# R2 vs JMU

## 1NC

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#### Affs should specify the restriction

#### Litany of restrictions means generics won’t be suffice and specific cards won’t apply because aff will say they’re not that

#### Vote neg – all ground and education revolve around legislation or judicial reasoning – complicates links for DAs and competition for counterplans

### 1NC Politics of Schmitt K

#### Politics is Schmittian – trying to fight the executive on their own battlefield is naïve – the aff is just a liberal knee-jerk reaction that swells executive power

Kinniburgh, 5/27 **–** (Colin, Dissent, 5-27, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/partial-readings-the-rule-of-law>)

The shamelessness of the endeavor is impressive—a far cry, in many ways, from the CIA’s secretive Cold War–era assassination plots. Obama has succeeded in anchoring a legal infrastructure for state-sponsored assassinations on foreign soil while trumpeting it, in broad daylight, as a framework for accountability. Peppered with allusions to the Constitution and to “the law” more generally, the call for transparency instead appears to provide an Orwellian foil for a remarkable expansion of executive powers. Existing laws, domestic or international, are proving a hopelessly inadequate framework with which to hold the Obama administration accountable for arbitrary assassinations abroad. No doubt it is tempting to turn to the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other relevant legal documents as a litmus test for the validity of government actions. Many progressive media outlets have a tendency to seize on international law, especially, as a straightforward barometer of injustice: this is particularly true in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as an editorial in the current issue of Jacobin points out. Both domestic and international legal systems often do afford a certain clarity in diagnosing excesses of state power, as well as a certain amount of leverage with which to pressure the states committing the injustices. To hope, however, that legal systems alone can redress gross injustices is naive. Many leftists—and not just “bloodless liberals”—feel obliged to retain faith in laws and courts as a lifeline against oppression, rather than as mere instruments of that same oppression. Even Marx, when he was subjected, along with fellow Communist League exiles, to a mass show trial in Prussian courts in the 1850s, was convinced that providing sufficient evidence of his innocence would turn the case against his accuser, Wilhelm Stieber, a Prussian secret agent who reportedly forged his evidence against the communists. In his writings, Marx expressed his disillusionment with all bourgeois institutions, including the courts; in practice, he hoped that the law would serve him justice. Richard Evans highlights this tension in his insightful review of Jonathan Sperber’s Karl Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life, published in the most recent London Review of Books. “Naively forgetting,” writes Evans, “what they had said in the Manifesto – that the law was just an instrument of class interests – Marx and Engels expected [their evidence against Stieber] to lead to an acquittal, but the jury found several of the defendants guilty, and Stieber went unpunished.” Marx’s disappointment is all too familiar. It is familiar from situations of international conflict, illustrated by Obama’s drone strikes justifications; it is evident, too, when a police officer shoots dead an unarmed Bronx teenager in his own bathroom, and the charge of manslaugher—not murder—brought against the officer is dropped for procedural reasons by the presiding judge. This is hardly the first such callous ruling by a New York court in police violence cases; the last time charges were brought against an NYPD officer relating to a fatal shooting on duty, in 2007, they were also dropped. Dozens of New Yorkers have died at the hands of the police since then, and Ramarley Graham’s case was the first that even came close to a criminal conviction—only to be dropped for ludicrous reasons. Yet New York’s stop-and-frisk opponents are still fighting their battle out in the courts. In recent months, many activists have invested their hopes for fairer policing in a civil class action suit, Floyd, et. al. vs. City of New York, which may just convict the NYPD of discrimination despite the odds. District court judge Shira Scheindlin, profiled in this week’s New Yorker, has gained a reputation for ruling against the NYPD in stop-and-frisk cases, even when it has meant letting apparently dangerous criminals off the hook. In coming weeks, she is likely to do the same for the landmark Floyd case, in what may be a rare affirmation of constitutional law as a bulwark against state violence and for civil liberties. Even if the city wins the case, the spotlight that stop-and-frisk opponents have shined on the NYPD has already led to a 51 percent drop in police stops in the first quarter of this year. Still, when the powerful choose the battlefield and write the laws of war, meeting them on their terms is a dangerous game.

#### Legality is what feeds a new form of muscular liberalism where these illusions cannot see how much they sustain it which legitimizes wars for democracies and doctrines of pre-emption

Motha 8 \*Stewart, Senior Lecturer, Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, Journal of Law, Culture, and Humanities Forthcoming 2008, Liberal Cults, Suicide Bombers, and other Theological Dilemmas

A universalist liberal ideology has been re-asserted. It is not only neo-con hawks or Blairite opportunists that now legitimise wars for democracy. Alarmingly, it is a generation of political thinkers who opposed the Nixonian logic of war (wars to show that a country can ‘credibly’ fight a war to protect its interests1), and those humbled by the anticolonial struggles of liberation from previous incarnations of European superiority that are renewing spurious civilizational discourses. This ‘muscular liberalism’ has found its voice at the moment of a global political debate about the legality and effectiveness of ‘just wars’ – so called ‘wars for democracy’ or ‘humanitarian war’. The new political alignment of the liberal left emerged in the context of discussions about the ‘use of force’ irrespective of UN Security Council endorsement or the sovereign state’s territorial integrity, such as in Kosovo – but gained rapid momentum in response to attacks in New York City and Washington on September 11, 2001. Parts of the liberal left have now aligned themselves with neoconservative foreign policies, and have joined what they believe is a new anti-totalitarian global struggle – the ‘war on terror’ or the battle against Islamist fundamentalism. One task of this essay, then, is to identify this new formation of the liberal left. Much horror and suffering has been unleashed on the world in the name of the liberal society which must endure. However, when suicide bombing and state-terror are compared, the retort is that there is no moral equivalence between the two. Talal Asad in his evocative book, On Suicide Bombing, has probed the horror that is felt about suicide bombing in contrast to state violence and terror.2 What affective associations are formed in the reaction to suicide bombing? What does horror about suicide bombing tell us about the constitution of inter-subjective relations? In this essay I begin to probe these questions about the relation between death, subjectivity, and politics. I want to excavate below the surface oppositions of good deaths and bad, justifiable killing and barbarism, which have been so central to left liberal arguments. As so much is riding on the difference between ‘our good war’ and ‘their cult of death’, it seems apt to examine and undo the opposition. The muscular liberal left projects itself as embodying the values of the ‘West’, a geo-political convergence that is regularly opposed to the ‘East’, ‘Muslims’, or the ‘Islamic World’. I undo this opposition, arguing that thanatopolitics, a convergence of death, sacrifice, martyrdom and politics, is common to left liberal and Islamist political formations. How does death become political for left liberals and Islamist suicide bombers? In the case of the latter, what is most immediately apparent is how little is known about the politics and politicization of suicide bombers. Suicide bombers are represented as a near perfect contrast to the free, autonomous, self-legislating liberal subject – a person overdetermined by her backward culture, oppressive setting, and yet also empty of content, and whose death can have no temporal political purchase. The ‘suicide bomber’ tends to be treated by the liberal left as a trans-historical ‘figure’, usually represented as the ‘Islamo-fascist’ or the ‘irrational’ Muslim.3 The causes of suicide bombing are often implicitly placed on Islam itself – a religion that is represented as devoid of ‘scepticism, doubt, or rebellion’ and thus seen as a favourable setting for totalitarianism.4 The account of the suicide bomber as neo-fascist assassin supplements a lack – that is, that the association of suicide bombing with Islam explains very little. The suicide bomber is thus made completely familiar as totalitarian fascist, or wholly other as “[a] completely new kind of enemy, one for whom death is not death”.5 So much that is written about the suicide bomber glosses over the unknown with political subjectivities, figures, and paradigms (such as fascism) which are familiar enough to be vociferously opposed. By drawing the suicide bomber into a familiar moral register of ‘evil’, political and historical relations between victim and perpetrator are erased.6 In the place of ethnographically informed research the ‘theorist’ or ‘public intellectual’ erases the contingency of the suicide bomber and reduces her death to pure annihilation, or nothingness. The discussion concludes by undoing the notion of the ‘West’, the very ground that the liberal left assert they stand for. The ‘West’ is no longer a viable representation of a geo-political convergence, if it ever was. Liberal discourse has regarded itself as the projection of the ‘West’ and its enlightenment. But this ignores important continuities between Islam, Christianity, and contemporary secular formations. The current ‘clash of monotheisms’, I argue after J-L Nancy, reveals a crisis of sense, authority, and meaning which is inherent to the monotheistic form. An increasingly globalised world is made up of political communities and juridical orders that have been ‘emptied’ of authority and certainty. This crisis of sense conditions the horror felt by the supposedly rational liberal in the face of Islamist terrorism. Horror at terrorism is then the affective bond that sustains a grouping that otherwise suffers the loss of a political project with a definite end. The general objective of this essay is to challenge the unexamined assumptions about politics and death that circulate in liberal left denunciations of Islamic fascism. The horror and fascination with the figure of the suicide bomber reveals an unacknowledged affective bond that constitutes the muscular liberal left as a political formation. This relies on disavowing the sacrificial and theological underpinnings of political liberalism itself – and ignores the continuities between what is called the ‘West’ and the theologico-political enterprise of monotheism. Monotheism is not the preserve of something called the ‘West’, but rather an enterprise that is common to all three Religions of the Book. The article concludes by describing how the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy on monotheism offer liberal left thinkers insights for rethinking the crisis of value that resulted from the collapse of grand emancipatory enterprises as well as the fragmentation of politics resulting from a focus on political identification through difference. I opened with a reference to the ‘liberal left’. Of course the ‘liberal left’ signifies a vast and varied range of political thinking and activism – so I must clarify how I am deploying this term. In this essay the terms ‘liberal left’ or ‘muscular liberal’ are used interchangeably. Paul Berman and Nick Cohen, whose writing I will shortly refer to, are exemplars of the new political alignment who self-identify as ‘democrats and progressives’, but whose writings feature bellicose assertions about the superiority of western models of democracy, and universal human rights.7 Among this liberal left, democracy and freedom become hemispheric and come to stand for the West. More generally, now, the ‘liberal left’ can be distinguished from political movements and thinkers who draw inspiration from a Marxist tradition of thought with a socialist horizon. The liberal left I am referring to would view the Marxist tradition as undervaluing democratic freedoms and human rights. Left liberals also tend to dismiss the so called post-Marxist turn in European continental philosophy as ‘postmodern relativism’.8 PostMarxists confronted the problem of the ‘collective’ – addressing the problem of masses and classes as the universal category or agent of historical transformation. This was a necessary correction to all the disasters visited on the masses in the name of a universal working class. The liberal state exploited these divisions on the left. It is true that a left fragmented through identity politics or the politics of difference were reduced to group based claims on the state. However, liberal multiculturalism was critiqued by anti-racist and feminist thinkers as early as the 1970s for ignoring the structural problems of class or as yet another nation-building device. The new formation of the muscular liberal left have only just discovered the defects of multiculturalism. The dismissal of liberal multiculturalism is now code for ‘too much tolerance’ of ‘all that difference’. The liberal left, or muscular liberal, as I use these terms, should not be conflated with the way ‘liberal’ is generally used in North America to denote ‘progressive’, ‘pro-choice’, open to a multiplicity of forms of sexual expression, generally ‘tolerant’, or ‘left wing’ (meaning socialist). It might be objected that it is not the liberal left, but ‘right wing crazies’ driven by Christian evangelical zeal combined with neo-liberal economic strategies that have usurped a post-9/11 crime and security agenda to mount a global hegemonic enterprise in the name of a ‘war on terror’. It might also be said that this is nothing new – global expansionist enterprises such as 18th and 19th century colonialism mobilised religion, science, and theories of economic development to secure resources and justify extreme violence where necessary. Global domination, it might be argued, has always been a thanatopolitical enterprise. So what’s different now? What is crucial, now, is that the entire spectrum of liberalism, including the ‘rational centre’, is engaged in the kind of mindset whereby a destructive and deadly war is justified in the name of protecting or establishing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. It might then be retorted that this ‘rational centre’ of liberalism have ‘always’ been oriented in this way. That is partly true, but it is worth recalling that the liberal left I have in mind is the generation that came of age with opposition to the war in Vietnam, other Indo-Chinese conflagrations, and the undoing of empire. This is a left that observed the Cold War conducted through various ‘hot wars’ in Africa, Central and Latin America, and South East Asia and thus at least hoped to build a ‘new world order’ of international law and multilateralism. This is a left that was resolved, by the 1970s, not to repeat the error of blindly following a scientific discourse that promised to produce a utopia – whether this was ‘actually existing socialism’ or the purity of ‘blood and soil’. But now, a deadly politics, a thanatopolitics, is drawn out of a liberal horror and struggle against a monolithically drawn enemy called Islamic fundamentalism. What is new is that Islam has replaced communism/fascism as the new ‘peril’ against which the full spectrum of liberalism is mobilized. Islamist terrorism and suicide bombers, a clash between an apparently Islamic ‘cult of death’ versus modern secular rationality has come to be a central preoccupation of the liberal left. In the process, as Talal Asad has eloquently pointed out, horror about terrorism has come to be revealed as one way in which liberal subjectivity and its relation to political community can be interrogated and understood.9 Moreover, the potential for liberal principles to be deployed in the service of legitimating a doctrine of pre-emption as the ‘new internationalism’ is significant. The first and second Gulf Wars, according to the liberal left, are then not wars to secure control over the supply of oil, or regional and global hegemony, as others on the left might argue, but anti-fascist, anti-totalitarian wars of liberation fought in the name of ‘democracy’. Backing ‘progressive wars’ for ‘freedom and democracy’, those who self-identify as a left which is reasserting liberal democratic principles start by asking questions such as: “Are western freedoms only for westerners?”.10 In the process, freedom becomes ‘western’, and its enemy an amorphous legion behind an unidentifiable line between ‘west’ and the rest (the ‘Muslim world’). The ‘war for democracy’ waged against ‘Islamist terrorism’ and Muslim fundamentalism is the crucible on which the new alignment of the liberal left is forged.

