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# 1

**Our interpretation is that the aff must defend an increase in statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President.**

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**(2) discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: university students already have preconceived and ideological notions about how the world operates---government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes, however those outcomes may be defined---and, it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making**

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability topredict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example,simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis \*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their *own* government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while *bringing theory into the realm of practice*.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research *‘‘*their’’government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.1

**(3) switch side debate---effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation---this activation of agency is vital to preventing mass violence and genocide**

**Robert-Miller, 3 –** Patricia Roberts-Miller 3 is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause.Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional,**fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.** Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.** Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

# 2

**The aff is not a statutory restriction on the executives power**

**Fisher, 97 –** (Louis, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, “Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse,” U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107, Lexis)

A legal analysis by Walter Dellinger, at that time Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, draws a bold definition of presidential war power but appears to concede that if Congress gets its act together to enact a statutory restriction, the legislative limit controls the President: "By establishing and funding a military force capable of being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitutional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Congress left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives." n131

#### War powers authority means the warrant to exercise powers, not simply the ability to do so.

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Adam, "The Politics Economics Make." March 22, 2009, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2009/Colgate\_Zimmerman.pdf

**Skowronek distinguishes between presidential power and authority. Power is the formal and informal resources of the presidency. Authority is the warrant to exercise the powers of the presidency**. Skowronek asserts that presidential authority is a function of a recurrent pattern that he refers to as political time. Political time is the “historical medium through which authority structures have recurred,” whereas secular time is “the medium through which power structures have evolved.”1 Political time describes the ability of the president to exercise authority over the formal powers of the office, whereas secular time is the emergent pattern that describes how those formal powers have developed and evolved. **Skowronek employs these conceptions of secular and political** **time to understand how “contingent structures of authority have affected the reorganization of presidential power, and how changes in the organization of the presidential power have affected the political range of different claims to authority**.”2 In short, Skowronek attempts to employ these two patterns – secular and political – to describe the president’s ability to exercise authority over the formal powers of the office changed. **Skowronek concludes that as the formal powers of the presidency expands; the** **ability of the president to exercise those powers has narrowed**.

**) topic discussions are good---discussions of the topic create an actively engage citizenry that can check the executive---these decisions affect our every day lives**

**Young, 13 –** (9/4, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” <http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13>)

Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

**The impact is uncheck tyranny and militarism**

**Schnieir, 5 –** (Bruce, “Schneier on Security,” <https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/12/the_security_th_1.html>)

T his past Thursday, the New York Times exposed the most significant violation of federal surveillance law in the post-Watergate era. President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to engage in domestic spying, wiretapping thousands of Americans and bypassing the legal procedures regulating this activity. This isn't about the spying, although that's a major issue in itself. This is about the Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search. This is about circumventing a teeny tiny check by the judicial branch, placed there by the legislative branch, placed there 27 years ago -- on the last occasion that the executive branch abused its power so broadly. In defending this secret spying on Americans, Bush said that he relied on his constitutional powers (Article 2) and the joint resolution passed by Congress after 9/11 that led to the war in Iraq. This rationale was spelled out in a memo written by John Yoo, a White House attorney, less than two weeks after the attacks of 9/11. It's a dense read and a terrifying piece of legal contortionism, but it basically says that the president has unlimited powers to fight terrorism. He can spy on anyone, arrest anyone, and kidnap anyone and ship him to another country ... merely on the suspicion that he might be a terrorist. And according to the memo, this power lasts until there is no more terrorism in the world. Yoo starts by arguing that the Constitution gives the president total power during wartime. He also notes that Congress has recently been quiescent when the president takes some military action on his own, citing President Clinton's 1998 strike against Sudan and Afghanistan. Yoo then says: "The terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001, were surely far graver a threat to the national security of the United States than the 1998 attacks. ... The President's power to respond militarily to the later attacks must be correspondingly broader." This is novel reasoning. It's as if the police would have greater powers when investigating a murder than a burglary. More to the point, the congressional resolution of Sept. 14, 2001, specifically refused the White House's initial attempt to seek authority to preempt any future acts of terrorism, and narrowly gave Bush permission to go after those responsible for the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. Yoo's memo ignored this. Written 11 days after Congress refused to grant the president wide-ranging powers, it admitted that "the Joint Resolution is somewhat narrower than the President's constitutional authority," but argued "the President's broad constitutional power to use military force ... would allow the President to ... [take] whatever actions he deems appropriate ... to pre-empt or respond to terrorist threats from new quarters." Even if Congress specifically says no. The result is that the president's wartime powers, with its armies, battles, victories, and congressional declarations, now extend to the rhetorical "War on Terror": a war with no fronts, no boundaries, no opposing army, and -- most ominously -- no knowable "victory." Investigations, arrests, and trials are not tools of war. But according to the Yoo memo, the president can define war however he chooses, and remain "at war" for as long as he chooses. This is indefinite dictatorial power. And I don't use that term lightly; the very definition of a dictatorship is a system that puts a ruler above the law. In the weeks after 9/11, while America and the world were grieving, Bush built a legal rationale for a dictatorship. Then he immediately started using it to avoid the law. This is, fundamentally, why this issue crossed political lines in Congress. If the president can ignore laws regulating surveillance and wiretapping, why is Congress bothering to debate reauthorizing certain provisions of the Patriot Act? Any debate over laws is predicated on the belief that the executive branch will follow the law. This is not a partisan issue between Democrats and Republicans; it's a president unilaterally overriding the Fourth Amendment, Congress and the Supreme Court. Unchecked presidential power has nothing to do with how much you either love or hate George W. Bush. You have to imagine this power in the hands of the person you most don't want to see as president, whether it be Dick Cheney or Hillary Rodham Clinton, Michael Moore or Ann Coulter. Laws are what give us security against the actions of the majority and the powerful. If we discard our constitutional protections against tyranny in an attempt to protect us from terrorism, we're all less safe as a result.

