### Framework

#### Improvements happen rapidly through peer review—only in a system of disclosure do we know the arguments the other team is making in enough detail to actually test

Torvalds and Diamond ’1 [Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); "Why Open Source Makes Sense"; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2]

It’s the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the pc wasn’t developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a projects development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the general public license-the anticopyright- as the movement’s powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to gain widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source is expanding beyond the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and reposting’s. The site nicely sums up the tradeoff from the traditional approach: “what we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument.” (Put it another context: with a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It’s a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for disease, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realize the tightfisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system, the source code-the programing instructions underlying the system is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, and exploit it. But those improvements, changes, and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and to everyone. When a project is opened up, there is a rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That’s what we experienced with linux. Imagine: instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to a project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no er, peer. The first time people hear about the open source approach, it sounds ludicrous. That’s why it has taken years for the message its virtues to sink in. Ideology isn’t what has sold the open source model. It started gaining attention when it was obvious that open source was the best method of developing and improving the highest quality technology. And now it is winning in the marketplace, an accomplishment has brought open source its greatest acceptance. Companies were able to be created around numerous value added services, or to use open source as a way of making a technology popular. When the money rolls in, people get convinced. One of the least understood pieces of the open source puzzle is how so many good programmers would design to work for absolutely no money. A word about motivation is in order. In a society where survival is more or less assured, money is not the greatest of motivators. Its been well established that folks do their best work when they are driven by a passion. When they are having fun. This is as true for playwrights and sculptors and entrepreneurs as it is for software engineers. The open source model gives people the opportunity to live their passion. To have fun. And to work with the world’s best programmers, not the few who happen to be employed by their company. Open source developers strive to earn the esteem of their peers. That’s got to be highly motivating.

#### Fairness—open source reduces entry barriers and solves resource disparities

Antonucci ’5 [Michael (Debate coach for Towson, formerly Georgetown& Lexington High School); “eDebate~ open source? resp to Morris,” December 8; www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html]

Here's what I'd defend: a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams. Most systems would indeed revalue evidence. The extent of this revaluation depends upon the nature of the open source system adopted. A real dividing line is the disclosure issue. Two basic 'disclosure' variations: Variation i [weak version]: Your evidence enters the collective pool \*after\* you read it. You lose intellectual property claims to an argument or card by virtue of using it. This system revalues, but retains some pro card-cutter value, given the rate of argument innovation in the upper echelons. It's basically a mixed evidence economy, sort of a European socialist model. Variation ii [strong version]: Your evidence enters the collective pool \*before\* you read it. In fact, entry in the collective pool is a \*precondition\* for the reading of any specific piece of evidence. This system isn't just a revaluation. This system would set money on fire. Cards (and new arguments) lose all of their economic value overnight. Employing a card cutter would obviously be a ridiculous investment, although employing (a) debate teacher(s) would still make a lot of sense. d. "Voluntary" open source systems (evidence collectives) don't work very well. People have proposed various regional collective evidence pools as an "alternative". I'm sure they've been helpful and interesting opportunities for intellectual cross-pollination. As a genuine equity proposal, though, get real. Do you really think you can beat a top-notch unified machine with a loose network (over a hundred repetitions)? I don't.

#### The ballot is key

Sanchez ’5 [Kevin (debate coach); "~eDebate~ open source / creative commons / how long will you folks keep this stuff locked?"; December 12; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064838.html]

at the n.d.t., many teams chose to post their first constructive speeches on an accessible website -- that's the internet disclosure which stefan has worked hard to achieve. yet some debaters chose not to do so, although they may've likely read the blocks of their opponents prior to the round. (i even recall stefan and others stopping just short of calling such free-riders 'cheaters'.) this begs the question, how does this community intend to enforce this norm? i'd suggest that the short-term answer is not top-down punishment from tourney directors, but debaters themselves taking ballots away from free-riders, fair and square. everyone knows there are dominant players who benefit immensely from the status quo: teams which can afford to hire extra staff, students who can afford to go to pricey institutes, companies which can afford to sue you if you share their evidence. despite the lipservice paid to the educational mission of debate, until this competitive incentive changes, nothing will magically 'level the playing field'. so how do participants alter competitive incentive? again, by winning ballots. blatantly non-topical cases, for example, are liabilities. if/when the 'open source / creative commons' position wins more ballots, it will more likely compel debaters to put their briefs online. quite simply, the 'solvency mechanism' - at least for the immediate future - is winning the position itself.

### Topicality

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.

Algoso 2011 – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011

(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

 2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### Case

#### Oppression must be addressed collectively --- phenomenalism creates exclusionary politics that perpetuates inequality

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It is inexcusable to build analyses of historical experience around exclusions, exclusions that stipulate, for instance, that only women can understand feminine experience, only Jews can understand Jewish suffering, only formerly colonial subjects can understand colonial experience (Said 1993: 35). The idea of a politics underpinned by solidarities based on “sameness” has a long history in the critical tradition. Marx’s initial conceptualisation of the standpoint of the proletariat (albeit, significantly different from those of subsequent developments of standpoint epistemology) has been used by feminist theorists as well as those arguing for a post-colonial perspective in terms of the subaltern, and, more recently, for a dalit standpoint (Hart- sock 1984, Guha 1983, Rege 1998, 2000). However, while using identity as the basis of political action has been seen to be powerful (and effective), it has also increasingly become seen as problematic. The exclusionary politics of movements such as black power, much radical and lesbian feminism, and latterly, movements for ethnic purity and/or religious integrity, for example, have yielded a deep concern with the programme of separation and isolationism that such movements are often seen to be based upon. For many critics, more troubling still has been the usually accompanying claim that only women can be feminists, or only black people can work against racism, or only dalits against caste oppression, and so on. A position which states that only those who have experienced an injustice can understand and thus act effectively upon it seems to rest upon an essentialist theory of identity which assumes that the possibility of knowledge about particular situations is restricted to one’s possession of the relevant (seemingly) irreducible traits (being female, black, dalit, and so forth). Arguably, one consequence of these separatist tendencies is that they perpetuate the individualist fallacy that oppressive social relationships can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) suggesting that where structures of inequality overlap with categories of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002).

**Their focus on personal narratives causes political inaction, makes performance a palliative, and perpetuates the status quo**

**Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland**

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

**Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy** also **enables political inaction** in two respects. First, **an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution.** As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, **an unstructured, informal discussion** [End Page 418] **"leaves people with no place to go and** the lack of structure leaves them with **no way of getting there."**70 Second, **the** therapeutic **impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency.** "**Therapy**," Cloud argues, "**offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action.**" Public **discourse emphasizing healing and coping**, she claims, "**locates** blame and **responsibility for solutions in the private sphere.**"71¶ **Clinton's Conversation on Race** not only **exemplified the** frequent **wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform.** In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ **Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens** chiefly **aired personal experiences and perspectives during** the **various community dialogues.** In keeping with their talk-show formats, **the forums showcased** what Orlando Patterson described as **"performative 'race' talk,"** "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, **performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.**73 **Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities"** Clinton also had promised to explore, **including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.**¶ **Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue"** in the name of "responsibility" and "community," **Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional,"** he writes, **"contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium."** More to the point, "**a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."**74 **Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns.** Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. **There was nothing to argue about.**"75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. **Jackson invoked** the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing **suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither** exhaustive **racial data nor concrete goals.** **"The game,"** wrote Jackson, **"is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."**77

**This is a trade-off DA --- they provide fuel to the fire**

**Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland**

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, **a communicative model that views public issues through a** relational, **personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction.** **Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is** achieving **an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression.** As Schudson puts it, **"Conversation has no end outside itself."**39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic **paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions** to public problems **by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy.** As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, **"[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal**, and **analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling** . . . **Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign** . . . **[but] only the very limited realm of** therapeutic, **small group interaction.**"40¶ Finally, and related, **a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual**, the **"self-help"** on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic **framing** of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, **provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems** such as disproportionate black [End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, **all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling** defenders of **the status quo** to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

#### The aff’s protest against racism takes place from a safe distance—this maintains ideology

A – paranoia is adopted as a hedge against the “bureaucracy” which is what the aff criticizes

B – if the desires of the movement are accomplished that equals the end of the movement

C – empirics prove, conservatives were against communism but in reality they needed communism to continue existing – paranoia needs an enemy to enjoy

Carlson, 99 – Professor of Law (David Gray and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Columbia Law Review November, 1999)

Schlag presents a dark vision of what he calls "the bureaucracy," which crushes us and controls us. It operates on "a field of pain and death." n259 It deprives us of choice, speech, n260 and custom. n261 As bureaucracy cannot abide great minds, legal education must suppress greatness through mind numbing repetition. n262 In fact, legal thought is the bureaucracy and cannot be distinguished from it. n263 If legal thought tried to buck the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy would instantly crush it. n264 Schlag observes that judges have taken "oaths that require subordination of truth, understanding, and insight, to the preservation of certain bureaucratic governmental institutions and certain sacred texts." n265 Legal scholarship and lawyers generally n266 are the craven tools of bureaucracy, and those who practice law or scholarship simply serve to justify and strengthen the bureaucracy. "If there were no discipline of American law, the liberal state would have to invent it." n267 "Legal thinkers in effect serve as a kind of P.R. firm for the bureaucratic state." n268 Legal scholarship has sold out to the bureaucracy: Insofar as the expressions of the state in the form of [statutes, etc.] can be expected to endure, so can the discipline that so helpfully organizes, rationalizes, and represents these expressions as intelligent knowledge. As long as the discipline shows obeisance to the authoritative legal forms, it enjoys the backing of the state... Disciplinary knowledge of law can be true not because it is true, but because the state makes it true. n269 Scholarship produces a false "conflation between what [academics] celebrate as 'law' and the ugly bureaucratic noise that grinds daily in the [\*1946] [ ] courts...." n270 Scholarship "becomes the mode of discourse by which bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous individuals." n271 "The United States Supreme Court and its academic groupies in the law schools have succeeded in doing what many, only a few decades ago, would have thought impossible. They have succeeded in making Kafka look naive." n272 Lacanian theory allows us to interpret the meaning of this anti-Masonic vision precisely. Schlag's bureaucracy must be seen as a "paranoid construction according to which our universe is the work of art of unknown creators." n273 In Schlag's view, the bureaucracy is in control of law and language and uses it exclusively for its own purposes. The bureaucracy is therefore the Other of the Other, "a hidden subject who pulls the strings of the great Other (the symbolic order)." n274 The bureaucracy, in short, is the superego (i.e., absolute knowledge of the ego), n275 but rendered visible and projected outward. The superego, the ego's stern master, condemns the ego and condemns what it does. Schlag has transferred this function to the bureaucracy. As is customary, n276 by describing Schlag's vision as a paranoid construction, I do not mean to suggest that Professor Schlag is mentally ill or unable to function. Paranoid construction is not in fact the illness. It is an attempt at healing what the illness is - the conflation of the domains of the symbolic, imaginary, and real. n277 This conflation is what Lacan calls "psychosis." Whereas the "normal" subject is split between the three domains, the psychotic is not. He is unable to keep the domains separate. n278 The symbolic domain of language begins to lose place to the real domain. The psychotic raves incoherently, and things begin to talk to [\*1947] him directly. n279 The psychotic, "immersed in jouissance," n280 loses desire itself. Paranoia is a strategy the subject adopts to ward off breakdown. The paranoid vision holds together the symbolic order itself and thereby prevents the subject from slipping into the psychotic state in which "the concrete 'I' loses its absolute power over the entire system of its determinations." n281 This of course means - and here is the deep irony of paraonia - that bureaucracy is the very savior of romantic metaphysics. If the romantic program were ever fulfilled - if the bureaucracy were to fold up shop and let the natural side of the subject have its way - subjectivity would soon be enveloped, smothered, and killed in the night of psychosis. n282 Paranoid ambivalence toward bureaucracy (or whatever other fantasy may be substituted for it) is very commonly observed. Most recently, conservatives "organized their enjoyment" by opposing communism. n283 By confronting and resisting an all-encompassing, sinister power, the subject confirms his existence as that which sees and resists the power. n284 As long as communism existed, conservatism could be perceived. When communism disappeared, conservatives felt "anxiety" n285 - a lack of purpose. Although they publicly opposed communism, they secretly regretted its disappearance. Within a short time, a new enemy was found to organize conservative jouissance - the cultural left. (On the left, a similar story could be told about the organizing function of racism and sexism, which, of course, have not yet disappeared.) These humble examples show that the romantic yearning for wholeness is always the opposite of [\*1948] what it appears to be. n286 We paranoids need our enemies to organize our enjoyment. Paranoid construction is, in the end, a philosophical interpretation, even in the clinical cases. n287 As Schlag has perceived, the symbolic order of law is artificial. It only exists because we insist it does. We all fear that the house of cards may come crashing down. Paradoxically**, it is this very "anxiety" that shores up the symbolic**. The normal person knows he must keep insisting that the symbolic order exists precisely because the person knows it is a fiction. n288 The paranoid, however, assigns this role to the bureaucracy (and thereby absolves himself from the responsibility). Thus, paranoid delusion allows for the maintenance of a "cynical" distance between the paranoid subject and the realm of mad psychosis. n289 In truth**, cynicism toward bureaucracy shows nothing but the unconfronted depth to which the cynic is actually committed to what ought to be abolished.**

#### Ideology is sustained because we gain enjoyment from protesting it—attempts to change the system in a debate tournament is the ultimate act of conformity since nothing is at stake

A – Kundera is a writer who opposed the socialist ideology, for his works to be of any meaning the socialist structures had to be present

B – participating in a revolt that is done from a safe distance (speeches) strengthens the system because they will tear down your revolt

C – privately indulging in cynical irony while publically obeying the rules of the system is a conformist attitude which is apolitical

D – we get enjoyment from the existence of that which we hate, because we laugh at the system

E – two examples were given – the movie Brasil has a government official marching as if he was doing something important the hero sees him but he gets enjoyment from seeing this official repeating this meaningless action and then the Opera Life with an Idiot

Zizek, 95 - Philosopher and Psychoanalyst, Institute for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Cardozo Law Review)

Emphasis should be laid on the inherent political dimension of the notion of enjoyment or on the way this kernel of enjoyment functions as a political factor. Let us probe this dimension through one of the enigmas of cultural life in postsocialist Eastern Europe: the fate of Milan Kundera. Throughout the sixties and the seventies, Kundera's novels, from The Joke to The Unbearable Lightness of Being, were hailed in the West at the quintessential cultural expression of the Central European movement, preparing the ground for the "velvet revolution" that overthrew the Communist regime in 1990. Yet in his own country, the Czech Republic, the attitude towards him in the "orthodox" dissident circles was always one of uneasiness. Even now, after the victory of democracy, he suffers a kind of excommunication in Bohemia. His works are rarely published, the media pass them over in silence, and everybody is somehow embarrassed to speak about him. In order to justify such a treatment, one rakes up old stories about his hidden collaboration with the Communist regime, about his taking refuge in private pleasures and avoiding the morally upright conflict a la Vaclav Havel, etc. However, the roots of this resistance lie deeper: Kundera conveys a message unamenable to the "normalized" democratic consciousness. At first glance, the fundamental axis that structures the universe of his works seems to be the opposition between the pretentious pathos of the official socialist ideology and the islands of everyday private life, with its small joys and pleasures, laughters and tears, beyond the reach of ideology. These islands enable us to assume a distance which renders visible the ideological ritual in its vain, ridiculous pretentiousness and grotesque meaninglessness: **it is not worth the trouble to revolt against an official ideology with pathetic speeches** on freedom and democracy - sooner or later, such a revolt leads to a new version of the "Big March"

 (Kundera's ironic name for the tightly controlled mass movement in which individual destinies are sacrificed to some sacred "progressive" ideological goal). If Kundera is reduced to such an attitude, it is easy to dismiss him via Havel's fundamental "Althusserian" insight into how the **ultimate conformist attitude** is precisely such an "apolitical" stance which, **while publicly obeying the imposed ritual, privately indulges in cynical irony**. It is not sufficient to ascertain that the ideological ritual is a mere appearance which nobody takes se- [\*930] riously - this appearance is essential, which is why one has to take a risk and refuse to participate in the public ritual. n8 One must therefore take a step further and consider that there is no way to simply step aside from ideology. The private indulgence in cynicism and the obsession with private pleasures are all precisely how totalitarian ideology operates in nonideological everyday life. It is how this life is determined by ideology, how ideology is "present in it in the mode of absence," if we may resort to this syntagma from the heroic epoch of structuralism. The depoliticization of the private sphere in late Socialist societies is "compulsive," marked by the fundamental prohibition of free political discussion; for that reason, such depoliticization always functions as the evasion of what is truly at stake. This accounts for the most immediately striking feature of Kundera's novels: the depoliticized private sphere in no way functions as the free domain of innocent pleasures; there is always something damp, claustrophobic, inauthentic, even desperate, in the characters' striving for sexual and other pleasures. In this respect, the lesson of Kundera's novels is the exact opposite of a naive reliance on the innocent private sphere; the totalitarian socialist ideology vitiates from within the very sphere of privacy to which we take refuge. This insight, however, is far from conclusive. Another step is needed to deal with Kundera's even more ambiguous lesson. Notwithstanding the dampness of the private sphere, the fact remains that the totalitarian situation gave rise to a series of phenomena attested by numerous chronicles of everyday life in the socialist East. In reaction to totalitarian ideological domination, not only a cynical escape into the "good life" of private pleasures took place, but also an extraordinary flourishing of authentic friendship, of paying visits at home, of shared dinners, and of passionate intellectual conversations in closed societies - features which usually fascinated visitors from the West. The problem, of course, is that there is no way to draw a clear line of separation between the two sides; they are the front and the back of the same coin, which is why, with the advent of democracy, they both get lost. It is to Kundera's credit that he does not conceal this ambiguity: the spirit of "Middle Europe" - of authentic friendship and intellectual sociability - sur- [\*931] vived only in Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland as a form of resistance to totalitarian ideological domination. Perhaps yet another step is to be ventured here; the very **subordination to the** socialist **order brought about** a specific **enjoyment**: not only the enjoyment provided by an awareness that people were living in a universe absolved of uncertainty (since the system possessed, or pretended to possess, an answer to everything), but above all the enjoyment of the very stupidity of the System - a relish in the emptiness of the official ritual, in the worn-out stylistic figures of the predominating ideological discourse. n9 An exemplary case of this enjoyment that pertains to the "totalitarian" bureaucratic machinery is provided by a scene from Terry Gallein's film, Brasil. n10 In the labyrinthine corridors of a large government building, a high-ranking functionary marches promptly, followed by several clerks desperately trying to keep pace with him. The functionary moves at a frenetic pace, inspecting documents and shouting orders to the people around him while quickly walking, in a great hurry, as if on his way to some important meeting. When this functionary stumbles upon the film's hero, Jonathan Pryce, he exchanges a couple of words with him and rushes forward, busy as ever. However, half an hour later, the hero sees him again in a distant corridor, carrying on his senseless ritualistic march. Enjoyment is provided by the very senselessness of the functionary's act: although his frantic officiating imitates efficiency, it is in the strict sense purposeless - a pure ritual repeated ad infinitum. The contemporary Russian composer Alfred Schnittke succeeded in exposing this quality in his opera, Life with an Idiot: n11 the so-called "Stalinism" confronts us with what Lacan designated as the imbecility inherent to the signifier as such. n12 The opera tells the story of an ordinary married man ("I") who, under a punishment imposed by the Communist Party, is compelled to take a person from a lunatic asylum to live with his family. This idiot, Vava, appears to be a "normal" bearded, bespectacled intellectual, constantly spouting meaningless political phrases; he soon, however, shows his true colors as an obscene intruder, first by having sex with I's wife and then with I himself. Vava stands here not only for [\*932] the **empty pseudointellectual prattle**, but for the imbecile obscenity of the symbolic order itself, of language which "runs amok" and gets entangled in the vicious cycle of enjoying its own game. Insofar as we are living in the universe of language, we are condemned to this imbecility of the superego: we can assume a minimal distance from it, thus rendering it more bearable, but we can never be rid of it.