Yorker. June 25, 2013. “A deadly triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.” Brookings Essay. http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadly-triangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-d?utm\_expid=23328448-5.F\_5LVAOmTpyUUU8Zy4qhcQ.1 --Veeder

The danger posed by the jihadis—not just to India, but to Pakistan as well—is increasingly clear to all. In the late spring, when I tried to have breakfast with a Pakistani friend who lives near the military’s main primary school in Lahore, I was unable to get to him because all the roads through the Lahore Cantonment area were blocked by checkpoints. According to the soldiers manning the roadblocks, so fearful have the generals become of the Pakistani Taliban that they lock down much of Lahore every day in order to insure that their kids can get safely to school and back. They have also abandoned the use of military number plates on their cars, aware that these might attract the attention of Taliban suicide bombers. British diplomats in Islamabad take the view that because the Pakistani army now fears jihadi-generated instability more than it fears India it really has changed its attitude toward the jihadis. As General Kayani himself stated in a major speech in April on the eve of the elections: “The menace of terrorism and extremism has claimed thousands of lives, including those of the Army, Rangers, FC, Police, Frontier Constabulary… and the innocent people of Pakistan… [A] small faction wants to enforce its distorted ideology over the entire nation by taking up arms and for this purpose defies the Constitution of Pakistan and the democratic process,” he said. He went on to call on militants to lay down their arms and accept the country’s constitution unconditionally. ¶ This has led many Pakistan-watchers to speculate that the generals may have had a change of heart about the dangers of their longtime strategy in Afghanistan. General Kayani recently told a senior American military officer that if Afghanistan deteriorated into chaotic civil war after the Americans leave, it would be bad for Afghanistan but a disaster for Pakistan. The army now fears the possibility that the return of Taliban rule would create a reverse sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban and other malcontents. The continuation of clashes between India and Pakistan in—and over—Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal is dangerous for all countries in the region and for the world, especially given Pakistan’s reported fondness for developing tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield, such as the recently tested Hatf IX missile, with a range of under 40 miles. Pakistan is apparently also testing other small, low-yielding nuclear devices such as landmines, presumably designed to destroy large Indian tank formations moving into Pakistani territory. ¶ The priority that Pakistan has given to such weapons and the scenarios they’re meant to deal with constitute the latest and most alarming manifestation of the government’s fixation on India as the main threat to Pakistan’s existence. In fact, however, the threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is clearly no longer from India at all, and arguably never has been. For years, largely and perversely because of Pakistan’s own policies, that threat has come from within Pakistan itself. Likewise, as far as India is concerned, the real threat to its dominance of the region is not Pakistan so much as the dragon rising on the other side of the Himalayas: China, which now has very considerable mineral assets in Afghanistan.

#### The affirmative’s cry against the evils of western colonialism portrays actions of the past as the root of all evil. This form of guilt-driven politics creates an infinite debt that must be relentlessly atoned for

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 3 & 4) MattG

Innocence corrupted by science, good misled by evil—both themes of this turn-of-the-century pot-boiler, a mixture of melo­drama and social fantasy, are still prominent today. Interestingly, they predominate not in literature, but in politics, particularly in relations between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. In al­most identical language, the callow Third World is described as having been robbed of its natural goodness by a diabolical and corrupting West. In fact, every Westerner is presumed guilty until proven innocent. We Europeans have been raised to detest ourselves, certain that, within our world, there is a certain essential evil that must be relentlessly atoned for. This evil is known by two terms-colonialism and imperialism. And it can be summed up in a few figures—tens of millions of Indians wiped out by the conquistadores, two hundred million Africans deported or dead in the slave trade, and the millions of Asians, Arabs, and Africans killed during colonial wars and wars of liberation-

#### The plan merely reverts oppression and dehumanizes anyone from America—this increases violence and turns the case

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 17) MattG

An expression invented by a famous American anti-war linguist to describe his country made a stir at this time: the Bloodbath Archipelago, as opposed to Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago.13 The United States unleashed unlimited resources for killing because of a profound internal moral putrefaction.14 There was no "American way of life," only an American way of death. This insane civilization was rapidly self-destructing before our eyes, and Rene" Dumont perceived a general failure throughout its inhuman supercities when he declared in 1973 that "New York had already become almost unlivable,"15 and was destined for a speedy ruin because of the combined effects of unemployment, garbage, and crime.

#### Occidentalist persecution of Western ideals and hatred of the West allows brutes to rise to power. The impact is persecution, discrimination, torture, suppression, and ultimately, death.

Burma & Margalit 4 (Ian Buruma is writer for The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, The New York Times. Currently Henry R. Luce Professor of Democracy, Human Rights, and Journalism at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY. Avishai Margalit is the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institue for Advanced Study in Princeton, and Professor Emeritus in Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. OCCIDENTALISM: THE WEST IN THE EYES OF ITS ENEMIES. ISBN: 0-14-303487-1, pg. 41-42)IAA

The horizon of Mao’s rural revolution went far beyond Shanghai. His idea of a rural revolt was not limited to China. Mao saw himself as the champion of the entire Third World. And so did his sympathizers of the West. For all those who hated the Bourgeois West, Maoism promised a way out of capitalist alienation, urban decadence, Western imperialism, selfish individualism, cold reason, and modern anomie. Under Mao, warm human bonds would be restored, life would have deep meaning once again, and people would have faith. The Country would finally strike back, just as God once had his revenge on Babylon, and as a new generation of holy warriors is attempting to do today. Mao’s most immediate target was the “Westernized” city dwelling bourgeoisie. In the autumn of 1951, he unleashed a succession of bloody campaigns against bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. “Tiger-hunting teams” were sent out to gather likely suspects for public humiliation, torture, and, for several hundred thousand people, death. Intellectuals, Mao declared, had to be cleansed of bourgeois ideology, especially individualism and pro-Americanism. Small fry would be sent to hard labor camps, but the worst offenders were immediately shot. The assault on the urban middle class went on for more than a decade. A speech Mao gave to Party leaders in 1955 is couched in the brutal rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism, but it shares a common loathing with other revolutionaries who would bring the pillars of the City down: On this matter, we are quite heartless! On this matter, Marxism is indeed cruel and has little mercy, for it is determined to exterminate imperialism, feudalism, capitalism, and small production to boot….Some of our comrades are too kind, they are not tough enough, in other words, they are not so Marxist. It is a very good thing, and a significant one too, to exterminate the bourgeoisie and capitalism in China. Our aim is to exterminate capitalism, obliterate it from the face of the earth and make it a thing of the past.15

#### Their criticism of America is merely a displacement of their own guilt and anger over their own weakness—this proliferates amongst liberals and manifests itself in hatred.

Bruckner 1986

(Pascal, maître de conférences at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, and collaborator at the Nouvel Observateur, “Tears of the White Man – Compassion as Contempt”, Ch.1 Page 16) MattG

Western Europe knew that, without the help of the Marines, they would purely and simply have been wiped off the map. But some forms of generosity are insulting. Because salvation came from the outside— except for some weak internal resistance whose effect was more symbolic than military (De Gaulle's genius was to purge France of the dishonor of collaboration)— America showed very clearly the life force that had once been alive in Europe. The little American cousin had surpassed her European elders in vigor, power, and creativity. It is hard to forgive assistance when it shows up such weakness. And so, the liberator of 1944 became the enemy of mankind. From then on, every occasion was sought to get back at the USA, at least symbolically. The Cold War, McCarthyism, and then the Korean War were to constitute the first occasions for an outpouring of bitterness. For a degenerate Europe that had watched rather than participated in history, however, there was a particularly sweet revenge to be taken on a New World that was still trying to teach it something when the first units of the American expeditionary forces landed in Saigon in 1965. The old whore, poor and needy, scolded the young prostitute for her wrongdoing, in order to expunge her own earlier misdeeds. On the morrow of the Algerian War and its bloody excesses, what a pleasure it was for the French to unload the colonial burden on Uncle Sam, who, as it happened, had shown a remarkable hypocrisy. Nobody in Paris had forgotten that the Eisenhower administration had refused to help the defeated French army at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. Upon our transatlantic cousin, who pillaged Central America, re-established dictatorship in Santo Domingo, showered fire and napalm on Viet-cong guerrillas, organized the blocade of Cuba, and overthrew the socialist regime of Allende, we could vomit forth accusations of what we ourselves once were the inheritors of a colonial culture and we could be repulsed by an image that horrified us. Faced with rejection from the four corners of the world, in the face of European traditions of culture and refinement America the Evil was showing all the symptoms by which the guilt of the West was known—she was rich to the point of satiety; imperialistic, domineering, insolent, and polluting; alienating her youth; exploiting her minorities; glorifying her foundation on genocide; a prospering only because of massacre and murder. She was a nation that had replaced the good things in life with the pursuit of profit, and moral values with the cult of the almighty dollar. In a word, she was the very apotheosis of rapacity and violence.

#### Blaming the US for violence committed by others permits totalitarian governments and violent radicals to commit atrocities—only to have those atrocities blamed on the United States and require atonement in a vicious cycle of guilt.

Beer 1986

(William R., a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, introduction to “Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt”Page XIV of Intro,) MattG

Third-Worldism, then, is a sign of the intellectual sterility of the Left, which must seek abroad for people to liberate because class struggle and Marxian revolution are becoming increasingly irrelevant at home. The course of Third-Worldism in the United States has been quite different, and in its peculiarly American guise, remains politically influential. It also takes on some different forms. Still, in America, as in France, the downtrodden countries of the world are glorified, while the West is denigrated. Third-Worldists never criticize Soviet colonialism in Central Asia, Chinese Communist colonialism in Tibet, or Vietnamese colonialism in Cambodia. Third-Worldism is directed almost exclusively against capitalist democracies. Noam Chomsky, for example, one of the best-known American Third-Worldists, blames the United States for the numerous "bloodbaths'' that have occurred since World War II. Even when massacres and repression are the work of leftist totalitarians, Chomsky holds the United States responsible, because its lack of acceptance drives leftist totalitarians to their actions (cf. Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, Pantheon, 1982, esp. pp. 22-29). William Shawcross, too, performs the intellectual acrobatics needed to achieve this posture. In Sideshow (Simon and Schuster, 1979), his famous book on Cambodia, Shaw-cross attempts to blame the United States for the holocaust perpetrated by the Khmers Rouges. He alleges that the Khmers Rouges arose from the "inferno" that was created by American policy. "Statesmen must be judged by the consequences of their actions. Whatever Nixon and Kissinger intended for Cambodia, their efforts created catastrophe. . . . Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime" (p. 396). Simply put, Shawcross's argument says that Communists commit genocide and America is responsible. Chomsky and Shawcross are only two among many who unfailingly conclude that American policy must be held accountable for the "excesses" of Third World revolutionaries.

#### The 1AC’s remembrance of stories creates ascetic suffering—we should prefer to forget traumatic experiences

Zupancic, 03 (Alenka, “The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two,” p47-49)