# 3

**There exists an intrinsic antagonism in debate – on one side, debate is always shaped by strategy, winning, and debate theory. The other side is the desire to influence a larger public. The aff’s desire to change the debate community is always shaped by the norms of debate. Your aff will never be receptive to the larger public. We should view outside of the academy as more important than our debate spaces**

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension. “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension, these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity, characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147). Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration producing gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006, 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy that there can be immediate, material, political consequences.

**Our argument is particularly true to the 1AC – using debate for political purposes tradeoffs with producing tools useful for the public.**

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic blindness to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.

**Alternative – Reject the affirmative because of their use of debate as a conception of political agency. We should keep competing elements of the antagonism in view to understand the limits of debate as political agency in itself**

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised, however, by the conclusion that broadly effective activism is only possible outside of academia. The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified. Instead, effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view—and not simply as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives. Rather, the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position, reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences, must be constantly present, each vying for our attention. And, insofar as the two elements are not kept in tension with each other, the scholarly subject position becomes increasingly unbearable, leading to the production of what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations for the gap.

**Our goal as rhetorical scholars should be the exploration and production of inventional resources suitable for the larger public, otherwise we get lost in TOO-EASY ASSURANCES that what we are doing here – in the debate space – is necessary and sufficient**

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

The challenge is to resist synthetically resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms” with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement. Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view, even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics working in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how academics might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense, to classical rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize, as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.

**The question of institutional support is key to expanding wider base for change and caring for other communities – radical exposures fail**

Ruggero 9 E. Colin, The New School for Social Research in New York, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, Radical Green Populism: Climate Change, Social Change and the Power of Everyday Practices, 11-11, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/e-colin-ruggero-radical-green-populism-climate-change-social-change-and-the-power-of-everyday-p

Radicals must carefully deliberate the development of alternative social institutions and intellectual resources for subversion and, ultimately, change. What will they look like? Self-managed energy systems, car and bicycle shares, farming collectives, green technology design firms, recycling and composting operations, construction and refitting operations...the needs are broad and the possibilities are endless, but each must be carefully considered. What institutions and resources might prove most valuable over the long term? What institutions and resources can help strengthen radical communities? What institutions and resources would other communities be best served by, a particularly important question in the process of broadening the cultural-social unity of a wide social base for change.

# 4

ANIMAL ADVOCACY IN THE CURRENT CAPITALIST ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE WILL BE ANTI-SYSTEMIC IN ITS EFFECT. YOUR PROJECT WILL INEVITABLY MAKE HUGE CONCESSIONS TO APPEAR POLITICALLY POWERFUL

**FOTOPOULOS**, a political philosopher and economist who founded the inclusive democracy movement, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Polytechnic of North London **& SARGIS**, has taught secondary school biology in the inner city for twenty-four years. He is a political activist and union leader, **06**

(Takis and John, The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, vol.2, no.3, June)

Primarily, then, the very composition of AAM, enhanced by the fact that there is no clear political project of an antisystemic nature to back this movement, means that it is **bound to be a single-issue reformist movement.** This is because, as is the case **with every popular front** and every ‘forum-type’ movement, **any common political platform that could possibly emerge from it would have to represent the lowest common denominator of its varied components**. And this is exactly the fundamental weakness which could make the development of an antisystemic consciousness out of a philosophy of ‘rights’ almost impossible.

**Capitalism leads to extinction, nuclear war, environmental collapse, poverty, racism, and sexism**

**Brown**, Charles [Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan] May 13th 20**05** (http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.htm)

The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or exacerbates all major social ills of our times. With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to spiral, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most workers experience long years of stagnant real wages, while health and education costs soar. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.

OUR ALT IS A MUCH MORE EXPANSIVE RESISTANCE - systemic politics is radically different than single-issue reforms. Think of our alt as a form of disobedience to the corporate system or post-issue activism where we resist our complicity to the larger global system.

**REINSBOROUGH**, Grassroots Organizer and Popular Educator, **03**

(Patrick, worked on a range of issues including forest protection, police brutality, peace in Northern Ireland, indigenous rights, organizing director of the Rainforest Action Network, JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & PROTEST, Aug, vol 1, # 2, <http://www.journalofaestheticsandprotest.org/1/de_colonizing/index.html>)

Our revolution(s) will really start rolling when the logic of our actions and the appeal of our disobedience is so clear that it can easily replicate and spread far beyond the limiting definition of “protester” or “activist”. To do so, our movements for justice, ecology and democracy **must deepen their message** by more effectively articulating the values crisis underlying the corporate system. We must lay claim to life-affirming, common sense values and expose one of the most blatant revolutionary truths of the modern era: the corporate rule system rooted in sacrificing human dignity and planetary health for elite profit is out of alignment with an increasing number of people’s basic values. This is the domain of **post-issue activism**— the recognition that the roots of the emerging crisis lie in the **fundamental flaws** of the modern order and that our movements for change need to talk about re-designing **the whole global system**— now. Post-issue activism is a **dramatic divergence** **from the slow progression of single-issue politics, narrow constituencies and band-aid solutions**. Traditional single-issue politics, despite noble and pragmatic goals, is not just a strategic and gradualist path to the same goal of global transformation. Rather **the framework** of issue-based struggle **needs to affirm the existing system** in order to win concessions and thus **inhibits the evolution of more systemic movements.** Too often we spend our time campaigning against the smoke rather than clearly alerting people to the fact that their house is on fire. Post-issue activism is the struggle to address the holistic nature of the crisis and **it demands new frameworks, new alliances and new strategies.**

# Case

This REDUCTIONISM GETS IT WRONG. IT PRESUMES THAT ISOLATED OBJECTS CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF THE WHOLE.

