# PTX DA

#### Restrictions kill PC- Obama’s first term proves other objectives outweigh SOP questions

Ackerman and Hathaway 11 (Bruce and Oona, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 447, lexis)

President Bush had now transformed a war authorized by Congress into a war authorized by the president alone. Gone was Saddam's "continuing" threat to the national security of the United States. Gone were the U.N. Security Council resolutions. In their place, the president presented Congress with a fait accompli - a document that committed the country to fight the war for three more years. n115 But would the new administration go along with this unconstitutional power play? Only months before, Senators Obama, Biden, and Clinton had endorsed a resolution demanding the submission of any new Iraq agreement to Congress for approval. n116 Now that they were president, vice president, and secretary of state, they could make their earlier resolution into reality.¶ As they pondered their next steps, developments in Iraq provided an ironic commentary. The new Iraqi constitution, like our own, required the chief executive to submit the bilateral agreements to the country's parliament for ratification. In stark contrast to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki followed constitutional requirements, providing the Iraq assembly with an opportunity to deliberate upon and approve the bilateral agreement. n117 Did Iraq's embryonic democracy have an important constitutional lesson to teach the oldest democracy in the world? n118¶ [\*475] While campaigning for the presidency, Senators Obama and Clinton appeared to think so. But on January 20th, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton silently acquiesced in their predecessor's usurpation of congressional authority. They made no public effort to reconcile this decision with their previous protests. Their silent acceptance of Bush's agreement with Iraq - effectively ratifying it - had obvious political advantages: when Obama announced his determination to withdraw combat troops by August 2010, Republicans were in no position to denounce the administration's plans as tantamount to surrender, for the pronouncement was consistent with the plan announced in the agreement negotiated by President Bush. n119¶ Congress joined in this act of collective amnesia - with politics, once again, serving as the obvious motivation. The Democrats in control of both houses had better things to do than embarrass their new president with constitutional objections to the ongoing military effort in Iraq. They were preparing themselves for the coming struggle over the stimulus package, health care reform, financial reform, and other high-priority initiatives. No one was prepared to fight for Congress's right to approve an agreement that was already in place and was serving as the basis of the country's war in Iraq.¶ Nor were minority Republicans inclined to act as the nation's constitutional conscience. This would not only involve a direct attack on Bush's earlier actions. It would (implicitly) suggest that President Obama had the constitutional prerogative to repudiate the Bush agreement and opt for a speedier pullout in Iraq - a policy few if any Republicans in Congress supported.¶ Political imperatives were now trumping the institutional logic of the separation of powers. n120 Both political parties had an interest in allowing President Obama to silently ratify President Bush's transformation of a limited war into an unlimited conflict. With no one contesting the matter, the media failed to note the odd disjunction posed by Iraq's turn to parliamentary participation and Washington's embrace of executive unilateralism.

Debt ceiling will be raised now

Przybyla, 9/24 [Heidi, Bloomberg, “Republicans Debt-Ceiling Strategy Relies on Obama Budget,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/republicans-debt-ceiling-strategy-relies-on-obama-budget.html>, ALB]

Senate

Democrats including Senate Budget Committee Chairman Patty Murray predict Republicans will capitulate rather than allow a default. Obama won’t “under any circumstances” negotiate on the debt limit, spokesman Jay Carney said yesterday.¶ Obama has said he’s willing to negotiate to reduce entitlement costs. In his most recent budget plan, he proposed reducing Medicare spending by $371 billion over 10 years by taking money from provider groups including hospitals, managed-care plans and nursing homes. Health care and entitlement costs account for 43 percent of the U.S. budget.¶ Obama’s fiscal 2014 blueprint also proposes saving $50 billion over a decade by requiring the wealthy to pay more for their Medicare Part B and Part D coverage starting in 2017.¶ Republican Priorities¶ The House-led effort to strip funding from Obamacare, headed for defeat in the Senate, has obscured Republicans’ priorities of reining in mandatory spending, Cornyn said.¶ Even with Obama’s refusal to negotiate, there is room for compromise on the debt measure, said Senator Amy Klobuchar.¶ “There will be an agreement, and I think we can do it without any of these extraneous, partisan poison pills,” the Minnesota Democrat said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on Sept. 22.¶ Murray, who also led a 2011 supercommittee on debt reduction, said there can be no real negotiating as long as the Tea Party is singularly focused on defunding Obamacare. “If there is a fair and balanced path forward,” she said, “I’m on board, but it’s not going to include eliminating Obamacare.”¶ Small Scale¶ Senator Mike Crapo, an Idaho Republican and member of a separate debt-negotiating group, said a small-scale bargain targeting entitlement spending is possible once wrangling over Obamacare ends.¶ “The only place you can be incremental at this point is in entitlement reform,” Crapo said. Revisions to the U.S. tax code must be made in a comprehensive way, and the Congress has already cut other federal programs to historic lows, he said.

**PC is key**

Kuhnhenn, 9/9 [Jim, “Syria, budget could become Obama’s make-or-break issues,” <http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_24046750/syria-budget-could-become-obamas-make-or-break>, ALB]¶

The tasks stacking up before President Barack Obama over the coming weeks will test his persuasive powers and his mobilizing skills more than at any other time in his presidency.¶ How well Obama handles the challenges could determine whether he leads from a position of strength or whether he becomes a lame duck one year into his second term.¶ Between now and the end of October, Obama must persuade wary lawmakers that they should grant him authority to take military action against Syria; take on Congress in an economy-rattling debate over spending and the nation's borrowing limit; and oversee a crucial step in putting in place his prized health care law.¶

Failure to act on the debt ceiling collapses the economy-Multiple internal links

Swagel, 9/4 [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]

A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects. Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence. With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent.

#### Best studies prove economic collapse causes war

**Royal 10** (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from **economic decline**, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

# PP DA

#### Unique LINK—Obama is massively expanding Presidential War Powers Now—Plan is a unique reversal of that trend.

Friedersdorf, 9-12-13 [Obama Acts Like He Doesn't Know He's an Executive-Power Extremist On the fake moderation of a president who talks a good game but doesn't follow through CONOR FRIEDERSDORF SEP 12 2013 is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/ 09/obama-acts-like-he-doesnt-know-hes-an-executive-power-extremist/279583/]

