### Off1

#### **The aff’s focus and framing of sexual violence as a problem only for women in the policy debate community obscures the real and material forms of violence perpetuated against men in debate and in partner violence more globally-This is symptomatic of a broader harmful problem in academia-They render violence invisible**

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

Defense of Feminist Theory. I suggest that one of the explanations for denying the evidence.an gender symmetry is to defend feminism in general. This is because a key step in the effort to achieve an equalitarian society is to bring about recognition of the harm that a patriarchal system causes. The removal of patriarchy as the main cause of PV weakens a dramatic example of the harmful effects of patriarchy. Any weakening of efforts to achieve greater gender equality is unfortunate but by no means critical, because that effort can continue on the basis of many other ways in which women continue to be subordinate to men, such as the gap in earnings of men and women. Protecting Services and Avoiding Harm to Women Victims. There is a fear that, if the public, legislators, and administrators knew about and believed the research on gender symmetry, it would weaken funding ofservices for women victims, such as shelters for battered women, and weaken efforts to arrest and prosecute violent men. I know of no evidence that funding for services for women victims has ever been decreased because "women are also violent." Nevertheless, I have been told on several occasions that I am endangering services for battered women by publishing the results of research showing equal perpetration and insisting that PV by women must also be addressed. At a meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, one panel member said that this type of phalli-centric research was undermining efforts to help battered women. This was followed by vigorous applause.¶ Arrests of women for PV have been increasing nationwide (Martin, 1997; Miller, 2001). In California between 1987 and 1997, the ratio of male to female arrests for PV decreased from 1 female arrest to 18 male arrests to a ratio of 1 female arrest to 4.5 male arrests (Deleon-Granados, Wells, & Binsbacher, 2006). The increase is not a result of more female PV, because rates of both fatal and nonfatal PV declined during this period (Catalano, 2006; Rennison & Rand, 2003; Straus & Gelles, 1986; Straus, Kantor, & Moore, 1994; Straus & Kaufman Kantor, 1994). It is most likely a result of the successful effort by the women's movement to change police practice from one of avoiding interference in domestic disturbances to one of mandatory or recommended arrest (Deleon-Granados et al., 2006). Their fear is that if the evidence on symmetry becomes widely known and accepted, it will justify more arrests of women for PV. In my opinion, if criminal prosecution is an appropriate part of the effort to reduce PV, that policy should apply to women as well as men perpetrators.¶ The denial of the overwhelming body of evidence on gender symmetry can be understood as one of many instances of the operation of theory of cultural cognition (Kahan & Braman, 2006). Cultural cognition research has found that that people tend to reject evidence that threatens key values. Other current examples include denial of climate change and denial of the evidence on the effectiveness and safety of vaccination.

#### This perpetuates an ongoing system of violence against our bodies

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

Failure to perceive PV by women is part of the explanation for the denial. But much more contributes to the denial, and the concealing and distortion of evidence cannot be attributed just to perceptual limitations. This section suggests four additional explanations for the fact that reputable scholars deny the overwhelming evidence on gender symmetry; including evidence from their own research. Focus on Extreme Cases. An important cause of the denial of gender symmetry occurs because the deniers tend to focus on the relatively small proportion of overall PV that is visible to the criminal justice system, shelters, batterer treatment programs, and other service providers. These tend to involve women victims. There usually are also men victims, but that is not known to service providers and researchers in those settings because they do not ask and are usually forbidden to ask women victims whether they have also attacked their partner. For example, I was refused permission to do a study in a shelter I had a small part in founding because of such a question. In contrast, the research showing gender symmetry has, until very recently, been based on general population samples where the predominant form of PV is minor. The findings of these general population studies are not believed by battered women's advocates because they are inconsistent with what they know about the characteristics of the cases they work with every day. However, the few studies that have obtained data from women partners of men in batter treatment programs or men arrested for PV have found that a quarter to two-thirds of the women have assaulted their partner (Straus, 2010). For example, a recent community study of couples (Capaldi et aI., 2009) found that, although the men were more likely to have been arrested for PV, the women "had higher levels of physical and psychological aggression than the men overall. Men who were arrested did not have higher levels of aggression toward a partner overall compared to the women involved in the incidents" (p. 514). A study of battered women and their children by McDonald, Jouriles, Tart, and Minze (in press) asked the women about their own use of violence. More than 67% admitted to have perpetrated severe PV on a male partner in the previous year. Furthermore, this violence was significantly correlated with externalizing behaviors by their children.