YIH 90**,** Ecologist - New World Agriculture Group,

(Katherine, *Monthly Review*, Oct, v42, EXAC)

Reductionism presumes that phenomena can be described entirely in terms of the properties of isolated objects, or, in other words, that **the "whole**" (for example, the community) can be understood as simply the sum of the "parts" (for example, the species in the community), with no properties of its own. But neither part nor whole completely determines the other. Reductionism's faith in the atomistic nature of the world leads to **fallacies** in scientific theory and its application by justifying the study of parts in isolation of each other and **underestimating** **the need to understand their interconnectedness,** the nature of that interconnectedness, and the properties of complex wholes.

SPECIES-ISM IS NOT THE CAUSE of all oppression – WE MUST STRIVE TO ELIMINATE HUMAN DOMINATION FIRST

**FOTOPOULOS**, a political philosopher and economist who founded the inclusive democracy movement, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Polytechnic of North London **& SARGIS**, has taught secondary school biology in the inner city for twenty-four years. He is a political activist and union leader, **06**

(Takis and John, The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, vol.2, no.3, June)

The reason why (for those who have chosen autonomy/democracy) human interests are privileged over nonhuman ones has, therefore, **nothing to do with speciesism** and everything to do with the fact that only human beings can be potentially autonomous. An additional reason why human interests are by necessity privileged over animal interests is that animal liberation is only possible within the context of a liberated society, in which all forms of domination and exploitation among humans have been **abolished first**, as was argued above. Finally, it is clear that an inclusive democracy cannot be “representative” of all sentient species since democracy is inconceivable if it includes the “representative” element.

Denouncing the category of humans – without any transformative potential – is a SELF-DEFEATING GESTURE - denouncing conceptions of “human” doesn’t mean that we’ll ever get past them

Calarco 4, Assistant Professor Philosophy @ Fullerton,

(Matthew, Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought)

We now have stronger reasons than ever before for rejecting a certain conception of what it is to be human, but we seem to be hardly any closer **to a post-metaphysical thinking** regarding the animal. You might say that Continental philosophy **has had an easier time denouncing** what **Descartes or Kant** said about the human than it has criticizing what they said about the animal, an observation that naturally leads one to question whether the humanism it rejects is really quite so defunct after all. The "end of humanism," the "ends of man," the "end of philosophy," the "death of the author," the "death of God," the "death of man" — these apocalyptic shibboleths are becoming self-defeating utterances amid a discourse that has said hardly anything about animals in comparison. We can only speculate why Continental philosophers have generally not had more to say about the traditional other of man — animals. One might perhaps attempt to account for the grossness of the discrepancy between man-talk and animal-talk by evoking the seemingly insurmountable difficulties of escaping metaphysical discourse itself. It is an established part of Heideggerian lore that **the philosopher who seeks to go beyond metaphysics is destined to find herself all the more firmly rooted within it**. Does not the discourse on the animal as such presuppose a distinction be made between animals and humans, thereby reaffirming the hegemony of humanism according to the familiar logic of negation? Would it not be better to eschew speaking of an opposition between the human and the animal altogether?

YOU CAN’T ESCAPE ANTHROPOCENTRISM – THE LANGUAGE OF HUMANISM WILL ALWAYS CREEP IN

**Turner**, Pf of philosophy and religious studies at Nasvhille State Community College, **02**

(Donald L., The Animal Other, *disClosure* 12, EBSCO)

For Derrida, the ideas of Heidegger and Levinas are eschatological in their attempts to make contact with absolute alterity or to transcend, via language, a humanistic horizon. Derrida questions any claim to transcend a humanistic or anthropocentric frame of mind, arguing that **reliance on language “ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on the oldest ground,”** re-establishing one “more naively and more strictly than ever” inside the realm one purports to transcend (Margins 135). Derrida insists that a critique of “humanism” and “metaphysics” such as that issued by Heidegger can only come from within that very tradition and using tools it provides (Bennington 303-309). Derrida treats Levinas’s approach similarly in “Violence and Metaphysics,” which is both a defense of Heidegger in the face of Levinas’s attacks and a critique of Levinas’s formulation of absolute alterity. For Derrida, description of an encounter with truly absolute alterity is a practical impossibility, for one cannot describe that which one can by definition have no comprehension—there must be some similarity for a self to recognize an other as existing at all (Bernasconi 128-131). As with his critique of Heidegger, Derrida’s point is that Levinas’s description of absolute alterity requires that he **employ the ontological language that he seeks to transcend**, and thus that any contact with the other must involve some mutual affectedness (Writing 151).

Your impacts are based around an exaggerated and false binary.

Turner 5, Pf of philosophy and religious studies at Nashville State Community College,

(Donald, Janus Head, 8(1), 335-339, http://www.janushead.org/8-1/AttertonCalarco.pdf)

The selection that treats ethical issues most directly is the piece from Ferry, which describes an “absurd alternative” between (1) a bad Cartesian “metaphysics of subjectivity” that views animals as “mere raw material” and disregards their suffering, and (2) the belief “that it is necessary to ‘deconstruct’ humanism at all costs” (151). This latter approach is shared, argues Ferry, by thinkers such as Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and certain radical ecologists. He believes this orientation ignores the relevance of human uniqueness and **takes a “step backward” into “barbarity**” (155); in response, he supports a non-anthropocentric humanism. This approach respects animal interests enough to prohibit their torture, while respecting humanity enough to recognize that such respect of others is only possible among human beings, the only animal who “lives by law” as Ferry puts it, linking his view to Kantian and Jewish thinking (154-155).