It's often hard to tell if President Obama is lying to the American people or to himself. Is he willfully misrepresenting who he is? Or is he blind to his true self? Over the last five years he has repudiated many of the positions he took in 2008, but still talks like and perhaps likes to think of himself as the man who ran on change. A passage from his Tuesday speech on Syria provides a striking example. The relevant passage -- an aside on executive power -- comes just after the president explains that he favors a strike on Syria to deter the use of chemical weapons (emphasis added): That's my judgment as commander-in-chief. But I’m also the president of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. So even though I possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress. I believe our democracy is stronger when the president acts with the support of Congress. And I believe that America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together. This is especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president, and more and more burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force. What a fascinating paragraph! Even as Obama implies that he is a circumspect steward of constitutional democracy, he asserts that even absent "a direct or imminent threat," he has absolute power to wage war without congressional support, the Constitution and the opinions of the demos be damned. If the passage ended there it would be staggering in its internal tension. As Jack Goldsmith explained in detail, intervening in Syria without congressional sign-off would "push presidential war unilateralism beyond where it has gone before." Asserting that power without using it is still an extreme position to take.¶ Obama goes a delusion farther. Ostensibly because he hasn't yet intervened, even though he repeatedly and needlessly asserts his right to do so unilaterally, he casts himself as moving away from unilateralism and toward consulting Congress. The benefits are "especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president," he notes, "while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force."¶ The grammer is priceless. Who "put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president"? In Obama's telling, "a decade" put the executive power there.¶ The absence of a human subject in the sentence isn't hard to figure out. For all President George W. Bush's faults, he sought and received majority support for the Patriot Act, the September 2001 AUMF, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq. Obama's expansion of the drone war and his illegal war-making in Libya didn't turn out as bad as Iraq, so it's hard to see him as a worse president, but Obama has done more than Bush to expand the war-making power of the White House. As for "sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force," it's Obama who went into Libya despite the fact that a House vote to approve U.S. involvement was brought to the floor and voted down.¶ Yet Obama complains about these trends as if someone other than Obama is responsible for them, and as if he has been and remains powerless to do more to reverse them. When Obama asked Congress to vote in Syria, no one forced him to insist that he had the power to intervene militarily even if a legislative vote declared otherwise. No one forced him to defend the extreme position that the presidential war power is so sweeping that it includes waging wars of choice rejected by Congress that don't involve any direct or imminent threat to the United States. ¶ He went out of his way to defend that maximal precedent, even as gave us the impression that he was trying to rein in executive power that he claims to find regrettable and worrisome. It's all consistent with Obama's favorite rhetorical tactic: granting the validity of an objection in his rhetoric, then totally ignoring the objection in his actions. In so doing, he confuses public discourse and subverts debate. We know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions. He believes the president has the power to intervene militarily without Congress in places that do not threaten America; that he can order American citizens killed in secret without due process; that he can secretly collect data on the phone calls of all Americans; that he can invoke the state-secrets privilege to avoid adjudicating constitutional challenges to his policies on their merits; that he can indefinitely detain prisoners without evidence, charges or due process, that he can sit in judgment of anyone on earth, then send a drone anywhere to strike them.¶ Yes, we know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions, that there are many steps to rein in executive power that he could take but hasn't taken ... and that he worries repeatedly about an excess of executive power in his rhetoric. What we don't know is the reason for this disconnect. After all, this ain't like Gitmo. If he really wanted to do more to shrink executive power, he could do a lot unilaterally, and no one could stop him. Is he trying to fool us? Or is he fooling himself, because he likes to think of himself as more prudent and moderate man than he is? Can he not bear the truth that he's a Cheneyite extremist\*? My best guess is that he's trying to fool us. But it's hard to know for sure.¶ \*It would be fascinating to look at the many issues on which Bush-Cheney and Obama take the same position, and compare how many times each was referred to in the media as "out of the mainstream," a phrase that faded fast circa January 2009.

#### Presidential leadership is key to arms reduction and preventing US-Russia-China war

Daryl G. Kimball, 12-4-12 (Executive Director of the Arms Control Association , “Obama Underscores Need for Further Progress to Reduce Nuclear Dangers”, Armscontrolnow.org)

In addition to renewing the framework agreement for cooperation with Russia and other states to secure vulnerable WMD stockpiles from terrorists, President Obama must seize his second term opportunity to reduce the nuclear dangers in other areas:**¶** Ending Cold War Thinking. In Prague in 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to “end Cold War thinking” and further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Following the modest but important New START treaty, the White House must follow through by implementing a saner, “nuclear deterrence only” strategy outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. As the President said in a March 2012 speech:¶ “My Administration’s nuclear posture recognizes that the massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited for today’s threats, including nuclear terrorism. Last summer, I therefore directed my national security team to conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces. That study is still underway.”¶ “But even as we have more work to do, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.”¶ To make the necessary changes in the old nuclear war plan, Obama should eliminate outdated targeting assumptions developed decades ago to deplete an opponent’s war-fighting assets after the outbreak of hostilities rather than to ensure there is a sufficient retaliatory capability to deter nuclear attack in the first place.¶ He should also seek to lower current requirements for how much damage must be accomplished to ensure that a target is destroyed. To deter a nuclear attack, adversaries need only realize the United States is capable of reducing key targets to radioactive rubble rather than a fine dust.¶ These changes in U.S. nuclear strategy could open the way for further U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear reductions — to no more than 1,000 deployed nuclear warheads each. Even with 500 warheads on survivable delivery systems, the United States would still have more than enough nuclear firepower to deter nuclear attack by the other or by any other current or future nuclear adversary.¶ Cutting Bloated U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals. As a new report from the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Panel suggests, with New START verification tools in place, reciprocal U.S.-Russian cuts, including new transparency measures on tactical nuclear weapons, need not wait for a formal, new, follow-on treaty.¶ And by signaling he is prepared to accelerate reductions and move U.S. forces below the 1,550 deployed strategic warhead ceiling of New START, the U.S. president could induce the Kremlin to build down rather than build up its forces. This would help reduce the enormous cost of planned strategic force modernization by both countries in the coming years. Such actions would put pressure on China to abandon its slow increase in nuclear forces and open the door for serious multilateral disarmament discussions.**¶** And as Stephen Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon write in the December issue of Arms Control Today, the two sides can and should also begin talks on a new comprehensive nuclear reductions treaty that leads to further verifiable reductions in all types of warheads — strategic, nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed.¶ Moving the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Forward. Twenty years after its last nuclear test, the United States no longer needs or wants a resumption of testing. Yet by failing to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Washington has denied itself and others the treaty’s full security benefits. U.S. ratification is essential to bring other hold-out states on board and to move closer to full entry into force.¶ Since the beginning of his first term, President Barack Obama and senior administration officials have consistently expressed support for the pursuit of U.S. reconsideration and ratification of the treaty. In April 2009 he called for U.S. reconsideration and ratification of the CTBT. In March 2012, Obama reaffirmed that commitment and said: “… my administration will continue to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”¶ Today the case for U.S. approval of the CTBT is stronger than it has ever been. Moving forward and gaining the necessary 67 Senate votes in support of ratification of the CTBT remains difficult, but is within reach with strong presidential leadership and a serious, sustained bipartisan review of the issues.¶ Its time for the President to follow-through on the CTBT.¶ With his national security team in flux and occupied with tough security challenges–from Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, to upcoming talks on Iran’s nuclear program, to North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions–it is essential that the President appoint a senior, high-level White House coordinator or a high-level task force to push the ratification campaign along. As far back as 2000, thoughtful CTBT advocates, including Gen. John Shalikashvili, have called for “a sustained interagency effort to address senators’ questions and concerns” on the CTBT and other nonproliferation issues.¶ With the CTBT in force, the established nuclear-weapon states would not be able to proof-test new nuclear warhead designs, newer nuclear nations would find it far more difficult to build more-advanced warhead types, and emerging nuclear states would encounter greater obstacles in fielding a reliable arsenal. U.S. action on the CTBT is urgently needed to help head off future nuclear arms competition, particularly in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.¶ A Lasting Legacy¶ By taking these bold steps, President Obama could significantly reduce global nuclear dangers, reinforce the beleaguered nuclear nonproliferation system, and establish a lasting international nuclear security legacy. Among other benefits, this would build support for tougher enforcement actions regarding states, such as Iran and North Korea, that fail to meet their safeguards obligations, and build pressure on other nuclear-armed states to contribute more to the goal of realizing a world without nuclear weapons.¶ As President John F. Kennedy suggested five decades ago, we must work faster and harder to abolish nuclear weapons before they abolish us. In the months ahead, President Obama can and should seize the leadership opportunity to further reduce the nuclear threat.

