### 1NC Fwork

#### Our Framework is that Debate Praxis Should Focus and Be Evaluated Based on the Outcomes of Action Rather Than the Target of the Action

Violation: The Affirmative Focuses on the theoretical process of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

#### We Have a Couple Net Benefits to This Interpretation:

#### First is Critical Pedagogy: Debating the Process of Politics is not Enough – the Only Way to Test the Viability of Methodology is to Look at the Outcomes Rather Than the Goals of Politics

These Calls That Reorient Social Norms Fundamentally Alter Policy – Ignoring This Fixture in Debate Posits Their Aff as Nonfalsifiable and Does Not Truly Test the Nature of Policy

Thomas Sowell, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, 1999 on the faculties of leading universities nation-wide, *The* *Quest for Cosmic Justice***,** The Free Press: New York, pg. 43-48

**Economic development has been the most successful of all anti-poverty policies.** It was not very long ago, as history is measured, when such things as oranges or cocoa were the luxuries of the rich and when it was considered an extravagance for the President of the United States to have a bathtub with running water installed in the White House. Within the twentieth century, such things as automobiles, telephones, and refrigerators went from being luxuries of the rich to being common among the general population, all within the span of one generation. Material well-being is of course not everything. Justice matters as well. But, **whatever one's vision of a just world, what is crucial is to recognize that** (i) **different visions lead to radically different practical policies, that** (2) **we shall continue to talk past one another so long as we do not recognize that cosmic justice changes the very meaning of the plainest words, and that** (3) **whatever we choose to do, it should be based on a clear understanding of the costs and dangers of the actual alternatives, not simply the heady feeling of exaltation produced bv particular words or visions.** Recognizing that many people "through no fault of their own" have windfall losses, while those same people—and others—also have windfall gains, the time is long overdue to recognize also that **taxpayers through no fault of their own have been forced to subsidize the moral adventures which exalt self-anointed social philosophers.** Victims of violent crimes have been forced to bear even more painful losses from those same moral adventures. **There is no question that a world in which cosmic justice prevailed would be a better world** than a world limited to traditional justice. **However,** it is one thing to rail against the fates, but **no one should confuse** that with a serious **critique of existing society,** much less **a basis for constructing a better one.** There is an ancient fable about a dog with a bone in his mouth. He looked down into a pool of water and saw a reflection that looked to him like another dog with another bone— and that other bone seemed to be larger than his bone. Determined to get the other bone instead, the dog opened his mouth and prepared to jump into the water. This of course caused his own bone to drop into the water and be lost. **Cosmic justice** is much like that illusory bone and it too **can cause us to lose what is attainable in quest of the unattainable.** "It's Time For A Change!"

Second is Partisanship: Focusing Agency on Identifying Root Causes Reorients Partisanship Towards the Center of Politics – By Focusing Solely on the Ability to Reveal These Structures, the Aff Locks Us Into a System of Deliberative Binaries That Makes Evaluation Impossible

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 97-8

In contrast to "deliberation," which means "the thoughtful consider­ation of alternative courses of action,"1 we might think of "partisan­ship" as "struggle to enact a fixed course of action." So defined, the differences between deliberation and partisanship are as obvious as they are profound: deliberation requires openness and the cooperative exercise of the intellect; partisanship presumes closure and involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power. As a general rule, it also follows that deliberative democracy will flourish in inverse proportion to partisanship. For this reason deliberative democrats need a strategy for eliminating (or at least containing) par­tisanship. This paper advances such a strategy, a strategy which I recommend based on a critique of the two alternatives that have for some time dominated thinking in this area. The first of these alterna­tives is advanced by a wide-range of participatory democrats. On their view, partisanship can not only be contained, but also perhaps elimi­nated altogether, by having would-be partisans confront one another in public decision-making bodies. The participatory strategy ultimately rests on the belief that all partisan conflict is susceptible to transforma­tion as long as partisanship is confronted directly. Indeed, the partici­patory strategy for dealing with partisanship enjoins two sorts of confrontation: confrontation among citizens and confrontation with an actual decision. The second alternative strategy for dealing with parti­sanship that I examine here, no less well known, is Madisonian. Its strategy for limiting partisanship is in many ways the mirror image ofthat proposed by participatory democrats. Where the participatory strategy puts its faith in confrontation, the Madisonian strategy puts its faith in separation—again of two sorts. For the Madisonian, the worst effects of partisanship can be contained by first separating citi­zens from the actual task of decision-making and then by institution­alizing separate sources of decision-making power.Although I believe there is something to be learned from both the participatory and the Madisonian strategies for dealing with par­tisanship, I end up rejecting both of them in favor of an alternative which weds Madisonian institutional insights to participatory demo­crats' concern with the individual citizen. I argue that the best way to limit the unavoidable influence of partisanship is to confine par­tisan maneuvering to the latter stages of decision making and policy formation. I conclude that both distance and proximity can be made to serve the ends of deliberative democracy, that, indeed, distance and proximity must be combined in any effective strategy for limit­ing partisanship. That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action. Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action. Especially when viewed in the context of democratic politics, deliberation and partisanship thus seem irreconcilable. First, and most obviously, deliberation involves weigh­ing alternatives; partisanship involves coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form, rhetorical manipulation. Second, deliberation requires balancing or adjudicating between a plurality of views; par­tisanship presupposes that one view has been judged superior (or advantageous). Third, deliberation requires only an opposing view­point; partisanship requires an opponent.

Third Our Interpretation Solves Best: This Focus is Critical to Recognize There Are Multiple Layers to the war powers Debate – Focus Solely on Identifying the Harms Falsely Paints This as a Question of Yes or No – Only Our Framework Allows Debaters to Critically Engage the Resolution

Michael Hale Vice President for Curriculum Consulting with VitalSource Technologies in Raleigh, NC 2009 “Teaching the Immigration Debate in Freshman Composition” Radical Teacher, 84, Spring 2009, 18-30

