### Off1

#### **The aff’s focus and framing of sexual violence as a problem only for women in the policy debate community obscures the real and material forms of violence perpetuated against men in debate and in partner violence more globally-This is symptomatic of a broader harmful problem in academia-They render violence invisible**

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

Defense of Feminist Theory. I suggest that one of the explanations for denying the evidence.an gender symmetry is to defend feminism in general. This is because a key step in the effort to achieve an equalitarian society is to bring about recognition of the harm that a patriarchal system causes. The removal of patriarchy as the main cause of PV weakens a dramatic example of the harmful effects of patriarchy. Any weakening of efforts to achieve greater gender equality is unfortunate but by no means critical, because that effort can continue on the basis of many other ways in which women continue to be subordinate to men, such as the gap in earnings of men and women. Protecting Services and Avoiding Harm to Women Victims. There is a fear that, if the public, legislators, and administrators knew about and believed the research on gender symmetry, it would weaken funding ofservices for women victims, such as shelters for battered women, and weaken efforts to arrest and prosecute violent men. I know of no evidence that funding for services for women victims has ever been decreased because "women are also violent." Nevertheless, I have been told on several occasions that I am endangering services for battered women by publishing the results of research showing equal perpetration and insisting that PV by women must also be addressed. At a meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, one panel member said that this type of phalli-centric research was undermining efforts to help battered women. This was followed by vigorous applause.¶ Arrests of women for PV have been increasing nationwide (Martin, 1997; Miller, 2001). In California between 1987 and 1997, the ratio of male to female arrests for PV decreased from 1 female arrest to 18 male arrests to a ratio of 1 female arrest to 4.5 male arrests (Deleon-Granados, Wells, & Binsbacher, 2006). The increase is not a result of more female PV, because rates of both fatal and nonfatal PV declined during this period (Catalano, 2006; Rennison & Rand, 2003; Straus & Gelles, 1986; Straus, Kantor, & Moore, 1994; Straus & Kaufman Kantor, 1994). It is most likely a result of the successful effort by the women's movement to change police practice from one of avoiding interference in domestic disturbances to one of mandatory or recommended arrest (Deleon-Granados et al., 2006). Their fear is that if the evidence on symmetry becomes widely known and accepted, it will justify more arrests of women for PV. In my opinion, if criminal prosecution is an appropriate part of the effort to reduce PV, that policy should apply to women as well as men perpetrators.¶ The denial of the overwhelming body of evidence on gender symmetry can be understood as one of many instances of the operation of theory of cultural cognition (Kahan & Braman, 2006). Cultural cognition research has found that that people tend to reject evidence that threatens key values. Other current examples include denial of climate change and denial of the evidence on the effectiveness and safety of vaccination.

#### This perpetuates an ongoing system of violence against our bodies

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

Failure to perceive PV by women is part of the explanation for the denial. But much more contributes to the denial, and the concealing and distortion of evidence cannot be attributed just to perceptual limitations. This section suggests four additional explanations for the fact that reputable scholars deny the overwhelming evidence on gender symmetry; including evidence from their own research. Focus on Extreme Cases. An important cause of the denial of gender symmetry occurs because the deniers tend to focus on the relatively small proportion of overall PV that is visible to the criminal justice system, shelters, batterer treatment programs, and other service providers. These tend to involve women victims. There usually are also men victims, but that is not known to service providers and researchers in those settings because they do not ask and are usually forbidden to ask women victims whether they have also attacked their partner. For example, I was refused permission to do a study in a shelter I had a small part in founding because of such a question. In contrast, the research showing gender symmetry has, until very recently, been based on general population samples where the predominant form of PV is minor. The findings of these general population studies are not believed by battered women's advocates because they are inconsistent with what they know about the characteristics of the cases they work with every day. However, the few studies that have obtained data from women partners of men in batter treatment programs or men arrested for PV have found that a quarter to two-thirds of the women have assaulted their partner (Straus, 2010). For example, a recent community study of couples (Capaldi et aI., 2009) found that, although the men were more likely to have been arrested for PV, the women "had higher levels of physical and psychological aggression than the men overall. Men who were arrested did not have higher levels of aggression toward a partner overall compared to the women involved in the incidents" (p. 514). A study of battered women and their children by McDonald, Jouriles, Tart, and Minze (in press) asked the women about their own use of violence. More than 67% admitted to have perpetrated severe PV on a male partner in the previous year. Furthermore, this violence was significantly correlated with externalizing behaviors by their children.

#### Vote for UNLV to bring the subject to light and to reduce the stigma of males reporting violence that Fullerton perpetuates

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

The methods used to conceal and deny the evidence on gender symmetry are detailed in previous articles (Straus, 1990, 2007, 2008a) and will only be summarized here. It is important to recognize that the terms conceal, deny, and distort apply to aca- demics who have produced or know about research evidence that could be concealed, denied, or distorted. Thus, this section refers to the academic community, not to service providers.¶ Perhaps the most frequent method of dealing with the unacceptable evidence that women assault partners at the same or higher rate as men is to conceal the evidence. The pattern was established early in research on PV by a survey conducted for the Kentucky Commission on Women (Schulman, 1979). This excellent survey found about equal rates of assault by men and women partners, but only assaults by men were presented in the commission report.¶ The upper half of Figure 3 shows prevalence rates by gender in the prepublication version of a Canadian study (Kennedy & Dutton, 1989). In the published version (lower half of Figure 3), the wife-to-husband data are absent.¶ The data analysis for my coauthored article on the "Drunken Bum Theory of Wife-Beating" (Kaufman Kantor & Straus, 1987) included women who were drunken bums as well as men, but the paper submitted for publication included only data on men's drinking and men's violence.¶ In the Global School-Based Health Survey, using questionnaires completed by students age 13 to 15 (World Health Organization, 2006), question 38 asked the students whether they had been slapped or hurt on purpose by a boyfriend or girl- friend in the past 12 months. The results for all of the first four nations (Jordan, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zambia) showed a slightly higher percent of boys than girls who reported being slapped or hurt on purpose by a girlfriend or boyfriend. Because those were only the first 4 nations in a planned 70-nation study, I waited until data on more nations became available. Two years later, in 2008, results for many nations were available, but question 38 and the data on this question were nowhere to be found.¶ Although at least 200 papers report research that found gender symmetry in perpetration, many studies with similar results were not submitted for publica~ tion because the authors thought a paper showing gender symmetry would not be accepted or because the authors feared adverse effects on their reputation and employability (see Method 7).¶ The Canadian National Violence Against Women Survey (Johnson & Sacco, 1995) used the Conflict Tactics Scales or CTS (Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996) to obtain the data on PV for a sample of women. The CTS is based on family systems theory and therefore included items to measure violence by both partners. However, the designers of the Canadian study modified the CTS by deleting the ques- tions on perpetration by the women interviewed The result, of course, was data on victimization of women and none on perpetration by women. Many other studies have used this strategy. The original plan for the U.S. National Violence Against Women Survey was identical-that is, interview women and use only the CTS ques- tions about their victimization. Fortunately, a last-minute compromise was reached between those who wanted to interview women only about their victimization and those who wanted to use the full CTS. The compromise to proceed with the original plan of asking women only about their victimization but to add a sample of men who were also asked only about victimization (which among heterosexual couples had to also be data on female perpetration), This created embarrassing results, such as that 39% of the violent acts documented by this study were perpetrated by women and that the coercive control scale scores of women were as high as the scores of men (Felson & Outlaw, 2007; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000b). These "unbelievable" results were part of the reason for the two-year delay in releasing the study results.¶ After the study data became available, the data on men victims and women's perpetration continued to be ignored, as illustrated by Thompson, Saltzman, and Johnson's (2003) study of risk factors for injury and M. P. Johnson's study of "intimate terrorists" (Johnson & Leone, 2005). Both analyzed only the female partici- pant half of the data. Consequently, no information about the risk of injury to men and no information about women intimate terrorists will appear in the literature. Fortunately, a growing number of researchers are not constrained by the ideology that has dominated and handicapped understanding of partner violence for the past 30 years. The misleading picture that is conveyed is shown by the results of a study that did examine the full data set. Felson and Outlaw (2007) found that the coercive control scores (the criterion used by Johnson to distinguishing intimate terrorists from other violent partners) of men and women were about the same. Straus and Gozjolko (2007) applied Johnson's criteria for identifying intimate terrorists to the 14,252 participants in the International Dating Violence Study. They found about the same percentage of women as men in the intimate terrorist category or have coercive control scores (the key mean of identifying intimate terrorists) as high as the scores of men in the study, as have five other studies (Felson & Outlaw, 2007; Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2004; Laroche, 2005; Prospero, 2009; Prospero, Dwumah, & Ofori-Dua, 2009). Yet in his 2008 book, Johnson continues to assert, without qualifi- cation, that intimate terrorists are almost exclusively men. The results of these four studies of intimate terrorism are also consistent with other research showing that gender symmetry applies to chronic severe violence and to police and shelter cases (Straus, 2009c).

