# Round 4 vs Rutgers

## 1NC

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#### Our interpretation is that the aff must defend an advocacy in the direction of the topic, which is an increase in statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President.

#### Increase means to make greater

Dictionary.com No Date Given <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase?s=ts> increase - Show IPA verb, in·creased, in·creas·ing, noun verb (used with object)

to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: “to increase taxes.”

#### Restriction on war power authority must be a limit that controls the president

Fisher, 97 **–** (Louis, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, “Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse,” U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107, Lexis)

A legal analysis by Walter Dellinger, at that time Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, draws a bold definition of presidential war power but appears to concede that if Congress gets its act together to enact a statutory restriction, the legislative limit controls the President: "By establishing and funding a military force capable of being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitutional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Congress left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives." n131

#### First is limits – limited topics encourage aff innovation, predictive research, and clash—a precursor to productive education. The inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments

#### Second is fair ground – the resolution is the only neutral site of stasis for controversy – changing this allows them to define the debate in ways that make it impossible for us to compete and really easy for them to win

#### Third is decision-making – only maintaining a limited topic of discussion and a clear stasis for both teams provides the necessary and requisite foundation for decision-making and advocacy skills – even if they are contestable, that is different from being valuably debatable

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy,there is no need for debate: *the matter can be settled by unanimous consent*. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of *illegal* immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concernsto be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States. Congress to make progress on the immigration debate *during the summer of 2007*. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened upsimply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate¶ . They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide *much* basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Effective decision-making is the lynchpin to solve all social and political problems --- this is an impact to limits, role-playing and decision-making that turns case

Lundberg ‘10 **–** (Christian Lundberg, Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity forcritical thinking, analysis of public claims, informeddecision making, and better public judgment. If the picture ofmodem political life that underwrites this critique of debateis a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution**,** at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenryto research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong supportfor expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, researchand information processingskills, oral communicationskills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and new articulations of democratic life**.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce** revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; andincreasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenrythat deliberateswith greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Discussions of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – we control uniqueness: students already have dogmatic notions about the world – government policy discussions is vital to force engagement with competing perspective to improve social outcomes and break down pre-conceived barriers of what is right – this turns case

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability topredict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example,simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis \*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their*own*government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while *bringing theory into the realm of practice*.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research*‘‘*their’’government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Topic discussions are good---they create an actively engage citizenry that can check the executive---these decisions affect our everyday lives

Young, 13 **–** (9/4, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” <http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13>)

Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintainsequality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### Prefer our evidence because it is more specific to the debate context. Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

### 1NC Case

#### We shouldn’t decide the debate on the basis of first-person traumatic stories – it’s impossible to validate, it’s easily exploited, and it inhibits debate

Subotnik ‘98, Professor of Law, Touro College, (Daniel, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring)

What can an academic trained to question and to doubt possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." 74 "Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly 75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [\*695] cles. 76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. 77 [\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. 78 [\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity."

#### The concern with ourselves becomes overwhelming – diluting collective liberation

bell hooks 94 Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations (1994), hooks

Critically examining these blind spots, I conclude that many of us are motivated to move against domination solely when we feel our self-interest directly threatened. Often, then, the longing is not for a collective transformation of society, an end to politics of dominations, but rather simply for an end to what we feel is hurting us. This is why we desperately need an ethic of love to intervene in our self-centered longing for change. Fundamentally, if we are only committed to an improvement in that politic of domination that we feel leads directly to our individual exploitation or oppression, we not only remain attached to the status quo but act in complicity with it, nurturing and maintaining those very systems of domination**.** Until we are all able to accept the interlocking, interdependent nature of systems of domination and recognize specific ways each system is maintained, we will continue to act in ways that undermine our individual quest for freedom and collective liberation struggle.

#### Pain fails to create a successful strategy against racism – it’s too fleeting and it essentializes whiteness

* over-focusing on pain means there’s less focus on strategies for coping
* mechanism to scapegoat and blame for pain

Slocum 8 Rachel, PF University of Wisconsin - La Crosse, graduate research began with work in Mali, West Africa, where she studied women's and men's access to land in a large government rice project called the Office du Niger. Rachel began a study of race and the movement to make food systems more local, research she continues to pursue. She uses ethnographic methods to study racial identity in the context of this movement nationally and locally, *ACME: An E Journal of Critical Geographies*, The Embodied Politics of Pain in US Anti-Racism, volume 7, issue 3

This paper has analyzed instances of anti-racist activism and training in which sadness is drawn out of white participants. Pain as a means to attract concern from whites about racism is too fleeting a basis for anti-racism and may even work against it. This pain is elicited by using a notion of race that essentializes whiteness and does not acknowledge the fuzziness of race and the productiveness of its uncertainty. White people need to be involved in anti-racism, but these elements militate against such involvement. Further, the geographical imaginaries of this anti-racist practice omit differences in how racism manifests and what to do about it that are specific to place. This geographical understanding of the world tends to reduce racism to US-centric binaries and the ‘black-white’ divide, excluding other power geometries. I agree with those who have argued for greater pleasure, humor, absurdity and celebration in politics (e.g. Torgerson, 1999; Grosz, 2001; Merrifield, 2002), but I do not have examples of an anti-racist politics of joy.

#### WE’RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DEBATE’S PAST - The idea that we are all complicit in whiteness IS OVER-SIMPLIFED AND LACKS NUANCE. Certain practices – NOT PEOPLE – are more complicit in whiteness than others.

**Litowitz**, Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., Oberlin College, **97**

(Douglas E. University of Notre Dame, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503)

It simply will not do to say that all whites are equally complicitous in this country's legacy of racism and that all blacks are innocent victims; what results is a somewhat **simplistic universe of oppressors and oppressed,** sketched in black and white. What is missing here, I [\*528] think, is what is missing in much of CRT work: balance, **nuance, and a weighing of insider and outsider perspectives**.

#### Your link arguments produce a simplistic conception of whiteness. The debate community become homogenized as white. Policy debate is all white. Belief in fiat, all white. CPs, white. Concerns for fairness, just more whiteness. A concern for anything other than whiteness, white. This turns their form of anti-racism into an oppressive understanding of reality

**Adeleke**, Pf African American Studies, The University of Montana-Missoula, **02**

(Tunde, Globalization And the Challenges of Race-based Pedagogy, http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v2.2/adeleke.html)

The need for a distinct black pedagogy and epistemology seems justifiable within American society and polity, given historical and persistent distrust of mainstream education, and onslaughts on affirmative action, and the conviction of many that mainstream education does not adequately and accurately reflect and represent the experience of blacks. In the global context, however, such race-based pedagogy **becomes constricting, limiting, and extremely problematic**. If indeed, globalization is effecting de-territorialization, shrinkage and circumscription of the political authority of the nation state, if national boundaries are becoming almost superfluous, as humans grow closer and are compelled to confront commonality and convergence, as opposed to distinctiveness and separatism, then the adoption of race-based pedagogy itself becomes problematic. What the adoption of race-based pedagogy does is **replicate exactly the hegemonic model that blacks are criticizing and challenging;** one historically and traditionally based on race, and skewed culturally in favor of the white dominant class. Many critiques of Afrocentricity see it as the extreme opposite of the Eurocentric pedagogy that it purports to reject. Paulo Freire describes a situation where those struggling against oppression often end up adapting values and strategies of their oppressor, becoming themselves oppressors or sub-oppressors. Though they may be aware of being dominated, yet “their perception of themselves as opposites of their oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole.” (Freire, 1992: 30). In the case of black America, there was a strong move to reject the epistemic logic of the oppressor. However, the paradigm that evolves **bears strong resemblance to the culturally and racially skewed epistemology of the oppressor** (Ibid). This identification is a kind of curious and problematic one in that it is unintended and born of alienation from, and an attempt to disown, the hegemonic ethos of the dominant academic system. Consequently, what emerges is a paradigm based on race, just as the dominant pedagogy of the oppressor was heavily dependent on race. That is, there emerges **an equally hegemonic pedagogy**; one that asserts and affirms or **essentializes particularistic ethos and culture**, that are deemed in conflict with those of the dominant group; and one which is often **conferred superiority through claims of originality and preeminence.** Instead of developing a transcendence of the existentialist contradiction at which, “the reality of oppression has already been transformed,” resulting in a pedagogy that “ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy for all men in the process of permanent liberation” (Ibid. 40). the oppressed (in this case blacks) seek still a culturally skewed and equally hegemonic paradigm. Instead of what Paulo Freire envisages, that is, the possibility of a pedagogy of liberation that **unites both oppressor and oppressed on the basis of consensus** on these ethos that are not racially and culturally skewed and hegemonic, **what emerges is a segregationist paradigm** that recreates and repackages the myths “created and developed in the old order.” Advocates of race-based pedagogy believe that the ole myths have not been adequately expelled, but rather have somehow been dispersed under different code words and euphemisms. This is what legitimizes a race-based pedagogy, hence the increasing ascendance of Afrocentricity. The fundamental problem is that Afrocentricity, based on race (an artificial sociological construct), and ethnicity (which sustains an ill-defined and imprecise construction of identity), **renders the issue of the cultural base of the Afrocentric education even more problematic** as it is **based on an oversimplification of an otherwise complex African culture and ethnicity**. In other words, a major problem of Afrocentric education and pedagogy becomes its very lack of depth in ‘African’ cosmology, for what is represented as ‘African’ is often a narrow and poor replica of the original.

#### Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than symbolic victories

Michael Omi 13, and Howard Winant, Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, 2013 Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attenstion to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.

#### Institutional focus key---personal expression as politics calcifies the SQ and cedes the political

* occupy vs civil rights movement

Kreiss & Tufekci 13 \*Daniel, assistant prof in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the U of North Carolina at Chapel hill, \*\* and Zeynep, assistant prof at the School of Information and Library Science and an adjunct assistant professor at the Department of Sociology Univ of North Carolina, Occupying the Political: Occupy Wall Street, Collective Action, and the Rediscovery of Pragmatic Politics, Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 13(3) 163– 167

The drumming crisis was barely contained, but not fully averted, and became moot after the forceful eviction of the encampment from Zuccotti. That said, this tale illuminates a key difference between two movements and, perhaps, a deeper cultural style of contemporary social movements. On one level is the contrast in the leadership style and organization of the civil rights movement and Occupy, and the legitimacy of the concept of leadership to those in the movement. The civil right movement, while an immensely complicated phenomenon that was both professionally channeled (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986) and decentralized through networks of progressive churches, civil society organizations, and grassroots activists, developed a tactical repertoire that was distinct from the political valuation of the organizational form and decision-making structure of the movement. By contrast, in this brief article we argue that Occupy participants cast the values and form of the movement itself—how it operates and makes decisions—in terms that are synonymous with its very identity and survival. Occupy is the change that its members seek. There is both promise and peril in this approach. Occupy is finding it difficult to engage in institutional politics—which we argue is key to broad and durable societal transformations. We suggest that as Occupy goes home, and as it prepares to come back, it should renegotiate the tension between self-expression and strategic institutional action, and between movement itself as a goal and movement goals. In short, we argue that mistaking an anti-institutional style of participatory democracy and self-expression for both real democracy and radical capitalist critique undermines political power—and ultimately results in less progress toward participatory democracy as the movement becomes politically less relevant and less able to bring about societal change. Self-Expression as a Mode of Collectivity The drum circle clash was symptomatic of a larger crisis within the movement over who, if anyone, can impose or even suggest modalities of protest. This is not because collective identity or goals are unimportant to Occupy; rather, it is because collective movement identity itself is premised upon creating a space for individual expression. As a consequence, Occupy has found it difficult to develop the decision-making procedures or legitimate leadership structures that enable individuals to align themselves with the strategic choices of the movement without undermining a key tenet of the very collective identity that secures its existence as a movement. While this is an outcome of the rise of constructed personal identity as a key expression of the political self since the 1960s, it is also a broader phenomenon. One of the defining features of modernity is that identity is less a feature of organized social relations (Calhoun, 1994, p. 11) as a reflexive effort by the individual that involves strategic and performative choices. The assertion of the self as an identity is a political project (Castells, 1997). This emergence of identity as a source of political power has had a major impact on trajectories of social movements. Activism and political activity itself is increasingly also a way to construct a desirable self (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) rather than achieve an external goal. The desirable self is the political project as the arbiter of moral value (Lichterman, 1996). As a consequence, the personal is not only political, the legitimacy of movement organizational forms and tactics is entwined with their realization of personal expression. Certainly, movement participants have long adopted organizational forms based on moral values rather than political efficacy (Jasper, 1997, p. 228). However, the case of Occupy highlights the dilemma faced by a movement where the fullest expression of individual identity and a denial of engagement with the structured demands of institutional politics are its very form of politics. The situation has evolved from one in which there was (naturally) a tension between process and goals to one in which individual expression and the mechanics of internal processes have drowned out most other considerations. Therefore, we are witnessing the transition away from movements that had the capacity to handpick their representatives so as to generate maximum sympathy among the broader public, even at the cost of bowing to and reinforcing the very prejudices it was fighting―to ones which seemingly cannot deal with a mundane problem like loud and continuous drumming by its participants in a residential area. Interestingly, one of the key mechanisms through which the Occupy movement has negotiated this tension between individual self-expression and collective identity is through its signature tactic: The “human microphone.” This tactic, which started as a response to a lack of amplified sound in Zuccotti Park, begins with someone yelling “mic check” and the crowd repeating this in unison. After that, speakers address the crowd in short phrases which are again repeated by the whole gathering, phrase by phrase, so that everyone can hear. The “mic check” has evolved from a meeting tactic to Occupy’s signature form of protest, one that activists have used to challenge public figures. In interviews, Occupy organizers argue that this “unison repetition” alters political dynamics by making everyone, even those who disagree with a point, repeat it, almost as if it were their own point, and also by creating a powerful sense of the collective through shared speech (personal interviews, second author). Further, it cuts the power of individual charisma—and hence sets bounds upon the power of self-expression—as it is difficult to be a great orator and monopolize public attention when one has to stop every few words to be repeated by a large crowd. In other words, the psychodynamics of the human microphone reflect a “collective effervescence” (Durkheim, 1912) and cut against the very individualized and performative processes which dominate the movement. This phenomenon is interesting both theoretically and politically, as it reveals a movement creatively grappling with its constitution through self-expression while maintaining a collective space for action. This tension between self-expression and collectivity remains a significant challenge for Occupy as it limits the depth and breadth of the movement’s impact. In particular, we believe that the movement has failed to engage with institutional politics, limiting the durability of the cultural change it has already effected. Symbolic and Institutional Power The Occupy movement has, to-date, focused on claiming, producing, and wielding the symbolic power of the street. Modeled after the movements of the Arab Spring, Occupy self-consciously appropriated the innovative tactic of materially claiming public space. The contested idea of the street provided the performative context, and the pavement and mass media the platforms, for activists to occupy the public sphere. Through this collective, embodied presence of activists, Occupy has claimed symbolic street power and effected cultural change (Gamson, 1992). For example, while more research is needed, survey data suggests that Occupy has succeeded in changing the media and public discourse around its central mobilizing frame: inequality (Gamson, 2012). Although the public is split on its attitudes toward Occupy and its tactics and overall critique of American capitalism, public salience of inequality has increased (Pew, 2011). As importantly, in helping to create this issue salience Occupy has seemingly created the discursive space that enabled institutional, Democratic Party elites to rhetorically embrace its frame of inequality. Occupy has created a “radical flank effect” (Haines, 1984), staking out a radical position that provided ideological cover for Party elites to turn from the rhetoric of deficits and advance more modest proposals that entail a more active state. While it being an election year certainly helped, Obama’s efforts around the extension of the payroll tax and creation of the “millionaire tax,” as well as embrace of tough rhetoric that echoed the movement’s critique of inequality reveals the discursive space opened by the Occupy movement. While elites have embraced the movement’s themes, it appears that the institutional connections to the Democratic Party stop at this cultural influence. While it is young, the Occupy movement can be read through the lens of populism (Goodwin, 2012). Populism is not a coherent and stable ideology but a reaction to institutional power that has historically assumed both conservative and progressive guises (Kazin, 1998). Its coherence lies in its expression as a political style that rejects calcified institutional and bureaucratic politics and grounds its legitimacy in direct appeals to “the people” (Canovan, 1999, p. 4). Populist politics is expressive and direct. It is personal, unmediated by institutions, organizations, elites, and professionals. For Canovan (1999, p. 13), populism is the “redemptive” face of democracy, ritualistically cleansing pragmatic, institutional forms of governance that are “very far removed from spontaneous expression” (p. 13). For many participants in and supporters of Occupy, pragmatic politics is seemingly an anathema (Dean, 2012). Disillusionment with political institutions, from parties and electoral politics to civil society organizations, appears widespread across the populist left, which has long turned from institutional politics in the attempt to create alternative social (Turner, 2006) and political forms (Gitlin, 1993) that are projects of transformative politics. The Occupy movement, the most significant and sustained class-based mobilization in a generation, echoes these earlier projects of transformative world making. From the beginning Occupy was dually oriented toward experimenting with forms of unmediated self-expression and participatory democratic practice as paths to liberating collectivity. And yet, even as the redemptive is the necessary animating spirit of democracy, Canovan (1999) argues that it is through pragmatic politics that the functions of governance are carried out and institutional power wielded. Actual transformative politics has rarely been without an institutional component, even if it does not involve the institutionalization of movements. Civil rights and the women’s, queer, and disability rights movements have all fought successfully to implement institutional and political change ranging from federal laws to workplace polices. This is not to suggest that cultural change is unimportant. It is to suggest that social transformation can only exist through some engagement with institutional politics that makes change durable. It is the turn from pragmatic politics and institutional engagement that distinguished Occupy from the Tea Party, the most recent manifestation of a five decade old populist conservative movement. Similar to other manifestations of conservative mobilization (McGirr, 2001; Teles, 2008) the Tea Party adopted a dual orientation toward both symbolic and institutional power. The most recent example is the Tea Party’s populist mobilization around the 2010 midterm elections, which reshaped the internal workings of the Republican Party and redoubled its institutional ability to block much of the president’s agenda—including what now passes as progressive reform. In conjunction with party elites and conservative media outlets, in 2010 the Tea Party movement drove turnout in the Republican primaries and the midterm elections (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). After the elections, the Tea Party and its legislative allies created a 62-member caucus in the House and enlisted four members of the Senate to create a voting block that repeatedly eschewed legislative compromise. Even more, Tea Party activists not only drove turnout in the midterm elections, the presence of activists in districts helped hold members to account for the movement’s policy goals (Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2011). In the process, the Tea Party caucus wielded all of the institutional tools at its disposal for the purposes of thwarting the president’s, and often the Republican House leadership’s, agenda. In this, the Tea Party resembles other movements that have taken advantage of political opportunities to open the space for new configurations of institutional politics (Amenta, 2008; McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). The contemporary conservative movement is, in large part, a story of the successful navigation of the twin faces of redemptive and pragmatic politics. Activists who participated in the redemptive mobilization around Barry Goldwater’s candidacy worked to reshape the Republican Party in the years after his defeat (Perlstein, 2001). All of which enabled movement conservatives to seize the political opportunity that Reagan’s candidacy offered. If Goldwater began to unravel the American consensus ideologically, it was Reagan who drew on the movement to wield the levers of institutional power that had effects that ran much deeper than cultural stylings. Reagan dismantled unions, cut taxes on the wealthy, and gutted social service programs. It was Reagan’s electoral victory that forged a radical reimagining of the American state and its obligations to its citizens, and created the institutional forms to hold it in place, from regulatory changes to the reshaping of the judiciary. Conclusion The Occupy movement may now be melting into a sedimentary network (Chadwick, 2007) of activists that will hang together through new media technologies and reconstitute itself around symbolic events in the coming years ― as it did in protest events at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. This symbolic power will likely prove fleeting given the deinstitutionalized nature of redemptive politics. Deinstitutionalization can certainly be a strength in some contexts, such as the overthrowing of a dictator or the rapid creation and publicizing of a national political movement. But, in the routine workings of pragmatic politics, these organizational qualities are a distinct disadvantage, as secular liberals discovered in their recent defeat in the Egyptian elections. After the initial flare of the movement’s mediated publicity, the political context in the United States has changed to one that requires political organization able to engage and challenge institutional politics to advance an agenda forward. If Occupy is deeply divided about its engagement with pragmatic, institutional politics and fails to build meaningful ties to unions and civil society and advocacy organizations during the president’s second term it will be a wasted opportunity. Occupy’s redemptive energy, for instance, would be well directed towards the organization of a progressive, “Occupy Congress” voting block inside Congress that can hold Democrats to account for its aims. In effect, this strategy would call for using the master’s pragmatic tools to occupy the master’s institutional house. This strategy does not exclude the potential for transforming these institutional tools through a focus on process—neither does it disallow the regenerative politics which broader room for self expression can facilitate. It does, however, call for rethinking the balance between process and durable goals, and between personal and institutional transformation—which in turn can transform the conditions through which individuals ultimately flourish. Nor is this a call for abandoning redemptive politics which can again be mobilized when the institutional levers of power become, as they will inevitably, calcified.

### 1NC Cap Root Cause

#### Capitalists within both the African-American and Jewish community attempt to set their group against the other using economic conditions as an argument against coalition building – capitalism is a prior question to cooperation

Revolutionary Worker 98

Blacks and Jews: A Revolutionary View, Revolutionary Worker #971, August 30, 1998

Some forces argue that Jewish ghetto merchants--not the system as a whole--are the specific reason for the poverty of the Black community. They say that "Jews are bloodsuckers on the Black community." They explain this by arguing that Black poverty is caused when the "consumer dollars" of the Black community are sucked out by "outside" merchants. They say rents and retail profits are "taken" by "outsiders" to enrich other communities, leaving "less money behind in the Black community to circulate and create jobs." The solution, according to this theory, is to force "outside merchants" out of the ghetto--not just Jewish merchants, but also Koreans, Arabs and others--and replace them with small Black businesses. Supposedly then the "Black dollars" would remain in the ghetto "creating prosperity and jobs." In fact this theory promotes a straight-up, capitalist, Reagan-Republican "trickle-down economics": It claims that if you help some capitalists of "your" nationality get richer, then some of that wealth will "trickle" down to the masses of people. Aspiring capitalist forces within the Black community have promoted this theory. They want to mobilize the anger many people have against ghetto merchants to create a political demand for more Black businesses. And this theory has gotten a hearing among the Black masses: There has been a verdict among some sections of Black people that Jews--and especially Jewish merchants and landlords--played a special role in dogging and exploiting Black people. But it is not true that Jewish people have ever been the main oppressors of Black people: First, only a small portion of the Jewish population were involved in the ghetto economy. For every Jewish slumlord or sweatshop capitalist there have been other Jews involved in organizing against capitalist and racist practices--as communists, trade union organizers, civil rights activists, etc. Second, Jews involved in these exploitative activities are not involved as Jews or representing the attitudes of all Jews. Once again: Those Jewish people involved in oppression do so because of their class position and their role in the overall structure of capitalist society and its accumulation process. Their activities were not a matter of their "Jewishness." And third, the main cause of ghetto oppression was not small-time merchants, slumlords or social workers--it was the overall ruling class--the U.S. monopoly capitalist class.

### 1NC Cornell West

#### The topic provides a unique place for debaters to learn about how to best criticize and advocate for causes that help people in need outside the debate space. If we care about racism, if we care about drone strikes, then the ballot should be about WHAT CAN WE DO?

West 13 (Cornel, teacher at Union Theological Seminary, former pf at Princeton, Harvard, radio host, author) “Cornel West: Obama’s Response to Trayvon Martin Case Belies Failure to Challenge "New Jim Crow" 7-22-13 democracynow.org/2013/7/22/cornel\_west\_obamas\_response\_to\_trayvon

AMY GOODMAN: In the aftermath of the Zimmerman verdict and the mass protests around the country, we turn right now to Dr. Cornel West, professor at Union Theological Seminary, author of numerous books, co-host of the radio show Smiley & West with Tavis Smiley. Together, they wrote the book The Rich and the Rest of Us: A Poverty Manifesto, among Cornel West’s other books. Professor Cornel West— CORNEL WEST: Yes, yes. AMY GOODMAN: President Obama surprised not only the press room at the White House, but the nation, I think, on Friday, in his first public remarks following the George Zimmerman acquittal. What are your thoughts? CORNEL WEST: Well, the first thing, I think we have to acknowledge that President Obama has very little moral authority at this point, because we know anybody who tries to rationalize the killing of innocent peoples, a criminal—George Zimmerman is a criminal—but President Obama is a global George Zimmerman, because he tries to rationalize the killing of innocent children, 221 so far, in the name of self-defense, so that there’s actually parallels here. AMY GOODMAN: Where? CORNEL WEST: In Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen. So when he comes to talk about the killing of an innocent person, you say, "Well, wait a minute. What kind of moral authority are you bringing? You’ve got $2 million bounty on Sister Assata Shakur. She’s innocent, but you are pressing that intentionally.Will you press for the justice of Trayvon Martin in the same way you press for the prosecution of Brother Bradley Manning and Brother Edward Snowden?" So you begin to see the hypocrisy. Then he tells stories about racial profiling. They’re moving, sentimental stories, what Brother Kendall Thomas called racial moralism, very sentimental. But then, Ray Kelly, major candidate for Department of Homeland Security, he’s the poster child of racial profiling. You know, Brother Carl Dix and many of us went to jail under Ray Kelly. Why? Because he racially profiled millions of young black and brown brothers. So, on the one hand, you get these stories, sentimental— AMY GOODMAN: Ray Kelly, the former police chief of New York City. CORNEL WEST: That’s right. And yet, you get the bringing into his circle— AMY GOODMAN: The current one, yeah. CORNEL WEST: And, in fact, he even says Ray Kelly expresses his values, Ray Kelly is a magnificent police commissioner. How are you going to say that when the brother is reinforcing stop and frisk? So the contradictions become so overwhelming here. AMY GOODMAN: But President Obama, speaking about his own life experience, going from saying, "Trayvon Martin could have been my child," to "Trayvon Martin could have been me"? CORNEL WEST: Well, no, that’s beautiful. That’s an identification. The question is: Will that identification [with Trayvon] hide and conceal the fact there’s a criminal justice system in place that has nearly destroyed two generations of very precious, poor black and brown brothers? He hasn’t said a mumbling word until now. Five years in office and can’t say a word about the new Jim Crow**.** And at the same time, I think we have to recognize that he has been able to hide and conceal that criminalizing of the black poor as what I call the re-niggerizing of the black professional class. You’ve got these black leaders on the Obama plantation, won’t say a criminal word about the master in the big house, will only try to tame the field folk so that they’re not critical of the master in the big house.That’s why I think even Brother Sharpton is going to be in trouble. Why? Because he has unleashed—and I agree with him—the rage. And the rage is always on the road to self-determination. But the rage is going to hit up against a stone wall. Why? Because Obama and Holder, will they come through at the federal level for Trayvon Martin? We hope so. Don’t hold your breath. And when they don’t, they’re going to have to somehow contain that rage. And in containing that rage, there’s going to be many people who say, "No, we see, this president is not serious about the criminalizing of poor people." We’ve got a black leadership that is deferential to Obama, that is subservient to Obama, and that’s what niggerizing is. You keep folks so scared. You keep folks so intimidated. You can give them money, access, but they’re still scared. And as long as you’re scared, you’re on the plantation. AMY GOODMAN: Let’s talk about that issue of the civil rights charges. CORNEL WEST: Yes. AMY GOODMAN: During his remarks on Friday in the White House press room, President Obama addressed the calls for the Justice Department to file civil rights charges against George Zimmerman. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: I know that Eric Holder is reviewing what happened down there, but I think it’s important for people to have some clear expectations here. Traditionally, these are issues of state and local government, the criminal code. And law enforcement is traditionally done at the state and local levels, not at the federal levels. AMY GOODMAN: That’s President Obama. CORNEL WEST: And that’s not true. AMY GOODMAN: Professor Cornel West? CORNEL WEST: That was him saying, "Keep your expectations low. Sharpton, don’t get them too fired up. Keep the rage contained**."** We know, when it comes to the history of the vicious legacy of white supremacy in America, if the federal government did not move, we would still be locked into state’s rights. And state’s rights is always a code word for controlling, subjugating black folk. That’s the history of the black struggle, you see. So what he was saying was: Don’t expect federal action. Well, Sharpton is going to be in trouble. Marc Morial, two brothers, they’re going to be in trouble. AMY GOODMAN: Urban League. CORNEL WEST: The Urban League, absolutely. Ben Jealous—God bless the brother—he’s going to be in trouble. He’s getting folk riled up to hit up against this stone wall. The next thing, they’ll be talking about, "Well, maybe we ought to shift to gun control." No, we’re talking about legacy of the white supremacy. We’re talking about a criminal justice system that is criminal when it comes to mistreating poor people across the board, black and brown especially. And let us tell the truth and get off this Obama plantation and say, "You know what? We’re dealing with criminality in high places, criminality in these low places, and let’s expose the hypocrisy, expose the mendacity, and be true to the legacy of Martin." You know there’s going to be a march in August, right? And the irony is—the sad irony is— AMY GOODMAN: This is the march of the—honoring the 50th anniversary— CORNEL WEST: The 50th anniversary. AMY GOODMAN: —of the "I Have a Dream" speech. CORNEL WEST: And you know what the irony is, Sister Amy? Brother Martin would not be invited to the very march in his name, because he would talk about drones.He’d talk about Wall Street criminality. He would talk about working class being pushed to the margins as profits went up for corporate executives in their compensation. He would talk about the legacies of white supremacy. Do you think anybody at that march will talk about drones and the drone president? Will you think anybody at that march will talk about the connection to Wall Street? They are all on the plantation. AMY GOODMAN: Are you invited? CORNEL WEST: Well, can you imagine? Good God, no. I mean, I pray for him, because I’m for liberal reform. But liberal reform is too narrow, is too truncated. And, of course, the two-party system is dying, and therefore it doesn’t have the capacity to speak to these kinds of issues. So, no, not at all. AMY GOODMAN: So you’re saying that President Obama should not only say, "I could have been Trayvon Martin," but "I could have been, for example, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki," the 16-year-old son**—** CORNEL WEST: Yes. AMY GOODMAN: —of Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in a drone strike. CORNEL WEST: Or the name of those 221 others, precious children, who are—who were as precious as the white brothers and sisters in Newtown that he cried tears for. Those in Indian reservations, those in Chinatown, Koreatown, those in brown barrios, each child is precious. That is a moral absolute, it seems to me we ought to embrace. And if that’s true, then we’ve got monstrous mendacity, hyper hypocrisy and pervasive criminality in high places**.** That’s why Brother Snowden and Brother Manning are the John Browns of our day, and the Glenn Greenwalds and the Chris Hedges and Glen Fords and Bruce Dixons and Margaret Kimberleys and Nellie Baileys are the William Lloyd Garrisons of our day, when we talk about the national security state. AMY GOODMAN: Clearly, the power of the personal representation is what grabbed people on Friday. CORNEL WEST: Absolutely. AMY GOODMAN: You also had Attorney General Eric Holder doing the same thing— CORNEL WEST: The same thing. AMY GOODMAN: —when he was speaking at the NAACP convention on Tuesday. Holder drew parallels between his own experience as an African-American male and those of Trayvon Martin, when he recalled times in his life when he was racially profiled. ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC HOLDER: The news of Trayvon Martin’s death last year and the discussions that have taken place since then reminded me of my father’s words so many years ago. And they brought me back to a number of experiences that I had as a young man—when I was pulled over twice and my car searched on the New Jersey Turnpike, when I’m sure I wasn’t speeding, or when I was stopped by a police officer while simply running to catch a movie at night in Georgetown in Washington, D.C. I was, at the time of that last incident, a federal prosecutor. Trayvon’s death last spring caused me to sit down to have a conversation with my own 15-year-old son, like my dad did with me. This was a father-son tradition I hoped would not need to be handed down. But as a father who loves his son and who is more knowing in the ways of the world, I had to do this to protect my boy. I am his father, and it is my responsibility, not to burden him with the baggage of eras long gone, but to make him aware of the world that he must still confront. This—this is a sad reality in a nation that is changing for the better in so many ways. AMY GOODMAN: That’s U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder. They’re the ones, in the Justice Department, who are deciding whether or not to bring civil rights violations, criminal charges against George Zimmerman, who was acquitted in the Trayvon Martin killing. Professor Cornel West? CORNEL WEST: And, no, there’s no doubt that the vicious legacy of white supremacy affects the black upper classes, it affects the black middle classes. But those kinds of stories hide and conceal just how ugly and intensely vicious it is for black poor, brown poor. And so you end up with, if that’s the case, why hasn’t the new Jim Crow been a priority in the Obama administration? Why has not the new Jim Crow been a priority for Eric Holder? If what they’re saying is something they feel deeply, if what they’re saying is that they’re—themselves and their children have the same status as Brother Jamal and Sister Latisha and Brother Ray Ray and Sister Jarell, then why has that not been a center part of what they do to ensure there’s fairness and justice?Well, the reason is political. Well, [Obama and Holder] don’t want to identify with black folk, because a black president can’t get too close to black folk, because Fox News, with their reactionary self in oft—in so many instances, will attack them, and that becomes the point of reference? No**.** If they’re going to be part of the legacy of Martin King, Fannie Lou Hamer and Ella Baker and the others, then the truth and justice stuff that you pursue, you don’t care who is coming at you. But, no, this black liberal class has proven itself to be too morally bankrupt, too hypocritical, and indifferent to criminality—Wall Street criminality, no serious talk about enforcement of torturers and wiretappers under the Bush administration. Why? Because they don’t want the subsequent administration to take them to jail. Any reference to the hunger strike of our brothers out in California and other places, dealing with torture? Sustained solitary confinement is a form of torture. And we won’t even talk about Guantánamo**.** Force-feeding, torture in its core—didn’t our dear brother Yasiin Bey point that out, the former Mos Def? God bless that brother. Jay Z got something to learn from Mos Def. Both of them lyrical geniuses, but Jay Z got a whole lot to learn from Mos Def. AMY GOODMAN: Explain that. Yasiin Bey actually underwent— CORNEL WEST: That’s right. AMY GOODMAN: —force-feeding— CORNEL WEST: Yes, he did. AMY GOODMAN: —to see how it felt, and broke down and started screaming "Stop! Stop!" in the middle of it, and it was a videotape that went viral. CORNEL WEST: And it happens twice a day for those precious brothers in Guantánamo Bay. And, of course, that’s under Bush. People say, "That’s under Bush." OK, Bush was the capture-and-torture president. Now we’ve got the targeted killing president, the drone president. That’s not progress. That’s not part of the legacy of Martin King. That’s not part of the legacy of especially somebody like a Dorothy Day and others who I think ought to be at the center of what we’re all about, you see. AMY GOODMAN: Let me turn to another clip. Near the end of his speech on Friday, President Obama said the nation should be doing a better job helping young African-American men feel that they are a fuller part of society. I want to play that clip in a moment, but how would you do this? CORNEL WEST: Well, when I heard that, I said to myself, "Lord, he came to the York City and said Michael Bloomberg was a terrific mayor." Well, this is the same mayor who, again, nearly four-and-a-half million folk have been stopped and frisked. What’s terrific about that, if you’re concerned about black boys being part of society? No, no, I would say we’re going to have to talk seriously about massive employment programs; high-quality public education, not the privatizing of education; dealing with gentrification and the land grab that’s been taking place, ensuring that young black boys—and I want to include all poor boys, but I’ll begin on the chocolate side of town, there’s no doubt about that—that ought to have access a sense of self-respect and self-determination, not just through education and jobs, but through the unleashing of their imagination, more arts programs in the educational system. They’ve been eliminated, you see. Those are the kind of things, hardly ever talked about. But, oh, we can only talk about transpartnerships in terms of global training for capital and multinational corporations and big banks. That’s been the priority, the Wall Street-friendly and the corporate-friendly policies that I think are deeply upsetting for somebody like myself vis-à-vis the Obama administration. AMY GOODMAN: This is what President Obama said Friday. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: We need to spend some time in thinking about how do we bolster and reinforce our African-American boys. And this is something that Michelle and I talk a lot about. There are a lot of kids out there who need help, who are getting a lot of negative reinforcement. And is there more that we can do to give them a sense that their country cares about them and values them and is willing to invest in them? You know, I’m not naïve about the prospects of some grand, new federal program. I’m not sure that that’s what we’re talking about here. But I do recognize that, as president, I’ve got some convening power, and there are a lot of good programs that are being done across the country on this front. And for us to be able to gather together business leaders and local elected officials and clergy and celebrities and athletes, and figure out how are we doing a better job helping young African-American men feel that they’re a full part of this society and that they’ve got pathways and avenues to succeed, I think that would be a pretty good outcome from what was obviously a tragic situation. And we’re going to spend some time working on that. AMY GOODMAN: Cornel West? CORNEL WEST: Yeah, you see, if you’re concerned about poor black brothers, then you make it a priority. It’s the first time he spoke publicly about this in five years, so it’s clear it’s not a priority. When he went down to Morehouse, it was more scolding: "No excuses." Went to NAACP before, "Quit whining." No, we’re wailing, we’re not whining. So, to say to the country, "Well, we need to talk about caring," well, you’ve got to be able to enact that, you see. And for those of us who spend a lot of time in prisons, those of us at Boys Clubs, all the magnificent work that various churches and civic institutions do in the black community—and it cuts across race, of course; you’ve got a lot of white brothers and sisters and brown and others who are there, as well—the question