#### The alt is to reject the aff in favor of building a culture of resilience

Vermeule and Posner 11 Adrian Vermeule, prof of Law at Harvard University Law School, Eric A Posner., prof of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, *Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic*, Oxford University Press 2011

We do not yet live under a plebiscitary presidency. In such a system, the president has unchecked legal powers except for the obligation to submit to periodic elections. In our system, Congress retains the formal power to make law. It has subjected presidential lawmaking to complex procedures and bureaucratic checks,1 and it has created independent agencies over which the president in theory has limited control. The fed­eral courts can expect the executive to submit to their orders, and the Supreme Court retains certain quasi-lawmaking powers, which it exercises by striking down statutes and blocking executive actions. The federal system is still in place. State legal institutions retain considerable power over their populations. But these legal checks on executive authority (aside from the electoral constraint) have eroded considerably over the last two hundred years. Congress has delegated extensive powers to the executive. For new initia­tives, the executive leads and Congress follows. Congress can certainly slow down policymaking, and block bills proposed by the executive; but it cannot set the agenda. It is hard to quantify the extent of congressional control over regulatory agencies, but it is fair to say that congressional intervention is episodic and limited, while presidential control over both the executive and independent agencies is strong and growing stronger. The states increasingly exercise authority at the sufferance of the national government and hence the president. The federal courts have not tried to stop the erosion of congressional power and state power. Some commentators argue that the federal courts have taken over Con­gress’s role as an institutional check. It is true that the Supreme Court has shown little compunction about striking down statutes (although usually state statutes), and that it rejected some of the legal theories that the Bush administration used to justify its counterterrorism policies. However, the Court remains a marginal player. The Court ducked any legal rulings on counterterror policies until the 2004 Hamdi decision, and even after the Boumediene decision in 2008, no detainee has been released by final judicial order, from Guantanamo or elsewhere, except in cases where the government chose not to appeal the order of a district judge. The vast majority of detainees have received merely another round of legal process. Some speculate that judicial threats to release detainees have caused the administration to release them preemptively. Yet the judges would incur large political costs for actual orders to release suspected terrorists, and the government knows this, so it is unclear that the government sees the judi­cial threats as credible or takes them very seriously. The government, of course, has many administrative and political reasons to release detainees, quite apart from anything the courts do. So the executive submits to judi­cial orders in part because the courts are careful not to give orders that the executive will resist. In general, judicial opposition to the Bush administration’s counterter­rorism policies took the form of incremental rulings handed down at a gla­cial pace, none of which actually stopped any of the major counterterrorism tactics of that administration, including the application of military power against Al Qaeda, the indefinite detention of members of Al Qaeda, tar­geted assassinations, the immigration sweeps, even coercive interrogation. The (limited) modifications of those tactics that have occurred resulted not from legal interventions but from policy adjustments driven by changed circumstances and public opinion, and by electoral victory of the Obama administration. However, the Obama administration has mostly confirmed and in some areas even expanded the counterterrorism policies of the Bush administration. Strong executive government is bipartisan. The 9/11 attack provided a reminder of just how extensive the presi­dent’s power is. The executive claimed the constitutional authority to, in effect, use emergency powers. Because Congress provided redundant stat­utory authority, and the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to address the ultimate merits of the executives constitutional claims, these claims were never tested in a legal or public forum. But it is worth trying to ima­gine what would have happened if Congress had refused to pass the Autho­rization for Use of Military Force and the Supreme Court had ordered the executive to release detainees in a contested case. We think that the execu­tive, backed up as it was by popular opinion, would have refused to obey. And, indeed, for just that reason, Congress would, never have refused its imprimatur and the Supreme Court would never have stood in the execu­tive’s way. The major check on the executives power to declare an emer­gency and to use emergency powers is—political. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 also revealed the extent of executive power. Acting together, the Fed, the Treasury, and other executive agencies spent hundreds of billions of dollars, virtually nationalizing parts of the financial system. Congress put up a fuss, but it could not make policy and indeed hardly even influenced policy. Congress initially refused to supply a blank check, then in world-record time changed its mind and gave the blank check, then watched helplessly as the administration adopted pol­icies different from those for which it said the legislation would be needed. Courts played no role in the crisis except to ratify executive actions in tension with the law.2 What, then, prevents the executive from declaring spurious emergencies and using the occasion to consolidate its power—or for that matter, consolidating its power during real emergencies so that it retains that power even after normal times return? In many countries, notably in Latin America, presidents have done just that. Citing an economic crisis, or a military threat, or congressional gridlock, executives have shut down independent media, replaced judges with their cronies, suppressed political opposition, and ruled by dictate. Could this happen in the United States? The answer is, very probably, no. The political check on the executive is real. Declarations of emergency not justified by publicly visible events would be met with skepticism. Actions said, to be justified by emergency would not be approved if the justification were not plausible. Separation of powers may be suffering through an enfeebled old age, but electoral democracy is alive and well. We have suggested that the historical developments that have under­mined separation of powers have strengthened democracy. Consider, for example, the communications revolution, which has culminated (so far) in the Internet Age. As communication costs decrease, the size of markets expand, and hence the scale of regulatory activity must increase. Localities and states lose their ability to regulate markets, and the national govern­ment takes over. Meanwhile, reduced communication costs increase the relative value of administration (monitoring firms and ordering them to change their behavior) and reduce the relative value of legislation (issuing broad-gauged rules), favoring the executive over Congress. At the same time, reduced communication costs make it easier for the public to mon­itor the executive. Today, whistleblowers can easily find an audience on the Internet,; people can put together groups that focus on a tiny aspect of the government s behavior; gigabytes of government data are uploaded onto the Internet and downloaded by researchers who can subject them to rigorous statistical analysis. It need not have worked out this way. Govern­ments can also use technology to monitor citizens for the purpose of suppressing political opposition. But this has not, so far, happened in the United States. Nixon fell in part because his monitoring of political enemies caused an overwhelming political backlash, and although the Bush administration monitored suspected terrorists, no reputable critic suggested that it targeted domestic political opponents. Our main argument has been methodological and programmatic: researchers should no longer view American political life through the Madisonian prism, while normative theorists should cease bemoaning the decline of Madisonianism and instead make their peace with the new political order. The center of gravity has shifted to the executive, which both makes policy and administers it, subject to weak constraints imposed by Congress, the judiciary, and the states. It is pointless to bewail these developments, and futile to argue that Madisonian structures should be reinvigorated. Instead, attention should shift to the political constraints on the president and the institutions through, which those political con­straints operate—chief among them elections, parties, bureaucracy, and the media. As long as the public informs itself and maintains a skeptical attitude toward the motivations of government officials, the executive can operate effectively only by proving over and over that it deserves the public s trust. The irony of the new political order is that the executive, freed from the bonds of law, inspires more distrust than in the past, and thus must enter ad hoc partnerships with political rivals in order to persuade people that it means well. But the new system is more fluid, allowing the executive to form those partnerships when they are needed to advance its goals, and not otherwise. Certain types of partnership have become recurrent pat­terns—for example, inviting a member of the opposite party to join the president’s cabinet. Others are likely in the future. In the place of the clockwork mechanism bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment thinking of the founders, there has emerged a more organic system of power sharing and power constraint that depends on shifting political alliances, currents of public opinion, and the particular exigencies that demand government action. It might seem that such a system requires more attention from the public than can reasonably be expected, but the old system of checks and balances always depended on public opinion as well. The centuries-old British parliamentary system, which operated in. just this way, should provide reason, for optimism. The British record on executive abuses, although hardly perfect, is no worse than the American record and arguably better, despite the lack of a Madisonian separation of legislative and executive powers

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#### The Executive Branch of the United States should declare that it no longer has the authority to use drones for targeted killing. The Executive Branch of the United States should create a national security court housed within the executive branch and “executive v. executive” divisions as per our Katyal evidence to promote internal separation of powers via separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.

#### Presidential veto power and executive deference mean external restraints fail – internal separation of powers constrains the president and leads to better decision making

Katyal ’6 Neal Katyal, Professor of Law @ Georgetown, The Yale Law Journal, “Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within” 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2006

