# UNLV Cards Round Doubles

## 1NC

### Off1

#### Interpretation- “Restrictions” must *legally limit* an activity under the President’s authority- the President must no longer have authority to carry it out

DOE ’95 (Personnel Security Administrative Review Cases – DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS Hearing Officer's Opinion Case Name: Personnel Security Hearing Date of Filing:December 5, 1995 – http://www.oha.doe.gov/cases/security/vso0075.htm)

In contrast, it is not clear, as the Army and the DOE alleged, that the individual was being dishonest when he signed a document stating that he had never been restricted or suspended from flight duty. DOE Exhibit 5(g)(3). There is no dispute that the individual washed out of pilot flight training. However, the record contains no clear and consistent definitions of the terms "restricted" or "suspended." As pointed out by the individual, neither term is defined in the glossary of the Army Flight Regulations. Post-hearing brief of individual at 6. In the civilian world, the word "restrict" means "to hold within limits" and the word suspend means "to bar for a period of time" or "to cause to stop for a period." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 1002, 1166 (1984). Thus, the word "restrict" implies that, for example, a pilot or naval flight officer has been limited from certain duties that a pilot or naval flight officer would normally have, unlike in the present case, where the individual never became a pilot and nothing in the record indicates that the individual was ever restricted in his duties as an naval flight officer. Neither is there any evidence that, prior to his suspension in 1991, the individual was suspended from flight duty, i.e. barred from certain duties for a period of time and then returned to those duties. Therefore, I do not find that the individual's denials that he was ever restricted or suspended from flight duty constitute derogatory information under Criterion (l).

#### Two violations- the aff is ONLY a *reporting requirement,* and they only require the disclosure of *legal justifications for “targeted killings,”* not *of the individual killings themselves*

#### Reasons to vote-

#### Ground- all of our generic links are premised on the aff taking away presidential authority to do things or legally limiting their activities- they take away any deference good or targeted killing good ground- the neg is left with virtually nothing

#### Predictability- there are an INFINITE number of agencies or other governments they can report to and NO REASON that informing specific people of the aff’s choice is bad- they get advantages based SOLELY on the reporting with NO additional neg ground

#### Bidirectionality- they justify affs that require the executive to report on activities they currently *don’t have authority to do*- here’s specific ev that reporting requirements GRANT authority NOT restrict it

Mayer 2001 (Kenneth, Political Science Professor at UW-Madison, With the Stroke of a Pen:¶ Executive Orders and Presidential Power, http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7095.html)

Moreover, efforts to check presidential power through legislative restrictions often have had the counterproductive effect of legitimizing the very powers that Congress has tried to limit. I treat this problem in more detail in chapter two, but two examples highlight the problem that Congress faces. When Congress tried to limit the president's ability to carry out covert intelligence operations by imposing reporting requirements in the Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980, it inadvertently provided legislative recognition of the president's covert operations authority. The mere fact that Congress required the president to report on such activities was read by the courts as a congressional recognition of the president's right to conduct them. "So once again," concludes Gordon Silverstein, "Congress' attempt to control the executive's actions in foreign policy only provided fresh and unprecedented explicit authorization for executive prerogative."112

### Off2

#### CP Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order requiring the release of the United States Department of Justice memoranda outlining the legal basis and justification for drone strikes in the area of targeted killing.

#### Internal checks are comparatively more effective than external restrictions

Radsan 2010 (Afsheen, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, BUSH AND OBAMA FIGHT TERRORISTS¶ OUTSIDE JUSTICE JACKSON'S TWILIGHT¶ ZONE, 26 Const. Comment. 551 2009-2010)

Back to my focus on the CIA, not only do I question the¶ usefulness of Jackson's categories on issues of executive power, I¶ challenge whether Congress is a significant check on intelligence¶ activities.35 More promising as checks on the intelligence¶ community are the patrolling entities within the executive¶ branch: the lawyers, the inspectors general, and the review¶ boards within the clandestine service. Internal checks, in other¶ words, are more effective than external checks on the CIA's¶ manifestations of executive power. Congress's express or implied¶ approval of intelligence activities, whether by appropriations or¶ by more specific statutes, is superficial compared to deeper¶ trends within the executive branch. In a sort of paradox,¶ however, the most important checks are the most difficult to¶ measure; empirical data on the CIA's Office of General¶ Counsel, the Office of Inspector General, and the Accountability¶ Review Boards are thin-and often classified. This paradox¶ applies to both Presidents Bush and Obama.

### Off3

#### Congressional restrictions kill PC- Obama’s first term proves other objectives outweigh SOP questions

Ackerman and Hathaway 11 (Bruce and Oona, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 447, lexis)

President Bush had now transformed a war authorized by Congress into a war authorized by the president alone. Gone was Saddam's "continuing" threat to the national security of the United States. Gone were the U.N. Security Council resolutions. In their place, the president presented Congress with a fait accompli - a document that committed the country to fight the war for three more years. n115 But would the new administration go along with this unconstitutional power play? Only months before, Senators Obama, Biden, and Clinton had endorsed a resolution demanding the submission of any new Iraq agreement to Congress for approval. n116 Now that they were president, vice president, and secretary of state, they could make their earlier resolution into reality.¶ As they pondered their next steps, developments in Iraq provided an ironic commentary. The new Iraqi constitution, like our own, required the chief executive to submit the bilateral agreements to the country's parliament for ratification. In stark contrast to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki followed constitutional requirements, providing the Iraq assembly with an opportunity to deliberate upon and approve the bilateral agreement. n117 Did Iraq's embryonic democracy have an important constitutional lesson to teach the oldest democracy in the world? n118¶ [\*475] While campaigning for the presidency, Senators Obama and Clinton appeared to think so. But on January 20th, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton silently acquiesced in their predecessor's usurpation of congressional authority. They made no public effort to reconcile this decision with their previous protests. Their silent acceptance of Bush's agreement with Iraq - effectively ratifying it - had obvious political advantages: when Obama announced his determination to withdraw combat troops by August 2010, Republicans were in no position to denounce the administration's plans as tantamount to surrender, for the pronouncement was consistent with the plan announced in the agreement negotiated by President Bush. n119¶ Congress joined in this act of collective amnesia - with politics, once again, serving as the obvious motivation. The Democrats in control of both houses had better things to do than embarrass their new president with constitutional objections to the ongoing military effort in Iraq. They were preparing themselves for the coming struggle over the stimulus package, health care reform, financial reform, and other high-priority initiatives. No one was prepared to fight for Congress's right to approve an agreement that was already in place and was serving as the basis of the country's war in Iraq.¶ Nor were minority Republicans inclined to act as the nation's constitutional conscience. This would not only involve a direct attack on Bush's earlier actions. It would (implicitly) suggest that President Obama had the constitutional prerogative to repudiate the Bush agreement and opt for a speedier pullout in Iraq - a policy few if any Republicans in Congress supported.¶ Political imperatives were now trumping the institutional logic of the separation of powers. n120 Both political parties had an interest in allowing President Obama to silently ratify President Bush's transformation of a limited war into an unlimited conflict. With no one contesting the matter, the media failed to note the odd disjunction posed by Iraq's turn to parliamentary participation and Washington's embrace of executive unilateralism.

#### Obama will win the debt ceiling fight now- his political strength is the key factor

Kapur 9/12/2013 (Sahil, Talking Points Memo’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent. His articles covering politics and public policy have been published in The Huffington Post, The Guardian and The New Republic, Cantor: If We Can’t Defund Obamacare, Let’s Delay It, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/eric-cantor-obamacare-debt-ceiling-shutdown-default.php)

In order to persuade conservatives lawmakers to vote to keep the federal government funded past Sept. 30, House Republican leaders are proposing to stare down President Barack Obama over the debt ceiling by seeking a one-year delay of Obamacare.¶ At a closed-door meeting Tuesday, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) floated a strategy to delay the rollout of Obamacare for one year in exchange for lifting the debt ceiling. The meeting was focused on pitching a plan that lets Republicans vote to defund Obamacare without risking a government shutdown if the Senate rejects the idea, a move that is meeting fierce resistance on their right flank, which wants to go further.¶ A senior Republican aide familiar with Cantor’s remarks said he was essentially trying to persuade his members that the debt limit, which the federal government is expected to hit in mid-October, provides a better opportunity than a threatened government shutdown to undermine Obamacare.¶ “He didn’t draw any red lines,” said the GOP aide. “He said it’s a better opportunity than [the continuing resolution] and a delay there is very doable.” The aide added that the concession wouldn’t necessarily just involve Obamacare; there could be other reforms. The aide admitted that it depends in part on what the president is willing to give up.¶ It all sounds far-fetched. After all, trading a government shutdown for default would be like trading a common cold for cancer. And it remains to be seen whether GOP leaders would let the economy collapse if they don’t get their way, or if they’re merely saying what they have to say to get through the shutdown crisis.¶ An upside to proposing the debt ceiling idea now is that it helps persuade Republican lawmakers not to withhold their support for keeping the government open. Cantor’s suggestion this week comes as Republicans are taking heavy fire from conservative advocates for refraining from risking a government shutdown over Obamacare. House leaders have postponed consideration of the continuing resolution until next week to build support.¶ Last month, Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) floated the idea of delaying or defunding the health care reform law in a debt ceiling package. But he, too, stopped short of drawing any red lines. A leadership aide described it at the time as an “option.”¶ Despite the anti-Obamacare frenzy consuming their right flank, Republican leaders recognize that both a shutdown and default would be a disaster for their party, potentially threatening their House majority ahead of a mid-term election when they hope to win back the Senate. Their balancing act to satisfy conservatives enough to avert a shutdown but not to create expectations that threatening debt default is the way to go.¶ Back in January, when President Barack Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, as he is now, the House GOP backed down and lifted the debt ceiling without substantive concessions (but rather symbolic ones). Republican leaders recognize that it will be extremely difficult to extract major Obamacare concessions, especially on the eve of its rollout. The last-ditch option in Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) pocket would be to avert disaster by bringing up legislation that passes with the support of mostly Democrats. This route is far from ideal for him, but he hasn’t ruled it out.¶ In a memo to Republicans last Friday, Cantor vowed to continue attacking Obamacare, but not necessarily at risk of wreaking havoc on the economy. Instead he promised that leaders will “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” He said Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”¶ At the end of the day, the battle over Obamacare is largely a side show that Republican leaders have to deal with. The real fight, where Republicans have genuine leverage, is over how much the government will spend next fiscal year and whether Congress will make permanent the lower spending levels after the automatic cuts known as sequestration.

Failure to act on the debt ceiling collapses the economy-Multiple internal links

Swagel, 9/4 [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]

A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects. Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence. With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent.

#### Best studies prove economic collapse causes war

Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Off4

#### Unique LINK—Obama is massively expanding Presidential War Powers Now—Plan is a unique reversal of that trend.

Friedersdorf, 9-12-13 (That’s yesterday)[Obama Acts Like He Doesn't Know He's an Executive-Power Extremist On the fake moderation of a president who talks a good game but doesn't follow through CONOR FRIEDERSDORF SEP 12 2013 is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/ 09/obama-acts-like-he-doesnt-know-hes-an-executive-power-extremist/279583/]

It's often hard to tell if President Obama is lying to the American people or to himself. Is he willfully misrepresenting who he is? Or is he blind to his true self? Over the last five years he has repudiated many of the positions he took in 2008, but still talks like and perhaps likes to think of himself as the man who ran on change. A passage from his Tuesday speech on Syria provides a striking example. The relevant passage -- an aside on executive power -- comes just after the president explains that he favors a strike on Syria to deter the use of chemical weapons (emphasis added): That's my judgment as commander-in-chief. But I’m also the president of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. So even though I possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress. I believe our democracy is stronger when the president acts with the support of Congress. And I believe that America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together. This is especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president, and more and more burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force. What a fascinating paragraph! Even as Obama implies that he is a circumspect steward of constitutional democracy, he asserts that even absent "a direct or imminent threat," he has absolute power to wage war without congressional support, the Constitution and the opinions of the demos be damned. If the passage ended there it would be staggering in its internal tension. As Jack Goldsmith explained in detail, intervening in Syria without congressional sign-off would "push presidential war unilateralism beyond where it has gone before." Asserting that power without using it is still an extreme position to take.¶ Obama goes a delusion farther. Ostensibly because he hasn't yet intervened, even though he repeatedly and needlessly asserts his right to do so unilaterally, he casts himself as moving away from unilateralism and toward consulting Congress. The benefits are "especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president," he notes, "while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force."¶ The grammer is priceless. Who "put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president"? In Obama's telling, "a decade" put the executive power there.¶ The absence of a human subject in the sentence isn't hard to figure out. For all President George W. Bush's faults, he sought and received majority support for the Patriot Act, the September 2001 AUMF, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq. Obama's expansion of the drone war and his illegal war-making in Libya didn't turn out as bad as Iraq, so it's hard to see him as a worse president, but Obama has done more than Bush to expand the war-making power of the White House. As for "sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force," it's Obama who went into Libya despite the fact that a House vote to approve U.S. involvement was brought to the floor and voted down.¶ Yet Obama complains about these trends as if someone other than Obama is responsible for them, and as if he has been and remains powerless to do more to reverse them. When Obama asked Congress to vote in Syria, no one forced him to insist that he had the power to intervene militarily even if a legislative vote declared otherwise. No one forced him to defend the extreme position that the presidential war power is so sweeping that it includes waging wars of choice rejected by Congress that don't involve any direct or imminent threat to the United States. ¶ He went out of his way to defend that maximal precedent, even as gave us the impression that he was trying to rein in executive power that he claims to find regrettable and worrisome. It's all consistent with Obama's favorite rhetorical tactic: granting the validity of an objection in his rhetoric, then totally ignoring the objection in his actions. In so doing, he confuses public discourse and subverts debate. We know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions. He believes the president has the power to intervene militarily without Congress in places that do not threaten America; that he can order American citizens killed in secret without due process; that he can secretly collect data on the phone calls of all Americans; that he can invoke the state-secrets privilege to avoid adjudicating constitutional challenges to his policies on their merits; that he can indefinitely detain prisoners without evidence, charges or due process, that he can sit in judgment of anyone on earth, then send a drone anywhere to strike them.¶ Yes, we know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions, that there are many steps to rein in executive power that he could take but hasn't taken ... and that he worries repeatedly about an excess of executive power in his rhetoric. What we don't know is the reason for this disconnect. After all, this ain't like Gitmo. If he really wanted to do more to shrink executive power, he could do a lot unilaterally, and no one could stop him. Is he trying to fool us? Or is he fooling himself, because he likes to think of himself as more prudent and moderate man than he is? Can he not bear the truth that he's a Cheneyite extremist\*? My best guess is that he's trying to fool us. But it's hard to know for sure.¶ \*It would be fascinating to look at the many issues on which Bush-Cheney and Obama take the same position, and compare how many times each was referred to in the media as "out of the mainstream," a phrase that faded fast circa January 2009.

#### Perception of Obama as a strong leader is key to climate negotiations – solves GHG

MARK LANDLER, 7-2-13 (Obama Seeks New U.S. Role in Climate Debate, NYT)

When President Obama barged into a meeting of leaders from Brazil, China, India and other countries at a climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, he managed to extract a last-minute agreement to set a goal to limit the rise in global temperatures.¶ It was the high-water mark of Mr. Obama’s leadership on climate change — even if the deal was less than the Americans or Europeans wanted — but it has been downhill ever since. Preoccupied with other problems, the president largely disappeared from the global debate.¶ Now he is trying to reclaim the spotlight.¶ Mr. Obama’s climate change speech at Georgetown University last week was aimed not just at a domestic audience, but also at foreigners convinced that a balky Congress had killed America’s commitment to tackling the issue. “Make no mistake,” he said, mopping his brow in the 90-degree heat, “the world still looks to America to lead.”¶ Mr. Obama has done more than talk: he recently reached a deal with President Xi Jinping of China to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbons, known as HFCs, a particularly potent greenhouse gas. In a meeting long on atmosphere, it was the only achievement that actually cleared the air.¶ “We felt we needed to expand the discussion,” said Caroline Atkinson, deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs. “We’re working all the different international angles: multilaterally, bilaterally and actions on our own.”¶ That last point is crucial because at Georgetown, Mr. Obama reaffirmed the pledge he made in Copenhagen that the United States would reduce its emissions by about 17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. Without mandated cuts in emissions from American power plants, which Mr. Obama announced he would address using his executive powers, there is little hope that the United States can meet that goal.¶ For a president who has been on the defensive over the National Security Agency’s surveillance operations and his failure to close the military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the climate change plan offers a chance to reset his image overseas. It carries echoes of what once made him so popular, tempered with the pragmatism of a leader in his second term.¶ Yet skepticism about America’s resolve to lead runs deep after four years in which climate change took a back seat in Washington to the financial crisis, a new health care law, fiscal negotiations and an overhaul of the nation’s immigration laws — really, every other big-ticket item on Mr. Obama’s agenda.¶ Whether the president can erase those doubts is an open question. While the United States drifted, Europe and Australia have plowed ahead with their own ambitious initiatives to reduce emissions. Critics were quick to fault Mr. Obama’s speech for its lack of specifics.¶ “It’s no longer the case where everyone expects key decisions from the United States and are disappointed when they don’t come,” said Stephan Singer, director of global energy policy at the environmental group WWF in Brussels. “Many countries went ahead and did their own stuff, independent of the lack of action in the U.S.”¶ Still, Mr. Singer and other experts said a re-engaged United States would make a difference in global climate efforts, particularly with countries like China and India, the world’s first and third largest emitters of carbon dioxide. Both still point to the laggard No. 2, the United States, as the main reason they should not be obliged to do more.¶ Mr. Obama’s speech kindled hopes for a couple of reasons. The centerpiece of his plan does not require Congressional approval. And he announced that the United States would no longer finance the building of conventional coal-fired plants overseas, which would help curb emissions in developing countries.¶ Mr. Obama also argued that confronting climate change need not threaten economic growth: that investing in windmills, solar panels and other types of clean-energy technology could spur scientific innovation and generate jobs. That mollifies countries like India that often complain that the West lectures them about cutting emissions, even if it constricts their development and deprives them of a better lifestyle.¶ “The U.S. has become very sophisticated in its bilateral dealings with countries,” said Durwood Zaelke, who runs the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development. “We are targeting things that India needs, like super-efficient air-conditioning.”¶ On a recent visit to New Delhi, Secretary of State John Kerry announced a loan-guarantee program by the United States Agency for International Development intended to generate at least $100 million in private financing to develop clean-energy technologies.¶ “The good news is that if we do this right, it’s not going to hurt our economies,” Mr. Kerry said. “It actually helps them. It won’t deny our children opportunity; it will actually create new ones.”¶ Chandra Bhushan, an Indian environmentalist, wrote in the online magazine Down to Earth that it was “hypocritical” for Mr. Kerry to call for India to cut emissions in its residential sector without discussing how the United States planned to do the same.¶ Still, Mr. Kerry got a warmer reception than his predecessor, Hillary Rodham Clinton, on her first visit to India four years earlier. After touring an energy-efficient building outside New Delhi that was meant to showcase American-Indian cooperation, she was caught off guard when an Indian minister warned the United States not to bully India into legally binding reductions of its carbon emissions.¶ With his long history as a champion of climate change legislation, Mr. Kerry could serve as a not-so-secret weapon for Mr. Obama. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Mr. Kerry said he intended to put climate change at the heart of his agenda at the State Department.¶ Mr. Kerry was at the table last month in Rancho Mirage, Calif., when Mr. Obama made his deal on HFCs with Mr. Xi. The administration is emphasizing these agreements, in part to work around the hurdles of negotiating a global deal to reduce emissions through the United Nations, an effort that has dragged on for years.¶ For all Mr. Obama’s efforts to forge side deals and clean-energy partnerships, his reaffirmation of his goal to reduce emissions 17 percent ties him to the United Nations process. Attention now turns to the next big climate conference, which is expected to be held in France in 2015. The question is what role the United States will play.¶ “There are still fears that the political issues in the U.S. could pull down the outcome in the 2015 meeting,” said Jennifer Morgan, director of climate and energy programs at the World Resources Institute. “But this breath of fresh air from the president could revive things.”

#### Prez Powers necessary to improve environmental regulations and reduce pollution

Anita Kumar, 3-19-13 (McClatchy Newspapers, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants”, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.Uer7vL-n3FI#storylink=cpy)

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress.¶ Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way.¶ He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals.¶ While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider.¶ He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change.¶ Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.¶ “It’s gridlocked and dysfunctional. The place is a mess,” said Rena Steinzor, a law professor at the University of Maryland. “I think (executive action) is an inevitable tool given what’s happened.”¶ Now that Obama has showed a willingness to use those tactics, advocacy groups, supporters and even members of Congress are lobbying him to do so more and more.¶ The Center for Progressive Reform, a liberal advocacy group composed of law professors, including Steinzor, has pressed Obama to sign seven executive orders on health, safety and the environment during his second term.¶ Seventy environmental groups wrote a letter urging the president to restrict emissions at existing power plants.

#### Climate change causes massive extinctions – It is reversable

Hansen 08 (James Hansen, directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies,  adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University, “Tell Barack Obama the Truth – The Whole Truth,” Nov/Dec 2008)

Embers of election night elation will glow longer than any prior election. Glowing even in other nations, and for good reason. We are all tied together, more than ever, like it or not.¶ Barack Obama’s measured words on election night, including eloquent recognition of historic progress, from the viewpoint of a 106-year-old lady, still stoke the embers. But he was already focusing on tasks ahead, without celebratory excess.¶ Well he should. The challenge he faces is unprecedented. I refer not to the inherited economic morass, as threatening as it is. The human toll due to past failures and excesses may prove to be great, yet economic recessions, even depressions, come and go.¶ Now our planet itself is in peril. Not simply the Earth, but the fate of all of its species, including humanity. The situation calls not for hand-wringing, but rather informed action.¶ Optimism is fueled by expectation that decisions will be guided by reason and evidence, not ideology. The danger is that special interests will dilute and torque government policies, causing the climate to pass tipping points, with grave consequences for all life on the planet.¶ The President-elect himself needs to be well-informed about the climate problem and its relation to energy needs and economic policies. He cannot rely on political systems to bring him solutions – the political systems provide too many opportunities for special interests.¶ Here is a message I think should be delivered to Barack Obama. Criticisms are welcome.¶ Climate threat. The world’s temperature has increased about 1°F over the past few decades, about 2°F over land areas. Further warming is “in the pipeline” due to gases already in the air (because of climate system inertia) and inevitable additional fossil fuel emissions (because of energy system inertia).¶ Although global warming to date is smaller than day-to-day weather fluctuations, it has brought global temperature back to approximately the highest level of the Holocene, the past 10,000 years, the period during which civilization developed. Effects already evident include:¶ 1. Mountain glaciers are receding worldwide and will be gone within 50 years if CO2 emissions continue to increase. This threatens the fresh water supply for billions of people, as rivers arising in the Himalayas, Andes and Rocky Mountains will begin to run dry in the summer and fall.¶ 2. Coral reefs, home to a quarter of biological species in the ocean, could be destroyed by rising temperature and ocean acidification due to increasing CO2.¶ 3. Dry subtropics are expanding poleward with warming, affecting the southern United States, the Mediterranean region, and Australia, with increasing drought and fires.¶ 4. Arctic sea ice will disappear entirely in the summer, if CO2 continues to increase, with devastating effects on wildlife and indigenous people.¶ 5. Intensity of hydrologic extremes, including heavy rains, storms and floods on the one hand, and droughts and fires on the other, are increasing.¶ Some people say we must learn to live with these effects, because it is an almost god- given fact that we must burn all fossil fuels. But now we understand, from the history of the Earth, that there would be two monstrous consequences of releasing the CO2 from all of the oil, gas and coal, consequences of an enormity that cannot be accepted.¶ One effect would be extermination of a large fraction of the species on the planet. The other is initiation of ice sheet disintegration and sea level rise, out of humanity’s control, eventually eliminating coastal cities and historical sites, creating havoc, hundreds of millions of refugees, and impoverishing nations.¶ Species extermination and ice sheet disintegration are both ‘non-linear’ problems with ‘tipping points’. If the process proceeds too far, amplifying feedbacks push the system dynamics to proceed without further human forcing. For example, species are interdependent – if a sufficient number are eliminated, ecosystems collapse. In the physical climate system, amplifying feedbacks include increased absorption of sunlight as sea and land ice areas are reduced and release of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, as permafrost melts.¶ The Earth’s history reveals examples of such non-linear collapses. Eventually, over tens and hundreds of thousands of years, new species evolve, and ice sheets return. But we will leave a devastated impoverished planet for all generations of humanity that we can imagine, if we are so foolish as to allow the climate tipping points to be passed.¶ Urgency. Recent evidence reveals a situation more urgent than had been expected, even by those who were most attuned. The evidence is based on improving knowledge of Earth’s history – how the climate responded to past changes of atmospheric composition – and on observations of how the Earth is responding now to human-made atmospheric changes.¶ The conclusion – at first startling, but in retrospect obvious – is that the human-made increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), from the pre-industrial 280 parts per million (ppm) to today’s 385 ppm, has already raised the CO2 amount into the dangerous range. It will be necessary to take actions that return CO2 to a level of at most 350 ppm, but probably less, if we are to avert disastrous pressures on fellow species and large sea level rise.¶ The good news is that such a result is still possible, if actions are prompt. Prompt action will do more than prevent irreversible extinctions and ice sheet disintegration: it can avert or reverse consequences that had begun to seem inevitable, including loss of Arctic ice, ocean acidification, expansion of the subtropics, increased intensity of droughts, floods, and storms.¶ Principal implication. CO2 is not the only human-made gas that contributes to global warming, but it is the dominant gas with a lifetime that dwarfs that of the other major gases. Much of the CO2 increase caused by burning fossil fuels remains in the air more than 1000 years. So CO2 must be the focus of efforts to stop human-caused climate change.¶ It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that solution of global warming is to phase down total fossil fuel emissions by some specified percentage. That approach will not work as a strategy. The reason for that conclusion and an outline of a better strategic approach follow immediately from geophysical boundary constraints.¶ Figure 1a shows oil, gas and coal reserves, with the purple portion being the amount that has already been burned and emitted into the atmosphere. Despite uncertainty in the size of undiscovered resources, their amounts are certainly enough to yield atmospheric CO2 greater than 500 ppm. That amount would be disastrous, assuring unstable ice sheets, rising sea level out of humanity’s control, extermination of a large fraction of the species on Earth, and severe exacerbation of climate impacts discussed above.¶ Oil is used primarily in vehicles, where it is impractical to capture CO2 emerging from tailpipes. The large pools of oil remaining in the ground are spread among many countries. The United States, which once had some of the large pools, has already exploited its largest recoverable reserves. Given this fact, it is unrealistic to think that Russia and Middle East countries will decide to leave their oil in the ground.¶ A carbon cap that slows emissions of CO2 does not help, because of the long lifetime of atmospheric CO2. In fact, the cap exacerbates the problem if it allows coal emissions to continue. The only solution is to target a (large) portion of the fossil fuel reserves to be left in the ground or used in a way such that the CO2 can be captured and safely sequestered.¶ Coal is the obvious target. Figure 1b shows that if there were a prompt moratorium on construction of new coal plants, and if existing ones were phased out linearly over the period 2010-2030, then atmospheric CO2 would peak during the next few decades at an amount somewhere between 400 and 425 ppm. The peak value depends upon whose estimate of undiscovered reserves is more accurate. It also depends upon whether oil in the most extreme environments is exploited or left in the ground, and thus it depends on the carbon tax (see below).¶ This coal-phase-out scenario yields the possibility of stabilizing climate. Overshoot of the safe CO2 level is sufficiently small that improved agricultural and forestry practices, including reforestation of marginal lands, could bring CO2 back below 350 ppm, perhaps by the middle of the century. But if construction of new coal plants continues for even another decade it is difficult to conceive a practical, natural way to return CO2 below 350 ppm.¶

### Drone Prolif

#### Alt cause to other countries beginning to use drones-US exporting-Which the plan does not stop-Both your Stanford cards make this arg for us

#### No evidence that anyone would strike a nuclear reactor and cause a meltdown-Your link evidence is about what hypothetically would happen, but not that anyone has the motivation to stage that type of attack

#### McKillop concedes drone prolif is inevitable and irreversible, it uses the “Pandora’s Box” analogy—the genie cannot be put back into the bottle AND the conclusion of the Aff article proves.

Mckillop 13

Belief that the US will maintain, and can maintain technological supremacy in UAVWs is also used to argue for maintaining current US policy in favour of drone war, but this is as laughable as claiming nobody else but an American can chew gum and walk straight at the same time. Unfortunately, UAVWs are here to stay, and we can fear how they will be used.

#### Other more realistic threats to nuclear power plants make the impact not unique—assault squad raids, cyber attacks, truck bombs, and crashing a plane into a nuke power plant are all EASIER, CHEAPER, FASTER TO SCALE UP, and more likely.

#### Risk is incredibly low—Nuke power plants have existed for more than HALF a CENTURY and NO ONE has EVER attacked one in a military assault.

#### Their internal link card proves their terminal impact to meltdowns is empirically false—Fukushima, Chernobyl, (and 3-Mile Island) meltdowns ALL prove that there is no risk of extinction.

#### They’re safe

Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘2 [December 2002 ¶ DETERRING TERRORISM: ¶ Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrate ¶ Nuclear Power Plant’s Structural Strength http://www.safesecurevital.com/pdf/EPRI\_Nuclear\_Plant\_Structural\_Study\_2002.pdf]

Nonetheless, the nuclear power industry is confident that nuclear plant structures that house ¶ reactor fuel can withstand aircraft impacts, even though they were not specifically designed for ¶ such impacts. This confidence is predicated on the fact that nuclear plant structures have thick ¶ concrete walls with heavy reinforcing steel and are designed to withstand large earthquakes, ¶ extreme overpressures and hurricane force winds. The purpose of this study is to validate that ¶ confidence.

#### No Risk of Meltdown – Safeguards Post 9/11 Account for Prolonged Blackout Periods

Associated Press 2011 By Dina Cappiello 03/29/11 “Long Blackouts Pose Risk To U.S. Nuclear Reactors” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/blackout-risk-us-nuclear-reactors\_n\_841869.html

Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts – the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power – remained "a dominant contributor to the risk of core melt at some plants." The events of Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued regulations requiring that plants have portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to manually operate an emergency reactor cooling system when batteries go out.¶ The NRC says these steps, and others, have reduced the risk of core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants.¶ For instance, preliminary results of the latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that any release caused by a blackout there would be far less rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken. With more time, people can be evacuated. The NRC says improved computer models, coupled with up-to-date information about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook.

#### You have NO EVIDENCE that **you** SOLVE Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict-

#### 1) Your Global Post evidence says that the two countries ALREADY HAVE the drones-Plan does nothing to stop that

#### 2) Your ev says that Iran will use Armenia as a PROXY for starting conflict-Makes your impact inevitable and you definitely don’t solve that internal link

#### Armenian Azerbaijan war empirically denied – they both have drones and have used them against each other already – this is their evidence from a year ago

**Global Post 12,** “Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war,” Global Post, Oct 23rd, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war?page=0,1

To some extent, these countries are already being pulled towards conflict. Last September, Armenia shot down an Israeli-made Azerbaijani drone over Nagorno-

Karabakh and the government claims that drones have been spotted ahead of recent incursions by Azerbaijani troops into Armenian-held territory. Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, said in a briefing that attacks this summer showed that Azerbaijan is eager to “play with its new toys” and its forces showed “impressive tactical and operational improvement.” The International Crisis Group warned that as the tit-for-tat incidents become more deadly, “there is a growing risk that the increasing frontline tensions could lead to an accidental war.” With this in mind, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have long imposed a non-binding arms embargo on both countries, and both are under a de facto arms ban from the United States. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this has not stopped Israel and Russia from selling to them. After fighting a bloody war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a stalemate with an oft-violated ceasefire holding a tenuous peace between them. And drones are the latest addition to the battlefield. In March, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, which consisted largely of advanced drones and an air defense system. Through this and other deals, Azerbaijan is currently amassing a squadron of over 100 drones from all three of Israel’s top defense manufacturers. Armenia, meanwhile, employs only a small number of domestically produced models. Intelligence gathering is just one use for drones, which are also used to spot targets for artillery, and, if armed, strike targets themselves. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces routinely snipe and engage one another along the front, each typically blaming the other for violating the ceasefire. At least 60 people have been killed in ceasefire violations in the last two years, and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group claimed in a report published in February 2011 that the sporadic violence has claimed hundreds of lives.

#### Alt cause – Armenian-azerbaijan relations are low due to sovereignty disputes over the Nagorno-Karabakh area. Ideological conflicts can’t be resolved with inorms – Taiwan proves

#### No internal link to Middle East War-Your Primakov card indicates that Israel and Iraq draw in is what causes escalation-No reason why those countries get drawn into an Armenia Azerbaijan conflict

#### No Middle east escalation

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney 7 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why\_the\_iraq\_war\_wont\_engulf\_the\_mideast.html, accessed December 25, 2007)

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### Multiple alt causes to lack of U.S. credibility in the Middle East-wishy washy American policy on Egypt, missteps on Syria, indefinite detention, all prove that your aff is a drop in the bucket

#### TELLING EVERYBODY HOW MANY PEOPLE WE KILL DOESN’T INCREASE CREDIBILITY-People will probably be pissed about drones no matter how clear we are that we are killing people

#### Alt causes to soft power-Putin is better at diplomacy than the United States-This is not a good sign-Syria proves

**Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.**

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a **serious fiscal crisis** **by the end of this decade.** As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The **best indicators** of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced by a multipolar** international **system.** The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

**Heg doesn’t solve conflict.**

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has **already rid itself of crime.** Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict **declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—**nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms** necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

#### No spillover – Crumbling reputation in one area doesn’t affect other areas like security

Brooks and Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in Government at Dartmouth, 5 (Stephen G. and William C., “International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, September)

This argument that the institutional order is imperiled if the United States does not strongly invest in maintaining a multilateral reputation is a potentially powerful caution against succumbing to the unilateral temptation, but it ultimately rests on weak theoretical foundations. Despite the fact that reputation “now stands as the linchpin of the dominant neoliberal institutionalist theory of decentralized cooperation,” it remains woefully underdeveloped as a concept.64 In the most detailed theoretical analysis to date of the role that reputation plays within international institutions, George Downs and Michael Jones decisively undermine the institutionalist conception of reputation. As they note, institutionalist theory rests on the notion that “states carry a general reputation for cooperativeness that determines their attractiveness as a treaty partner both now and in the future . . . A defection in connection with any agreement will impose reputation costs that affect all current and future agreements.”65 But, they object, no theoretical justification has been provided in the literature to back up this institutionalist view that a state possesses “a single reputation for cooperation that characterizes its expected reliability in connection with every agreement to which it is party.”66 Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that “the reputational consequences of defection are usually more bounded” than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes.” 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then lack of compliance with the former organization will in no way directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having multiple reputations “helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a state’s defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security) are virtually nonexistent in the literature.”68 This conclusion is consistent with the two most detailed studies of reputation in IR, which decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate across different issue areas.69 In the end, the current lack of an empirical or theoretical justification for the notion that states carry a single reputation means that we have no basis for accepting the institutionalists’ argument that America must endorse multilateralism across the board because to do otherwise has consequences that endanger the entire institutional order. That, together with theory’s lack of purchase on the issues of coordination costs and bargaining power, invalidates the institutionalist argument about the high cost of unilateralism.

### Terrorism

#### None of your terrorism advantage is about Congressional oversight of drones-It’s about drone attacks happening in the first place-Something that your aff obviously does not resolve

#### And, not every allied country favors elimination of drone strike-Saudi Arabia LOVES drone strikes and will still cooperate with us on counter terrorism measures regardless

#### Zero risk of nuclear terrorism

Mearsheimer Professor of Political Science at UChicago ’11 (John, January, “Imperial by Design,” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=10>, Mike)

The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

#### 2. No motivation for nuclear terror

Francis J. Gavin 10, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, “Same As It Ever Was,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37

A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. . . . Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.” 57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58 As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that popular wisdom on the topic is significantly flawed.”59

#### 3. No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

### A2: Ayson

#### Very low probability

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

#### Their scenario rests on the US blaming China and Russia for the attack, but we won’t

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to befingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.

### Solvency

#### 75% of authors on the topic think congressional oversight is a sham – seriously look at the quals on this card

Scorcher 13 (Sara, Staff writer for the National Journal, citing National Security Insiders: Gordon Adams, Charles Allen, Thad Allen, James Bamford, David Barno, Milt Bearden, Peter Bergen, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, David Berteau, Stephen Biddle, Nancy Birdsall, Marion Blakey, Kit Bond, Stuart Bowen, Paula Broadwell, Mike Breen, Mark Brunner, Steven Bucci, Nicholas Burns, Dan Byman, James Jay Carafano, Phillip Carter, Wendy Chamberlin, Michael Chertoff, Frank Cilluffo, James Clad, Richard Clarke, Steve Clemons, Joseph Collins, William Courtney, Lorne Craner, Roger Cressey, Gregory Dahlberg, Robert Danin, Richard Danzig, Daniel Drezner, Mackenzie Eaglen, Paul Eaton, Andrew Exum, William Fallon, Eric Farnsworth, Jacques Gansler, Stephen Ganyard, Daniel Goure, Mike Green, Mark Gunzinger, Jim Harper, Michael Hayden, Michael Herson, Pete Hoekstra, Bruce Hoffman, Paul Hughes, Colin Kahl, Donald Kerrick, Rachel Kleinfeld, Lawrence Korb, David Kramer, Andrew Krepinevich, Charlie Kupchan, W. Patrick Lang, Cedric Leighton, James Lindsay, Justin Logan, Trent Lott, Peter Mansoor, Ronald Marks, Brian McCaffrey, Steven Metz, Franklin Miller, Philip Mudd, John Nagl, Shuja Nawaz, Kevin Nealer, Michael Oates, Thomas Pickering, Paul Pillar, Stephen Rademaker, Marc Raimondi, Celina Realuyo, Bruce Riedel, Barry Rhoads, Marc Rotenberg, Kori Schake, Mark Schneider, John Scofield, Tammy Schultz, Stephen Sestanovich, Sarah Sewall, Matthew Sherman, Jennifer Sims, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Frances Townsend, Mick Trainor, Suzanne Spaulding, Ted Stroup, Tamara Wittes, Dov Zakheim, and Juan Zarate, “Insiders: Congress Ineffective in Oversight of National Security”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-congress-ineffective-in-oversight-of-national-security-20130610)[rkezios]

Three-quarters of National Journal's National Security Insiders said Congress ineffectively oversees the executive branch's national security programs. "Congress has for years been a lapdog to the executive branch and does not exercise much meaningful oversight over national security programs," one Insider said. There is too much to oversee, and Congress has no real expertise, another added. "Politicization means that there is no agreement on what 'oversight' means." Some blamed partisan politics for the problem. "It is not possible to provide adequate oversight when viewing national security through tinted, extremely partisan views. National security suffers when not approached in a bipartisan view." One-quarter of Insiders disagreed, saying Congress is effective at checking the executive branch on security issues, at least to some degree. "Congressional committees dealing with national security have mostly dedicated members and strong staffs, and committees have stronger bipartisan traditions than do those in other areas," one Insider said. "A weakness, however, is that the Congress abets populist politics by managing one scandal at a time and obsessing on protection of spending in members' districts and states." Another Insider pointed out that lawmakers' control is limited. "I believe that some do as well as they can, considering the executive branch controls the keys to the information vaults." Does Congress play an effective oversight role over the executive branch's national security programs? (50 votes) No 74% Yes 26% No "Too many members of Congress are intimidated by national security. The rapid turnover in recent years has diminished the bench of members with the experience and confidence to engage with the executive branch on these issues." "Congress could play an effective role with its constitutional appropriations authority but rarely uses the power it has at its disposal." "Congress has lost its way in real oversight. Their role now is narrow and reactive. Not only do they fail to offer solutions, they don't even try to define the problem well." "In my experience, they are easily bulldozed by skilled briefers." "In my job, we visit the Hill. We literally had a congressman tell the class that congressmen don't have time for national security and it's not important. The fact that Congress hasn't declared war, its most sacred duty, since 1942 [when it declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania] should tell us something." "It used to. It is now that body that engages in random acts of after-sight, and partisan at that. It complains more than it oversees." "As with almost every other aspect of public policy, severe partisanship overcomes the work of Congress." "Under the previous administration, but no longer." "The initial abdication came during the Gulf of Tonkin. Only worse since. Cowardice over taking responsibility for potential disasters sustains the status quo." "But it rarely has. The Constitution sets up a natural conflict, and that has never really done much for 'oversight.' It has [been] worsened, however, by the declining quality of Hill staff. The old adage was, there were two types on the Hill—those who want to do something and those who want to play games. The games-players—often frustrated former program staffers—head to the Hill to inflict their often ill-informed opinions." "You must be joking. They are entirely (politically) rational in their near-total negligence of their constitutional obligations. Why take risks?"

#### There is congressional oversight now – it doesn’t solve anything

Starks 13 (Tim, “Unmanned Oversight How Congress whiffed on drones”, [http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112347/congress-and-drones-why-has-oversight-been-so-bad)[rkezios](http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112347/congress-and-drones-why-has-oversight-been-so-bad%29%5Brkezios)]

The members of the two Intelligence Committees have seen more of the drone strike programs than anyone outside the White House, the Pentagon, and spy agencies. The Senate Intelligence Committee, chaired by Senator Diane Feinstein, has monthly review sessions on the strikes. Meanwhile, the House Intelligence Committee Chairman, Rep. Mike Rogers, said on the House floor in December: "If there is any air strike conducted that involves an enemy combatant of the United States outside the theater of direct combat, it gets reviewed by this committee. I am talking about every single one. That's an important thing. There are very strict reviews put on all of this material." Both Feinstein and Rogers, however, have been reluctant to criticize the drone programs; in fact, they're both strong supporters. And nearly all of the information their committees handle is classified. Feinstein, for instance, said in a speech last summer that "collateral damage is really greatly reduced beyond what you may read in the press" but offered no supporting evidence: "I have asked, 'please please please can I release these numbers?' And the answer is 'no, they're classified,'" she explained. "So that's about as far as I could go on that." "We've seen members come out of these sessions saying, 'We're satisfied,'" says Andrea Prasow, senior counsel in Human Rights Watch's Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program. "Essentially they're just saying, 'Just trust us.' Sometimes, it's necessary for the public to be told 'Just trust us,' but very, very rarely." Although much of the committees' work needs to be confidential, not all of it does. Steven Aftergood, editor of Secrecy News, has written about the declining tendency of the Intelligence Committees to hold public hearings: The Senate Intelligence Committee had just one such hearing in 2012, which Aftergood calculated was the fewest in 25 years and perhaps ever. "It absolutely weakens the committees," says Amy Zegart, a Stanford professor and Hoover Institution fellow who has written extensively on congressional oversight of intelligence. "The juice the committees get is from public support. To the extent that the committees are focusing public attention on intelligence issues, they have a lever in negotiations with the executive branch." Other Congressional committees you might expect to exercise some oversight of the White House drone programs have faced criticism for being ineffective. In January, Vicki Divoll, a former Senate Intelligence Committee staffer, took Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy to task in The New York Times for "limply requesting the Department of Justice memorandums that justify the targeted killing program." The House Judiciary Committee has likewise opted for the velvet glove. In December, it procedurally scuttled a resolution from since-retired Rep. Dennis Kucinich demanding more information from the administration on drone strikes. The committee's leaders said they were seeking the information by other means and didn’t want to up the ante just yet. Other committees have fared just as poorly. "The Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees have never received any briefings," says Zenko. "They've threatened to withhold funding, and the administration has said, 'Go ahead and try it.'" This means, Zenkos says, the committees "can't really do their oversight function."

## 2NC

### T

#### They also cut this wrong- that paragraph is about the President being the only one in the executive branch that CAN disclose information as opposed to LOWER LEVEL EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS- here’s the full paragraph

(note: their URL went to an entirely different article by a different person. Here’s where I found this: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg51671/html/CHRG-105shrg51671.htm>)

``The President's roles as Commander in Chief, head of the ¶ executive Branch, and sole organ of the Nation in its external ¶ relations require that he have ultimate and unimpeded authority ¶ over the collection, retention and dissemination of ¶ intelligence and other national security information in the ¶ Executive Branch. There is no exception to this principle for ¶ those disseminations that would be made to Congress or its ¶ Members. In that context, as in all others, the decision ¶ whether to grant access to the information must be made by ¶ someone who is acting in an official capacity on behalf of the ¶ President and who is ultimately responsible, perhaps through ¶ intermediaries, to the President. The Constitution does not ¶ permit Congress to circumvent these orderly procedures and ¶ chain of command--and to erect an obstacle to the President's ¶ exercise of all executive powers relating to the Nation's ¶ security--by vesting lower-level employees in the Executive ¶ Branch with a supposed `right' to disclose national security ¶ information to Members of Congress (or anyone else) without the ¶ authorization of Executive Branch personnel who derive their ¶ authority from the President.'' [Id. at 4.]

#### Also- the line they don’t highlight said Bush’s argument was rejected… their ev is a non-sequitur

Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law with a Ph.D. who worked in the Law Library at the Library of Congress, “Congressional Access to National Security Information,” 2008, http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=facschol

The Bush administration supported this pragmatic argument with the ¶ theory that the President is authorized, without disclosure of the program ¶ to Congress or the public, by the Authorization to Use Military Force ¶ (AUMF) to ¶ use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, ¶ organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com­¶ mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, ¶ 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent ¶ any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by ¶ such nations, organizations or persons.196 The administration has argued that whatever obligation it had to ¶ share information with Congress relating to the development of legal ¶ policy, whether under previous Justice Department norms or the ¶ information-sharing rubric of the National Security Act of 1974,197 was ¶ obviated by the passage of the AUMF.198 The view that the AUMF ¶ provides a blanket justification for whatever action the administration ¶ deems necessary as part of the war on terror was squarely rejected by the ¶ Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.199 Despite the reclassification and release in April 2008 of the Yoo ¶ Memorandum, numerous OLC opinions remained secret for many years, ¶ supposedly for reasons of national security—the same reason offered for ¶ the initial nondisclosure of the Yoo Memorandum, which was eventually ¶ declassified in response to a FOIA request.

#### Their ev says that authority doesn’t exist

Rozell 12, Mark (Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University) “The Constitution and Executive Privilege,” Library of Law and Liberty, 7/12/12, <http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/07/12/the-constitution-and-executive-privilege/>

Executive privilege is the constitutional principle that permits the president and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. This presidential power is controversial because it is nowhere mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. That fact has led some scholars (Berger 1974; Prakash, 1999) to suggest that executive privilege does not exist and that the congressional power of inquiry is absolute. There is no doubt that presidents and their staffs have secrecy needs and that these decision makers must be able to deliberate in private without fear that every utterance may be made public. But many observers question whether presidents have the right to withhold documents and testimony in the face of congressional investigations or judicial proceedings.¶ Executive privilege is an implied presidential power that is recognized by the courts, most famously in the U.S. v. Nixon (1974) Supreme Court case. There are generally four areas that an executive branch claim of privilege is based: 1) presidential communications privilege; 2) deliberative process privilege; 3) national security, foreign relations or military affairs, and 4) an ongoing law enforcement investigation. In the current controversy over congressional access to Department of Justice documents pertaining to the Fast & Furious scandal investigation, the president and Attorney General Eric Holder are relying on the deliberative process privilege and also the ongoing law enforcement investigation defense.

#### Reporting requirements are NOT restrictions- they impose NO LIMITS on activity

Maskell 2008 (Jack, Legislative Attorney in the American Law Division at the Congressional Research Service, Grassroots Lobbying: Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements, http://congressionalresearch.com/RL33794/document.php)

The activities involved in lobbying, public advocacy and political expression ¶ about public policy issues, government and legislation, have been found by the ¶ Supreme Court to be among the most important freedoms in preserving an open ¶ democracy.12 The Court has thus noted the “profound national commitment to the ¶ principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide ¶ open,”13 and has in the past explained that “expression on public issues ‘has always14 ¶ rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” The ¶ Supreme Court has therefore found that any regulations imposed by Congress on ¶ such lobbying and advocacy activities may not unduly burden the exercise of ¶ participants’ First Amendment rights.15 ¶ Even when a federal regulation on public policy advocacy involved merely a ¶ disclosure and reporting requirement, and not a restriction which directly limits or ¶ prohibits advocacy activities, such a regulation underwent a rigorous constitutional16 ¶ scrutiny since, as characterized by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court ¶ has recognized the “deterrent effects on the exercise of First Amendment rights” ¶ which may arise “as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct ¶ in requiring disclosure.”17 The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama18 overturned ¶ a State court contempt citation against the NAACP for that organization’s failure to disclose its local membership list. Recognizing that “(e)ffective advocacy of both ¶ public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably ¶ enhanced by group association” and that, based upon the First Amendment rights of ¶ freedom of speech, petition and assembly, the Constitution guarantees the “freedom ¶ to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,” the Court noted ¶ the “chilling effect” that certain state actions, such as requiring the disclosure of ¶ membership lists, may have upon the exercise of those rights.19

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### CP

#### This is the core educational question of the topic- The CP has an advocate, and is *an explicit alternative to other branches*

Radsan and Murphy 2010 (Afsheen and Richard, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF¶ TERRORISTS, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 405 2009-2010)

Yet as a practical matter, the judicial role just identified is¶ vanishingly small. Justice Thomas is surely correct that the executive¶ must dominate decisions about who lives and dies in war. This makes¶ executive self-control all the more important-and leads to our second¶ claim. Due process is everywhere. For a century, debate has bubbled¶ over the extra-territorial reach of the Constitution. 30 The logic of¶ Boumediene's five-justice majority opinion is that the Due Process¶ Clause binds the executive worldwide-from Alaska to Zimbabwe. 31¶ This duty exists even for matters that cannot or should not be subject to¶ significant judicial control; the executive must obey the Constitution¶ even if no court is in a position to say so. Honoring this obligation¶ requires the executive to adopt procedures that maximize the accuracy¶ and propriety of the CIA's targeted killing without unacceptably¶ harming national security. 32 Following the lead of cases from the¶ European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Israel,33 we¶ submit that as one integral element of these procedures, executive¶ authorities should conduct independent, impartial, post-hoc review of¶ the legality of any targeted killing by the CIA and that this review¶ should be as public as national security permits. 34

#### Executive implementation allows more flexibility *on high-level terrorist targets-* key to solve terrorism

Radsan and Murphy 2011 (Afsheen and Richard, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, MEASURE TWICE, SHOOT ONCE:¶ HIGHER CARE FOR¶ CIA-TARGETED KILLING, http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/4/Murphy.pdf)

In keeping with IHL’s flexible, fact-sensitive approach, our rule of¶ heightened certainty may not apply in truly exceptional circumstances.¶ For example, the target may play an irreplaceable role in AQ/T. Osama¶ Bin Laden, to name one person, was beyond doubt a legitimate target; he¶ was probably number one on the CIA’s target list—and on the Defense¶ Department’s list. At some point, a drone operator might have seen on¶ the screen a person who, based on all available information, was probably¶ Osama Bin Laden—but not Osama Bin Laden beyond any doubt.¶ The military advantage of killing Osama Bin Laden, compared to a midlevel¶ AQ/T member, would have justified the additional risk of mistakenly¶ harming a peaceful civilian. Targeting the person at the top, it turns¶ out, does not have to be as certain. Yet the relevant agency (whether the¶ CIA or the Air Force) should bear the burden of justifying any departure¶ from the default rule of heightened certainty in targeting. Part of the¶ government’s burden should be to explain why trying to kill the head of¶ Al Qaeda today justifies the risk of killing another “tall man” hunting for¶ scrap metal.153

#### Solves the International Norms advantage- The advantage solvency is based off an international signal the executive branch would be in a better position to make. Practices are key to establish customary international law, not formal statutory restrictions

Tom Gjelten, 12- ’10 (Antioch University New England, “Shadow Wars: Debating Cyber 'Disarmament'”, World Affairs http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/shadow-wars-debating-cyber-disarmament)

In venues where the Russians felt more confident, they were even bolder. In August 2009, the six member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China—approved a Russian-drafted agreement that cited the Russian U.N. resolution and elaborated on it. The SCO accord defined “information war” in part as a “confrontation between two or more states in the information space aimed at . . . undermining political, economic, and social systems [or] mass psychologic [ sic ] brainwashing to destabilize society and state.” Among the “security threats” described in the agreement was the dissemination of information harmful to the “spiritual, moral, and cultural spheres of other States.” The wording seemed to justify censorship of dissident writings on the Internet and bar countries from supporting such Internet activity in another state. The signatory countries resolved to work for “collective measures” that incorporated those ideas. U.S. officials interpreted the agreement as expressing the Russian and Chinese vision of what a U.N. cyber arms control agreement should entail, and they suspected the accord was concluded with the idea that it might serve someday as a source of customary international law,

which arises through accepted precedents and practices rather than through formal conventions.

## 1NR

### Politics

**Economic collapse turns the aff – It causes resource wars – people won’t be willing to cooperate anymore because they’re fighting over resources**

**And it causes miscalc that’s more probable than their impacts because rational actors and deterrence checks their impacts**

**Our impacts are more likely because they’re based in STATISTICS and STUDIES – prefer those impacts because they’re more likely than their one-shot unpredictable impacts**

**And it happens faster the aff because it takes years for other countries to BUILD DRONES**

**Happens before their impacts so we can turn theris but can’t turn ours**

**Economic collapse turns meltdowns because we won’t have money to pay for reactors so no one will maintain them**

**Economic strength key to Heg**

**Khalilzad 1995** (Zalmay, chair of RAND’s project Air Force Security and Doctrine Program, “Losing the Moment,” Washington Quarterly, Sping, lexis)

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum.

#### Economic collapse causes terrorism – increase recruitment too

Kevin J. **Fandl 04**, Adjunct Law Professor - Washington College of Law, ‘4 (19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 587)

In his final speech in the United Kingdom as President of the United States, Bill Clinton stressed: "we have seen how abject poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends." 50 His words carried more significance than he could have known at that moment. 51 The terrorist networks that have come about in recent history are a significant threat to world security not only because of the suicidal methods they employ, but also because of the status of the countries [\*598] where these networks recruit new members, engage in training exercises and where the leadership seeks refuge. These countries are not equipped politically or economically to design proactive plans to uproot such organizations in their own countries, despite their expressed efforts to do so. 52 They are developing countries with weak, or no, democratic political structure with which to coordinate such efforts. They do not have the resources that European countries, for instance, have in place to take preventative measures in order to sustain peace. 53 The George W. Bush Administration indicated that it "is aware of the link between desperate economic circumstances and terrorism." 54 Yet, rather than working to develop sustainable economies capable of both directly (through increased political pressure and rule of law programs) and indirectly (through increased employment opportunities and social stability) eradicating terrorism, President Bush has chosen to dedicate significant resources to a military conquest against the elusive concept of terrorism itself. 55 Many Americans and, to a much lesser extent, other Western citizens, support the view that terrorism can be fought with tanks and [\*599] bombs. 56 They obstinately believe that military technology is capable of uncovering each potentially threatening terrorist cell and keeping the West safe. 57 This conventional method of warfare, while effective in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be useless in eliminating the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are non-conventional actors using non-conventional means through amorphous concepts that cannot be identified, contained, or labeled. These are actors whose most potent weapon is the communication of ideas among masses of people awaiting an opportunity for a better life. Many of us watch in excited anticipation for Osama bin Laden's capture and/or death. However, we should rest assured that whether he is still alive will have no bearing on the control that his ideas, and the ideas of those like him, have on the impoverished and desperate in the Middle East, South Asia, and perhaps beyond. No military technology will be able to destroy the prevalence and furtherance of those ideas. 58

#### Turns Pakistan and Middle East

#### Warrick 08, Washington Post Staff Writer, 11-15-2008 (Joby, “Experts See Security Risks in Downturn, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/14/AR2008111403864.html)

Intelligence officials are warning that the deepening global financial crisis could weaken fragile governments in the world's most dangerous areas and undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to a new wave of security threats. U.S. government officials and private analysts say the economic turmoil has heightened the short-term risk of a terrorist attack, as radical groups probe for weakening border protections and new gaps in defenses. A protracted financial crisis could threaten the survival of friendly regimes from Pakistan to the Middle East while forcing Western nations to cut spending on defense, intelligence and foreign aid, the sources said. The crisis could also accelerate the shift to a more Asia-centric globe, as rising powers such as China gain more leverage over international financial institutions and greater influence in world capitals. Some of the more troubling and immediate scenarios analysts are weighing involve nuclear-armed Pakistan, which already was being battered by inflation and unemployment before the global financial tsunami hit. Since September, Pakistan has seen its national currency devalued and its hard-currency reserves nearly wiped out. Analysts also worry about the impact of plummeting crude prices on oil-dependent nations such as Yemen, which has a large population of unemployed youths and a history of support for militant Islamic groups. The underlying problems and trends -- especially regional instability and the waning influence of the West -- were already well established, but they are now "being accelerated by the current global financial crisis," the nation's top intelligence official, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, said in a recent speech. McConnell is among several top U.S. intelligence officials warning that deep cuts in military and intelligence budgets could undermine the country's ability to anticipate and defend against new threats.

**Our evidence takes this into account – Obama has carefully calibrated his agenda to account it and still has SUFFICENT capital to push CIR**

**And all our uniqueness arguments answer this and say we can still deal with the debt ceiling**

#### Debt ceiling at the top of the agenda

Button 9/10 [Adam, writer for ForeX Live, “Debt Ceiling Back on the Agenda, ‘X Date’ could only be 5 weeks away,” ForeXLive, September 10, 2013, <http://www.forexlive.com/blog/2013/09/10/debt-ceiling-back-on-the-agenda-x-date-could-be-only-5-weeks-away/>] CPO

The moment Congress flips the switch and puts the Syria debate on the backburner, the focus will shift to the debt ceiling debate.¶ The latest analysis shows the date when the US runs out of money and has no accounting options to artificially spend more is between Oct 18 and Nov 5. They call this the X date and the Washington Post looks at the mechanics of how bills will be paid as the funds run out.¶ For markets, the main issue is bondholders. If government workers or contractors aren’t paid for a few weeks it will have some cooling effect on the economy but a technical default could get very ugly. I assume, the government could find a way to prioritize payments to bondholders but they aren’t convinced.

**Their ev =** Syria doesn’t thump-Russian deal allows him to escape political implications

Bohan, 9/11 [Carrie, Reuters, “Delay in Syria frees Obama to shift to heavy domestic agenda,” <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/thomson-reuters/130911/delay-syria-vote-frees-obama-shift-hefty-domestic-agenda>, ALB]

Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.¶ But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.¶ "He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.¶ Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.

**Hold all of their link uniqueness arguments to a very high threshold---issues don’t cost capital until they’re at the finish line**

**Drum 10, Kevin, Political Blogger, Mother Jones, http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-back-burner)**

Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about political issues in general. The fact is that political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active one. Opposition to Social Security privatization was pretty mild until 2005, when George Bush turned it into an active issue. Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue. Etc. I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they don't until the issue in question is squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military, for example, hasn't changed a lot over the past year or two, but once Congress takes up the issue in earnest and the Focus on the Family newsletters go out, the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage — well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something different from what it tells you now. Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to **move an actual bill**. Then all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.

#### Debt Ceiling Will be lifted Now

#### - Republicans will back to down to a strong Obama to avert economic crises. Our evidence cites GOP leaders and the strategy that was effective to avert the previous crises- That’s Kapur

**All oru ev proves we’ll make a deal fast enough sow e still solve**

Their ev = snapshot

L control U

Obamas push ensures Debt ceiling will be raised now-But it’ll be close!!

Sahadi, 9/12 [Jeanne, CNN Money, “The never-ending charade of debt ceiling fights,” <http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/12/news/economy/debt-ceiling/?source=cnn_bin>, ALB]

Lawmakers are tied up in knots over increasing the debt ceiling this fall. But they eventually will. The only question is how messy the process will be.¶ Why assume they'll raise it? Because they have no real choice if they want to avoid a U.S. default. A default would hurt the economy and markets, and most lawmakers know this. That's why they regularly raise the debt ceiling before it comes to that.¶ In fact, since 1940, Congress has effectively approved 79 increases to the debt ceiling. That's an average of more than one a year.¶ How do they raise it? Sometimes lawmakers have raised it by small amounts, other times by large amounts. And sometimes they've raised it "temporarily" with provisions for a "snap-back" to a lower level.¶ Since it's a politically tough vote, they occasionally devise clever ways to tacitly approve increases without ever having to publicly record a "yes" vote.¶ For example, as part of the deal to resolve the 2011 debt ceiling war, Congress approved a plan that let President Obama raise the debt limit three times unless both the House and Senate passed a "joint resolution of disapproval." Such a measure never materialized. And even if it had, the president could have vetoed it.¶ Then this past February, lawmakers decided to temporarily "suspend" the debt ceiling.¶ Under this scheme, Treasury was able to continue borrowing to pay the country's bills until May 19. At that point, the debt limit automatically reset to the old cap plus whatever Treasury borrowed during the suspension period.¶ Related: Debt ceiling 'X' date could hit Oct. 18¶ What does raising the debt ceiling accomplish? Despite some politicians' incorrect assertions, raising the debt ceiling does not give the government a "license to spend more."¶ It simply lets Treasury borrow the money it needs to pay all U.S. bills in full and on time. Those bills are for services already performed and entitlement benefits already approved by Congress. In other words, it's a license to pay the bills the country incurs as a result of past decisions made by lawmakers from both parties over the years.¶ Refusing to raise the debt ceiling is "not like cutting up your credit cards. It's like cutting up your credit card bills," said historian Joseph Thorndike, who has written about past debt crises.¶ How high is it today? The debt ceiling was reset at $16.699 trillion on May 19, up from the $16.394 trillion where it was before the suspension.¶ Since then, Treasury has been forced to use "extraordinary measures" to keep the country from breaching the limit.¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said those measures will be exhausted by mid-October, after which he will only have $50 billion on hand, plus incoming revenue to pay what's owed. Sounds like a lot, but it won't last long.¶ How long will it last? An analysis by the Bipartisan Policy Center estimates that the Treasury will no longer be able to pay all bills in full and on time at some point between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.¶ So, you're saying they only have a few weeks to work this out? Yup.¶ House Republicans say they will demand spending cuts and fiscal reforms in exchange for their support of a debt ceiling increase. The White House, meanwhile, has said it won't negotiate quid pro quos.¶ The question is when will Republicans or the White House -- or both - bend in the standoff? If recent history is any guide it likely will be just in the nick of time.¶ And there's no telling how creative the deal they cut will be.¶ But any bad blood created along the way almost certainly would poison other budget negotiations. To top of page¶

#### Debt ceiling deal coming now, but it will be tough- Obama’s capital key to get Republicans to back off of Obamacare and other demands

AP 9/13/2013 (GOP leaders confounded on stopgap spending bill, lexis)

GOP leaders eager to avoid blame for a possible government shutdown next month appear confounded by conservatives' passion for using fast-approaching deadlines to derail the implementation of President Barack Obama's health care law.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, conceded Thursday his plan was all but dead for quickly passing a temporary spending bill that also defunds Obamacare, make the Senate vote on each idea separately and then send only the portion for keeping the government open to the White House for the president's signature.¶ Meanwhile, new freelance effort by rank-and-file Republicans to condition keeping the government open or preventing a debt ceiling default on delaying Obamacare for a year hit a brick wall of opposition from Democrats vowing to never let the health care law be delayed or unraveled.¶ Nonetheless, some Republicans floated the idea of postponing all of the unimplemented portions of the new law for a year including a requirement that virtually everyone buys health insurance and with new tax subsidies to help many people pay for it in exchange for raising the government's borrowing cap and easing tens of billions of dollars in broad, automatic spending cuts.¶ "Let's give them something and then we get something in exchange," Rep. John Fleming, R-La., said. "We give the administration the debt ceiling increase they want. We give them maybe some sequestration dollars that they would like to have. And in exchange we delay Obamacare, which I think the president should want. ... He's already delayed big chunks of it. It's not ready for implementation."¶ The administration has delayed a provision of the health care law requiring larger employers to provide health insurance to their workers. State exchanges through which people can purchase health insurance are set to begin operation Oct. 1.¶ Washington faces two key deadlines in coming weeks. The first is Oct. 1, when a stopgap spending measure will be needed to fund federal agency operations such as employee salaries, equipment and other costs. Without new spending authority, non-essential government operations would shut down for the first time since 1996. Even if the government shuts down, however, Social Security, Medicare and other so-called mandatory programs would continue to operate on autopilot.¶ The other, far more important must-pass measure looms later in October and would increase the government's borrowing limit so it can pay all of its bills, including Social Security benefits, interest payments on government debt, and payments to local governments and government contractors. Defaulting of those obligations would have far greater consequences for both the economy and the political fortunes of the politicians that bear the blame from voters.¶ The White House vowed again Thursday that it will do everything in its power to protect and defend Obama's health care law, his most significant accomplishment in office.¶ "We will not accept anything that delays or defunds Obamacare," White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said.¶ "It's not going to happen. It's the law of the land. It's been upheld by the Supreme Court," said Rep. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md. "So anybody who ties the operations of the government or the debt ceiling to trying to defeat Obamacare is really in favor of shutting down the government and having us default on our debt."¶ The chaos on Capitol Hill forced House leaders to tell lawmakers they'll likely have to scrap a vacation set for the week of Sept. 23 so they can be available to work out a short-term spending bill to keep the government running past the Oct. 1 start of the new budget year.¶ On Tuesday, GOP leaders proposed a plan to advance the measure through the House coupled with a provision to derail implementation of the new health care law but allow the Democratic Senate to send it on to the White House shorn of the "defund `Obamacare'" provision as long as there was a vote on it. That got poor reviews from some conservatives who don't see it as fighting hard enough to block Obamacare.¶ House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, R-Wis., is privately proposing a one-year delay of Obamacare implementation as part of the stopgap funding bill. The flaw in that strategy is that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., could win a vote to strip the Obamacare provision out in the Senate and send it straight back to the House.¶ "There are a lot of members with a lot of ideas," Boehner said. "And we're going to continue to talk to all of them."¶ The speaker met Wednesday with Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew an adversary from the 2011 budget and debt negotiations and presented him with a list of examples in which debt ceiling legislation has been paired with budget cuts. Such examples including budget pacts in 2011, 1997 and 1990.¶ "For decades the White House, the Congress have used the debt limit to find bipartisan solutions on the deficit and the debt. Now these types of changes were signed into law by Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton and President Obama himself two years ago," Boehner said. The administration says is won't negotiate on the debt limit after Republicans used it in 2011 to demand spending cuts.¶ On numerous other occasions, including seven instances during the administration of George W. Bush, Republicans have delivered support for debt ceiling increases without any spending cuts attached. That's what the administration and Democrats are demanding now, and they're confident that Republicans have less leverage than they think.¶ "If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I'm virtually certain they blink," Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said. "They know they shouldn't be playing havoc with the markets."

Backdoor deal making is working- Continued focus ensures passage

AP, 9/12 [“John Boehner on Debt Limit Fight: Spending Must Be Addressed,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/12/john-boehner-debt-limit_n_3914668.html>, ALB]

House Speaker John Boehner says Republicans will insist on curbing spending in the fight over the debt limit.¶ President Barack Obama has said he won't negotiate over extending the government's ability to borrow money when it runs out, probably next month.¶ But Boehner says that presidents of both parties have agreed to budget constraints as the price for extending the debt limit, and that this time is no different.¶ The Ohio Republican spoke at a news conference Thursday.

**We’ll link turn this – we agree the Plan is popular – but they make OBAMA FIGHT and VETO the Plan – so he fights against a popular plan which kills his political capital because all of Congress loves the Plan – we’ve never made an argument that he pushes the Plan, but he fights it, so we’re link turning the link turn**

Scheuerman 13 (William, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, PhD from Harvard, Barack Obama's "war on terror", Eurozine, 3/7, http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2013-03-07-scheuerman-en.pdf)

Given dual democratic legitimacy, holders of executive power face deeply¶ rooted institutional incentives to retain whatever power or authority has landed¶ in their laps. Fundamentally, their political fate is separate from that of the¶ legislature's. They have to prove −− on their own −− that they deserve the trust¶ placed in them by the electorate. Unlike prime ministers in parliamentary¶ regimes, they also face strict term limits. As astute observers have noted, this¶ provides political life in presidential regimes with a particular sense of urgency¶ since the executive will only have a short span of time in which to advance his¶ or her program. Presidentialism's strict separation of powers means that the¶ executive will soon likely face potentially hostile opponents who have gained a¶ foothold in the legislature. In the US, for example, even presidents recently¶ elected with large majorities immediately need to worry about looming¶ midterm congressional elections. To be sure, even prime ministers in¶ parliamentary systems will want to get things done. But incentives to do so in a¶ high−speed fashion remain more deeply ingrained in presidential systems.¶ These familiar facts about presidentialism allow us to help make sense of¶ Obama's disappointing record. Without doubt, Obama has been personally as¶ well as ideologically committed to reining in Bush−era executive prerogative.¶ Yet he now occupies an institutional position which necessarily makes him¶ averse to far−reaching attempts to limit his own room for effective political¶ and administrative action, especially when the stakes are high, as is manifestly¶ the case in counterterrorism. Understandably, he needs to worry that the¶ electorate will punish him −− and not the Congress or Supreme Court −− for¶ mistakes which might result in deadly terrorist attacks on US citizens. Given¶ the institutional dynamics of a presidential system characterized by¶ more−or−less permanent rivalry, it is hardly surprising that he has held onto so¶ much of the prerogative power successfully claimed for the executive branch¶ by his right−wing predecessor. As Obama's own political advisors have been¶ vocally telling him since 2009, it might indeed prove politically perilous if he¶ were to go too far in abandoning the substantial discretionary powers he enjoys¶ in the war on terror. Unfortunately, their "sound" political advice −− which¶ indeed may have helped Obama get reelected −− simultaneously has had¶ deeply troublesome humanitarian and legal consequences.

#### Overriding vetoes annihilates PC harder than you even know

Gattuso and Moore 1985 (James and Stephen, Policy Analyst and Research Associate at the Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, #443, (1985): 1-12, Reagan’s Trump Card: The Veto, http://www.unz.org/Pub/PolicyArchive-1985jul-00009?View=PDF)

Nothing dissipates a President’s political clout faster than a vote by two-thirds of each house of Congress to override the veto. An override signifies vulnerability and weakness. As such, the Administration should place top priority into building coalitions to assure that its veto will be sustained. But if Reagan has promised unequivocally that he will veto a bill, such as a tax increase, he must do so even if an override is probable. The cost of making empty threats and having the bluff called is greater than the cost of the override. And there is a potential cost to those voting to override: an electoral backlash for thwarting a presidential pledge.

**And even if they win Obama doesn’t veto the Plan – they cause him to fight it which kills capital**

#### Barack won’t agree to drone restrictions

NYT 5-24-2013 (The End of the Perpetual War, lexis)

In the past, we have been deeply troubled by the administration's insistence that the review of planned targeted killings be handled entirely within the executive branch. On Thursday, he said he was willing to talk to Congress about ''options for increased oversight'' -- including the establishment of ''a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action'' or ''an independent oversight board in the executive branch.'' Mr. Obama said he had constitutional and operational concerns about both ideas; in the end, he may not agree to either. But at least he did not contemptuously dismiss them as some of his advisers have done in the past.

#### Obama would veto drone restriction

Newman 13 (Alex, writer for The New American, March 28th, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/14936-gop-lawmakers-seek-to-restrain-obama-on-killing-americans>) CC

Critics of the administration’s extra-judicial assassination program have been winning the battle for public opinion by a landslide. In fact, a Gallup poll released this week revealed that about 80 percent of Americans were opposed to using drones to attack U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism in the “Homeland.” Just 13 percent supported the idea, while seven percent were undecided. Killing American “suspected terrorists” in other countries is also opposed by a majority of citizens — not that constitutionally guaranteed rights could be infringed upon based on public sentiment anyway. ¶ Even the most ruthless Third World despots would never dare to claim openly that they have the authority to murder anyone, anywhere, anytime, without trial or even charging the target with a crime. The “establishment” wing of both the Democrat Party and the GOP, however, despite swearing an oath to uphold the Constitution, has come out swinging to support Obama’s lawlessness on the issue. ¶ Among Democrats, even House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi — who duped voters into believing she opposed war and supported civil liberties — announced her support of the president’s extrajudicial killing spree last month. Speaking to a liberal reporter, Rep. Pelosi of California said she was not even sure whether the Obama administration should tell the public after it executes an American without due process. "Maybe,” she responded. “It just depends."¶ In the Republican Party, two of the most prominent so-called RINOs – Republicans In Name Only — have also admitted they support Obama’s murder-by-drone machinations. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina even proposed a resolution to commend the president for his extra-judicial assassination program. Sen. John McCain from Arizona, meanwhile, rightly opposed torture, yet for some reason claimed to believe that opposition to execution of Americans without charge or trial is a hallmark of what he childishly called “wacko birds” before publicly apologizing. ¶ Obama claims his invented authority to murder or indefinitely detain anyone applies only to suspected “al-Qaeda” terrorists, their supporters, or vaguely defined “associated forces.” However, with indisputable evidence that the administration has itself been supporting self-styled al-Qaeda leaders in both Libya and Syria, the question of who might be labeled a suspected terrorist becomes crucial. If al-Qaeda is getting U.S. weapons, funding, and training from Obama to overthrow certain Middle Eastern regimes, whom does the president really consider to be a terrorist? ¶ According to official documents released by multiple federal agencies and departments in recent years, the real terror threat to the “Homeland” is actually regular Americans: pro-life activists, gun owners, conservatives, constitutionalists, Ron Paul supporters, libertarians, veterans, opponents of illegal immigration, and others. Even a U.S. military “think tank” recently put out a shoddy “study” claiming that conservatives were the real danger. The Justice Department, meanwhile, was exposed last year training state and local police to consider mundane political bumper stickers as possible indicators of domestic terrorism.¶ The legislation to prohibit the assassination of Americans on U.S. soil was filed last week and has now been referred to the House Judiciary, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees. No hearings have been scheduled yet, according to legislative staffers. If the bill eventually reaches the president’s desk, Obama may well try to veto it, of course — though doing so would likely be an albatross around his neck even among his most ardent supporters. ¶ Still, lawmakers could override a potential veto. With 80 percent of Americans opposed to drone strikes targeting Americans on U.S. soil, members of Congress from both parties would probably have a very tough time explaining their opposition to the legislation to constituents. Activists are already rallying to support “Life, Liberty, and Justice for All Americans.” Whether more lawmakers will follow suit remains to be seen.

#### Obama wants to be able to use drones without oversight

New Zealand Herald 13 (May 24th, “Obama Defends Drone Strikes but Says no Cure All”, L/X) CC

US President Barack Obama sought to advance the US beyond the unrelenting war effort of the past dozen years, defining a narrowing terror threat that still imperils the nation but now is defined by smaller networks and homegrown extremists rather than the grandiose plots of Osama bin Laden"s al-Qaeda. He defended his controversial drone-strikes program as a linchpin of the US response to the evolving dangers.¶ In a lengthy address at the National Defence University,, Obama argued that changing threats require changes to the nation"s counterterrorism policies. He implored Congress to close the much-maligned Guantanamo Bay detention center in Cuba and pledged to allow greater oversight of the drone program. But he plans to keep the most lethal efforts with the unmanned aircraft under the control of the CIA.¶ He offered his most vigorous public defence yet of drone strikes as legal, effective and necessary as terror threats progress.¶ "Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror," Obama told his audience of students, national security and human rights experts and counterterror officials. "What we can do - what we must do - is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend."¶ Obama"s address came amid increased pressure from Congress on both the drone program and the status of the Guantanamo prison. A rare coalition of bipartisan lawmakers has pressed for more openness and more oversight of the highly secretive targeted strikes, while liberal lawmakers have pointed to a hunger strike at Guantanamo in pressing Obama to renew his stalled efforts to close the detention center.¶ The president cast the drone program as crucial in a counterterror effort that will rely less on the widespread deployment of US troops as the war in Afghanistan winds down. But he acknowledged the targeted strikes are no "cure-all" and said he is deeply troubled by the civilians unintentionally killed.

Unqeiqueness ev answers this

#### Syria doesn’t kill PC – doesn’t affect any legislative item

Bacon Jr. 9-9-13 (Perry, “Losing the Syria Vote Does Not Turn Obama Into a Lame Duck,” <http://thegrio.com/2013/09/09/no-losing-the-syria-vote-does-not-turn-obama-into-a-lame-duck/>, Mike)

But the presidency is not one issue, or just about foreign policy. If the House or the Senate blocks action in Syria, Republicans still would be wise to back the immigration bill the Senate passed earlier this year, giving Obama a major victory but also making it easier for the GOP to win Latino votes in the future. House Republicans, divided internally on that issue, have been delaying consideration of the bill, and that process is unaffected by what happens on Syria. The Obama administration, even if it does not act in Syria, will still be implementing a far-reaching health care law that could provide health insurance to millions of Americans. The president will still have the use of the bully pulpit, to make the case against America’s growing income inequality and urge our society to focus more on the specific challenges faced by African-American males, as Obama suggested he would do after the George Zimmerman verdict. The administration can still fight controversial voting laws passed in Republican-led states, urge fewer prosecutions of non-violent drug offenders and support the growing American acceptance of gay marriage. And it wasn’t as if Obama’s agenda had been moving quickly through Congress before he starting talking about Syria. Republicans in the Senate had blocked his gun control push, the House delayed the immigration bill and members of both parties were not fully on board with his economic agenda. Before Syria was in the headlines, the administration was planning to spend September pushing for Congress to approve government funding for the next year and raise the federal debt limit, the kind of necessary but unexciting lawmaking that Obama has been limited to since Republicans won control of the House of Representatives in 2010. That’s the key factor here: Republican control of the House. Much speculation has centered on Obama losing his “political capital” or his ability to influence Congress and the public over the last three years. But the evidence is fairly clear; Obama has struggled to get legislation through Congress since its membership came to include many more Republicans, who disagree with him on most issues. If Obama wanted to cut taxes on the wealthy Americans or allow the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, both ideas Republicans strongly support, they could easily be passed in Congress. A loss by Obama on Syria won’t change the views of Republicans, who were already against most of what Obama proposed, or congressional Democrats, who won’t suddenly stop supporting Obamacare or other presidential initiatives. If the president is barred from attacking Syria by Congress, that will not be the last real day of his presidency. The next day will not be the first day of the 2016 campaign, which has long been underway anyway. President George W. Bush’s poll numbers dropped quickly after his mishandling of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and it was considered the end of presidency. But he still managed to implement a whole new strategy in Iraq and loan billions of taxpayer dollars to American banks and auto companies in his last two years in office — hardly the stuff of a man who was powerless. No matter what happens in Syria, Barack Obama will still have more than 1200 days to make an impact on American public policy and culture.

#### Pol cap is key-He has just enough support after Syria

**Pace, 9/12** [Julie, AP White House Correspondent, “Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda,” <http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic-issues-4808667.php>, ALB]

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶

**Ferguson concedes decline causes war**

Niall Ferguson 09, Prof. History @ Harvard, April, (<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4681&page=0>)

Seven years ago, in his State of the Union address on Jan. 29, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush warned of an “axis of evil” that was engaged in assisting terrorists, acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and “arming to threaten the peace of the world.” In Bush’s telling, this exclusive new club had three members: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Bush’s policy prescription for dealing with the axis of evil was preemption, and just over a year later he put this doctrine into action by invading Iraq. The bad news for Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, is that he now faces a **much large**r and potentially **more troubling** axis—an axis of upheaval. This axis has at least nine members, and quite possibly more. What unites them is not so much their wicked intentions as their instability, which the global financial crisis only **makes worse every day**. Unfortunately, that same crisis is making it far from easy for the United States to respond to this new “grave and growing danger.” When Bush’s speechwriters coined the phrase “axis of evil” (originally “axis of hatred”), they were drawing a parallel with the World War II alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, formalized in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. The axis of upheaval, by contrast, is more reminiscent of the decade before the outbreak of World War II, when the Great Depression unleashed **a wave of global political crises**. The Bush years have of course revealed the perils of drawing facile parallels between the challenges of the present day and the great catastrophes of the 20th century. Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression could have **comparable consequences for the international system**. For more than a decade, I pondered the question of why the 20th century was characterized by so much brutal upheaval. I pored over primary and secondary literature. I wrote more than 800 pages on the subject. And ultimately I concluded, in The War of the World, that three factors made the location and timing of lethal organized violence more or less predictable in the last century. The first factor was ethnic disintegration: Violence was worst in areas of mounting ethnic tension. The second factor was economic volatility: **The greater the magnitude of economic shocks, the more likely conflict was**. And the third factor was empires in decline: When structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody. In at least one of the world’s regions—the greater Middle East—two of these three factors have been present for some time: Ethnic conflict has been rife there for decades, and following the difficulties and disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States already seems likely to begin winding down its quasi-imperial presence in the region. It likely still will. Now the third variable, **economic volatility, has returned with a vengeance.** U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s “Great Moderation”—the supposed decline of economic volatility that he hailed in a 2004 lecture—has been obliterated by a financial chain reaction, beginning in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, spreading through the banking system, reaching into the “shadow” system of credit based on securitization, and now triggering collapses in asset prices and economic activity around the world. After nearly a decade of unprecedented growth, the global economy will almost certainly sputter along in 2009, though probably not as much as it did in the early 1930s, because governments worldwide are frantically trying to repress this new depression. But no matter how low interest rates go or how high deficits rise, there will be a substantial increase in unemployment in most economies this year and a painful decline in incomes. Such economic pain nearly always has geopolitical consequences. Indeed, we can already see the first symptoms of the coming upheaval.

**Slow growth makes the US uncooperative and desperate – leads to hegemonic wars – independent scenario**

**Goldstein 07** - Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, Avery Goldstein, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” [Journal of Strategic Studies](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713636064), Volume[30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713636064~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D30#v30), Issue [4 & 5](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg780703608)August 2007, pages 639 – 682

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to theultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance**.** The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth(much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650

#### US economic decline makes global nuclear war likely

O’Hanlon and Lieberthal 12 Michael O’Hanlon, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. Kenneth Lieberthal, Ph.D., is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. “The real national security threat: America's debt,” July 3, LA Times Op-Ed, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursuenuclear weaponsfor their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

## Case

**Their ev lists 3 things**

#### Releasing the DOJ memoranda solves transparency with other nations, targeting criteria, and civilian data

Stanford International Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic, 2012, “[Executive Summary and Recommendations](http://www.livingunderdrones.org/executive-summary-recommendations/)” http://www.livingunderdrones.org/

In light of these concerns, this report recommends that the US conduct a fundamental re-evaluation of current targeted killing practices, taking into account all available evidence, the concerns of various stakeholders, and the short and long-term costs and benefits. A significant rethinking of current US targeted killing and drone strike policies is long overdue. US policy-makers, and the American public, cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian harm and counter-productive impacts of US targeted killings and drone strikes in Pakistan.

This report also supports and reiterates the calls consistently made by rights groups and others for legality, accountability, and transparency in US drone strike policies:

The US should fulfill its international obligations with respect to accountability and transparency, and ensure proper democratic debate about key policies. The US should:

Release the US Department of Justice memoranda outlining the legal basis for US targeted killing in Pakistan; Make public critical information concerning US drone strike policies, including as previously and repeatedly reques­ted by various groups and officials:[[7]](http://www.livingunderdrones.org/#_ftn7) the tar­geting criteria for so-called “signature” strikes; the mechanisms in place to ensure that targeting complies with international law; which laws are being applied; the nature of investigations into civilian death and injury; and mechanisms in place to track, analyze and publicly recognize civilian casualties;[[8]](http://www.livingunderdrones.org/#_ftn8)

Ensure independent investigations into drone strike deaths, consistent with the call made by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism in August 2012;[[9]](http://www.livingunderdrones.org/%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn9)

In conjunction with robust investigations and, where appropriate, prosecutions, establish compensation programs for civilians harmed by US strikes in Pakistan.

The US should fulfill its international humanitarian and human rights law obligations with respect to the use of force, including by not using lethal force against individuals who are not members of armed groups with whom the US is in an armed conflict, or otherwise against individuals not posing an imminent threat to life. This includes not double-striking targets as first responders arrive.

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**Roberts say they need to create guidelines on LEGIITMATE uses of drones – I.E. WHEN WE CAN AND CAN NOT USE DRONES**

#### \*Increasing congressional visibility is the only way to stop drone proliferation that prevents instability.

Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC

The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States government and its closest allies. The aircraft are too easy to obtain, with barriers to entry on the production side crumbling too quickly to place limits on the spread of a technology that promises to transform warfare on a global scale. Already, more than 75 countries have remote piloted aircraft. More than 50 nations are building a total of nearly a thousand types. At its last display at a trade show in Beijing, China showed off 25 different un[Personed] aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines.It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: An advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main precedent for its application is the one set by the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following.America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts.To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order.“I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.”—Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligenceHyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

#### No impact to terrorism

**Mueller and Steward 12** (John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf)

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15