#### US-Russian war causes extinction

**FRUMKIN AND HELFAND 2012** (Howard Frumkin, MD, DrPH, School of Public Health, University of Washington; Ira Helfand, MD, Physicians for Social Responsibility, “A Prescription for Survival: Prevention of Nuclear War,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine, March, Science Direct)

The arsenals of India and Pakistan are of particular concern given their size—approximately 80 warheads each—and the ongoing tension between these two states. Recent studies have shown that if only 100 of the weapons in their combined arsenals were used in a war targeting population centers, 20 million people would die in the first few hours in the firestorms that would engulf the great cities of the subcontinent, and vast areas would be contaminated with deadly radioactive fallout. In addition, the firestorms would loft some 5 million tons of soot and dust into the upper atmosphere, dropping temperatures across the globe an average of 1.25° C and reducing precipitation worldwide, with both these effects lasting up to a decade. [16] and [17] There have been no detailed studies yet on the effect of this climate disruption on agriculture and human nutrition, but there is reason to fear that it could cause a global famine of historic proportions.

The increasing danger posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has prompted a growing group of senior defense experts to call for urgent new steps to eliminate nuclear weapons. In January of 2007 Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn declared: “Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.”18

**Still**, it is not the arsenals of these new nuclear powers that pose the greatest danger**. Ninety-five percent** of the nuclear weapons in the world today remain in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. Even under the New START Treaty, they are each allowed to keep 1550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, thousands of nondeployed weapons, and all of their nonstrategic warheads. A 2002 study showed that if only 300 of the weapons in the Russian arsenal were targeted at U.S. cities, 70 to 100 million people would die. In addition, the attack would destroy the communications and transportation networks and the rest of the social infrastructure on which modern societies depend. Over the following months, the majority of the population not killed in the initial attack would die of starvation, exposure, and disease. The U.S. counterattack on Russia would cause the same level of devastation there.19

As in the case of a regional nuclear war in South Asia, the direct effects of this large-scale nuclear war would be only a small part of the picture. If the full strategic arsenal allowed under New START were drawn into the conflict, the resulting firestorms in the U.S. and Russia would loft more than150 million tons of debris into the upper atmosphere. In a matter of **days**, temperatures would plummet across the globe by an average of 8° C. In the interior regions of North America and Eurasia, temperatures would fall as much as 30° C. In the temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere there would not be a **single day** free of frost for 3 years. [20] and [21] Agriculture would stop, and ecosystems would collapse. The vast majority of the human race would starve to death, and it is possible that **homo sapiens could become extinct**.

# XO CP

#### Executive actors solve restrictions and oversight, enable independent review, and are the only way to avoid leaking intel

Radsan and Murphy 2011 (Afsheen and Richard, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, MEASURE TWICE, SHOOT ONCE:¶ HIGHER CARE FOR¶ CIA-TARGETED KILLING, http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/4/Murphy.pdf)

There are other candidates to conduct independent review. Executive¶ officials, to be sure, are not as independent as federal judges. These¶ officials have a natural impulse to avoid embarrassing the administration¶ they work for. Moreover, if the media are correct that CIA Director¶ Leon Panetta approves drone strikes,181 then this review goes toward the¶ most senior officials in the intelligence community. Despite these challenges,¶ there is at least one official with a measure of independence for¶ meaningful review of CIA drone strikes. The CIA’s Inspector General (IG) is charged with investigating the¶ legality of CIA actions.182 He or she is experienced with protecting classified¶ information. His or her independence is protected by a statute that¶ permits only the president to remove the IG.183 And he or she has a dual¶ reporting line to the CIA Director and to the congressional oversight¶ committees.184 The CIA’s IG is thus our preferred candidate.¶ The CIA’s IG should review all the CIA’s targeted killings for reasoned¶ decision making. Based on this review, an IG could recommend¶ internal discipline, compensation to unwarranted victims of a strike, or,¶ in an extreme case of abuse, referral to the Department of Justice for¶ criminal proceedings. The IG should also be involved in reviewing the¶ CIA’s internal procedures on target selection and execution of attacks.¶ IG’s due process, so to speak, substitutes for what otherwise might come¶ from the courts. To enhance accountability, the IG could prepare public¶ reports detailing as much information on strikes as reasonably consonant¶ with national security. Such reports would need to balance the interests¶ of accountability against the CIA’s need to enable foreign governments¶ to keep their role in assisting U.S. intelligence a secret. They would also¶ need to avoid excessive revelations of sensitive sources and methods.¶ Given the limited number of CIA strikes, the dangers this program¶ poses to peaceful civilians now and in the future, and the extensive data¶ concerning each strike, it is feasible for the IG to conduct an investigation¶ of all CIA drone strikes. These investigations will not guarantee¶ perfection. Nothing can. But they will help ensure the accuracy and the¶ legality of strikes, curb abuses, and provide a modicum of accountability¶ for a shadow war. Because they are feasible under the laws of war, IHL¶ requires them.

# T

#### Interpretation- “Targeted killing” means extra-judicial, premeditated killing of a specific individual not in government custody

Radsan and Murphy 2010 (Afsheen and Richard, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF¶ TERRORISTS, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 405 2009-2010)

The Yemeni strike provides a dramatic example of "targeted**¶** killing," defined here as extra-judicial, premeditated killing by a state of¶ a specifically identified person not in its custody. States have used this¶ tool-secretly or not-throughout history.5 In recent years, targeted¶ killing has generated new controversy as two states in particular-Israel¶ and the United States-struggle against opponents embedded in civilian¶ populations. Israel expressly adopted targeted killing against Palestinian militants in the West Bank and Gaza.6 Less expressly, the¶ United States adopted a similar policy against al Qaeda-particularly in¶ the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.7 In January 2009, a U.S.¶ official claimed that an intensified campaign of CIA Predator strikes¶ into Pakistan had killed eight out of al Qaeda's top twenty leaders. 8¶ President Obama, on his third full day of office, authorized two more¶ strikes, embracing President Bush's policies at least to some degree.9¶ Since then, many additional Predator strikes have been reported. 10¶ Targeted killings, whether ordered by Republicans or Democrats,¶ provide a demoralized public with some tangible evidence that¶ democracies are tough enough to strike at suspected terrorists, to kill¶ before we are killed. Any backlash overseas is a different story.

#### They can’t be *combat* operations, only single-target kills

Ulrich 2005 (Jonathan, JD from UVA law, The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the¶ President's Authority to Order Targeted¶ Killing in the War Against Terrorism, 45 Va. J. Int'l L. 1029 2004-2005)

The principle of discrimination, which demands that parties to a¶ conflict direct their operations against only combatants and military¶ objectives, goes hand-in-hand with military necessity. By its very¶ nature, the targeting of specific terrorists singles out those individuals**¶** helping to further the enemy's efforts. In this setting, the proper**¶** identification of the person within the cross-hairs is a prerequisite to the**¶** application of force; indiscriminate aggression is never an element of¶ targeted killing. Consequently, this calculated, precise use of lethal¶ force readily complies with the

#### Violation- “offensive uses of drones” includes COMBAT operations- not just targeted killing

RT 2013 (US combat drones to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014, http://rt.com/news/us-drones-afghanistan-2014-360/)

Though the US military continues its drawdown from Afghanistan, long after combat troops are gone by the end of the 2014, one factor that will remain the same is the presence of American combat drones.¶ Air Force Major General H.D. Polumbo, the commander of the joint US-NATO air war over Afghanistan, confirmed to reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday that armed drones will still fly over Afghanistan, along with some fixed-wing fighters and bombers.¶ “They can collect intelligence, but they also are armed. And they’re armed to be able to provide force protection to our coalition forces and then when our coalition ground force commanders, when they deem it appropriate, they can control that air-delivered munition capability from the RPAs to be put in support of the Afghans,” according to Maj. Gen. Polumbo.¶ Drones patrolling Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain have become ubiquitous with America’s presence in the country. According to the United Nations’ mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the number of drone strikes rose quite sharply in 2012 to 506, compared to 294 the year before.

#### Reasons to vote-

#### Limits and precision- “targeted killing” does NOT mean “drones”- all of our disads are based on certain kinds of drone operations and particular practices the literature discusses- they justify affs which restrict any military technology in any way they want

#### Extra T- even if they affect targeted killing, affecting other operations gives them inflated solvency and forces us to win T to get back to square one- independent voting issue

# Case

# Pakistan

#### Strikes don’t cause instability

Boyle 13 [Michael J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>, ALB]\*\*we reject any offensive language used in this evidence

For example, the government of Pakistan has been ambivalent about ¶ drone strikes, condemning them in some cases but applauding their results in ¶ others. Much has been made of the extent to which the Pakistani government ¶ has offered its ‘tacit consent’ for the US drone strikes on its territory. The US ¶ has been willing to provide details on drone strikes after the fact, but has refrained ¶ from providing advance warning of an attack to the Pakistani government for fear ¶ that the information might leak. Pakistan has been operationally compliant with ¶ drone strikes and has not ordered its air force to shoot down drones in Pakistani ¶ airspace. Despite official denials, it has been revealed that the Pakistani government has permitted the US to launch drones from at least one of its own airbases.80¶

#### The concept of failed states as dangerous is not based on reality rather on a subconscious desire to reinstate colonialism

**Morton 5** (Adam David**,** School of Politics @ Univ. of Nottingham, ‘5 [Sept, New Political Economy 10.3, “The ‘Failed State’ of International Relations,” muse])

This policy-making approach represents a **pathological view** of conditions in postcolonial states as characterised by deviancy, aberration and breakdown from the norms of Western statehood.10 It is a view perhaps most starkly supported in the scholarly community by Robert Kaplan’s vision of the ‘coming anarchy’ in West Africa as a predicament that will soon confront the rest of the world. In his words: The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.11 Hence a presumed reversion ‘to the Africa of the Victorian atlas’, which ‘consists now of a series of coastal trading posts . . . and an interior that, owing to violence, and disease, is again becoming . . . “blank” and “unexplored”’.12 Similarly, Samuel Huntington has referred to ‘a global breakdown of law and order, failed states, and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world’, yielding a ‘global Dark Ages’ about to descend on humanity. The threat here is characterised as a resurgence of non-Western power generating conflictual civilisational faultlines. For Huntington’s supposition is that ‘the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc . . . from the bulge of Africa to central Asia . . . has bloody borders’ and ‘bloody innards’.13 In the similar opinion of Francis Fukuyama: Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke huma- nitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbours. Since September 11, it also has been clear that they shelter international terrorists who can do significant damage to the United States and other developed countries.14 Finally, the prevalence of warlords, disorder and anomic behaviour is regarded by Robert Rotberg as the primary causal factor behind the proliferation of ‘failed states’. The leadership faults of figures such as Siakka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaı ̈re), Siad Barre (Somalia) or Charles Taylor (Liberia) are therefore condemned. Again, though, the analysis relies on an internalist account of the ‘process of decay’, of ‘shadowy insurgents’, of states that exist merely as ‘black holes’, of ‘dark energy’ and ‘forces of entropy’ that cast gloom over previous semblances of order.15 Overall, within these representations of deviancy, aberration and breakdown, there is a significant signalling function contained within the metaphors: of darkness, emptiness, blankness, decay, black holes and shadows. There is, then, a dominant view of postcolonial states that is imbued with the imperial representations of the past based on a discursive economy that renews a focus on the postcolonial world as a site of danger, anarchy and disorder. In response to such dangers, Robert Jackson has raised complex questions about the extent to which international society should intervene in ‘quasi-’ or ‘failed states’ to restore domestic conditions of security and freedom.16 Indeed, he has entertained the notion of some form of international trusteeship for former colonies that would control the ‘chaos and barbarism from within’ such ‘incorrigibly delinquent countries’ as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti and Sudan with a view to establishing a ‘reformation of decolonisation’.17 Andrew Linklater has similarly stated that ‘the plight of the quasi-state may require a bold experiment with forms of international government which assume temporary responsibility for the welfare of vulnerable populations’.18 In the opinion of some specialists, this is because ‘such weak states are not able to stand on their own feet in the international system’.19 Whilst the extreme scenario of sanctioning state failure has been contemplated, the common response is to rejuvenate forms of international imperium through global governance structures.20 Backers of a ‘new humanitarian empire’ have therefore emerged, proposing the recreation of semi-permanent colonial relationships and the furtherance of Western ‘universal’ values, and, in so doing, echoing the earlier mandatory system of imperial rule**.**21 In Robert Keohane’s view, ‘future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described both as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited’.22

#### No impact—regional adaptation

**Bandow 9** – Senior Fellow @ Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (11/31/09, Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10924)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the **least likely outcome** is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling.

Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the **neighborhood can adapt and resist**." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### No loose nukes

**Koring 2009** [PAUL, Globe and Mail, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal safe, security experts say,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-safe-security-experts-say/article1325820/]

Pakistan's nuclear-weapons security is modeled on long-standing safeguards developed by the major powers and includes **separately storing** the physical components needed for a nuclear warhead and keeping them **apart and heavily guarded**. "Even if insurgents managed to get a fully assembled weapon, they would lack the 'secret decoder ring' [the special security codes] needed to arm it," Mr. Pike said. Thought to possess a relatively modest nuclear arsenal of between 70 and 100 warheads, Pakistan is even more secretive about its security measures than most nuclear-weapons states. But even if those measures were somehow breached, Mr. Pike said, even a complete nuclear weapon would be a limited threat in the hands of terrorists. "If they did try to hot-wire it to explode in the absence of knowing the approved firing sequences, it would probably only trigger the high-explosives, making a jim-dandy of a dirty bomb," he said, referring to an explosion that spreads radioactive material over a small area, but is **not a nuclear blast.**

#### Coup won’t go nuclear

Kampani 99 (Gaurav, Research Associate – CNS, “The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia”, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/gaurav.htm)

Fears that the coup could leave Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the military's hands, unfettered by civilian control, are largely unfounded. The degree of actual civilian participation in Pakistan's nuclear decision-making has always been limited. In Pakistan, the military has been responsible for major decisions on defense, security, and nuclear issues. The civilian governments have participated in the process, but only in a supportive role. Pakistani observers also doubt whether any civilian government would have had access to such information as the precise number of nuclear warheads that Pakistan has in its inventory, nuclear storage sites, number of delivery vehicles, operational readiness, existing fissile material stocks, future production rates, command and control chain, future plans on the architecture of the nuclear deterrent, and so forth. (3)

#### Zero risk of Indo-Pak war

Butcher 10 (Bill, “India, Pakistan, the Bomb, and ‘Limited War,’” June 25, <http://subversify.com/2010/06/25/india-pakistan-the-bomb-and-limited-war/>, Mike)

Then, secondly, a nuclear deterrent is only effective if there’s a real threat of its being used. Even if the Indian deterrent was reliable and reliably deliverable, it would be useless for the following reasons: 1. The countries are too damned close together. This isn’t a trivial problem. Most Pakistani cities are only a short distance, relatively speaking, from the border. Depending on the season, the winds blow either from west to east (in winter) or east to west (in summer). So, in winter, fallout from Indian bombs exploded over Pakistan would be blown back into India, and – in summer – Pakistan would get its own bomb’s radiation blown back over its own territory. While Pakistan might compensate by bombing targets deeper inside India, we wouldn’t have that luxury. So for at least half the year we’d be poisoning ourselves by nuking Pakistan. 2. As I wrote here, the centres of Indian economic and political power are all concentrated in North and West India, specifically in Delhi and Bombay (Mumbai). Therefore a nuclear exchange would wipe out the Indian economic and political establishment. Make no mistake about this – the elite do not wish to commit literal, economic or political suicide. Therefore there will be no nuclear exchange – whatever the provocation. 3. Pakistan is now a vital state to the United States because of the ongoing and failing occupation of Afghanistan. Since the US now has virtually complete control over Indian decision-making, and will learn of any “secret” Indian decisions virtually as soon as they are made, it will move fast and hard to stop any ideas of an Indian nuclear strike. 4. Indian Muslims are electorally significant to the non-Hindunazi parties. A very large number of them have relatives across the border, and won’t relish the idea of those relatives being incinerated under a mushroom cloud. I admit it’s a minor reason, but it’s still a reason. 5. And since the countries are so very close together, the flight times of missiles will be very short and it will be almost impossible to counter them by some kind of anti-missile shield. Therefore, the cities are virtual pushovers. You’ll notice that in all this I am talking primarily of India use of nukes on Pakistan and not vice-versa; that’s because I’m assuming Pakistan has no intention, as the weaker nation, of committing suicide by launching a nuclear war. Only in case of an all-out war where the existence of its nuclear arsenal is under threat is it likely to be the first to launch nukes. All in all, we can dismiss the possibility of a nuclear war.

#### Their arguments rest of flawed realist depictions of India and Pakistan—Makes the conflict inevitable

Mutti 9—Spent a year in India as a Fullbright Fellow. Over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Demockracy journal Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent, http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/)

Writer Amitav Ghosh divined a crucial connection between the two messages. “When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11, they are in effect pushing the Indian government to mount a comparable response.” Indeed, India’s opposition Hindu nationalist BJP has blustered, “Our response must be close to what the American response was.” Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.”¶ As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war.¶ Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war:¶ 1. For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes.¶ The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so.¶ 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries.¶ 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat to Pakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not.

State strength is a western concept used to justify intervention.

Nizamani 2008 (Haider, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, 2k [The roots of rhetoric: politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, p. 8)

Imagine something exactly opposite to the above narrative and what we have is a “strong” (read Western) state. Therefore, “strong states contain characteristics opposite of those found in weak states, as well as others.”32 Hence, “in most modern industrial societies…there is a consensus that the purpose of governance is to help provide ‘the good’ life for the individual,” where power rotates among different social groups, “and no group faces systematic persecution or denial of civil liberties and political office.”33 Even if the existing practices of the Western societies were taken as fixed givens, the discriminatory exclusion of lesbian and gay communities— the group that comes immediately to mind—in the United States through systematic laws against same-sex marriages provides a marked contradiction to the above claim. The point is not to find faults with what are ideally described as the characteristics of “strong states.” It suffices to say that the yardstick of measuring is firmly fixed with reference to the assumed practices of the contemporary Western states.34

#### Their arguments rest of flawed realist depictions of India and Pakistan—Makes the conflict inevitable

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# Terrorism

#### No impact to terrorism

**Mueller and Steward 12** (John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf)

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

Drones are key to global counter-terrorism operations

Byman Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings August 2013 (Daniel, “Why Drones Work,” *Foreign Affairs 92*(4), Lexis, Mike)

The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

NOBODY DOES IT BETTER

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban -- top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is "the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders" and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.

Ant-drone backlash is small and inevitable

Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, “Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington's Weapon of Choice”, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

Doesn’t help AQAP

Watts 12 (Clinton Watts is a Senior Analyst with the Navanti Group and a Senior Fellow at The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI). He is also a former U.S. Army Officer and former Special Agent with the FBI. Frank J. Cilluffo is the Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington University., 6/21/2012, "Drones in Yemen: Is the U.S. on Target?", www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf)

AQAP’s persistence arises not only from internal instability in Yemen but even more from exogenous forces leading this al Qaeda affiliate to be bolstered above all others. Critics of drone strikes myopically focus on this tactic as the singular cause for AQAP’s ascension. Drone strikes at most provide only a peripheral and recent motivation for the growth of a terrorist affiliate that has been aggressively attempting to expand over the past five years. Several phenomena occurring outside Yemen’s borders have been the primary catalyst for AQAP’s emergence. First, foreign fighter records captured by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007 indicated that Yemeni foreign fighters were the second most likely to choose to be “fighters” rather than “martyrs” when they arrived in Iraq. This data point signaled the intent of some Yemeni al Qaeda members in Iraq to return home should they survive Iraqi battlefields. By 2008, the U.S. “Surge” strategy took effect and foreign fighter flows slowed and largely reversed from Iraq. In turn, terrorist attack data from 2008 showed Yemen as the second highest country for terrorist attacks outside of Iraq and Afghanistan suggesting seasoned Yemeni foreign fighters from Iraq may have returned to wage jihad in their homeland.7 Second, in 2005-2006, Saudi Arabia initiated a major counterterrorism clampdown on AQAP operatives pushing many veteran, Saudi al Qaeda members into Yemen where they helped form AQAP’s second incarnation in 2009.8 Young Saudi men have long filled the ranks of al Qaeda and its affiliates, and Saudi Arabia’s persistent tamping down of internal al Qaeda threats creates terrorist bleedover in nearby Yemen. Third, prior to his death, Bin Laden began searching for a new safe haven for relocating his battered operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As noted by Gabriel Koehler Derrick in recent analysis of the Abbottabad documents declassified in May 2012, Bin Laden envisioned Yemen, “either as a “safe haven” for jihadists or a “reserve” force for al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan or Iraq.” Of all al Qaeda affiliates, Yemen provided the best venue for those al Qaeda operatives (particularly those from the Arabian Peninsula) seeking shelter from U.S. counterterrorism efforts.9 Fourth, Yemen provides Bin Laden and al Qaeda a safe haven more proximate to their essential base of financial support – wealthy Persian Gulf donors. Being bled by middlemen and the endless amount of protection money needed to sustain safe harbor in Pakistan, Bin Laden likely saw Yemen as a more efficient and effective location for securing resources. With his death, financial support for al Qaeda in Pakistan has decreased substantially and many believe that the remaining stream of al Qaeda donor support now flows to AQAP in Yemen, not al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan.10Even a slight increase in donor support in the wake of Bin Laden’s death would further empower AQAP. Finally, foreign fighters that once would have flocked to Iraq (2005-2007) or Afghanistan (2008-2010) now likely see more opportunity for jihad by migrating to Yemen. While the foreign fighter flow to Yemen represents merely a trickle of what al Qaeda’s recruitment was at its height, AQAP in Yemen likely provides the most appealing option for joining an official affiliate of the al Qaeda movement – especially for those potential recruits in the Arabian Peninsula. Keep in mind that military actions, including the use of drones, have made travel to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) less appealing and less hospitable to foreign fighters. These successful U.S. military activities have had significant operational effects on al Qaeda and its affiliates by disrupting pipelines, and they serve as a strong deterrent to future al Qaeda activities in the FATA.11In parallel to the many exogenous factors strengthening AQAP over the past five years, Yemen’s instability and intermittent military commitment to fighting AQAP has provided ample opportunity for the terror groups to expand over the past year. The political struggles of the Saleh regime and its replacement have undermined the country’s military capacity allowing for AQAP and its insurgent arm Ansar al-Sharia to successfully advance and hold territory. The Yemeni government’s continuing inability to provide for portions of the Yemeni population allows AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia space to fill a void in needed social services and secure local popular support. Most importantly, Yemeni incompetence breathed life into a dormant AQAP franchise allowing known al Qaeda operatives on at least two occasions to escape detention providing much of the group’s current energy.12 While some narrowly point to drones for manufacturing AQAP, many exogenous and endogenous factors propel the group’s current external terrorism campaign and internal insurgency against the Yemeni state. What do critics of drones misunderstand about drone operations in Yemen? Critics of the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen confusingly lump together disparate issues related to terminology, intelligence processes, legal authorities and terrorist propaganda to justify stopping the use of the U.S.’s most effective counterterrorism technique – all while failing to offer a viable alternative for countering AQAP’s immediate threat to the U.S. Although an imperfect tool, drone strikes suppress terrorists in otherwise denied safe havens and limit jihadists’ ability to organize, plan and carry out attacks. These strikes help shield us from harm and serve our national interests. Doing nothing is simply not an option. Media accounts of attacks in Yemen often mistakenly credit U.S. drones for every explosion in Yemen. Drones represent one of several technology platforms executing airstrikes that include cruise missiles, potentially U.S. or Yemeni fighter aircraft or even helicopter assaults. Drone critics correctly cite instances where poor intelligence leads to the killing of civilians and/or those in opposition to the Saleh regime. However, one of the instances commonly used in calls to end drone use in Yemen is actually not the result of a drone strike. Critics point to the intelligence failures of a cruise missile attack in al Majalah on December 17, 2009.13 As an example, Gregory Johnsen at Princeton University and Yemen expert writing at Waq-al-Waq led his rebuttal of current drone policy, entitled “Drones, Drift and the (New) American Way of War,” with criticisms of drone warfare by citing this December 17, 2009 cruise missile attack.14Instead of pointing to this incident as justification for halting drone strikes in Yemen, the civilian casualties created by this intelligence failure and use of a cruise missile alternatively suggest the need for the use of drones as a more surgical platform for achieving our counterterrorism objectives while minimizing civilian casualties. Cruise missiles introduce several factors that may contribute to errant targeting. The limitations of cruise missiles, in many ways, provided the impetus for developing the drone platform.15 Cruise missiles 1) require intelligence far in advance of hitting their target, 2) take a considerable amount of time to travel to their target, 3) are difficult to divert from their target once launched and 4) employ large scale and more devastating munitions such as cluster bombs which can lead to increased civilian casualties. In contrast, drones can provide their own targeting intelligence devoid of Yemeni government influence, provide real-time visual surveillance of a target, minimize the time between target engagement and target impact, and use smaller munitions able to reduce civilian casualties. While neither technology platform is a perfect engagement tool, drones vis-à-vis cruise missiles have further improved the U.S. ability to engage terrorists and minimize civilian casualties. Drone critics this past year have also challenged the legality of targeting AQAP members, specifically those members that are American citizens.16 First, drone and legal critics have challenged the legality of the drone strike killing American AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. In response, the U.S. Department of Justice released a memo in February 2012 detailing its justifications for targeting al-Awlaki in response to his planning and directing the attempted Christmas Day 2009 attempt on an airliner over Detroit.17 Even when given this evidence, these same critics continue to advocate that Awlaki should have been pursued through the U.S. legal system, charged with a federal crime, arrested and then tried in a courtroom. In addition to the obvious limitations the U.S. encounters trying to capture a terrorist residing in a volatile foreign safe haven, these arguments ignore the fact that Awlaki knowingly traveled outside the U.S. and admittedly joined an officially designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This action alone permits Awlaki’s targeting and undercuts the claims of illegality by drone critics. These authors believe the legal argument posed by drone critics in the case of Awlaki lacks legitimacy. It is worth emphasizing furthermore that drone strikes may not always be the preferred course. Attempts to capture high value targets are riskier but that downside may be outweighed by the potential intelligence value of key individuals. A case-by-case assessment will always be needed. The second contentious legal debate related to drone targeting comes from the inadvertent killing of Anwar al-Awlaki’s son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki on October 14, 2012. Reporting suggests the intended target of the strike was AQAP’s media chief, Ibrahim al Bana.18 The death of Abdulrahaman al-Awlaki is a tragedy and has become a rallying point for those believing U.S. drone strikes create excessive civilian casualties. However, these same critics cannot explain why Abdulrahman al-Awlaki was present in the home of a suspected AQAP target, nor do they place any responsibility on Anwar al-Awlaki’s family who knowingly placed Abdulrahman in the orbit of terrorists clearly being pursued by the U.S. Third and most recently, anti-drone advocates have rallied against the Obama administration’s recent authorization to implement signature strikes against AQAP in Yemen.19 This argument against drones, above all others, may prove the most credible. The term “signature strikes” suggests the notion that the U.S. fires missiles at unknown targets for simply looking suspicious. Journalists and human rights advocates are right to draw attention to the use of this tactic as it implies the killing of unknown people for unclear reasons. The signature strike tactic, if used injudiciously, will result in the killing of innocent civilians and is certainly more inclined to radicalize local populations and inspire further AQAP recruitment. Those opposing drone use in Yemen commonly cite civilian casualties as reason for stopping drone strikes. Civilian casualties should be avoided at all costs, however drones in comparison to all other kinetic counterterrorism options, likely produce the fewest civilian casualties per engagement. Statistics and ratios remain difficult to calculate, and research has only just begun on this new counterterrorism application. But, in comparison to other forms of warfare, drone strikes may be one of the least civilian casualty producing tools in the history of warfare (See endnote).20 Large scale military intervention (i.e. regime change), broad-based counterinsurgency, backing of the Yemeni military, arming of militias – all of these counterterrorism options are far more likely to produce civilian casualties. Drones supported by intelligence provide U.S. counterterrorism efforts the most surgical and the least casualty-producing tool for engaging AQAP. In conjunction with the debate over drones creating civilian casualties, media debates ignore how al Qaeda deliberately uses civilians as human shields against attack. In documents seized during the Abbottabad raid, Bin Laden instructs his operatives to avoid drone strikes by staying out of cars noting, “We could leave the cars because they are targeting cars now, but if we leave them, they will start focusing on houses and that would increase casualties among women and children.”21 Bin Laden instructed his operatives to use women and children as human shields against drones knowing 1) the U.S. would be more reluctant to target operatives when civilian casualties would be numerous and 2) the U.S. unknowingly killing civilians during drone attacks would undermine local popular support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts providing al Qaeda ample fuel for propaganda – a lesson learned by al Qaeda in past failed jihadi campaigns where their expansive violence against innocent civilians eroded local popular support for the terror group. The U.S. should continue to avoid civilian casualties from drone strikes, but drone critics must also realize how al Qaeda uses civilians as pawns for undermining drone strikes. Some thoughtful critics of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen with whom we respectfully disagree, notably Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University22 and Jeremy Scahill of The Nation (although there are others)23, cite drone strikes as increasing the number of AQAP operatives in Yemen. The logic behind this assertion appears horribly backwards. The U.S. deploys drones where terrorist go – weak and failed states providing adequate safe haven for planning and executing terrorists attacks. However, the U.S. does not deploy drones to countries for the purpose of shooting at innocent people in hopes of creating terrorists. Johnsen24, Scahill, the recent Washington Post article by Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda,”25 and others (see endnote for summary)26 point to AQAP propaganda citing drones as motivation for terrorist recruitment and in turn suggest this as justification for the U. S. ceasing the tactic – essentially determining that if our terrorist enemies don’t like a tactic we should stop pursuing it. If one wants to assess which counterterrorism techniques are most effective against al Qaeda and affiliated groups, then look no further than al Qaeda’s propaganda. Al Qaeda, the Taliban and now AQAP have all focused their propaganda campaigns on eliminating the U.S. ability to employ night raids and drones. Why do they focus on these two tactics? Because night raids and drones are the most effective means for deterring these groups; Bin Laden admits this in his own internal documents captured in Abbottabad. Unable to leverage effective counter drone operations, al Qaeda, the Taliban and now AQAP seek to use propaganda to enrage local populations in hopes of interrupting this highly effective counterterrorism tool. Letting our adversaries (AQAP) dictate our tactics should never be an option.

### A2: Ayson

#### Very low probability

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

#### Their scenario rests on the US blaming China and Russia for the attack, but we won’t

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, 2010 Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to befingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.

#### No backlash to drones

By Kimi Tsuruta | August 16, 2012 Aid instead of drones may hold key to hindering AQAP http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/aid-instead-of-drones-may-hold-key-to-hindering-aqap/

However, whether the U.S. drone attacks and their collateral damage have directly led to civilians joining the AQAP out of revenge and anti-American sentiments remains in dispute.¶ “The sense of resentment based on my research does not transfer into more recruiting for al-Qaeda,” said Christopher Swift, a fellow at the University of Virginia Law School’s Center for National Security Law who has directly interviewed tribal leaders and Islamist politicians from 14 of Yemen’s 21 provinces.¶ There is no evidence of a correlation between the increased drone attacks and the tripling of the AQAP membership in the last three years, and instead the economic condition in Yemen plays the biggest factor in civilians joining the organization, according to Swift. He, however, acknowledges the validity of conflicting claims made by others, like Yemeni youth activist Ibrahim Mothana

# Modeling

**Israeli military officials prevent strikes- empirics prove**

**Berg 13, BBC News reporter**

(Raffi, “Iran crisis: Would Israel launch an attack?,” 3-19-13, da 3-27-13, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21768360>, mee)

In fact, an Israeli investigative programme said in 2010 an order was issued by Mr Netanyahu to the Israeli military to prepare for a strike on Iran within hours if required, but that **the order was cancelled due to strong opposition from Israel's military and intelligence chiefs**. A flurry of reports in August 2012 also suggested Israel was preparing a strike before that November's US presidential elections. At that time though, **previous heads of Israel's intelligence establishment publicly declared their opposition**, saying an attack on Iran would be unsuccessful and counter-productive. Among them was former domestic intelligence agency director Yuval Diskin, who expressed the view that bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would only lead it to accelerate its programme.

#### No Middle East WDM use – country calculations changing

Malin 12, Executive Director on Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 5-28-’12 (Martin, “Unconventional wisdom” Bulletin for Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/unconventional-wisdom)

As negotiations with Iran over the future of its nuclear program inch toward a possible deal, another intractable Middle East problem with a nuclear dimension is likely to start getting more serious attention. It is the question of whether there is any chance that Israel, Iran, and their Arab neighbors will agree to discuss establishing a regional zone free of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. Earlier this month in Vienna, Jaakko Laajava, a Finnish diplomat and the facilitator of the proposed 2012 Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference, reported to the Non-Proliferation Treaty preparatory committee meeting that although he had conducted more than 100 meetings -- both inside and outside the region -- he had yet to secure an agreement from all relevant states on participation. News of Laajava's no-news statement was met with another round of eye-rolling and finger-pointing: The likely holdouts are Israel and Iran, with a major question mark hanging over Syrian participation. After decades of backsliding, proliferation, and conflict in the Middle East, the conventional wisdom says the current round of efforts will fail. I think the conventional wisdom is wrong. In the past, many leaders in the Middle East have seen chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons as an attractive answer to their problems. But this logic is changing. Developments in the region are creating conditions that make progress on arms control and disarmament more possible, not less. Reviewing matters within. Internal conditions throughout the Middle East are becoming less conducive for either sparking or sustaining WMD programs. Arab protesters are demanding less corruption and more government accountability. Large, secretive WMD programs supporting unaccountable military-industrial cliques will be harder to support in the region's emerging political economies. The domestic political struggles underway across the Middle East have both leaders in power and their opponents focusing inward on reform, not outward toward old enemies. If democratic processes begin to take root (and, admittedly, it is premature to say that they will), what effect will this have on the perceived role of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Research by political scientists Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt suggests that democratizing states, in need of international acceptance and support, are particularly sensitive to nonproliferation norms and loathe to violate them. Regional evolution. The region's historic military rivalries have receded and the security rationale for WMD is receding with them. Iraq, which was once Iran's bitterest enemy and in US crosshairs for its WMD programs (real and imagined), now closely coordinates its policies with both Tehran and Washington. Tension in the Saudi-Iranian relationship requires the attention of leaders in Riyadh and Tehran, but in no way resembles the military rivalry that once existed between Iran and Iraq. Inter-Arab animosity has also moderated. In April, when demonstrations erupted outside its embassy in Cairo, Saudi Arabia quickly withdrew its ambassador, Ahmed Qattan. But within a week, Riyadh reinstated Qattan and promised a major aid package to Egypt. Contrast that incident with Saudi-Egyptian relations in the 1960s, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed his country's troops in Yemen to defeat Saudi proxies and used poison gas to do the job. Times have changed The Arab-Israeli conflict, the original driver of Israel's nuclear weapons program, has been reduced to two issues: the core question of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the future of the Golan Heights. Although each problem is vexing, neither is any longer the spark that can ignite region-wide conflict and threaten Israel's very existence. Israel's peace with Egypt may cool even further, but neither of Egypt's presidential candidates calls for abrogating the treaty because the treaty is as much an anchor of Egypt's national security as it is of Israel's. Israeli and Iranian calculations. As Israel considers how best to secure its future, it must choose among three strategic options. Israel can try to extend its nuclear monopoly by attacking or sabotaging the nuclear projects of Iran and perhaps other states down the road. This option, Israel's policy for the past several decades, is becoming increasingly untenable. In the short- to medium-term, bombing carries the risk of retaliation, and the unintended consequence of fueling the nuclear ambitions it is trying to stamp out. And Israel can only bomb what it knows about. But the long-term problem is more profound: Can Israel sustain a policy of militarily preventing nuclear development in a neighborhood of growing interest in nuclear power and a progressive diffusion of technology? Israel's second option -- deterrence -- carries the price of eventually abandoning nuclear ambiguity, since maintaining an active deterrent through periods of crisis and change in Iranian capabilities will require explicit statements and even demonstrations of Israeli capability. Such demonstrations will threaten and provoke Arab states in a way that Israel's nuclear weapons now do not, further raising the costs and risks of deterrence. In light of the above choices, Israel may come to see the third option as the least unpalatable: Entering into negotiations with its neighbors to establish rules for limiting the possession of WMD across the region, eventually putting its own capabilities on the negotiating table. Discussing a WMD-free zone would allow Israel to prolong its nuclear weapons monopoly with the fewest challenges for an interim period, while negotiating the terms of a transition to a nuclear and WMD free Middle East. It can also use a forum on regional arms control as a venue to raise its concerns about proliferation elsewhere in the region. Iran has important security interests in pursuing a WMD-free zone. Tehran has a long-term strategic interest in denuclearizing Israel, and, odious as it might seem to Iran's leaders, direct negotiations with Israel on regional security and a WMD ban are the only way to do that. Iran would find other security benefits from engaging diplomatically on the issue: Regional security discussions can help Iran break out of its isolation. In WMD-free zone discussions, Iran can split the US-Arab coalition against it and focus attention on Israel's nuclear weapons. The creation of a zone -- if it were to occur in the next several years -- would leave Iran far ahead of its Arab neighbors in its nuclear knowledge and experience, preserving an important security hedge, while reducing the incentives for its neighbors to attempt to match its expensive fuel-cycle investment. Wild cards. If the current P5+1 negotiations with Tehran collapse and Israel or the United States attack Iran, then both the political and security justifications for proliferation will be reinforced across the region. Voices within Iran calling for an operational deterrent will gain traction. And similar arguments will reverberate in Riyadh, Cairo, and possibly elsewhere. Failure of the proposal to hold a conference in 2012 on a Middle East WMD-free zone will be the least of concerns. Syria also presents potential problems. In the short-term, having suspended its membership in the Arab League for its violent crackdown on protesters, many Arab states would prefer not to reward the Assad regime with a platform at a conference to discuss weapons of mass destruction. In the long-term, competitive external intervention in a Syrian civil war could help reverse the trends supporting the move toward WMD disarmament. Syrian behavior, together with its chemical weapons stocks, should remind everyone why the discussion of a WMD-free zone and regional security more broadly in the Middle East is urgent. The short-term political costs of Syrian participation are trivial by comparison. Predictions. In capitals across the Middle East, policy makers will soon be pressed for their responses to a proposal to meet in Finland to discuss a regional WMD ban, possibly in December. Though Tehran and Jerusalem will grasp at old arguments to insist that the idea is foolish or unnecessary, a cold, hard look at emerging security interests in the new Middle East will take a bite out of old dogmas. Invitations to Helsinki will bring Israel and Iran to the negotiation table. Undoubtedly, the process will be long and frustrating. But the conventional wisdom will be overturned.

#### No US precedent---not causal

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way: ¶ Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat. ¶ “Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.” ¶ By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?) ¶ It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be. ¶ Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so. ¶ But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.¶ Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

**No solve modeling – their ev says need to set GUIDELINE – not just ban them – people no just give them up**

#### Zero chance that U.S. self-restraint causes any other country to give up their plans for drones

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/>

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire: ¶ If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them. ¶ “The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.” ¶ This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran. ¶ The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests. ¶ Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone? ¶ While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states

#### No risk of drone wars- Wont escalate

Joseph Singh 12, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2eSvaZnfQ

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Iran won’t retaliate

Robert **Haddick 12** (Robert Haddick is managing editor of Small Wars Journal, “The Ticking Clock” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/10/the\_ticking\_clock?page=0,1)

A strike on Iran's nuclear complex would be at the outer boundary of the Israeli Air Force's capabilities. The important targets in Iran are near the maximum range of Israel's fighter-bombers. The fact that Iraq's airspace, on the direct line between Israel and Iran, is for now undefended is one more reason why Israel's leaders would want to strike sooner rather than later. Israel's small inventory of bunker-buster bombs may damage the underground uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, but they will likely have no effect on the Fordow mountain complex. Iran has undoubtedly dispersed and hidden many other nuclear facilities. An Israeli strike is thus likely to have only a limited and temporary effect on Iran's nuclear program. If so, why bother, especially when such a strike risks sparking a wider war? Israel's leaders may actually prefer a wider escalating conflict, especially before Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. Under this theory, Israel would take the first shot with a narrowly tailored attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Paradoxically, Israel's leaders might then prefer Iranian retaliation, which would then give Israel the justification for broader strikes against Iran's oil industry, power grid, and communication systems. Even better if Iran were to block the Strait of Hormuz or attack U.S. forces in the region, which would bring U.S. Central Command into the war and result in even more punishment for Iran. Israel's leaders may believe that they enjoy "escalation dominance," meaning that the more the war escalates, the worse the consequences for Iran compared to Israel. Israel raided Iraq's nuclear program in 1981 and Syria's in 2007. Neither Saddam Hussein nor Bashar al-Assad opted to retaliate, very likely because both knew that Israel, with its air power, possessed escalation dominance. Israel's leaders have good reason to assume that **Iran's leaders will reach the same conclusion.** What about the rockets possessed by Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran's proxies north and south of Israel's population centers? Israel's leaders may believe that they are much better prepared to respond to these threats than they were in 2006, when the Israeli army struggled against Hezbollah. There is no guarantee that Hezbollah and Hamas will follow orders from Tehran to attack -- they understand the punishment the reformed Israeli army would inflict. Hezbollah may now have an excellent reason to exercise caution. Should the Assad regime in Damascus collapse, Hezbollah would likely lose its most important protector and could soon find itself cut off and surrounded by enemies. It would thus be a particularly bad time for Hezbollah to invite an Israeli ground assault into southern Lebanon.

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#### The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence

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Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism. ¶ Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy. ¶ The theory of ‘lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3, was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ‘open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artefacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ¶ Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law. ¶ The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ‘rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ‘rule of law’. The notion of ‘rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not f

ully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ‘efficient’ market. ¶ The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it.

#### The impact’s is a confluence of crises that place the globe in jeopardy---the plan’s consolidation of neoliberal hegemony collapses democracy, causes resource wars, and environmental collapse

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The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”.¶ But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy. ¶ The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India. ¶ The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy. ¶ And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”. ¶ Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies. ¶ There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity. ¶ Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.