is: Since when has it been a priority in this administration at all? So that that language begins to ring very, very hollow. Because he’s right: We’ve got to love, we’ve got to care for our poor brothers and sisters, and especially our black and brown brothers and sisters, because they’re lost, they’re confused, they’re desperate, they’re unemployed, they’re too uneducated, and they turn on each other, because when you criminalize poor people and criminalize poor black people, we turn on each other. There’s no doubt about that. Can you imagine if the creativity and intelligence that goes into turning on each other is turned on the system—not any individual, but the system itself, the unfair system—and tries to undercut the criminality of our criminal justice system to make it fair and to make it just? AMY GOODMAN: You mentioned stop and frisk under Ray Kelly, who is being considered for head of Department of Homeland Security, and under Mayor Bloomberg— CORNEL WEST: That’s right. AMY GOODMAN: —700,000 stops and frisks in New York City. It’s now on trial, in court, vastly, overwhelming, of young African-American mainly young men, some young women—the vast majority do not get arrested, but they— CORNEL WEST: That’s right. AMY GOODMAN: —have these endless encounters with the authorities. CORNEL WEST: Absolutely. And I just never forget Brother Carl Dix and others, right when we were on—we had a week-long trial and had a guilty verdict. But during that week— AMY GOODMAN: When you were protesting and you got arrested. CORNEL WEST: After we protested and went to jail and then went to court and was—had a guilty verdict, right? That week, the president came to New York and said, "Edward Koch was one of the great mayors in the last 50 years," and then said, "Michael Bloomberg was a terrific mayor." Now, this is the same person saying we’ve got to care for black boys, and black boys are being intimidated, harassed, humiliated, 1,800 a day. It’s just not a matter of pretty words, Mr. President. You’ve got to follow through in action. You see, you can’t use the words to hide and conceal your mendacity, hypocrisy and the support of criminality—or enactment of criminality when it comes to drones, you see. And the sad thing is, Sister Amy, is that we just don’t have enough free people, let alone free black people. Black people, we settled for so little**,** so we get **a** little symbolic gesture, we get a little identification, and like on MSNBC, which is part of the Obama plantation, they start breakdancing again: "Oh, isn’t it so wonderful? He’s really one of us. We can now wave the flag again. We can now support our mindless Americanism," in the language of my dear brother Maulana Karenga, intellectual that he is. No. We ought to be over against injustice, no matter what, across the board, and be vigilant about it. I don’t care what color the president or the governor or the mayor is. AMY GOODMAN: Let’s talk about Stand Your Ground for a minute. You know, Stevie Wonder now says he won’t play in any state that has Stand Your Ground. CORNEL WEST: Yeah, that’s a beautiful thing, a beautiful thing. AMY GOODMAN: President Obama addressed the issue of the Stand Your Ground law in Florida, the law allowing people fearing for their lives to use deadly force without retreating from a confrontation. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: I know that there’s been commentary about the fact that the Stand Your Ground laws in Florida were not used as a defense in the case. On the other hand, if we’re sending a message as a society in our communities that someone who is armed potentially has the right to use those firearms, even if there’s a way for them to exit from a situation, is that really going to be contributing to the kind of peace and security and order that we’d like to see? And for those who resist that idea that we should think about something like these Stand Your Ground laws, I’d just ask people to consider, if Trayvon Martin was of age and armed, could he have stood his ground on that sidewalk? And do we actually think that he would have been justified in shooting Mr. Zimmerman, who had followed him in a car, because he felt threatened? And if the answer to that question is at least ambiguous, then it seems to me that we might want to examine those kinds of laws. AMY GOODMAN: That’s President Obama speaking on Friday. Cornel West? CORNEL WEST: Well, I certainly agree with him that we ought to fight Stand Your Ground laws, but we’ve got to keep in mind Stand Your Ground laws are part of the legacy of the slave patrol, which is to say it’s primarily white brothers and sisters armed to keep black people under control. And I come from Sacramento, California. I remember when the Black Panther Party walked into the Capitol with their guns. Now, you noticed at that moment, all of a sudden people were very much for gun control, even the right wing. Why? Because the Panthers were saying, "Well, let’s just arm all the black folk to make sure they stand their ground." Oh, Lord. That’s such a challenge. Now, see, you know, as a Christian and trying to be part of the legacy of Martin, you see, I don’t want people armed across the board. I do believe in self-defense, just like I believe in self-respect and self-determination, but I don’t want people armed. So it’s very clear there’s a class and a racial bias in these laws, and therefore we ought to fight these laws. There’s no doubt about it. But we have to be very honest and candid about the hypocrisy operating when we talk about these things. AMY GOODMAN: It was rather chilling to hear both Robert Zimmerman, George Zimmerman’s brother, and also Mark O’Mara, the attorney for George Zimmerman, talking about how—the fact that George Zimmerman is supposed to get his gun back, that he needs it more than ever, because he’s targeted, because he’s afraid. What is more frightening than a frightened George Zimmerman with a gun? CORNEL WEST: No, it’s true. But it’s—I mean, when you let criminals off, they feel—they feel as if their criminality has been affirmed, and therefore they want to be able to continue to act as if they—the business is as usual, back to business as usual. AMY GOODMAN: Cornel, as we wrap up this segment, I’d like you you to stay for the next segment about— CORNEL WEST: Sure, sure. AMY GOODMAN: —Howard Zinn’s books in Indiana. If you were invited to speak at the 50th anniversary celebration of the "I Have a Dream" speech, the March on Washington—August 28th, 1963, is when it happened, 50 years ago—what would you say? Give us a few minutes. CORNEL WEST: I would say we must never tame Martin Luther King Jr. or Fannie Lou Hamer or Ella Baker or Stokely Carmichael. They were unbossed. They were unbought. That Martin was talking about a beloved community, which meant that it subverts any plantation—Bush’s plantation, Clinton’s plantation, Obama’s plantation—and the social forces behind those plantations, which have to do with Wall Street, have to do with multinational corporations. And we’re going to focus on poor people. We’re going to focus on working people across the board. We’re going to talk about the connection between drones, which is a form of—a form of crimes against humanity outside the national borders. We’re going to talk about Wall Street criminality. We’re going to talk about how we ensure that our gay and lesbian brothers and sisters have their dignity affirmed. We’re going to talk about the children.Martin Luther King Jr. was a free black man. He was a Jesus-loving free black man. Will the connection between drones, new Jim Crow, prison-industrial complex, attacks on the working class, escalating profits at the top, be talked about and brought together during that march? I don’t hold my breath. But Brother Martin’s spirit would want somebody to push it. And that’s part of his connection to Malcolm X. That’s part of his connection to so many of the great freedom fighters that go all the way back to the first slave who stepped on these decrepit shores. AMY GOODMAN: Cornel West. Professor Cornel West now teaches at Union Theological Seminary here in New York. Before that, he was a professor at Princeton University and, before that, at Harvard University. He is the author of numerous books, co-hosts a radio show with Tavis Smiley called Smiley & West, and together they wrote the book The Rich and the Rest of Us: A Poverty Manifesto. When we come back, we’re going to look at the controversy around the late, great historian Howard Zinn in Indiana. Stay with us.