# \*\*\*2NC

# 2NC Selfish Politics DA

Grossberg, 92 [Lawrence, “Professor of Communications Studies at the University of North Carolina, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture, 1992 p. 388-390]

If the Left can give up its demand for purity, it may be able to make the compromises which may be necessary for effective political opposition in the contemporary world. It will act **strategically and tactically**, For example, it could use contemporary advertising to its own advantage ie.g., when Reagan came out in support of gun control, or in the "Big (keen" campaign in California, where effec¬tive advertising could have prepared people tor the corporate-spon¬sored media barage opposing the initiative). Politics is **always a strategic matter:** one must decide where and how to struggle, it has to be decided when identities, or ideologies or state politics **are appropriate and important sites of struggle**. And this will sometimes involve **the need to compare, evaluate and** perhaps **even** prioritize the demandsand claims **of** particular **struggles,** based not soley on moral commitments or theoretical reductions (as in alliance;- of solidarity) but on the exigencies and possibilities of the context. Questions need to be raised about the effective mobilization and deployment of resources, about when different fractions have to come together under a common identity, and when one group should act on behalf of another group's interest, rather than its own immediate interest. Such decisions will have to be based on political calculations of importance and possibility, but also on calculations about how best to mobilize peopleinto the particular struggle and **into a broader movement.** Sometimes that will mean having to bear defeats in one place, in order to win a victory somewhere else.

# 2NC Link

Your aff will fail to motivate the larger public. Rachel Carson and ecological economics proves that selfish appeals towards human interests are necessary.

Penn 3**,** Human Behavior and Evolution Society,

(Dustin J., *Quarterly Review of Biology*, Sept)

Although education is insufficient to elicit the sacrifices needed, it is still necessary. Moreover, an evolutionary perspective suggests that environmental education will be most effective for triggering changes when it shows how the destruction of the environment harms individual interests, though it is also important to remember that an individual's evolutionary interests include close relatives, friends, and their group or tribe--as well as their own health, survival, and economic interests (Ridley and Low 1993; Heinen 1995a,b,c, 1996). The state of environment only became a major political issue when environmentalists, such as Rachel Carson (1962), increased public awareness about the dangers of pollution for people's health. Similarly, ecological economics has been successful in showing how environmental degradation is adversely affecting the health and economic well-being of individuals and nations (Costanza 1991). Many environmental thinkers, such as Deep Ecologists, attack appeals to human and self-interests as "shallow ecology" (Roszak et al. 1995; Sessions 1995). They want people to protect the environment, not because it benefits their interests, but because of its "intrinsic value." However, as E O Wilson points out: "A stiffer dose of biological realism appears to be in order. ... The only way to make a conservation ethic work is to ground it in ultimately selfish reasoning... An essential component of this formula is the principle that people will conserve land and species fiercely if they foresee a material gain for themselves, their kin, and their tribe" (Wilson 1984:131-132). This is evolutionary-informed ecology rather than shallow ecology. Conservationists emphasize the importance of biodiversity for its potential medical benefits and ecosystem services for humanity (Daily 1997). They are attempting to find how conservation might benefit local peoples, making them stakeholders. Some environmental activists are cleverly showing the public how we can reduce runaway taxes and governmental spending by eliminating environmentally destructive subsidies and projects funded by the government. For example, the Green Scissors report outlines 74 U.S. governmental programs that, if cut, would protect the environment and save taxpayers $54 billion (e.g., subsides for timber, mining, automotive, and petroleum industries) (Newport 2001). Environmentalists who criticize such appeals to human self-interest overlook the evolutionary design and constraints on the human mind. **Making successful environmental policies requires** considerations of the **evolved psychological constraints** on human behavior, as well as our ecological constraints for growth.

# 2NC Overview

ANIMAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ARE EASILY COOPTED BY CONSERVATIVES

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However, although we agree that a radical transformation of our attitude towards animals should be a significant part of an antisystemic movement’s programme, **we see a fundamental difference between the part of the programme which aims at liberating animals versus that part which aims at liberating humanity.** The former is just based on the fact that, at present, many people do not grasp the ethical (intrinsic) worth and value of animals and the ethical, social, and environmental problems stemming from exploiting them, whereas the latter is based on a deliberate choice that we, as rational human beings, make, i.e. a choice for autonomy and its political expression ―a genuine democracy― which can only come about when a majority of people make this choice. Clearly, the part of the antisystemic movement’s programme which aims at liberating animals cannot be based on any kind of deliberate choice by animals but, at most, on their instinctive preference for freedom that we can infer. In other words, animals cannot be the subjects of an antisystemic movement; they can only be its ‘objects’. This is important because if we agree on it, then we must also agree on the premise that the liberation of humans is a precondition for the liberation of animals and not vice versa, as the case is presented by the ALM. It is on the basis of this premise that we argue that the struggle for the liberation of animals can only be part of an antisystemic movement for the liberation of humanity, **otherwise it will remain a single-issue movement as at present, attracting anyone from right-wing animal lovers and vegetarians** (History is full of such cases, the Nazis being a typical example and their Animal Protection Law of 1933 represents perhaps the strictest legislation for the protection of animals in the world) to reformists of various kinds, with the odd exception of some anticapitalist ‘extremists’.

# 2NC AT: Perm

THE PERM WILL BE CRUSHED – it won’t produce an anti-systemic consciousness

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On the other hand, any attempt to radicalise AAM by changing its nature from a popular front, single-issue, type of movement to a clearly antisystemic movement, would simply lead to the **decimation of the entire movement.** As regards the ALM in particular, the fact that its rhetoric and direct-action tactics show an understanding that the state is a political extension of the capitalist economy and that, therefore, “representative democracy” is a myth, does not, by itself, mean the development of an antisystemic consciousness. Particularly so, if one takes into account the existence of neo-fascist currents within the broader AAM movement. Neither does the fact that the ALM uses libertarian organisation procedures like the affinity groups make it antisystemic in nature. The antisystemic character of a movement is not determined by its organisational or tactical procedures but by the content of its political project, especially if, as was shown above, it is at least questionable that the project to emancipate animals is integrally related to the struggle to emancipate humans—unless the former is an integral part of an antisystemic movement aiming to achieve the latter.

THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS WILL OVERWHELM THE PERM – Marxist environmentalism proves

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Finally, the very nature of an ecological movement, and even more so of ALM, whose objective is the protection of a particular aspect of Nature, makes it a one-issue movement. The attempts by social ecologists, Marxists and radical greens to **turn ecological movements into universalist movements failed, precisely because those movements emphasised the need to reintegrate society with just one aspect of its environment** (Nature) and not with all aspects of it ―particularly with economy and polity which are exclusively man-made, in contrast to Nature which is only partially affected by man’s activities.

OUR ALT MUST COME FIRST – humans need to have basic needs to develop empathy for animals

**NIBERT**, Associate professor of sociology at Wittenburg University, **08** (David, Abolitionist Online, http://www.abolitionist-online.com/interview-issue05\_animal.rights.human.rights-david.nibert.shtml)

In my book, I invoke Abraham Maslow’s concept of the hierarchy of needs to help explain this oversight. In essence, Maslow suggested that most humans need to have their basic needs met **before they are able to respond empathetically and altruistically.** This is one of the reasons I believe the development of socialist society is essential for the achievement of substantial and sustainable justice for both humans and other animals. So, while these initial plans for dramatic social change envisioned by many grassroots activists may not explicitly include justice for other animals, I believe the interests of the other inhabitants of the earth can best be raised, **debated** and acted on when the forces of corporate greed do not preclude mass consciousness and liberation.

MORE EV - **FOTOPOULOS**, a political philosopher and economist who founded the inclusive democracy movement, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Polytechnic of North London **& SARGIS**, has taught secondary school biology in the inner city for twenty-four years. He is a political activist and union leader, **06**

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The development of an alternative consciousness towards animals has to be part of the development of an antisystemic consciousness, and this has to become hegemonic (at the local/ regional/ national/ transnational level) **before** new institutions implementing an ecological democracy ―as part of an ID― begin to be built. In other words, the strategy for an ecological democracy should be part of the transitional ID strategy in which direct action, though playing a more significant role than the traditional tactics of the Left (demonstrations etc), would still only be a defensive tactics, whereas, most of all, we would need an aggressive tactics consisting of building alternative institutions within the present system (which would include institutions of ecological democracy) that would make the antisystemic consciousness hegemonic.

# 2NC Links

ECOLOGY MOVEMENTS PROVE OUR SINGLE-ISSUE LINK

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Likewise, since the ecology movement began, the ecological crisis has sharply deteriorated. This is not to say that education has not helped to demystify various hierarchical discriminations, but they have not been completely overturned. Why? Because all these liberation movements were **fighting against only one aspect of power** and not for the abolition of all forms of power so as to bring about equal distribution of all power – as a result, the system of the market economy and representative democracy have not been overthrown. Likewise, AAM could easily become another reformist lobbyist movement just as the civil rights movements have turned into.

# 2NC Alt

ONLY THE ALT CAN CONSTRAIN CORPORATE POWER AT THE HEART OF MODERN COLONIZATION

**Boggs**, Chair of the Caucus for a New Political Science, American Political Science Association, **07**

(Carl, Fast Capitalism, 2.2, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2\_2/boggs.html)

The global ecological crisis, deepening with each passing year, threatens the world as never before, an outgrowth of unrestrained corporate power that today colonizes every realm of human life. The crisis intersects with virtually every social problem, from declining public health to chaotic weather patterns, growing poverty, resource depletion, agricultural collapse, even military conflict. It goes to the core of industrialism and modernity, to relentless efforts by privileged interests to commodify and exploit all parts of the natural world, including most natural habitats and species within it. The power of a neoliberal international system based in the United States and a few other advanced capitalist nations is so great, moreover, that a crisis which earlier might have been contained now veers out of control, with few political mechanisms or counterforces to resist it. Living habitats are being ravaged at such an alarming rate that the carrying capacity of the earth has already been exceeded, a process of destruction justified by resort to such high-sounding virtues as social progress, material prosperity, and national security. Since transnational corporations, bolstered by immense government and military power, recognize few limits to their quest for wealth and domination, **anti-system movements will be forced to adopt increasingly radical politics—**progressive socialization of the state and economy, alternative modes of production and consumption, a new paradigm of natural relations. This means nothing short of a qualitative break with longstanding patterns of development if the planet is to be saved from imminent disaster. If a political shift of this magnitude seems utterly remote and utopian, that is to be expected: genuine alternatives to the global corporate-military tyranny are presently weak and fragmented, and what exists lacks strategic coherence. Some progressive forces retain the capacity to disrupt business-as-usual, others have the power to achieve limited reforms, but none pose any real threat to the power structure. There are no truly anti-system movements of any scope or permanence, including among the multitude of environmental organizations and groups, despite the urgency of the crisis. In the case of animal rights, three decades of popular struggles have shown that even modest gains have been won slowly, with great difficulty, and against imposing obstacles. Of course this problem is scarcely unique to the challenge of transforming natural relations: time-honored goals of disarmament, ending poverty, and conquering disease, for example, are today no closer to realization than they were many decades ago. Still, where struggles to dramatically uplift the world raise such compelling political and moral issues, pessimism or resignation is simply no option insofar as history shows that **even limited victories can set in motion more far-reaching dynamics of change**. In the existing state of affairs, moreover, an attitude of retreat makes less and less sense insofar as fissures and cracks in a seemingly efficient monolithic system have begun to widen as global capitalism reaps more and more of its own bitter harvest.

