# R1

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#### Our interpretation is that the aff must defend an advocacy in the direction of the topic, which is an increase in statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President

#### Increase means to make greater

Dictionary.com No Date Given <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase?s=ts> increase - Show IPA verb, in·creased, in·creas·ing, noun verb (used with object)

to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: “to increase taxes.”

#### An archaeological criticism is not a statutory and/or judicial restriction -

#### Restriction on war power authority must be a limit that controls the president

Fisher, 97 **–** (Louis, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, “Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse,” U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107, Lexis)

A legal analysis by Walter Dellinger, at that time Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, draws a bold definition of presidential war power but appears to concede that if Congress gets its act together to enact a statutory restriction, the legislative limit controls the President: "By establishing and funding a military force capable of being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitutional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Congress left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives." n131

#### First is limits – limited topics encourage aff innovation, predictive research, and clash—a precursor to productive education. The inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments

#### Second is fair ground – the resolution is the only neutral site of stasis for controversy – changing this allows them to define the debate in ways that make it impossible for us to compete and really easy for them to win

#### Third is decision-making – only maintaining a limited topic of discussion and a clear stasis for both teams provides the necessary and requisite foundation for decision-making and advocacy skills – even if they are contestable, that is different from being valuably debatable

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy,there is no need for debate: *the matter can be settled by unanimous consent*. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of *illegal* immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concernsto be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States. Congress to make progress on the immigration debate *during the summer of 2007*. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened upsimply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate¶ . They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide *much* basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Effective decision-making is the lynchpin to solve all social and political problems --- this is an impact to limits, role-playing and decision-making that turns case

Lundberg ‘10 **–** (Christian Lundberg, Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity forcritical thinking, analysis of public claims, informeddecision making, and better public judgment. If the picture ofmodem political life that underwrites this critique of debateis a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution**,** at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenryto research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong supportfor expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, researchand information processingskills, oral communicationskills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and new articulations of democratic life**.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce** revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; andincreasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenrythat deliberateswith greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Discussions of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – we control uniqueness: students already have dogmatic notions about the world – government policy discussions is vital to force engagement with competing perspective to improve social outcomes and break down pre-conceived barriers of what is right – this turns case

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability topredict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example,simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis \*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their*own*government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while *bringing theory into the realm of practice*.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research*‘‘*their’’government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Topic discussions are good---they create an actively engage citizenry that can check the executive---these decisions affect our everyday lives

Young, 13 **–** (9/4, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” <http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13>)

Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Prefer our evidence because it is more specific to the debate context. Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### (\_\_) Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Ryan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintainsequality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### (\_\_) Only our framework teaches debaters how to speak in the language of experts---that solves cession of science and politics to ideological elites who dominate the argumentative frame

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ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy. There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making. For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge. Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics. Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251). National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts. In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences. The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality. Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray. For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

### 1NC SoE

#### -The state of exception is rhetorical. Your link arguments ignore that it takes work to justify states of exception – proving the aff is critical to their contestation.

Saas 12 \*\*William O. Pf Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State University. symploke > Volume 20, Numbers 1-2

Theories of the exception are not hospitable to rhetoric. The most sophisticated theorists of the exception, Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, have at once both overlooked and understated its fundamentally rhetorical character. In so doing, they have mystified the exception as super-linguistic and resistant to rhetorical critique. For his part, Schmitt acknowledges that the sovereign must repeatedly and spectacularly exercise his decisive powers in public in order to maintain total power (1985). Similarly, Agamben gestures to the rhetorical nature of the exception when he notes that the exception is the product of subjective sovereign judgment: "obviously the only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared to be so" (2005, 30). Neither theorist, however, offers a substantive meditation on the role of language in sustaining and advancing the exceptional decision. Critics are left to declaim sovereign power as something transcendent, an "effective though fictional" space resistant to immanent critique (87). In contradistinction to Schmitt and Agamben, I argue that the state of exception is rhetorical in nature—and that the declaration of a state of [End Page 77] exception, in turn, mobilizes and embeds the executive bureaucracy as purely a power instrument for the charismatic leader. One aspect of the state of exception, as defined by Schmitt, is that it is clearly defined in time—it cannot be perpetual, or it is no longer by definition exceptional. For Schmitt, there are rules for what a sovereign can and cannot do during a state of exception, which is declared in a moment of constitutional or political crisis. The task of the exceptional ruler is to uphold the constitution, not to change it. What is most interesting about our post-modern state of exception is that it is at once both perpetual and constitutive—the state of exception is not bound by time, and it has become the excuse for changing the constitution in important ways and also expanding what many have called the "national security state." Both charisma as the force of history and charisma as embodied presence supplement theories of the exception in useful ways. With the former, the sovereign decision is situated in its sociohistorical context. It will thus matter when the exception is spoken. With the latter, the figure of the sovereign is reframed as the figure of the charismatic rhetor. Thus, it will matter who speaks the exception, and how successful they are at doing so. Together, these conceptions of charisma open space for critique of both the sovereign and her claims to the exception. In effect, the charismatic leader must be capable of absorbing the historical exception, of becoming the image of a new history, in order to sustain any kind of enduring rule in the state of exception. That is, the would-be charismatic leader cannot be overtaken by the force of history; she must become the force of history. With that power in hand, she is free to make any sort of extraordinary decree she likes (within the bounds of history; here the empowering force is also the limit point of charismatic-sovereign power). In Weberian terms, the sovereign must also routinize the exception, must translate the exception into a permanent "state of exception" through the "depersonalization," or transfer of charisma.

#### -Agamben’s criticisms of sovereign power are too theoretical. He points out that sovereigns have the power to create exceptions but he doesn’t prove that they will

Kretsedemas 8, assistant professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, (Philip, American Quarterly, Volume 60, Number 3, September)

Ong asserts that **there is always room for resistance to the forms of sovereign power** described by Agamben—as illustrated by the numerous immigrant rights mobilizations that have taken shape on the global stage (as well as the massive groundswell of support for the U.S. immigrant protests of 2006 and the resistance to “illegal immigrant” laws among many U.S. towns, cities, and states). Agamben provides a useful explanation of the defining tendencies and components of a particular kind of sovereign power, but this is best understood as an **ideal-type theorization and** not a literal account of how relations between the sovereign and subjected always play out in “reality.”