#### Vote for UNLV to bring the subject to light and to reduce the stigma of males reporting violence that ISU perpetuates

Murray A. Straus, PhD, ’10 (Professor of Sociology and Co-Director Family Research Laboratory University of New Hampshire,“Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment”, Partner Abuse, Volume 1, Number 3, 2010)

The methods used to conceal and deny the evidence on gender symmetry are detailed in previous articles (Straus, 1990, 2007, 2008a) and will only be summarized here. It is important to recognize that the terms conceal, deny, and distort apply to aca- demics who have produced or know about research evidence that could be concealed, denied, or distorted. Thus, this section refers to the academic community, not to service providers.¶ Perhaps the most frequent method of dealing with the unacceptable evidence that women assault partners at the same or higher rate as men is to conceal the evidence. The pattern was established early in research on PV by a survey conducted for the Kentucky Commission on Women (Schulman, 1979). This excellent survey found about equal rates of assault by men and women partners, but only assaults by men were presented in the commission report.¶ The upper half of Figure 3 shows prevalence rates by gender in the prepublication version of a Canadian study (Kennedy & Dutton, 1989). In the published version (lower half of Figure 3), the wife-to-husband data are absent.¶ The data analysis for my coauthored article on the "Drunken Bum Theory of Wife-Beating" (Kaufman Kantor & Straus, 1987) included women who were drunken bums as well as men, but the paper submitted for publication included only data on men's drinking and men's violence.¶ In the Global School-Based Health Survey, using questionnaires completed by students age 13 to 15 (World Health Organization, 2006), question 38 asked the students whether they had been slapped or hurt on purpose by a boyfriend or girl- friend in the past 12 months. The results for all of the first four nations (Jordan, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zambia) showed a slightly higher percent of boys than girls who reported being slapped or hurt on purpose by a girlfriend or boyfriend. Because those were only the first 4 nations in a planned 70-nation study, I waited until data on more nations became available. Two years later, in 2008, results for many nations were available, but question 38 and the data on this question were nowhere to be found.¶ Although at least 200 papers report research that found gender symmetry in perpetration, many studies with similar results were not submitted for publica~ tion because the authors thought a paper showing gender symmetry would not be accepted or because the authors feared adverse effects on their reputation and employability (see Method 7).¶ The Canadian National Violence Against Women Survey (Johnson & Sacco, 1995) used the Conflict Tactics Scales or CTS (Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996) to obtain the data on PV for a sample of women. The CTS is based on family systems theory and therefore included items to measure violence by both partners. However, the designers of the Canadian study modified the CTS by deleting the ques- tions on perpetration by the women interviewed The result, of course, was data on victimization of women and none on perpetration by women. Many other studies have used this strategy. The original plan for the U.S. National Violence Against Women Survey was identical-that is, interview women and use only the CTS ques- tions about their victimization. Fortunately, a last-minute compromise was reached between those who wanted to interview women only about their victimization and those who wanted to use the full CTS. The compromise to proceed with the original plan of asking women only about their victimization but to add a sample of men who were also asked only about victimization (which among heterosexual couples had to also be data on female perpetration), This created embarrassing results, such as that 39% of the violent acts documented by this study were perpetrated by women and that the coercive control scale scores of women were as high as the scores of men (Felson & Outlaw, 2007; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000b). These "unbelievable" results were part of the reason for the two-year delay in releasing the study results.¶ After the study data became available, the data on men victims and women's perpetration continued to be ignored, as illustrated by Thompson, Saltzman, and Johnson's (2003) study of risk factors for injury and M. P. Johnson's study of "intimate terrorists" (Johnson & Leone, 2005). Both analyzed only the female partici- pant half of the data. Consequently, no information about the risk of injury to men and no information about women intimate terrorists will appear in the literature. Fortunately, a growing number of researchers are not constrained by the ideology that has dominated and handicapped understanding of partner violence for the past 30 years. The misleading picture that is conveyed is shown by the results of a study that did examine the full data set. Felson and Outlaw (2007) found that the coercive control scores (the criterion used by Johnson to distinguishing intimate terrorists from other violent partners) of men and women were about the same. Straus and Gozjolko (2007) applied Johnson's criteria for identifying intimate terrorists to the 14,252 participants in the International Dating Violence Study. They found about the same percentage of women as men in the intimate terrorist category or have coercive control scores (the key mean of identifying intimate terrorists) as high as the scores of men in the study, as have five other studies (Felson & Outlaw, 2007; Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2004; Laroche, 2005; Prospero, 2009; Prospero, Dwumah, & Ofori-Dua, 2009). Yet in his 2008 book, Johnson continues to assert, without qualifi- cation, that intimate terrorists are almost exclusively men. The results of these four studies of intimate terrorism are also consistent with other research showing that gender symmetry applies to chronic severe violence and to police and shelter cases (Straus, 2009c).

