# R2--NEG v OKLAHOMA LS

## 1NC

### OFF

#### **There is an intrinsic antagonism in debate** –on one side, debate is always shaped by strategy, winning, and debate theory. The other side is the desire to influence a larger public. The aff’s desire to change the debate community is always shaped by the norms of debate. Your aff will never be receptive to the larger public. We should view outside of the academy as more important than our debate spaces

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

Giroux’s concluding words, in which scholars reclaim the promises of a truly global democratic future, echo Ono and Sloop’s construction of scholarship as the politically embedded pursuit of utopia, McKerrow’s academic emancipation of the oppressed, McGee’s social surgery, Hartnett’s social justice scholar, and Fuller’s agent of justice. Each aims to unify the competing elements within the scholarly subject position—scholarly reflection and political agency—by reducing the former to the latter. Žižek’s advice is to consider how such attempts are always doomed to frustration, not because ideals are hard to live up to but because of the impossibility of resolving the antagonism central to the scholarly subject position. The titles “public intellectual” and “critical rhetorician” attest to the fundamental tension. “Public” and “rhetorician” both represent the aspiration to political engagement, while “critical” and “intellectual” set the scholar apart from noncritical, nonintellectual public rhetoric. However, rather than allowing the contingently articulated terms to exist in a state of paradoxical tension, these authors imagine an organic, unavoidable, necessary unity. The scholar is, in one moment, wholly public and wholly intellectual, wholly critical and wholly rhetorical, wholly scholar and wholly citizen—an impossible unity, characteristic of the sublime, in which the antagonism vanishes (2005, 147). Yet, as Žižek predicts, the sublime is the impossible. The frustration producing gap between the unity of the ideological sublime and conflicted experience quickly begins to put pressure on the ideology. This is born out in the shift from the exhilarated tone accompanying the birth of critical rhetoric (and its liberation of rhetoric scholarship from the incoherent and untenable demands of scientific objectivity) to a dispirited accounting for the difficulty of actually embodying the imagined unity of scholarly reflection and political agency. Simonson, for example, draws attention to the gap, noting how, twenty years later, it is hard to resist the feeling that “the bulk of our academic publishing is utterly inconsequential.” His hope is that a true connection between scholarly reflection and political agency may be possible outside of academia (2010, 95). Fuller approaches this conclusion when he says that the preferred path to filling universities with agents of justice is through “scaling back the qualifications needed for tenure-stream posts from the doctorate to the master’s degree,” a way of addressing the antagonism that amounts to setting half of it afloat (2006, 154). Hartnett is especially interesting because while he also insists on the existence of the gap, dismissing “many” of his “colleagues” as merely dispensing “politically vacuous truisms” or, worse, as serving as “tools of the state” and “humanities-based journals” as “impenetrably dense” and filled with “jargon-riddled nonsense,” he evinces a considerable impatience with the audiences he must engage as a social justice scholar (2010, 69, 74–75). In addition to reducing those populating the mass media to a cabal of “rotten corporate hucksters,” Hartnett rejects vernacular criticisms of his activism as “ranting and raving by fools,” and chafes at becoming “a target for yahoos of all stripes” (87, 84). In other words, the gap is not only recognized on the academic side of the ledger but appears on the public side as well; the public (in the vernacular sense of the word) does not yield to the desire of the social justice scholar. Or, as Žižek puts it, referencing Lacan, “You never look at me from the place in which I see you” (1991, 126). More telling still, Hartnett’s main examples of social justice scholars are either retired or located outside of academia (2010, 86). As Simonson suggests, and Hartnett implicitly concedes, it may well be that it really is only outside the academy that there can be immediate, material, political consequences.

#### Using debate for political purposes tradeoffs with producing tools useful for the public.

Welsh 12 Scott Department of Communication Appalachian State University (“Coming to Terms with the Antagonism between Rhetorical Reflection and Political Agency”, *Philosophy and Rhetoric,* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, Jstor)

What does it mean to say rhetoric scholarship should be relevant to democratic practice? A prevailing answer to this question insists that rhetoric scholars are participants in the democratic contest for power just like all other citizens, no more and no less. Drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the argument of this essay is that reducing scholarship to a mode of political agency not only produces an increasingly uninhabitable academic identity but also draws our attention away from producing results of rhetorical inquiry designed to be useful to citizens in democracy. Clinging to the idea that academic practice is a mode of political action produces a fantastic blindness to the antagonism between scholarly reflection and political agency that structures academic purpose. While empirical barriers to the production of rhetorical resources suitable for democratic appropriation undoubtedly exist, ignoring the self-frustrating character of academic desire is no less of an impediment to the production of democratically consequential rhetoric scholarship.

#### **Reject the affirmative because of their use of debate as a conception of political agency. We should keep** competing elements of the antagonism in view to understand the limits of debate as political agency in itself.

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In light of Žižek’s account of antagonism, one should not be surprised, however, by the conclusion that broadly effective activism is only possible outside of academia. The failure to unify scholarship and politics was predestined in the symbolic imagination that rendered them unified. Instead, effectively coming to terms with an antagonism means finding ways to keep the competing elements of the antagonism in view—and not simply as “bad” academic pretensions in conflict with “good” political motives. Rather, the two elements that constitute the scholarly subject position, reflective investigation and the production of unavoidable consequences, must be constantly present, each vying for our attention. And, insofar as the two elements are not kept in tension with each other, the scholarly subject position becomes increasingly unbearable, leading to the production of what Žižek calls supplemental ideological fantasies or ready explanations for the gap.