#### - The concept of bare life is politically dangerous and neutralizes resistance

Negri and Casarino, 4 –Italian Moral and Political Philosopher and Associate Professor Of Cultural Studies And Comparative Literature At The University Of Minnesota

(Antonio and Cesare, "It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy," Cultural Critique, No. 57, Spring, Project Muse)

AN: I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to Homo Sacer, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to [End Page 173] eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute pow-erlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [potenza]? **I am worried about the fact that the concept of naked life** as it is conceived by Agamben **might be taken up by political movements and in political debates: I find this prospect quite troubling, which is why I felt the need to attack this concept** in my recent essay. Ultimately, I feel that nowadays **the logic of traditional eugenics is attempting to saturate and capture the whole of human reality**—even at the level of its materiality, that is, through genetic engineering—and **the ultimate result of such a process of saturation and capture is a capsized production of subjectivity within which ideological undercurrents continuously try to subtract or neutralize our resistance.** CC: And I suppose you are suggesting that the concept of naked life is part and parcel of such undercurrents. But have you discussed all this with Agamben? What does he think about your critiques? AN: Whenever I tell him what I have just finished telling you, he gets quite irritated, even angry. I still maintain, nonetheless, that **the conclusions he draws in Homo Sacer lead to dangerous political outcomes** and that the burden of finding a way out of this mess rests entirely on him. And the type of problems he runs into in this book recur throughout many of his other works. I found his essay on Bartleby, for example, absolutely infuriating. This essay was published originally as a little book that also contained Deleuze's essay on Bartleby: well, it turns out that what Deleuze says in his essay is exactly the contrary of what Giorgio says in his! I suppose one could say that they decided to publish their essays together precisely so as to attempt to figure this limit— that is, to find a figure for it, to give it a form—by some sort of paradoxical juxtaposition, but I don't think that this attempt was really successful in the end. In any case, all this incessant talk about the limit bores me and tires me out after a little while. The point is that, inasmuch as it is death, the limit is not creative. The limit is creative to the extent to which you have been able to overcome it qua death: the limit is creative because you have overcome death.

#### Securitization norms are only effective if there’s an audience to accept it.

Hartkorn 9 Siris, Lunds University Department of Political Science - Peace and Conflict Studies, In search for strength, A case study of regime (in)security in Yemen

Securitization is therefore the next level after politicization and it legitimizes breaking of the normal rules (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998, pp. 23-25). The question then arises if anyone can securitize any issue and of course that is not the case. The securitization of an issue is only successful when the audience accepts it and thereby legitimizes the extraordinary measures, which the securitization demands (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998, pp. 25). The acceptance from the audience does not necessarily have to rely on a free choice, it can be forced as well, but without any sign of acceptance among the audience, there will not be securitization but only a securitizing move (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998, pp. 25).

### 1NC Archy

#### The end point of an archaeological criticism is reflection never application or change --- the aff does not solve the impacts of the 1ac

**Dean, 94 –** (Mitchell, “Critical and effective histories,” <http://www.revalvaatio.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/dean-critical_and_effective_histories_foucaults_methods_and_historical_sociology.pdf>)

When reading Foucault, it is important to keep in mind that the conceptual¶ innovation, even at its most prolix as in¶ The Archaeology of Knowledge¶ (1972), is not seeking to initiate or develop a science or discipline, but to¶ explore how it is possible to think in a certain way and how far a specific¶ language can be used. This is why so little of what Foucault was to write¶ could be described as an application of concepts or methodological principles¶ and why, having offered accounts of method at certain points, he appears to¶ jettison them or take them up in an entirely different fashion. Methodological¶ codification, in this regard, is best regarded as a summary that revisits and¶ clarifies analysis¶ after¶ the event rather than a rationalistic plan put into practice¶ by analysis. The present work is not an attempt to codify those methods but¶ to find out how far one can get by reflecting on them in the context of¶ particular problems of sociology and history. Indeed, to speak of following¶ ‘Foucault’s methods’ is as paradoxical as speaking of ascending stairs or¶ cascading waterfalls in the graphic work of M.C.Escher

#### focus on the *roots of detention* is bad because it is just a description of the squo – better for judges to increase judicial restrictions through an archaeological excavation of their post 9/11 discourse – proves a topical version of the aff

**Shaub 11** (Jonathan David Shaub, J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; M.A., English, Belmont University, 2010; B.A., Philosophy and Religious Studies, Vanderbilt University, 2003, now a Bristow Fellow at the Office of the Solicitor General, “A Foucauldian Call for the Archaeological Excavation of Discourse in the Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation,” Spring, 2011 Northwestern University Law Review, 105 Nw. U.L. Rev. 869

This Note contends that judges in the Guantánamo habeas cases, and in future cases presenting “hard questions,” must engage the issues directly, on a fundamental discursive level. One of the principal purposes of the Judicial Branch is to control the excesses of the Executive and Legislative Branches in order to protect individual liberties, especially during wartime. The ancient writ of habeas corpus is one of the most salient examples of this role.272 In recent habeas proceedings, however, the courts have spoken from within the post-9/11 discursive formation and based their decisions on foundational énoncés that necessarily preclude this power. Taking all “necessary and appropriate” measures in a discursively unified conception of “war” may historically have included a fundamental power to detain combatants, but the inquiry should not end there. The judiciary may have a historical practice of deferring to the Executive in matters of “national security” and “foreign affairs,” but that should not be the final word. Only by exploring these self-legitimizing terms that carry so many inherent relationships to history, institutional practice, and the current discourse can a judge both provide notice to the political branches and engage in the kind of dynamic, constructive dialogue that will hone and test the issues confronting the judiciary today. Professor Daniel Williams observed that it seems “as if the ontology of ‘enemy combatants’ was foisted upon us by 9/11.”273 He uses figurative language to describe the way that the discourse obscures the fact that “‘enemy combatant’ is a construct we have injected into our cultural milieu.” 274 This description of the way it seems is actually a description of reality.

#### The aff doesn’t excavate the meaning of terrorism or the idea that the US is a benevolent nation – ensuring that their criticism will fail to get at the root of permanent war

Williams 7 \*Daniel R, Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.

Penn State Law Review, Fall, 112 Penn St. L. Rev. 341

\* \* \* Hamdi forces the reckoning with what it means to be at "war" by raising the specter of "indefinite" detention. 263 The specter of indefinite detention surfaces because the distinguishing feature of our enemy makes indefinite detention potentially necessary. Specifically, within the label of war and the specter of indefinite detention is the slippery idea of [\*415] terrorism. 264 So much ink has been spilled in an effort to define the term, as if it were a lexical exercise as opposed to an investigation into realpolitik, 265 and yet we lose sight of the fact that the essential difficulty here is articulating what is distinctive about terrorism that is not under inclusive but at the same time does not indict our own foreign policy. 266 That task - exempting ourselves from a condemnation we would like to attach to others - ultimately renders "terror" and "terrorism" non-concepts, words that manipulate rather than carry a genuine cargo of meaning calculated to rationally persuade. 267 The prospect of perpetual war, and the concomitant indefinite detention, cannot be disentangled from the conundrum of defining "terrorism." 268 [\*416] All this lurks beneath O'Connor's characterization that this is "an unconventional" war. 269 She says the Court "recognizes ... the national security underpinnings of the "war on terror'" but never elaborates what those underpinnings are. 270 That failure to elaborate serves a function in this narrative, for what allows the decision to hang together, to cohere as a legal document, is the invisible background storyline of American exceptionalism. The glue keeping intact the entire narrative structure is the national mythos that we as a nation could not be other than a benevolent force in the world - this is a definitional matter, and thus immune from any factual critique, of which there are too many to mention - and that Islamic terrorists have arisen virtually out of nowhere to victimize us. 271 Because this storyline is definitional rather than empirical, most Americans find it almost impossible to escape, to critique. 272 Most of the world is outside its grip, and thus most of the world's inhabitants are open to understanding our global predicament of intensified and disbursed violence as a burgeoning "global civil war." 273 This difference in consciousness about our pursuit of empire and the [\*417] resulting blowback arising from it probably explains why most of the world is dubious of our foreign-policy maneuvers and why many regard the U.S. as the most potent threat to world peace. If the real national-security underpinnings to this "war on terror" are linked to a pax Americana pursuit, then the sacrificing of our basic values that undergird our one-time understanding of due process for the sake of this "war" is a sly bait-and-switch, and Legality becomes complicit in it. Of course, none of this can really be played out either in the Hamdi decision or in public discourse generally, because the idea of American exceptionalism - the mythology at the core of Wilsonian idealism, an idealism that is the lifeblood of the neo-conservative foreign policy that we have disastrously pursued since 9/11 274 - has sunk too deep into the American psyche. 275 We can as a nation no more see ourselves as aggressors on the world stage than we could see ourselves as aggressors against the Native Americans during our quest for westward expansion. And so we reflexively understand Guantanamo-style detention as a reaction to the problem of terrorism, even if we object to it on legalistic, humanistic, or other grounds. It strikes us as beyond comprehension to see it as anything but an appendage (misguided or not) to the larger struggle to overcome "terrorism." What we cannot do is consider the converse, see the so-called war on terror as an ingredient, as in the service of, Guantanamo (the resurgence of a form of sovereignty long past but never fully overcome), see the construction of Islamic "terrorism" in the public mind as an ingredient in the development of a detention practice that suits the homogenizing of a global populace aimed at the production of consumers and bare-life laborers, denuded of tradition and culture. In that sense, Hamdi conceals its own perhaps unwitting complicity with a vision of pax Americana-style globalization, a vision so plainly visible that we Americans can hardly see it.