# 2NC AT: Alt = Anthro

OUR ETHIC OF AUTONOMY CAN GENERATE CONCERN FOR ANIMALS

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However, this does not mean that the quality of life and the happiness of animals are of no importance to the citizens of a democratic society, given that concern for animals is a crucial part of the ethics of autonomy, as was stressed in the last section. In other words, in a democratic society, concern for animal happiness and quality of life is not just the by-product of ‘a cozy welfare view of animals’, but a moral precondition for individual and social autonomy itself. The difference is that, whereas respect for human life is an absolute, as there is no autonomy without life, respect for animal life is subject to exceptions defined by the democratic assemblies on the basis of the moral values drawn from the principles of autonomy and community, and are reversible only by exceptional majorities. Likewise, since the ecology movement began, the ecological crisis has sharply deteriorated. This is not to say that education has not helped to demystify various hierarchical discriminations, but they have not been completely overturned. Why? Because all these liberation movements were fighting against only one aspect of power and not for the abolition of all forms of power so as to bring about equal distribution of all power – as a result, the system of the market economy and representative democracy have not been overthrown. Likewise, AAM could easily become another reformist lobbyist movement just as the civil rights movements have turned into. So, talking about autonomy instead of rights does not simply mean that we are imposing our arbitrary will on animals because they cannot meet our unique conditions of social life. It is exactly because we take for granted our higher intelligence that we can make the decision to implement certain highly moral principles with respect to animals in the first place, and not because we are more powerful than them. If this were the case then we should also expect a bear or a shark not to use us as food despite the fact that they are by nature more powerful than us! We humans are morally autonomous, because we can legislate moral laws for ourselves and for others. Bears are incapable of overriding the laws of nature, which are immoral towards bears feeding on salmon, for example.

# \*\*\*1NR

### Perm

#### In critical debates you should change your understanding of competition- traditional notions of competition don’t apply because the aff de-emphasizes the advocacy statement and advocates the aff in its entirety. Any permutation is severing the method the 1ac has advanced because it is changing their approach to the aff. Any other interpretation of competition makes it impossible to be negative.

Gordon 13 Malcolm Gordon, Malcolm Gordon–Assistant Director of Debate at the University of Missouri – Kansas City, Oct 14, METHODOLOGY, COMPETITION, AND K DEBATES http://hsimpact.wordpress.com/2013/10/14/methodology-competition-and-k-debates/