#### **Our goal as rhetorical scholars should be the exploration and production of inventional resources suitable for the larger public,** otherwise we get lost in TOO-EASY ASSURANCES that what we are doing here – in the debate space – is necessary and sufficient

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The challenge is to resist synthetically resolving these antagonisms, whether in confirming or disconfirming ways. Rather, as Žižek might suggest, the aim should be to “come to terms” with these antagonisms by articulating academic identities less invested in reparative fantasies that imagine a material resolution of them (1989, 3, 5, 133; 2005, 242–43). Accounts that fail to come to terms with the impossibility of closure and continue to invest in such fantasies yield either indignant calls for activism or too-easy assurance of the potential consequence of one’s work, neither of which is well suited to scholar-citizen engagement. Coming to terms with these antagonisms, I ultimately argue, is aided by a reconsideration of a number of Jürgen Habermas’s (1973, 1970) early works on the relationship between theory and practice and C. Wright Mills’s (2000) account of the relationship between scholarly reflection and political agency in The Sociological Imagination. Turning to Giambattista Vico, Habermas shows us how to keep the antagonisms clearly in view, even though he does not suggest a vision of scholarship that might allow academics to deliberately respond to the antagonism between scholarship and political agency. It is Mills, rather, through his concept of academics working in support of the sociological imagination, who suggests how academics might do just that. Directly and indirectly returning, in a sense, to classical rhetorical roots, each challenges rhetoric scholars to emphasize, as the aim of rhetoric scholarship, the exploration and production of inventional resources suitable for appropriation by citizen-actors. Such a construction of the relationship between academics and politics locates political agency and the situated pursuit of practical wisdom in democratic publics without absolving scholars of responsibility to them.

### OFF

#### Our interpretation is that the aff must defend an advocacy in the direction of the topic, which is an increase in statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President.

#### Increase means to make greater

Dictionary.com No Date Given <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase?s=ts> increase - Show IPA verb, in·creased, in·creas·ing, noun verb (used with object)

to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: “to increase taxes.”

#### Restriction on war power authority must be a limit that controls the president

Fisher, 97 **–** (Louis, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, “Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse,” U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107, Lexis)

A legal analysis by Walter Dellinger, at that time Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, draws a bold definition of presidential war power but appears to concede that if Congress gets its act together to enact a statutory restriction, the legislative limit controls the President: "By establishing and funding a military force capable of being sent around the globe, and declining in the War Powers Resolution or elsewhere to forbid the President's use of his statutory and constitutional powers to deploy troops into situations of risk such as Haiti, Congress left the President both the authority and the means to take such initiatives." n131

#### First is Limits – resolutional limits encourage aff innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. The inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments

#### Second is Fair ground – the resolution is the only neutral site of stasis for controversy – changing this allows them to define the debate in ways that make it impossible for us to compete and really easy for them to win

#### Third is decision-making – only maintaining a limited topic of discussion and a clear stasis for both teams provides the necessary and requisite foundation for decision-making and advocacy skills – even if they are contestable, that is different from being valuably debatable

Steinberg & Freeley ‘8\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy,there is no need for debate: *the matter can be settled by unanimous consent*. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of *illegal* immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concernsto be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States. Congress to make progress on the immigration debate *during the summer of 2007*. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened upsimply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate¶ . They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide *much* basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Effective decision-making is the lynchpin to solve all social and political problems --- this is an impact to limits, role-playing and decision-making that turns case

Lundberg ‘10 **–** (Christian Lundberg, Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity forcritical thinking, analysis of public claims, informeddecision making, and better public judgment. If the picture ofmodem political life that underwrites this critique of debateis a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution**,** at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenryto research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong supportfor expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberativecapacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills**,** researchand information processingskills, oral communicationskills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and new articulations of democratic life**.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce** revisions **of** democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class**,** gender**, and** racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; andincreasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenrythat deliberateswith greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Discussions of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – we control uniqueness: students already have dogmatic notions about the world – government policy discussions is vital to force engagement with competing perspective to improve social outcomes and break down pre-conceived barriers of what is right – this turns case

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability topredict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example,simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis \*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their*own*government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while *bringing theory into the realm of practice*.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research*‘‘*their’’government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Prefer our evidence because it is more specific to the debate context. Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### CASE

#### Their aff replaces a precise focus with the big sweeping claims of post-9/11, dehumanizing Muslims and terrorists generally. That mindset makes it impossible to grieve since we have no idea for whom we grieve and justifies endless violence.

#### No solvency – Butler says we have to grieve through the obituary since only it can attempt to re-humanize, but you don’t even read the names of those indefinitely detained, enacting the same violence against their bodies as detention.

#### Their aff’s proscribed grief is re-appropriated to justify the War on Terror

Schneider and Butler 10

Nathan (writer on religion and resistance for Harper’s, The Nation, the New York Times, editor of Waging Nonviolence and Killing the Buddha, author of two books) and Judith (Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley). “A Carefully Crafted F\*\*k You.” An Interview with Judith Butler. Guernica. The European Graduate School. March 2010.

Guernica: **Forms of grief are deployed, through certain deplorable exemplars, to justify a military regime**—**the Holocaust, for example, and now 9/11**. Why, then, **can’t grief just as easily be used to justify more war?** Judith Butler: Well, **I** do **worry about those instances in which public mourning is explicitly proscribed**, and that invariably happens in the context of war. I think **there were ways, for instance, of producing icons of those who were killed in the 9/11 attacks in such a way that the desire for revenge and vindication was stoked**. So we have to distinguish between modes of **mourning [can]** that actually extend our ideas about equality, and those that **produce differentials, such as “this population is worth protecting” and “this population deserves to die**.” Guernica: **The hawkish wing in the “war on terror” has quite effectively claimed the banner of feminism.** Is feminism as it has been articulated in part to blame for this? **¶** Judith Butler: No, I think that **we have seen quite cynical uses of feminism for the waging of war.** The vast majority of feminists oppose these contemporary wars, and object to the false construction of **Muslim women “in need of being saved**” as a cynical use of feminist concerns with equality. There are some very strong and interesting Muslim feminist movements, and casting Islam as anti-feminist not only disregards those movements, but displaces many of the persisting inequalities in the first world onto an imaginary elsewhere. Guernica: After millions of protesters around the world could do nothing to prevent the Iraq War, what do you think is the most effective form of protest? Disobedience? Or even thinking? ¶ Judith Butler: Let us remember that Marx thought of thinking as a kind of practice. Thinking can take place in and as embodied action. It is not necessarily a quiet or passive activity. Civil disobedience can be an act of thinking, of mindfully opposing police force, for instance. I continue to believe in demonstrations, but I think they have to be sustained. We see the continuing power of this in Iran right now. The real question is why people thought with the election of Obama that there was no reason to still be on the street? It is true that many people on the left will never have the animus against Obama that they have against Bush. But maybe we need to protest policies instead of individuals. After all, it takes many people and institutions to sustain a war. ¶ Guernica: Anyone who went to an anti-war protest during the Bush administration surely saw the violence of the anger directed personally against the president. People have a need to personalize. It seems to me the strength of your book, though, is that it counter-personalizes, turning our focus not so much to policies or policy-makers as to victims and potential victims. ¶ Judith Butler: It is personal, but it asks what our obligations are to those we do not know. So in this sense, it is about the bonds we must honor even when we do not know the others to whom we are bound. ¶ Guernica: Your account of nonviolence revolves around recognizing sociality and interconnection as well. Does it also rely on the kind of inner spiritual work that was so important, for instance, to Gandhi? ¶ Judith Butler: I am not sure that the work is “inner” in the way that Gandhi described. But I do think that one has to remain vigilant in relation to one’s own aggression, to craft and direct it in ways that are effective. This work on the self, though, takes place through certain practices, and by noticing where one is, how angry one is, and even comporting oneself differently over time. **I think this has to be a social practice, one that we undertake with others.** That **support and solidarity are crucial to maintaining it**. **Otherwise, we think we should become heroic individuals, and that takes us away from effective collective action. ¶** Guernica: What can philosophy, which so often looks like a kind of solitary heroism, offer against the military-industrial complexes and the cowboy self-image that keep driving us into wars? At what register can philosophy make a difference? ¶ Judith Butler: Let’s remember that the so-called military-industrial complex has a philosophy, even if it is not readily published in journals. The contemporary cowboy also has, or exemplifies, a certain philosophical vision of power, masculinity, impermeability, and domination. So the question is how philosophy takes form as an embodied practice. Any action that is driven by principles, norms, or ideals is philosophically informed. So we might consider: what practices embody interdependency and equality in ways that might mitigate the practice of war waging? My wager is that there are many.

#### Butler argues for a mourning backed by rage. That rage can only lead to violence toward the Other

McIvor 12, David W. (PhD from Duke University, research associate @ The Kettering Foundation) “Bringing Ourselves to Grief: Judith Butler and the Politics of Mourning” *Political Theory.* 2 May 2012. <http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/40/4/409>

Butler turns to Levinas and Adorno for the cultivation of ethical dispositions in which mourning is refigured as a site of dispossession. Yet this move repeats the melancholic refrain. **Under the thrall of the unforgiving superego figure derived from Levinas and Adorno, the political expression of mourning becomes a curious (if not paradoxical) enraged nonviolence, which Butler calls the “carefully crafted ‘fuck you.’**”80 **Butler presumes that** acts of ek-static **acknowledgement** beneath the gaze of a revised superego **will allow enraged claims to take on a nonviolent character, but it is difficult to accept this idea** at face value. **On the contrary, the deep anger of the political “fuck you”—no matter how carefully crafted—seems to inevitably drift towards violence that,** far from remaining in touch with the ek-static nature of subjectivity, **obliterates the ambivalence of both the targeted other and the social-political world composed of a plurality of multi-faceted others**.81

#### Butler advocates the removal of the subject’s identity from politics, but complete denial separates us from reality and kills our ability to grieve

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Because **Butler** is leery of the regnant social forces that structure and uphold identity, she **emphasizes mourning as a “disidentificatory” practice**, in the style of Antigone. Hence she initially conceives of mourning as a limit ethos that exposes, tests **and resignifies identity claims that are too dogmatic or too much in denial over identity’s contingent foundation**. Seemingly unsatisfied with the limited nature of an Antigonean politics, Butler turned to claim mourning as a positive process of cultivating ethical dispositions such as generosity and humility, which could serve as resources for a nonviolent politics. However, **the subject’s identity is not secured by this process but, instead, perpetually deferred and decentered by** unwilled **susceptibility to others**. Hence this turn still rests on a claim of melancholic subjectivity reinforced now by a dictatorial, melancholic “Thou Shalt” that obscures the vexed and ambivalent nature of our interactions with, and responsibilities to, multi-faceted others. For Klein, **on the other hand,** non-dogmatic identity results **not from disidentificatory refusals or a perpetual deferral of the self, but** from positive identifications with ambivalent internal and external realities **and objects. In the depressive position we experience loss but manage to internalize objects that make this loss bearable and continued life possible. The work of mourning succeeds not through disintegration but integration of the subject, which will not eliminate our grief over, or grievances with, others but will make these grievances more realistic and our efforts to address them more reparative.**

#### By focusing on an ethic of grief, Butler ignores the political conditions necessary to acknowledge suffering

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Alongside this emphasis on mourning as a practice of resignification, **Butler** **has** more recently **described mourning in terms of an “identification with suffering itself” that cultivates ethical dispositions such as humility and generosity**.12 An acknowledgement of the universal susceptibility to suffering and the “disorientation” of grief puts the individual in a salutary “mode of unknowingness” that might make for a more welcoming form of life.13 As David Gutterman and Sara Rushing see it, **this represents a move by Butler towards an “ethics of grief,” through which a common vulnerability to loss enables individuals to develop humility towards their constitutive limitations.** 14 **In the wake of this move, however**, **critics** such as Bonnie Honig and George Shulman **have faulted Butler for displac[es] politics with ethics, a displacement that compromises her earlier insights into the inevitably contested nature of public life and disavows the political conditions necessary for the acknowledgment of others and their suffering**.

#### Your starting point is too abstract and prevents respect of the Other in the world

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**Insofar as these claims about precariousness and vulnerability, however, are pitched at the level of an abstract, universal humanism, they elide the concrete messiness of our actual, lived communities in which we (imperfectly) act, speak, love, and mourn. The difficulty** with Butler’s ethics of responsibility in the thrall of Levinas **is not that we can reasonably deny our impingement by the other’s “face” but that we are responsive to a plurality of faces, and that each of these faces has more than one face. The origin of ethics** in a pre-ontological relation **can only serve to obscure the multiple ambivalent relationships that comprise our ethical and political commitments, visions, responsibilities, and actions.**

#### Butler’s reliance on Adorno’s ethic of responsibility makes acting impossible

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**Butler** herself **seems nervous about the abstract nature of Levinas’ claims, which is why she turns to Adorno** in order to reconnect an ethics of responsibility to a theorist indebted to a Weberian “ethic of responsibility.” For Adorno, **responsibility required a critical investigation of both the social and material conditions of our time and the ideological discourses surrounding and justifying those conditions.** Adorno formulated this as “an element not just of self-criticism, but of criticism of that unyielding, inexorable something that sets itself up in us.”75 The pressure of this “inexorable something” puts into circulation a critical process of investigating “damaged life” that is the antipode to moral narcissism. **For Butler, this resembles a tarrying with grief as a means of interrogating the limits of subjugation.** **She follows Adorno** in seeing the “unyielding, inexorable something” as a means of recalling the subject to its own opacity or fallibility. **Yet** **Adorno’s unyielding self-criticism reflects his melancholic faith that “life itself is so deformed and distorted that no one is able to live the good life**.76 Therefore, **the only responsible course for Adorno is to follow an absolute “negative prescription” of resistance “to all the things imposed on us**, to everything the world has made of us.”77 **On this view, there are no benign or innocuous (let alone positive) actions or forms of life; even an occasional “visit to the cinema” becomes a “betrayal” of self-critical insights and an unforgiveable act of conformism to the deformed and violent world.**78

#### Grief does not solve the state of exception, which according to Butler is the root cause of bare life and violence against the Other

Boesten 10

Jelke (phd, pf University of Leeds) “Inequality, normative violence and livable life: Judith Butler and Peruvian Reality” 2010 polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/working-paper-no1-2010.pdf

Butler starts her discussion with Foucault’s understanding of governmentality in which political power manages and regulates populations (for further elaboration see Drinot, this volume). Foucault saw governmentality as characteristically late modern, in that it was clearly distinct from earlier understandings of state power, i.e., sovereignty. Butler points out that sovereignty has come back, emphasizing that it has not replaced governmentality, but that ‘**sovereignty, under emergency conditions in which the rule of law is suspended, [reemerged**] in the context of governmentality with the vengeance of an anachronism that refuses to die.’ Writing **in the context of the discussion about Guantanamo Bay, the concentration of power in the executive branch of US government suspended the separation of powers and vested judiciary power in the President** –suggesting a ‘return’ to the times when a monarch had sovereign power over its subjects. Yet, Butler asserts, **decision-making about who gets a trial and who will be detained indefinitely** **lies with** ‘managerial officials’, suggesting that they do so within a field of governmentality. Modern governmentality is bound up with contemporary sovereignty in **the officials who rule via delegated power, deciding over life and death in a paralegal setting.** Agamben notes that sovereignty, understood as an extra-legal authority, establishes the conditions for the exceptional suspension of law, i.e. the sovereign has the power to grant exceptional status. In doing so, the state creates a ‘para legal universe that goes by the name of law’. This does not mean that the bureaucrats who exercise power over life and death do so in a context of lawlessness, but **they operate on the basis of the exception to the law. Such a construction of a state of emergency, suggests Butler, makes all life vulnerable to be assigned exceptional status, i.e. to be stripped of rights in an indefinite state of emergency** (Butler 2004c). **This vulnerability is what Butler calls the ‘precarity’ of life. It is sovereignty that makes the state of emergency, and the suspension of law, possible.** As Butler asserts, ‘the law is suspended in the name of the ‘sovereignty’ of the nation where ‘sovereignty’ denotes the task of any state to preserve and protect its own territoriality’ (p55). Of course, **the notion of nation and territory helps to set the parameters for exclusion, for defining the other.** The process of imagining nation shows that the other can be internal and that a nation does not necessarily include all who live in its territory. Nevertheless, sovereign power does cover territory, and the suspension of law within its territory means that those who are not perceived as forming part of the nation enter a freefall, are suspended themselves, become vulnerable to the visions of the infinite enemy, in other words, they become a state of exception. Butler calls upon Agamben to reflect on the meaning of the infinite enemy. According to Agamben, the state that invokes its sovereign power to declare the exception to the law, or the emergency, strips certain life from its ‘ontological status as subjects’ (Butler 2004c p67). Agamben distinguishes between the political being and bare life. The political being, or bios, is a life valued with rights, a citizen. **Bare life,** or zoë, consists of life, but not rights. It **is life devoid of value, life that does not deserve to live**. It is life as biological minimum (Agamben 1998). **Bare life is the exception where law does not rule nor protect.** Butler is interested in bare life in the context of the suspension of law in cases that fit the vision of the infinite enemy according to a sovereign state, ‘animated by an aggressive nostalgia that seeks to do away with the separation of powers’ (2004c p61). **Bare life refers to those kept in indefinite detention: it is life, but ungrievable, unreal, irrelevant in the political context as perceived by the sovereign powers in a state of emergency. The notion of bare life is powerful as it invokes processes of dehumanization and the possibility of horrendous violence perpetrated upon bodies.** However, bare life is a philosophical notion that describes a state of ontological suspension; it does not allow for subtleties that may keep people at the margins of the polis, in the permanent uncertainty of becoming subject to such extreme exception. **Agamben himself, in his discussion of crimes against humanity in general, and the holocaust in particular, urges that ‘instead of asking the hypocritical question of how crimes of such atrocity could be committed against humans we must investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime’** (1998 p 171). A careful questioning of the normative truths that guide and restrict life help visibilise violence otherwise tolerated, normalized, and in some cases, legitimized. This, in turn, is the starting point to investigate the deployments of power which make abuse possible, for example in Peru.

#### Rejection of the state precludes structural solutions

Watson 12

Janell (pf Virginia Tech) “Butler’s Biopolitics: Precarious Community” 2012

Whether or not one accepts Butler’s theory of impossible grief as an explanation for unevenly imposed precarity, **this globally unequal imposition of precarity is certainly a political concern for leftists**, and Butler portrays it touchingly. However, **she is less convincing when she promotes vulnerability for all as an oppositional politics.** For her, Antigone commits a political act of defiance when she declares to King Creon that she will bury her brother. **Butler** opens Antigone’s Claim by **ask[s] what happened to feminist defiance of the state, complaining that contemporary feminists turn to the state to seek juridical redress for injuries inflicted by that same state** (2000, 1).7 Antigone instead defiantly refuses to seek justice from the abusive state. She turns her back on the state even though exile from it means certain death. **Abandoning the leftist tradition of collective uprising against the sovereign, Butler portrays a single woman who accepts banishment without actually trying to change the way the sovereign oppressor wields power. This backing away from power is why** Dean quite rightly characterizes **Butler’s recent work [is] an ethics without a politics.** Antigone **[She] takes a moral stance, but does not try to intervene in the regime that victimize[s]** her.

#### Lack of critical engagement with the state feeds neoliberalism and means the death of the left

Watson 12

Janell (pf Virginia Tech) “Butler’s Biopolitics: Precarious Community” 2012

The **neglect of the state** and of the economy **is** perhaps **less a problem than the disturbingly laissez-faire quality to Butler’s** and Esposito’s **politics of vulnerability** haunted by the specter of death. Even if it manages to launch a politics of life, **the politics of precariousness risks falling into the same systemic naturalism championed by neoliberalism**. **Liberalism** **organizes** **society so that it appears to function on its own—much like Butler’s shadowy figures of discourse-wielding power.** **The situation comes to seem naturalized—as when Butler claims that the subject cannot destroy the interpellating powers that brought it into being**. Foucault explains that security tries to get “the components of reality to work in relation to each other” (2007, 47). **This is why neoliberalism can advocate non-interference even while maintaining an effective security apparatus.** “The game of liberalism—not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course; laisser-faire, passer et aller—basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself” (Foucault 2007, 48). Even as **Butler shuns the state [but also]**, as when championing Antigone in exile, she **advocates foregrounding the reality of social dependency and corporeal mortality rather than attempting to modify the machinations of the state. She therefore falls into the security state’s own strategy of turning her reality to its political advantage.** **The social sciences contribute** to liberal naturalization, **transforming the social sphere into so many self-perpetuating systems that can be studied like the weather.** For Reid, twenty-first-century liberal regimes’ state of **permanent mobilization against terror is rooted in the organization of society according to the needs of war,** and therefore its strategies for indirectly managing populations derive from military science (2006, 17–18). In contrast, for Butler the economic sciences provide the logic of population management. She is still following Foucault in this regard, since governmentality’s principal form of knowledge is political economy (Foucault cited in Dean 2008, 110). Butler’s shift in emphasis from disciplined subjects to managed populations is reflected in her economic vocabulary. Although for her the economic is only one dimension of precarity, she relies on several economic concepts in describing the world’s vulnerable populations. **She writes that “Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe**” (Butler 2006, 32). Distribution is an economic phenomenon related to several others. For example, she writes that “**war is precisely an effort to minimize precariousness for some and to maximize it for others**” (2010, 54). Minimizing and maximizing are economic concepts. Lives that matter are lives with “worth,” with “value,” that “count”—to cite some of the other economic vocabulary scattered throughout Precarious Lives and Frames of War. **While Butler’s primary concern may be with inequality and her political aim “a more radical and effective form of egalitarianism”** (2010, xxii), **her analysis relies on the economic notion of distribution**. Precariousness is distributed equally among all living beings, while “Precarity is distributed unequally or, at least, **strategies to implement** that **unequal distribution are precisely what is at work in war and in the differential treatment of catastrophes such as famine and earthquakes**” (2010, xvii). Precariousness “establishes a certain equality of exposure,” but current **global political conditions deny** this **equality** “in favor of a differential distribution of precarity” (2010, xxv). Butler is describing a biopolitical economy of corporeally vulnerable lives. I am defining economy broadly to include not only the exchange of goods, resources, or money, but also and especially distribution and valuation in an economy which manages populations by regulating life and death, withholding or conferring the biopolitical power to protect. **Her economics of vulnerability seems to operate as a perpetual motion machine watched over by an invisible hand. This makes it hard to reimagine a more nurturing state and a more just economy. These were the dreams of communism and socialism, and despite the failures of the communisms and socialisms that have actually existed, I think that it would be politically fatal if the left gives up the quest for better means of governing, producing, and distributing. Precarity is the problem, but precariousness is not the solution.**

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## 2NC

### CASE

Adnan Farhan Abd Al Latif was a Yemeni citizen detained at Guantanamo on January 17 2002. He was held there for 10 years, 7 months, 25 days. Latif died at Guantanamo on September 10, 2012. He died at the age of 36.

Ali Abdullah Ahmed was a Yemeni citizen detained at Guantanamo on 2002. Ahmed died at Guantanamo on June 10, 2006. He died at the age of 36.

Abdul Rahman al-Amri was a citizen of Saudi Arabia detained at Guantanamo on 2002. al-Amri died at Guantanamo on May 30, 2007. He died at the age of 34.

Awal Gul was a citizen of Afghanistan detained at Guantanamo on 2002. Gul died at Guantanamo on February 2, 2011. He was the father of 18 children. He died at the age of 61.

Inayatullah was a citizen of Afghanistan detained at Guantanamo on 2006. Inayatullah died at Guantanamo on May 18, 2011. He died at age 37.

Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi

Yemen

June 1, 2009

Died at age 35

Mani Shaman Turki al-Habardi Al-Utaybi

Saudi

2001

June 10, 2006

32

Yasser Talal al Zahrani

Saudi

2001

June 10, 2006

29

#### According to Butler, the ONLY WAY to grieve a life is through the obituary, literally reading names to re-humanize. Otherwise, you commit the same violence. I DON'T EVEN KNOW THE AUTHOR TO YOUR OBITUARY BECAUSE YOU DIDNT HAVE THE CONSIDERATION TO READ HIS NAME--butler defines obituary as ability to grieve a lost life--literally the dead.

**Butler,** Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley, **2004**

(Judith, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, page 34)

**discourse** itself **effects violence through omission**. If **200,000 Iraqi children were killed** during the Gulf War and its aftermath,1 do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, Singly or collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? **Are there names attached to those children?** There are no obituaries for the war casualties that the United States inflicts, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition. Although we might argue that it would be impractical to write obituaries for all those people, or for all people, I think we have to ask, again and again, **the obituary functions as the** instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the **means by which a life becomes**, or fails to become, a **publicly grievable** life, an icon for national self-recogn ition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. As a result, we have to consider [he obituary as an act of nation-building. The matter is not a simple one, for, **if a life is not grievable, it is not quite a life**; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if not the unburiable.

#### This means zero solvency since the aff ignores the larger context in which grief occurs and turns case – they only perpetuate violence against the other through war.

Gutterman and Rushing 08

David S. (pf Willamette Univ) and Sara L. (pf Montana St) Judith Butler’s Precarious Politics. “Sovereignty and suffering: towards an ethics of grief in a post-9/11 world” 2008

And yet as President George W. **Bush** **made perfectly clear**, in declaring the time for grieving to be over a mere ten days after 9/11, **grief can figure within American political discourse as nothing but weakness and inaction.** The sign of our strength, in Bush’s opinion, is that ‘Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution’ (Bush 2001: para. 6). It is this rapid conversion – **this quick hardening and turning away from grief** – that **Butler laments**. For grieving humanises us, it humanises others. Furthermore, insofar as none of us is above the reality that all human life can be instantaneously annulled, regardless of class, race, ideology, or nationality, ‘grief equalizes us’ (Butler 2003a: 7). Or at least, **grief has the potential to equalise us, if we can recognise both the inequality of our vulnerability and the equality of our grievability**. Here, then, is the political and ethical test Butler places before us. **The actions of the US in the past years – the waging of pre-emptive war, the authorisation of torture, extraordinary rendition, and indeﬁnite detention – can be read as a resounding rejection of the hand of solidarity extended by the world after 9/11. If there was an opportunity to heed the precariousness of life** and to break the cycle of revenge – by identifying with others and with suffering itself, **by grieving our losses**, becoming undone by them – **it was rapidly and decisively shut down. This opportunity was not merely a casualty of war. Bush Administration policies after 9/11 can be read precisely as an attempt to effect that foreclosure, and as a rejection** and/or failure **of Butler’s test**.

### WELSH

#### The fantasy of change is a DA

Lobel 7 (Orly, Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego, Harvard Law Review, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937)

The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism - the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action - all produce **a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation**. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble. [226](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n226) The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a "time of the nation" body of knowledge and motivation. [227](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n227) In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-state-national federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline. [228](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n228) There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed "the missing middle" by Professor Theda Skocpol. [229](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n229) New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that **this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism**. [230](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n230) Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, **to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative**. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be **self**-  [\*987]  **regarding** and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities. [231](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n231)

#### Educational institutions like debate should enable students to participate in the process of governing. We can’t dismantle warfare states without creating the cultural conditions and public spheres to move beyond being spectators of war.

Giroux 13 Henry A. is a social critic and educator, and the author of many books. He currently holds the Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Ontario, Monthly Review, Volume 65, Issue 01 (May)

In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 Such massive inequality and the suffering and political corruption it produces point to the need for critical analysis in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means developing terms that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced. Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for desires, subjectivities, and social relations that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance. What is needed are modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized networks, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life. Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to develop new cultural and political vocabularies that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One central pedagogical and political task in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and militarized knowledge factories. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military, market, and religious fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign policy. Any viable notion of resistance to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful. Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of

common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation, nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a surplus of fear, insecurity, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the ideological and structural foundations of violence that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for educators, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing that: the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the conformity of its intellectuals who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic.

#### Grief must be accessible to the public, otherwise it will never go beyond its current form, used to justify violence and war.

McIvor 12, David W. (PhD from Duke University, research associate @ The Kettering Foundation) “Bringing Ourselves to Grief: Judith Butler and the Politics of Mourning” *Political Theory.* 2 May 2012. <http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/40/4/409>

Here **the theorist of the mourning subject has to engage in a conversation with a host of concrete publics through which grief [is] and grievance are framed and filtered. Mourning** in this light **is** **conceived neither as subversion** **nor as dispossession**; **instead it is a means of speaking about loss in the name of establishing crosscutting relationships amidst social plurality and diversity. By emphasizing engagements across multiple, concrete publics we can overcome the abstractions and contradictions of Butler’s politics of grief**. This would cash in on the immanent promises of Antigone’s (and **Butler’s) claims**, which, **when resituated within the discursive space of the polis, imply that the norms and frames of life and grief can be deliberatively reworked and revised. Bringing ourselves to grief is a vital ethical and political charge, but to embed this charge in our political and cultural practices we must** work through, instead of endlessly repeating, the scene of melancholic subjugation. In the process we would **return the politics of mourning to its location within the precarious life of the polity**.

#### If individual grieving is seen as sufficient, then there will be no public or communal deliberation, which is key to resolving difference and spurring action

McIvor 12, David W. (PhD from Duke University, research associate @ The Kettering Foundation) “Bringing Ourselves to Grief: Judith Butler and the Politics of Mourning” *Political Theory.* 2 May 2012. <http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/40/4/409>

In the space remaining I would like to point in the direction that this work might go. For starters it would involve revising accounts of democratic theory and practice so that they might take seriously Antigone-like disruptive claims of **grief [as]** and grievance while ultimately favoring **a mode of politics** that would cultivate and reinforce the dispositions of Klein’s mourning subject. In part, this **is done by re-situating these claims within a broadened concept of public discourse such that they can disrupt hasty prohibitions of grief while remaining committed to the possibility of articulating and working through these claims in public with multi-faceted others**. **These claims** **only** **originate from within concrete communities** and modes of address, **and more capacious or generous forms of civic identity must thereby originate through repeated acts of acknowledgement of, and identification with, these claims**. Clearly this is easier said than done. Butler’s judgment regarding the poverty of regnant public discourses of loss and grief is largely borne out. **Too often public modes of mourning do not exceed what she calls the “dry grief of an endless political rage**.”101 Yet Antigone’s discursive success provides a model for how claims of grief can address and even overcome this dry form of grief in order to form the effective basis of a revised civic identity. **Public contestation of the norms circumscribing life and loss is valuable not because it reveals an ineffable “limit” to subject formation but because it exposes our limited perspectives and life-experiences.** **Deliberation across differences can induce reflection on heretofore-inviolable articles of faith and dogmatic certainties**.102 **It can lead to an appreciation of the ambiguity and tragedy marking our lives with others while developing relatively open and public means of acting in the face of this instability and uncertainty**. Reflexive comparisons regarding grief and loss can lead to the reexamination of deeply held norms and the evolution of unthinking doxa into more reflective judgments. Iterations of such processes in turn nurture a civic identity committed to honoring the dignity of political adversaries by acknowledging that disagreements and tensions cannot be wished away but only slowly and patiently worked through.

#### Focusing on epistemology selfishly ignores real world problems

Jarvis 0 Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 2

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5

#### TRADE-OFFS - Trying to fix debate – especially ones that lack a clear agenda – won’t be easy and it will come at the cost of paying attention to worse off groups

LOBEL 7, Asst Pf of Law, U of San Diego(Orly, Harvard Law Review, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937)

Similarly, at the local level, grassroots politics **often lack a clear agenda** and are particularly **ripe for cooptation** resulting in far lesser achievements than what may have been expected by the groups involved. In a critical introduction to the law and organizing model, Professor Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly describe the ways in which new community-based approaches to progressive lawyering privilege grassroots activism over legal reform efforts and the facilitation of community mobilization over conventional lawyering. [181](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n181) After carefully unpacking the ways in which community lawyers embrace  [\*977]  law and organizing, Professor Cummings and Eagly rightfully warn against "exaggerating the ineffectiveness of traditional legal interventions" and "closing off potential avenues for redress." [182](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b7d531dcca7209b987833602ed6fbb4e&docnum=23&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAt&_md5=3f8bfd4662cb01d0d1bf9f28a63e1155&focBudTerms=lobel%20and%20harvard&focBudSel=all#n182) Significantly, the strategies embraced by new public interest lawyers have not been shown to produce effective change in communities, and certainly there has been no assurance that these strategies fare comparatively better than legal reform. Moreover, what are meant to be progressive projects of community action and community economic development frequently can have **a hidden effect of excluding worse-off groups,** such as migrant workers, because of the geographical scope and zoning restrictions of the project.

## 1NR

### FRAMEWORK

#### The value of debate is its ability to train students to think critically within an insulated forum – their framework destroys this educational potential because invites cooption by outside sources

**Coverstone**, Director @ Princeton High School, **1995** [Alan, “An Inward Glance,” http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm]

Yet, Mitchell goes too far. In two important areas, his argument is slightly miscalibrated. First, Mitchell underestimates the value of debate as it is currently practiced. There is greater value in the somewhat insular nature of our present activity than he assumes. Debate's inward focus creates an unusual space for training and practice with the tools of modem political discourse. Such space is largely unavailable elsewhere in American society. Second, Mitchell overextends his concept of activism. He argues fervently for mass action along ideological lines. Such a turn replaces control by society's information elite with control by an elite all our own. More than any other group in America today, practitioners of debate should recognize the subtle issues upon which political diversity turns. Mitchell's search for broad themes around which to organize mass action runs counter to this insight. As a result, Mitchell's call for an outward activist turn threatens to subvert the very values it seeks to achieve.¶ AN OASIS IN THE DESERT¶ Mitchell's argument underestimates the nature of academic debate in three ways. First, debate trains students in the very skills required for navigation in the public sphere of the information age. In the past, political discourse was controlled by those elements who controlled access to information. While this basic reality will continue in the future, its essential features will change. No longer will mere possession of information determine control of political life. Information is widely available. For the first time in human history we face the prospect of an entirely new threat. The risk of an information overload is already shifting control of political discourse to **superior information managers**. It is no longer possible to control political discourse by limiting access to information. Instead, control belongs to those who are capable of identifying and delivering bits of information to a thirsty public. Mitchell calls this the "desertification of the public sphere."¶ The public senses a deep desire for the ability to manage the information around them. Yet, they are unsure how to process and make sense of it all. In this environment, snake charmers and charlatans abound. The popularity of the evening news wanes as more and more information becomes available. People realize that these half hour glimpses at the news do not even come close to covering all available information. They desperately want to select information for themselves. So they watch CNN until they fall asleep. Gavel to gavel coverage of political events assumes top spots on the Nielsen charts. Desperate to decide for themselves, the public of the twenty-first century drinks deeply from the well of information. When they are finished, they find they are no more able to decide. Those who make decisions are envied and glorified.¶ Debate teaches individual decision-making for the information age. No other academic activity available today teaches people more about information gathering, assessment, selection, and delivery. Most importantly, debate teaches individuals how to make and defend their own decisions. Debate is the only academic activity that moves at the speed of the information age. Time is required for individuals to achieve escape velocity. Academic debate holds tremendous value as a space for training.¶ Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue.¶ Second, Mitchell's argument underestimates the risks associated with an outward turn. Individuals trained in the art and practice of debate are, indeed, well suited to the task of entering the political world. At some unspecified point in one's training, the same motivation and focus that has consumed Mitchell will also consume most of us. At that point, political action becomes a proper endeavor. However, all of the members of the academic debate community will not reach that point together. A political outward turn threatens to corrupt the oasis in two ways. It makes our oasis a target, and it threatens to politicize the training process.¶ As long as debate appears to be focused inwardly, **political elites will not feel threatened**. Yet one of Mitchell's primary concerns is recognition of our oasis in the political world. In this world we face well trained information managers. Sensing a threat from "debate," they will begin to infiltrate our space. Ready made information will increase and debaters will eat it up. Not yet able to truly discern the relative values of information, young debaters will eventually be influenced dramatically by the infiltration of political elites. Retaining our present anonymity in political life offers a better hope for reinvigorating political discourse.¶ As perhaps the only truly non-partisan space in American political society, academic debate holds the last real possibility for training active political participants. Nowhere else are people allowed, let alone encouraged, to test all manner of political ideas. This is the process through which debaters learn what they believe and why they believe it. In many ways this natural evolution is made possible by the isolation of the debate community. An example should help illustrate this idea.¶ Like many young debaters, I learned a great deal about socialism early on. This was not crammed down my throat. Rather, I learned about the issue in the free flow of information that is debate. The intrigue of this, and other outmoded political arguments, was in its relative unfamiliarity. Reading socialist literature avidly, I was ready to take on the world. Yet I only had one side of the story. I was an easy mark for the present political powers. Nevertheless, I decided to fight City Hall. I had received a parking ticket which I felt was unfairly issued. Unable to convince the parking department to see it my way, I went straight to the top. I wrote the Mayor a letter. In this letter, I accused the city of exploitation of its citizens for the purpose of capital accumulation. I presented a strong Marxist critique of parking meters in my town. The mayor's reply was simple and straightforward. He called me a communist. He said I was being silly and should pay the ticket. I was completely embarrassed by the entire exchange. I thought I was ready to start the revolution. In reality, I wasn't even ready to speak to the Mayor. I did learn from the experience, but I did not learn what Gordon might have hoped. I learned to stop reading useless material and to keep my opinions to myself.¶ Do we really want to force students into that type of situation? I wrote the mayor on my own. Debaters will experiment with political activism on their own. This is all part of the natural impulse for activism which debate inspires. Yet, in the absence of such individual motivation, an outward turn threatens to short circuit the learning process. Debate should capitalize on its isolation. We can teach our students to examine all sides of an issue and reach individual conclusions before we force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.

#### This middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments

Biesta ‘9 Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63). To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77). It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

#### There are two links to the AFF: (1) the subject is the debater, instead of the USFG

Ericson 3

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.