#### Genealogies can be recolonized – there’s nothing liberatory about new histories – they will get re-interpreted and colonized. You have to prove the larger effect of your genealogy – that it has a starting point, that it can influence the public, that it won’t be distorted, or ignored as anti-economical

Brown 96, Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz, (Wendy, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 185, lexis)

It is from his "Two Lectures" on power, 15 and occurs in the context of his discussion of discovering or "disinterring" subju- gated knowledges: . . . is it not perhaps the case that these fragments of genealogies are no sooner brought to light, that the particular elements of the knowledge that one seeks to disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the risk of re-codification, recolonisation? In fact, those unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex them, to take them back within the fold of their own discourse and to invest them with everything this implies in terms of their effects of knowledge and power. 16 Here, Foucault's concern is less with disrupting the conventional modernist equation of power with speech on one side, and oppression with silence on the other, than with the ways in which insurrectionary discourse borne of exclusion and marginalization can be colonized by that which produced it much as counter-cultural fashion is routinely commodified by the corporate textile industry. While "disqualified" discourses are an effect of domination, they nevertheless potentially function as oppositional when they are deployed by those who inhabit them. However, when "annexed" by those "unitary" discourses which they ostensibly oppose, they become a particularly potent source of regulation, carrying as they do intimate and detailed knowledge of their subjects. Thus, Foucault's worry would appear to adhere not simply to the study of but to the overt political mobilization of oppositional discourses.

#### Just because you come up with a new history doesn’t mean your memory can overcome the structures of forgetfulness – genealogies don’t produce coalitions – it produces more comfort in oppressing others

Han 6, Pf of Sociology department at Temple University, (Chong-suk, bad subjects, <http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2006/76/gaysofcolor.html>)

By now, two things are bitterly clear about our “shared” American experiences. One, a shared history of oppression rarely leads to coalition building among those who have been systematically denied their rights. More devastatingly, such shared experiences of oppression rarely lead to sympathy for others who are also marginalized, traumatized, and minimized by the dominant society. Rather, all too miserably, those who should naturally join in fighting discrimination find it more comforting to join their oppressors in oppressing others. As a gay man of color, I see this on a routine basis – whether it be racism in the gay community or homophobia in communities of color. And it pisses me off.

#### And too much history can destroy the present – it’s better to understand the present as a way to understand history

Zizek 5 Slavoj, Why is Wagner Worth Saving?

23. However, the first problem here is that, even if accurate, such insights do not contribute much to a pertinent understanding of the work in question. One often hears that, in order to understand a work of art, one needs to know its historical context. Against this historicist commonplace, one should affirm that too much of a historical context can blur the proper contact with a work of art- in order to properly grasp, say, Parsifal, one should ABSTRACT from such historical trivia, one should DECONTEXTUALIZE the work, tear it out from the context in which it was originally embedded. Even more, it is, rather, the work of art itself which provides a context enabling us to properly understand a given historical situation. If, today, someone were to visit Serbia, the direct contact with raw data there would leave him confused.

#### Archaeological criticisms are bad and fail for the judiciary to create change

**Shaub 11** (Jonathan David Shaub, J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; M.A., English, Belmont University, 2010; B.A., Philosophy and Religious Studies, Vanderbilt University, 2003, now a Bristow Fellow at the Office of the Solicitor General, “A Foucauldian Call for the Archaeological Excavation of Discourse in the Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation,” Spring, 2011 Northwestern University Law Review, 105 Nw. U.L. Rev. 869

Judges should engage in archaeological methodology when deciding fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the applicability of old precedents to this “difficult time.” The archaeology described below is necessary because énoncés are not immediately perceptible but are typically hidden among the phrases and propositions of a discourse. Therefore, the courts rely on these self-legitimizing foundational terms and concepts without actually exploring whether they are, in fact, new emergences within the post-9/11 discursive formation. The plinth, the base supporting a statute or column, must be unearthed and “polished—even fashioned or invented.” 231 One of the principal reasons Foucault advocates this archaeology is his desire to focus on the radical discontinuity of emergences instead of situating them within a larger historical narrative. At the same time, Foucault seeks to eliminate the idea that “historical development . . . is organized like a necessary continuity; that events are linked together, the one engendering the other in an uninterrupted flow that permits decreeing one the ‘cause’ or ‘origin’ of the other.”232 In law, then, Foucault’s insight and proposed methodology are extraordinarily valuable because they force a judge to wrestle with the way that words and concepts shift depending on their discursive relations. Not only is this archaeological excavation of discourse a valuable practice in and of itself, but it also provides the full blueprint of the structure of argumentation so that another judge who disagrees can respond on a more fundamental level. For example, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court relied on the historical ability of police officers to make warrantless arrests of individuals who commit felonies to uphold the constitutionality of an arrest in United States v. Watson.233 In dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out that “felony” as the majority used it included a much wider swath of crimes than it had historically, and he argued that the majority opinion had thus failed to be faithful to historical practice.234 He was asserting that although the syntagm of “felony” remained the same, the énoncé of “felony” constituted something far different in the current discourse than it had historically. Had the majority recognized this discursive point as well, it would have been forced to present an archaeological argument that “felony” as used today should be treated in the same way that “felony” has been treated historically. In the same way, the post-9/11 habeas cases present judges with the opportunity to engage in such an archaeological excavation with the post9/11 énoncés. In so doing, the courts would provide a principled framework, built upon the plinths underlying the discourse, with which others could disagree on the same fundamental level. In the cases outlined above, some courts have approached the historical development since 9/11 as a necessary continuum, each development built upon a prior event and existing within a self-enclosed discourse. Many of the opinions start with 9/11 as both the origin and ultimate cause of each subsequent event. “On September 11, 2001,” the world changed unalterably and nothing can be viewed except in its relation to 9/11. Foucault’s discussion of the place of the French Revolution within the discourse of the Enlightenment could easily be mistaken for one about 9/11: The idea of a single break suddenly, at a given moment, dividing all discursive formations, interrupting them in a single moment and reconstituting them in accordance with the same rules—such an idea cannot be sustained. . . . . . . . [T]he French Revolution . . . does not play the role of an event exterior to discourse, whose divisive effect one is under some kind of obligation to discover in all discourses; it functions as a complex, articulated, describable group of transformations that left a number of positivities intact, fixed for a number of others rules that are still with us, and also established positivities that have recently disappeared or are still disappearing before our eyes.235 The tragedy of 9/11 has created a “sudden break” in all discourses, a fact recognized by many judges in the judicial discourse. However, the event is not “exterior” to the preexisting discourses so that it has had no influence over their underlying meaning. The discursive formation that has resulted presumes that many previously existing legal constructs have been “left intact” without addressing the question of why. As Foucault says of the French Revolution, the proposition that 9/11 occurred and interrupted everything only to put everything back in “accordance with the same rules” cannot be sustained. In ushering in this “difficult time,” 9/11 has also established a new discursive formation, with new rules, new énoncés, and a new référentiel consisting of its own collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces.