As a human being, I believe that everyone is equal, and the documentary created a way to reiterate that belief of equality. Other students wrote about how the documentaries helped them realize that they had many false ideas about immigrants. A female African American student wrote, “After watching the movie, I saw that many of my ideas and opinions about immigration, the struggle immigrants go through to get here and how they are treated, was very naïve.” From this realization, she was also able to connect the racism experienced by undocumented immigrants to the racism faced by African Americans. “Like black people, immigrants a lot of times are treated like they should not even be alive. They are taken advantage of . . . because people think less of them.” Assignment 1 Summary: Which Side Are You On? Immigration is a controversial issue that cannot be easily divided into left, liberal, and conservative categories. Because it places the students on unfamiliar ground that does not conform to traditional partisan American politics, the immigration debate provokes more critical thinking than a discussion of welfare or affirmative action, where the lines are drawn along more familiar boundaries. For example, conservative students who support the Bush administration do not know how to process his administration’s vocal support of “immigration reform” with their standard AM-radio, anti-immigrant rhetoric. Interestingly, there is considerable division in the Republican Party over immigration reform. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal editorializes, “No issue more deeply divides American conservatives today than immigration. It’s the subject on which we get the most critical mail by far . . .” (“Conservatives and Immigration”). A vocal minority of the Republican Party, represented by people like Representative Tom Tancredo and Pat Buchanan, wants strict enforcement and immigration restriction. A whole host of cultural nationalist, xenophobic, and racist hate groups orbit around this section of the Republican Party (Barry, “The Politics and Ideologies of the Anti- Immigrant Forces”). They have a populist message that speaks to disaffected working-class and middle-class voters. In contrast, a large percentage of the neoconservative section of the Republican Party, represented by figures such as Bush and McCain, are more subservient to the growing demands from U.S. corporations for a large exploitable work force. They promote enforcement combined with a guest worker program and a long, complicated, and expensive path to legalization that keeps new immigrants in a state of constant fear of deportation and, therefore, more exploitable (Bacon, “How U.S. Corporations Won the Debate Over Immigration”). On the other side, liberal or left students must not only contemplate the divisions within the Republican Party but also divisions within the Democratic Party—particularly the newly elected more conservative Democrats often referred to as the Blue Dog Coalition (Anderson). In addition, there are strong divisions between Washington-based immigrant lobbying groups and organizations created by and predominantly composed of immigrants that work at the grassroots level for unconditional legalization and family reunification (Bacon, “Time to Build a Stronger, More Radical Movement”). For example, in a controversial editorial “Change of Heart on Guest Workers,” the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) withdrew its support for unconditional legalization for the undocumented and instead crossed over to the neocon/neoliberal camp by supporting a guest worker program advocated by the McCain-Kennedy coalition.5 There are also debates between leftist and liberals over open borders versus regulated borders (La Botz). Additionally, nonpolitical religious students are being challenged by their spiritual leaders to adopt more pro-immigrant positions.6 Lastly, environmental groups have been split between Malthusians who advocate sharp reductions in population and social justice environmentalists who research deeper root causes of environmental devastation than simply over-population. The Sierra Club has witnessed terrible fighting between these factions (“Hostile Takeover”). The first assignment asks students to summarize the positions of the various organizational forces involved in the immigration debate. It allows students to develop knowledge of the broader scope of the issue while sharpening their critical thinking and writing skills. Instead of starting with the rhetorical mode, I start with the writing situation (how do you sort out the various factions in this debate?), and then have the students discuss which rhetorical mode would best fit the particular demands of the writing situation. Sorting out these different factions lends itself well to a classification and division assignment. Students can choose to classify and divide one side of the debate or both sides in a compare and contrast format organized around a category such as “economic arguments.” For example, Tom Barry, a prominent investigative journalist on immigration issues, insists, “Antiimmigration forces include partisans of the two main political parties as well as adherents of parties and movements on the political left and right that fall outside mainstream political thinking” (“Politics and Ideologies of the Anti-Immigrant Forces”). In fact, Barry subdivides the restrictionist side of the immigration debate into six categories: Restrictionist Policy Institutes, White Supremacist, Malthusian Environmentalist, Paleo- Cons, Neo-Cons, and Border Vigilantes. Barry’s point underscores the uncommon nature of the immigrant rights debate, and how it requires deeper thinking than many other issues in order to form an opinion. Using Tom Barry’s article as a model, the first assignment asks students to write a 4-page essay in which they subdivide the pro-immigrant forces into categories they create. They select two articles from an online reader I prepared with links to articles from Barry, Bacon, La Botz, The Interfaith Worker Justice Center, and Guskin and Wilson in order to conduct research on the pro-immigrant forces. This assignment makes students reach beyond the simplistic pro/con, two-sided structure by which most controversial issues get framed in current U.S. politics; each side is examined carefully to reveal many more factions than originally thought.

Mobilizing This Solution-Based Activism is Key to Real Change – Without Vocal Opinions on Outcomes, The Government Will Largely Ignore the Need to Change the System

Christina Boswell University of Edinburgh 2007 “Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?” International Migration Review, 41.1, Spring 2007 75-100

However, at the level of public discourse, the accumulative function of migration remains contested in most immigration countries. For this reason, states often adopt a two-level approach to migration as a contributor to accumulation. Insofar as they consider labor migration to be important for accumulation, they may tolerate or discretely introduce liberal policies for certain industries, and in this sense migration can indirectly enhance legitimacy through its positive economic impact. However, where public opinion is skeptical about migration and this positive impact is largely unacknowledged in public debates, states have often avoided publicly advocating liberal migration policies, which may well undermine their legitimacy in other ways. The third function that is crucial to state legitimacy in most welfare states we can loosely term “fairness.” This is a question of whether political and social structures and government policies are seen to promote a just pattern of distribution. As we saw in the last section, nation-states have traditionally derived much of their legitimacy from protecting the privileged rights of their own nationals. Governments and rival parties tend to mobilize popular support through demonstrating their willingness and ability to exclude outsiders from access to finite socioeconomic resources. However, there are two sources of qualification to mobilization around this generally protectionist conception of fairness. The first is the effect of the inclusion of mobilized ethnic minority groups on conceptions of the scope of justice. Incorporating ethnic minority groups as members can encourage more pluralist conceptions of the scope of entitlement. Multicultural societies will tend to deploy less rigidly bounded conceptions of membership. Secondly, we also saw earlier that conceptions of fairness at the domestic level are usually premised on universalistic theories of justice. Thus even within domestic debates on distribution, there is a latent ethic of equal rights that is difficult to fully disregard in public discussions about immigration or refugee policy. However, as I argued earlier, such universalist theories of justice are often weak in the face of protectionist arguments for closure. The final precondition for legitimacy with clear relevance to migration policy is what I termed institutional legitimacy, similar to the notion of Rechtstaat. This refers to public confidence that state practices conform to certain formal conditions considered vital for the preservation of democracy and liberty. Such formal conditions include the rule of law, separation of powers, conformity with the constitution, and respect of civil liberties. As Hollifield and others have argued, concern about conforming to these requirements often places limits on more restrictionist policies on migration control, refugee and asylum policy, or the rights of long-term residents (1992, 2004). In short, migration impinges in a number of ways on these four conditions for legitimacy. This to a large extent explains why migration has taken on such central importance in political debates. The point is not so much that migration affects societal interests; many phenomena do this, but fail to surface as politically contested issues (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Rather, it raises key questions about the way in which the state is, or is not, fulfilling its ascribed functions. Legitimacy Conflicts and How They Are Reconciled This provisional sketch of the state’s functional imperatives can help explain the sources of power of liberal institutions in shaping migration policy. Governments and bureaucracies have limited motivation to take on board interests and norms that are not helping them to meet these imperatives. However, there is frequently a coincidence between functional imperatives and the liberal approaches propounded by societal actors, domestic institutions, or international regimes. For example, the imperative of accumulation can make states especially sympathetic to the labor requirements of capital, encouraging them to adopt more liberal labor-migration policies. The imperative of ensuring institutional legitimacy makes states cautious about rolling back judicial powers, thus delimiting the scope for the restriction of refugee or immigrant rights. And the need to secure consent from mobilized or enfranchised minority groups can also encourage a dynamic of rights extension. I could cite more examples. But the point to reiterate is that these liberal constraints are not a function of exogenous factors, i.e . , the characteristics of liberal institutions or the power of the business lobby. Rather, their power derives from their resonance with state interests, understood as the imperative to meet the preconditions for legitimacy. However, a second important point is that these functional imperatives are difficult to realize simultaneously. And migration policies often bring them into conflict in a particularly pronounced way. Here we should note that the original proponents of the notion of the state’s functional imperatives were profoundly pessimistic about the state’s capacity to meet these requirements over any period of time. Jürgen Habermas (1997) characterized this as a legitimation crisis, in which the state was unable to fulfill its ascribed function of protecting citizens from economic shock through a social safety net. This deficiency exposed latent social conflicts, and forced the state to compensate by falling back on alternative strategies of mobilization. Claus Offe (1972) also assumed that states in capitalist society would be unable to reconcile the dual imperatives of accumulation and legitimacy in the long term.

### 1NC Anti-politics

#### Equivocating on policy implementation turns the aff. The solution to the Right is university students like us – a uniqueness trend they reverse.

Todd Gitlin formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 2005 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 9/25/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01\_04.pdf

Weak thinking on the American left is especially glaring after September 11, 2001, as I’ll argue in part III, but this is hardly to say that the right has been more impressive at making the world comprehensible. For decades the right has cultivated its own types of blindness and more than that: having risen to political power, it has been in a position to make blindness the law of the land. The neoconservatives’ foreign policy is largely hubris under a veneer of ideals. The antigovernment dogma of deregulation, privatization, and tax cuts exacerbates economic and social troubles. A culture war against modernity—against secularism, feminism, and racial justice—flies in the face of the West’s distinctive contribution to the history of civilization, namely, the rise of individual rights and reason. To elaborate on these claims is the work of other books. The reasons for the right-wing ascendancy are many, among them—as I argued in letter 7 of Letters to a Young Activist (2003)—the organizational discipline that the right cherishes and the left, at least until recently, tends to abhor. The left’s institutions, in particular, unions, are weak. But my focus here is another reason for the right’s ascendancy: *the left’s intellectual disarmament.* Some of the deficiency is institutional. Despite efforts to come from behind after the 2000 election, there remain decades’ worth of shortfall in the left’s cultural apparatus. In action-minded think tanks, talk radio and cable television, didactic newspapers, subsidies for writers, and so on, the right has held most of the high cards.1 Left and liberal analyses and proposals do emerge from universities and research centers, but their circulation is usually choked off for lack of focus, imagination, and steady access to mass media—except in the cheapened forms of punditry and agitprop. The right’s masterful apparatus for purveying its messages and organizing for power is not the only reason why the left has suffered defeat after defeat in national politics since the 1960s. The left’s intellectual stockpile has been badly depleted, and new ideas are more heralded than delivered. When the left has thought big, it has been clearer about isms to oppose—mainly imperialism and racism—than about values and policies to further. At that, it has often preferred the denunciatory mode to the analytical, mustering full-throated opposition rather than full-brained exploration. While it is probably true that many more reform ideas are dreamt of than succeed in circulating through the brain-dead media, the liberal-left conveys little sense of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. While the right has rather successfully tarred liberals with the brush of “tax-and-spend,” those thus tarred have often been unsure whether to reply “It’s not so” or “It is so, we’re proud to say.” A fair generalization is that the left’s expertise has been constricted in scope, showing little taste for principle and little capacity to imagine a reconstituted nation. It has been conflicted and unsteady about values. It has tended to disdain any design for foreign policy other than “U.S. out,” which is no substitute for a foreign policy—and inconsistent to boot when you consider that the left wants the United States to intervene, for example, to push Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. All this is to say that the left has been imprisoned in the closed world of outsider politics. Instead of a vigorous quest for testable propositions that could actually culminate in reform, the academic left in particular has nourished what has come to be called “theory”: a body of writing (one can scarcely say its content consists of propositions) that is, in the main, distracting, vague, self-referential, and wrong-headed. “Theory” is chiefly about itself: “thought to the second power,” as Fredric Jameson defined dialectical thinking in an early, dazzling American exemplar of the new theoretical style.2 Even when “theory” tries to reconnect from language and mind to the larger social world, language remains the preoccupation. Michel Foucault became a rock star of theory in the United States precisely because he demoted knowledge to a reflex of power, merely the denominator of the couplet “power/knowledge,” yet his preoccupation was with the knowledge side, not actual social structures. His famous illustration of the power of “theory” was built on Jeremy Bentham’s design of an ideal prison, the Panopticon—a model never built.3 The “linguistic turn” in the social sciences turns out to be its own prison house, equipped with funhouse mirrors but no exit. When convenient, “theory” lays claim to objective truth, but in fact the chief criterion by which it ascended in status was aesthetic, not empirical. Flair matters more than explanatory power. At crucial junctures “theory” consists of flourishes, intellectual performance pieces: things are said to be so because the theorist says so, and even if they are not, isn’t it interesting to pretend? But the problem with “theory” goes beyond opaque writing—an often dazzling concoction of jargon, illogic, and preening. If you overcome bedazzlement at the audacity and glamour of theory and penetrate the obscurity, you find circularity and self-justification, often enough (and self-contradictorily) larded with populist sentimentality about “the people” or “forces of resistance.” You see steadfast avoidance of tough questions. Despite the selective use of the still-prestigious rhetoric of science, the world of “theory” makes only tangential contact with the social reality that it disdains. Politically, it is useless. It amounts to secession from the world where most people live.

#### The Aff is NOT “political” in the sense our authors discuss. Re-defining “politics” to not include concrete fiated action is a word-game that makes curriculum symbolic and impractical.

Chandler ‘7 (David, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Westminster, Area, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 118-119)

This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to 'make a difference' is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. **This is** the **politics of symbolism**. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of 'raising awareness'– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes ([Pupavac 2 006](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/cgi-bin/fulltext/117996027/main.html%2Cftx_abs%22%20%5Cl%20%22b24)). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretence of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an 'awareness of poverty'. The struggle for 'awareness' makes it clear that **the focus of symbolic politics is** theindividual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their 'awareness', rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world. It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation (see further, [Chandler 2004a](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/cgi-bin/fulltext/117996027/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b25)). Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical 'incommunicability' of our personal identities and claims – you are 'either with us or against us'; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable. It is this **lack of desire to engage** which most distinguishes the unmediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities, founded on struggles of collective interests ([Chandler 2004b](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/cgi-bin/fulltext/117996027/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b26)). The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers' doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer.This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been 'freed' from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent.

#### If the World’s too “conservative” it’s because our form of political engagement is TOO THIN. It’s linear.

Chandler ‘9

David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – 'The Global Ideology: Rethinking the Politics of the "Global Turn" in IR', International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2009), pp. 530-547.

http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal\_articles/Journal%20of%20Int%20Rels%20-%20Global%20Ideology%20published.pdf

While the Cold War discipline of international relations is understood in ideological terms of power and interests, the critical and constructivist theorists who regularly assert the constitutive nature of theorising rarely understand this as a socially mediated relationship. Robert Cox’s breakdown of social theorising into ‘problem solving approaches’, which restrict themselves to attempts to resolve problems on the basis of existing interests and relations of power, and ‘critical approaches’, which take an emancipatory approach,20 has often been reproduced in ways which tend to understand the act of theorising idealistically.21 Theorising is then seen to construct society in line with the political interests or class position of the theorist; critical theorising then increasingly becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency.22 In this context, critical ‘global’ understandings of community and political interaction were often seen to be progressive and a challenge to the power and interests of (nation state-based) political elites. In the 1990s, critical theorists led the call for the globalisation of our conceptions of the international sphere, highlighted in the shift away from understanding security in terms of state security to the security of the individual.23 It was argued that the expansion of the security referent, from the state to the global level, and the expansion of our understanding of threats, from narrow military concerns to concerns of environmental degradation, poverty and women’s rights, would transform the international agenda. States were seen as barriers to a new, more progressive world order based on shared concerns and interests. Rather than being the bearers of security, protecting their citizens, states were increasingly conceived of as a threat to their citizens’ security, through genocide, war and their abuse of human rights. These critical concerns were swiftly taken up by Western governments, international institutions and NGOs and, as they did so, globalised visions of security, focusing on securing the needs of individuals rather than states, became increasingly part of the political mainstream.24 For some theorists, working within constructivist frameworks, the emergence of global politics has been framed in ways less directly confrontational to the interests of states. Instead, it is argued, Western state political elites have begun to conceive of their self-interests in a more enlightened way – one which is less confrontational and more cooperative.25 This shift in the perception of state interests and the manner of their projection in the international sphere has been understood to be a product of global interaction and the construction of new norms of behaviour and ideas of global citizenship. These new norms were often seen to be driven by NGOs and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’ acting in the global political sphere, shaping public perceptions of the global political agenda and forcing states to respond and to gradually take on board assumptions about the importance of issues such as human rights and the rule of law.26 Global politics was therefore often conceived not in geopolitical, territorial terms of realpolitik but in the ethical terms of a contestation between global approaches and state-based ones, which pitted cosmopolitanism and human rights advocacy against narrow national interests, which were alleged to hold back the consistent implementation of emerging global norms.27 Frameworks of global politics in the 1990s tended to contrast the international sphere of progress and NGO activism with an increasingly moribund domestic sphere of political party competition. In the 1990s power was still seen to reside at the level of states, even though the agenda was being set by global interaction and politics operating at the global level. In the 2000s, the globalisation of politics has become increasingly expressed in the erosion of distinctions between the global and the domestic.28 For radical poststructuralist theorists, the erosion of the barrier between the global and the domestic has been commonly articulated in terms of the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, empire, or of biopower. The undermining of the politics of state-based representation and the globalisation of regulatory power has become the starting assumption for the poststructuralist ‘scaling up’ of Foucault in critiques of global governmentality.29 If power was located at the global level then resistance was as well, in a direct challenge to this power.30 This ‘globalisation’ of resistance meant that the focus was not necessarily on narrow NGO activism and lobbying but could include any form of protest and dissent, as long as it was viewed from the perspective of global struggle: from ethical shopping to protests against free trade or the destruction of the rain forests.31 In the dominant frameworks for understanding the globalisation of politics, the problem is not that politics is represented in global, deterritorialised terms, but that our understandings of the global as the political sphere for contestation and progress lag behind the economic and social transformations that have created our globalised world and with it the globalised nature of threats – from global warming to the global war on terror. This framework closes off any need for questioning the politicisation of the global level, suggesting that the only questions concern the manner in which we undertake global politics and/or reorganise our political institutions to adapt to the threats and possibilities of our ‘global world’. This demonstrates the power of what is here conceptualised as the Global Ideology: an ideological framework which naturalises and reifies its subject matter, posing the globalisation of politics as a matter of imposed necessity rather than a social construct which is open to critique. Demystifying the ‘global’ Demystifying the ‘global’ involves articulating the mediating links between our subjective understanding of the globalised world and the attenuated nature of social and political struggle. It is possible to understand the globalisation of politics as a social construct without theoretical positions being directly understood as unmediated reflections of clashing political interests or subject positions. Critical theorists and constructivists have often tended to conceive of their work as advocacy on the part of the progressive forces of global civil society in its political struggle against powerful elites, defending the status quo of state-based international relations. In the same way, critical poststructuralists tend to understand their work as part of the struggle against the power of liberal ‘empire’ ranged against the radical challenge of the ‘multitude’.32 In these frameworks of understanding global politics, the shift towards the global is seen as indicative of new lines of political struggle which have replaced those of the territorialised framework of Left and Right. For liberal and critical theorists, this is the struggle for human rights and emancipation against the sovereign power of states. For poststructuralist theorists, this is seen as the struggle for autonomy and difference against the universalising war waged ‘over ways of life itself’ by neoliberal biopolitical governance. However, these struggles remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress are intimated but are yet to fully develop. There is a problem of the social agency, the collective political subject, which can give content to the theorising of global struggle articulated by academic theorists.33 Without a social agency, which can give global politics the content which academic theorists insist is immanent, there seems to be a weak link in the chain of argument which asserts that the globalising nature of economic and social transformations has run ahead of our capacities to engage with the world politically. On the one hand, there appears to be a crude technological determinism at work: somehow, speeded up communications are held to have transformed social relations to such an extent that we need new frameworks of social and political theorising and practices. On the other hand, there appears to be a crude idealism: the enlightened advocates of global progress are held to represent or express the immanent or arising progressive forces – from global civil society to the ‘multitude’ – which are yet to make their own appearance. How can the theoretical and practical gap be bridged between assertions of transformed social relations, which are alleged to have created a deterritorialised world, and the fact that the social forces, alleged to reflect or be agents of these changes, remain immanent or marginal? It seems that we live in a world where politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement.

#### Anti-Politics means they can’t solve, threatens the planet, and cedes politics to the Right.

Boggs ’97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context diseases, technological displacement of workers) of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### 1NC K

#### Their Focus on ontology sustains neoliberalism and prevents emancipatory politics

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

This article explores why self-defined radical and “subversive” political theory has, by and large, failed to examine the rampant increase in inequality under thirty years of neoliberal capitalism as a major threat to democracy.1 During this period, the most highly cited work in radical political thought focused on predominantly ontological and epistemological issues of “difference” and “the fiction of the coherent self.”2 But just as post-structuralist and difference theorists attacked the rational chooser of Rawlsian liberalism as a falsely universal subject and interrogated equality as a homogenizing category, political elites of both the right and the moderate left achieved an ideological consensus in favor of a new, neoliberal universal subject—the entrepreneurial, self-sufficient, competitive marketplace individual. Thus, it is rather ironic that during the “Great Compression” of the 1960s, when income and wealth inequality moderately decreased—in part due to the power of the labor and social democratic movements in advanced democracies—the revival of political theory focused on the challenge to democracy posed by economic inequality and the absence of voice for employees in the workplace; think of the early work of Carole Pateman, C.B. Macpherson, Michael Walzer, and Sheldon Wolin.3 Yet in the past several decades of rapidly growing inequality most radical theorists have focused on the challenge difference poses to democratic societies or how liberal democratic institutions of “governance” engage in the repressive norming of the self. This is not to deny the role that difference plays within a democratic pluralist society, or the intellectual validity of interrogating how dominant institutional norms can constrict individual identity. But the problem that vexed Rousseau, Mill, Marx, and the founders of contemporary democratic theory remains more relevant than ever: how do inequalities in wealth, income, power, and life-opportunity contradict the formal commitment of liberal democracy to the equal moral worth of persons?¶ Given the accentuated role that corporate power and wealth plays in American politics today, why also do few political theorists examine the tension between corporate power and democracy? Not since Charles Lindblom's and Robert Dahl's work in the late 1970s and early 1980s have students of politics focused on the anomalous role of corporations in a democratic society. As Dahl and Lindblom argued, in a democratic society binding decisions should only be granted legitimacy if they are made democratically. Yet corporate management regularly issues edicts that have binding, coercive effects on their employees and society at large.4 Nor have theorists focused on how the weakening of democratic institutions of countervailing power, such as unions and grass-roots social movements, has engendered a formal democracy that is de facto an oligarchy. 5 Recently, mainstream—even behavioral—American politics scholars have investigated the corrosive effects that the fungible nature of wealth into political power has upon democracy, as well as the resulting dominance in decision-making of the political preferences of elites. But recent political theory has been relatively silent on these issues.6¶ By the late 1980s theorists of difference, such as Iris Marion Young and Carol Gilligan, shifted the focus of radical theory from economic democracy to a critique of how one-size-fits-all social policies failed to meet the differential needs of members of particular groups.7 The turn to difference offered important insights for both theorists and activists, as democratic public policies must account for the differential needs of particular individuals and groups. But what the focus on difference sometimes obscured is that the argument that each individual should receive the resources necessary to satisfy their particular human needs still relies upon a universal democratic commitment to the equal standing of all members of society.¶ In contrast to theories of difference, the post-structuralist turn in political theory in part arose as a reaction to fears that identity and difference politics essentialized and homogenized the status of the self within groups.8 Post-structuralism rejected both Rawlsian liberalism's belief in a coherent, rational chooser and identity politics' granting of primacy to the group as the shaper of individual identity. Instead, post-structuralist analysis emphasized the labile, incoherent, shifting nature of a self constituted by, in Judith Butler's terms, the “performative discursive iteration” of social norms.9 Post-structuralist theorists emphasized the agonal nature of politics and the ever-present possibility that the discursive self could “performatively resist” hegemonic norms.10 That is, by refusing to perform according to the social norms that allegedly inscribe the self, individuals could engage in “transgressive” resistance. Ironically, just as allegedly radical theorists discerned the “radical Nietzschean” possibilities of individual resistance, the social and political options of working class individuals and many people of color in the United States were being further constrained by increased social, economic, and political inequality. This focus on individual resistance may have come about—as the literary theorist Terry Eagleton argues—because the forward progress of the left had been reversed by the triumph of Thatcher and Reagan and, thus, theorists lost faith in the possibility of democratic majoritarian political change.11

#### Social solidarity against neoliberalism is the only way to prevent social regression

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Just as the right's growing hegemony from the 1980s onward eroded majoritarian support for progressive taxation and universal public goods, radical theory, through its dominant concerns for difference and transgression, abandoned any intellectual defense of the core democratic value of social solidarity. In the United States today, social solidarity is the forgotten sibling among the troika of democratic values—“liberty, equality, and fraternity”—that suffused the democratic social revolutions from the French Revolution onwards. The concept of “fraternity,” or, in gender neutral terms, “solidarity,” implies that citizens develop a capacity for empathy toward others and for trust in their fellows. Democratic citizens act in solidarity with one another because they recognize that their common project is an interdependent one and thus each member of the community has both a moral and an instrumental interest in assuring a minimal level of well-being for all.¶ For much of the twentieth century the left in capitalist democracies fought to expand social rights out of the belief that radical social inequality eroded the value of equal political and civil rights. If democracy involves the making of binding laws by equal citizens, the left argued, there cannot exist a group of citizens who are so socially excluded that they cannot participate politically. Universal public education emerged with the rise of democracy precisely out of insurgent social movements' concern that all citizens gain a “civic education.” Over time, excluded social groups fought to be included as full citizens; and the expansion of citizen rights to “others”—the essence of social solidarity—continues today in the fight for immigrant rights across the globe. As the work of T.H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi demonstrates, the historic struggle between democratic left and right has revolved around the extent to which social rights—public provision, social insurance, and labor rights—should constrain the inegalitarian outcomes of a market-based economy.23¶ Thus, even the most classically liberal of democratic polities—the United States and the United Kingdom—provide minimal levels of universal insurance against disability, unemployment, and old age. But among developed democracies only the “liberal market” United States and United Kingdom do not provide universal forms of state-funded childcare or child support. This reality enabled the right, in both countries, to deploy racialized “anti-welfare” politics that mobilized a segment of the working class, whose formal market earnings rendered them ineligible for means-tested child support programs, against both strong public provision and the relatively high rates of taxation that regressive tax policies impose upon working families.¶ That is, in the dialectic of democracy and solidarity the bonds of fellowship are not naturally fixed. Democratic social movements frequently struggle to expand the popular conception of who is part of the “we.” Often, in times of national crisis and broad social vulnerability, bonds of solidarity expand and strengthen, as do social policies that insure a universal economic and social floor under which citizens cannot fall. Hence, we associate the expansion of social and labor rights during the New Deal and French Popular Front governments with the shared vulnerability of the Great Depression. The United States' GI Bill and the post-World War II radical expansion of the British welfare state came immediately after a “total war” in which victory depended upon the military and productive contributions of working-class men and women, recent immigrants, and oppressed minorities.¶ Thus far, strong bonds of social solidarity have only been constructed (and also eroded) at the level of the nation state, the community of “we” versus “them.” In addition, radical theory and practice has yet to tackle the difficulty of expanding social rights—and of defending existing ones—during periods of capitalist stagnation and global economic restructuring. This makes even more pressing, but also problematic, the project of expanding solidarity across national borders. Today, the struggle for greater solidarity between the working people of northern Europe and southern Europe will define whether the European project becomes more democratic or fragments on the shoals of anti-solidaristic austerity policies.¶ But the contraction of public provision under neoliberal capitalism is no more natural or inexorable than was its historical expansion. Today, the struggle of undocumented workers for an expeditious path to citizenship should lead normative theorists to revisit arguments as to why political, civil, and social rights should be extended to all those (and their dependents) who contribute productive labor to our society. And at a time when the minimum wage is less than one-half of the real value it had in the 1960s, low-wage service workers—both native-born and immigrants—are beginning to protest their inability to raise a family in dignity on their meager wages. Such protest will likely expand if undocumented immigrants gain secure legal rights. In addition, as the baby boomers come to retirement with inadequate savings and radically underfunded or non-existent pensions, there is likely to be resistance to neoliberal efforts to constrict, rather than expand, Social Security.

#### Thus the alternative—vote negative to reject neoliberalism

#### Solidarity against neoliberalism first is necessary to secure difference while confronting racial, gender and economic domination

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Given how divided the United States is, not only politically, but also geographically and socially on lines of race, class, and citizenship status, democratic theorists perhaps should refocus their energies on defining the role solidarity and equality of standing must play in the construction of a just society. For example, the political conflict likely to define America's political future is how expeditiously undocumented workers and their dependents become full citizens. Unlike some who long for a return to a class-based politics of social solidarity, I am well aware that forms of racial, national, and gender exclusion helped construct past forms of political solidarity.12 Moreover, the working class has never been a truly homogeneous and “universal class”; its identity and consciousness are constructed in complex ways that reflect the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality and the role that ideology and culture play in social life.¶ Yet, absent a revival of a pluralist, majoritarian left it is hard to imagine how difference can be institutionalized in an egalitarian manner. Theorists of difference are, in some ways, blind to the reality that difference (or “diversity”) can be—and is being—institutionalized on a radically inegalitarian social terrain, in which some social groups have much more power and opportunity than others. This blind spot mimics the weaknesses of the liberal pluralist theory that dominated political science in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, radical theorists pointed out that liberal pluralist society failed to be fully democratic because some groups had inordinate economic and political power as compared to their small numbers within the demos.13 Today, the same critique of difference can be made.¶ Post-structuralist theorists' focus on the performative resistance of decentered, mutable selves also fails to recognize that the performative options of working-class individuals, persons of color, women, and gays and lesbians are constrained by the structural distribution of racial, economic, and gendered forms of power. Thus, if the performative options of the vast majority are to be enhanced, left theorists have to recover a politics and practice of solidarity and democratic equality; concepts which neither a pure politics of difference nor an agonal politics of post-structuralist radical democracy can adequately ground.

### The War on Terror

#### Claims that women are peacemakers reinforce biological determinism and devalue women’s intellectual agency.

Watkins, feminist activist, 89

(Gloria Jean, a.k.a. Bell Hooks, YOU KNOW WHO, Talking Back, 1989, p.106)

Advocates of feminism who are concerned about militarism must insist that women (even those who have children) are not inherently more life-affirming or non-violent. Many women who mother are very violent. Many women who mother, either as single parents or with males, have taught male and female children to see fighting and other forms of violent aggression as acceptable modes of communication that are more valued than loving or caring interaction. Even though women often assume a nurturing, life-affirming role in their relationship to others, performing that role does not necessarily mean that they value or respect that mode of relating as much as they may revere the suppression of emotion or the assertion of power through force. Feminists must insist that women who do choose (whether or not they are inspired by motherhood) to denounce violence, domination, and its ultimate expression-war-are political thinkers making political choices. If women who oppose militarism continue to imply, however directly or indirectly, that there is an inherent predisposition in women to hate violence, they risk reinforcing the very biological determinism that has been the ideological stronghold of anti-feminists.

#### Not the right root cause- The reason we go to war in the Middle East is not feminism it is to combat terrorism, it had nothing to do with women. Saudi Arabia totally disproves

**Our definition terrorism makes crucial distinctions – it prevents others from exploiting the War on Terror and increases our ability to combat such violence by shifting the activities to alternate courses, reducing the scope of international terrorism**

**Ganor 01** (Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2001 (Defining Terrorism: "Is One Man's Terrorist Another Mail's Freedom Fighter?")

We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars between organization and a state. The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in. or supporting terrorism, an

d will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims. thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as me "politically correct" one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

Drones are key to global counter-terrorism operations

Byman 13 Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings August (Daniel, “Why Drones Work,” *Foreign Affairs 92*(4), Lexis, Mike)

The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused. Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage. So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid. NOBODY DOES IT BETTER The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and

 the Taliban -- top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is "the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders" and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.

#### Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal 12– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound.

The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

#### Maintance of a friend/enemy distinction is key to truly bracketing war and preventing total wars of annihilation

Odysseos 7, Senior Lecturer of IR at the University of Sussex, [Louiza, “Violence after the State? A Preliminary examination of the Concept of Global Civil War,” Prepared for the 6th Pan-European IR Conference]

The first achievement concerns the aforementioned bracketing and ‘regulation’ of war, which can be traced, I have argued elsewhere, both to the emergence of the state as an agent of rationalisation and ‘detheologisation’ of public life but also to the drawing and maintenance of lines or distinctions (the so-called ‘amity lines’) between European soil and the ‘free space’ of extra- European lands available for appropriation.13 The amity lines set aside two distinct areas considered ‘open spaces’ (Schmitt 2003: 94-95): on the one hand, the landmass of the New World, whose belonging to the native populations was not recognised, and on the other, the newly mapped and navigable seas. In both types of ‘open space’, force could be used freely and ruthlessly as these were areas ‘designated for agonal tests of strength’ amongst European powers (Schmitt 2003: 99). Refreshingly, Schmitt does not deny that this spatial distinction ‘presupposed the consignment of unrestrained violence to the rest of the world’ (Rasch 2005: 258), but it was this which negated the need for expansive war on European soil, and allowed limited war, guerre en forme, to emerge as the norm. In this peculiar way, therefore, the interstate order which existed until 1914 (cf. Nancy 2003b: 51) had sought ‘to prevent wars of annihilation, i.e. to the extent that war was inevitable, to bracket it’ (Schmitt 2003: 246). This was wholly different from later classical and contemporary liberal attempts to abolish or banish war, that is, to end war as such (Joas 2003; Reid 2006). The jus publicum Europaeum recognised that ‘any abolition of war without true bracketing resulted only in new, perhaps even worse types of war, such as reversions to civil war and other types of wars of annihilation’ (Schmitt 2003: 246). It accepted war as an inevitable occurrence of international political order and, in doing so, laid a foundation for ‘a bracketing of war’ which rendered it as ‘a regulated contest of forces gauged by witnesses in a bracketed space. Such wars are the opposite of disorder’ (Schmitt 2003: 187). The acceptance of this type of regulated but limited warfare also enabled the recognition of the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds. This development of the notion of justus hostis (just enemy), associated with the denigration of justa causa (just cause) reasoning in the commencement and waging of war, is the second achievement of this order.14 The concept of an ‘equal and just enemy’ evolved alongside the emergence and consolidation of the modern state as the predominant political entity, as well as the weakening of the moral authority of the Church out of the demise of the respublica Christiana. Under these conditions, warfare became divorced from substantive causes of justice. Since war was the means by which land could change ownership status, it became a type of political relation amongst states (Schmitt 2003: 100). Any enemy which had the form of a state was a just enemy and war could be waged against it. This avoided wars of conviction, creed and religion (that is, based on justa causa) which had historically led to unlimited war seeking the enemy’s annihilation. As he would say almost two decades later, ‘with the bracketing of war, European humanity had achieved something extraordinary: renunciation of the criminalization of the opponent, i.e. the relativization of enmity, the negation of absolute enmity’ (Schmitt 2007: 90). For Schmitt, ‘renouncing the discrimination and defamation of their enemies’ was a significant and rare, in fact, a most ‘human’ development (Schmitt 2004: 64).

### Framing

**Discourse doesn’t shape reality and punishing language undermines real social change**

Matthew **Roskoski and** Joe **Peabody**, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” **1991**, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 10/17/02

Previously, we have argued that the **language advocates** have **erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality**. We have defended the thesis that **reality shapes language, rather than the obverse**. Now we will also contend that **to attempt to solve a problem by editing** the **language** which is symptomatic of that problem **will** generally **trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem.** There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that **we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change.** As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that **restricting language only limits the overt expressions** of any objectionable reality, **while leaving subtle and** hence **more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify,** more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, **and more likely to have its undesirable effect**. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

#### Speech acts don’t spillover – no impact

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

**War makes patriarchy more likely – proves our impact short-circuits the alternative**

**Workman 96**

Thom, Poli Sci @ U of New Brunswick, YCISS Paper no. 31, p. 4, January 1996, http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP31-Workman.pdf

With the loosening of the positivist/Realist hold on international relations and the simultaneous rise of feminist analysis, intellectual space has been created to address war in terms of the social relations of power between men and women. This development places war within a broader patriarchal matrix, and has helped to develop an understanding of war as one (obviously important) manifestation of patriarchal violence. This development also has promoted a more unassuming character with respect to the subject matter itself. The concerns lies less with warfare or its destructive potential (although this concern remains) than it does with the relationship between warfare and the oppression of women. Primary concern, that is, rests less with war than with the reproduction of patriarchy. This paper addresses the gender critique of war directly. It argues that the gender critique of war has racked enough to be able to identify a preliminary thesis regarding war and the reproduction of patriarchy. The altered experiences and practices of war, combined with the sometimes dramatic modifications in gender representations (through propaganda, literature etcetera), are considerable. War produces cultural crises of gender, especially as it throws the historical contingency and cultural arbitrariness of gendered constructs into relief. There is the suggestion that through war traditional gendered constructs can modulate and unwind. An emerging sense of cultural crisis revolving around gender shifts typically accompanies both war and post-war periods. Indeed, much of the initial research on gender and war, in view of the extensive shifts in representations and practices during war, directly or indirectly explores the emancipatory effect of war upon women. To the extent that war is contingent upon such gendered constructs, constructs that the practice itself appears to threaten and endanger, the relationship between war and gender might be said to be paradoxical. The paradoxical dynamic between gender and war, however, is softened by the profundity of the links between war and patriarchy. The gendering of experiences during war, along with the restoration of traditional gendered constructs after war, more than compensate for any war- induced sundering of the patriarchal tapestry. While the practice of war suggests that it might encourage a rupture in the gendered fabric of society, it overwhelmingly contributes to patriarchal reproduction. Questions oriented around the emancipatory potential of war where women are concerned, therefore, run the risk of losing a perspective on the overall role of modern warfare in the reproduction of women's oppression.

**Their patriarchy impacts are contrived, reductionist, essentialist, and fracture resistance – this ev is specific to debate**

**Crenshaw 02** [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, “Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate” 2002 p. 119-126]

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation

 of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the ¶ convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leadsthe judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14

#### Patriarchy’s not the root cause

Bell 06, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University,

(Duncan, “Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory,” *International Affairs* 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the ‘end of history’ and now a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of ‘masculine values’, which are ‘rooted in biology’. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. ‘Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.’ Moreover, the ‘line from chimp to modern man is continuous’ and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative ‘feminized’ zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as ‘masculine policies’ are essential in dealing with a masculine world: ‘In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.’ Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise—free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a particular political objective. This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama’s argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama’s claims about the animal world display ‘a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence’.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender that although biological differences do play a minor role, focusing so heavily on them is profoundly misleading.50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama’s essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics

**There is no way to determine why one standpoint is more important than another, destroys the legitimacy of their alt.**

**Gomm 96, Lecturer in Sociology and Social Policy, Open University**

**[Peter Foster and Roger Gomm and Martyn Hammersley, “Constructing educational inequality”, p 37]**

Standpoint epistemologies also suffer from severe problems. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one category of person has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, yet it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a particular philosophy of history. Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women’s emancipation (Hartsock, 1983. Harding, 1986). However, while we must recognize that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives which give them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology, simply by virtue of their social positions (Merton, 1972).

#### Reality outweighs representations and discourse

**Wendt 99**

Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security at Ohio State University, 1999, “Social theory of international politics,” gbooks

The effects of holding a relational theory of meaning on theorizing about world politics are apparent in David Campbell's provocative study of US foreign policy, which shows how the threats posed by the Soviets, immigration, drugs, and so on, were constructed out of US national security discourse.29 The book clearly shows that material things in the world did not force US decision-makers to have particular representations of them - the picture theory of reference does not hold. In so doing it highlights the discursive aspects of truth and reference, the sense in which objects are relationally "constructed."30 On the other hand, while emphasizing several times that he is not denying the reality of, for example, Soviet actions, he specifically eschews (p. 4) any attempt to assess the extent to which they caused US representations. Thus he cannot address the extent to which US representations of the Soviet threat were accurate or true (questions of correspondence). He can only focus on the nature and consequences of the representations.31 Of course, there is nothing in the social science rule book which requires an interest in causal questions, and the nature and consequences of representations are important questions. In the terms discussed below he is engaging in a constitutive rather than causal inquiry. However, I suspect Campbell thinks that any attempt to assess the correspondence of discourse to reality is inherently pointless. According to the relational theory of reference we simply have no access to what the Soviet threat "really" was, and as such its truth is established entirely within discourse, not by the latter's correspondence to an extra-discursive reality 32 The main problem with the relational theory of reference is that it cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for representational failures or m/'sinterpretations. Worldly resistance is most obvious in nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can't fly. But examples abound in society too. In 1519 Montezuma faced the same kind of epistemological problem facing social scientists today: how to refer to people who, in his case, called themselves Spaniards. Many representations were conceivable, and no doubt the one he chose - that they were gods - drew on the discursive materials available to him. So why was he killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own? The realist answer is that Montezuma was simply wrong: the Spaniards were not gods, and had come instead to conquer his empire. Had Montezuma adopted this alternative representation of what the Spanish were, he might have prevented this outcome because that representation would have corresponded more to reality. The reality of the conquistadores did not force him to have a true representation, as the picture theory of reference would claim, but it did have certain effects - whether his discourse allowed them or not. The external world to which we ostensibly lack access, in other words. often frustrates or penalizes representations. Postmodernism gives us no insight into why this is so, and indeed, rejects the question altogether.33 The description theory of reference favored by empiricists focuses on sense-data in the mind while the relational theory of the postmoderns emphasizes relations among words, but they are similar in at least one crucial respect: neither grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content.34 Both privilege epistemology over ontology. What is needed is a theory of reference that takes account of the contribution of mind and language yet is anchored to external reality. The realist answer is the causal theory of reference. According to the causal theory the meaning of terms is determined by a two-stage process.35 First there is a "baptism/' in which some new referent in the environment (say, a previously unknown animal) is given a name; then this connection of thing-to-term is handed down a chain of speakers to contemporary speakers. Both stages are causal, the first because the referent impressed itself upon someone's senses in such a way that they were induced to give it a name, the second because the handing down of meanings is a causal process of imitation and social learning. Both stages allow discourse to affect meaning, and as such do not preclude a role for "difference" as posited by the relational theory. Theory is underdetermined by reality, and as such the causal theory is not a picture theory of reference. However, conceding these points does not mean that meaning is entirely socially or mentally constructed. In the realist view beliefs are determined by discourse and nature.36 This solves the key problems of the description and relational theories: our ability to refer to the same object even if our descriptions are different or change, and the resistance of the world to certain representations. Mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world.

#### Discourse doesn’t shape reality

Fram-Cohen 85 (Michelle Fram-Cohen 1985 “Reality, Language, Translation” American Translators Association Conference in Miami)

The idea that language is created inside one's mind independently of outside experience eliminates the possibility that the external world is the common source of all languages. But a common source of all languages underlies any attempt to explain the possibility of translation. Chomsky suggests that the common basis of all languages is universal phonetics and semantics, with the result that "certain objects of human thoughts and mentality are essentially invariable across languages." (13) To the best of my knowledge Chomsky did not develop this idea in the direction of explaining the possibility of translation. In contrast, linguist Eugene Nida insists that outside experience is the common basis of all languages when he writes that "each language is different from all other languages in the ways in which the sets of verbal symbol classify the various elements of experience." (14) ida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation.