# 1NC-People Power Movement

#### 1) ‘People Power’ did not resolve issues of inequality or poverty---It destroyed cultural achievements within the Philippines, turning their methodology

Gómez 13 (9/4, Enric-Sol Brines Gómez, With The Voices, “The Philippines: consequences of the “People’s Power Revolution” 25 years later” http://www.withthevoices.com/2013/09/04/the-philippines-consequences-of-the-peoples-power-revolution-25-years-later/)

What were the outcomes of EDSA I revolution? Well, first of all, it made possible the end of a dictatorship. It is true that some freedoms came back for the Filipinos. However, economic disparities and huge inequality remain. Secondly, without Marcos, the golden era of the Philippines disappeared. With them, this country was the second economy power of Asia (after Japan). The time when Ferdinand Marcos held all the power under him, his wife Imelda traveled around the world putting the Philippines between the most important countries in the world. At that time, Imelda elevated the Filipino culture and arts very high, especially with the construction of the impressive buildings of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The recovered democratic Filipino regime has been unable to reach those achievements.

#### 2) It also failed to address human rights---That ensures governmental corruption

Gómez 13 (9/4, Enric-Sol Brines Gómez, With The Voices, “The Philippines: consequences of the “People’s Power Revolution” 25 years later” http://www.withthevoices.com/2013/09/04/the-philippines-consequences-of-the-peoples-power-revolution-25-years-later/)

Also, the imperfect democracy that appeared after EDSA revolution has not advanced in some basic Human Rights. It is easy to check the situation of thousands of unprotected workers in the Philippines. Most of them receive unfair salaries, as a consequence of the lack of trade unions. The usual killing of trade union leaders and the government prosecution of unions is yearly denounced by different international Human Rights associations. ¶ At the same time, the new democracy in the Philippines created a very weak government. The presence of the public sector in the country has clearly stepped back. The time of huge public projects has ended, at least so far. Of course, the Philippines need more infraestructures to foster its development. The best example is the clearly inefficient and small Metro Manila Massive Transportation System. More lines, more trains are more frequences are needed.

and families.

#### 3) The use of ‘People Power’ as a method of resistance ensures backlash and fails to reform the aspects of the government they criticize---The ‘People Power II’ movement proves

Mydans 1 (Seth, New York Times, “'People Power II' Doesn't Give Filipinos the Same Glow” http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/05/world/people-power-ii-doesn-t-give-filipinos-the-same-glow.html)

Fifteen years ago, Filipinos braved tanks and threats in a ''people power'' revolution to bring down a dictator who had stolen an election, and to restore democracy after two decades of martial law.¶ Last month, in what Filipinos are calling People Power II, huge crowds again forced a president from office. As before, it was an emotional outpouring, with songs and raised fists.¶ But there were crucial differences that have cast doubt on the dedication of Filipinos to democratic processes, and to their chagrin, Filipinos have drawn not praise but censure from abroad.¶ The man they overthrew, Joseph Estrada, was a democratically elected president half way through his six-year term. The popular uprising took place when it became clear that due process -- his impeachment trial in the Senate -- would not produce the result many people hoped for: his removal by constitutional means. The turning point came when the armed forces chief informed Mr. Estrada that the military was ''withdrawing its support.''¶ The legal rationale for his removal was a last-minute Supreme Court ruling that ''the welfare of the people is the supreme law,'' in effect stripping Mr. Estrada of any legitimacy.¶ Filipinos were thrilled at the peaceful ouster of a president who had become an embarrassment -- a lazy, hard-drinking womanizer who had allowed the economy to collapse and had, according to testimony in the Senate, engaged in systematic corruption.¶ But if they expected cheers once again from around the world, they were instead hurt and infuriated when People Power II was met with doubt and criticism, described by foreign commentators as ''a defeat for due process,'' as ''mob rule,'' as ''a de facto coup.''¶ It was seen as an elitist backlash against a president who had overwhelmingly been elected by the poor. This time, it appears, ''people power'' was used not to restore democracy but, momentarily, to supplant it. Filipinos seemed to prefer democracy by fiesta, still shying from the hard work of building institutions and reforming their corrupt political system.

#### 4) ‘People Power’ is literally the opposite of the AFF---It creates a closed society that creates conditions for dominate economic models

Almond 4 (Mark, Taipei Times, “The unnerving consequences of people power” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/12/10/2003214517/2)

People Power is, it turns out, more about closing things than creating an open society. It shuts factories but, worse still, minds. Its advocates demand a free market in everything -- except opinion. The current ideology of New World Order ideologues, many of whom are renegade communists, is Market-Leninism -- that combination of a dogmatic economic model with Machiavellian methods to grasp the levers of power.