This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean “forgetting” is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of “great health”? Nietzsche claims that memory entertains some essential relationship with pain. This is what he describes as the principle used in human “mnemotechnics”: “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”21 Thus, if memory is essentially related to pain (here it seems that Nietzsche claims the opposite of what psychoanalysis is claiming: that traumatic events are the privileged objects of repression; yet pain is not the same thing as trauma, just as “forgetting” is not the same thing as repressing), then forgetting refers above all to the capacity not to nurture pain. This also means the capacity not to make pain the determining ground of our actions and choices. What exactly is pain (not so much physical pain, but, rather, the “mental pain” that can haunt our lives)? It is a way in which the subject internalizes and appropriates some traumatic experience as her own bitter treasure, In other words, in relation to the traumatic event, pain is not exactly a part of this event, but already its memory (the “memory of the body”). And Nietzschean oblivion is not so much an effacement of the traumatic encounter as a preservation of its external character, of its foreignness, of its otherness. In Unfashionable Observations, Second Piece (“On the Utility and Liability of History for Life”), Nietzsche links the question of forgetting (which he employs as a synonym for the ahistorical) to the question of the act. Forgetting, oblivion, is the very condition of possibility for an act in the strong sense of the word. Memory (the “historical”) is eternal sleeplessness and alert insomnia, a state in which no great thing can happen, and which could even be said to serve this very purpose. Considering the common conception according to which memory is something monumental that “fixes” certain events, and closes us within their horizon, Nietzsche proposes a significantly different notion. It is precisely as an eternal openness, an unceasing stream, that memory can immobilize us, mortify us, make us incapable of action. Nietzsche invites us to imagine the extreme example of a human being who does not possess the power to forget. Such a human being would be condemned to see becoming everywhere: he would no longer believe in his own being, would see everything flow apart in turbulent particles, and would lose himself in this stream of becoming. He would be like the true student of Heraclitus. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep.28 Memory holds us in eternal motion—it keeps opening numerous horizons, and this is precisely how it immobilizes us, forcing us into frenetic activity. Hence, Nietzsche advances a thesis that is as out of tune with our time as it was with his own: “every living thing can become healthy, strong and fruitful only within a defined horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and too selfish, in turn, to enclose its own perspective within an alien horizon, then it will feebly waste away or hasten to its timely end.”29 Of course, Nietzsche’s aim here is not to preach narrow-mindedness and pettiness, nor is it simply to affirm the ahistorical against history and memory. On the contrary, he clearly states that it is only by thinking, reflecting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing (i.e. only by means of the power to utilize the past for life, and to reshape past events into history) that the human being becomes properly human. Yet, in the excess of history, the human being ceases to be human once again, no longer able to create or invent. This is why Nietzsche insists that “every great historical event” is born in the “ahistorical atmosphere,” that is to say, in conditions of oblivion and closure: Imagine a man seized and carried away by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea; how his world changes’ Looking backward he feels he is blind, listening around he hears what is unfamiliar as a dull, insignificant sound; and those things that he perceives at all he never before perceived in this way; so palpable and near, colorful, resonant, illuminated, as though he were apprehending it with all his senses at once. All his valuations are changed and devalued;. . . It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings; a tiny whirlpool of life in a dead sea of night and oblivion; and yet this condition—ahistorical, antihistorical through and through— is not only womb of the unjust deed, but of every just deed as well; and no aftist will create a picture, no general win a victory, and no people gain its freedom without their having previously desired and striven to accomplish these deeds in just such an ahistorical condition. . Thus, everyone who acts loves his action infinitely more than it deserves to be loved, and the best deeds occur in such an exuberance of love that, no matter what, they must be unworthy of this love, even if their worth were otherwise incalculably great.3° If we read this passage carefully, we note that the point is not simply that the capacity to forget, or the “ahistorical condition,” is the condition of “great deeds” or “events.” On the contrary: it is the pure surplus of passion or love (for something) that brings about this closure of memory, this “ahistorical condition.” In other words, it is not that we have first to close ourselves within a defined horizon in order then to be able to accomplish something. The closure takes place with the very (“passionate”) opening toward something (“a woman or a great idea”). Nietzsche’s point is that if this surplus passion engages us “in the midst of life,” instead of mortifying us, it does so via its inducement of forgetting. Indeed, I could mention a quite common experience here: whenever something important happens to us and incites our passion, we tend to forget and dismiss the grudges and resentments we might have been nurturing before. Instead of “forgiving” those who might have injured us in the past, we forget and dismiss these injuries. If we do not, if we “work on our memory” and strive to keep these grudges alive, they will most probably affect and mortify our (new) passion. It could also be interesting to relate Nietzsche’s reflections from the quoted passage to the story of Hamlet, in which the imperative to remember, uttered by Hamlet’s father’s Ghost, plays a very prominent role. Remember me! Remember me!, the Ghost repeats to Hamlet, thus engaging him in the singular rhythm that characterizes the hero of this play—that of the alternation between resigned apathy and frenetic activity or precipitate actions (his killing of Polonius, as well as that of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; his engagement in the duel with Laertes . . .). This movement prevents Hamlet from carrying out the very deed his father’s Ghost charges him with. Many things have been said and written about the relationship between action and knowledge in this play, and about how knowledge prevents Hamlet from acting. Although the two notions are not unrelated, it might be interesting to consider this also in terms of memory (not only in terms of knowledge). It could be worthwhile to contemplate the role played by the imperative of memory. Could we not say that one of the fundamental reasons for the difficulty of Hamlet’s position is precisely the structural incompatibility of memory and action— that is to say, the fact that action ultimately always “betrays” memory? And do we not encounter something similar in the wider phenomenon of melancholy (in the play, Hamlet is actually said to be “melancholic”) as a never-ending grief that keeps alive, through pain, the memory of what was lost? Additionally, although we can recognize in this kind of melancholy a form of fidelity (for instance—to use Nietzsche’s words—fidelity to “a woman or a great idea”), this kind of fidelity, bound to memory, should be distinguished from fidelity to the very event of the encounter with this woman or idea. Contrary to the first form, this second form of fidelity implies and presupposes the power to forget. Of course, this does not mean to forget in the banal sense of no longer remembering the person or the idea in question, but in the sense that forgetting liberates the potential of the encounter itself, and opens up—precisely through its “closure”—the possibility of a new one.

#### Falling victims to memory precludes any possibility for change – they need to forget in order to solve.

ZUPANČIČ IN 2003 (Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Massachusetts: MIT; 2003; pg 56-61)

One could say that, with the eyes of the sinner fixed on the cross, forgiving creates a new debt in the very process of this act. It forgives what was done, but it does not forgive the act of forgiving itself. On the contrary, the latter establishes a new bond and a new debt. It is now infinite mercy (as the capacity of forgiving) that sustains the infinite debt, the debt as infinite. The debt is no longer brought about by our actions; it is brought about by the act of forgiving us these actions. We are indebted for forgiveness. The infinite capacity to forgive might well become the infernal flame in which we "tem­per" our debt and guilt. This is why Nietzsche counters the concept of forgiving with the concept of forgetting ("a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done to him and was unable to forgive simply because he-forgot") .26 This is perhaps the moment to examine in more detail what Nietzschean "forgetting" is actually about. What is the capacity of forgetting as the basis of "great health"? Nietzsche claims that **mem­ory entertains some essential relationship with pain.** This is what ~~he~~ describes as the principle used in human "mnemotechnics": **"If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory."" 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## 2NC—Framework

### 2NC—Dem Delib OV

#### And, democratic deliberation is an all-powerful praxis empirically proven to help citizens become appreciative of the collective problems we face—the only way to revive politics is to align debate with the model we propose

Gundersen 2000

(Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9m, Dil)

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens apprecia­tion of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the ab­sence of the institutional interdependence established by the US con­stitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' apprecia­tion of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that deci­sion-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their rep­resentatives. One can add to these theoretical considerations a length­ening list of empirical findings which suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the prob­lems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if deliberation will of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time en­hance interdependence. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more demo­cratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collec­tive choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reason­able, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, citizens must borrow a page from the participa­tory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as their responsi­bility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are, after all, under direct and constant pressure to act rather than deliberate. Politics, in other words, must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.

### 2NC—Decision Making

#### **The critical thinking of our model is necessary for reasoned decisionmaking**

Steinberg and Freeley 2008  
(David L Steinberg is a professor of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J Freeley is a criminal, civil rights law, and personal injury attorney., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pg.3-4) MT

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California’s requirement states: Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly competitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring out solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking “entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism.” Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves the thinking of those involved.

## 2NC—Case

### 2NC—Heg

#### Unrestrained drone usage key to hegemony

Reynolds 2013 (Michael A. Reynolds, Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, “Return of the Maxim Gun? Technology and empire in an age of austerity”, Global Discourse, 26 Jun 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23269995.2013.807603#tabModule)

The United States, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim gun, has successfully leveraged technology to extend its power and reach into foreign societies in ways that would have been inconceivable to the empires of the high-imperial age. American military personnel, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have employed thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or drones more popularly, to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals literally around the globe, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500 people (Zenko 2012). Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have long protected themselves from the superior firepower of regular armies and police forces by declining to wear uniforms or other open markers of identity and by refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to do one of the two things: either to curb their use of firepower and thereby neutralize their own advantage, or to employ force indiscriminately and thereby risk alienating their population and public opinion around the world with excessive violence. This is the classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. To American strategic planners, surveillance and attack drones hold out the promise that they can, if not overcome this dilemma, at least mitigate it. By employing drones to find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States can aspire to identify whether or not those individuals are hostile and then seamlessly employ an attack drone to destroy that individual. Thus, the United States government now routinely uses drones to mount extended and even around-the-clock observation of foreign locales to identify and kill suspected terrorists. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems clear that drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma. In countries where they fly they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies significantly more difficult. Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, a major appeal of drones is their cost. Drones pose no risk of death to highly trained and valuable pilots and they are comparatively cheap. The Predator, the best-known armed drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, drones will likely only grow cheaper as design improves, economies of scale drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars. When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, drones emerge as a potent tool for monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers. The drone is, in essence, a tool well-suited to imperial policing, on sea as well as on land. Thus, the withdrawal of American military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints will not necessarily equate to an equivalent reduction in America's coercive capabilities. For better or for worse, technology such as drones, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence provide the world's policeman with a more potent, if not bigger, baton for the buck. Further advances in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. Technology makes many things possible. Empire in an age of austerity might well be one of them.

#### Heg solves global nuclear war—multiple hotspots

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 13 [Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2013, Lean Forward In Defense of American Engagement, <http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/22.%20Brooks,%20Lean%20Forward.pdf>, B. Morales]

¶ They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars.¶ The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.¶ AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY¶ Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than¶ ¶ three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.¶ UNBALANCED¶ One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own -- or that they will do so in the future.¶ Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it¶ faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point.¶ If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback -- especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms.¶ Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures¶ ¶ and grow faster than they otherwise would.¶ The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline.¶ To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international¶ commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy.¶ Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.¶ LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION¶ The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts -- a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake.¶ History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment.¶ If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship.¶ ¶ After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence.¶ For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes.¶ Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the un, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"¶ If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations.¶ Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the¶ Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.¶ KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.¶ Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal¶ ¶ their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.¶ But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington -- notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia -- might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East -- but at what¶ cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.

### 2NC—Link Turn

#### All critics pre-March 2013 are flawed

McNeal 2013 (Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. TARGETED KILLING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

FORTHCOMING IN THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL, March 5, 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>, bs)

To date scholars have lacked a thorough understanding of the U.S.¶ government’s targeted killing practices. As such, their commentary is¶ oftentimes premised on easily describable issues, and fails to grapple with the multiple levels of intergovernmental accountability present in¶ current practice. When dealing with the theoretical and normative issues¶ associated with targeted killings, scholars have failed to specify what¶ they mean when they aver that targeted killings are unaccountable. Both¶ trends have impeded legal theory, and constrained scholarly discourse on¶ a matter of public import.¶ This article is a necessary corrective to the public and scholarly¶ debate. It has presented the complex web of bureaucratic, legal,¶ professional, and political accountability mechanisms that exert influence¶ over the targeted killing process. It has demonstrated that many of the¶ critiques of targeted killings rest upon poorly conceived understandings¶ § Marked 14:02 § of the process, unclear definitions, and unsubstantiated speculation. The¶ article’s reform recommendations, grounded in a deep understanding of¶ the actual process, reflect an assumption that transparency, performance¶ criteria, and politically grounded independent review can enhance the¶ already robust accountability mechanisms embedded in current practice.

## 1NR—Case

### Zupancic

#### Their reflexive interrogation of the queer subject is manifestation of memory that exerts violence and the ascetic ideal – results in the leveraging of your pain in relation to the spatial self to enforce a passive nihilism.

Nietzsche, 87 (Frederick, “Genealogy of Morals,” Second Essay, “Guilt…”, “The Basic Writings of Nietzsche,” p497)

\*\*Currently looking for the highlighted version\*\*

How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there? One can well believe that the answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle perhaps indeed’ there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth. One might even say that wherever on earth solemnity, seriousness, mystery, and gloomy coloring still distinguish the life of man and a people, something of the terror that formerly attended all promises, pledges, and vows on earth is still effective: the past, the longest, deepest and sternest past, breathes upon us and rises up in us whenever we become “serious.” Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties) —all this has its origin in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here; a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present, unforgettable, “fixed,” with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system with these “fixed ideas”—and ascetic procedures and modes of life are means of freeing these ideas from the competition of all other ideas, so as to make them “unforgettable.” The worse man’s memory has been, the more fearful has been the appearance of his customs; the severity of the penal code provides an especially significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon these slaves of momentary affect and desire.