### Off2

The aff must defend a topical plan and change in USFG policy to answer the evolutional question

Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

 “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

¶ Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### This year’s resolution offers a crucial opportunity for political engagement --- policy relevant debate about war powers decision-making is critical to hold the government accountable for their hypocrisy --- only engaging specific proposals and learning the language of the war-machine solves

Ewan E. **Mellor** [European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences, Graduate Student, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 20**13**, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”]

**This section of the paper considers** more generally **the need for** just war **theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force**, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. **It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice**,35 **as well as on** Michael **Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society**.36 It argues that **the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.**”37¶ Kelsay argues that:¶ [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38¶ He also argues that “**good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation**, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 **This is important as it highlights the need for** just war **scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved**. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. **Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”**40 **in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms**.¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. **The** just war **theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices**. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 **the** just war **theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted**.42 **It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to**¶ **demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values**.43 **The tradition** itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, **constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.**44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 **By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis**.¶ **Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is**, as Clausewitz stated, **a continuation of policy**. **War**, according to Clausewitz, **is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued**.47 ***Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship***.48 ***This engagement must bring*** just war ***theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers***, **however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power**. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition **the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language**. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 **it is incumbent upon** just war **theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account**. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, **it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies**.”51

#### The aff undermines this goal --- by rejecting engagement with the presidency in favor of reliance on purely local politics they contribute to the decline of liberalism and the resurgence of conservative movements

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For a time, **LBJ's "careful practicality" and moral leadership made him an indispensable ally of the civil rights movement**. His greatest strength as majority leader of the Senate had been personal persuasion, a talent he now used to convince the Senate Republican leader, Everett Dirksen, to endorse the 1964 civil rights bill and enlist moderate Republicans in the cause. This support came with a price. Dirksen insisted on compromises that reduced the power of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and limited the authority of the Justice Department to bring suits against businesses to those situations in which a clear "pattern and practice" of discrimination existed.3 These compromises addressed moderate Republicans' distaste for overlapping bureaucracies and excessive litigation, as well as their desire to protect northern and western businesses from intrusive federal agencies. Still, the principal objective of the civil rights bill-eliminating entrenched segregation in the South-was preserved.¶ Dirksen's support of the civil rights bill also followed from the senator's perception, confirmed by the president's successful southern tour, that public opinion had turned in favor of civil rights. Investing the power and prestige of his office in a cause and a movement, Johnson persuaded Dirksen and most members of Congress that civil rights reform could no longer be resisted. As Dirksen put it, paraphrasing Victor Hugo's diary, "No army is stronger than an idea whose time has come."4 Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964.¶ **Throughout the fight for this legislation, Johnson drew strength from and collaborated with civil rights leaders, even seeking their support for his decision not to delay signing the bill until Independence Day**.5 More controversially, most civil rights activists accepted the compromise that the Johnson White House struck with Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) at the 1964 Democratic Convention, which included seating of the regular Mississippi delegation.6 In return, the deal included the symbolic gesture of making MFDP delegates honored guests at the convention, with two of its members seated as special delegates at large, and a prohibition of racial discrimination in delegate selection at the 1968 convention. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Committee of Racial Equality (CORE) assailed the White House for sacrificing the MFDP's moral cause on the altar of expediency. But the MFDP, through its lawyer Joseph Rauh, joined King and most moderate civil rights leaders in swallowing the compromise.7 Not only were southern states threatening to walk out of the convention if the regular Mississippi delegation was purged, but Johnson and Democratic leaders also warned civil rights leaders that an unruly convention would cost the party the support of several border states and deprive Democrats of a chance to win a historic landslide-and a mandate for further reform.8¶ Just as important, Johnson's support for a nondiscrimination rule would have enormous long-term consequences for the Democratic Party. Previously, state parties had sole authority to establish delegate selection procedures. Johnson's proposed solution to the MFDP compromise established the centralizing principle that henceforth the national party agencies would decide not only how many votes each state delegation got at the national convention, but also would enforce uniform rules on what kinds of persons could be selected (Milkis 1993, 210-16). 9¶ Having gained credibility with civil rights leaders during the first critical year of his presidency, **Johnson solidified an alliance with them during the dramatic prelude to the 1965 voting rights legislation that ultimately enfranchised millions of African Americans**. New archival materials, specifically the Johnson Tapes, clarify that **Johnson did not want to go slow after the 1964 act. LBJ not only pushed aggressively to continue the advance of civil rights, but also seemed to welcome the movement's ability to disrupt politics-as-usual and to spur action**. On January 15, 1965, for instance, Johnson put in a call to King urging more grassroots protest that would increase pressure on Congress by dramatizing "the worst conditions [of blacks being denied the vote] that you can run into . . . If you can take that one illustration and get it on the radio, get on the television, get it in the pulpits, get it in the meetings-every place you can-then pretty soon the fellow who didn't do anything but drive a tractor would say, 'Well, that is not right- that is not fair.'¶ Johnson later might have had second thoughts about this importunity, since King and civil rights activists would take direct action in Selma, Alabama, that aroused massive resistance from local police and state troopers as well as national demonstrations in support of the marchers, some of which were directed at the president for not taking immediate action to avert the violence. Nonetheless, when King sought his public endorsement of the Selma campaign, Johnson championed the demonstrators' cause despite the efforts of White House aides to shield him from public involvement in the crisis. "I should like to say that all Americans should be indignant when one American is denied the right to vote ... all of us should be concerned with the efforts of our fellow Americans to register to vote in Alabama," Johnson said. "I intend to see that the right [to vote] is secured for all our citizens."11¶ In March of 1965, as the crisis in Selma worsened, Johnson delivered his famous voting rights message to Congress. His speech warned that the enactment of the voting rights bill was but one front in a larger war that must include not just federal laws to throw open the "gates of opportunity," but also affirmative action against ignorance, ill health, and poverty that would enable individual men and women to "walk through those gates." As he memorably closed, "Their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall overcome" (Johnson 1965a).¶ LBJ had not won over southern congressmen, most of whom slumped in their seats as the joint session erupted in applause. Yet he had triumphed where FDR failed- without embroiling himself in an enervating purge campaign against conservative Democrats, as Roosevelt had in 1938, he joined civil rights activists to discredit southern resistance to racial justice.12 Dr. King, watching the speech on television in Montgomery, Alabama, was moved to tears. As he wrote of the historical address, "President Johnson made one of the most eloquent, unequivocal, and passionate pleas for human rights ever made by a President of the United States. . . . We had the support of the President in calling for immediate relief of the problems of the disinherited people of our nation (King 1998, 288).¶ Even more skeptical civil rights activists, who had refused to acquiesce to the 1964 MFDP compromise, were moved by Johnson's fervent support of what one of his startled advisors called "radical" changes in the federal government's support of voting rights.14 SNCC President John Lewis acknowledged that on this night LBJ was "a man who spoke from his heart, a statesman, a poet."" The following week, CORE's James Farmer led a march to the White House to express civil rights activists' support for the president's efforts. "When President Johnson said 'we shall overcome' he joined the civil rights revolution," Farmer told the marchers "Now it's up to you and me to keep him in it-to keep him and our friends in Congress moving. If we let up the pressure, they let up the progress.'"5¶ Although most activists appreciated Johnson's support in achieving historic reforms, tensions within the civil rights movement threatened to sever its critical but uneasy ties with his White House. Indeed, in contrast to moderate civil rights leaders, more radical insurgents loathed White House leadership and their views increasingly gained a hold over the movement. Johnson's civil rights sermon won little praise from radical civil rights activists in Alabama like James Foreman, the field secretary for SNCC. As far as radical SNCC dissidents were concerned, Johnson's speech was little more than a "tinkling, empty symbol." As he told reporters, "Johnson spoiled a good song that day" (Lewis with D'Orso 1998, 340).¶ Social Protest and the Limits of White House Leverage¶ Toward the end of 1965, the energy and resources committed to the Great Society began to suffer, threatened by Johnson's preoccupation with the Vietnam War. The war also fatally wounded his relationship with the civil rights movement. Even moderate civil rights leaders like King became visible participants in the antiwar movement. King saw the Vietnam War not only as morally indefensible, but also as a growing commitment that would divert resources needed to address problems of poverty at home. As the schisms in the civil rights movement deepened along with the administration's involvement in Vietnam, Johnson became the target, rather than the ally, of civil rights activists.¶ In late November, White House aide Hayes Redmon lamented the antiwar efforts of civil rights activists. "I am increasingly concerned over the involvement of civil rights groups with anti-war demonstrators," he wrote in a memo to White House aide Bill Moyers. "The anti-Vietnam types are driving the middle class to the right. This is the key group that is slowly being won over to the civil rights cause. Negro leadership involvement with anti-Vietnam groups will set their programs back substantially."16 King's opposition became public in September of 1965, infuriating Johnson and exposing the inherent conflict between the interests of the president and civil rights movement. Like Kennedy, Johnson deferred to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover's use of telephone wiretaps and hotel room microphones to discredit King on national security grounds.17¶ Johnson had tried to renew ties with King a few weeks before the civil rights leader publicly voiced opposition to his administration. In August, soon after race riots broke out in Watts, he called King to express his continued support for civil rights and to question him about rumors that he opposed Johnson's Vietnam policy.1" Trying in vain to meet the demands of spiraling civil rights militancy, the president urged King to take seriously and to help publicize a recent commencement address the president had given on June 4 at Howard University (Kotz 2005, 353). The speech proclaimed that "freedom was not enough" and that the time had come to "seek . . . not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and as a result." LBJ told King that it demonstrated his administration's commitment to address the most stubborn forces sustaining racial inequality.'9 The Howard University speech was arguably the boldest rhetorical presidential challenge to racial injustice since Lincoln's second inaugural. And yet, he complained, civil rights activists had in large part greeted it with a deafening silence. Johnson also urged the civil rights leader to support the administration on Vietnam, telling King, "I want peace as much as you do if not more so," because "I'm the fellow who had to wake up to 50 marines killed."20¶ King acknowledged that Johnson's Howard University speech was "the best statement and analysis of the problem" he had seen and that "no president ever said it like that before."21 Nonetheless, King and other movement leaders refused to lavish praise publicly on the Howard University address, concerned that associating too closely with Johnson might weaken their standing in the civil rights community. As David Carter has written, "in this period of growing polarization it had become increasingly clear to civil rights leaders, and ultimately even to the President and his staff, that a White House blessing of a leader was tantamount to a curse" (2001, 320).¶ Indeed, King was the least of the administration's problems. As the civil rights movement trained its eye on the poverty-stricken ghettos of large northern cities, King lost influence to more militant leaders who were better attuned than he to the frustrations and rage of young urban blacks (Mann 1996, 480). "Black power" advocates like Stokely Carmichael, newly elected head of SNCC, and Floyd McKissick of CORE, were not only dissatisfied with the achievements of the Johnson administration's civil rights program, but they also were contemptuous of its objective of racial integration. The growing militancy of black America erupted during the summer of 1966 as urban riots swept across the nation. In the wake of these developments, the moderately conservative middle class, as the White House feared, grew impatient with reform. The administration's string of brilliant triumphs in civil rights was snapped. Its 1966 civil rights bill, an open housing proposal, fell victim to a Senate filibuster. Johnson's leadership of the civil rights movement was a great asset to him in 1964, but it was a political liability by the summer of 1966.¶ From the start of his presidency, Johnson had recognized that his alliance with the civil rights movement risked substantial Democratic losses in the South. The president's encouraging visit to Georgia gave him hope that he would be forgiven by white southerners; this was the very purpose of his appeal to conscience. But the elections of November 1966 confirmed the South was not in a forgiving mood. Three segregationist Democrats-Lester Maddox in Georgia, James Johnson in Arkansas, and George P. Mahoney in Maryland-won their party's gubernatorial nomination. In Alabama, voters ratified a caretaker administration for Lurleen Wallace, since her husband, George, was not permitted to succeed himself. George Wallace, dubbed the "prime minister" of Alabama, had by 1966 emerged as a serious threat to consummate the North-South split in the Democratic Party, either by entering the 1968 presidential primaries or running as a third party candidate. The gubernatorial race in California, where former movie star Ronald Reagan handily defeated the Democratic incumbent Edmund G. Brown, revealed that conservative insurgency was not limited to southern Democrats.¶ In the wake of the civil rights crisis of 1966, Johnson no longer met with civil rights leaders. Instead, he followed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 's advice to send a number of his younger aides to various cities to meet with young black leaders. The attorney general's suggestion was the origin of ghetto visits that White House aides made throughout 1967; a dozen or so visited troubled black areas in more than 20 major cities. On the one hand, the ghetto visits revealed the extent to which the modern presidency sought to assume important tasks once carried out by intermediary political associations like political parties. Rather than relying on local party leaders for information about their communities, Johnson asked his aides to live in various ghettos and then report directly to him about the state of black America. Local public officials and party leaders, even Chicago's powerful boss Richard Daley, were not told of the ghetto visits, lest they take umbrage at someone from the White House rooting about their home territories.¶ On the other hand, these visits marked the declining significance of the modern presidency as the leading agent of liberal reform-a symptom of its "extraordinary isolation."22 This isolation was accentuated by the evolution of the civil rights movement, whose more militant leaders, representing an oppositional culture that tended to withdraw rather than bestow legitimacy on reigning institutions, gained ascendancy in urban ghettos. The Johnson White House struggled to understand why young urban blacks, as one aide put it, "were against just about every leader (Negro and white) . . . except [black power advocates like] Stokely Carmichael."23 The awkward presence of these Johnson aides-mostly white, mostly from small towns and cities in the Midwest and Southwest-spending a week, sometimes a weekend, in volatile ghetto environments such as Harlem and Watts was, as a leading participant put it, a "unique attempt by the President to discover what was happening in urban ghettos and why."24 Aides were not sent to organize or manipulate or steer, but solely to gain a sense of the ideas, frustrations, and attitudes at the basis of the riots.¶ The ghetto reports apparently helped persuade Johnson to respond to the riots by intensifying his efforts to expand civil rights and war on poverty programs.The administration continued to push for an open-housing bill that was enacted after King's assassination. In 1968, LBJ also submitted and Congress passed the most extensive and most expensive public housing legislation in American history. Finally, Johnson continued to support the White House's Office of Economic Opportunity, even though its sponsorship of Community Action Programs (CAPs), requiring "the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and groups involved," was reportedly having a disruptive influence in many cities and was the target of bitter complaints from local party leaders. LBJ seethed privately about the "revolutionary" activity that some CAPs were fomenting, but he never repudiated them publicly and continued to support federal funds for neighborhood organizations. CAPs were the administration's final, frail hope that it could benefit from the transformative energy of a movement over which it rapidly lost influence.26¶ Political Failure and Enlightened Administration¶ **Against the general norm that presidents are repressive or indifferent in their response to the demands of insurgent groups, Johnson's uneasy collaboration with the civil rights movement shows how an ambitious president and social activists can form an alliance in the service of enduring reform**. Although this fusion of presidential power to a movement for social justice was short lived, **the fragile partnership made possible the most dramatic civil rights legislation since the Reconstruction era**. **Without the work of civil rights leaders and activists in mobilizing demonstrations that elicited the violent reaction of segregationists and aroused strong sympathy in the country, no civil rights revolution would have been possible. At the same time,** **without Johnson's willingness to support, indeed, to take advantage of the opportunity that civil rights direct action provided, the landmarks laws of 1964 and 1965 might never have been enacted.**¶ Johnson's singularly determined fusion of executive power to a social movement eventually imploded. As early as 1965, it became clear that Johnson's effort to become a leader of the civil rights movement suffered from his attempt to manage all the other responsibilities that the modern presidency pulls in its train. Since Theodore Roosevelt, reformers and ambitious presidents had endeavored to reconstruct the executive office so that its constitutional mandate to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" might be rededicated as a vantage point for social and economic change. But Johnson's explosive relationship with the civil rights movement cast serious doubt on the "Progressive era conceit that the presidency is inherently disposed to ally itself with movements for reform and liberation" (Skowronek and Glassman 2007, 7). In the end, the Great Society revealed both the untapped potential for cooperation between the modern presidency and social movements and the inherent tensions between "high office" and insurgency that made such collaboration so difficult. The tasks of the modern presidency-the domestic and international responsibilities that constrained the "steward of the public welfare"-necessarily limited the extent to which Johnson could become a trusted leader of the social movements that arose during the 1960s.¶ By 1968, Johnson, the self-fashioned agent of a political transformation as fundamental as any in history, had become a hated symbol of the status quo, forced into retirement lest he contribute further to the destruction of the liberal consensus. As he privately told Hubert Humphrey in the spring of 1968, "I could not be the rallying force to unite the country and meet the problems confronted by the nation ... in the face of a contentious campaign and the negative attitudes towards [me] of the youth, Negroes, and academics."27¶ LBJ thus saw the mantle of leadership pass to the likes of Eugene McCarthy, whose pioneering grassroots organization drove the president from the field in 1968, and George McGovern, the Democratic nominee for president in 1972. The "McGovern Democrats," who took control of the Democratic Party in the wake of the fractious 1968 presidential contest, followed the progressive tradition of scorning partisanship-of desiring a direct relationship between presidential candidates and grassroots activists. In this respect, the expansion of presidential primaries and other changes in the nomination politics initiated by the McGovern-Fraser reforms were the logical extension of the modern presidency. But these reformers, champions of a "new politics," rejected notions of popular presidential leadership that prevailed during the Progressive era and New Deal eras (Ceaser 1979; Miroff 2007). **Viewing the president as the agent rather than the steward of the public welfare, new politics liberals embraced the general ideas current in the late 1960s that social movements should direct presidential politics and governance.**¶ **Even as McGovern's insurgent presidential campaign was an electoral disaster, the legislation conceived by the ephemeral alliance between Johnson and the civil rights movement built a national administrative apparatus that had staying power in American political life**. The 1964 and 1965 civil rights reforms empowered the federal bureaucracy-especially the Department of Justice, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the newly formed EEOC-to assist the courts in creating parallel enforcement mechanisms for civil rights. These proved effective. For example, in four years the Johnson administration accomplished more desegregation in southern schools than the courts had in the previous 14.¶ As historians like Hugh Davis Graham have chronicled, "new theories of compensatory justice and group rights" given prominent expression in LBJ's Howard University Address were deftly advanced by "new social regulators" in the EEOC (Graham 1990, Chapter IX). Despite the late-1960s political demise of the Great Society, the EEOC staff, aided by supporters in other executive agencies and the federal courts, was able to expand the EEOC's power far beyond the original constraints of Title VII of the act. The text of Title VII explicitly sought to limit findings of discrimination by requiring evidence of intent. EEOC staffers argued that racial disparities in the composition of a labor force were ample proof of discrimination, whether intended or not. Seizing authority on its own accord, the EEOC collected data from tens of thousands of employers in order to analyze entire industries. Only a couple of years after Johnson left office, the federal courts deferred to EEOC guidelines, tossing aside Title VII's original dictates in favor of an "effects based definition of discrimination" that went beyond the goal of equal treatment to that of equal results (Graham 1990, 250). A "quiet revolution" had occurred in national administration, one that dismantled the compromise that Dirksen and moderate Republicans extracted in 1964.¶ Similarly, as Richard Valelly has documented, an "extended Voting Rights Act" emerged from an institutional partnership between the Justice Department and the courts. **The alliance between bureaucratic discretion and legal activism expanded the 1965 statute from the commitment to free African Americans from discriminatory practices, such as literacy tests, to a more capacious program that promoted minority office holding, regulated nonsouthern states and local jurisdictions that had discriminated against the voting rights of racial minorities, and freed regulators and plaintiffs from having to demonstrate intentional discrimination in seeking remedies for low levels of minority representation and electoral participation** (Valelly 2004, chap. 9)-**These**¶ **administrative and legal efforts appeared to give institutional form to hard-won victories achieved by Johnson and civil rights activists**. At the same time, the securing of what Valelly has called a "second reconstruction" tended to isolate civil rights activists. LBJ paid dearly for the alienation of the social movements from the White House; just as surely, ***the civil rights movement and the other social protest movements it inspired paid a price for their rejection of presidential leadership***. The 1960s unleashed new forces and new expectations that could not be quelled by the election of Nixon. Indeed, it was the 1970s rather than the 1960s when affirmative action and many other civil rights measures became a real presence in American society. **And yet, even as they continued to look to the national government to solve the problems thrown up by an industrial-and postindustrial-order, the public interest groups that emerged during the 1970s** (which evolved from the social movements of the 1960s) **distrusted presidential leadership and bureaucratic agencies, and sought to protect social policy from unfriendly executive administration** (Melnick 2005). **Teaching Americans both to expect more from the government and to trust it less, the Great Society was the fulcrum on which decline of liberalism and the rise of conservatism tilted.**¶ **Johnson's willingness to embrace the civil rights movement and its reform agenda transcended narrow, cautious self-interest. Indeed, his wholehearted support for far-reaching civil rights defied the careful distance that most presidents maintained vis-à-vis social movements**. As we shall see, Reagan and his political allies developed an alliance with Christian Conservatives that was arbitrated by a reconstructed Republican Party. Consequently, he would be much less exposed in his relationship with the Religious Right than Johnson had been in seeking to leverage the civil rights revolution.

#### The uncompromising ideology of the affirmative creates greater exclusion than it solves- They force us to defend sexual violence doesn’t occur or that it is good

Knight 00, Professor of Education at LaTrobe University,

(The Urban Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, Democratic Education and Critical Pedagogy, link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1005177227794.pdf)

It is difficult for critical pedagogy to encourage the oppressed to traditional academic success, because that would be the equivalent of seducing the oppressed into accepting ideological premises that contribute to and sustain oppression. That they exempt themselves from such seduction has already been noted. Critical pedagogy, by hiding behind hegemony, embraces an unacceptable excuse for failure to learn. It finds curriculum to be alienating and useless, but no viable alternative is proposed. The importance of meaningful relationships between students and teachers is recognized, but what is proposed is vague and is expressed in secret code. ¶ Critical pedagogy has its own brand of exclusiveness. It is an exclusiveness that is the consequence of a nonnegotiable ideology: The major consequence of this kind of uncompromising determinism is that it leaves insufficient space for the role of reflexivity in the process of practical change. (Carr, 1995, p. 113) The frenzied focus of critical pedagogy on eradication of sexism, racism, classism, and homophobia instead of working together to negotiate an inclusive community may contribute to the very problem that it ostensibly opposes: There are prevailing asymmetries of power, not just between teacher and student, but among students themselves, and it is in [sic] the playing out of these asymmetries which can lead quickly to the expression of the very “isms” which the teacher seeks to educate away. “Teaching the conflicts” . . . may produce more conflict. (Harley, 1997, p. 91) When it comes to language—which is curious because in the growing volumes of critical pedagogical literature there is recognition of how language is used to include and exclude—nobody excludes better than critical pedagogues.

Try-or-Die –Destruction coming now, and avoiding anti-politics is vital to a solution.

**Hogan ‘7**

(Michael, Honorary Associate of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, August, p. 16-17)

However, the experience of the 1930s, when one of those crises in capitalism precipitated a collapse of confidence in liberal democracy, should give pause for thought. How confident can we be that there will not be another major and drawnout crisis in the world economy? Who seriously believes that the growth that drives capitalism can continue indefinitely? Already there are warning signs in the phenomenon of global warming which suggest that severe ‘limits to growth’ may not be that far in the future. Faced with a long-term period of economic readjustment and contraction, what nation can be confident that the problems can be solved to the satisfaction of its citizens by democratic processes if there is so little entrenched support for those processes? Will we again look for scapegoats and authoritarian leaders instead of complex and messy solutions? Anti-politics is a worry, if not for now, then for the future. Perhaps it would be wise not to wait for the crisis to happen but to strengthen the contemporary supports of liberal democracy beforehand. Not all such supports are weak. For example, the webs of voluntary associations that de Tocqueville (2004) noted as characteristic of a strong 19th century American democratic culture are even stronger in most modern democracies (despite the distracting and isolating influence of television). The ‘social capital’ described by Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) is certainly an important contributor to any successful democratic culture, and the evidence from countries like Australia suggests not only that its citizens tend to be ‘joiners’ of voluntary associations, but that such activity is closely linked with political participation (Passey & Lyons 2005, pp. 78–79.) There are some indications that contemporary uses of the internet (the explosion of personal and corporate blogs, or the popularity of search engines such as Google or Wikipedia) are reviving a concern for real information and debate that television seemed to inhibit. If modern major political parties are losing their ability to articulate issues, especially for minorities, that is not a fatal loss. Modern pressure groups and single-issue parties are quite capable of filling the gap. The real problem area is that of interest aggregation— putting together a deal or a package that can be presented for acceptance by the electorate. The competition in this arena is coming from the mass media, which seems more interested in oversimplifying issues than in explaining the complexities. Who is going to explain that real solutions are difficult, complex and messy? Perhaps one way of strengthening modern democratic cultures might be to look again at the nature of grass roots participation, so that citizens become as involved in the political process as they are in their children’s football team, their church choir or their book club. There has been considerable academic interest in creating new structures (for example, to foster community engagement, as in citizens’ juries)—a trend to what is often called ‘deliberative democracy’. In Britain the independent Power Inquiry (2006) recently conducted a national survey of responses to questions such as: Do you feel no one in politics listens? Do you feel too few people make the decisions that affect your life, your family and your country? That political faces come and go—but nothing really changes? And that, when things go wrong, politicians are rarely held to account?2 The recommendations of the Inquiry included decentralising power and increasing opportunities for popular participation in politics, so that not everything is left to elites. A good introduction to the wider literature can be found in Lyn Carson’s internet site on ‘Active Democracy’ (2007) or in a case study of policy making that suggests how such decentralisation might work (Carson et al. 2002). As in the creation of liberal democracy (or its erosion), no single-factor proposals are likely to remedy the problems discussed in this paper. However, if nothing else, the more that citizens become involved in decision making, even at a local government level, the more they are likely to appreciate and value the skills of professional politicians who at present hold the future of liberal politics in their hands.

Debating within the parameters determined by the topic creates radical agonistic democratic politics. The disregard of rules turns adversaries into enemies and games into conflicts. Vote negative because they’re not playing.

Tally, English – Texas State University, ‘7

(Robert T, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2)

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured.

If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52)

Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all.

A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide?

These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

### Off3

#### Their advocacy is otherizing, makes it impossible to collectively contest neoliberalism

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Feminist advocates of a politics of difference question whether Rawls's theory of justice adequately considers the differentials in power and interest that exist among the distinct communities or groups within a pluralist democracy. Thus, in a pluralist society, according to theorists of difference, if the equal moral worth of persons is to be achieved, members of the community with differential needs should be treated according to their particular needs (for example, single mothers). Marx made these points long ago (in an admittedly economistic fashion) in The Critique of the Gotha Programme;14 and Joan Scott returned to these themes in her groundbreaking essay on the role difference must play within any pluralist theory of equality.15 Feminist theorists who come out of a left tradition, such as Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib, are careful to consider what type of “generalized” norms or empathetic reasoning are necessary to construct a shared normative commitment to democratic equality across difference. We can draw on these works by left feminists working out of a post-Habermasian or quasi-universalist tradition to help us ground a politics of pluralist solidarity and equality.16¶ But, as Anne Phillips points out, the valuation of difference can, at times, obfuscate the dependence of democratic feminist theorists and activists upon universal democratic norms, particularly when they oppose undemocratic inequalities across groups or anti-democratic practices within groups.17 According to theorists of difference, precautions need to be taken against deploying universal liberal conceptions of human nature that mask particularist raced, gendered, or classed conceptions of human interests. Iris Marion Young, the most cited theorist writing on the politics of difference, draws upon her experience of struggles within the feminist movement against a falsely universalizing conception of “women” (that is, white and middle class) that would negate the distinct social experience and needs of women of color, queer women, and working-class women.18 She argues that particular groups often embrace distinct concepts of politics, fairness, and justice. Thus, she contends that imposing universal conceptions of justice upon particular groups may deny these groups the right to develop their particular conceptions of the good.¶ Young, to her credit, acknowledges that a democratic version of identity politics must achieve some common understandings—across group difference—of democratic procedural norms and policies. Yet in Young's most influential work, Justice and the Politics of Difference, there exists an unresolved tension between her commitment to difference, on the one hand, and to a democratic egalitarian polity that grants equal moral respect to each citizen, on the other. Ultimately Young's commitment to giving proportional political voice to different groups (seemingly regardless of their character or political goals) contradicts her democratic commitment to treating each individual as an equal member of a democratic community. Young fails to articulate clearly the democratic side of her commitment to difference by never specifying the shared values and practices citizens must embrace across their differences in order to build a democratic society. For example, should racist communities be given the particular consideration and even seemingly proportional representation that Young advocates for “oppressed” groups? If not, then the very definition of “oppression” is parasitic on a belief that members of an oppressed group have been denied the universal rights that should be accorded to all members of a democratic community.¶ In addition, Young fails to note that if democratic citizens fail to conceive of others as sharing a common humanity, then it will be extremely difficult to develop bonds of solidarity across difference. A quick example to illustrate the dilemma: while many gay and lesbian people are African-American, the dominant political and cultural institution in that community—the church—has a long (though receding) tradition of homophobia that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) members of the African-American community and their supporters contest. Advocates within the black community of LGBTQ rights invariably draw upon universal notions of human rights to critique the predominant practices of their particular community.19

#### Social solidarity against neoliberalism is the only way to prevent social regression

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Just as the right's growing hegemony from the 1980s onward eroded majoritarian support for progressive taxation and universal public goods, radical theory, through its dominant concerns for difference and transgression, abandoned any intellectual defense of the core democratic value of social solidarity. In the United States today, social solidarity is the forgotten sibling among the troika of democratic values—“liberty, equality, and fraternity”—that suffused the democratic social revolutions from the French Revolution onwards. The concept of “fraternity,” or, in gender neutral terms, “solidarity,” implies that citizens develop a capacity for empathy toward others and for trust in their fellows. Democratic citizens act in solidarity with one another because they recognize that their common project is an interdependent one and thus each member of the community has both a moral and an instrumental interest in assuring a minimal level of well-being for all.¶ For much of the twentieth century the left in capitalist democracies fought to expand social rights out of the belief that radical social inequality eroded the value of equal political and civil rights. If democracy involves the making of binding laws by equal citizens, the left argued, there cannot exist a group of citizens who are so socially excluded that they cannot participate politically. Universal public education emerged with the rise of democracy precisely out of insurgent social movements' concern that all citizens gain a “civic education.” Over time, excluded social groups fought to be included as full citizens; and the expansion of citizen rights to “others”—the essence of social solidarity—continues today in the fight for immigrant rights across the globe. As the work of T.H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi demonstrates, the historic struggle between democratic left and right has revolved around the extent to which social rights—public provision, social insurance, and labor rights—should constrain the inegalitarian outcomes of a market-based economy.23¶ Thus, even the most classically liberal of democratic polities—the United States and the United Kingdom—provide minimal levels of universal insurance against disability, unemployment, and old age. But among developed democracies only the “liberal market” United States and United Kingdom do not provide universal forms of state-funded childcare or child support. This reality enabled the right, in both countries, to deploy racialized “anti-welfare” politics that mobilized a segment of the working class, whose formal market earnings rendered them ineligible for means-tested child support programs, against both strong public provision and the relatively high rates of taxation that regressive tax policies impose upon working families.¶ That is, in the dialectic of democracy and solidarity the bonds of fellowship are not naturally fixed. Democratic social movements frequently struggle to expand the popular conception of who is part of the “we.” Often, in times of national crisis and broad social vulnerability, bonds of solidarity expand and strengthen, as do social policies that insure a universal economic and social floor under which citizens cannot fall. Hence, we associate the expansion of social and labor rights during the New Deal and French Popular Front governments with the shared vulnerability of the Great Depression. The United States' GI Bill and the post-World War II radical expansion of the British welfare state came immediately after a “total war” in which victory depended upon the military and productive contributions of working-class men and women, recent immigrants, and oppressed minorities.¶ Thus far, strong bonds of social solidarity have only been constructed (and also eroded) at the level of the nation state, the community of “we” versus “them.” In addition, radical theory and practice has yet to tackle the difficulty of expanding social rights—and of defending existing ones—during periods of capitalist stagnation and global economic restructuring. This makes even more pressing, but also problematic, the project of expanding solidarity across national borders. Today, the struggle for greater solidarity between the working people of northern Europe and southern Europe will define whether the European project becomes more democratic or fragments on the shoals of anti-solidaristic austerity policies.¶ But the contraction of public provision under neoliberal capitalism is no more natural or inexorable than was its historical expansion. Today, the struggle of undocumented workers for an expeditious path to citizenship should lead normative theorists to revisit arguments as to why political, civil, and social rights should be extended to all those (and their dependents) who contribute productive labor to our society. And at a time when the minimum wage is less than one-half of the real value it had in the 1960s, low-wage service workers—both native-born and immigrants—are beginning to protest their inability to raise a family in dignity on their meager wages. Such protest will likely expand if undocumented immigrants gain secure legal rights. In addition, as the baby boomers come to retirement with inadequate savings and radically underfunded or non-existent pensions, there is likely to be resistance to neoliberal efforts to constrict, rather than expand, Social Security.

#### Solidarity against neoliberalism is necessary to secure difference while confronting racial, gender and economic domination

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Given how divided the United States is, not only politically, but also geographically and socially on lines of race, class, and citizenship status, democratic theorists perhaps should refocus their energies on defining the role solidarity and equality of standing must play in the construction of a just society. For example, the political conflict likely to define America's political future is how expeditiously undocumented workers and their dependents become full citizens. Unlike some who long for a return to a class-based politics of social solidarity, I am well aware that forms of racial, national, and gender exclusion helped construct past forms of political solidarity.12 Moreover, the working class has never been a truly homogeneous and “universal class”; its identity and consciousness are constructed in complex ways that reflect the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality and the role that ideology and culture play in social life.¶ Yet, absent a revival of a pluralist, majoritarian left it is hard to imagine how difference can be institutionalized in an egalitarian manner. Theorists of difference are, in some ways, blind to the reality that difference (or “diversity”) can be—and is being—institutionalized on a radically inegalitarian social terrain, in which some social groups have much more power and opportunity than others. This blind spot mimics the weaknesses of the liberal pluralist theory that dominated political science in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, radical theorists pointed out that liberal pluralist society failed to be fully democratic because some groups had inordinate economic and political power as compared to their small numbers within the demos.13 Today, the same critique of difference can be made.¶ Post-structuralist theorists' focus on the performative resistance of decentered, mutable selves also fails to recognize that the performative options of working-class individuals, persons of color, women, and gays and lesbians are constrained by the structural distribution of racial, economic, and gendered forms of power. Thus, if the performative options of the vast majority are to be enhanced, left theorists have to recover a politics and practice of solidarity and democratic equality; concepts which neither a pure politics of difference nor an agonal politics of post-structuralist radical democracy can adequately ground.

### Case

#### Speaking for others is wrong—their privileged social location makes any claim to political empowerment suspect—it’s an act of commodification and colonial domination, which turns the K

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others” Cultural Critique Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.)

Feminist discourse is not the only site in which the problem of speaking for others has been acknowledged and addressed. In anthropology there is similar discussion about whether it is possible to speak for others either adequately or justifiably. Trinh T. Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology is "mainly a conversation of `us' with `us' about `them,' of the white man with the white man about the primitive-nature man...in which `them' is silenced. `Them' always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless...`them' is only admitted among `us', the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an `us'..."[4](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote4) Given this analysis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropological discursive practice. The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for others has followed from the widespread acceptance of two claims. First, there has been a growing awareness that where one speaks from affects both the meaning and truth of what one says, and thus that one cannot assume an ability to transcend her location. In other words, a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to her social location or social identity) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims, and can serve either to authorize or dis-authorize one's speech. The creation of Women's Studies and African American Studies departments were founded on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and that we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect on the content of what is said. The unspoken premise here is simply that a speaker's location is epistemically salient. I shall explore this issue further in the next section. The second claim holds that not only is location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous.[5](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote5) In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reenforcing the oppression of the group spoken for. This was part of the argument made against Anne Cameron's speaking for Native women: Cameron's intentions were never in question, but the effects of her writing were argued to be harmful to the needs of Native authors because it is Cameron rather than they who will be listened to and whose books will be bought by readers interested in Native women. Persons from dominant groups who speak for others are often treated as authenticating presences that confer legitimacy and credibility on the demands of subjugated speakers; such speaking for others does nothing to disrupt the discursive hierarchies that operate in public spaces. For this reason, the work of privileged authors who speak on behalf of the oppressed is becoming increasingly criticized by members of those oppressed groups themselves.[6](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote6) As social theorists, we are authorized by virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask ourselves whether this is ever a legitimate authority, and if so, what are the criteria for legitimacy? In particular, is it ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me? We might try to delimit this problem as only arising when a more privileged person speaks for a less privileged one. In this case, we might say that I should only speak for groups of which I am a member. But this does not tell us how groups themselves should be delimited. For example, can a white woman speak for all women simply by virtue of being a woman? If not, how narrowly should we draw the categories? The complexity and multiplicity of group identifications could result in "communities" composed of single individuals. Moreover, the concept of groups assumes specious notions about clear-cut boundaries and "pure" identities. I am a Panamanian-American and a person of mixed ethnicity and race: half white/Angla and half Panamanian mestiza. The criterion of group identity leaves many unanswered questions for a person such as myself, since I have membership in many conflicting groups but my membership in all of them is problematic. Group identities and boundaries are ambiguous and permeable, and decisions about demarcating identity are always partly arbitrary. Another problem concerns how specific an identity needs to be to confer epistemic authority. Reflection on such problems quickly reveals that no easy solution to the problem of speaking for others can be found by simply restricting the practice to speaking for groups of which one is a member.

#### Speaking for others oppresses them—we must stop the impulse to speak to allow the organic intellectual to rise up

Lauren Marino (published author in the Malacester Journal of Philosophy, Volume 14, Issue 1, Spring 2005. “Speaking for Others”)

What then is the solution? I agree with bell hooks that the oppressed must celebrate their position on the margins. The oppressed should not try to move into the center but appreciate their counterculture. The oppressed must produce intellectuals so that the dominated can speak to the dominating. The idea goes back to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the organic intellectual.7 The elites are indoctrinated in the ruling ideology and have an investment in the current order. No matter how progressive their politics may be, the elite will always be the elite. Their investment in the current social order precludes offers of true systemic change. Gramsci writes of the need for the working class to develop its own intellectuals who are organically tied to their class. This argument is similar to hooks’ argument. The margin must produce organic intellectuals. It might be thought that these organic intellectuals should translate between language games. But as hooks points out, using “the oppressor’s language” is not adequate because it cannot articulate the experience of the oppressed. Yet, it is the only language game the oppressing can play. Organic intellectuals affect the center from the margins if they are able to incorporate multiple voices in the texts they create. The goal of the organic intellectual according to hooks is to “identify the spaces where we begin a process of revision” to create a counter-ideology.8 Hooks relates this agency to language. “Language is also a place of struggle.”9 The counterculture can produce a counter-language, which is able to produce a new language to mediate between the margins and the center. Necessarily the new game must include portions of both old language games or no one will understand it. It must use old understandings to create new meanings. These counter-languages can function as the intermediary language games that the oppressed and the elites can be initiated simultaneously. A new language game must be created. A good example of this is Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. He used concepts of freedom and democracy familiar to the center to explain the experience of the oppressed within in the mainstream language game, as well as created new metaphors and linguistic form, i.e. the preacher’s sermon, to bring the voice of the oppressed and the oppressors into a realm of communication. (bell hooks uses the preachers sermon form in her refrain ‘language is also a place of struggle’).10 One famous metaphor is freedom as a bounced check to African Americans. This created a new understanding of the situation. It worked between the language of oppression understood by African Americans and the center’s understanding of freedom and the promises of democracy. King was able to include multiple voices, building a bridge between the margin and the center. The conclusion of hooks is that the margin can be more than a place of oppression and alienation. It can be “a site of radical possibility, a space of resistance,” that is not open to those in the center. It is the space to produce counter-hegemonic culture that the organic intellectual is looking for. The oppressed can retell their story, and if we accept Rorty’s argument that the self is contingent, the oppressed create themselves in the process. To speak for the oppressed is to silence them. Moreover, in their absence of voice, we define them. We can define them in many ways, but they will always be a “they” and not an “us.” They will be the other. We must have faith in the margins to produce new language games to communicate with us.

# 2NC

### 2NC Assault Focus

#### There are benefits of being men, that doesn’t justify the sexual violence men receive, the popular girl in the community getting you drunk to have sex with you then leaving you passed out in your bed, the girl you want to be friends with because you went to an all guys school and lacked female relationships that ends up grabbing your dick in the elevator and pushing you or slapping you for saying no

#### This has happened to me on multiple occasions, For legal reasons, i can't tell you who in the debate community it was, it is also traumatizing I shouldn’t have to relive the experience

#### L- A woman is only someone who self-identifies

#### Voting negative is a competitive starting point- we should start with the premise all sexual violence is bad and not privilege differnet types

#### The onus is on you as a judge to confront this issue-It’s a huge problem

JAMES DAO, 6-23-13 (NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/us/in-debate-over-military-sexual-assault-men-are-overlooked-victims.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

Sexual assault has emerged as one of the defining issues for the military this year. Reports of assaults are up, as are questions about whether commanders have taken the problem seriously. Bills to toughen penalties and prosecution have been introduced in Congress. But in a debate that has focused largely on women, this fact is often overlooked: the majority of service members who are sexually assaulted each year are men.¶ In its latest report on sexual assault, the Pentagon estimated that 26,000 service members experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2012, up from 19,000 in 2010. Of those cases, the Pentagon says, 53 percent involved attacks on men, mostly by other men.¶ “It’s easy for some people to single out women and say: ‘There’s a small percentage of the force having this problem,’ ” said First Lt. Adam Cohen, who said he was raped by a superior officer. “No one wants to admit this problem affects everyone. Both genders, of all ranks. It’s a cultural problem.”¶ Though women, who represent about 15 percent of the force, are significantly more likely to be sexually assaulted in the military than men, experts say assaults against men have been vastly underreported. For that reason, the majority of formal complaints of military sexual assault have been filed by women, even though the majority of victims are thought to be men.¶ “Men don’t acknowledge being victims of sexual assault,” said Dr. Carol O’Brien, the chief of post-traumatic stress disorder programs at the Bay Pines Veterans Affairs Health Care System in Florida, which has a residential treatment program for sexually abused veterans. “Men tend to feel a great deal of shame, embarrassment and fear that others will respond negatively.”¶ But in recent months, intense efforts on Capitol Hill to curb military sexual assault, and the release of a new documentary about male sexual assault victims in the military, “Justice Denied,” have brought new attention to male victims. Advocates say their plight shows that sexual assault has risen not because there are more women in the ranks but because sexual violence is often tolerated.¶ “I think telling the story about male victims is the key to changing the culture of the military,” said Anu K. Bhagwati, executive director of the Service Women’s Action Network, an advocacy group that has sharply criticized the Pentagon’s handling of sexual assault. “I think it places the onus on the institution when people realize it’s also men who are victims.”¶ The Department of Defense says it is developing plans to encourage more men to report the crime. “A focus of our prevention efforts over the next several months is specifically geared towards male survivors and will include why male survivors report at much lower rates than female survivors, and determining the unique support and assistance male survivors need,” Cynthia O. Smith, a department spokeswoman, said in a statement.¶ In interviews, nearly a dozen current and former service members who said they were sexually assaulted in the military described fearing that they would be punished, ignored or ridiculed if they reported the attacks. Most said that before 2011, when the ban on openly gay service members was repealed, they believed they would have been discharged if they admitted having sexual contact — even unwanted contact — with other men.

### AT Not About Policy Debate

#### There is a bias in Academia

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

This method of denial mostly works through self-censorship by authors who fear their article will be rejected or that it will undermine their reputation. A dramatic example occurred while this article was being written. A colleague coauthored an article with me that dealt with gender symmetry. She probably did 60% of the work on the article. During the course of our collaboration, she learned about the harass- ment and penalization of some researchers who have published on gender symmetry (see Method 7 below). That led her to withdraw from coauthorship of an important article. She was coming up for tenure and promotion review and feared authorship of that article would adversely affect the chances for a successful review and also a more general stigmatization that could make finding an alternative position difficult. Even if her perception of the threat was wrong, the fact of her fear and its effect on her scholarly work was real.¶ In December 2005, the National Institute of Justice invited grant proposals to investigate PV and sexual violence. It stated that studies involving men victims are not eligible for funding.¶ A proposal I submitted to the National Institute of Mental Health was not funded because, among other criticisms, one of the reviewers strongly objected to the premise that PV is a human relationships issue, as much or more than a gender issue. In the tough competition for funding, if one reviewer out of the panel gives a proposal a very low rating, it is enough to push the priority score below the funding line. Others have had similar experiences-for example, Amy HoItzworth-Munroe (Holtzworth-Munroe,2005).

### A/T Perm

#### The affirmative should not get a permutation-

#### A) This is a method debate – we have impact turned theirs – they started with A and we said A is bad and the alternative is B – there is no C that coopts A and B. tis is a question of starting points

#### B) The negative gets no ground if the aff gets a perm – we are stuck defending the status quo which everyone agrees is bad – that is not a productive discussion for this academic space

#### C) They haven’t read an advocacy statement – the permutation is aff conditionality because they can shift what it means to vote affirmative in the 2AC – that clarification makes it impossible for the negative to generate unique offense and is a reason to reject the permutation – this is not a framework argument – only a reason they need to defend their method on its own

#### D) If we win any of our link arguments it proves the alternative is more desirable than the permutation for confronting hegemonic structures of oppression – even if there is a net benefit to the perm the sequencing debate proves it is impossible for them to solve it without *prioritizing* opposition to neoliberalism

#### E) The aff has had infinite prep time to formulate their 1AC and advocacy statement – that means they should be able to defend it on its own – they also speak first and last which means that structural aff bias is sufficient offense for them – if they don’t have both a theoretical AND substantive justification for the permutation you should not count it in your decision-making calculus

# Trigger Warning not solve

The trigger warning is ingenuine- a trigger warning is good if there is a chance to avoid the image, its for those who could psych rela

# Speaking For Others 2NC Turns Case

The link is their rothfield evidence and their Le et al evidence. Why do you need to bring other narratives in. this is the same appocolypsticism they criticize

#### Though well intentioned, their discursive act reinscribes the “hierarchy of civilizations” and reinforces racist, imperialist conceptions of Latin America—must reject the K on face

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others” Cultural Critique Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.)

 (1) The impetus to speak must be carefully analyzed and, in many cases (certainly for academics!), fought against. This may seem an odd way to begin discussing how to speak for, but the point is that the impetus to always be the speaker and to speak in all situations must be seen for what it is: a desire for mastery and domination. If one's immediate impulse is to teach rather than listen to a less-privileged speaker, one should resist that impulse long enough to interrogate it carefully. Some of us have been taught that by right of having the dominant gender, class, race, letters after our name, or some other criterion, we are more likely to have the truth. Others have been taught the opposite and will speak haltingly, with apologies, if they speak at all.[16](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote16) At the same time, we have to acknowledge that the very decision to "move over" or retreat can occur only from a position of privilege. Those who are not in a position of speaking at all cannot retreat from an action they do not employ. Moreover, making the decision for oneself whether or not to retreat is an extension or application of privilege, not an abdication of it. Still, it is sometimes called for. (2) We must also interrogate the bearing of our location and context on what it is we are saying, and this should be an explicit part of every serious discursive practice we engage in. Constructing hypotheses about the possible connections between our location and our words is one way to begin. This procedure would be most successful if engaged in collectively with others, by which aspects of our location less obvious to us might be revealed.[17](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote17)One deformed way in which this is too often carried out is when speakers offer up in the spirit of "honesty" autobiographical information about themselves, usually at the beginning of their discourse as a kind of disclaimer. This is meant to acknowledge their own understanding that they are speaking from a specified, embodied location without pretense to a transcendental truth. But as Maria Lugones and others have forcefully argued, such an act serves no good end when it is used as a disclaimer against one's ignorance or errors and is made without critical interrogation of the bearing of such an autobiography on what is about to be said. It leaves for the listeners all the real work that needs to be done. For example, if a middle class white man were to begin a speech by sharing with us this autobiographical information and then using it as a kind of apologetics for any limitations of his speech, this would leave to those of us in the audience who do not share his social location all the work of translating his terms into our own, apprising the applicability of his analysis to our diverse situation, and determining the substantive relevance of his location on his claims. This is simply what less-privileged persons have always had to do for ourselves when reading the history of philosophy, literature, etc., which makes the task of appropriating these discourses more difficult and time-consuming (and alienation more likely to result). Simple unanalyzed disclaimers do not improve on this familiar situation and may even make it worse to the extent that by offering such information the speaker may feel even more authorized to speak and be accorded more authority by his peers. (3) Speaking should always carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says. To whom one is accountable is a political/epistemological choice contestable, contingent and, as Donna Haraway says, constructed through the process of discursive action. What this entails in practice is a serious commitment to remain open to criticism and to attempt actively, attentively, and sensitively to "hear" the criticism (understand it). A quick impulse to reject criticism must make one wary. (4) Here is my central point. In order to evaluate attempts to speak for others in particular instances, we need to analyze the probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context. One cannot simply look at the location of the speaker or her credentials to speak; nor can one look merely at the propositional content of the speech; one must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there. Looking merely at the content of a set of claims without looking at their effects cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of it, and this is partly because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention to the discursive arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any given discursive event. For example, in a situation where a well-meaning First world person is speaking for a person or group in the Third world, the very discursive arrangement may reinscribe the "hierarchy of civilizations" view where the U. S. lands squarely at the top. This effect occurs because the speaker is positioned as authoritative and empowered, as the knowledgeable subject, while the group in the Third World is reduced, merely because of the structure of the speaking practice, to an object and victim that must be championed from afar. Though the speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, one of the effects of her discourse is to reenforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser-privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard.[18](http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html#footnote18) This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize discourse, as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on. ¶ All such evaluations produced in this way will be of necessity indexed. That is, they will obtain for a very specific location and cannot be taken as universal. This simply follows from the fact that the evaluations will be based on the specific elements of historical discursive context, location of speakers and hearers, and so forth. When any of these elements is changed, a new evaluation is called for.

## Neolib

#### The Role of the Ballot is to affirm the team who best confronts hegemonic structures of oppression – you should use this academic space to oppose neoliberalism – that confronts hegemonic structures of oppression by ensuring that performative resistance is possible in the university setting

#### Neoliberalism prevents radical critique in the university setting

Feigenbaum Professor of Media and Politics at Bournemouth University ‘7 (Anna, “The Teachable Moment: Feminist Pedagogy and the Neoliberal Classroom,” *Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies (29) 4*, 337-349, Mike)

Canadian scholar Elizabeth Brule ́ argues in her 2004 essay, ‘‘Going to the Market,’’ that the corporatization of the university has led to the construction of students as rational, economic decision makers. As Brule ́ argues, ‘‘The only choices considered rational, however, are those that increase one’s employment opportunities within the strict confines of the labour market.’’ 1 Brule ́ further cites this construction as the cause for students’ disengagement with critical pedagogy. The corporatization of the university, she suggests, makes it increasingly difficult for educators to foster feminist and anti-racist perspectives. 2 Competition, self-sufficiency and strident individualism — which are both the symptoms and disease of neoliberalism — appear entirely at odds with the overthrow of power relations. Trapped within a neoliberal agenda, students come to disavow any connection with radical critique. 3

#### Conversely - The alternative ruptures neoliberalism in the university setting

Feigenbaum Professor of Media and Politics at Bournemouth University ‘7 (Anna, “The Teachable Moment: Feminist Pedagogy and the Neoliberal Classroom,” *Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies (29) 4*, 337-349, Mike)

This question of ‘‘conditions’’ is precisely what is at stake in the scenes I have discussed. At the junctures of risk and vulnerability, at the sites of pain and anxiety, what we are able to exchange in spite of — and with spite toward — neoliberalism, is not only a nomadic or temporary escape. Rather, the exchanges of the teachable moment flow back into and again outside of the classroom, imagining and creating conditions for ethical relations and critical consciousness. It is this transitional movement of knowledge that ruptures the logic of the increasingly corporatized classroom, challenging neoliberal ideologies which seek to dictate fictions of fleshless and touch-free, economically rational relations between student and teacher. Thus, by simultaneously confronting the corporatization of our classrooms and engaging the creative risk of encounter, we are sometimes able to move — in writing and also in flesh — the effects of these teachable moments.

#### Turns case - Neoliberalism constructs gender-specific division of labor that ascribes traditional identities based on gender and encourages patriarchy.

Wichterich**,** member of the scientific advisory council of Attac Germany andactive in WIDE (Women in Development Europe),**200**9 (Christa, “Women peasants, food security and biodiversity in the crisis of neoliberalism” *Development Dialogue* Issue 51[, http://rosalux-europa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173](http://rosalux-europa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173))//CS

Masculine and feminine roles in agriculture are constructed within the gender-specific division of labour and in the context of the dual agricultural production system – commercial, chemical-intensive monocultures, on the one hand, and mixed cultures geared towards local markets and self-sufficiency, on the other. Under the influence of local regional and global market forces and in the socio-cultural allocation of gender-specific tasks and capacities, traditional responsibilities and social ascription of masculinity and femininity are entangled in ever-new ways and transform power relations(Krishna 2004; Rupp 2007). The Guatemalan peasant women who design their kitchen garden like many spirals turning into each other of corn, sweet potatoes and other vegetables are tied by a mixture of survival pragmatism, ancestor worship and natural philosophy to their land and biodiversity. They treat both as an inheritance from their ancestors, from which they are not allowed nor want to separate themselves through sale. The plots should remain in the clan or in the ethnic community, in order to ensure their survival and well-being.The peasant women have had their own understanding of biodiversity and of the seed as their own means of production ‘for centuries’. They see their work self-consciously as value-creating activity and their knowledge as productive capacity, with the help of which they have not only maintained the genetic stock, but have productively further developed it. Furthermore, they have accumulated detailed knowledge of the nutritional value and healing powers of local species. Traditional knowledge in these reproduction contexts is a constitutive element of survival spaces and a central livelihood resource (Kuppe 2002).The women peasants therefore understand themselves as investors: they give value to the plants and develop their productivity, which in its turn ensures that the women enjoy esteem in the community. Their practical and strategic interest in biodiversity and in food security often brings the women peasants into conflict with their men. Official government agricultural advisors offer the men commercial seeds and praise the advantages and earning possibilities of monocultures, recently above all those of organic fuel. In Burkina Faso, many peasants followed the desire of the government and planted cotton, reducing the fields of the women, in order to have more land available for the allegedly lucrative cotton. The women nevertheless continued to foster and care for biodiversity in the kitchen gardens. It was precisely that which ensured their food supply when ¶ the cotton prices on the world market fell into the basement. Peasant women in Tanzania had a similar experience. In a subversive action, they planted banana trees and cabbage between the coffee trees, even though the government had forbidden mixed farming on the export fields.

### Link

#### Their emphasis on narratives of history without a proactive should statement doesn’t solve neoliberal tendencies and only fractures coalition building

#### Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Many commentators note that neither Brown nor Butler analyze how social and group dynamics contribute to the constitution of the self. 26 Butler holds that resistance can only come through an “ironic” and subversive choice to “perform” outside the iteratively performed social norms that enable and constitute the subject.27 Such a conception not only raises the now traditional question of whether she can define who is “the doer behind the deed” of resistance; it also conjures up an ironic parallel between the methodological (“anti”) individualist nature of Butler's world of discursively constructed subjects and Rawls's methodological individualist rational chooser. Communitarians and deliberative democrats frequently criticize Rawls for deducing rules of justice from the representative thinking of one deracinated and de-sexed ideal chooser operating in the original position and behind the veil of ignorance. In a similar manner, Butler's performative resister appears to be a representative (yet incoherent) subject whose repertoire of ironic, performative resistance seems to draw upon disembodied discourse. Thus, it seems as if one incoherent self can represent all incoherent selves. The alleged freedom of the transgressive self also strikingly mirrors the neoliberal conception of the free chooser in the marketplace, whose freedom is allegedly unconstrained by any structural barriers such as class domination.¶ But, in reality, discursive performance is not the sole manner by which individuals negotiate the material, cultural, and structural realities that both empower and constrain individuals. For example, individuals cannot readily discursively perform themselves out of their socio-economic or class position. There is a certain materiality to poverty or to being subject to the authority and discipline of a boss that cannot simply be ironically and performatively resisted. Class and other forms of gender and racial power relations are structural, as well as discursive. Even the “parodic” possibilities of gender reversal are constrained by the communities in which one resides. Is the reversal of drag a viable public possibility in a violently homophobic community?

# 1NR

# 1NR

# F/W

## 2NC Overview

**We agree with the affirmative, there are problems with sexual violence and we need to confront – but the way they do it forces the neg to disprove the aff, it FORCES the neg to say that sexual violence doesn’t matter or that sexual violence that doesn’t occur – that’s unproductive – we shouldn’t be forced to disprove the aff to win the debate – yes we should talk about this, but we should talk outside the round, have forums where we as a community talk about it**

**There’s no reason they need the ballot – if they cared about bringing the issue to light, then they wouldn’t need the ballot, you can vote negative and endorse that it’s good to debate the topic WHILE saying we should reject sexual violence in the debate space – that’s the Knight evidence**

#### Trying to accomplish these goals within a debate round creates backlash against whatever you’re trying to accomplish – telling opponents they should lose at the altar of your political movement causes alienation and resentment

**Atchison and Panetta 09** – \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community.

However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.

From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

**And engaging the government on war-powers is uniquely important – Melkis and Mellor say it teaches which war powers are bad – which is critical to challenging them in the real world – this is critical to prevent drone strikes that kill innocent civilians everyday, prevent people from indefinitely detained, or preventing the U.S. from invading other countries on false premises like how we did in Iraq**

**Hogan says this is critical – we need to learn how to confront the government to prevent right wing fill-in – couple of impacts**

**First Right-wing control allows them to destroy the environment which will kills millions of people that we should prevent**

**And it means they’ll rollback progress we’ve made- they’ll rollback things like laws that help solve sexual violence and prevent us from engaging the government to put laws into effect that would solve sexual violence – this helps us in debate too because we learn how to engage proposals we can defend and create laws that affect us in debate here too**

## Young

**Debating about war powers is important – makes posible checks on excessive presidential authority – college students are key**

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

Our framework is also critical to developing skills to learn how to create broader social change to challenge other problems as well

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.