After all, Publius's view of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi. It is often remarked that "9/11 changed everything"; 2 particularly so in the war on terror, in which Congress has been absent or content to pass vague, open-ended statutes. The result is an executive that subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government. Many commentators have bemoaned this state of affairs. This Essay will not pile on to those complaints. Rather, it begins where others have left off. If major decisions are going to be made by the President, then how might separation of powers be reflected within the executive branch? The first-best concept of "legislature v. executive" checks and balances must be updated to contemplate second-best "executive v. executive" divisions. And this Essay proposes doing so in perhaps the most controversial area: foreign policy. It is widely thought that the President's power is at its apogee in this arena. By explaining the virtues of internal divisions in the realm of foreign policy, this Essay sparks conversation on whether checks are necessary in other, domestic realms. That conversation desperately needs to center on how best to structure the ever-expanding modern executive branch. From 608,915 employees working in agencies in 1930, 3 to 2,649,319 individuals in 2004, 4 the growth of the executive has not generated a systematic focus on internal checks. We are all fond of analyzing checks on judicial activism in the post-Brown, post-Roe era. So too we think of checks on legislatures, from the filibuster to judicial review. But [\*2317] there is a paucity of thought regarding checks on the President beyond banal wishful thinking about congressional and judicial activity. This Essay aims to fill that gap. A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers is bureaucracy. Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy creates a civil service not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term institutional worldview. These benefits have been obscured by the now-dominant, caricatured view of agencies as simple anti-change agents. This Essay celebrates the potential of bureaucracy and explains how legal institutions can better tap its powers. A well-functioning bureaucracy contains agencies with differing missions and objectives that intentionally overlap to create friction. Just as the standard separation-of-powers paradigms (legislature v. courts, executive v. courts, legislature v. executive) overlap to produce friction, so too do their internal variants. When the State and Defense Departments have to convince each other of why their view is right, for example, better decision-making results. And when there is no neutral decision-maker within the government in cases of disagreement, the system risks breaking down. In short, the executive is the home of two different sorts of legitimacy: political (democratic will) and bureaucratic (expertise). A chief aim of this Essay's proposal is to allow each to function without undermining the other. This goal can be met without agency competition - overlapping jurisdiction is simply one catalyzing agent. Other ideas deserve consideration, alongside or independent of such competition, such as developing career protections for the civil service modeled more on the Foreign Service. Executives of all stripes offer the same rationale for forgoing bureaucracy-executive energy and dispatch. 5 Yet the Founders assumed that massive changes to the status quo required legislative enactments, not executive decrees. As that concept has broken down, the risks of unchecked executive power have grown to the point where dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity. Such claims of executive power are not limited to the current administration, nor are they limited to politicians. Take, for example, Dean Elena Kagan's rich celebration of presidential administration. 6 Kagan, herself a former political appointee, lauded the President's ability to trump bureaucracy. Anticipating the claims of the current administration, Kagan argued that the [\*2318] President's ability to overrule bureaucrats "energizes regulatory policy" because only "the President has the ability to effect comprehensive, coherent change in administrative policymaking." 7 Yet it becomes clear that the Kagan thesis depends crucially on oversight by the coordinate legislative branch (typically controlled by a party in opposition to the President). Without that checking function, presidential administration can become an engine of concentrated power. This Essay therefore outlines a set of mechanisms that create checks and balances within the executive branch. The apparatuses are familiar - separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts. But these restraints have been informally laid down and inconsistently applied, and in the wake of September 11 they have been decimated. 8 A general framework statute is needed to codify a set of practices. In many ways, the status quo is the worst of all worlds because it creates the facade of external and internal checks when both have withered. I. THE NEED FOR INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS The treacherous attacks of September 11 gave Congress and the President a unique opportunity to work together. Within a week, both houses of Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF); 10 two months later they enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to further expand intelligence and law enforcement powers. 11 But Congress did no more. It passed no laws authorizing or regulating detentions for U.S. citizens. It did not affirm or regulate President Bush's decision to use military commissions to try unlawful belligerents. 12 It stood silent when President Bush accepted thinly reasoned legal views of the Geneva Conventions. 13 The administration was content to rely on vague legislation, and Congress was content to enact little else. 14 There is much to be said about the violation of separation of powers engendered by these executive decisions, but for purposes of this Essay, I want [\*2320] to concede the executive's claim - that the AUMF gave the President the raw authority to make these decisions. A democratic deficit still exists; the values of divided government and popular accountability are not being preserved. Even if the President did have the power to carry out the above acts, it would surely have been wiser if Congress had specifically authorized them. Congress's imprimatur would have ensured that the people's representatives concurred, would have aided the government's defense of these actions in courts, and would have signaled to the world a broader American commitment to these decisions than one man's pen stroke. Of course, Congress has not passed legislation to denounce these presidential actions either. And here we come to a subtle change in the legal landscape with broad ramifications: the demise of the congressional checking function. The story begins with the collapse of the nondelegation doctrine in the 1930s, which enabled broad areas of policymaking authority to be given to the President and to agencies under his control. That collapse, however, was tempered by the legislative veto; in practical terms, when Congress did not approve of a particular agency action, it could correct the problem. But after INS v. Chadha, 15 which declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, that checking function, too, disappeared. In most instances today, the only way for Congress to disapprove of a presidential decree, even one chock full of rampant lawmaking, is to pass a bill with a solid enough majority to override a presidential veto. The veto power thus becomes a tool to entrench presidential decrees, rather than one that blocks congressional misadventures. And because Congress ex ante appreciates the supermajority-override rule, its members do not even bother to try to check the President, knowing that a small cadre of loyalists in either House can block a bill. 16 For example, when some of the Senate's most powerful Republicans (John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and John Warner) tried to regulate detentions and trials at Guantanamo Bay, they were told that the President would veto any attempt to modify the AUMF. 17 The result is that once a court [\*2321] interprets a congressional act, such as the AUMF, to give the President broad powers, Congress often cannot reverse the interpretation, even if Congress never intended to give the President those powers in the first place. Senator McCain might persuade every one of the other ninety-nine Senators to vote for his bill, but that is of no moment without a supermajority in the House of Representatives as well. 18 At the same time, the executive branch has gained power from deference doctrines that induce courts to leave much conduct untouched - particularly in foreign affairs. 19 The combination of deference and the veto is especially insidious - it means that a President can interpret a vague statute to give himself additional powers, receive deference in that interpretation from courts, and then lock that decision into place by brandishing the veto. This ratchet-and-lock scheme makes it almost impossible to rein in executive power. All legislative action is therefore dangerous. Any bill, like Senator McCain's torture bill, can be derailed through compromise. A rational legislator, fearing this cascading cycle, is likely to do nothing at all. This expansion of presidential power is reinforced by the party system. When the political branches are controlled by the same party, loyalty, discipline, and self-interest generally preclude interbranch checking. That reluctance is exacerbated by a paucity of weapons that check the President. Post-Chadha, Congress only has weapons that cause extensive collateral damage. The fear of that damage becomes yet another reason why Congress is plagued with inertia. And the filibuster, the last big check in periods of single-party government, is useless against the host of problems caused by Presidents who take expansive views of their powers under existing laws (such as the AUMF). Instead of preserving bicameralism, Chadha has led to its subversion and "no-cameralism." A Congress that conducts little oversight provides a veneer of legitimacy to an adventurist President. The President can appeal to the historic sense of checks and balances, even if those checks are entirely compromised by modern political dynamics. With this system in place, it is no surprise that recent calls [\*2322] for legislative revitalization have failed. No successful action-forcing mechanisms have been developed; instead we are still in John Hart Ely's world of giving a "halftime pep-talk imploring that body to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful authority." 20 It is time to consider second-best solutions to bring separation of powers into the executive. Bureaucracy can be reformed and celebrated (instead of purged and maligned), and neutral conflict-decision mechanisms can be introduced. Design choices such as these can help bring our government back in line with the principles envisioned by our Founders. 21

#### A “national security court” improve oversight, accountability, and congressional review of targeted killing – comparatively better than external restraints

Katyal ’13, Neal Katyal, Professor of Law @ Georgetown, NW Times “Who Will Mind the Drones?” February 20, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/an-executive-branch-drone-court.html?_r=0>

In the wake of revelations about the Obama administration’s drone program politicians from both parties have taken up the idea of creating a “drone court” within the federal judiciary, which would review executive decisions to target and kill individuals. But the drone court idea is a mistake. It is hard to think of something less suitable for a federal judge to rule on than the fast-moving and protean nature of targeting decisions. Fortunately, a better solution exists: a “national security court” housed within the executive branch itself. Experts, not generalists, would rule; pressing concerns about classified information would be minimized; and speedy decisions would be easier to reach. There is, of course, a role for federal courts in national security. In 2006, I argued and won Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a Supreme Court case that struck down President George W. Bush’s use of military tribunals at Guantánamo Bay. But military trials are a far cry from wartime targeting decisions. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which reviews administration requests to collect intelligence involving foreign agents inside the country and which some have advocated as a model for the drone court, is likewise appropriately housed within the judicial system — it rules on surveillance operations that raise questions much like those in Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” cases, a subject federal judges know well. But there is no true precedent for interposing courts into military decisions about who, what and when to strike militarily. Putting aside the serious constitutional implications of such a proposal, courts are simply not institutionally equipped to play such a role. There are many reasons a drone court composed of generalist federal judges will not work. They lack national security expertise, they are not accustomed to ruling on lightning-fast timetables, they are used to being in absolute control, their primary work is on domestic matters and they usually rule on matters after the fact, not beforehand. Even the questions placed before the FISA Court aren’t comparable to what a drone court would face; they involve more traditional constitutional issues — not rapidly developing questions about whether to target an individual for assassination by a drone strike. Imagine instead that the president had an internal court, staffed by expert lawyers to represent both sides. Those lawyers, like the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the military, would switch sides every few years, to develop both expertise as repeat players and the ability to understand the other point of view. The adjudicator would be a panel of the president’s most senior national security advisers, who would issue decisions in writing if at all possible. Those decisions would later be given to the Congressional intelligence committees for review. Crucially, the president would be able to overrule this court, and take whatever action he thought appropriate, but would have to explain himself afterward to Congress. Such a court would embed accountability and expertise into the drone program. With a federal drone court, it would simply be too easy for a president or other executive-branch official to point his finger at a federal judge for the failure to act. With an internal court, it would be impossible to avoid blame. It’s true that a court housed within the executive branch might sound nefarious in today’s “Homeland” culture — if Alexander Hamilton celebrated the executive, in Federalist No. 70, for its “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch,” some now look at those same qualities with skepticism, if not fear. In contrast, advocates of a drone court say it would bring independent, constitutional values of reasoned decision making to a process that is inherently murky. But simply placing a drone court in the judicial branch is not a guaranteed check. The FISA Court’s record is instructive: between 1979 and 2011 it rejected only 11 out of more than 32,000 requests — making the odds of getting a request rejected, around 1 in 3,000, approximately the same as those of being struck by lightning in one’s lifetime. What reason does the FISA Court give us to think that judges are better than specialists at keeping executive power in check? The written decisions of an internal national security court, in contrast, would be products of an adversarial system (unlike the FISA Court), and later reviewed by Congressional intelligence committees. If members of Congress saw troublesome trends developing, it could push legislation to constrain the executive. That is something a federal judge cannot do. One of our Constitution’s greatest virtues is that it looks to judges as a source of reasoned, practical, rights-minded decision making. But judges should be left to what they know. A national security court inside the executive branch may not be a perfect solution, but it is a better way to balance the demands of secrecy and speed with those of liberty and justice.

#### Internal checks comparatively solve better and don’t link to politics

Metzger ‘9, Gillian E. Metzger, Professor of Law @ Columbia Law School, “The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers” 59 Emory L.J. 423, Emory Law Journal, 2009

Several bases exist for thinking that internal separation of powers mechanisms may have a comparative advantage. First, internal mechanisms [\*440] operate ex ante, at the time when the Executive Branch is formulating and implementing policy, rather than ex post. As a result, they avoid the delay in application that can hamper both judicial and congressional oversight. 76 Second, internal mechanisms often operate continuously, rather than being limited to issues that generate congressional attention or arise in the form of a justiciable challenge. 77 Third, internal mechanisms operate not just at the points at which policy proposals originate and are implemented but also at higher managerial levels, thus addressing policy and administration in both a granular and systemic fashion. In addition, policy recommendations generated through internal checks may face less resistance than those offered externally because the latter frequently arise after executive officials have already decided upon a policy course and are more likely to take an adversarial form. 78 Internal mechanisms may also gain credibility with Executive Branch officials to the extent they are perceived as contributing to more fully informed and expertise-based decisionmaking. 79

### 1NC DA

#### TPA will pass – Reid opposition is just posturing

Seher, 2-1-’14 (Jason Seher, CNN “Kerry, Hagel rebuke Reid on fast-track trade bill” http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/01/kerry-hagel-rebuke-reid-on-fast-track-track-bill/)

In a rare joint appearance at the Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel dismissed Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's opposition to renewing fast-track trade authority and predicted that the bill will ultimately pass in spite of Reid's opposition. "I've heard plenty of statements in the Senate on one day that are categorical, and we've wound up finding accommodations and a way to find our way forward," Kerry told the audience of European allies. "I respect Harry Reid, worked with him for a long time," Kerry said. "I think all of us have learned to interpret a comment on one day in the United States Senate as not necessarily what might be the situation in a matter of months." Reid said Wednesday he is unlikely to consider a bill on the issue anytime soon. "I’m against fast track," said Reid, who controls which bills get to the Senate floor. "I think everyone would be well-advised not to push this right now." With several outstanding trade pacts - including a major deal with the European Union - securing President Barack Obama's "trade promotion authority" remains a priority for the administration. The power would limit Congress' ability to influence American trade policy, only allowing them up or down votes on massive trade deals while leaving negotiations with other nations entirely under the purvey of the President. Proponents of the measure say the TPA prevents crucial trade agreements from getting bogged down in the bureaucratic slog and would help open new markets for U.S. goods. Democrats oppose the measure, arguing past trade deals led companies to ship jobs overseas. Heralding the ability as something that could "have a profound impact" on the American economy, Kerry said the extension of President Obama's authority could pay dividends and help further drive down the unemployment rate. "It's worth millions of jobs," he said. Kerry also was emphatic that Reid's opposition would not stall progress. "I wouldn't let it deter us one iota, not one iota," he said. Hagel echoed his counterpart's tone on the issue, saying that Reid's decision to put the bill on hold was imprudent. "Let's be smart and let's be wise and let's be collaborative and use all of the opportunities and mechanisms that we have to enhance each other - culturally, trade, commerce, exchanges," Hagel said.