However, the plinths of the post-9/11 judicial discourse—such terms as “national security,” “war,” and “enemy combatants”—are being used regularly by judges who either do not see the interrelationships within the discursive formation that have reconstructed their meaning or feel powerless to address them. Instead of acknowledging the radical discontinuity between the historic use of these terms and their use within the post-9/11 discursive formation, or even recognizing the possibility of such a discontinuity, most judges have relied on their unity. Judges can only understand the construction of the definitions and power relationships and determine who has the authority to “speak,” i.e. to draft definitions, by unearthing these énoncés and exploring their relational spaces. Thus, judges must attempt to excavate the plinths of this post-9/11 discursive formation. An understanding of this discursive construction is necessary to form new principles, or plinths, upon which to base a decision about fundamental questions of the separation of powers and international law in the post-9/11 world. Therefore, judges should excavate the discursive formation and then, by means of what Foucault termed “controlled decisions,” address the why of the foundational elements and institutional relationships of the discursive formation. A. Drafting the Definitions by a Series of “Controlled Decisions” Archaeology studies “human history . . . through the excavation of sites and the analysis of artifacts and other physical remains”236 and constructs a picture of past culture from these basic remnants. Foucault chose this analogy to describe his discursive methodology and defined his version of archaeology: What, in short, we wish to do is to dispense with ‘things’. To ‘depresentify’ them. . . . To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.237 Thus, to escape the inertia of the post-9/11 discursive formation, the judiciary must define its role and the constitutional principles that define it without reference to the “foundation,” i.e. self-legitimizing énoncés such as “war” and “foreign relations.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor cited Youngstown and Egan for the proposition that the Judicial Branch has historically deferred to the Executive in matters of national security and foreign relations,238 but she did not relate these assertions to the “conditions of their historical appearance” as Foucauldian archaeology would require.

### 1NC Exceptionalism

#### Hegemony solves great power war

Khalilzad 11 – Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,” online: <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.¶ The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

#### Solves mass violence – proximate cause of peace and improves quality of life

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. ¶ As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶ To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Heg is ethical and not utopian

Reus-Smit, 4 **–** (Christian IR @ Australian Nat’l, American Power and World Order p. 109-115)

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is equally unsatisfying. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is utterly undiscriminating. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a deeply impoverished ethical posture, as it raises the critique of power above all other human values. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

#### Our impact isn’t based on myopic security discourse – multiple independent fields support – prefer our impact because it is interdisciplinary

Wohlforth 9 – William, professor of government at Dartmouth College, “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preferencee for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### The plan’s restrictions inhibit decisive indefinite detention action—that’s key to effective ops

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Reading the tea leaves of judicial dicta may be fraught with difficulty, but one certainly discerns from these pragmatic guidelines a view that the Executive should be accorded reasonable deference in matters of preventive detention. This deference is strongest during the early phases of detention, when facts are unclear, when the risks of release are acute, and the dangers of substituting a judicial judgment for that of the military or the Commander-in-Chief is greatest. If the Government learns that al-Qaeda operatives have invaded the U.S. bent on detonating explosives near chemical-laden rail cars, the overwhelming national effort must be directed toward destroying or detaining those forces intent on harming the country. This is not the time for Miranda and presentment but for concerted, decisive action bounded by the law of war. Every instrument of national power must be brought to bear, both military and civilian. If it makes the most sense for the FBI to detain someone, they should do so. If the military has the most information and can most quickly and effectively detain and interrogate, then consistent with military regulations, they should do so.¶ The process of understanding the depth and breadth of the danger, connecting the web of those involved, determining the possibility of future attacks takes time. It remains essential to afford the Commander-in-Chief adequate time and decision space to maximize the opportunity to defeat the threat and prevent future attacks.That is why the NDAA imposes no temporal limits, why it avoids geographic restrictions and why it grants no special protections to citizens who take up arms with the enemy. As Hamdan and Boumerdiene make clear, there are limits to the Court's deference. The more time that passes, the greater the consequences of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and the greater the risk of not affording someone a reasonable opportunity to challenge the basis for their detention. If there is consensus on the matter of process in preventive detention, it appears to mean reasonable deference followed by increased scrutiny with the passage of time. It means judicial review bounded by pragmatism, and it means balancing very real security concerns against the need to protect individuals from arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

#### The aff results in catastrophic terrorism---releases terrorists and kills intel gathering

Jack Goldsmith 9, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, 2/4/09, “Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/2/09%20detention%20goldsmith/0209\_detention\_goldsmith.pdf