### Off2

#### The 1AC should have came with a trigger warning- Vote Neg

Louise McCudden, 3- ’12 (“Trigger warnings are nothing to do with censorship. They give people more choice, not less.”, The F word Blog)

It's a small but important win in terms of awareness for the causes of both feminism and mental health that "trigger warnings" are now reasonably common online. Yet they're not used by the majority of bloggers, and show no real signs of moving beyond the blogosphere. Not only that, but they are often met with curious levels of resistance, even derision, from entirely sensible, compassionate people. It matters a great deal, and we should say so, because trigger warnings are invaluable. They allow a little bit of control over what you choose to look at; enough to make all the difference between participating in communities, discussions, blogs, and other life-changing support networks, or avoiding them. Support networks are lost to victims, and important voices of experience are lost to the support networks.¶ "Triggering", of course, usually happens as a symptom of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Anyone suffering from PTSD - whether they've been officially diagnosed with it or not - will understand what "triggering" is immediately, but the more painful the trigger, the worse it is to explain, so we're often left with a vague argument about "offensive topics" versus "freedom of speech" which is, although interesting, almost entirely irrelevant to trigger warnings.¶ A call for trigger warnings is not indicative of moral outrage, humour failure, or a plea for censorship. Triggering is more like a chemical reaction, or a phobia, than personal distaste. It's not moral, or emotional. It's medical.¶ Sometimes it's explained like this. If there's a trauma you've had trouble processing, vivid depictions of similar traumas can remind you of it. Well, yes, they can. But this, while horrible, isn't quite what triggering is. When something triggers repressed memories, they stream into your consciousness without your consent. It doesn't just remind of you what happened; it actually makes you re-live it. You feel like you're experiencing the incident again, in real life - until it stops.¶ It's nothing to do with being offended, or having hurt feelings. If you suffer from PTSD, you probably handle being extraordinarily "upset" most days without so much as a sneeze. But the impact of being hit with an unexpected trigger is much worse than being "upset." You might feel sick. You might get a migraine. You might shut down emotionally, you not be able to stay in control of your temper, or your tears. You might black out momentarily, or even forget who, or where, you are. When that happens in a controlled environment or in a safe place with people you trust it's bad enough but if it's happening in the middle of the street, or in a meeting, or when you're standing on the tube with strangers in your personal space, or on a date, or in a job interview, or when you're babysitting, or when you're driving, or...?¶ Identifying something as a potential likely trigger is not the same as passing a moral judgment, and nor is it a call for the item to be censored. Writers who handle an issue like rape sympathetically and intelligently still often choose to carry trigger warnings, because they know that acknowledging a potential trigger is not a value judgment on the content. You can absolutely love something, but still find it triggers for you.¶ And content warnings aren't a radical concept. Films, video games, even music albums carry advisory labels; news readers tell you if the report coming up might distress you, so it's not like we don't already understand and accept the idea anyway. ¶ All trigger warnings do is acknowledge that there are different sorts of horror, and they're not all measurable by things like age. If a record label is going to warn me that Eminem will use a swear word, why not warn me that he's going to depict a rape scene? If Facebook is going to protect people from breastfeeding images in case we find those offensive, surely they could warn us if we're about to click on a page with vivid rape stories, in case that makes us unwell? ¶ So trigger warnings are nothing to do with censorship. If anything, they're the opposite of censorship. If you're interested in free choice and free speech, then trigger warnings are a way to protect those principles. Giving people a trigger warning is simply giving them information. Not giving one because you didn't think of it or didn't know about them is different - I've done that myself. But knowing about them, and choosing not to use them, because you have an idea in your head about censorship and freedom? That's just deliberately denying people information that might help them make an important choice. And there are loads of reasons why people might do that, of course. But none of them have anything to do with freedom.