#### Plan tanks capital and derails the agenda – empirics prove

Kriner ’10 Douglas L. Kriner, assistant professor of political science at Boston University, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### TPA is critical to US economic growth and restoring America’s free trade credibility – Obama PC is key

Riley and Kim 4/16 Bryan Riley is Jay Van Andel Senior Analyst in Trade Policy and Anthony B. Kim is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation.

www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancing free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them.¶ More than a decade has passed since TPA was last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the President in 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom.¶ Emerging TPA Renewal Debates¶ Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA legislation. However, many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is critical, given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years.¶ Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.[1]¶ After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”[2]¶ In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that¶ [t]he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.[3]

#### Decline collapses power projection – leads to nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdownof U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1NC Framing

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

Cummiskey 90– Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Prioritize existential risks – they come first

Bostrum 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### Squo is structurally improving---health, environment and equality

Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rn-lomborg

COPENHAGEN – For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world. Pessimists see a world where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as “cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But, rather than picking facts and stories to fit some grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶ Consider gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In 1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture, which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline, leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶ Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest improvements. Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection of 76 years in 2050).¶ The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶ In economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear. Most of the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP. And the overall trend is even clearer. Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the most good.

### 1NC Civilians

#### Drones are accurate--virtually no civilian deaths.

Young 12 (Alex, associate staff @ Harvard International Review, “A Defense of Drones”, February 25 2013, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-defense-of-drones)

This strategy is not without controversy. The Obama administration’s heavy use of unmanned drones in the War on Terror has come under fire from a variety of opponents, including human rights groups, think tanks, and even foreign governments. Critics claim that drone strikes cause civilian casualties, incorrectly target only the most prominent leaders of terrorist groups, and create backlash against the US. To hear some tell it, the use of drones exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem of terrorism.¶ The reality is not so bleak: drones are very good at what they do. Unmanned attacks are highly effective when it comes to eliminating specific members of terrorist organizations, disrupting terrorist networks without creating too much collateral damage. Their effectiveness makes drone strikes a vital part of US counterterrorism strategy.¶ Predator and Reaper drones are not the indiscriminate civilian-killers that some make them out to be: strikes are targeted and selective. This has become increasingly true as drone technology has improved, and as the military has learned how best to use them. A confluence of factors has made drone strikes much better at eliminating enemy militants while avoiding civilians: drones now carry warheads that produce smaller blast radiuses, and the missiles carrying those warheads are guided using laser, millimeter-wave, and infrared seekers. The result has been less destructive drone strikes that reach their intended target more reliably. A number of non-technological shifts have also made drones a more useful tool: Peter Bergen, a national security analyst for CNN, summarized on July 13th, 2012 that more careful oversight, a deeper network of local informants, and better coordination between the US and Pakistani intelligence communities have also contributed to better accuracy. Data gathered by the Long War Journal indicates that the civilian casualty rate for 2012 and the beginning of 2013 is only 4.5 percent. Even Pakistani Major General Ghayur Mehmood acknowledges that, “most of the targets [of drone strikes] are hard-core militants.” Imprecise drone strikes that cause many civilian casualties are now a thing of the past. This improved accuracy may also help to mitigate anti-American sentiment that stems from civilian casualties.

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties. Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership. If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature. Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

**Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key**

Nathan Myhrvold 13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

#### No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### Counting bodies does not challenge what makes them killable

Wilcox 11 Lauren. Charles and Amy Scharf Post-Doctoral Research Fellow Johns Hopkins University. Department of Political Science. "Body Counts: The Politics of Embodiment in Precision Warfare" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference "Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition", Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, MONTREAL, QUEBEC, CANADA, Mar 16

While counting bodies is one step toward a critical analysis of precision warfare, the mere counting of bodies does not necessarily challenge the production of certain bodies as killable, especially as such numbers are compared (3,000 US soldiers killed in Iraq versus 3,000 killed on September 11th, Iraqi civilians killed by Coalition forces versus Iraqi civilians killed by Saddam Hussein). As one theorist noted, “common practices of reporting casualties have become so normalized that they at once obscure and reproduce the workings of geopolitical power that frame these numbers,” (Hyndman 2007, 38). Butler echoes this concern, arguing that the act of representing, or ‘seeing’ the other is not enough to ensure the humanization of the subject. Subjects produced as ‘bare life’ for example, are constituted “life unworthy of being lived,” (Agamben 1998, 138-139). It is not the ‘human’ that is represented, but rather, the ‘human’ is the limit of the possibility of representation. What has been produced as ‘inhumane’ or outside of the bounds of humanity cannot be brought in by representation. For Butler, following Levinas, “The human cannot be captured through the representation, and we can see that some loss of the human takes place when it is ‘captured’ by the image” (Butler 2004, 145). The representation of suffering beings does not necessarily bring them into the ethical moment, but rather, representation practices can be used to produce some humans, some bodies, as ‘other,’ as lives not worth mourning. The ‘human’ exceeds representation because representation is what brings ‘beings’ into being; a process that forces the question of the ethical from physical violence per se to questions of ethical representational, boundary-producing practices.

#### Grounding politics in situated knowledge is dangerous – mere standpoint epistemology is the basis for exploitation and dominance and legitimates climate-denialism to oppose regulations

Eglash, 11 – (Ron, Multiple objectivity: an anti-relativist approach to situated knowledge", Kybernetes, Vol. 40 Iss: 7/8, pp.995 – 1003, “Multiple Objectivity: an Anti-relativist Approach to Situated Knowledge”)

The term “relativism” has several different connotations: in anthropology for example it is a methodology for allowing the investigator to take on the “emic” view of the subjects of the investigation. Science and Technology Studies (STS) concerns epistemological relativism: the stance that the choice between competing scientific claims cannot be decided by a transcendent source such as nature, rationality, or evidence, since those sources are (typically) marshaled by both sides. Unfortunately many of the external critics of STS (Sokal, Gross, Levitt, etc.) have conflated this relativism with anti-realism. Contrary to their assertions, epistemological relativism does not deny an external reality, existing independently of human consciousness. But disregarding such inaccurate characterization, there are still good reasons for firmly abandoning epistemological relativism. This essay will review the reasons for opposing relativism, and describe an alternative stance, multiple objectivity, which can allow research on the social construction of science and technology without the inclusion of a relativist epistemology.The relativist stance is not adopted by all STS researchers, but of those who do, a good representative would be Bloor’s Strong Program. In both the original statement (Bloor 1976) and later exposition he is careful to distinguish between anti-realism, which he is opposed to, and relativism, which he summarizes as the stance that “there are no absolute proofs to be had that one scientific theory is superior to another: there are only locally credible reasons” (Bloor 1999 pg 102). He also notes, however, that even those epistemological theories that are opposed to social construction in normal science, such as Popper’s falsifiability framework, do not typically see the decision between competing theories as a matter of “absolute” proof. Thus in his view the distinction becomes more a matter of emphasis: for relativists social influences have the potential to play a large role in normal science; for anti-relativists it is an insignificant role, and the bulk of significant decisions are due to the direct influence of nature and logic. This erroneously makes relativism synonymous with social construction. Setting aside for the moment the great varieties and nuances of social construction theories, and focusing on the (admittedly crude) characterization of epistemological relativism above, why should any social scientist object to relativism? And even if they do object, wouldn’t eliminating relativism mean that we can no longer study the social construction of normal science, and restrict us to the study of pathological cases, social impact analysis, and the like? A good starting place for the first question--why we should object--can be found in Latour (2002). There he cites certain critics of global warming (who admit that they are promoting the views of a small minority in the scientific community because it will forestall environmental regulations), and other uses of skepticism against scientific authority that he (and likely most readers of this essay) would find potentially destructive. In a more extensively detailed example, Nanda (2003) analyzes the use of STS and constructivist arguments by right-wing nationalists in India, whose activities include suppression of minority groups through both physical violence and cultural domination It is tempting to dismiss such depressing outcomes as merely an aberrant abuse of constructivist skepticism, but Latour (p. 227) himself warns against such excuses: “Should I reassure myself by simply saying that bad guys can use any weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction when it suits them?” Relativism is more than just a potential for external abuse; it is also an internal problem for STS. Recently the Committee on Anthropology of Science, Technology and Computing (CASTAC), the STS group within the American Anthropological Association, held an online discussion on a proposal to issue a public statement in support of teaching evolution and excluding “Intelligent Design,” a creationist version of biology, in public school science curricula. Three CASTAC members (all tenure-track faculty) expressed doubt that the principles of social construction would allow such a position; two of them with great regret. During that time (fall 2005) professor of STS Steve Fuller testified as an expert witness on behalf of the Intelligent Design defendants in the Dover Pennsylvania court case; almost all STS researchers I have discussed this with expressed dismay at his position.

#### Grief is re-appropriated to justify the War on Terror

Schneider and Butler 10

Nathan (writer on religion and resistance for Harper’s, The Nation, the New York Times, editor of Waging Nonviolence and Killing the Buddha, author of two books) and Judith (Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley). “A Carefully Crafted F\*\*k You.” An Interview with Judith Butler. Guernica. The European Graduate School. March 2010.

Guernica: **Forms of grief are deployed, through certain deplorable exemplars, to justify a military regime**—**the Holocaust, for example, and now 9/11**. Why, then, **can’t grief just as easily be used to justify more war?** Judith Butler: Well, **I** do **worry about those instances in which public mourning is explicitly proscribed**, and that invariably happens in the context of war. I think **there were ways, for instance, of producing icons of those who were killed in the 9/11 attacks in such a way that the desire for revenge and vindication was stoked**. So we have to distinguish between modes of **mourning [can]** that actually extend our ideas about equality, and those that **produce differentials, such as “this population is worth protecting” and “this population deserves to die**.” Guernica: **The hawkish wing in the “war on terror” has quite effectively claimed the banner of feminism.** Is feminism as it has been articulated in part to blame for this? Judith Butler: No, I think that **we have seen quite cynical uses of feminism for the waging of war.** The vast majority of feminists oppose these contemporary wars, and object to the false construction of **Muslim women “in need of being saved**” as a cynical use of feminist concerns with equality. There are some very strong and interesting Muslim feminist movements, and casting Islam as anti-feminist not only disregards those movements, but displaces many of the persisting inequalities in the first world onto an imaginary elsewhere. Guernica: After millions of protesters around the world could do nothing to prevent the Iraq War, what do you think is the most effective form of protest? Disobedience? Or even thinking? Judith Butler: Let us remember that Marx thought of thinking as a kind of practice. Thinking can take place in and as embodied action. It is not necessarily a quiet or passive activity. Civil disobedience can be an act of thinking, of mindfully opposing police force, for instance. I continue to believe in demonstrations, but I think they have to be sustained. We see the continuing power of this in Iran right now. The real question is why people thought with the election of Obama that there was no reason to still be on the street? It is true that many people on the left will never have the animus against Obama that they have against Bush. But maybe we need to protest policies instead of individuals. After all, it takes many people and institutions to sustain a war. Guernica: Anyone who went to an anti-war protest during the Bush administration surely saw the violence of the anger directed personally against the president. People have a need to personalize. It seems to me the strength of your book, though, is that it counter-personalizes, turning our focus not so much to policies or policy-makers as to victims and potential victims. Judith Butler: It is personal, but it asks what our obligations are to those we do not know. So in this sense, it is about the bonds we must honor even when we do not know the others to whom we are bound. Guernica: Your account of nonviolence revolves around recognizing sociality and interconnection as well. Does it also rely on the kind of inner spiritual work that was so important, for instance, to Gandhi? Judith Butler: I am not sure that the work is “inner” in the way that Gandhi described. But I do think that one has to remain vigilant in relation to one’s own aggression, to craft and direct it in ways that are effective. This work on the self, though, takes place through certain practices, and by noticing where one is, how angry one is, and even comporting oneself differently over time. **I think this has to be a social practice, one that we undertake with others.** That **support and solidarity are crucial to maintaining it**. **Otherwise, we think we should become heroic individuals, and that takes us away from effective collective action.** Guernica: What can philosophy, which so often looks like a kind of solitary heroism, offer against the military-industrial complexes and the cowboy self-image that keep driving us into wars? At what register can philosophy make a difference? Judith Butler: Let’s remember that the so-called military-industrial complex has a philosophy, even if it is not readily published in journals. The contemporary cowboy also has, or exemplifies, a certain philosophical vision of power, masculinity, impermeability, and domination. So the question is how philosophy takes form as an embodied practice. Any action that is driven by principles, norms, or ideals is philosophically informed. So we might consider: what practices embody interdependency and equality in ways that might mitigate the practice of war waging? My wager is that there are many.