These three concerns challenge the detention paradigm. They do nothing to eliminate the need for detention to prevent detainees returning to the battlefield. But many believe that we can meet this need by giving trials to everyone we want to detain and then incarcerating them under a theory of conviction rather than of military detention. I disagree. For many reasons, it is too risky for the U.S. government to deny itself the traditional military detention power altogether, and to commit itself instead to try or release every suspected terrorist. ¶ For one thing, military detention will be necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. For another, we likely cannot secure convictions of all of the dangerous terrorists at Guantánamo, much less all future dangerous terrorists, who legitimately qualify for non-criminal military detention. The evidentiary and procedural standards of trials, civilian and military alike, are much higher than the analogous standards for detention. With some terrorists too menacing to set free, the standards will prove difficult to satisfy. Key evidence in a given case may come from overseas and verifying it, understanding its provenance, or establishing its chain of custody in the manners required by criminal trials may be difficult. This problem is exacerbated when evidence was gathered on a battlefield or during an armed skirmish. The problem only grows when the evidence is old. And perhaps most importantly, the use of such evidence in a criminal process may compromise intelligence sources and methods, requiring the disclosure of the identities of confidential sources or the nature of intelligence-gathering techniques, such as a sophisticated electronic interception capability. ¶ Opponents of non-criminal detention observe that despite these considerations, the government has successfully prosecuted some Al Qaeda terrorists—in particular, Zacharias Moussaoui and Jose Padilla. This is true, but it does not follow that prosecutions are achievable in every case in which disabling a terrorist suspect represents a surpassing government interest. Moreover, the Moussaoui and Padilla prosecutions highlight an under-appreciated cost of trials, at least in civilian courts. The Moussaoui and Padilla trials were messy affairs that stretched, and some observers believe broke, our ordinary criminal trial conceptions of conspiracy law and the rights of the accused, among other things. The Moussaoui trial, for example, watered down the important constitutional right of the defendant to confront witnesses against him in court, and the Padilla trial rested on an unprecedentedly broad conception of conspiracy.15 An important but under-appreciated cost of using trials in all cases is that these prosecutions will invariably bend the law in ways unfavorable to civil liberties and due process, and these changes, in turn, will invariably spill over into non-terrorist prosecutions and thus skew the larger criminal justice process.16¶ A final problem with using any trial system, civilian or military, as the sole lawful basis for terrorist detention is that the trials can result in short sentences (as the first military commission trial did) or even acquittal of a dangerous terrorist.17 In criminal trials, guilty defendants often go free because of legal technicalities, government inability to introduce probative evidence, and other factors beyond the defendant's innocence. These factors are all exacerbated in terrorist trials by the difficulties of getting information from the place of capture, by classified information restrictions, and by stale or tainted evidence. One way to get around this problem is to assert the authority, as the Bush administration did, to use non-criminal detention for persons acquitted or given sentences too short to neutralize the danger they pose. But such an authority would undermine the whole purpose of trials and would render them a sham. As a result, putting a suspect on trial can make it hard to detain terrorists the government deems dangerous. For example, the government would have had little trouble defending the indefinite detention of Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden's driver, under a military detention rationale. Having put him on trial before a military commission, however, it was stuck with the light sentence that Hamdan is completing at home in Yemen.¶ As a result of these considerations, insistence on the exclusive use of criminal trials and the elimination of non-criminal detention would significantly raise the chances of releasing dangerous terrorists who would return to kill Americans or others. Since noncriminal military detention is clearly a legally available option—at least if it is expressly authorized by Congress and contains adequate procedural guarantees—this risk should be unacceptable. In past military conflicts, the release of an enemy soldier posed risks. But they were not dramatic risks, for there was only so much damage a lone actor or small group of individuals could do.18 Today, however, that lone actor can cause far more destruction and mayhem because technological advances are creating ever-smaller and ever-deadlier weapons. It would be astounding if the American system, before the advent of modern terrorism, struck the balance between security and liberty in a manner that precisely reflected the new threats posed by asymmetric warfare. We face threats from individuals today that are of a different magnitude than threats by individuals in the past; having government authorities that reflect that change makes sense.

**Terrorism causes extinction---hard-line responses are key**

Nathan Myhrvold 13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund ¶ themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be ¶ lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, ¶ or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to ¶ duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of technology trends ¶ means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly ¶ lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a ¶ small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will ¶ require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has ¶ received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented.¶ History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

## 2NC

No cards

## 1NR

### CASE

#### A few conceded arguments about the state of exception -

#### 1. Contestation -

#### Voting neg means that people are already smart enough to not need your aff. Reception-theory proves representations don’t “create reality”. Audiences are smart enough to reach their own conclusions.

Kraus ’89 et al – Sidney Kraus is a professor in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University and Dennis Giles is also in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep), pp. 522-3 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791366

#### Edelman assumes (like the early Frankfurt School) that viewers/auditors of the spectacle (here, the political spectacle) have only two choices they can accept the terms (rules) of the game or reject them. There is no room for a negotiated reading of political discourse or the appropriation of political "problems" by individuals to serve their interests-their legitimate wellbeing as they define it. In this theory, spectators/participants are presented with a crude dualism: accept it all, reject it all. Ignored in the discussion a re the so-called" cultural" studies published during the past decade [e.g., Hall (1980), Morely (1980, 1981), Radway (1984, 1986), Fiske (1986), Giles (1986); cf. two recent studies not available to Edelman: Steiner( 1988), and Giles (1989)],which have extended" reception theory" [e.g., Iser (1978), Suleiman and Crosma (1980), Jauss (1982) with an introduction by Paul de Man)]. This major theoretical perspective of culture, literary, film and television studies in the United States and Britain rejects the notion of a universally passive appropriation of a text on its own terms (political or otherwise) to explore the actual pragmatics of the act of viewing/reading a "spectacle." These studies present alternatives to the either/or stance of Edelman. While assuming that any practice of discourse constructs its own illusionary" world"( in Nelson's terms) and is potentially mystifying, these critics stress the ability and freedom of viewers/auditors and spectators/participants to construct their "own" meanings( like Edelman's). This developing body of theory and analysis posits and describes the ability of viewers of the "spectacle" to negotiate the meaning of texts-to read and realize (Iser's term) meanings which often diverge from the "dominant" readings preferred by the political and media institutions.

#### Extend the Kretsedemas evidence –

as illustrated by the numerous immigrant rights mobilizations that have taken shape on the global stage (as well as the massive groundswell of support for the U.S. immigrant protests of 2006 and the resistance to “illegal immigrant” laws among many U.S. towns, cities, and statesf

#### The aff is CONTEXT DEFICIENT – ignoring that the post-Iraq era evoked the largest global protest to the state of exception in the world.

Maani 12 TruthDig, 5-11, http://www.truthdig.com/arts\_culture/item/zombie\_politics\_dangerous\_authoritarianism\_or\_shrinking\_democracy\_-\_part\_ii/P100/

I am not opposed to “action,” nor am I attempting to “diffuse” anything. I am simply pointing out that, contrary to your claims, the “people” as a whole have not acquiesced to most of the items you list. Indeed, you may remember that the run-up to the invasion of Iraq - even before it began - invoked the largest global protest in the history of the world: over 30 million people in 60 cities in 20 countries - including millions in the U.S. As for your other items: -“The election fraud of 2000 with the illegal appointment of Bush II, the war criminal, to office by our SCOTUS.” There was plenty of popular outrage over this - including in some of the “corporate-controlled media” you speak of. “Expanded militarization of America.” In this case, it is actually the media - including some MSM - who are LEADING the outrage. -“Domestic survelliance of the populace.” And again, not only popular outrage, but much of the MSM took this on in a major way. -“The assassination of American citizens abroad accused of being ‘terrorists’ or ‘terrorists sympathizers.’ This, too, is being reported - and questioned - even in the MSM, though I would agree there seems to be too little outrage on the part of the general populace. -“The enactment of the NDAA which empowers the our POTUS with life or death power over any citizen without due process of law.” Although I am as mortally opposed to the NDAA as anyone, it really doesn’t change anything that was in the AUMF of 2001, or the prior NDAAs. Still, you are right in this case that there has been precious little outrage re this. -The enactment of the US Patriot Act that effectively shredded the US Constitution.” Actually, while the Patriot Act (and Patriot Act II) did indeed do damage to the Constitution, I would argue that the Military Commissions Act did far more, as it all but eviscerated both habeas corpus and posse comitatus, two of the most sacred and critical provisions. But there was, in fact, quite some backlash over the original Patriot Act. In most of these cases, there was in fact been outrage, including in some, if not much, of the MSM (to say nothing of the AM). And the rise of the TP and OWS (and particularly the national, even global, conversation about income inequality that OWS has generated (among other things)) are further proof that there is active - and effective, particularly vis-a-vis the “public eye” (media) - protest against some or many of the things that are occurring. When I talk of “acquiescence,” I am talking about WHOLESALE acquiescence; i.e., at very least a majority of the populace simply (as elisalouisa and SHE suggest) “surrendering” or “submitting” to a fascist State. However, although both of us may be frustrated by the fact that MORE people are not actively involved in protest, etc. - though, to be fair, even many of those who are not actively involved nevertheless support those who are, whether on the left or the right - I would still suggest that this country is nowhere NEAR becoming a fascist state, despite your punch-list items, and despite some of the seeming attempts by our plutocracy to fashion itself as a proto-fascist or fascist State. Again, this is by no means a call to simply sit on our hands and do nothing. And despite your frustration-derived claims about me, I have and will continue to quite actively protest both your punch-list items and many other things, and encourage others to do the same. However, they should do it because the things we are discussing are wrong and dangerous - NOT because the “sum” of those things somehow “add up” to fascism. They do not. Peace.