Competition Now that we know the general types of critical affs, let’s get to it. The most common argument K affs beat a critical neg strategy on are permutations. These affs often defend philosophical concepts that emphasize fluidity, inclusiveness, and fragmentation (postmodernism, yo!). It makes it easy for them to explain why including your K alt is not incompatible with the conceptual framework provided by the aff. Often the goals of the aff are more in line with the neg’s K, too: social or economic justice, equality…these are all buzz words many K affs use. Since these are the same impacts that K alts attempt to solve, it becomes much more difficult for the neg to prove the choices are incompatible. Compare this to a round where you run the security K against a hegemony good affirmative-it’s easier for the neg to defeat the permutation when the goals of the aff (the advantages) are the links to the neg K. In rounds filled with K on K violence, the link is rarely the goals of the aff, and much more often the mechanism or approach, something much more easily augmented with a permutation. How can you successfully prove the competition of critical negative arguments against these affirmatives? I will presuppose that you are interested in learning the benefits of doing so (as opposed to just going for T every time), since you are still reading the article, after all. Since competition is something that originates with counterplans, we need to figure out how to best translate the established norms for counterplan competition, which is typically applied in debates between two teams discussing instrumental policies, to competition in debates between a critical affirmative and a critical negative. The first common misconception about competition in debate revolves around the idea of mutual exclusivity. This phrase just means that two options the judge is deciding between are mutually exclusive with one another (you can’t ban space exploration and increase space exploration at the same time). I say it’s a misconception because so few counterplans in debate are mutually exclusive. Think of some of the most common counterplan types: alternate agent, alternate actor, multiple actors. Usually these counterplans just have someone else implement the same policy of the plan. They are not mutually exclusive-the EU and the US can increase assistance at the same time, the court and the congress can both shape the same policy, etc. Now, the simplest way to determine competition is the following: a counterplan is competitive if it avoids a disadvantage that the affirmative or permutation cannot avoid. This concept is dubbed competition through net benefits, a truly clever name. One similarity between counterplan competition and the competition of KOKV (K on K Violence) follows this line of thinking: a K alternative is superior to the affirmative if it provides more benefits than the plan or permutation. This never changes. The part of K competition that DOES change involves the theoretical arguments debaters assert in order to get the judge to reject the permutation: Severance, intrinsic, and timeframe arguments. In this discussion, we’ll focus on severance arguments. The permutation, to be theoretically legitimate, needs to contain the entire affirmative plan and all or part of the counterplan. Severance is bad-this is a norm, and easy to explain. So easy that I won’t explain it right now. This is usually very easy to figure out in a counterplan v plan debate, because both teams are assuming common interpretations of those plans. The affirmative has to include all of the things the plan does in the permutation. Most permutations are either “do both” (entirety of the plan and counterplan) or perm “do the plan and….” K affs are a different breed entirely. They de-emphasize the one sentence advocacy statement, and often times have advantages that are about the grand ways we should approach or interpret the plan differently. In these situations, how can the negative generate competition? Substance and Theory This is the most straightforward way, the one we are all trained in very early on. Prove the perm links to the K, stupid! Use the links to your K to prove that the inclusion of the aff in the permutation means the permutation still links to the K. Of course, this is easier said than done in many rounds of K on K crime. Much of this has to do with that I call the “nebulous specificity” of most K affs. Typically, a K aff will indict a very specific idea with a very broad, all-encompassing theory. Affirmatives are geared in to talk about why they don’t link to anything, because they can shift back and forth between the merits of the theoretical framework they endorse at-large and the mere use of that framework in their specific instance. Most critical negative arguments will link to the grand theory much more than they will to the specific instance, so it’s usually pretty predictable which one the aff is going to emphasize in the 2ac/1ar/2ar. The problem with this that so many judges are quick to re-calculate the link dramatically once the permutation comes into play. The alternative is going to be a different method of defining or approaching the problem (use a different ontological framework, a different methodology, etc). Many judges, because they have been trained to evaluate competition in the ways explained above, will expect the negative to prove a tradeoff between the two methods. Of course, literature that criticizes one methodology in favor of another rarely discusses the possibility of combining the two, because it is the initial choice of method itself that these authors criticize. Another reason most Ks of method indict those of the aff flow from the fact that it is just inferior to another method. It doesn’t solve/describe/explain the issue as well as the method proposed by the negative. Unfortunately, this kind of indictment doesn’t assume the judge training that requires a tradeoff between the two. For example, I have seen judges vote for the permutation in a round where one team was advocating Marxist economics and the other was advocating an end to modernity. While these two frameworks are obviously incompatible (dare I say they are opposites) of one another, there is still often an assumption that the negative needs a card that proves the combination of the two causes a “trade off” in the use of methods. Otherwise, the aff can just say that their permutation includes Marxist methodology, thus meaning there is no risk of a tradeoff. This permutation also means the aff includes the neg’s method, so all of the link arguments that say “aff’s method is bad because it doesn’t use this other method that explains things better” are solved by the permutation to just add the neg’s alternative to the aff. Because of this unique combination of circumstances, I advise debaters to change the name of the game, and focus on theory as well as substance. No, not topicality, though it would be pretty funny if my conclusion was everyone should just go for T. I always explain to debaters that in the end theory is just a bargain negotiated between the debaters and the judge. The best theory arguments don’t just say exclude x or y argument. That’s too simple. The most compelling theory arguments involve a give-and-take where the team says “hey, if you are going to let them do this, you gotta let me do this” (consultation counterplans justify intrinsic permutations!). Use this give-and-take strategy and the fact that the judge’s knowledge of competition is rooted in counterplan theory to your advantage. The goal here is to prove that the nature of the 1ac means the judge should have a much lower threshold for a negative link/rejecting the perm as severance. First, look at the structure of the 1ac. Critical affirmatives usually talk about the importance of a prior framing question in the 1ac. Affirmatives may talk about ontology, epistemology, modernity, psychoanalysis, or any number of philosophical/sociological perspectives. In the process, they inevitably make that strategy the fulcrum of the debate. Think about if you were to read a traditional policy strategy: the affirmative would likely say that their framing issue is prior to the question of your disad. The aff sets this up for 9 minutes by discussing why approach or framing is more important than outcomes. You need to point this out to the judge as you explain how the judge should evaluate permutations. Second, tie this into what the judge already believes about competition. It is nearly universal that severance is not a good standard for permutations. Use this to your benefit. How can we go about proving the permutation actually severs? Well, there are two questions here. What does it sever? Is the thing that it severs an important part of the aff advocacy? Think back to counterplans. Severance of the plan is considered bad because it is the advocacy of the aff, thus is the cornerstone of the neg’s strategy. All negative arguments on some level are derived from an understanding of what the plan does. Even Ks that just read links to the aff’s advantages or representations rely on the belief that those advantages are branches stemming from the plan. So what does the aff sever? Well, assuming you’ve done the first step (using the 1ac and cross X to establish that method/ontology/framing is a prior question), the aff assuredly severs their starting point. Any inclusion of your alternate negative framework means the aff has shifted their methodological approach from the 1ac to the 1ac + the K. The work on framing importance also changes the judge’s threshold for what constitutes a link. If you have evidence that says X method is bad because it’s not Y, and Y is superior for A,B,C reasons, the judge should be highly skeptical of allowing a permutation. Your arguments about X method being bad will almost inevitably say it’s bad because it excludes certain theoretical assumptions from its approach. Thus, the exclusion of those assumptions is part of the aff’s method. Attempting to include them retroactively with a permutation means the aff has created a new methodology, with theoretical underpinnings their original methodology discounted. Our next question: is the item the aff is severing important to neg strategy in such a way that the judge ought to reject the permutation? Much of this work has been done in the above paragraphs, but you still need to be specific. Don’t forget that this is not a traditionally defended affirmative. Explain that to the judge. Negotiate. Bargain. Plead! Since the aff places their framing at the center of the debate, the judge should evaluate the entire 1ac as though it’s a method and that it was the approach to that method that was the lynchpin of the aff’s advocacy. The affirmative doesn’t just say that method is key and should be evaluated first. They say their method is key and their method should be evaluated first. The aff demarcated this ground as the center of the debate. The aff stood up for 9 minutes and talked about why the choices we make in those approaches are not neutral or innocent. Thus, the aff has already established that all negative strategy must begin with this question. Once they are allowed to change their method, to augment it by including things your evidence says their approach ontologically/epistemologically/methodologically excludes, there is truly no space from which the negative can generate a strategy other than topicality, which I assume the aff has said is racist/sexist/classist/causes genocide.

### T

#### War Power is distinct from Commander in Chief Power. It’s simply the ability to declare war and an authorization on the use of force, not command of the armed forces or personnel decisions

Weinberger 2009

Seth, Restoring the Balance, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Press, 20

The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful check on presidential power and a vital means of safeguarding domestic civil liberties. A declaration of war, as the Founders understood it, as the Constitution intends it, and as the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government interpret it, is **not** about the command and direction of the armed forces of the United States. Whether the president can send American soldiers into battle **does not** depend on whether Congress has declared war or even given its specific authorization to the use of force. Nor does the ability of Congress to prevent or oversee the president’s use of force turn on the existence of a declaration of war. Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of the threat to the United States and recognizing that meeting the threat demands extraordinary measures above and beyond the foreign deployment of troops.