### 1NC Distancing

#### The military will shift to JSOC – increased frequency and severity of strikes turns the case and prevents accountability – the squo is comparatively better

Kaplan 13 – Slate columnist on foreign policy (Fred, "The Drones Are in the Details," http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/war\_stories/2013/03/john\_brennan\_wants\_the\_pentagon\_to\_take\_command\_of\_the\_cia\_s\_drone\_strike.html)

Shifting control of drone strikes from the CIA to the military essentially means shifting authority for those drone strikes from Title 50 to Title 10. It places them under the rubric of “traditional military activities”—and the standards and practices of U.S. armed forces. One implication of this is that it will be harder to justify drone strikes in areas where U.S. troops are not openly at war. It also means that if a president contemplates stretching the limits of Title 10—that is, if he or she considers drone strikes outside war zones—the military’s lawyers will get involved, and they tend to be more scrupulous than CIA lawyers (who, after all, deal with overseas covert actions, which often skirt, or ignore, U.S. law). One pertinent provision of Title 10 is that, in order for U.S. armed forces to operate on foreign soil, they must get permission of the local government. If the military controlled drone strikes, they couldn’t be ordered without this permission. However, there are two ways around these strictures. First, there have been occasions when presidents—including President Obama—have simply (and legally) declared that certain members of the armed forces are, for the moment, acting under Title 50. Most notably, when Navy SEALs raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, they were declared to be under CIA command. Therefore, they did not need the Pakistanis’ permission to cross the border. The same abracadabra could be recited for drone operators. Or maybe the president wouldn’t even have to go that far. SEALs, like Delta Force and other “shadow” forces, are part of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC is part of the armed forces; it therefore falls under Title 10. However, under an executive order signed by President George W. Bush (and still in effect), it has authority to conduct secret operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist networks worldwide. So, if control of drone strikes is shifted from the CIA to the military and the military decides to assign the mission to JSOC, the strikes might be as frequent and far-flung as ever—maybe even more so, since Bush’s executive order allows JSOC to conduct its operations without consulting or notifying Congress. (By contrast, under Title 50, the CIA has to tell the congressional intelligence committees about its covert operations.)

#### Plan's restrictions causes a shift to the CIA.

Alston 11 President and Fellows of Harvard College. All Rights Reserved. Harvard National Security Journal 2011 Harvard National Security Journal 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283 The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders Philip Alston John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author was UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions from 2004 until 2010. lexis

But the most significant problem by far with double-hatting is its impact in terms of accountability. Already in 2003, Colonel Kathryn Stone had noted that "[w]hen the CIA and SOF operate together on the battlefield, the legal distinctions regarding operating authorities and procedures, and accountability, can become blurred." n247 In Singer's view one of the motivations for the practice was to avoid accountability. He argues that the CIA was given operational responsibilities because "no one wanted to have a public debate about the use of force in a third country" and this could be avoided by secretly using the CIA instead. The result, he says, is to flout "the intent, if not the letter, of the most important legal codes that originally divided out roles in realms of policy and war." n248 A recent Congressional study also concludes that one of the actual objectives of the "unprecedented use of U.S. SOF in clandestine and covert roles as well as being assigned to the CIA" is precisely to blur the boundaries of responsibility and accountability. n249 This deliberate undermining of the distinction between intelligence gathering and operational activities has grave implications in terms of both domestic and international accountability. Domestically, DOD and especially JSOC foreign killing operations are subject to virtually no meaningful accountability, and the same applies to the CIA.

#### Congressional oversight means more secrecy

Greenwald 12THURSDAY, JUN 7, 2012 03:05 AM PDT Probing Obama’s secrecy games Will high-level Obama officials who leak for political gain be punished on equal terms with actual whistleblowers? BY GLENN GREENWALD

What all of this reflects is the wildly excessive, anti-democratic secrecy behind which the U.S. Government operates, and the solution in the face of this growing controversy ought to be serious attempts to increase transparency and dilute the wall of secrecy. But that’s highly unlikely to happen. When people like Dianne Feinstein, Carl Levin and John McCain start digging their hands into these controversies, they reflexively do the opposite: they are devoted to always-increasing levels of government secrecy. For Security State servants like these, secrecy is the currency on which their power, influence and self-importance depends: the more government actions which they know about but which are concealed from the citizenry, the more influential and unaccountable they are. So as is usually true when bipartisan groups of self-important Senators gather in common cause, they’re certain to make the core problem worse. In response to the genuine problem of selective leak-punishment by the Executive Branch, they will not try to increase transparency but will do the opposite: attempt to plug leaks, punish whistleblowers, and fortify U.S. Government secrecy powers even beyond where they are now.

#### The executive will give the Congress the finger – secrecy, media and lying

Branfman 13 Fred, Director of Project Air War, interviewed the first Lao refugees brought down to Vientiane from the Plain of Jars in northern Laos, visited U.S. airbases in Thailand and South Vietnam, talking with U.S. Embassy officials, Alternet, 6-9

Whatever his personal beliefs prior to becoming President Mr. Obama, as the Executive's titular leader, has necessarily signed up to support the secrecy, lying, and disinformation it employs to enjoy maximum flexibility from democratic oversight in order to pursue its policies of overt and covert violence. Two important new books - Jeremy Scahill's Dirty Wars and Mark Mazzetti's The Way of the Knife - describe how, in near-total secrecy, the U.S. Executive is a world of its own. Over the last 12 years, Executive officials have unilaterally and secretly launched, escalated or deescalated wars; installed and supported massively corrupt governments, savage warlords, or local paramilitary forces, and overthrown leaders that have displeased it; created the first unit of global American assassins and fleets of machines waging automated war; engaged in vicious turf wars for more money and budget; spied on Americans including the media and activists on a scale unmatched in U.S. history; compiled 3 different sets of global "kill lists" independently operated by the White House, CIA and Pentagon/JSOC; used police-state tactics while claiming to support democracy, e.g. when it fed retina scans, facial recognition features and fingerprints of over 3 million Iraqi and Afghani males into a giant data base; incarcerated and tortured, either directly or indirectly, tens of thousands of people without evidence or trial; and much more. All of these major activities are conducted entirely by the Executive Branch, without meaningful Congressional oversight or the knowledge of the American people. The foundational principle of the U.S. Constitution is that governments can only rule with the "informed consent" of the people. But the U.S. Executive Branch has not only robbed its people of this fundamental right. It has prosecuted those courageous whistleblowers who have tried to inform them. The U.S. mass media, dependent upon the Executive for their information and careers, and run by corporate interests benefiting from Executive largesse, predominately convey Executive Branch perspectives on an hourly basis to the American people. Even on the relatively few occasions when they publish information the Executive wishes to keep secret, it has little impact on Executive policies while maintaining the illusion that the U.S. has a "free press". The U.S. Executive is essentially free to conduct its activities as it wishes. In future articles in this space we will explore three key features of the U.S. Executive Branch: (1) Evil - If evil consists of murdering, maiming, and making homeless the innocent, and/or waging the “aggressive war” judged the “supreme international crime” at Nuremberg, the U.S. Executive Branch is today clearly the world’s most evil institution. It has killed, wounded or made refugees of an officially-estimated 21 million people in Iraq and Indochina alone, far more than any other institution since the time of Stalin and Mao. President Obama is the first U.S. President to acknowledge, in his recent "counterterrorism" speech, that this number has included killing "hundreds of thousands" of civilians in Vietnam whom it officially claimed it was trying to protect. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put the total number of Vietnamese killed at 3.4 million. [38] (2) Lawlessness - If illegality consists of refusing to obey the law, the Executive is clearly the most lawless institution in the world. It routinely violates even timid legislative attempts to control its unilateral war-making. And no nation on earth has signed fewer international laws, and so failed to observe even those it has signed. These include measures like those intended to clean up the tens of millions of landmines and cluster bombs [39] with which it has littered the world, refused to clean up, and which continue to murder and maim tens of thousands of innocent people until today. (3) Authoritarianism - And if "authoritarianism" consists of a governing body acting unilaterally, regularly deceiving its own citizenry, neutering its legislature ,and prosecuting those who expose its lies, the U.S. Executive is clearly the most undemocratic institution in America. Indeed its deceiving its own people - keeping its activities secret and then lying about and covering them up when caught - throws its very legitimacy into question.

#### The President can easily use the Covert Action Statute to justify any imminent threat

Lawfare 12 Legality of U.S. Government’s Targeted Killing Program under Domestic Law, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/legality-of-targeted-killing-program-under-u-s-domestic-law/

Nevertheless, Bradley and Goldsmith explain, even if Congress did not authorize the U.S. government’s targeted killing program with the AUMF, the President could in theory act against terrorists presenting an imminent threat under the Covert Action Statute (CAS), 50 U.S.C. §413b. The CAS is potentially an important authorizing authority, as its scope extends beyond that of the AUMF, namely in that it is not limited to those terrorist groups linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In other ways, though, the CAS may be narrower than the AUMF. For instance, Robert Chesney sets forth the argument that the CAS merely authorizes that which is otherwise lawful under Article II, and thus does not expand the scope of the President’s authority.

**Oversight of targeting killings causes a shift to signature strikes.**

Jens David Ohlin 13, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes. Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained**,** it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes. That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power. Rather, such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect. It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage. Let me explain. Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings**.** The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes-- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, this would be a case of willful blindness -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously. But the court system would push the military back towards the old system: target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts. And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

## 2NC

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### All of our solvency arguments are *net offense*---legalism creates the façade that the executive is being constrained while allowing the government to do as it pleases under the guise of constraint---this swells executive power and turns the case

Osborn 8 Timothy Kaufman is the Baker Ferguson Professor of Politics and Leadership at Whitman College; from 2002-06 as president of the American Civil Liberties of Washington; and he recently completed a term on the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association. Theory & Event > Volume 11, Issue 2

The examples cited in this section suggest not the formation of an utterly lawless regime, but, rather, within an order that continues to understand itself in terms of the categories provided by liberal contractarianism, the more insidious creation, multiplication, and institutionalization of what David Dyzenhaus calls "grey holes." Such holes are "spaces in which there are some legal constraints on executive action...but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases."40 As such, they are more harmful to the rule of law than are outright dictatorial usurpations, first, because the provision of limited procedural protections masks the absence of any real constraint on executive power; and, second, because location of the authority to create such spaces within the Constitution implies that, in the last analysis, they bear ex ante authorization by the people. When created, in other words, they may receive but they do not require ratification, whether by Congress or by those whom its members are said to represent. What this means in effect is that the second Bush administration has dispensed with Jefferson's stipulation that extra-constitutional executive acts (or, rather, acts that Jefferson deemed to be outside those constitutionally permitted) require ex post facto ratification; and, in addition, that it has dispensed with Locke's contention that, however unlikely, at least in principle, specific exercises of extra-legal prerogative power (or, rather, acts that Locke deemed to be outside those legally permitted) are properly subject to revolutionary rejection. What one finds in the second Bush administration, then, is a denial of both models of accountability, combined with an aggressive commitment to the constitution of a security state that is liberal only in name. As it extends its reach, perfection of that state renders the prospect of popular repudiation of prerogative power ever more chimerical, and, indeed, renders recognition of the problematic character of its exercise ever less likely.

#### Second is national security utilitarianism – the public has been subdued into believing the government’s means-end rationality logic that seeks to control and dominate around the world which is pushing us on the brink of extinction – Syria is the most recent example

Instead of engaging in diplomacy which would have been the better option we were on the brink of initiating a nuclear war in the region

Williams 8 \*Daniel R, Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.

Penn State Law Review, Summer, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 55

B. The Underbelly of the Enlightenment Heritage - the Weberian Nightmare What has heretofore given a patina of acceptability to this modern-day Foucauldian "political dream of the plague" is the narrative idea of a wounded and vulnerable nation gripped in an existential crisis, seeking to protect itself against human "missiles of destruction." The descriptive (a threatened wounded nation) produces in this story the normative (the adjudicative assembly line for enemy combatants). The Foucauldian "political dream of the plague" is the Weberian nightmare. In Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Frankfurt School theorists Horkheimer and Adorno identify the Weberian nightmare of obsessive instrumental rationality as the dominant cognitive orientation in Western culture. 147 Whereas most Americans see as features of this means-ends orientation the awesome feats of science (the amazing technological prosthetics that drives humanity closer to becoming a God, as Freud observed), critical theorists like Horkheimer and Adorno saw what Weber saw 148 - a cognitive orientation that feeds into and fuels our obsessive drive to dominate and control all that surrounds us. 149 The salient point in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, for our purposes, is that the instrumentalist orientation has been unleashed to devour the very idea of the "sacred" in life. 150 September 11th and the war on terror has only hastened a movement along an already existing trajectory. What we experience in our alienated, gadget-filled, but spiritually vacant existence - what Max Weber termed our "disenchantment with the world" 151 - is a reflection of what Horkheimer and Adorno diagnosed, and of how badly our capacity for reason has been corrupted by a fetish for means-ends rationality. 152 That corruption, which is on [\*91] full display in the overt means-ends reasoning of Hamdi itself, has led to what philosopher Albert Borgmann calls a "crucial debility" in our culture, characterized by the "expatriate quality of public life" where we "live in self-imposed exile from communal conversation and action." 153 There is, then, a certain blowback effect, where a mode of thinking that was supposed to lead to humanity's flourishing has been whipsawed back upon us as a powerful corrupting, even imprisoning, force. Whereas the Enlightenment, as exemplified by Rousseau, Voltaire, and Kant, promised freedom from irrationality and darkness, it has instead denuded the public sphere and bequeathed to us a technocratic language that debilitates the ability to conceptualize our way out of a disastrous course (ecologically and otherwise) on which our technocratic means-ends orientation has put us. 154 The quest for domination and control immanent within Enlightenment's fetish for means-ends reasoning, which supposedly promised a world of flourishing human rights (though pursued through the blood of ancient cultures, such as the native peoples in the Americas), drained modernity of the very vitality that modernist thinkers insisted [\*92] was distinctive about Enlightenment society. 155 It has instead taken us to the brink of annihilation in a world where the disparities of wealth are grossly appalling and human behavior slides so easily into barbarism and violence, usually in the service of preserving or further deepening those disparities. Whereas the Enlightenment broke the bondage of atrophied tradition, it has wrought a world where little is sacred, and what little remains is rapidly dwindling, where "what holds us all together is a cold and impersonal design." 156 We slaughtered cultures within our own country - Native American cultures that we still do not fully appreciate and comprehend - with the quintessential Enlightenment slogan, Manifest Destiny, only to bring about an ennui and despair that produces a nostalgic yearning for the sacred upon which those slaughtered cultures built their now-defunct way of life.

### 2NC Framework/Giroux

#### The role of the ballot is to affirm the best methodology for creating cultural changes toward restricting executive power – aff should be held accountable for their method – justifications are intrinsically tied to their policy

#### Their method is bad – (1) it’s rooted in tyrannaphobia (2) the state is hijacked by elites who control decision making and normalize an authoritarian state that wages war on populations – debate should focus on how cultural elements combat normalization of violence

Giroux 13 Henry A. is a social critic and educator, and the author of many books. He currently holds the Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Ontario, Monthly Review, Volume 65, Issue 01 (May)

In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 Such massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced. Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance .What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life. Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens.Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic.

### 2NC Permutation

#### Perm doesn’t solve – it gets lost in the battlefield of legal authority and reigns in politics

#### There’s a Sequencing DA – alt has to come first or movements get sapped

Nagin 5 Tomiko Brown, Visiting Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, “ELITES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE LAW: THE CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,” Columbia Law Review, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1436

Those seeking to have an impact on the political and legal orders should not root a mass movement in the courts;instead, affirmative litigation about constitutional rights should be anchored upon and preceded by a mass movement.Efforts to achieve fundamental change shouldbegin with the target constituency and be waged initially outside of the confines of institutionalized politics.Law should be understood as a tactic in an ongoing political struggle, where the struggle is the main event and favorable legal outcomes are its byproducts. There is a crucially important temporal component to this view. Legal claims can be tactically useful in a political strategy for achieving change - butonly after social movements lay the groundworkfor legal change. Social movements must first create political pressure that frames issues in a favorable manner, creates cultural norm shifts, and affects public opinion; these norm shifts then increase the likelihood that courts will reach outcomes favored by lawyers. [437](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b1b76c3bff33e7c7527182cc42568c87&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAl&_md5=b4841fe459fa752b47486b13d84385b6&focBudTerms=milliken%20w/150%20hispanic%20or%20latino&focBudSel=all#n437) Again, my claims find support in the history of the mid-twentieth-century civil rights movement. This narrative posits an intimate relationship between the sociopolitical dynamics within black client communities and the success (or failure) of civil rights lawyers' litigation campaigns for rights. The postwar civil rights movement confirms that the moral suasion of participatory democratic groups of nonlawyers, and typically nonelites, was integral to law's movement from a Jim Crow regime to a [\*1523] constitutional order in which formal equality was the norm. During the past three decades, historians who have analyzed social change have discovered that small groups of inexpert individuals can be the leading edge of a social movement, especially when they work in coalition with those who traditionally wield influence in society. [438](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b1b76c3bff33e7c7527182cc42568c87&docnum=11&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAl&_md5=b4841fe459fa752b47486b13d84385b6&focBudTerms=milliken%20w/150%20hispanic%20or%20latino&focBudSel=all#n438)Through their commitment to a social cause, ordinary people with no insider knowledge of the technical aspects of the broad issue on which they are mobilizing can create circumstances in which those with actual power (political, economic, and, ultimately, legal power) are persuaded to act in their favor.

#### Aff gets lost in the details of specifics like \_\_\_\_\_ policy which ignores broader systemic criticism and normalizes war on terror

Saas, 12 \*\*William O. Pf Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State University. symploke > Volume 20, Numbers 1-2

How might one critique this massive network of violence that has become so enmeshed in our contemporary geo-socio-political reality? Is there any hope for reversing the expansion of executive violence in the current political climate, in which the President enjoys minimal resistance to his most egregious uses of violence? How does exceptional violence become routine? Answers to these broad and difficult questions, derived as they are from the disorientingly vast and hyper-accelerated retrenchment of our current political situation, are best won through the broad strokes of what Slavoj Žižek calls "systemic" critique. For Žižek, looking squarely at interpersonal or subjective violences (e.g., torture, drone strikes), drawn as we may be by their gruesome and immediate appeal, distorts the critic's broader field of vision. For a fuller picture, one must pull one's critical focus back several steps to reveal the deep, objective structures that undergird the spectacular manifestations of everyday, subjective violence (Žižek 2008, 1-2). Immediately, however, one confronts the limit question of Žižek's mandate: how does one productively draw the boundaries of a system without too severely dampening the force of objective critique? For practical purposes, this essay leaves off discussion of neoliberal economic domination, vital as it may be to a full accounting for the U.S.' latest and most desperate expressions of state solvency.

#### Bad for the left – as progressives stay focused on the law, conservatives chalk up more wins. Reliance on the law is WORSE than doing nothing

West 6, Pf Law @ Georgetown, (Robin, *Harvard Journal of Law & Gender*, Winter, lexis)

And law is indeed a strikingly conservative and conserving set of institutions and practices. I argued in the book that legal critics, feminist and otherwise, should elevate the concept of harm in our thinking about law. And when we do so, we should think much more than we currently do about the harms sustained by various subordinated groups, including women. All I want to add here in response to some of Halley's remarks is that harm- and law-focused inquiries with respect to gender or otherwise that come from such a focus are indeed reformist projects. They are projects about how law could do better, instrumentally, what it claims to do, and what it does do some of the time, what it does not do at all well most of the time, and often does not do at all, period. However, while it is important to get judge-made law to do better what it already does, it is even more important. I think, to put law in its place. Law--meaning here, adjudicative law--is (lo and behold) not politics. It cannot do what politics might be able to do. It has been a tragic mistake, I think, of liberals, radicals, identitarian theorists, critical legal scholars, and progressives of all stripes involved in law, legal theory, and legalism of the past half century, to assert, and so repetitively and confidently, the contrary. The domain of adjudicative law has its own ethics. It is for the most part deeply moored in conservative values. It has some redemptive potential and therefore some play for progressive gains, but really not much. More important, it has the potential, all in the name of justice, to further aggravate the harmsit manages to so successfully avoid. *Caring for Justice* was an attempt to expose the aggravation of harm done by law in the name of justice, exploit its redemptive potential, and argue that others should do this also. But completely aside from the arguments of that book, I think this is still a very important and very much under-examined question for progressive lawyers to ask: how much can be asked of adjudicative law? Again, my answer is "not much." Others disagree. My current retrospective on the place of Catharine MacKinnon's jurisprudence in our law and letters, for example, argues that a part of the brilliance of her labors over the last thirty years has been her quite conscious embrace of law and legalism, rather than the domain of politics, culture, or education, to achieve evolutionary changes in our understanding of both sexual injury and sexual justice. [**97**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n97) She has been phenomenally successful in pushing law to become a **[\*48]** vehicle for that evolutionary change. By contrast, I think, the benighted attempt over the last half century of progressive constitutional lawyers and theorists to employ the stratagems and ethics of legalism so as to refigure our fundamental politics, to achieve substantive equality, expand liberty, and the like--and to do so by urging on courts the development of progressive interpretations of their constitutional corollaries--has been a pretty striking failure, and not only because of the current Republican staffing of the courts. Obviously, the arguments put forward by progressives, radicals, and liberals in their thousands upon thousands of pages of briefs--arguments about what equality should look like, about what freedoms we all should or should not have, about democracy, about speech, about reproduction, about race, about sex, and so on and so on and so on, as well as their constitutional corollaries, from *Brown* [98](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n98) to *Roe* [99](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n99) to *Casey* [100](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n100) to *Lawrence* [101-](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n101-)-are vital arguments with which to engage. The problem is that these arguments should be--and are not--the bread and butter of very ordinary politics, completely traditionally understood. The repeated insistence by liberal legalists over the last half-century that these arguments are, in fact, in law's domain has not secured progressive victories and has had the perverse effect instead of impoverishing our politics. [**102**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=39680407fb828dfdd157d657f657a888&docnum=53&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=51&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=4f80854bd4621b982f860148cd3f92b3&focBudTerms=casey%20and%20foucault%20and%20abortion&focBudSel=all#n102) The repeated insistence by critical legal scholars over the last thirty years that, contra liberalism, there is no difference between law and politics--and that what follows is simply that all those legal arguments in all of those endless Supreme Court opinions pontificating over the meaning of liberty and equality are in fact political arguments--has not changed this dynamic one bit. It has not only underscored the total absence of any coherent progressive instrumentalism from left understandings of the potential of law. Of greater consequence, it has also even **further emasculated and eviscerated** our politics, worse than liberalism could have done if it had tried, and it did not. The critical insistence on the deconstruction of the differences between law and politics has only reinforced, rather than challenged in any meaningful way, the liberal legalist conceit that law, rather than politics ordinarily understood, is the domain of radical and liberal political thought. We have no political "left" in this country, in part, because those who would otherwise be inclined to make one have instead poured their thought, their passion, and their commitments into litigation [\*49] strategies or into the project of pointing out over and over the politics of those projects**.** The result of this has been an entrenched conservatism across the board**-**-the board, that is, of both law and politics. Progressives need to re-direct their political arguments, including the radical arguments, out of law and law reviews and into the domain of politics. We first have to get over the lazy assumption that there is no need to do so--either because law is much loftier than ordinary politics, such that ennobling political arguments *ought* to be made in judicial fora (liberalism); or because there's no difference between law and politics, so that pointing out that legal arguments are through and through political is the beginning and end of political thought (critical). There are alternatives to both, and we ought to start figuring out what they are.

### 2NC Politics NB

#### Executive action avoids politics

Sovacool 9 Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333,

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

### CTS

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

 Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). Some of those scholarsmost associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silke’s (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

## 1NR

### Politics

#### TPA essential to TPP and TTIP

Newsmax 12/14 “Key Lawmakers Strike Bipartisan Deal on International Trade” Saturday, 14 Dec 2013 http://www.newsmax.com/US/international-trade-legislation-congress/2013/12/14/id/541865#ixzz2qaydUsBt

Three top U.S. lawmakers on key congressional committees have reached a bipartisan deal on legislation the White House needs to advance international trade agreements and will introduce the measure early next month, congressional aides said on Saturday.¶ The Trade Promotion Authority legislation, which would let the White House put trade agreements before Congress for an up or down vote without amendments, is considered crucial to enacting trade deals and could pave the way for major accords with Pacific Rim and European trading partners.¶ The agreement was reached among Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont., who chairs the Senate Finance Committee which has jurisdiction over trade, the committee's senior Republican, Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah, and Rep. Dave Camp of Michigan, the Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, which is also oversees trade issues.¶ The agreement was first reported in the Wall Street Journal.¶ The measure has a provision directing negotiators to consider currency issues as a negotiating objective, one aide said. Details were not available.¶ Foreign exchange fairness is a critical issue for many U.S. businesses, which argue that some countries suppress the value of their currency against the U.S. dollar to give their products an advantage over U.S. goods. China, with which the United States had a $315 billion trade deficit in 2012, is a frequent target of such complaints.¶ U.S. negotiators are in the endgame of a deal with countries in Latin America and Asia known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and are also working on an accord with the European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.¶ Trade deals usually lower the cost of goods into the United States but also may cause job losses as manufacturers move facilities abroad where labor is cheaper. Trade promotion authority is considered essential to prevent such deals, which are often laboriously negotiated over years, from getting bogged down in Congress.

#### War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8 Millennium - Journal of International Studies *May 2008* vol. 36 *no. 3 575-595*

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 But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

### Uniqueness

#### Conceded link, I don’t have to win huge uniqueness, flag that the Plan REWRITES THE NDAA

#### Insiders think TPA will pass but strong Obama push is key

Economist 2/7

“Harry Reid Threatens To Impoverish The World By At Least $600 Billion A Year” FEB. 7, 2014

http://www.businessinsider.com/harry-reid-threatens-to-impoverish-the-world-by-at-least-600-billion-a-year-2014-2

Mr Obama has never been an ardent free-trader, yet his second term got off to a promising start. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, a deal with large Pacific-rim economies, is close to completion; America and Japan are hammering out the rules for farm goods. European and American trade wonks continue to meet regularly, hoping to wrap up a "next-generation" trade agreement as early as next year.¶ To make all this happen Mr Obama needs "trade promotion authority" (usually known as "fast-track"), which would let him negotiate deals and then present them to Congress for a simple yes-or-no vote, with no chance for lawmakers to rewrite the details. Without such authority, America's trading partners cannot take the White House seriously as a negotiator. Fast-track was last granted to George W. Bush in 2002 and expired in 2007. Since Republicans are generally pro-trade and Democrats are generally loyal to Mr Obama, most people in Washington at first assumed that Congress would give it to him without a fuss.¶ But with elections looming and lawmakers in a populist mood, that is far from certain. Late last year roughly half the members of the House wrote to Mr Obama declaring their opposition to fast-track; most were from his own party. In early January a bipartisan group of senators introduced a fast-track bill. Mr Obama spoke up for it in his state-of-the-union address, but only in passing and in mercantilist terms. The aim is "to protect our workers, protect our environment and open new markets to new goods stamped 'Made in the USA'," he said; without mentioning that cheap imports raise living standards.¶ Barely had he left the podium when Mr Reid mugged him. Answering questions from reporters, he reiterated his opposition to fast-track and advised its backers "not [to] push this right now". Insiders doubt that Mr Reid would kill the bill outright. Haggling in the Senate may yield a new version with enough about labour standards and the environment to satisfy the protectionists. If so, Mr Reid will probably allow a vote, and the bill should pass. The White House remains publicly optimistic.¶ Yet damage is already being done. Michael Froman, Mr Obama's trade representative, says negotiations have not been affected by the politicking in Washington. However, even if Mr Reid's rebellion was partly for show (his seat is at risk in 2016), it still worries America's trade partners. Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, may be reluctant to offend voters at home for the sake of a trade deal that America's legislators might promptly torpedo. Similarly, the French, who have been a constant pain in talks between America and Europe, could argue that since America's leaders seem determined to attach conditions to a fast-track bill, France's demands for carve-outs deserve consideration, too.¶ At home meanwhile, Democratic opposition could harden. Some lawmakers may see an opportunity to put daylight between themselves and their Republican foes ahead of November's elections. With corporate profits looking healthy and wages still stagnant almost five years into the recovery, some may be tempted to portray Republican backing for free trade as support for fat-cat corporations.¶ Mr Reid's surprise rebuke suggests that Mr Obama needs to communicate better with his allies. And if he wishes to prevent two of the most promising trade deals in a decade from unravelling, he will need to make a far more full-throated case for the benefits of free exchange.

#### Reid’s opposition won’t stall progress- John Kerry concedes

Seher 2/1

CNN's Jason Seher “Kerry, Hagel rebuke Reid on fast-track trade bill” http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/01/kerry-hagel-rebuke-reid-on-fast-track-track-bill/

In a rare joint appearance at the Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel dismissed Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's opposition to renewing fast-track trade authority and predicted that the bill will ultimately pass in spite of Reid's opposition.¶ "I've heard plenty of statements in the Senate on one day that are categorical, and we've wound up finding accommodations and a way to find our way forward," Kerry told the audience of European allies.¶ "I respect Harry Reid, worked with him for a long time," Kerry said. "I think all of us have learned to interpret a comment on one day in the United States Senate as not necessarily what might be the situation in a matter of months."¶ Reid said Wednesday he is unlikely to consider a bill on the issue anytime soon.¶ "I’m against fast track," said Reid, who controls which bills get to the Senate floor. "I think everyone would be well-advised not to push this right now."¶ With several outstanding trade pacts - including a major deal with the European Union - securing President Barack Obama's "trade promotion authority" remains a priority for the administration. The power would limit Congress' ability to influence American trade policy, only allowing them up or down votes on massive trade deals while leaving negotiations with other nations entirely under the purvey of the President. Proponents of the measure say the TPA prevents crucial trade agreements from getting bogged down in the bureaucratic slog and would help open new markets for U.S. goods. Democrats oppose the measure, arguing past trade deals led companies to ship jobs overseas.¶ Heralding the ability as something that could "have a profound impact" on the American economy, Kerry said the extension of President Obama's authority could pay dividends and help further drive down the unemployment rate.¶ "It's worth millions of jobs," he said.¶ Kerry also was emphatic that Reid's opposition would not stall progress.

#### Empirics on our side

Washington Post 2/2

“The Washington Post: Reid can undermine Obama on TPP” Feb 02 http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/57477685-82/obama-trade-reid-tpp.html.csp

The day after Mr. Obama made his plea, Mr. Reid sounded as if he were rejecting it — thus imperiling the entire TPP project. That might be a stretch: Mr. Reid has never supported trade promotion authority, and he has never been much for free-trade deals, either. He has nevertheless permitted such legislation to move through the Senate in the past, and he stopped short of an explicit threat to block it this time.

#### Reid’s opposition means PC key

WSJ 1/29

“Harry Reid's Trade Veto Are Democrats playing a double political game on free trade?” Jan. 29, 2014 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304428004579351180680000934

Harry's veto underscores that if Mr. Obama is going to get a trade victory, he's going to have to spend some political capital persuading his own party. That is, if he really wants a negotiating success and isn't looking for a political excuse to drop the whole thing.

#### Obama has the PC – dems need him for midterm success

NYT 2/3

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/us/politics/trade-issue-goes-untouched-as-obama-and-reid-meet.html?\_r=0

Also present were Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado, chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and Guy Cecil, the committee’s executive director. Democrats, who said the meeting had been scheduled before Mr. Reid’s comments last week, are seeking political help from Mr. Obama. Despite the president’s sagging poll numbers, he remains an effective fund-raiser and can motivate the party base in some parts of the country.¶ The dispute over trade, though, highlights the challenges facing Mr. Obama as he tries to advance his agenda in a campaign year. As he negotiates trade pacts with Europe and Asia, he wants Congress to give him authority to submit agreements for up-or-down votes, as previous presidents have been able to do, rather than allowing lawmakers to amend them. So-called fast-track authority is viewed as essential to passing any agreements, and it is one area where the president and Republicans agree.¶ But the Democratic base, particularly labor unions and environmental activists, has long been skeptical of such trade agreements, and Mr. Reid opposes giving the authority to the president. “Everyone would be well advised just to not push this right now,” he said the day after Mr. Obama’s State of the Union address.¶ Republicans have needled Mr. Obama about the schism. “He’s absolutely right,” Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican leader, said of Mr. Obama on Monday. “But now the president’s own party is now standing in the way of getting anything done. So if ever there was a moment for the president to use his phone, this is it.”¶ Mr. Obama’s aides said he would continue to seek the authority. “These trade agreements would significantly boost our exports,” Jay Carney, the White House press secretary, said shortly before the meeting with Mr. Reid. “And the president’s going to push hard for this because he believes it’s the right thing to do for our economy, the right thing to do for American workers.”

### Link

#### Links to politics- Congress is doing everything it can to prevent a shift

Miller 1/15 Greg, Washington Post “Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to Pentagon” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84\_story.html?hpid=z1

Congress has moved to block President Obama’s plan to shift control of the U.S. drone campaign from the CIA to the Defense Department, inserting a secret provision in the massive government spending bill introduced this week that would preserve the spy agency’s role in lethal counterterrorism operations, U.S. officials said. The measure, included in a classified annex to the $1.1 trillion federal budget plan, would restrict the use of any funding to transfer unmanned aircraft or the authority to carry out drone strikes from the CIA to the Pentagon, officials said. The provision represents an unusually direct intervention by lawmakers into the way covert operations are run, impeding an administration plan aimed at returning the CIA’s focus to traditional intelligence gathering and possibly bringing more transparency to drone strikes. The move also reflects some lawmakers’ lingering doubts about the U.S. military’s ability to conduct strikes against al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates without hitting the wrong targets and killing civilians. Those apprehensions were amplified after a U.S. military strike in Yemen last month killed a dozen people, including as many as six civilians, in an 11-vehicle convoy that tribal leaders said was part of a wedding procession. U.S. officials said that the strike was aimed at a senior al-Qaeda operative but that reviews of the operation have raised concern that it failed to comply with White House guidelines requiring “near certainty” that no civilians would be harmed. On Wednesday, there were reports that another U.S. strike had killed a farmer in Yemen. The extent of the restrictions contained in the drone provision remained unclear. The measure was included by members of the House and Senate appropriations committees, said officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to comment publicly on the legislation. Other senior lawmakers and congressional officials declined to comment on the contents of the classified annex, which details funding for U.S. spy agencies. Still, senior lawmakers have been vocal in expressing concern about the prospect of the CIA ceding responsibility for drone strikes to the military. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a member of the Appropriations Committee, said last year that she had seen the CIA “exercise patience and discretion specifically to prevent collateral damage” and that she “would really have to be convinced that the military would carry it out that well.” Feinstein declined to comment on the budget measure this week. But a senior aide said that the senator “stands by her earlier statements” and that the Intelligence Committee has “recently reviewed this issue, and Senator Feinstein believes her views are widely shared on the committee.” Asked about the scope of that review, the aide said the panel “took stock of” the program and “came to a conclusion” but would not elaborate. Among Feinstein’s colleagues on the Intelligence Committee is Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D-Md.), who is chairman of the appropriations panel responsible for the budget bill. A spokesman for that committee declined to comment. There is no mention of the drone provision in the hundreds of pages of the budget blueprint released to the public. A section outlining $572 billion in Pentagon spending notes that “adjustments to classified programs are addressed in the accompanying classified annex.” A person familiar with the omnibus bill confirmed that the annex includes language on the drone program but would say only that the provision is more complicated than merely withholding money to prevent drone operations from being transferred to the Pentagon. Former U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence appropriations process said that aside from placing restrictions on funding, Congress could create other obstacles — for example, requiring the Pentagon to certify that it has matched the CIA’s capabilities and targeting methodology before it is allowed to proceed.