#### *READ SLOW*

Tahir Afzal’s brother died in a drone strike. “It was in the afternoon around two o’clock and he was on his way to work. They were in a car. A drone struck and four people died in it, including children who were walking on the road. . . . There were lots of drones wandering over that day. They were wandering all over, and as the car passed by, it was targeted.” Tahir told our team, “He was my older brother, and I miss him a lot.”

“[Before, everybody was involved in their own labor work. We were all busy. But since the drone attacks have started, everybody is very scared and everybody is terrorized. . . . People are out of business, people are out of schools, because people are being killed by these drone attacks.” Tahir emphasized, “It’s not a [fictional] story. It’s brutality that we are undergoing and that needs to be stopped.” <http://www.livingunderdrones.org/victim-stories/>

## 2NC

### Bad is Good

#### If we truly care about the coalition between the black and Jewish community, you should judge this debate by what it provides for the larger public – rhetorical criticism does nothing if we don’t pay attention to how it’s actualized in a particular moment

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

It is also tempting to conclude that one could still essentially engage in activist rhetorical reflection to the degree that one promotes particular inventional resources over others. Nevertheless, owing to the unpredictable, constantly shifting rhetorical challenges surrounding even a single issue, this is also wrong. The practical effect of any argumentative form, vocabulary, concept, or criticism always depends on how it is appropriated, cast, recast, or responded to in a particular political moment. For example, calls from critics of war rhetoric to substitute humanizing for dehumanizing figures are easily co-opted by political leaders pursuing war in the name of humanitarian concern. Hence, in context, even “humanizing” rhetorics often need to be displaced by seemingly amoral rhetorics of national interest if military action is to be avoided ([Motter 2010](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.usc.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v045/45.1.welsh.html#b27), 520–22). As Terry Eagleton argues, “This is not to say that theories and literary forms are politically neutral.” Rather, “they are politically polyvalent, capable of generating a multiplicity of sometimes quite contradictory social effects” (1990, 30–31). Instead of being a limitation, however, as Eagleton implies, the polyvalent quality of the products of rhetorical reflection is their most valuable quality. As critical “interventions” addressed to a particular political moment, the products of rhetorical reflection have a very brief shelf life, often spoiling before they reach market; regarded as contributions to a complex, conflicted rhetorical imagination, they become indefinitely valuable. [End Page 20] They become available for appropriation and reappropriation by citizens, who, at the “right point in time,” in the words of Michel de Certeau, discover an “unexpected pertinence” (1984, 83, 89). We as debate-scholars can actively aid democratic practice, by providing a space for reflection where political ideas can be tested. Our job should be to hypothetically advocate as many real policy positions proposed by actual political actors as possible, especially those arguments and advocacies that we think are flawed or wrong, so that we can make their weaknesses available to the public in the form of arguments they could use (and likewise, we should actively negate whatever ideas we personally think are the best so as to push them to their limits). Citizen activists on all sides of an issue will find things to appropriate from our discourse; regardless of how it turns out, the real-world political deliberations will be better informed, better reasoned, better debated. That is our politics.

### Anderson

#### Only we access offense---arguments like topicality don’t injure people, but policies do---avoiding democratic engagement means the aff can never actually transform the institutions that produce exclusion in the first place

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Probyns piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the books content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas. When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument. In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

## 1NR

### 1NR Phelan

#### Specifically in the context of the debate – your method is a method of Making the oppressed subject visible provokes surveillance, voyeurism and attempts at imperial possession and incorporation.

Peggy Phelan Chair NYU Performance Studies Dept. 93 [*Unmarked* p. 7-8]

The current contradiction between “identity politics” with its accent on visibility, and the psychoanalytic/ldeconstructionist mistrust (if visibility as she source of unity or wholeness needs to he refigured, if not resolved. As the left dedicates ever more energy to visibility politics, I am increasingly troubled by the forgetting of the problems of visibility so successfully articulated by feminist film theorists in I he 1970s and 1980s. I am not suggesting that continued invisibility is the “proper” political agenda for the disenfranchised, but. rather that. the binary between the power of visibility and the impotency of invisibility is falsifying. There is real power in remaining unmarked; and there are serious limitations to visual representation as a political goal. Visibility is a trap (“In this matter oft he visible, everything is a trap”: (Lacan *Four Fundamental Concepts*: 93); it summons surveillance and the law; it provokes voyeurism, fetishism, the colonialist/imperial appetite for possession. Yet it retains a certain political appeal. Visibility politics have practical consequences: a line can be drawn between a practice (getting someone seen or read) and a theory (if you are seen it. is harder for “them” to ignore you, to construct a punitive canon); the two can be reproductive. While there is a deeply ethical appeal in the desire for a more inclusive representational landscape and certainly under-represented communities can be empowered by an enhanced visibility, the terms of this visibility often enervate the putative power of these identities. A much more nuanced relationship to the power of visibility needs to be pursued than the Left currently engages.” Arguing that communities of the hitherto under-represented will be made stronger if representational economies reflect and see them, progressive cultural activists have staked a huge amount on increasing and expanding the visibility of racial, ethnic, and sexual “others.” It is assumed that disenfranchised communities who see their members within the representational field will feel great or pride in being Part, of such a community and those who are not in such a community will increase their understanding of the diversity and strength of such communities. Implicit within this argument. are several presumptions which bear further scrutiny: 1) Identities are visibly marked so the resemblance between the African-American on the television and the African-American on the street helps the observer see they are members of the same community. Reading physical resemblance is a way of' identifying community.

2 The relationship between representation and idenity is linear and smoothly mimetic, What one sees is who one is.

3 If one's mimetic likeness is not represented. one is not addressed. 4. Increased visibility equals increased power. Each presumption reflects the ideology of the visible, an ideology which erases the power of the unmarked, unspoken, and unseen.

### 1NR Cornell West

#### West believed that postmodern capitalist culture was deeply nihilistic

Dorrien 8 Gary, Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics at Union Theological Seminary and Professor of Religion at Columbia University. Philosopher Cornel West describes him as “the preeminent social ethicist in North America today” CrossCurrents, Imagining social justice: Cornel West's prophetic public intellectualism. Volume 58, Issue 1, pages 6–42, Spring

Capitalist culture bombarded its youthful consumers with titillating images designed to stimulate self-preoccupation, materialism, and antisocial attitudes, West contended; moreover, most American children lacked adequate parental guidance: "Most of our children--neglected by overburdened parents and bombarded by the market values of profit-hungry corporations--are ill-equipped to live live of spiritual and cultural quality." In a word, postmodern capitalist culture was deeply nihilistic. Philosophically, nihilism was the doctrine that there are no credible grounds for truth statements or standards; at the street level, it was the experience of "horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness." In West's telling, the culture of nihilism was especially toxic in poor black urban neighborhoods. It was the "major enemy of black survival in America," more destructive than oppression or exploitation. The black American struggle against nihilistic despair was hardly new, he acknowledged. It was as old as the slaveships and auction blocks that ripped apart black families and condemned blacks to chattel servitude.

### 1NR Cap Ballot Commodification Sustains System

#### Advocating the debate space as a site for change degenerates into academic self-congratulation that locks in the SQ - Resistance is first of all a function of the apparatus itself

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities).

Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse.

The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.