#### YOU TURN DISCOURSE INTO A NEW STRUCTURING REALITY, displacing human agency

Ebert 95, Pf Critical and Cultural Theory, University at Albany,

(Teresa, (Untimely) Critiques for a Red Feminism, Post-Ality, Marxism and Postmodernism, edited by Mas'ud Zavarzadeh)

Building on Foucault's theory of a localised, diffuse, a-systematic power, Butler rewrites constructionism, specifically the construction of gender/sexed bodies, as indeterminate. In short, she rewrites it in terms of invention — what she calls "performativity" or "citationality." In Bodies that Matter, Butler specifically contests, what she calls, "radical linguistic constructivism" which "is understood to be generative and deterministic" and forms a "linguistic monism, whereby everything "is only and always language" (6). According to Butler, "what ensues," from this position, "is an exasperated debate that many of us are tired of hearing" (6): a debate over determinism and agency, over essentialism and constructivism. She decries the way structuralist and radical linguistic theories **reduce "constructivism" "to determinism** and impl(y) the evacuation or **displacement of human agency**" (9). This is an especially important issue in Butler's work. She is committed to the preservation of "agency"; in fact, it is the priority of her post-al politics. But she rejects both the "voluntarist subject of humanism" and the "grammatical" subject of structuralist and classical post-structuralist theories. She thus dismisses those who "construe" construction "along structuralist lines," because they "claim that there are structures that construct the subject, impersonal forces, such as Culture or Discourse or Power, where these terms occupy the grammatical site of the subject" (9).

#### Neal proves our arguments

**critical purchase on the problem of the exception does call for a slant in emphasis towards archaeology**

#### You are not your second neal card – nothing about the aff applies their archaelogocal criticism to indefinite detention, in fact, your second Neal card doesn’t even mention the phrase indefinite detention –

#### WHAT ABOUT THE AFF IS A SPECIFIC RESPONSE? did you hear anything in the 1ac about the AUMF, 9/11, GUANTANAMO, the NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, the AL MAQELEH DECISION, ETC?

#### STATE OF EXCEPTION

#### You depictions of sovereign power are too absolute, theoretical and ahistorical. Extend SAAS – Agamben scholars overlook the rhetorical character of exceptions. State of exceptions can be fought both within the government and through public contestation. Their belief that states of exception are ahistorical prevents their alt from ever solving.

#### Extend Negri and Casarino -

#### B. We have a tradeoff DA: Their link and impacts arguments create a type of paranoia that prevents us from seeing liberalism at its worst.

#### The concept of the human is not what sustains the war on terror –

GREGG 4, Pf Cultural Studies @ University of Queensland,

(Melissa, Where is the law in ‘unlawful combatant’?, paper presented at ‘The Italian Effect’ Conference, University of Sydney, September, http://www.cccs.uq.edu.au/resources/unlawful.doc)

The suggestion I want to make is that with the rarely acknowledged slide into Holy War, the deliberate confusion between religion, economy and the law perpetuated by the neo-conservatives dissipates the hope Agamben places in bare life as some redeeming final possibility. In Agamben’s model, the idea of human rights ‘proves to be **untenable’** at that moment when a person has ‘lost every quality and every specific relation except for the pure fact of being human’ (2000: 19-20).   While a number of writers have shown the effectiveness of this model for explaining the refugee situation,8 it is of limited use in the War on Terror for one important reason. **In the context of religious fundamentalism,** the ‘pure fact of **being human’ can no longer be counted on**. Enemies are not considered human but empty vessels for evil, irredeemably under the sway of satanic forces. This is how (in Australia) the calls for the death penalty can slowly creep back: a human would be open to rehabilitation, but an animal is innately and irrevocably condemned to base instincts. In the current conjuncture, no other definition of human is permissible except the (neo)liberal Christian subject.9 In the case of Guantanamo Bay, its central role in the War on Terror has been to **articulate the religious, economic and legal interests** of neo-conservatives to the point where the **very juridical and political freedoms once enshrined in the State are now irrelevant.** The Manichean frame for this battle (‘you are either with us or against us’) **absolves the need** to consider the circumstances of each prisoner’s case or the rehabilitation that a more confident society could afford.

#### I THINK HE HAS CONCEDED A BUNCH OF META LEVEL ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY ARCHAEOLOGY FAILS AS A METHOD – if we win any of these you should vote negative because it means the affirmative has failed to create the state of exception, which the fist part of this speech proves they already have a bad understanding of

#### Extend Dean - the aff is not applicable to anything – the Dean evidence says they only come up with “methodological codification” – it’s a summary effect that revisits and reflects

#### archaeological systems are locked in history but never offer solutions to create change

**Dean, 94 –** (Mitchell, “Critical and effective histories,” <http://www.revalvaatio.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/dean-critical_and_effective_histories_foucaults_methods_and_historical_sociology.pdf>)

This philosophical historian’s (or historical philosopher’s) studies, first¶ termed ‘archaeologies’ and later ‘genealogies’, as well as his writings on the¶ use and practice of history, particularly¶ The Archaeology of Knowledge¶ (1972)¶ and the essay on Nietzsche (1977b), offer a point of reflection on our changing¶ historical sense. They suggest a form of critical historical study that leaves¶ behind the methods and objectives of conventional, empiricist historiography¶ without recourse to sterile theoretical schemas. They raise again the problem¶ of the uses and pertinence of historical study, and of the practice of history¶ that is linked but not subservient to present theoretical, political, and ethical¶ issues.¶ It is a quite senseless task to be faithful to a form of thought which itself¶ seems designed to put the most loyal follower off track. This is a thought¶ that, despite an internal consistency, never felt the need to be faithful to itself.¶ It does not lend itself to a systematic theoretical elaboration. Rather, ‘theory’¶ is here embedded within substantive analyses. Its statement and restatement¶ takes less the form of a progress toward increasing clarity than a vertiginous¶ and prolix recreation, a continual renewal of itself, one which refuses to¶ stand still, to be the same. As a consequence, I feel compelled to take an¶ instrumental attitude toward Foucault’s work and to admit that what follo¶ is a use of his work for particular objectives concerning the historical-¶ sociological study sketched above. It is my general hypothesis that Foucault’s¶ contribution to this historical sociology can be best understood as a delineation¶ of a form of history which is both¶ critical¶ and¶ effective¶ and which displaces¶ the invasion of historical analysis by what I shall call¶ the philosophy of history¶ .¶ These are terms which must be approached with care. They are the nub of¶ the following discussion.¶ Despite a concern with discourses as rule-governed systems for the¶ production of thought, Foucault never sought to apply a particular system or¶ to allow his own heuristics to congeal into a fixed, formal method.