### Framing

**Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences**

Gvosdev 5 – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### The impact is moral tunnel vision that undercuts responsibility for other atrocities

Issac ’02 (Jeffrey Issac, Professor of political science at Indiana University, Ph.D Yale, Director of Center for Study of Democracy and Public Life, Spring 2002, “End, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazinze, vol. 49, no. 2)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

####  “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### Your truth impossible claims are stupid and politically stagnating – process of debate and deliberative discussion solves

Susan Handelman – English Prof, Bar-Ilan University - 1990, Facing the Other: Levinas, Perelman and Rosenzweig, Religion & Literature, Vol. 22, No. 2/3, Religious Thought and Contemporary CriticalTheory (Summer - Autumn, 1990), pp. 61-84

In sum, Levinas and Perelman are both in search of a reason-of-theother, an other- reason which is not however arbitrary, violent, or willful, but rather a non-necessary form of imperative. And that for Perelman is found in the forms of reasoning and persuasion of the rhetorical tradition from the Greeks onward, forms of discourse which were denigrated and neglected by Cartesian logicians and philosophersdescribed as merely "ornamental," "literary," or "sophistic." From this tradition, Perelman constructs a "critical rationalism" that "transcends the duality 'judgments of reality/value judgments,' and makes both judgments of reality and value judgments dependent on the personality of the scientist or philosopher, who is responsible for his decisions in the field of knowledge as well as the field of action" (New Rhetoric 514).7 In other words, for Perelman rhetoric is a form of social but non-coercive and non-violent reason which is required to deliberate in areas where there are no necessary or absolute truths. That is, a realm where there are no truths which have *coercive* power, such as the "coercions" of self-evident reason or deductive logic or non-rational faith. Formal Cartesian reason is founded on the solipsistic notion of self-evident truths, clear, distinct, and necessary - there is no need for deliberation with others, nor any question of varying intensities of adherence to these truths, nor the possibility of withholding one's assent from them. Such reason, like the theoretical reason of Kant, "imposes itself on every rational being" and "agreement is inevitable" (2). Rhetoric, by contrast, is defined by Perelman asthat form of reason which involves the freely given and responsible commitment of a deliberating audience. Perelman's "new rhetoric" is then a "third way" between the compulsions of formal autonomous reason and the coercions of violence. To deliberate or argue with another implies that one has renounced resorting to forces alone, that value is attached to gaining the adherence of one's interlocutor by means of reasoned persuasion, and that one is not regarding him as an object, but appealing to his free judgement. Recourse to argumentation assumes the establishment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts, excludes the use of violence. (55) This is a notion of rhetoric quite at odds with the way the term is used in much contemporary literary theory where rhetoric has often been used to denote the ineradicable political biases and ideologies involved in language use and interpretation. Rhetoric is then the deployment of "textual strategies" in the war-game of interpretation; and/or linguistic self-consciousness and self-reflexivity; and/or the critical self-consciousness of the interpreter who recognizes that there is no ontological or transcendent foundation to language or truth, that all truth is embodied in the social constructs of linguistic practice. To attain this critical self-consciousness is posited as an act of demystification which is a necessary part of a politically progressive practice, a kind of "post-modern ethic." In fact, much of the recent epistemological skepticism and political criticism in literary theory justifies itself through an implicit stance of ethical and moral superiority: that is, it claims to resist by its demystifications and radical critiques the absolutism of tyrants and fanatics. But Perelman has a remarkable insight to add to the debate: the radical skeptic is often not the opposite, but the counterpart of the fanatic for both equate adherence to theses with recognition of absolute truth. Both skeptic and fanatic thus foreclose deliberative argument about choice when no absolute ground exists. Writes Perelman: Since rhetorical proof is never completely necessary proof, the thinking person who gives his adherence to the conclusions of an argumentation does so by an act that commits him and for which he is responsible. The fanatic accepts the commitment, but as one bowing to an absolute and irrefragable truth; the skeptic refuses the commitment, but under the pretext that he does not find it sufficiently definitive. He refuses adherence because his idea of adherence is similar to that of the fanatic: both fail to appreciate that argumentation aims at a choice among possible theses; by proposing and justifying the hierarchy of these theses, argumentation seeks to make the decision a rational one. This role of argumentation in decision making is denied by the skeptic and fanatic. In the absence of compelling reason, they both are inclined to give violence a free hand, rejecting personal commitment. (62) This passage might be used to gloss the painful political controversy that has so troubled many contemporary literary critics - the connection between Paul de Man's radical skepticism and his pro-fascist writings in World War II.8 Many of de Man's defenders have argued that his deconstructive skepticism was an implicit repudiation and overcoming of his earlier ideological writings, a posture of critical self-reflexiveness whose notions about "undecidability" and the "impossibility of reading" are intended to guard against all violent engagements. But Perelman's analysis indicates that such radical skepticism, which denies the grounds for any choice between meanings, is overly restrictive in its definition of truth and knowledge. Foreclosing deliberation and choice in endless aporias and "undecidabilities" is an act as absolutist and open to violence as that of the fanatic who refuses to debate due to her or his conviction of possessing that absolute truth.9 The same criticism could be made of the "ideological" critic, who holds that all values are masks for self-interested power plays; or the relativist who is intent on constantly undermining any and every claim to a firm foundation for a given value or truth, and refuses to allow for any deliberative argument about the hierarchy of values or criteria for making choices among them. For as the jurist knows, regardless of the lack of any absolute, clear, or unambiguous ground, choices still must be made and decisions rendered. In Perelman's view, both the fanatic and skeptic relieve themselves of the burden of personal responsibility, action, and commitment to choices made. Rhetorical argumentation, though, is oriented towards decision and the future: "it sets out to bring about some action or prepare the way for it by acting, by discursive methods, on the minds of the hearers" (47). Argumentation, Perelman reminds us, is not merely an intellectual exercise divorced from practical preoccupations. "Language is not only a means of communication: it is also an instrument for acting on minds, a means of persuasion" (132). That is precisely why argumentation is a substitute for the violence which attempts to obtain an action by the use of force or compulsion. I would argue that there are many lessons here for literary criticism and theory. First, restricting questions about meaning or the nature of the literary text to questions about the epistemological status of language is as artificial as the attempt to restrict all reasoning solely to formal logic. Nor is the only alternative an uncritical embrace of "politics" and the assertion that the way language acts on the world is essentially ideological and marked by relations of force, domination, and violence. In sum, for both Perelman and Levinas, aesthetics and politics need to be subsumed to a critical rationalism which for Perelman is rhetoric and for Levinas ethics.10 As philosopher, however, Levinas partakes of the ancient philosophical contempt for rhetoric, which he views as the approach to the neighbor through ruse, as a mode of sophistic manipulation and violence rather than as a search for truth. But Levinas' insistence on language as pre-eminently a call or command before it is an exchange of information, is at bottom "rhetorical."

#### Squo is structurally improving---health, environment and equality

Bjorn Lomborg 10/16, Adjunct Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, "A Better World Is Here", 2013, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/on-the-declining-costs-of-global-problems-by-bj-rn-lomborg

COPENHAGEN – For centuries, optimists and pessimists have argued over the state of the world. Pessimists see a world where more people means less food, where rising demand for resources means depletion and war, and, in recent decades, where boosting production capacity means more pollution and global warming. One of the current generation of pessimists’ sacred texts, The Limits to Growth, influences the environmental movement to this day.¶ The optimists, by contrast, cheerfully claim that everything – human health, living standards, environmental quality, and so on – is getting better. Their opponents think of them as “cornucopian” economists, placing their faith in the market to fix any and all problems.¶ But, rather than picking facts and stories to fit some grand narrative of decline or progress, we should try to compare across all areas of human existence to see if the world really is doing better or worse. Together with 21 of the world’s top economists, I have tried to do just that, developing a scorecard spanning 150 years. Across ten areas – including health, education, war, gender, air pollution, climate change, and biodiversity – the economists all answered the same question: What was the relative cost of this problem in every year since 1900, all the way to 2013, with predictions to 2050.¶ Using classic economic valuations of everything from lost lives, bad health, and illiteracy to wetlands destruction and increased hurricane damage from global warming, the economists show how much each problem costs. To estimate the magnitude of the problem, it is compared to the total resources available to fix it. This gives us the problem’s size as a share of GDP. And the trends since 1900 are sometimes surprising.¶ Consider gender inequality. Essentially, we were excluding almost half the world’s population from production. In 1900, only 15% of the global workforce was female. What is the loss from lower female workforce participation? Even taking into account that someone has to do unpaid housework and the increased costs of female education, the loss was at least 17% of global GDP in 1900. Today, with higher female participation and lower wage differentials, the loss is 7% – and projected to fall to 4% by 2050.¶ It will probably come as a big surprise that climate change from 1900 to 2025 has mostly been a net benefit, increasing welfare by about 1.5% of GDP per year. This is because global warming has mixed effects; for moderate warming, the benefits prevail.¶ On one hand, because CO2 works as a fertilizer, higher levels have been a boon for agriculture, which comprises the biggest positive impact, at 0.8% of GDP. Likewise, moderate warming prevents more cold deaths than the number of extra heat deaths that it causes. It also reduces demand for heating more than it increases the costs of cooling, implying a gain of about 0.4% of GDP. On the other hand, warming increases water stress, costing about 0.2% of GDP, and negatively affects ecosystems like wetlands, at a cost of about 0.1%.¶ As temperatures rise, however, the costs will rise and the benefits will decline, leading to a dramatic reduction in net benefits. After the year 2070, global warming will become a net cost to the world, justifying cost-effective climate action now and in the decades to come.¶ Yet, to put matters in perspective, the scorecard also shows us that the world’s biggest environmental problem by far is indoor air pollution. Today, indoor pollution from cooking and heating with bad fuels kills more than three million people annually, or the equivalent of a loss of 3% of global GDP. But in 1900, the cost was 19% of GDP, and it is expected to drop to 1% of GDP by 2050.¶ Health indicators worldwide have shown some of the largest improvements. Human life expectancy barely changed before the late eighteenth century. Yet it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the gain since 1900: in that year, life expectancy worldwide was 32 years, compared to 69 now (and a projection of 76 years in 2050).¶ The biggest factor was the fall in infant mortality. For example, even as late as 1970, only around 5% of infants were vaccinated against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. By 2000, it was 85%, saving about three million lives annually – more, each year, than world peace would have saved in the twentieth century.¶ This success has many parents. The Gates Foundation and the GAVI Alliance have spent more than $2.5 billion and promised another $10 billion for vaccines. Efforts by the Rotary Club, the World Health Organization, and many others have reduced polio by 99% worldwide since 1979.¶ In economic terms, the cost of poor health at the outset of the twentieth century was an astounding 32% of global GDP. Today, it is down to about 11%, and by 2050 it will be half that.¶ While the optimists are not entirely right (loss of biodiversity in the twentieth century probably cost about 1% of GDP per year, with some places losing much more), the overall picture is clear. Most of the topics in the scorecard show improvements of 5-20% of GDP. And the overall trend is even clearer. Global problems have declined dramatically relative to the resources available to tackle them.¶ Of course, this does not mean that there are no more problems. Although much smaller, problems in health, education, malnutrition, air pollution, gender inequality, and trade remain large.¶ But realists should now embrace the view that the world is doing much better. Moreover, the scorecard shows us where the substantial challenges remain for a better 2050. We should guide our future attention not on the basis of the scariest stories or loudest pressure groups, but on objective assessments of where we can do the most good.

### 2NC Circumvention – Lawyers

#### Pentagon officials know how to play the system

Kibbe 12 \* Jennifer D. Associate Professor of Government, Franklin & Marshall College. Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 373

In addition, Pentagon officials understand the current jurisdictional set-up all too well, and have effectively cultivated relationships with the armed services committees and appropriations defense subcommittees that help ensure a favorable reception for their interpretation of the "traditional military activities" exception.

#### Ohlin – they’ll just redefine as sig strikes

#### Executive lawyers will teach the Executive how to blow off the plan

Shane 12 \*Peter M. Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz School of Law. From 1978 to 1981, served in the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 507

Yet, the ideological prism of presidentialism can bend the light of the law so that nothing is seen other than the claimed prerogatives of the sitting chief executive. Champions of executive power - even skilled lawyers who should know better - wind up asserting that, to an extraordinary extent, the President as a matter of constitutional entitlement is simply not subject to legal regulation by either of the other two branches of government. [\*511] Government attorneys must understand their unique roles as both advisers and advocates. In adversarial proceedings before courts of law, it may be fine for each of two contesting sides, including the government, to have a zealous, and not wholly impartial, presentation, with the judge acting as a neutral decisionmaker. But in their advisory function, government lawyers must play a more objective, even quasi-adjudicative, role. They must give the law their most conscientious interpretation. If they fail in that task, frequently there will be no one else effectively situated to do the job of assuring diligence in legal compliance. Government lawyers imbued with the ideology of presidentialism too easily abandon their professional obligations as advisers and too readily become ethically blinkered advocates for unchecked executive power. Jack Goldsmith headed the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for a little less than ten months in 2003-2004. Of the work done by some government attorneys and top officials after 9/11, he said they dealt with FISA limitations on warrantless surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) "the way they dealt with other laws they didn't like: they blew through them in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that they guarded closely so no one could question the legal basis for the operations." 7 He describes a 2003 meeting with David Addington, who was Counsel and later Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, in which Addington denied the NSA Inspector General's request to see a copy of OLC's legal analysis in support of the NSA surveillance program. Before Goldsmith arrived at OLC, "not even NSA lawyers were allowed to see the Justice Department's legal analysis of what NSA was doing." 8