#### OUR T ARGUMENT IS NOT A RULE – IT’S AN EXPRESSION THAT WHAT THE AFF SAID WAS NOT FAIR TO THE NEGATIVE – WE HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THIS DEBATE – YOU’RE VOTING AGAINST THE AFF FOR BEING A TYPE OF POLITICS THAT doesn’t care about prepared opponents, which is crucial to the success of ideas. We should understand fairness as a form of agnostic politics. And the Other is only possible if we care about fairness.

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(Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an ~~able~~ opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### Cultivating respect is key to solve their impacts – a lack of respect for the non-human other is the root of anthropocentric ethics. Whatever flavor of anthropocentrism they read, this is still true

**Capilano University Open-Source, No Date** (Notes on Paul Taylor’s Ecological Theories

[http://ocw.capilanou.ca/philosophy/phil-208-environmental-ethics/non-anthropocentric.htm]

The fundamental issue in environmental ethics is whether there can be a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic -- that is a basis for right and wrong action concerning the environment which is not grounded solely in human concerns. This is the issue of the theoretical foundations of environmental ethics. Obviously, the main dispute is between those who claim that ethics can only ever have an anthropocentric basis (though many go on to claim that this will be sufficient for taking account of our environmental concerns), and those who claim that not only can there be, but there must be, a non-anthropocentric basis for environmental ethics. An ethical system could be non-anthropocentric in a number of ways. Any account of morality that has the effect or removing humans from being the sole thing of concern is non-anthropocentric. The main examples in environmental ethics are: animal rights/liberation theories (sentient animals have moral standing) biocentric theories (individual living things have moral standing) ecocentric theories (ecological systems have moral standing) There are variations within these views, so there is a wide range of possible non-anthropocentric theories. Taylor argues for the rather radical view that all living things have inherent value, and so are deserving of **moral respect**, equally. For Taylor, all that is required to have inherent value is to be alive -- essentially, striving towards staying alive. He grounds his view in the idea of "Respect for Nature", which is an extension of the Kantian principle of Respect for Persons.¶ To begin, Taylor clarifies his position by distinguishing it from an ecocentric view -- namely, it is not fundamentally holistic. The 'balance of nature' does not lead us to any moral principles. Rather, the good or well-being of all individual living things is of primary concern (so it is no anthropocentric either). There may be duties which require us to protect ecological systems, but these are only indirect duties to the individual living things that inhabit the ecological system.¶ Taylor argues that a biocentric ethic can be established (justified) by us taking on a new kind of moral attitude. This is the attitude that all living things, and not only humans, have inherent worth -- i.e., the attitude of respect for nature. But clearly, quite a bit of work needs to be done to establish that we ought to take on the new attitude. Two things need to be made clear, first.¶ (1) All living things have a good of their own -- that is, they can be benefited or harmed. This is reflected in the idea that all living things have the potential to grow and develop according to their biological natures. So, things can either go well or not with respect to this potential. This idea is not grounded, according to Taylor, in the ideas of having interests, or having an interest in something; and it is not conditional upon being sentient, or having consciousness. (Taylor thinks it is an open question whether a machine might have a good of its own in the relevant sense.)¶ (2) The attitude of respect for nature requires that we accept that all living things possess inherent worth. This would be reflected in us -- were we to take on the attitude of respect for nature -- adopting certain dispositions of behaviour, namely, in general, to act so as to show equal respect for all living things 'good of their own'.¶ This doesn't justify the claim that all living things do have inherent worth, though. So, more needs to be done to show this. Taylor's strategy is to argue that the claim that living things possess inherent worth will be justified if it can be shown that we are justified in adopting the attitude of respect for nature. Presumably, he thinks that respecting nature directly implies that we regard living things as possessing inherent worth.¶ Underlying the justification for the adoption of the attitude of respect for nature is the belief system characterized by Taylor as the "biocentric outlook on nature." This is an ecological outlook, with the key idea being the interdependence of living things. Taylor suggests four main components of the outlook:¶ (1) Humans are merely members of the biotic community -- not special.¶ - that we are animals -- the product of natural evolutionary processes -- is a fundamental feature of our existence. Also, as animals, we are entirely dependent on ecological systems for survival. [Humans might even be regarded as a rather nasty pest, with nothing but good consequences for the rest of Earth's living things if we were to be eliminated.]¶ (2) All ecosystems are built up of a web of interconnected and interdependent organisms.¶ - the long term ecological equilibrium is necessary for the continued existence of all individual living things. This holistic nature of ecosystems, though, is a factual aspect of the Earth, and does not lead automatically to any moral norms.¶ (3) Each individual living thing is "conceived of as a teleological center of life" -- i.e., with its own goals, its own "biological function."¶ - when we look at other living things from their point of view -- i.e., with their 'goals' -- we see that they are a unique "teleological center of life," 'striving' to 'achieve' their 'goals'. [Note all the single quote marks, indicating special uses of those words.]¶ (4) Humans are not in any way superior to other living things.¶ - humans must give up their arrogance towards other living things -- there is no reason to think that our special set of attributes and capabilities is somehow superior to any other organism's special attributes and capabilities. To do so is analogous to the hierarchical class structure artificially imposed throughout human history. And, there is no reason to think that we are fundamentally distinct -- and superior -- because we possess a soul, even if there exists such a thing/substance.¶ So, the adoption of this biocentric outlook, Taylor suggests, leads us to adopting the attitude of respect for nature, with the implication that we now have a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic.¶ Taylor cautions that this does not mean that we ascribe moral rights to individual living things. However, we are left without a clear account of just what it means.