#### Schaub is in the context of a BETTER WAY TO DO ARCHAEOLOGY – Al maqeleh

#### Williams – state of exception is TOO NORMALIZED

#### Neal is talking about Geneaologies -

#### Genealogies can be recolonized – there’s nothing liberatory about new histories – they will get re-interpreted and colonized. You have to prove the larger effect of your genealogy – that it has a starting point, that it can influence the public, that it won’t be distorted, or ignored as anti-economical

Brown 96, Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz, (Wendy, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 185, lexis)

It is from his "Two Lectures" on power, 15 and occurs in the context of his discussion of discovering or "disinterring" subju- gated knowledges: . . . is it not perhaps the case that these fragments of genealogies are no sooner brought to light, that the particular elements of the knowledge that one seeks to disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the risk of re-codification, recolonisation? In fact, those unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex them, to take them back within the fold of their own discourse and to invest them with everything this implies in terms of their effects of knowledge and power. 16 Here, Foucault's concern is less with disrupting the conventional modernist equation of power with speech on one side, and oppression with silence on the other, than with the ways in which insurrectionary discourse borne of exclusion and marginalization can be colonized by that which produced it much as counter-cultural fashion is routinely commodified by the corporate textile industry. While "disqualified" discourses are an effect of domination, they nevertheless potentially function as oppositional when they are deployed by those who inhabit them. However, when "annexed" by those "unitary" discourses which they ostensibly oppose, they become a particularly potent source of regulation, carrying as they do intimate and detailed knowledge of their subjects. Thus, Foucault's worry would appear to adhere not simply to the study of but to the overt political mobilization of oppositional discourses.

#### Just because you come up with a new history doesn’t mean your memory can overcome the structures of forgetfulness – genealogies don’t produce coalitions – it produces more comfort in oppressing others

Han 6, Pf of Sociology department at Temple University, (Chong-suk, bad subjects, <http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2006/76/gaysofcolor.html>)

By now, two things are bitterly clear about our “shared” American experiences. One, a shared history of oppression rarely leads to coalition building among those who have been systematically denied their rights. More devastatingly, such shared experiences of oppression rarely lead to sympathy for others who are also marginalized, traumatized, and minimized by the dominant society. Rather, all too miserably, those who should naturally join in fighting discrimination find it more comforting to join their oppressors in oppressing others. As a gay man of color, I see this on a routine basis – whether it be racism in the gay community or homophobia in communities of color. And it pisses me off.

#### And too much history can destroy the present – it’s better to understand the present as a way to understand history

Zizek 5 Slavoj, Why is Wagner Worth Saving?

23. However, the first problem here is that, even if accurate, such insights do not contribute much to a pertinent understanding of the work in question. One often hears that, in order to understand a work of art, one needs to know its historical context. Against this historicist commonplace, one should affirm that too much of a historical context can blur the proper contact with a work of art- in order to properly grasp, say, Parsifal, one should ABSTRACT from such historical trivia, one should DECONTEXTUALIZE the work, tear it out from the context in which it was originally embedded. Even more, it is, rather, the work of art itself which provides a context enabling us to properly understand a given historical situation. If, today, someone were to visit Serbia, the direct contact with raw data there would leave him confused.

### HEG

#### – hegemony prevents conflicts that create states of exception that are WORSE

#### a utilitarian framework prevents moral tunnel vision Issac, 02—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### dropped a slew of evidence – Khalizad and Barnett cites studies that prove any alternative is worse

### 2NC A2 Collapse Now/Unsustain

#### US expansion of globalization and hegemony over the last 20 years has entrenched American dominance

Beckley 11 Michael Beckley, Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, September 2011, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” http://michaelbeckleydotcom.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/beckley\_writing-sample6.pdf

Is unipolarity sustainable? The dominant perspective among international relations scholars is that the U.S. is in decline relative to China, and that much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the U.S. bears to sustain globalization. This study refutes this conventional wisdom with theoretical and empirical analyses. In Chapter 1 I develop an alternative theory that explains why globalization and hegemony reinforce unipolarity. In Chapter 2, I conduct a first-­‐cut test of my theory by comparing the U.S. and China across a large set of power indicators over the last twenty years. During this time period, globalization and U.S. hegemony expanded significantly, yet I find that the U.S. is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. In Chapter 3, I conduct time-­‐series and regression analyses to estimate the costs and benefits of key aspects of American hegemony and find that U.S. hegemony is, on balance, profitable. In Chapter 4 (not included in this writing sample) I use regression analyses and case studies to investigate the effects of globalization on U.S. and Chinese high-­‐ technology industries. I find that American firms increasingly conduct activities in which profits and proprietary knowledge are highest (R&D, branding, marketing) while Chinese firms remain stuck in low-­‐value manufacturing activities. Taken together, these results suggest that American dominance is not a temporary aberration, but rather a deeply embedded condition with the potential to persist well into this century.

#### This doesn’t take out our impact --- transition to multipolarity might be inev---it’s about the US maintaining its absolute military power to smooth the transition

Walton 7 Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in Reading, England, 07 [Dale C, “geopolitics and the great powers in the twenty-first century”, http://books.google.com/books?id=AQLTD1R-47AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Although international political conditions will differ enormously in the coming decades from those of the middle 1940’s, it would be grossly irresponsible for the United States to shrug off its burdens of great power status

and return to the slumber that it once enjoyed. Almost certainly, if the United States had refused to take an active role in European politics in the middle of the twentieth century, a world would have emerged in which American values would not have flourished and even their survival on the North American continent would have been profoundly threatened. America’s refusal to play a substantial role in the great power struggles of this century would have similarly deleterious effects. Importantly, if the United States withdraws to its hemisphere a third world war is far more likely. In a meta region full of young rising powers the presence of a strategically mature superpower can be expected to have a stabilizing effect; the enormous military resources possessed by America compels would be aggressors to consider carefully before launching a strategic adventure. Even more chillingly, as noted above, it is possible that the multipolar system could become sufficiently unbalanced that it would collapse, with a power such as China building a coalition that would allow it ultimately to emerge as the master of eastern Eurasia and the greatest power in the world. nited States is the “court of last resort” protecting against such an eventuality. The latter possibility does not contradict the above argument that us unipolarity is unsustainable - as an extra Eurasian power lacking the ruthlessness to destroy potential great power competitors preventatively, Washington simply cannot sustain unipolarity indefinitely. Nonetheless, while the emerging multipolar system appears robust it should receive “care and feeding” – otherwise it is vulnerable to grossly unbalanced events such as the creation of a very aggressive coalition dedicated to achieving Eurasian hegemony and willing if necessary to fight a third world war t o achieve it. Most likely such a coalition would not be able to simply bully its way to hegemony; it probably would have to fight, the results being a war enormously costly in blood, perhaps even one that would dwarf World War II in its price. If the aggressive coalition won, in turn, the multipolar system would be destroyed and the United States would face a competitor far more powerful than itself , and in all likelihood a world in which democracy and personal liberty would be in eclipse. In any case it is a geopolitical imperative for the United States that no power or coalition attains hegemony in Eastern Eurasia, much less that an explicitly hostile state or coalition succeeds in doing so. If the United States is to guard its national interests in this century, it is vital that it ensures the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity occurs in as gentle a manner as possible. In this capacity, it is important to understand that the United States is in long term relative decline, but, at the same time to acknowledge that it has very great military, financial and diplomatic resources at its disposal. If Washington deploys these resources wisely it can maximize its security over the long term and minimize the probability of a great power war.

#### Heg sustainable—system maker-privilege taker status means we can control assets and conditions and means conditions that took down past hegemons don’t apply to the US

-system making means benefits outweigh the costs—can control access to US market, tech, foreign aid, and support to shape power structures

-military spending only 4% which is sustainable

-hegemon status ensures investors into the economy and control of the market—makes it sustainable

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Michael, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure*” International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41–78 //mtc

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-taker”—it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefits.36 The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefits outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is “structural power.”37 It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.”38 Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,” pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.39 It also allows the United States to run a protection racket, garnering influence through the provision of security. As Joseph Nye explains, “Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds.”40 To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”43 The dollar’s global role may handicap American exports, but it also comes with perks including seigniorage,44 reduced exchange rate risks for U.S. firms involved in international commerce, competitive advantages for American banks in dollarized financial markets, and the ability to delay and defect current account adjustments onto other countries.45 More important, foreign governments that hold dollar reserves depend on U.S. prosperity for their continued economic growth and are thus “entrapped,” unable to disentangle their interests from those of the United States.46 Rather than seeking to undermine the American economy, they invest in its continued expansion.47 Finally, given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United States can distort international markets in its favor.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously. According to the alternative perspective, however, American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. firms.49 U.S. trade officials, “acting as self-appointed enforcers of the free trade regime, asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair traders.”50 Globalization, therefore, may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly throughout the international system, but a political process shaped by the United States in ways that serve its interests.

### A2: Counterbalancing

#### No internal link to an impact – Roberts says Russia and China are exercising and

#### US primacy ensures negative balancing over positive balancing which is stabilizing\*\*

He, Professor PolSci Utah State, ’12 (Kai, May, “Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War” Security Studies, Vol 21 Issue 2, p 154-191, T&F Online)

The lack of balancing behavior by major powers after the Cold War has become a highly debated research puzzle for ir scholars. Through introducing a new conceptual framework for balancing, I suggest that states are more likely to choose negative balancing strategies to undermine their adversaries’ power and influence when they do not face imminent threats. Since the hegemon provides the public good of security in the international system under unipolarity, the decrease in threat severity in the international system precludes positive balancing, alliance formation, and military buildup after the Cold War. This does not mean, however, that states forgo balancing behavior per se. Instead, states engage in negative balancing to undermine each other's power under anarchy. Employing the negative balancing model, I examine how threat perceptions have shaped China's negative balancing against the United States through multilateralism and us negative balancing against Russia through nato expansion. The threat-perception negative balancing model provides a roadmap for a state's balancing strategies. The model does not make deterministic predictions, but it provides a probabilistic model to examine states’ balancing behaviors. Negative balancing is by no means a new strategy for states to pursue security under anarchy. However, it is less-theorized or even ignored by traditional balancing of power scholars who mainly focus on alliance formation and military buildup in international relations. The negative balancing model thereby highlights the undermining and constraining logic of state behavior for changing the relative power of states versus their rivals in a realist world. The negative balancing model also offers a new perspective to understand traditional alliance formation. In examining the bipolar system in the Cold War, Waltz encounters an interesting puzzle in that the two superpowers are willing to form alliances with weak states that are ignorable according to his neorealist theory. 101 The negative balancing model suggests that the real reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to actively engage small, ignorable states during the Cold War was not for pooling resources as the conventional wisdom of alliance politics suggests, but to prevent these small countries from falling under the influence of the other side. 102 In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a negative balancing competition through undermining each others’ power and influence in the periphery. Still, it is worth noting that under the high-threat perceptions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, positive balancing—for example, the strategic competition between nato and the Warsaw Pact—was the major game in town. Negative balancing may explain why nato and the Warsaw Pact expanded to small countries, but it cannot explain why nato and the Warsaw Pact emerged and competed in the first place. It also suggests that negative balancing and positive balancing may coexist as strategies in pursuing security under anarchy. The dependent variable in this analysis is state behavior (different balancing strategies), not a structural situation describing the outcomes of states’ interactions (war/peace) nor a system with a particular distribution of power (balanced/imbalanced). The major purpose of this paper is to identify more balancing behaviors in a unipolar system, which is proclaimed a “world out of balance” by many scholars. Therefore, the analysis here identifies balancing behaviors in a “hard case” for realists, namely a unipolar system, when it would seem that balancing is not feasible, nor expected. Whether and when other states’ balancing behavior can realize a balance in the system or end the unipolar system are two questions beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the model of negative balancing behavior provides some implications for the international system. First, negative balancing strategies, especially the nonmilitary ones, are normally less violent and destructive to the international system. When two states engage in negative balancing toward each other, they compete in an indirect and less provocative way. Although these states still face a security dilemma because of concerns over the change in relative power, the intensity of the security dilemma will be less than the competition driven by positive balancing strategies. 103 Second, the externality of negative balancing strategies may contribute to regional stability. One negative balancing strategy uses institutions to constrain a rival's behavior. In setting up these institutions, the two states in competition need to please other regional powers in order to maximize influence (an ideational form of power) and minimize a rival's influence. The negative balancing strategies conducted by two states lead to an unintended consequence in which both states try to provide public goods to the region. Unlike in a positive balancing competition, other regional powers do not need to choose sides in the negative balancing competition between two great powers since negative balancing is indirect and less provocative in nature. Other regional powers may play off both sides to maximize their leverage through multilateral institutions. Other regional powers may therefore enjoy unintended peace, which is the positive externality of negative balancing conducted by two rivals in the region. For example, the strategic competition of the United States and China for influence in Asia through numerous institutions, such as apec and arf, does not jeopardize regional security. Regional powers, such as the asean states, South Korea, and Japan, can play both sides between China and the United States and increase their political leverage in regional affairs. 104

### A2: Offshore Balancing

#### Obama not transition to offshore balancing now – still foreign intervention

Walt, Professor IR Harvard, 12-1-’11 (Stephen, “A bandwagon for offshore balancing?” Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a\_bandwagon\_for\_offshore\_balancing)

Beinart is a smart and independent thinker, and he deserves credit for recognizing where things are now headed and for calling his readers' attention to it. But he doesn't fully grasp some of the essential features of offshore balancing. His (and Obama's) version of this strategy remains highly interventionist; the only difference is that Washington now uses drones, cruise missiles, and special forces instead of large land armies. But we are still violating other states' sovereignty and killing terrorists and civilians in several different places, including some areas that are hardly vital interests. As we are witnessing in Pakistan, this approach is inflaming anti-Americanism, radicalizing the Pakistani diaspora, jeopardizing the overdue effort to leave Afghanistan, and quite possibly making the terrorism problem worse over time. And Obama and Beinart's version of the strategy still assumes that it is America's responsibility to solve security problems in places like Yemen or Central Asia, instead of relying primarily on others to do it.