### Off3

#### Their Focus on Ontological difference sustains neoliberalism and prevents emancipatory politics

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

This article explores why self-defined radical and “subversive” political theory has, by and large, failed to examine the rampant increase in inequality under thirty years of neoliberal capitalism as a major threat to democracy.1 During this period, the most highly cited work in radical political thought focused on predominantly ontological and epistemological issues of “difference” and “the fiction of the coherent self.”2 But just as post-structuralist and difference theorists attacked the rational chooser of Rawlsian liberalism as a falsely universal subject and interrogated equality as a homogenizing category, political elites of both the right and the moderate left achieved an ideological consensus in favor of a new, neoliberal universal subject—the entrepreneurial, self-sufficient, competitive marketplace individual. Thus, it is rather ironic that during the “Great Compression” of the 1960s, when income and wealth inequality moderately decreased—in part due to the power of the labor and social democratic movements in advanced democracies—the revival of political theory focused on the challenge to democracy posed by economic inequality and the absence of voice for employees in the workplace; think of the early work of Carole Pateman, C.B. Macpherson, Michael Walzer, and Sheldon Wolin.3 Yet in the past several decades of rapidly growing inequality most radical theorists have focused on the challenge difference poses to democratic societies or how liberal democratic institutions of “governance” engage in the repressive norming of the self. This is not to deny the role that difference plays within a democratic pluralist society, or the intellectual validity of interrogating how dominant institutional norms can constrict individual identity. But the problem that vexed Rousseau, Mill, Marx, and the founders of contemporary democratic theory remains more relevant than ever: how do inequalities in wealth, income, power, and life-opportunity contradict the formal commitment of liberal democracy to the equal moral worth of persons?¶ Given the accentuated role that corporate power and wealth plays in American politics today, why also do few political theorists examine the tension between corporate power and democracy? Not since Charles Lindblom's and Robert Dahl's work in the late 1970s and early 1980s have students of politics focused on the anomalous role of corporations in a democratic society. As Dahl and Lindblom argued, in a democratic society binding decisions should only be granted legitimacy if they are made democratically. Yet corporate management regularly issues edicts that have binding, coercive effects on their employees and society at large.4 Nor have theorists focused on how the weakening of democratic institutions of countervailing power, such as unions and grass-roots social movements, has engendered a formal democracy that is de facto an oligarchy. 5 Recently, mainstream—even behavioral—American politics scholars have investigated the corrosive effects that the fungible nature of wealth into political power has upon democracy, as well as the resulting dominance in decision-making of the political preferences of elites. But recent political theory has been relatively silent on these issues.6¶ By the late 1980s theorists of difference, such as Iris Marion Young and Carol Gilligan, shifted the focus of radical theory from economic democracy to a critique of how one-size-fits-all social policies failed to meet the differential needs of members of particular groups.7 The turn to difference offered important insights for both theorists and activists, as democratic public policies must account for the differential needs of particular individuals and groups. But what the focus on difference sometimes obscured is that the argument that each individual should receive the resources necessary to satisfy their particular human needs still relies upon a universal democratic commitment to the equal standing of all members of society.¶ In contrast to theories of difference, the post-structuralist turn in political theory in part arose as a reaction to fears that identity and difference politics essentialized and homogenized the status of the self within groups.8 Post-structuralism rejected both Rawlsian liberalism's belief in a coherent, rational chooser and identity politics' granting of primacy to the group as the shaper of individual identity. Instead, post-structuralist analysis emphasized the labile, incoherent, shifting nature of a self constituted by, in Judith Butler's terms, the “performative discursive iteration” of social norms.9 Post-structuralist theorists emphasized the agonal nature of politics and the ever-present possibility that the discursive self could “performatively resist” hegemonic norms.10 That is, by refusing to perform according to the social norms that allegedly inscribe the self, individuals could engage in “transgressive” resistance. Ironically, just as allegedly radical theorists discerned the “radical Nietzschean” possibilities of individual resistance, the social and political options of working class individuals and many people of color in the United States were being further constrained by increased social, economic, and political inequality. This focus on individual resistance may have come about—as the literary theorist Terry Eagleton argues—because the forward progress of the left had been reversed by the triumph of Thatcher and Reagan and, thus, theorists lost faith in the possibility of democratic majoritarian political change.11

#### Their advocacy is otherizing, makes it impossible to collectively contest neoliberalism

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Feminist advocates of a politics of difference question whether Rawls's theory of justice adequately considers the differentials in power and interest that exist among the distinct communities or groups within a pluralist democracy. Thus, in a pluralist society, according to theorists of difference, if the equal moral worth of persons is to be achieved, members of the community with differential needs should be treated according to their particular needs (for example, single mothers). Marx made these points long ago (in an admittedly economistic fashion) in The Critique of the Gotha Programme;14 and Joan Scott returned to these themes in her groundbreaking essay on the role difference must play within any pluralist theory of equality.15 Feminist theorists who come out of a left tradition, such as Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib, are careful to consider what type of “generalized” norms or empathetic reasoning are necessary to construct a shared normative commitment to democratic equality across difference. We can draw on these works by left feminists working out of a post-Habermasian or quasi-universalist tradition to help us ground a politics of pluralist solidarity and equality.16¶ But, as Anne Phillips points out, the valuation of difference can, at times, obfuscate the dependence of democratic feminist theorists and activists upon universal democratic norms, particularly when they oppose undemocratic inequalities across groups or anti-democratic practices within groups.17 According to theorists of difference, precautions need to be taken against deploying universal liberal conceptions of human nature that mask particularist raced, gendered, or classed conceptions of human interests. Iris Marion Young, the most cited theorist writing on the politics of difference, draws upon her experience of struggles within the feminist movement against a falsely universalizing conception of “women” (that is, white and middle class) that would negate the distinct social experience and needs of women of color, queer women, and working-class women.18 She argues that particular groups often embrace distinct concepts of politics, fairness, and justice. Thus, she contends that imposing universal conceptions of justice upon particular groups may deny these groups the right to develop their particular conceptions of the good.¶ Young, to her credit, acknowledges that a democratic version of identity politics must achieve some common understandings—across group difference—of democratic procedural norms and policies. Yet in Young's most influential work, Justice and the Politics of Difference, there exists an unresolved tension between her commitment to difference, on the one hand, and to a democratic egalitarian polity that grants equal moral respect to each citizen, on the other. Ultimately Young's commitment to giving proportional political voice to different groups (seemingly regardless of their character or political goals) contradicts her democratic commitment to treating each individual as an equal member of a democratic community. Young fails to articulate clearly the democratic side of her commitment to difference by never specifying the shared values and practices citizens must embrace across their differences in order to build a democratic society. For example, should racist communities be given the particular consideration and even seemingly proportional representation that Young advocates for “oppressed” groups? If not, then the very definition of “oppression” is parasitic on a belief that members of an oppressed group have been denied the universal rights that should be accorded to all members of a democratic community.¶ In addition, Young fails to note that if democratic citizens fail to conceive of others as sharing a common humanity, then it will be extremely difficult to develop bonds of solidarity across difference. A quick example to illustrate the dilemma: while many gay and lesbian people are African-American, the dominant political and cultural institution in that community—the church—has a long (though receding) tradition of homophobia that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) members of the African-American community and their supporters contest. Advocates within the black community of LGBTQ rights invariably draw upon universal notions of human rights to critique the predominant practices of their particular community.19

#### Social solidarity against neoliberalism is the only way to prevent social regression

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Just as the right's growing hegemony from the 1980s onward eroded majoritarian support for progressive taxation and universal public goods, radical theory, through its dominant concerns for difference and transgression, abandoned any intellectual defense of the core democratic value of social solidarity. In the United States today, social solidarity is the forgotten sibling among the troika of democratic values—“liberty, equality, and fraternity”—that suffused the democratic social revolutions from the French Revolution onwards. The concept of “fraternity,” or, in gender neutral terms, “solidarity,” implies that citizens develop a capacity for empathy toward others and for trust in their fellows. Democratic citizens act in solidarity with one another because they recognize that their common project is an interdependent one and thus each member of the community has both a moral and an instrumental interest in assuring a minimal level of well-being for all.¶ For much of the twentieth century the left in capitalist democracies fought to expand social rights out of the belief that radical social inequality eroded the value of equal political and civil rights. If democracy involves the making of binding laws by equal citizens, the left argued, there cannot exist a group of citizens who are so socially excluded that they cannot participate politically. Universal public education emerged with the rise of democracy precisely out of insurgent social movements' concern that all citizens gain a “civic education.” Over time, excluded social groups fought to be included as full citizens; and the expansion of citizen rights to “others”—the essence of social solidarity—continues today in the fight for immigrant rights across the globe. As the work of T.H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi demonstrates, the historic struggle between democratic left and right has revolved around the extent to which social rights—public provision, social insurance, and labor rights—should constrain the inegalitarian outcomes of a market-based economy.23¶ Thus, even the most classically liberal of democratic polities—the United States and the United Kingdom—provide minimal levels of universal insurance against disability, unemployment, and old age. But among developed democracies only the “liberal market” United States and United Kingdom do not provide universal forms of state-funded childcare or child support. This reality enabled the right, in both countries, to deploy racialized “anti-welfare” politics that mobilized a segment of the working class, whose formal market earnings rendered them ineligible for means-tested child support programs, against both strong public provision and the relatively high rates of taxation that regressive tax policies impose upon working families.¶ That is, in the dialectic of democracy and solidarity the bonds of fellowship are not naturally fixed. Democratic social movements frequently struggle to expand the popular conception of who is part of the “we.” Often, in times of national crisis and broad social vulnerability, bonds of solidarity expand and strengthen, as do social policies that insure a universal economic and social floor under which citizens cannot fall. Hence, we associate the expansion of social and labor rights during the New Deal and French Popular Front governments with the shared vulnerability of the Great Depression. The United States' GI Bill and the post-World War II radical expansion of the British welfare state came immediately after a “total war” in which victory depended upon the military and productive contributions of working-class men and women, recent immigrants, and oppressed minorities.¶ Thus far, strong bonds of social solidarity have only been constructed (and also eroded) at the level of the nation state, the community of “we” versus “them.” In addition, radical theory and practice has yet to tackle the difficulty of expanding social rights—and of defending existing ones—during periods of capitalist stagnation and global economic restructuring. This makes even more pressing, but also problematic, the project of expanding solidarity across national borders. Today, the struggle for greater solidarity between the working people of northern Europe and southern Europe will define whether the European project becomes more democratic or fragments on the shoals of anti-solidaristic austerity policies.¶ But the contraction of public provision under neoliberal capitalism is no more natural or inexorable than was its historical expansion. Today, the struggle of undocumented workers for an expeditious path to citizenship should lead normative theorists to revisit arguments as to why political, civil, and social rights should be extended to all those (and their dependents) who contribute productive labor to our society. And at a time when the minimum wage is less than one-half of the real value it had in the 1960s, low-wage service workers—both native-born and immigrants—are beginning to protest their inability to raise a family in dignity on their meager wages. Such protest will likely expand if undocumented immigrants gain secure legal rights. In addition, as the baby boomers come to retirement with inadequate savings and radically underfunded or non-existent pensions, there is likely to be resistance to neoliberal efforts to constrict, rather than expand, Social Security.

#### Solidarity against neoliberalism is necessary to secure difference while confronting racial, gender and economic domination

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Given how divided the United States is, not only politically, but also geographically and socially on lines of race, class, and citizenship status, democratic theorists perhaps should refocus their energies on defining the role solidarity and equality of standing must play in the construction of a just society. For example, the political conflict likely to define America's political future is how expeditiously undocumented workers and their dependents become full citizens. Unlike some who long for a return to a class-based politics of social solidarity, I am well aware that forms of racial, national, and gender exclusion helped construct past forms of political solidarity.12 Moreover, the working class has never been a truly homogeneous and “universal class”; its identity and consciousness are constructed in complex ways that reflect the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality and the role that ideology and culture play in social life.¶ Yet, absent a revival of a pluralist, majoritarian left it is hard to imagine how difference can be institutionalized in an egalitarian manner. Theorists of difference are, in some ways, blind to the reality that difference (or “diversity”) can be—and is being—institutionalized on a radically inegalitarian social terrain, in which some social groups have much more power and opportunity than others. This blind spot mimics the weaknesses of the liberal pluralist theory that dominated political science in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, radical theorists pointed out that liberal pluralist society failed to be fully democratic because some groups had inordinate economic and political power as compared to their small numbers within the demos.13 Today, the same critique of difference can be made.¶ Post-structuralist theorists' focus on the performative resistance of decentered, mutable selves also fails to recognize that the performative options of working-class individuals, persons of color, women, and gays and lesbians are constrained by the structural distribution of racial, economic, and gendered forms of power. Thus, if the performative options of the vast majority are to be enhanced, left theorists have to recover a politics and practice of solidarity and democratic equality; concepts which neither a pure politics of difference nor an agonal politics of post-structuralist radical democracy can adequately ground.

### Appoc

#### We affirm the 1AC except the rejection of apocalyptic imagery in the context of global climate change.

**Apocalyptic imagery is key to genuine resistance**

**Schatz 12** (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-­‐Of-­‐ The-­‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012)

**Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner ignores how any** particular **metaphor—apocalyptic or not—always risks getting co--‐opted. It does not excuse inaction.** Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “**Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is known. Unless they** also **face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces” (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate over the environment by framing outany attempt for significant change**, whether it be radical or reformist. **Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognizethat we cannot fully escape the master’s house since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, we ought to act even if we may get co--‐opted.** As Foucault himself reminds us, “instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the**strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible,** somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (96--‐97). Here Foucault “asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism” (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the **revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change.** Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how **utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can** become powerful enough to **deconstruct** its house **despite the risk of co--‐optation or backlash**. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. **Ecocritics can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future.** Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--‐in--‐my--‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately,**images of planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a new world where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet**

#### They Cant Solve This – Their Focus Detracts From Our Ability to Create New Solutions That Mitigate Climate Change

**Karlsson 12**– (Nov. 2012, Rasmus, PhD, lecturer at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, South Korea, “Individual Guilt or Collective Progressive Action? Challenging the Strategic Potential of Environmental Citizenship Theory,” Environmental Values 21 (2012): 459–474, ingenta)