#### 5) The ‘people power’ movement did nothing to challenge the dominant structures of oppression posited by economic and political hierarchies—it only propped up systems of the state and allowed the whiteness of Washington’s politics to continue exploitative practices under the guise of progressive hope. This proves their reliance on this method for change doesn’t solve and only reifies whiteness

#### Bolshevik.org No Date (“Filipino Elite Still in the Saddle, Not ‘People Power', but Workers Power!”, Published 1917 (Summer 1986), http://www.bolshevik.org/1917/no2/no02phil.html)

The coalition which stood atop the ‘‘People Power’’ pyramid embraced the clerical hierarchy (a potent force in this 85 percent Catholic country), the commercial bourgeoisie of the Makati district, sections of the landholding hierarchy (represented by Aquino herself), and enjoyed the support of a sizeable portion of the middle and lower ranks of the officer corps. The bourgeois class character of the new administration is apparent in Aquino’s cabinet choices. Her Vice President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister (and rival), Doy Laurel, was one of the few bourgeois oppositionists who did not suffer financially under the dictatorship. Jaime Ongpin, the new Finance Minister, is president of one of the largest mining multinationals in the Philippines. The two leading military rebels, Ramos (Marcos’ top cop throughout the martial law period) and Enrile (who was among the richest and most corrupt of the cronies) kept their jobs as armed forces chief of staff and defense minister respectively. They embody the continuity of the state, in particular the military, from Marcos to Aquino. The new government is pledged to taking back a few of the holdings awarded to the cronies; reappropriating as much of Marcos’ loot as it can locate; and returning the army and the rest of the state apparatus to the service of the entire ruling elite. But Aquino’s ‘‘People Power’’ will do nothing to better the abysmal conditions of life for the 70 percent of the population who live in poverty. There are already indications that the illusions of last February are beginning to evaporate. In a speech delivered in mid-April, Vice President Laurel made reference to ‘‘deep grumblings sweeping across our land’’ (New York Times, 21 April). But Washington has no complaints. The multinational investments remain secure as do the naval and air bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field. Aquino’s victory has also kept the Filipino officer corps intact for its war on the NPA and has, at least temporarily, administered a major political setback to one of the world’s largest leftist insurgencies. A State Department aide summed up the view from Washington: ‘‘We feel we’re on a roll. Now we want to use that momentum and apply it to the contras.’’

# 1NC-Assata Shakur

#### 1) The framing of Assata Shakur in the 1AC’s Mos Def evidence and explanation is *deeply problematic*-it reinscribes masculine conceptions of resistance that paint men as the TRUE revolutionaries while women are labeled as sacrificial mother figures-This is reductionist, misguided, and patriarchal

**Corrigan, 9** [Lisa M., Assistant Professor of Communication, Co-Chair of the Gender Studies Program, Affiliate Faculty in both African & African American Studies and Latin American Studies in the Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Arkansas, “Sacrifice, Love, and Resistance: The Hip Hop Legacy of Assata Shakur,” *Women and Language*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pg. Comm and Mass Media Complete, ALB]

In his explanation of the relationship between¶ revolutionary action and love, guerrilla leader Che¶ Guevara underscores the importance of idealizing love of¶ "the people" as well as the centrality of sacrifice within¶ the revolutionary family to the work of vanguard social¶ movements. As one of the most well-recognized icons of¶ revolutionary thought and action, Guevara points to a¶ relationship between love and resistance in his writings¶ that has been overlooked by many scholars, particularly in¶ the way that this relationship frames the heroism and¶ martyrdom that provide the contours of many social¶ movements for liberation.¶ Likewise, Guevara's commentary on the sacrifices of¶ families enmeshed in revolutionary politics highlights the¶ role of reproduction in the creation and maintenance of¶ vanguard ideology. Developed primarily as a rejection of¶ modernity and the machinations of capitalism, Guevara's¶ comments on revolutionary ideology were influenced by and contributed to the revolutionary theory of Third¶ World writers like Franz Fanon, Paulo Friere, Aimé¶ Césaire and other theorists of color. This body of theory¶ attempted to understand how populations could resist¶ neocolonialism in productive ways, though Guevara's¶ initial comments on revolution in his 1965 letter¶ "Socialism and Man in Cuba" articulated a masculine¶ conception of resistance. Hazel Carby writes.¶ Clearly, in the general political and social¶ imagination the birth of future generations is¶ most frequently feminized, while revolution is¶ often represented as a homosocial act of¶ reproduction: a social and political upheaval in¶ which men confront each other to give birth to a¶ new nation, a struggle frequently conceived of in¶ terms of sex and sexuality. (127)¶ This gender dynamic, hinted at in Guevara's epigraph,¶ and expanded in Carby's work, illustrates how it is that¶ we come to understand men as true revolutionaries and¶ women as those who must make sacrifices in their roles as¶ wives and mothers. This conception of revolution -¶ which sees men as the true revolutionaries and only¶ acknowledges the singular role women can play as¶ mothers of new generations of activists — is reductionist¶ and erases the women who are active participants in¶ social justice movements as guerrillas, whether or not¶ they are also mothers and wives.¶ This essay seeks to explore the ways in which revolutionary love is described in terms of sacrifice, heroism, martyrdom, and, in particular, the gendered production of these terms by black revolutionaries. It also examines the heroization and martyring of former Black Panther and Black Liberation Army member Assata Shakur by hip hop artists to understand how she is positioned in the history of black revolutionary resistance. I argue that rapper Paris utilizes an immature form of love-talk to praise Shakur's strength as a black woman, which reduces Shakur's revolutionary black activism to the general struggles that women of color face every day. Although these struggles often form the basis for collective action by black women, his lyrics fail to either demand or acknowledge black revolutionary women who go beyond daily struggle. On the other hand, rapper Common's more mature love-talk characterizes Shakur outside of Guevara's gender binary as a revolutionary figure, a living martyr, and hero because she is a self- sacrificing revolutionary guerrilla and mother leading a liberation movement against racism, brutality, and the prison-industrial complex. As this kind of leader, Shakur can continue to inspire social justice activism from exile to new generations of black activists working towards black liberation, though she is not placed in a context of other historical black women who have struggled for black liberation. Finally, I argue that slam poets Tuiya Autry and Walidah Imarisha articulate the ideal love-talk encompassing revolutionary love. Autry and Imarisha utilize the language of black female poets in their love- talk describing Shakur in terms of her guerrilla activism, her strength, and, most importantly, her connections to revolutionary black liberation women across the ages.

**2)** **Focusing on Assata Shakur reifies heteronormativity**

**Corrigan 6** (Lisa M., Assistant Professor of Communication, Co-Chair of the Gender Studies Program, Affiliate Faculty in both African & African American Studies and Latin American Studies in the Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Arkansas, “REIMAGINING BLACK POWER: PRISON¶ MANIFESTOS AND THE STRATEGIES OF¶ REGENERATION IN THEREWRITING OF BLACK¶ IDENTITY, 1969-2002”, page 160, [http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/4182/1/umi-umd-3985.pdf)[rkezios](http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/4182/1/umi-umd-3985.pdf)%5brkezios)]

It seems that just as Shakur embraces the birth of her daughter as a moment of¶ regeneration, she also sees her autobiographical manifesto as a moment of (re)birth,¶ producing a whole new history of black women’s resistance to which Shakur is¶ intrinsically linked. The childbirth metaphor allows her to defy patriarchal convention¶ and merge the act of creation, in writing the text, with the act of(pro)creation, in having¶ Kakuya. Shakur’s counter-history is squarely grounded in the history of the black¶ women who came before her and whose spirit she continues to remember, even as she¶ naturalizes the role of men within the regenerational process of Black Power. By linking¶ her resistance to that of prior generations of black women, inside and outside of¶ America’s prisons, Shakur is able to craft a continuous, complex narrative of black¶ women’s activism that makes future generations responsible for continuing to defy the¶ social norms and discriminatory practices of the state.¶ 128 Such constructions in some¶ ways counter the hegemonic masculinity of the Black Power movement **while still**¶ **privileging heterosexuality and constructions of motherhood**. Shakur is also able to detail¶ the violence directed toward black women in the culture as a way of uniting black¶ memory against such pervasive raced, sexed and classed abuses. In many ways, Shakur’s¶ accounts of the violence against black people consolidate group affiliations by making¶ blackness and poverty irrefutable, unavoidable signs, which still provides fort he¶ possibilities of creative self-definitions as this traumatized collective historical memory is¶ forged.

**3) Turns the aff – heteronormative practice destroy any chance of inclusionary politics by excluding those who choose not to have children**

**4) Denial of reproductive choice furthers the heteronormative allegorizing of identity. All rights and freedoms are sacrificed in the name of protecting the idealized Child of reproductive futurism.**

**Edelman 04** (Lee Edelman, Professor of English, Tufts University, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE, 2004, 11)

In its coercive universalization, however, the image of the Child, not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children, serves to regulate political discourse – to prescribe what will count as political discourse – by compelling such discourse to accede in advance to the reality of a **collective future** whose figurative status we are never permitted to acknowledge or address. From Delacroix’s iconic image of Liberty leading us into a brave new world of revolutionary possibility – her bare breast making each spectator the unweaned Child to whom it’s held out while the boy to her left, reproducing her posture, affirms the absolute logic of reproduction itself – to the revolutionary waif in the logo that miniaturizes the “politics” of Les Mis (summed up in its anthem to futurism, the “inspirational” “One Day More”), we are no more able to conceive of a future without a fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the figure of the Child. That figural Child alone embodies the citizens of the Ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights “real” citizens are allowed. For the social order exists to preserve for this universal subject, this phantasmatic Child, a notional freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself, which might, after all, put at risk the Child to whom such a freedom falls due. Hence, whatever refuses this mandate by which our political institutions compel the collective reproduction of the Child must appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the logic of futurism on which meaning always depends. So, for example, when P. D. James, in her novel The Children of Men, imagines a future in which the human race has suffered a seemingly absolute loss of the capacity to reproduce, her narrator, Theodore Faron, not only attributes this reversal of biological fortune to the putative crisis of sexual values in late twentieth-century democracies – “Pornography and sexual violence on film, on television, in books, in life had increased and became more explicit but less and less in the West we made love and bred children,” he declares – but also gives voice to the ideological truism that governs our investment in the Child as the obligatory token of futurity: “Without the hope of posterity, for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live,” he later observes, “all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defenses shored up against our ruins.” While this allusion to Elliot’s “The Waste Land” may recall another of its well-known line, one for which we apparently have Elliot’s wife, Vivian, to thank – “What you get married for if you don’t want children?” – it also brings out the function of the child as the prop of the secular theology that shapes at once the meaning of our collective narratives and our collective narratives of meaning. Charged, after all, with the task of assuring “that we being dead yet live,” the Child, as if by nature (more precisely as the promise of a natural transcendence of the limits of nature itself), exudes the very pathos from which the narrator of The Children of Men recoils when he comes upon it in non-reproductive “pleasures of the mind and senses.” For the “pathetic” quality he projectively locates in non-generative sexual enjoyment – enjoyment that he views in the absence of futurity as empty, substitutive, pathological – exposes the fetishistic figurations of the Child that the narrator pits against it as legible in terms identical to those for which enjoyment without “hope for posterity” is peremptorily dismissed; legible, that is, as nothing more than “pathetic and crumbling defenses shored up against our ruins.” How better to characterize the narrative project of The Children of Men itself, which ends, as anyone not born yesterday surely expects from the start, with the renewal of our barren and dying race though the miracle of birth? After all, as Walter Wangerin Jr., reviewing the book for the New York Times, approvingly noted in a sentence delicately poised between description and performance of the novel’s pro-procreation ideology; “If there is a baby, there is a future, there is redemption.” If, however, there is no being, and, in consequence, no future, then the blame must fall on the fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably, life itself. Given that the author of The Children of Men, like the parents of mankind’s children, succumbs so completely to the narcissism – all-pervasive, self-congratulatory, and strategically misrecognized – that animates pro-natalism, why should we be the least bit surprised when her narrator, facing his futureless future, laments, with what we must call a straight face, that “sex totally divorced from procreation has become almost meaninglessly acrobatic”? Which is, of course, to say no more than that sexual practice will continue to allegorize the vicissitudes of meaning so long as the specifically heterosexual alibi of reproductive necessity obscures the drive beyond meaning driving the machinery of sexual meaningfulness; so long, that is, as the biological fact of heterosexual procreation bestows the imprimatur of meaning-production on heterogenital relations. For the Child, whose mere possibility is enough to spirit away the naked truth of heterosexual sex – impregnating heterosexuality, as it were, with the future of signification by conferring upon it the cultural burden of signifying futurity – figures our identification with an always about-to-be-realized identity. It thus denies the constant threat to the social order of meaning inherent to the structure of Symbolic desire that commits us to pursuing fulfillment by way of a meaning unable, as meaning, either to fulfill us or, in turn, to be fulfilled because, unable to close the gap in identity, the division incised by the signifier, that “meaning,” despite itself, means. The consequences of such an identification both of and with the Child as the preeminent emblem of the motivating end, though endlessly postponed, of every political vision as a vision of futurity must weigh on any delineation of a queer oppositional politics. For the only queerness that queer sexualities could ever hope to signify would spring from their determined opposition to this underlying structure of the political – their opposition, that is, to the governing fantasy of achieving Symbolic closure through the marriage of identity to futurity in order to realize the social subject. Conservatives acknowledge this radical potential, which is to say, this radical threat, of queerness more fully than liberals, for conservatism preemptively imagines the wholesale rupturing of the social fabric, whereas liberalism conservatively clings to a faith in its limitless elasticity. The discourse of the right thus tends toward a great awareness of, and insistence on, the literalization of the figural logics that various social subjects are made to inhabit and enact, the logics that, from a “rational” viewpoint, reduce individual identity to stereotypical generality, while the discourse of the left tends to understand better the Symbolic’s capacity to accommodate change by displacing those logics onto history as the inevitable unfolding of narrative sequence. The right, that is, better sees the inherently conflictual aspect of identities, the constant danger they face in alterity, the psychic anxiety with which they are lived; but the left better recognizes history’s persistent rewriting of those identities, finding hope in the fact that identity’s borders are never fully fixed. The left in this is always right from the vantage point of reason, but left in the shade by its reason is the darkness inseparable from its light: the defensive structure of the ego, the rigidity of identity as experienced by the subject, and the fixity of the Imaginary relation through which we (re)produce ourselves. This conservatism of the ego compels the subject, whether liberal or conservative politically, to endorse as the meaning of politics itself the reproductive futurism that perpetuates as reality a fantasy frame intended to secure the survival of the social in the imaginary form of the Child.

# 1NC-Nonviolence

#### 1) Their Deats evidence proves that the aff methodology wholeheartedly embraces Ghandian nonviolent resistance. Here are some lines that they don’t read…

Deats 11 [Richard, Super Consciousness, "The People Power Revolution in the Philippines," http://www.superconsciousness.com/topics/society/people-power-revolution-philippines]

In l986 millions of unarmed Filipinos surprised the world by nonviolently overthrowing the brutal dictator Ferdinand Marcos, known at the time as “the Hitler of Southeast Asia.” They called their movement “people power,” demonstrating in an amazing way the power of active nonviolence, the power of truth and love, similar to what was seen in the Gandhian freedom struggle in India and the civil rights movement in the United States. Beginning with the assassination in l983 of the popular opposition leader Senator Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino, the movement against Marcos grew rapidly. Imprisoned for seven years by Marcos, Aquino had experienced a deep conversion in his concentrated study of the Bible and Gandhi. This led him to begin advocating a nonviolent revolution against dictatorship. His subsequent martyrdom fueled the determination of many Filipinos to continue in his radical nonviolent path. I felt a strong affinity with this emerging movement. I had taught social ethics at Union Theological Seminary in the Philippines for thirteen years. Coming from the southern US where I was part of the civil rights struggle, the parallels with the Philippine situation were strong: Martin Luther King, Jr., the leading spokesman of the nonviolent movement against entrenched injustice had also been killed but his message and approach lived on. In 1984, the Little Sisters of Jesus, a community of nuns who worked among the poorest of the poor in metropolitan Manila, took it upon themselves to contact Jean and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, nonviolence lecturers and trainers in Europe who had worked for many years for the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) in situations of revolution and war. The nuns asked the Goss-Mayrs, a French-Austrian couple, to come to the Philippines to help assess the situation. Having lived under Nazism in World War II, they were acquainted with struggling against tyranny. They came and met with church leaders (the country is over ninety percent Christian), peasants, labor and student leaders and community organizers. Out of these meetings came the decision to build a nonviolent movement that would oppose the dictatorship. Also a part of the IFOR and having lived and worked in the Philippines, I joined in this campaign. Long active in anti-war efforts and the civil rights movement, I returned to the Philippines and joined in the nonviolence trainings, accompanied by Stefan Merken, Jewish pacifist, photographer and writer also active in the IFOR. Our training team consisted of myself, Merken and Professor Hilario Gomez and six students from Union Seminary who were part of an activist group, FOJ— Friends of Jesus. Our efforts spread over a wide swath of Luzon, the main island of the Philippines. We traveled by public bus from place to place where our workshops were held: in local churches, a rural life center, a college, a labor center and at the headquarters of the National Council of Churches. Due to dictatorial rule in the country, we tried to keep “under the radar” so as not to be arrested should the content of our workshops become known to the government. The trainings were for invited persons only and were not publicly announced or noticed. After an opening worship, with hymns and prayers, at each workshop Gomez presented a socio/political analysis of the country-the Filipinos called such a lecture a “situationer.” Then Gomez and I talked about the nonviolent understanding of biblical faith that pursues justice, that stands with the oppressed and that challenges cruel authority as was seen in the biblical prophets, in Jesus, in the Asian Gandhi and the African-American King. We did role plays, where participants would take assigned parts, such as a tenant farmer dealing with an oppressive landlord, or a worker stopped by an armed soldier for questioning. We talked about “the pillars of oppression”, e.g., the army, the government, the upper class. Participants shared their opinions and experiences and began to feel strength that came from verbalizing and acting out internal struggles that often had been held in silence. Learning of what had happened in India, in the US and other places was a powerful incentive for action. Ordinary people had done extraordinary things creating a contagion out of which movements had been born. Merken fascinated the participants with his Jewish perspective on biblical nonviolence. Most of them in this Asian nation had never even met a Jew, much less heard a Jewish pacifist discuss the first recorded act of civil disobedience when a midwife disobeyed the king’s edict to kill Hebrew male babies by hiding the infant Moses in the bulrushes, thereby saving his life. So nonviolent resistance wasn’t just a Gandhian idea! We had lively discussions. There was universal disgust with dictatorship but some thought one just had to passively endure it. “Bahala na” they would say, a Filipino expression that means “That’s just the way things are, the way they will be.” Others thought only violence could be effective against evil oppressors. As a bishop said to me, “I used to believe in nonviolence but Marcos is too cruel; only a bloody revolution will work against him.” When I asked him how long such a revolution would take, he said, “Ten years.” (Neither of us had any idea, of course, that less than a year later Marcos would have fled the country when faced with nonviolent masses of Filipinos). Others refused to sanction violence even in a just struggle. Some had heard I worked for the CIA; others had heard I was really a communist! But some had heard that I was part of monthly vigils against the Vietnam War; others had been my students in seminary and had seen me at student demonstrations favoring democracy. The workshop became a safe place where these contradictory ideas and accusations were aired. Along with vigorous discussion were also moments of humor that joined us together in shared laughter. Through it all, the examination of Gandhi, King and Aquino led to an emerging understanding that, as Dr. King had said, “The arc of the universe is long but it bends towards justice.” Perhaps the time of reckoning was at hand. The martyrdom of Senator Aquino heightened the determination of the people to end their long tyranny. Maybe his death was a signpost, not another dead end. The seeds planted in the workshops among Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and others of no particular faith; clergy and laity, intellectuals, students, peasant and labor leaders began to give birth to intensive efforts around the country to build a resistance community. Little by little, but also in unexpected leaps and bounds, there emerged a solid core of activists - including many key leaders - ready for a showdown with the Marcos dictatorship. The workshops of 1984 and 1985 were catalysts that awakened new possibilities into being. Age old habits of fatalism gave way to a determination for a better future. From cardinals and bishops to local priests and nuns, ministers and women deacons, brave students and farmers, a chorus rang out calling for change - dangerous and daring but absolutely necessary. Activists sprang into action, breathing new life into communities, forming new organizations, boldly speaking out about this “third way” - active nonviolence, the path between violence and passivity. I watched in awe at the creativity and boldness of “the unarmed forces” of the Philippines.

#### 2) The Filipino people power revolution just got lucky—Ghandian nonviolence is a bad strategy that misunderstands human nature, typically fails, and can lead to the movement’s literal extermination.

Stolinsky, ‘1 [ [10-10-01](http://www.newsmax.xom/archives/articles/2001/10/9/175032.shtml%2010-10-01) An earlier version of this article appeared in the May 1997 New Oxford Review. The Ugly Side of Pacifism, David, Wednesday, Oct. 10, 2001]

Even the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon evoke only sadness, while suggestions that we eliminate the terrorists bring forth strong objections, often with the question, "What would Gandhi advise?"¶ Gandhi was a great man, but we know of him only because he was fortunate enough to use his nonviolent methods against the British. Had he tried them on a more brutal foe, he would have wound up in a forgotten grave. Indeed, Gandhi advised the Jews not to resist the Nazis — perhaps the worst advice in history. Pacifists must choose their opponents with care.¶ Pacifists narcissistically assume everyone is like them, open to reason. They lack the imagination to see that some people do not use violence as a last resort, when other methods fail, but enjoy violence — revel in it. They cannot imagine that there are people who enjoy killing, and even some who look forward to dying themselves if enough "others" die also.¶ Many pacifists are zealous in protecting criminals’ rights, but they forget the rights of victims. Some time ago, a black store owner was robbed at gunpoint. He identified the robber, who threatened to kill him. The store owner applied for a gun permit but was denied. Later he used an unregistered gun to shoot the robber, who had been released from jail and tried to carry out his threat. The store owner was given a year in jail. Sympathy was used up on the robber — none was left for the store owner.¶ The word "peacemaker" has two basic meanings. The first refers to one who tries to calm hostility. The second refers to the Colt .45 revolver, which may be required if the first approach fails. Both types of peacemaker are needed to keep peace in the world.¶ Pacifists declare, "All life is precious," but what does this mean? I have seen the police photographing a corpse on a sidewalk, and two coyotes tearing apart a cat on a Los Angeles street. Every year coyotes kill many pets and occasionally attack a child, yet hunting or trapping them is illegal. In practice, "all life is precious" means that the life of a murderer is more precious than that of his victim, and the life of a coyote is more precious than that of a cat or dog. Pacifists stand aside in self-satisfied neutrality while predators roam free.¶ Pacifism is a luxury. Like golf, it can be enjoyed by a fortunate few, while most of us face a harsher reality. Pacifists often live in safe suburbs or gated communities, so they cannot understand why anyone feels the need for self-defense. They rarely work or live in high-crime areas, as do many poor people and minorities. They need not dirty their hands with weapons; gun oil has a pleasant smell with which they are unfamiliar. They depend on the police and military to keep them safe — and then look down with contempt on their protectors, while cutting their funding and hampering them with unrealistic rules.¶ As has been said, it doesn’t matter how many resolutions the sheep pass in favor of vegetarianism; the only thing that matters is whether the wolves are hungry. The world is full of hungry wolves. Sheep are too stupid to know this, so sheepdogs protect them. But what if the sheep were just smart enough to muzzle the sheepdogs, because the growls disturbed their peaceful slumbers?¶ Rather than a coherent philosophy of nonviolence and peacemaking, today’s pacifism is merely apathy and cowardice in fancy clothes:¶ "Give peace a chance." To do what? Allow more thousands of innocents to be slaughtered, while we stand aside feeling superior? Is that peace?¶ "Let’s sit down and talk." About what? How to identify body parts?¶ "There is another way." What, specifically?¶ "Stop the cycle of violence." What cycle? We did nothing after a hole was blown in the USS Cole and 17 sailors were killed. What good did our restraint do?¶ "Violence never settles anything." Really? What about World War II?¶ "We aren’t perfect." Neither is anyone. But this does not justify blaming the victims, and it does not excuse us from our duty.¶ Horrific as the Twin Towers atrocity was, it cannot obliterate the memory of the other 18,000 or so Americans who will be murdered this year. Violent death, crime and terrorism are realities we have been forced to face. We can no longer pretend that only others are at risk — others who live or work in "bad" parts of town.¶ We have been forced to face the fact that all parts of town, and of the world, can be "bad." There are people who want to see us dead. They don’t envy our free elections, free speech, religious pluralism, or women’s rights; they hate us because of these freedoms. They don’t want to take what we have; they spit on it. They don’t want to hijack our plane; they want to crash it. They want us dead. Not just soldiers. Men, women, and children. Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, atheists and even Muslims who disagree with their totalitarian agenda. All of us.¶ We are like the sheep that were just smart enough to muzzle the sheepdogs. If we are unwilling to defend ourselves, we can at least untie our protectors. Will we? Or will we look around for our missing companions, promptly forget about them, bleat about the high cost of dog food, and then go back to sleep, dreaming peaceful dreams, while our flock is picked off one by one?

# 1NC-Ballot Commodification

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their call for the ballot

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

#### Independently - their demand for the ballot is bad—it cedes revolutionary potential to the sovereign authority of the judge which paradoxically reaffirms the status quo.

David Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle in England, 1998, Performing Politics and the Limits of Language, Theory & Event, 2:1

Those who argue that hate speech demands juridical responses assert that not only does the speech communicate, but that it constitutes an injurious act. This presumes that not only does speech act, but that "it acts upon the addressee in an injurious way" (16). This argumentation is, in Butler's eyes, based upon a "sovereign conceit" whereby speech wields a sovereign power, acts as an imperative, and embodies a causative understanding of representation. In this manner, hate speech constitutes its subjects as injured victims unable to respond themselves and in need of the law's intervention to restrict if not censor the offending words, and punish the speaker: This idealization of the speech act as a sovereign action (whether positive or negative) appears linked with the idealization of sovereign state power or, rather, with the imagined and forceful voice of that power. It is as if the proper power of the state has been expropriated, delegated to its citizens, and the state then rememerges as a neutral instrument to which we seek recourse to protects as from other citizens, who have become revived emblems of a (lost) sovereign power (82). Two elements of this are paradoxical. First, the sovereign conceit embedded in conventional renderings of hate speech comes at a time when understanding power in sovereign terms is becoming (if at all ever possible) even more difficult. Thus the juridical response to hate speech helps deal with an onto-political problem: "The constraints of legal language emerge to put an end to this particular historical anxiety [the problematisation of sovereignty], for the law requires that we resituate power in the language of injury, that we accord injury the status of an act and trace that act to the specific conduct of a subject" (78). The second, which stems from this, is that (to use Butler's own admittedly hyperbolic formulation) "the state produces hate speech." By this she means not that the state is the sovereign subject from which the various slurs emanate, but that within the frame of the juridical account of hate speech "the category cannot exist without the state's ratification, and this power of the state's judicial language to establish and maintain the domain of what will be publicly speakable suggests that the state plays much more than a limiting function in such decisions; in fact, the state actively produces the domain of publicly acceptable speech, demarcating the line between the domains of the speakable and the unspeakable, and retaining the power to make and sustain the line of consequential demarcation" (77). The sovereign conceit of the juridical argument thus linguistically resurrects the sovereign subject at the very moment it seems most vulnerable, and reaffirms the sovereign state and its power in relation to that subject at the very moment its phantasmatic condition is most apparent. The danger is that the resultant extension of state power will be turned against the social movements that sought legal redress in the first place (24)

#### The AFF’s use of ‘People Power’ as a method of resistance props up a new ‘democratic’ regime, preventing real economic transformation in favor of neoliberalism

Gills and Grey 13 (Barry Gills and Kevin Grey, “People Power in an Era of Global Crisis: Rebellion, Resistance and Liberation” pg. 15 googlebooks)

The situation today bears certain parallels with the pattern analysed in low intensity democracy, in which the old authoritarian regime is formally overthrown by a mass mobilization of People Power demanding democracy and redistribution. However, the old regime’s state structure and economic policies continue under a new ‘democratic’ regime, which conceals an attempt to consolidate a permanent conservative political and economic hegemony, while preventing real or radical social-economic transformation and seeking to legimise the pursuit of neoliberal globalised capitalism, with the support of external powers, including the USA. Nobel peace prize winner Mohammed el Baradei has recently said of the SCAF military rulers of Egypt that they have been governing ‘as if no revolution took place and no regime has fallen’. In India, the world’s ‘largest democracy’, critical dissidents like Arundhati Roy argue that the country’s reigning political and economic elite operate ‘under cover of the notions and catch phrases of democracy’, while they conspire, corruptly, to keep hundreds of millions in ‘a cesspool of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and caste and gender discrimination.

The link only goes one way—we don’t render race secondary to class but understand that class relations are the mechanism which ACTUALIZES all forms of oppression—don’t risk the aff’s intersectional analysis which has historically rendered the material interplay of capitalism invisible

McLaren and D’Annibale 4 (Peter, Professor at the Graduate School of Education at UCLA, and Valerie “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” *Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia*)

This does not render as ‘secondary’ the concerns of those marginalized by race, ethnicity, etc. as is routinely charged by post-Marxists. It is often assumed that foregrounding capitalist social relations necessarily undermines the importance of attending to ‘difference’ and/or trivializes struggles against racism, etc., in favor of an abstractly deﬁned class-based politics typically identiﬁed as ‘white.’ Yet, such formulations rest on a bizarre but generally unspoken logic that assumes that racial and ethnic ‘minorities’ are only conjuncturally related to the working class. This stance is patently absurd since the concept of the ‘working class’ is undoubtedly comprised of men and women of different races, ethnicities, etc. (Mitter, 1997). A good deal of post-Marxist critique is subtly racist (not to mention essentialist) insofar as it implies that ‘people of color’ could not possibly be concerned with issues beyond those related to their ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ ‘difference.’ This posits ‘people of color’ as single-minded, one-dimensional caricatures and assumes that their working lives are less crucial to their self-understanding (and survival) than is the case with their ‘white male’ counterparts. 9 It also ignores ‘the fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody’s lives’ (Gimenez, 2001, p. 2) and that social oppression is much more than tangentially linked to class background and the exploitative relations of production. On this topic, Meyerson (2000) is worth quoting at length: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One of course is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not render women and people of color ‘secondary.’ This view assumes that ‘working class’ means white—this division between a white working class and all the others, whose identity (along with a corresponding social theory to explain that identity) is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid … [T]he primacy of class means … that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement so that the primacy of class puts the ﬁght against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender, and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not. The cohesiveness of this position suggests that forms of exploitation and oppression are related internally to the extent that they are located in the same totality— one which is currently deﬁned by capitalist class rule. Capitalism is an overarching totality that is, unfortunately,becoming increasingly invisible in post-Marxist ‘discursive’ narratives that valorize ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct.

Neoliberalism’s placement of the market as the highest priority has created a system of states that only rely on massive production. This is destroying the planet and causing massive amounts of poverty

**BERDAYES ‘4** (VICENTE, ASSOC PROF OF COMM STUDIES @SAINT MARY’S COLLEGE, GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE)

**Considering the world in this ecological manner highlights one of the contradictions embedded in the word “globalization,” for by the dose of the twentieth century it was clear that the transnational capitalist order was degrading the Earth’s environment and unraveling the biological and climatic interdependencies that constitute the world’s ecology. This liter-ally antiglobal form of globalization had already led to the extinction of many life forms and continues to stress the planet’s varied ecosystems to the point of collapse**.47 This environmental deterioration has not resulted from factors such as overpopulation working in isolation but instead is an outgrowth of what Emmanuel Wallerstein had termed the “modern world system.”**48 In the course of the modern era this network of relation­ships has led to the dissolution of traditional societies and premodern civilizations**, the dislocation and proletarianization of populations, and the constitution of an international order of states based on economic de­pendencies between core and peripheral nations. **The result is a “system” of intensive resource and labor exploitation that is catastrophic in scale whether measured in terms of its environmental impacts or the progres­sive impoverishment of the world’s peoples.49 The roots of this ecological and sociological crisis have been traced to several elements of Western culture, including** the ideal of dominating nature evident in the Judeo-Christian tradition, **the rise of political and economic individualism with the concomitant incessant pursuit of wealth, and the emergence of modern science and technology with their objectifying ontologies and epistemologies**. In the modern era, **these am­bient facets of culture crystallized into an explicitly exploitative attitude toward nature goaded by the overarching context of free-market capi­talism.50 Neoliberal economic theory**, in particular, **provides a framework of concepts that justifies the exploitation of natural resources for short-term profits. By idealizing continuous economic growth and the expan­sion of markets as the epitome of rationality, any attempt to forward sustainable or “steady-state” models of economic development seems preposterous**.51 In short, **while the market model is often celebrated as the basis of a global order, its underlying economistic rationality is ac­tually the basis for dissolving the planet’s primordial and truly global system of interdependencies.**52 <P36-37