In terms of its performative content, environmental citizenship theory tends to overlook the fundamental difference between individual and collective action. **While an individual can** presumably **stop doing a particular activity** (like driving), **it**nearly always **takes a collective effort to provide a meaningful alternative (**like public transportation). This difference seems to be especially pronounced when considering more radical strategies for sustainability like the difference between the individual action of not eating meat (because of its environmental impact) and the collective action of launching a new ‘Manhattan-project’ to develop artificial meat (Edelman et al. 2005) as a humane, safe and environmentally beneficial alternative to traditional meat production (Datar and Betti 2010). Thinking further about this difference, one could argue that environmental citizenship theory provides a deceptively simple answer to a complex question when it holds that justice primarily requires us to reduce our own individual ecological footprint. This line of criticism becomes especially **powerful if we have reason to believe that there are indeed accelerating technological paths to sustainability on a global level but that these paths are dependent on radical political action and a serious commitment to investment in the present (**Mandle2008). Under such circumstances**, the environmental movement’s resistance to an innovation-driven future (Cohen 2006) becomes** **ethically problematic** **since it is precisely those activists that are needed to not only persuade mainstream politicians about the urgency of the ecological crisis but also to build public support for radical investments in breakthrough technologies. Recent paleoclimatological evidence suggests that in order to avoid reaching the tipping level for catastrophic climatic effects, the CO2 level in the atmosphere will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm,**but likely even less than that (Hansen et al. 2008). However, with both India and China on a carbon-intensive path of rapid industrialisation with hundreds of new coal-fired plants currently under construction (Fairley 2007; Peng 2010), even optimistic calculations will see the atmospheric CO2 level approach 550 ppm in the coming decades (Sheehan et al. 2008**). To achieve the reductions needed for climate stability will require a Herculean effort. With this in mind, it seems as if the foremost duty of people in rich countries would be to develop the kind of new energy technology**that would make this industrial rise possible without causing irreversible environmental damage. Only if such technologies are substantially ‘faster, cleaner, and cheaper’ (Shellenberger et al. 2008) can we expect them to be implemented on a sufficient scale.**By** **individualising the site of political change, we risk losing the collective force** **necessary** to pursue such Herculean projects. Instead of offering a progressive vision of universal affluence that can bring together diverse (national) interests, **the future becomes marked by scarcity and dependent on individual moral betterment.** If we are right to assume that many people will be unable to meet the stringent demands of its moral code, then **we can expect environmental citizenship theory to be more likely to feed defeatism and resignation than meaningful action** (Butler 2010: 183). While some may hope for the market economy to autonomously provide the kind of technologies needed for global sustainability (Beckerman 1995), others, and even once staunch ‘deniers’ like Bjørn Lomborg, are now calling for political intervention and radical investments to meet the challenges of environmental change (Lomborg 2010).

**Failure to Engage These Discussions Makes Extinction Inevitable**

**Romm, ’12,**Aug 28, 2012 at 12:29 pm JOE ROMM is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress “Meteorological Society: Warming Is ‘Unequivocal’, We’re The ‘Dominant Cause’, We Need ‘Rapid Reduction’ Of CO2”

http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/28/757991/meteorological-society-warming-is-unequivocal-were-the-dominant-cause-we-need-rapid-reduction-of-co2/

**The American Meteorological Society** has **updated** and strengthened **its statement on global warming.**¶Here are **its** summary **conclusions, “based on the peer-reviewed scientific literature and** … **consistent with the vast weight of current scientific understanding”**:¶ **There is unequivocal evidence that Earth’s lower atmosphere, ocean, and land surface are warming; sea level is rising; and snow cover, mountain glaciers, and Arctic sea ice are shrinking.** **The dominant cause of the warming**since the 1950s **is human activities.** This scientific finding is **based on a large and persuasive body of research**. The observed **warming will be irreversible** for many years into the future, and even larger temperature increases will occur as greenhouse gases continue to accumulate in the atmosphere. **Avoiding this** future warming **will require a large and rapid reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions**. The ongoing warming will increase risks and stresses to human societies, economies, ecosystems, and wildlife through the 21st century and beyond, **making it imperative that society respond to a changing climate**. **To inform decisions on adaptation and mitigation, it is critical that we improve our understanding of the global climate system and our ability to project future climate through continued and improved monitoring and research**. This is especially true for smaller (seasonal and regional) scales and weather and climate extremes, and for important hydroclimatic variables such as precipitation and water availability.¶ Technological, economic, and **policy choices in the near future will determine the extent of future impacts of climate change.** **Science-based decisions are seldom made in a context of absolute certainty.**National and international **policy discussions should include consideration of the best ways to both adapt to and mitigate climate change. Mitigation will reduce the amount of future climate change and the risk of impacts that are potentially large and dangerous**. At the same time, some continued climate change is inevitable, and policy responses should include adaptation to climate change. **Prudence dictates extreme care in accounting for our relationship with the only planet known to be capable of sustaining human life.**¶ This new statement is considerably stronger than the 2007 one. That shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone, given that it is based on scientific observation and analysis:¶ The scientific evidence for manmade global warming has gotten considerably stronger — see It’s “Extremely Likely That at Least 74% of Observed Warming Since 1950″ Was Manmade; It’s Highly Likely All of It Was (and links therein);¶ Many observed changes have occurred faster than the models — see the 2010 AAAS presentation that concluded: New scientific findings since the 2007 IPCC report are found to be more than twenty times as likely to indicate that global climate disruption is “worse than previously expected,” rather than “not as bad as previously expected”;¶ **Projections of future changes have likewise become much more dire** — see “An Illustrated Guide to the Science of Global Warming Impacts: How We Know Inaction Is the Gravest Threat Humanity Faces.”¶ **Only anti-science deniers — pure rejectionists of rational thinking — can continue to encourage inaction in the face of this overwhelming body of evidence**.

#### Debate can serve as a nexus for movements to lobby for change. Avoidance of catastrophe is a critique of existing social reality.

**Kurasawa**, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, **in ‘4**

[Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and The Work of Foresight”, *Constellations* 11.4]

As we float in a mood of post-millennial angst, the future appears to be out of favor. Mere mention of the idea of farsightedness – of trying to analyze what may occur in our wake in order to better understand how to live in the here and now – conjures up images of fortune-telling crystal balls and doomsday prophets, or of eccentric pundits equipped with data-crunching supercomputers spewing forth fanciful prognostications. The future, then, has seemingly become the province of mystics and scientists, a realm into which the rest of us rarely venture. This curious situation goes back to a founding paradox of early modernity, which sought to replace pagan divination and Judeo-Christian eschatology with its own rational system of apprehending time. Thus came into being the philosophy of history, according to which human destiny unfolds teleologically by following a knowable and meaningful set of chronological laws leading to a final state of perfection; Condorcet, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to name but a few, are the children of this kind of historicism that expresses an unwavering faith in the Enlightenment’s credo of inherent progress over time. Yet in our post-metaphysical age, where the idea of discovering universal and stable temporal laws has become untenable, the philosophy of history lies in ruins. What has stepped into the breach is a variety of sciences of governance of the future, ranging from social futurism to risk management. By developing sophisticated modeling techniques, prognosticators aim to convert the future into a series of predictable outcomes extrapolated from present-day trends, or a set of possibilities to be assessed and managed according to their comparative degrees of risk and reward.1 Although commendable in their advocacy of farsightedness, these scientistic forms of knowledge are hampered by the fact that their longing for surefire predictive models have inevitably come up short. If historicism and scientistic governance offer rather unappealing paradigms for contemplating the future, a turn to the conventional political forecasts of the post-Cold War world order hardly offers more succor. Entering the fray, one is rapidly submerged by Fukuyama’s “end of history,” Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” Kaplan’s “coming anarchy,” or perhaps most distressing of all, the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of unilateral pre-emption. For the Left, this array of unpalatable scenarios merely prolongs the sense of hope betrayed and utopias crushed that followed the collapse of the socialist experiment. Under such circumstances, is it any wonder that many progressive thinkers dread an unwelcomed future, preferring to avert their gazes from it while eyeing foresight with equal doses of suspicion and contempt? But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian ‘Not-Yet’ remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future. In the twenty-first century, the lines of political cleavage are being drawn along those of competing dystopian visions. Indeed, one of the notable features of recent public discourse and socio-political struggle is their negationist hue, for they are devoted as much to the prevention of disaster as to the realization of the good, less to what ought to be than what could but must not be.2 The debates that preceded the war in Iraq provide a vivid illustration of this tendency, as both camps rhetorically invoked incommensurable catastrophic scenarios to make their respective cases. And as many analysts have noted, the multinational antiwar protests culminating on February 15, 2003 marked the first time that a mass movement was able to mobilize substantial numbers of people dedicated to averting war before it had actually broken out. More generally, given past experiences and awareness of what might occur in the future, given the cries of ‘never again’ (the Second World War, the Holocaust, Bhopal, Rwanda, etc.) and ‘not ever’ (e.g., nuclear or ecological apocalypse, human cloning) that are emanating from different parts of the world, the avoidance of crises is seemingly on everyone’s lips – and everyone’s conscience. From the United Nations and regional multilateral organizations to states, from non-governmental organizations to transnational social movements, the determination to prevent the actualization of potential cataclysms has become a new imperative in world affairs. Allowing past disasters to reoccur and unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when, in the process, the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized. Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies as a burgeoning “culture of prevention,”3 a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7

#### Scenario planning is vital to create appropriate risk assessments—we have an obligation to engage in these predictions

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[Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and The Work of Foresight”, *Constellations* 11.4]

A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will returnr in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage.