#### UN Advantage – AQIM

#### Congressional Leadership – Hamilton (coherence is good)

#### New Plan

### T

#### A. Interpretation- “Introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities” refers to human members of the Armed Forces- we have the best reading of the War Powers Resolution, the only place where this phrase is defined and used

Lorber 2013 (Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961 2012-2013)

C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations¶ As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers¶ Resolution-especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation-are¶ the definitions of key terms, particularly "armed forces," as the relevant¶ provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es armed¶ forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . .. hostilities," or if¶ such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign¶ nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate¶ solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces."17 The¶ requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed¶ forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces¶ equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." 74 As is evident,¶ the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR¶ applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over¶ executive actions. The definition of "hostilities," which has garnered the¶ majority of scholarly and political attention, 75 particularly in the recent¶ Libyan conflict,76 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes¶ important if "armed forces" exist in the situation.¶ As is evident from a textual analysis, an examination of the legislative¶ history, and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, 79 "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not¶ weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section¶ 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term¶ 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of¶ members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the¶ movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any¶ foreign country or government."' While this definition pertains to the¶ broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that¶ only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition¶ under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a¶ human individual who is part of an organization."" Thus, it appears that the¶ term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed¶ forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading.¶ First, the language of the statute states that "the term 'introduction of¶ United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such¶ armed forces."12 By using inclusionary-as opposed to exclusionarylanguage,¶ one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more¶ than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core¶ principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression¶ of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as nonmembers¶ constituting armed forces) . Second, the term "member" does¶ not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual¶ units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members¶ of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces"¶ refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not¶ determinative.¶ An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress¶ clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed¶ forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around¶ who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted¶ a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects,¶ proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution¶ cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central Intelligence Agency) . This amendment was dropped after encountering¶ pushback, but the debate revolved around whether those military¶ individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed¶ forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the¶ term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the¶ congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces"¶ 186 centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,¶ suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S.¶ combat troops.¶ The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale¶ but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities.' While¶ examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon¶ only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further¶ support for those two alternate interpretive sources." As one scholar has¶ noted, "[t]he War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with¶ sending U.S. troops into harm's way." 5 The historical context of the War¶ Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the¶ resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the¶ passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to¶ effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S.¶ troops to Southeast Asia,'oo as well as prevent the President from authorizing¶ troop incursions into countries in that region.'"' The WPR was a reaction to¶ the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones,¶ and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the¶ unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces,"¶ Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to¶ offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the¶ War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses,¶ and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question¶ regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the¶ operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military¶ operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For¶ example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an¶ activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country,¶ could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First,¶ it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not¶ participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed¶ forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. Thus, individual¶ operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not¶ constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.¶ Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is¶ remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's¶ way. 1 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target¶ such systems.194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities¶ or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities-which is¶ highly unlikely-such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### B. Violation- they restrict something other than the introduction of members of the Armed Forces

#### C. Reasons to vote-

#### 1) Limits- they allow the aff to restrict anything controlled by the military- they force the neg to defend the use of every military-ish device in existence which is an impossible burden

#### 2) Precision- this is a term of art - our evidence gives the best legal analysis of what that means- that’s the most predictable basis on which to define the topic

### Ptx

#### Obama is winning the fight against a new Iran sanctions bill but PC is key to sustain democratic momentum against its passage

Lockshin 1-21 (Matt, senior campaign manager and online organizer at CREDO Action, “A Big Day for Diplomacy With Iran,” 2014, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-lockshin/a-big-day-for-diplomacy-w_b_4632941.html>, CMR)

**Monday could go down in history as the day we took our first step toward a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that prevents the country from** ever **acquiring a nuclear weapon**. But the peaceful resolution of international concerns about Iran's nuclear program is hardly assured. **Those of us who support diplomacy have an important role to play in preventing** members of the **House and the Senate** -- Democrats and Republicans -- who are **unwilling to give President Obama the** time and political space **necessary to cut a reasonable deal** with Iran. Where We Are Now On Monday, Iran began to implement an interim deal it has made with the United States and our international partners. Iran's nuclear program is now frozen and subject to the most intrusive inspections in history. And for the next six months, while Iran's nuclear program is halted, negotiators will try to reach a comprehensive diplomatic agreement between Iran, the United States and various world powers to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. President **Obama has been a strong voice for peace** despite opposition from many within his own party. **Now** more than ever**, he needs** our strong and vocal support. These negotiations represent the best chance in a decade to resolve this issue peacefully. But they will be tough, both substantively and politically. President Obama himself has only given the talks a 50/50 chance of success. The stakes of these talks are high. **The alternative to a negotiated deal will be** either a continually growing Iranian nuclear program or another American war in the Middle East. So **we shouldn't take** **counterproductive actions that make** the **negotiations** even **harder** than they need to be. Yet **that is** precisely what hawks in both chambers of Congress are trying to do. The Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - New Sanctions. Among the leading political dangers to diplomatic talks is the belligerent and reckless move to impose new sanctions on Iran while negotiations are ongoing, in violation of our commitment to our international partners and Iranian diplomats as part of an interim nuclear deal. In December, news broke that 14 Senate Democrats led by New Jersey's Robert Menendez and New York's Chuck Schumer had joined Republicans (led by Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois) in pushing a new sanctions bill (S. 1881) that would blow up diplomacy with Iran and set us on a path to war. Initially, the new sanctions bill seemed to have momentum. But last week the momentum shifted in our favor, due in no small part to those who flooded the Senate with calls demanding that Senate Democrats not help the Republicans start another war. And as of this morning, there are more Senate Democrats on the record opposing new sanctions at this time than there are Democratic co-sponsors of the new sanctions bill. The National Iranian American Council, an organization that does great work supporting diplomacy with Iran, has a nice breakdown of where various senators stand on new sanctions. You can see their whip count, here. The Second Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - Tying President Obama's Hands Iran is currently under an extremely onerous sanctions regime. Sanctions have already crippled the Iranian economy and led to widespread economic pain, like rampant unemployment and shortages of medicine and other humanitarian supplies. While the purpose of sanctions has never been to punish ordinary Iranians, they are the ones who overwhelmingly feel the pain caused by sanctions. It's widely understood that if a deal is struck, the basic contours would be our agreeing to ease sanctions with a goal of ending them in exchange for a verifiable agreement with Iran that prevents it from ever building a nuclear weapon. But some members of Congress want to move the goalposts and are trying to pass legislation that lays out the contours of what an acceptable final deal than ends sanctions would look like -- and the standards they want to establish are so unrealistic that nothing that's actually on the table would ever satisfy them. This kind of legislation is not only dangerous if it passes. Iranian diplomats are less likely to go out on a limb and agree to potentially politically unpopular provisions if they don't believe Congress will back up President Obama by supporting the deal he cuts. The bottom line is that Congress needs to give President Obama the space he needs to cut a reasonable deal. Legislation that seeks to tie his hands not only makes it less likely that diplomacy will succeed (which in turn makes war much more likely), it also makes it more likely that the failure of diplomacy would be blamed (perhaps justifiably) on the United States. What Can We Do Now? The short version is that we need to do all that we can to provide time and space for the administration to negotiate a verifiable deal that protects our interests and advances our security in a peaceful manner. Congress will try to prevent that, and it's our job to ensure that it doesn't. In terms of strategy, we need to keep the pressure on Democrats in both chambers of Congress not to help the Republicans start another war. Senate Democrats are our top targets. Although momentum has slowed on the new Iran sanctions bill, we remain in a dangerous position. If anything goes even a little awry in the ongoing negotiations, then move for new sanctions can quickly regain momentum. Getting more Democratic senators on the record opposing new sanctions now is a priority, as is holding accountable those who are pushing for new sanctions. In the House, we need to make sure Democrats don't give bipartisan support to any bill, even a non-binding resolution, supporting new sanctions or setting down markers about what an acceptable final deal will look like. And Democrats in both chambers need to be reminded that should President Obama cut a reasonable deal with Iran, we will need them to back him up by passing legislation that reduces sanctions in exchange for a verifiable agreement that stops Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear bomb.

#### **Plan destroys Obama**

Loomis 7 Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### Sanction bill guarantees US backing of Israeli strikes on Iran – encourages Israel to act

Perr 12/24/13 – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon. Jon has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002). (Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

**Global war**

**Trabanco 9** – Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at anytime,” \*\*http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762\*\*)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. **Teheran will** unquestionably **resort to** its **proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah** (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) **to carry out attacks** against Israel, America and their allies, effectively **setting in flames** a large portion of **the Middle East**. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such **conflict could** rapidlyspiral out of control and thus a relatively **minor clash could** quickly **and** dangerously **escalate by engulfing the whole region and** perhaps even **beyond**. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (**America, Russia**, Europe, **China**). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### K

#### The affirmative is an attempt to sustain the neoliberal order- we must resist- Social solidarity against neoliberalism is the only way to prevent social regression

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Just as the right's growing hegemony from the 1980s onward eroded majoritarian support for progressive taxation and universal public goods, radical theory, through its dominant concerns for difference and transgression, abandoned any intellectual defense of the core democratic value of social solidarity. In the United States today, social solidarity is the forgotten sibling among the troika of democratic values—“liberty, equality, and fraternity”—that suffused the democratic social revolutions from the French Revolution onwards. The concept of “fraternity,” or, in gender neutral terms, “solidarity,” implies that citizens develop a capacity for empathy toward others and for trust in their fellows. Democratic citizens act in solidarity with one another because they recognize that their common project is an interdependent one and thus each member of the community has both a moral and an instrumental interest in assuring a minimal level of well-being for all.¶ For much of the twentieth century the left in capitalist democracies fought to expand social rights out of the belief that radical social inequality eroded the value of equal political and civil rights. If democracy involves the making of binding laws by equal citizens, the left argued, there cannot exist a group of citizens who are so socially excluded that they cannot participate politically. Universal public education emerged with the rise of democracy precisely out of insurgent social movements' concern that all citizens gain a “civic education.” Over time, excluded social groups fought to be included as full citizens; and the expansion of citizen rights to “others”—the essence of social solidarity—continues today in the fight for immigrant rights across the globe. As the work of T.H. Marshall and Karl Polanyi demonstrates, the historic struggle between democratic left and right has revolved around the extent to which social rights—public provision, social insurance, and labor rights—should constrain the inegalitarian outcomes of a market-based economy.23¶ Thus, even the most classically liberal of democratic polities—the United States and the United Kingdom—provide minimal levels of universal insurance against disability, unemployment, and old age. But among developed democracies only the “liberal market” United States and United Kingdom do not provide universal forms of state-funded childcare or child support. This reality enabled the right, in both countries, to deploy racialized “anti-welfare” politics that mobilized a segment of the working class, whose formal market earnings rendered them ineligible for means-tested child support programs, against both strong public provision and the relatively high rates of taxation that regressive tax policies impose upon working families.¶ That is, in the dialectic of democracy and solidarity the bonds of fellowship are not naturally fixed. Democratic social movements frequently struggle to expand the popular conception of who is part of the “we.” Often, in times of national crisis and broad social vulnerability, bonds of solidarity expand and strengthen, as do social policies that insure a universal economic and social floor under which citizens cannot fall. Hence, we associate the expansion of social and labor rights during the New Deal and French Popular Front governments with the shared vulnerability of the Great Depression. The United States' GI Bill and the post-World War II radical expansion of the British welfare state came immediately after a “total war” in which victory depended upon the military and productive contributions of working-class men and women, recent immigrants, and oppressed minorities.¶ Thus far, strong bonds of social solidarity have only been constructed (and also eroded) at the level of the nation state, the community of “we” versus “them.” In addition, radical theory and practice has yet to tackle the difficulty of expanding social rights—and of defending existing ones—during periods of capitalist stagnation and global economic restructuring. This makes even more pressing, but also problematic, the project of expanding solidarity across national borders. Today, the struggle for greater solidarity between the working people of northern Europe and southern Europe will define whether the European project becomes more democratic or fragments on the shoals of anti-solidaristic austerity policies.¶ But the contraction of public provision under neoliberal capitalism is no more natural or inexorable than was its historical expansion. Today, the struggle of undocumented workers for an expeditious path to citizenship should lead normative theorists to revisit arguments as to why political, civil, and social rights should be extended to all those (and their dependents) who contribute productive labor to our society. And at a time when the minimum wage is less than one-half of the real value it had in the 1960s, low-wage service workers—both native-born and immigrants—are beginning to protest their inability to raise a family in dignity on their meager wages. Such protest will likely expand if undocumented immigrants gain secure legal rights. In addition, as the baby boomers come to retirement with inadequate savings and radically underfunded or non-existent pensions, there is likely to be resistance to neoliberal efforts to constrict, rather than expand, Social Security.

#### Alternative is to reject the 1AC to stand in solidarity against neoliberalism, this is necessary to secure difference while confronting racial, gender and economic domination

Joseph M. Schwartz, 8-9-13 (Professor of Political Science at Temple University. Schwartz's teaching and published work focuses on the complex interaction among morality, ideology, and political and institutional development., “A Peculiar Blind Spot: Why did Radical Political Theory Ignore the Rampant Rise in Inequality Over the Past Thirty Years?”, Volume 35, Issue 3, 2013, Special Issue: Studying Politics Today: Critical Approaches to Political Science)

Given how divided the United States is, not only politically, but also geographically and socially on lines of race, class, and citizenship status, democratic theorists perhaps should refocus their energies on defining the role solidarity and equality of standing must play in the construction of a just society. For example, the political conflict likely to define America's political future is how expeditiously undocumented workers and their dependents become full citizens. Unlike some who long for a return to a class-based politics of social solidarity, I am well aware that forms of racial, national, and gender exclusion helped construct past forms of political solidarity.12 Moreover, the working class has never been a truly homogeneous and “universal class”; its identity and consciousness are constructed in complex ways that reflect the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality and the role that ideology and culture play in social life.¶ Yet, absent a revival of a pluralist, majoritarian left it is hard to imagine how difference can be institutionalized in an egalitarian manner. Theorists of difference are, in some ways, blind to the reality that difference (or “diversity”) can be—and is being—institutionalized on a radically inegalitarian social terrain, in which some social groups have much more power and opportunity than others. This blind spot mimics the weaknesses of the liberal pluralist theory that dominated political science in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, radical theorists pointed out that liberal pluralist society failed to be fully democratic because some groups had inordinate economic and political power as compared to their small numbers within the demos.13 Today, the same critique of difference can be made.¶ Post-structuralist theorists' focus on the performative resistance of decentered, mutable selves also fails to recognize that the performative options of working-class individuals, persons of color, women, and gays and lesbians are constrained by the structural distribution of racial, economic, and gendered forms of power. Thus, if the performative options of the vast majority are to be enhanced, left theorists have to recover a politics and practice of solidarity and democratic equality; concepts which neither a pure politics of difference nor an agonal politics of post-structuralist radical democracy can adequately ground.

#### Neoliberalism’s placement of the market as the highest priority has created a system of states that only rely on massive production. This is destroying the planet and causing massive amounts of poverty

**BERDAYES ‘4** (VICENTE, ASSOC PROF OF COMM STUDIES @SAINT MARY’S COLLEGE, GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE)

**Considering the world in this ecological manner highlights one of the contradictions embedded in the word “globalization,” for by the dose of the twentieth century it was clear that the transnational capitalist order was degrading the Earth’s environment and unraveling the biological and climatic interdependencies that constitute the world’s ecology. This liter-ally antiglobal form of globalization had already led to the extinction of many life forms and continues to stress the planet’s varied ecosystems to the point of collapse**.47 This environmental deterioration has not resulted from factors such as overpopulation working in isolation but instead is an outgrowth of what Emmanuel Wallerstein had termed the “modern world system.”**48 In the course of the modern era this network of relation­ships has led to the dissolution of traditional societies and premodern civilizations**, the dislocation and proletarianization of populations, and the constitution of an international order of states based on economic de­pendencies between core and peripheral nations. **The result is a “system” of intensive resource and labor exploitation that is catastrophic in scale whether measured in terms of its environmental impacts or the progres­sive impoverishment of the world’s peoples.49 The roots of this ecological and sociological crisis have been traced to several elements of Western culture, including** the ideal of dominating nature evident in the Judeo-Christian tradition, **the rise of political and economic individualism with the concomitant incessant pursuit of wealth, and the emergence of modern science and technology with their objectifying ontologies and epistemologies**. In the modern era, **these am­bient facets of culture crystallized into an explicitly exploitative attitude toward nature goaded by the overarching context of free-market capi­talism.50 Neoliberal economic theory**, in particular, **provides a framework of concepts that justifies the exploitation of natural resources for short-term profits. By idealizing continuous economic growth and the expan­sion of markets as the epitome of rationality, any attempt to forward sustainable or “steady-state” models of economic development seems preposterous**.51 In short, **while the market model is often celebrated as the basis of a global order, its underlying economistic rationality is ac­tually the basis for dissolving the planet’s primordial and truly global system of interdependencies.**52 <P36-37

### UN

#### Terror studies forms an epistemic community which reinforces dominant power structures and legitimizes western security agendas – their knowledge is produced within a self-referential state-sponsored sphere which excludes dissenting voices

Jackson et al ‘09 (Richard Jackson, Reader in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, where he is also a senior researcher in the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, “Critical terrorism studies: Framing a new research agenda,” in “Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda,” ed: Richard Jackson, p. 217-221)

A related weakness in the field is the dominance of what can be called ‘problem-solving’ approaches to the study of political terror which fail to interrogate the role of the status quo and existing power structures in perpetuating insecurity and violence (Gunning, 2007a). The adoption of a problem-solving approach is in part a consequence of the frequently compromising ethical-political relationships between states and their security agencies, and some scholars and analysts engaged in the study of non-state terrorism (Ranstorp, Raphael, this volume). This is the so-called ‘embedded experts’ or ‘organic intellectuals’ problem, whereby the leading scholars constitute an influential epistemic community directly linked to state power (see Burnett and Whyte, 2005; Jackson, 2007f). The dominance of this intellectual network is in part maintained through the operation of closed, static, and self-referential systems of knowledge production which function to exclude scholars with dissenting or counter-hegemonic views (see Reid, 1993). But it is also a function of the dominance of state-centric, realist perspectives among the leading scholars within the field. A particularly deleterious consequence of adopting a problem-solving perspective is the prioritisation of topics tailored to the demands of policymakers for practically useful knowledge in the fight against terrorism, or, the securitisation of research. Importantly, we detect a failure in the field to adequately reflect upon questions of research ethics, particularly as they relate to the safety of informants and primary researchers, the effects of research on ‘suspect communities’ and different end-users, and the way terrorism research is frequently called upon by governments and elites to legitimise certain counterterrorism practices and policies (see Breen Smyth, this volume; Toros, 2008b). There is no getting away from the reality that as with other terms like ‘paedophile’ or ‘rapist’, using the ‘terrorism’ label in relation to other human beings has real consequences on their lives and well-being and that of their families, friends, and wider community. More broadly, and related to the problem of embeddedness and problem-solving in the service of the status quo, we believe insufficient attention is paid to the ethics of advocating, endorsing, or just failing to openly condemn particular counterterrorism policies such as targeted assassination, rendition, torture, internment, shoot-to-kill policies, and harsh prison sentencing. Similarly, there has not been sufficient, rigorous research into the immediate, long-term and wider social effects of these counterterrorism policies, although an increasing number of (non-traditional) scholars have come to question the advisability of such tactics on the basis of empirical research (see Araj, 2008; Hafez, 2003). Finally, there is the impact of the current war on terrorism, which has had a noticeably chilling and disciplining effect on terrorism research due to the disciplinary nature of the ‘you are either for us or against us’ rhetoric and the political demands for national unity. This has lead directly to attempts at censorship of certain academics and commentators by some states, other scholars, and media commentators, as well as self-censorship and pressure on academics by state security organisations to inform on their students (see Breen Smyth, this volume). Another effect of the war on terrorism has been the compromising of existing research relationships through the co-option of researchers into government-determined research programmes, and the tainting of researchers with the suspicion that they may be working for the security services. Lastly, the war on terror has created a legal environment in which withholding information about one’s informants or possessing certain kinds of widely available materials are now criminal offences.

#### This ensures massive escalation – this approach is historically the largest proximate cause of violent death – non-state terrorism can’t hold a candle to it

Jackson et al ‘08 (Richard, Reader in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, where he is also a senior researcher in the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Eamon Murphy, Professor of History and International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia, and Scott Poynting, Professor in Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Introduction,” in “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and practice,” p. 1-2)

By all accounts, state terrorism has been one of the greatest sources of human suffering and destruction of the past five centuries. Employing extreme forms of exemplary violence against ordinary people and specific groups in order to engender political submission to newly formed nation states, transfer popula- tions, and generate labour in conquered colonial territories, imperial powers and early modern states killed literally tens of millions of people and destroyed entire civilizations and peoples across the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, the sub- continent, the Middle East, and Africa. Later, during the twentieth century, modern states were responsible for the deaths of 170 million to 200 million people outside of war (Rummel 1994), a great many of them murdered during notorious campaigns of state terrorism such as Stalin’s great terror, Mao’s Great Leap Forward, and Kampuchea’s return to Year Zero, and the rule of various dictatorial regimes in Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Uganda, Somalia, Indone- sia, Iran, Iraq and dozens of other countries. During the great wars of the twenti- eth century, millions of civilians were killed in atomic attacks and ‘terror bombing’ campaigns designed specifically to undermine morale and intimidate into submission – a case of randomly killing some people in order to influence others, which is the essence of the terrorist strategy (Grosscup 2006). Disturbingly, state terrorism remains as one of the single greatest threats to human and societal security and well-being today. Certainly, in comparison to the terrorism perpetrated by non-state insurgent groups, the few thousand deaths and injuries caused by ‘terrorism from below’ every year pales into rela- tive insignificance besides the hundreds of thousands of people killed, kid- napped, ‘disappeared’, injured, tortured, raped, abused, intimidated, and threatened by state agents and their proxies in dozens of countries across the globe in places like Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Congo, Somalia, uzbekistan, China and elsewhere. Even more disturb- ingly, government-directed campaigns of counter-terrorism in the past few decades have frequently descended into state terrorism by failing to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, responding highly disproportionately to acts of insurgent violence, and aiming to terrify or intimidate the wider population or particular communities into submission (Goodin 2006: 69–73). Consequently, the victims of state counter-terrorism have always vastly outnumbered the deaths caused by non-state or insurgent terrorism, including in the ongoing global war on terrorism.

#### Terrorism as a framework for politics creates diplomatic blowback- the aff’s choice to ground their advantages in a shift to terrorism policy militarize international cooperation and allow states to justify narrow self-interest in the name of anti-terror policy- makes long-term foreign policy disaster inevitable

Campbell ‘2, (David, Prof. of International Politics @ Newcastle University, “Time Is Broken: The Return of the Past In the Response to September 11”, *Theory and Event*, 5:4, Project Muse)

While the current operations of the war machine do not represent a changed world, some of their effects will undoubtedly change the world. Foremost amongst these is the way the focus on "the war against terrorism" as the organizing priority of international society interpolates all other issues into a manichean structure within which there is little if any space for ambiguity and complexity. Bush's simplistic rhetoric -- that you are either with us or with the terrorists, and that the United States will make no distinction between terrorists and those who support them -- produces a context in which one set of concerns will blowback into many others. "Blowback" is the term favored by intelligence agencies when they speak of policies from another time coming back to haunt the present and change the course of the future. It is common to analyses of Afghanistan which demonstrate that the network of financiers, suppliers and supporters now used by bin Laden and the al-Qa'eda organization was established by the US and Pakistan as part of the mujahadeen struggle against the Soviet occupation.[[24]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn24) Now that bin Laden and others are the objects of enmity rather than partners in an anti-communist struggle, we are witnessing how the construction of the much proclaimed international coalition against terrorism is a policy that will blowback into other areas with perverse effects. Indeed, despite the constant reiteration that this is a new kind of war, there is little more than return of the past in the way the US and Britain have responded. In the first place, the notion of an international coalition is misplaced. The war machine is a unilateralist US instrument, with some British input. While a handful of other countries have offered small-scale military support to the campaign, there is no desire on the Bush administration's part to cramp its style by having others involved in decision making. The extensive diplomatic activity that the media characterizes as being an effort to keep the 'fragile international coalition together' involves little more than the US and Britain buying acquiescence from states that might otherwise have opposed military action overtly. Such complicity comes at a price, however. Seeing that the US now wishes to view the world and its struggles through the lens of an international campaign against global terror, numerous countries (including China, Macedonia, Malaysia, India and Indonesia) have been rushing to demonstrate how their internal conflicts are the product of terrorist networks. Others, such as Australia, have proffered the spurious claim that their hostility to refugees is justified on anti-terrorism grounds.[[25]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn25) In each case, the purpose is to make difficult international criticism of their repressive responses. Russia is a case in point. Having allowed the US to approach former Soviet states bordering Afghanistan for basing rights during the war, President Putin has demanded that the US and the European Union cease criticism of Russian policies in Chechnya, where human rights abuses in the on-going war are rampant.[[26]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn26) During a visit to Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder duly obliged Putin by observing "as regards Chechnya, there will be and must be a more differentiated evaluation in world opinion."[[27]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn27) The White House spokesperson went further, stating that the US now accepts that al-Qa'eda has exploited and may have even caused the war in Chechnya.[[28]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn28) What we have, then, is the war on terrorism morphing into a re-run of the Cold War. The Cold War, remember, was both a struggle which exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union, and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates -- regardless of their strategic capacity to be a threat -- were slotted as a threat. If we recall that the phrase 'cold war' was coined by a fourteenth-century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase denotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is not context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of threat. But what was distinctive about the Cold War, and what has survived the demise of the Soviet Union, are the long established interpretive dispositions towards the international environment. These involve the zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all responses, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them.[[29]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4campbell.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn29) This return of the past means we have different objects of enmity, different allies, but the same structure for relating to the world through foreign and security policy. In the current context, this structure means that abuses and atrocities equal to or greater than the original crime that put us on this new path will be overlooked and tolerated, so long as the strategic goal remains in focus. What we are witnessing, therefore, is an emerging form of strategic international McCarthyism. Struggles unrelated to the global threat will nonetheless be cast as compradors of international terrorism, repressive policies will not be questioned, and those that dare criticize this complicity will be labeled fellow travelers of the terrorists.

#### Hegemony is the biggest source of international terrorism – we’ve killed over 6 million people and started the most wars – links turns their empiricism args

Trainer 2 - Senior Lecturer, School of Social Work, University of New South Wales (Ted, "If you want affluence, prepare for War," Democracy & Nature: The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy; Jul2002, Vol. 8 Issue 2, p281-299)

 [Non-listed examples – Germany – 40k. Japan – 1M. Laos – 1M. Iraq – 1M. Cambodia – 400k]

When things like this happen rich countries do not hesitate to support oppressive regimes willing to keep their countries to economic policies that will benefit local elites and rich countries, or to get rid of governments that threaten not to go along with such policies. Usually the rationale is in terms of the need to help a friendly government to put down a rebellion. Until recently this could always be labelled 'communist subversion', thereby eliminating any concerns about the legitimacy of the action. However in Colombia it has recently been labelled as a 'war on the drug trade', and in general it can now be labelled as a 'war on terrorism'. On many occasions governments of rich countries have waged ruthless war to install or get rid of regimes, according to whether or not they would facilitate the access of our corporations and the diversion of their resources and productive capacity to purposes that suited us. In other words the rich countries have an elaborate and powerful empire that they protect, extend and control mostly via their economic power, via the supply of military equipment and training to repressive regimes and via client regimes they support with money and arms, but often via the use of their own military force. Our living standards could not be as high as they are if a great deal of brutal repression was not being used to keep people to the economic policies that enrich us at their expense. As Herman says, there is a '… ruthless imposition of a neoliberal regime that serves Western transnational corporate interests, along with a willingness to use unlimited force to achieve Western ends. This is genuine imperialism, sometimes using economic coercion alone, sometimes supplementing it with violence.'13 Following are some illustrative references taken from the large literature documenting the nature and functioning of the empire. Much of this evidence indicts the USA but this is incidental. The core problem is the powerful acquisitive drive in the Western mentality which fuels the insatiable quest for greater personal wealth and higher 'living standards', greater corporate wealth and a rising GDP. Given this, nations will compete for scarce resources and one will emerge as dominant, and run the empire in its own interests. In our era, the dominant power just happens to be the USA. The fundamental long-term task is not to restrain US behaviour but to deal with the underlying motivation that comes from deep within Western culture and that generates imperialism and related problems, such as ecological destruction and resource depletion. In the early 1980s, approximately 40,000 people were killed by the ruling class in El Salvador, mostly via 'death squads' composed of off-duty military officers and police. 'The regime which presides over these measures would long since have collapsed were it not for the support of the USA. US-backed loans in 1981 amounted to US$523 million.14 The USA ensures '… the maintenance of a violent and undemocratic regime … which without American intervention would clearly fall within the next three months …'.15 Training by US military '… has directly aided the oligarchy to carry out its terror campaign against peasant and worker masses …'.16 'The US has unfailingly supplied the tools of terror and repression to the Salvadoran military, as well as training in their use.'17 After referring to similar massacres in Guatemala, Chomsky says '… this is international terrorism, supported or directly organised in Washington with the assistance of its international network of mercenary states.'18 In Indonesia in 1965, approximately 500,000 'communists' were slaughtered. The USA fuelled the climate which led to the bloodbath, supplied names, provided equipment and above all opted not to take steps to oppose the event it knew was coming.19 '… the US has undeniably launched major terrorist attacks against Cuba … including attempts to assassinate Castro. CIA trained Cuban exiles bombed a Cuban civilian airliner, killing all 73 aboard …'.20 George notes that most of these attacks of terrorism were organised by the Kennedy administration.21 Chomsky says '… the worst single terrorist act of 1985 was a car-bombing in Beirut on 8 March that killed 80 people and wounded 256. According to Woodward the attack "… was arranged by the CIA and its Saudi clients with the assistance of Lebanese intelligence and a British specialist …".22 In 1986 the major single terrorist act was the US bombing of Libya.'23 US efforts to crush the Sandinista government in Nicaragua constitute one of the clearest and most disturbing instances of sustained terrorism. The USA helped to install and then to maintain the Somaza regime for 46 years (the Somoza family ended up with 30% of the country's farmland).24 As Easterbrook says '… the US launched a war against Nicaragua. That was a terrible war. Tens of thousands of people died. The country was practically destroyed. The Nicaraguans went to the World Court … the World Court ruled in their favour and ordered the United States to stop its "unlawful use of force" (that means international terrorism) and pay substantial reparations … The United States responded by dismissing the court with contempt and escalating the attack. (Chomsky reports that US$100 million in military aid was immediately granted.25) At that point Nicaragua went to the UN Security council that voted a resolution calling on all states to obey international law … the United States vetoed it. Nicaragua then went to the General Assembly, which two years in a row passed a similar resolution with only the United States and Israel opposed.'26 The Contras were organised by the CIA to attack the Nicaraguan government. '… the documentation of the murder of civilians as standard operating procedure of the Contras was already massive in 1984.'27 Former CIA director Stansfield Turner stated to a House subcommittee that US support for the Contras '… would have to be characterised as terrorism …'.28 If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War During the 1980s, the USA assisted South Africa in the wars it initiated against neighbouring states in its effort to defend apartheit. Gervasi and Wong detail the activities that resulted in 1.5 million war related deaths.29 Some people, regions and countries have endured especially horrific consequences of this imperial situation and have abundant reason for violent hatred of the systems and nations that have inflicted intense and chronic suffering, and humiliation and indifference on them. This is most obvious in the case of the Palestinians, forced to live in squalid refugee camps for decades subject to periodic harassment and slaughter, while the US gives 40% of its foreign aid to Israel.30 Much of this has been military equipment used to kill Palestinian and other Muslim people. Some 20,000 were killed when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon. Israel has been frequently condemned by the UN for holding territory taken from the Palestinians and building settlements on it. When Iraq invaded Kuwait the USA retaliated with military force, killing hundreds of thousands, but the USA does not condemn Israel's invasions and acquisitions. Pilger says 'In Palestine the illegal occupation by Israel would have collapsed long ago were it not for US backing …'31 Of course, Israel's behaviour must be seen as a response to a problem of extreme insecurity and the death of many of its own citizens; the point of these illustrations is not to condemn Israel and exonerate the Arabs, it is to insist that the Palestinians like many other groups have abundant reason to be extremely discontented about the way they have been treated by the West and therefore to make events like 11 September somewhat less unintelligible . East Timor provides another of the most disturbing instances of recent Western state behaviour. Rich Western countries did not speak out, let alone condemn, let alone block the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, which they recognised as being in their interests. Instead they sold the Indonesians the weapons used to kill some 200,000 East Timorese people. US presidents Ford and Carter supported the takeover. Budiardjo quotes a US State Department official as saying Indonesia is '… a nation we do a lot of business with ... we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor.'32 Britain '… offered the Indonesian regime continuous and increasing military, financial and diplomatic support'.33 'It is well established that the Western powers … had already decided to give Indonesia a free hand'.34 In Iran '… the US installed the Shah as an amenable dictator in 1953, trained his secret services in "methods of interrogation" and lauded him as he ran his regime of torture'.35 The USA supported Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980s as he 'carried out his war (with Iran) … and turned a blind eye to his use of chemical weapons …'.36 'In Vietnam selected Vietnamese troops were organised into terror squads.'37 '… indiscriminate killing of civilians was a central part of a "counter-insurgency war" in which 20,000 civilians were systematically assassinated under the CIA's Operation Phoenix Program …'38 Pilger says this operation was the model for the later terror carried out in Chile and Nicaragua.39 In the 1960s, Kennedy instituted 'counterinsurgency, essentially the development of "special forces" trained in the use of terror to prevent peasants from supporting revolutionary groups'. For decades the US School of the Americas has provided this training to large numbers of Latin American police and military personnel, including many of the regions worst tyrants and torturers. As Monbiot says, 'The US has been training terrorists at a camp in Georgia for years—and it's still at it.'40 Training manuals include explicit material on the use of torture and terror.41 '… torture, "disappearance", mass killings and political imprisonment became the norm in many of the nations most heavily assisted by the United States …'42 Again, there is an extensive literature documenting these and many other cases.43 Herman and O'Sullivan present a table showing that in recent decades the overwhelming majority of terrorist actions, measured by death tolls, have been carried out by Western states. 'State terror has been immense, and the West and it's clients have been the major agents.'44 Any serious student of international relations or US foreign policy will be clearly aware of the general scope and significance of the empire that rich countries operate, and of the human rights violations, the violence and injustice this involves. Rich world 'living standards', corporate prosperity, comfort and security could not be sustained at anywhere near current levels without this empire, nor without the oppression, violence and military activity that keep in place conventional investment, trade and development policies. It should therefore be not in the least surprising that several hundred million people more or less hate the rich Western nations. This is the context in which events like those of 11 September must be understood. It is surprising that the huge and chronic injustice, plunder, repression and indifference evident in the global economic system has not generated much greater hostile reaction from the Third World, and more eagerness to hit back with violence. This is partly explained by the fact that it is in the interests of Third World rulers to acquiesce in conventional development strategies. Given the foregoing documentation it hardly needs to be added that in the modern era the USA is by far the greatest practitioner of terrorism in the world. Again space permits no more than a brief selection from the many summary statements to this effect. 'The US has rained death and destruction on more people in more regions of the globe than any other nation in the period since the Second World War … it has employed its military forces in other countries over 70 times since 1945, not counting innumerable instances of counter insurgency operations by the CIA.'45 '… the US state has long been using terrorist networks, and carrying out acts of terror itself.'46 The US '… is the greatest source of terror on earth'.47 'The greatest source of terrorism48 is the US itself and some of the Latin American countries.'49 '… the US is itself a leading terrorist state.'50 'There are many terrorist states, but the United States is unusual in that it is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its rivals to shame.'51 'We are the target of terrorists because in much of the world our government stands for dictatorship, bondage, and human exploitation. … We are the target of terrorists because we are hated. … And we are hated because our governments have done hateful things. … Time after time we have ousted popular leaders who wanted the riches of the land to be shared by the people who worked it. … We are hated because our government denies (democracy, freedom, human rights) to people in Third World countries whose resources are coveted by our multinational corporations. '52 'In 1998 Amnesty International released a report that made it clear that the US was 'at least as responsible for extreme violation of human rights around the globe as—including the promotion of torture and terrorism and state violence—as any government or organisation in the world.'53 'From any objective standpoint, Israel and the United States more frequently rely on terrorism, and in forms that inflict far greater quantums of suffering on their victims than do their opponents. '54 That this has been clearly understood for decades by critical students of American Foreign Policy is evident in the following quotes from the late 1970s and early 1980s. '… the US and its allies have armed the elites of the Third World to the teeth, and saturated them with counterinsurgency weaponry and training. … Hideous torture has become standard practice in US client fascist states. … Much of the electronic and other torture gear, is US supplied and great numbers of … interrogators are US trained …'.55 "Many of the world's most brutal dictatorships "… are in place precisely because they serve US interests in a joint venture with local torturers at the expense of their majorities".'56 After documenting supply of aid to 23 countries guilty of 'human rights abuses', Trosan and Yates say, 'Without US help they would be hard pressed to contain the fury of their oppressed citizens and US businesses would find it difficult to flourish'. Whenever their people have rebelled and tried to seize power, thereby threatening foreign investments, the USA has on every occasion actively supported government repression and terror, or has promoted coups to overthrow popular governments.57

#### 1. Zero risk of nuclear terrorism

Mearsheimer Professor of Political Science at UChicago ’11 (John, January, “Imperial by Design,” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=10>, Mike)

The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

#### 2. No motivation for nuclear terror

Francis J. Gavin 10, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, “Same As It Ever Was,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37

A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. . . . Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.” 57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58 As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that popular wisdom on the topic is significantly flawed.”59

#### 3. No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

#### Liberal war makes war ontological which destroys rationality—it will deploy “peaceful” processes to create ongoing wars against those who fall outside of humanity

Behnke & Bishai, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading & Senior Program Officer in the Education Program at the United States Institute of Peace, in ‘7

[Linda S. & Andreas, “War, violence and the displacement of the political”, in The International Political thought of Carl Schmitt, eds. Louiza Osysseos and Fabio Petito, pg. 116-8]

These rulers and their regimes can be identified by evaluating their behavi-our according to the criteria already documented in the UN system: the rule of law and human rights; rights of association and organization; freedom of expression and belief; and personal autonomy and economic rights. (ibid.: 140) The liberal project thus establishes an epistemic hegemony over its ‘other’. Self-determination and the notion that the people within a society themselves evaluate the political performance of its leadership are eliminated in favour of an apparently objectified yet clearly liberal gaze. And in order to prevent the ‘problem cases’ from exercising their potential for violence, liberal states are empowered to exercise their potential for violence in the form of diplomatic pressure or incentives, economic measures, or coer- cive action, often in combination. It can also incorporate new strategies such as indicting individual leaders . . . [or] support for non-violent resis- tance movements that are dedicated to democratizing their governments. (ibid.: 145) The crucial point here is that for liberal international lawyers, ‘the duty to prevent’ can and should be exercised pre-emptively. The fact that Saddam Hussein did not in fact possess weapons of mass destruction did not remove him from the liberal project, as the ‘nature of his regime’ defined his dangerousness, giving reason to ‘prosecute Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity com- mitted back in the 1980s’ (ibid.: 139). In other words, the prosecution would be a matter of expediency, with the goal not the pursuit of justice, but the elimina-tion of a particular regime. Again, the functionalist and purely regulatory trunca-tion of international law shows its face. Finally, given the duty to prevent assigned to liberal states, the UN Security Council is but one of various institutional structures through which to conduct the intervention. It is an expedient choice, rather than the exclusive one, as it still has ‘unmatched legitimacy’. However, given the urgency of the cause, less legitimate alternatives for enforcement, that is regional organizations or unilat- eral actions, are acceptable too once the UN Security Council is ‘paralyzed’ (ibid.: 148). In this case, a unilateral intervention might be ‘illegal but legitim- ate’. Again putting purpose ahead of process, the ends justify the means. As for Iraq, ‘even without such evidence [of weapons of mass destruction] the United States and its allies can justify their intervention if the Iraqi people welcome their coming and if they turn immediately back to the United Nations to rebuild the country’ (Slaughter 2003: A33). Leaving aside whether a ‘return back’ to the institution that was shunned in the decision-making process about the intervention in the first place can really establish the post hoc legitimacy of the intervention, and how to establish the response of the ‘Iraqi people’ in an unambiguous fashion, what becomes clear in these formulations is that liberal war is ultimately an ontological war, a war against a different form of being, rather than a war against a strategic enemy. Its most consistent formulation defines the foe simply in terms of its adherence to allegedly universal definitions of ‘popular sovereignty’ and dispenses with any kind of consideration of the extent to which such a country produces a manifest strategic threat. At stake now is whether a state is based on ‘popular sover- eignty’ rather than the ‘anachronistic’ rule of some home-grown specialist in violence who seizes and purports to wield the authority of the government against the wishes of the people, by naked power, by putsch or by coup, by the usurpation of an election or by those systematic corruptions of the electoral process in which almost 100 percent of the electorate purportedly votes for the incumbent’s list. (Reisman 2000: 243) What counts in modern international law instead is ‘the sovereignty of the people and not a metaphysical abstraction called the State’ (ibid.: 252). This argument, however, is problematic in so far as it stipulates a possible distinction between the state as ‘a metaphysical abstraction’ and the people as the real and primary referent of sovereignty (ibid.: 252). Reisman further muddies the water by offering the paradoxical observation that ‘international law still protects sov- ereignty, but . . . it is the people’s sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sover- eignty [sic!]’ (ibid.: 243). At a minimum, these formulations further obscure the relationship between state, people and sovereignty. First, it remains unclear to what extent a ‘people’ can have a claim to political status in the absence of the institutional structure of the state. Second, what exactly happens to the sovereign when his sovereignty is no longer recognized? Reisman seems to suggest that sovereignty is both essence (the sovereign) and attribute (his ‘recognizable’ sovereignty). Finally, the reality of the ‘people’ themselves is dubious. Reisman begins to acknow- ledge this issue, if in a marginal way, when he discusses the nitty-gritty of restoring democracy, a process he admits can be ‘messy, unpleasant, costly and susceptible to abuse’ (ibid.: 254). For example, we might find the ‘absence of a consensus on who should govern’, have doubts about the ‘integrity of the elec- tions’, or see ‘diverse groups vying for power’. So ‘no one can be sure that the unilateral intervener from the outside is implementing popular wishes. To varying extents, the intervener will be shaping them’ (ibid.: 254; emphasis added). In other words, the people in question are not necessarily sovereign at all, if sovereignty entails autonomous decision on their own political order. However, the outside intervention in fact reproduces the very logic that justified and led to the intervention in the first place: the ‘usurpation’ or ‘corruption’ of an election and the free will of the people. To invoke ‘popular sovereignty’ as a legal ground for outside intervention thus deconstructs itself, revealing itself as a political act or, in Derrida’s terms, a coup de force, creating what it purports to merely represent (Derrida 1992).

#### Idea of a just war feeds into Nuclear industrial complex Humanity necessitates Just War to legitimize its use of WMDs and absolute war against the absolute inhuman enemy- makes extinction inevitable

Shapiro, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Government, Illinois State University, in ‘8

[Kam, Carl Schmitt and the intensification of politics, pg. 89]

None of this is to suggest some kind of technological determinism on Schmitt's part. As he notes elsewhere, the technological obviation of de facto spatial boundaries is not enough to explain changing legal forms. After all, the traditional three-mile boundary persisted long after having been rendered symbolic by enhanced artillery. Along similar lines he Hegel's and Marx's arguments regarding the "artificially prolonged virginity" of economic freedom that persisted after the American frontier no longer provided an outlet for political conflict among different religious and economic groupings.134 Technology, for Schmitt, is always part of an interactive process: Both in the Nomos of the Earth and Theory of the Partisan, he suggests **humanity “needs” concepts of Just war to legitimate the intensified violence of weapons of mass destruction**.135 As he explains, "the present weapons of total mass destruction or men's premeditated evil do not constitute the ulti- mate danger. Rather, the danger lies in the inescapability of a moral obliga- tion. Those men who use these weapons against other men feel compelled to destroy these other men, i.e., their victims, even morally."136 If we commit too much violence against them, we cannot bear the re- proach of our victims. Thus, Bodin's salutary demoralization of war is reversed by the machine gun. Yet this very possibility reveals another reversal. Absolute enmity has become the consequence rather than the cause of spectacular Violence. Or, rather, neither technology (weapons of mass destruction) nor human nature (premeditated evil) can be isolated as sources of absolute en- mity, or even as independent qualities. In The Theory of the Partisan Schmitt ' writes, "It goes without saying that, in concrete reality, there are no isolated and independent aspects, but that only their respective relations and their functional dependence produce a general picture... . Ultimately, they all end up falling within the force-field of a technological-industrial development. ... The technological enhancement of human technological efficiency shat- ters entire normative systems."137 Similarly, the partisan is "uprooted from his environment" by his technological "motorization."'18 Again, none of this is to suggest that Schmitt had succumbed to determinism, though his resistance sometimes has a wistful quality, as when he warns against the progressive technocratic ideology that imagines the partisan "will disappear simply of his own accord, within smooth technological-functional processes, just as a dog disappears from the freeway."139 In a sense, technology takes the place occupied by nature in Land and Sea, determining "not only [Man's] horizon ... but also his poise, his movements, his figure and his height" yet without leaving him "a creature wholly conditioned by his medium."140 Schmitt's task, once again, was to contain material forces of destruction. "Enmity and war are inevitable. What counts is their containment, that is, preventing that the means of destruction resulting from the scientific process are unleashed in inhuman ways."141 The basis of this containment, however, is uncertain. As we have seen, the picture of a struggle between material forces and philosophical or political categories falsifies their practical inter- penetration. New technologies change not only the means but also the aim, scope, and justifications of conflict. Moreover, they change the significance of political theory.

#### There is no “global liberal order”---it’s not key to anything and fails inevitably

Barma et al., 13 (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, March/April 2013, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146)

Loyalists are quick to defend the concept of a robust liberal order by falling back on outdated metrics of success. The original de minimis aims of the postwar order achieved what now should be considered a low bar: preventing a third world war and a race-to-the-bottom closure of the global-trade regime. Beyond that, the last seventy years have certainly seen movement toward globalization of trade and capital as well as some progress on human rights—but less clearly as a consequence of anything like a liberal world order than as a consequence of national power and interest. ¶ What would a meaningful liberal world order actually look like if it were operating in practice? Consider an objective-based definition: a world in which most countries most of the time follow rules that contribute to progressively more collective security, shared economic gains and individual human rights. States would gradually downplay the virtues of relative advantage and self-reliance. Most states would recognize that foreign-policy choices are constrained (to their aggregate benefit) by multilateral institutions, global norms and nonstate actors. They would cede meaningful bits of sovereign authority in exchange for proactive collaboration on universal challenges. And they would accept that economic growth is best pursued through integration, not mercantilism, and is in turn the most reliable source of national capacity, advancement and influence. With those ingredients in place, we would expect to see the gradual, steady evolution of something resembling an “international community” bound by rights and responsibilities to protect core liberal values of individual rights and freedoms. ¶ No wonder proponents of the liberal-world-order perspective hesitate to offer precise definitions of it. Few of these components can reasonably be said to have been present for any length of time at a global level in the post–World War II world. There may be islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different. Moreover, the vectors today are mostly pointing away from the direction of a liberal world order. ¶ HOW DID we get here? Consider two founding myths of liberal internationalism. The first is that expressions of post–World War II American power and leadership were synonymous with the maturation of a liberal order. The narrative should sound familiar: The United States wins World War II and controls half of global GDP. The United States constructs an international architecture aimed at promoting an open economic system and a semi-institutionalized approach to fostering cooperation on security and political affairs. And the United States provides the essential global public goods—an extended security deterrent and the global reserve currency—to make cooperation work. Some essential elements of the system survive in a posthegemony era because the advantages to other significant powers of sustained institutionalized cooperation exceed the costs and risks of trying to change the game. ¶ In the 1990s the narrative gets more interesting, controversial and relevant. This is when the second foundational myth of the liberal world order—that it has an inexorable magnetic attraction—comes to the fore. The end of the Cold War and the attendant rejection of Communism is supposed to benefit the liberal world order in breadth and depth: on the internal front, new capitalist democracies should converge on individuals’ market-based economic choice and election-based political choice; on the external front, the relationships among states should become increasingly governed by a set of liberal international norms that privilege and protect the civic and political freedoms that capitalist democracies promise. The liberal order’s geography should then expand to encompass the non-Western world. Its multilateral rules, institutions and norms should increase in density across economic, political and security domains. As positive network effects kick in, the system should evolve to be much less dependent on American power. It’s supposedly easier—and more beneficial—to join the liberal world order than it is to oppose it (or even to try to modify it substantially). A choice to live outside the system becomes progressively less realistic: few countries can imagine taking on the contradictions of modern governance by themselves, particularly in the face of expanding multilateral free trade and interdependent security institutions. ¶ The story culminates in a kind of magnetic liberalism, where countries and foreign-policy decisions are attracted to the liberal world order like iron filings to a magnet. With few exceptions, U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades has been predicated on the assumption that the magnetic field is strong and getting stronger. It’s a seductive idea, but it should not be confused with reality. In practice, the magnetic field is notable mainly for its weakness. It is simply not the case today that nations feel equally a part of, answerable to or constrained by a liberal order. And nearly a quarter century after 1989, it has become disingenuous to argue that the liberal world order is simply slow in getting off the ground—as if the next gust of democratic transitions or multilateral breakthroughs will offer the needed push to revive those triumphalist moments brought on by the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the contrary, the aspirational liberal end state is receding into the horizon. ¶ THE PICTURE half a century ago looked more promising, with the initial rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the successful establishment of NATO setting expectations about what multilateral governance could achieve. But international institutions picked off the low-hanging fruit of global cooperation decades ago and have since stalled in their attempts to respond to pressing international challenges. The 1990s served up the best possible set of conditions to advance global liberalism, but subsequent moves toward political and economic liberalization that came with the end of the Cold War were either surprisingly shallow or fragile and short-lived. ¶ Ask yourself this: Have developing countries felt and manifested over time the increasing magnetic pull of the liberal world order? A number of vulnerable developing and post-Communist transitional countries adopted a “Washington Consensus” package of liberal economic policies—freer trade, marketization and privatization of state assets—in the 1980s and 1990s. But these adjustments mostly arrived under the shadow of coercive power. They generally placed the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the most disempowered members of society. And, with few exceptions, they left developing countries more, not less, vulnerable to global economic volatility. The structural-adjustment policies imposed in the midst of the Latin American debt crisis and the region’s subsequent “lost decade” of the 1980s bear witness to each of these shortcomings, as do the failed voucher-privatization program and consequent asset stripping and oligarchic wealth concentration experienced by Russians in the 1990s. ¶ If these were the gains that were supposed to emerge from a liberal world order, it’s no surprise that liberalism came to have a tarnished brand in much of the developing world. The perception that economic neoliberalism fails to deliver on its trickle-down growth pledge is strong and deep. In contrast, state capitalism and resource nationalism—vulnerable to a different set of contradictions, of course—have for the moment delivered tangible gains for many emerging powers and look like promising alternative development paths. Episodic signs of pushback against some of the excesses of that model, such as anti-Chinese protests in Angola or Zambia, should not be confused with a yearning for a return to liberal prescriptions. And comparative economic performance in the wake of the global financial crisis has done nothing to burnish liberalism’s economic image, certainly not in the minds of those who saw the U.S. investment banking–led model of capital allocation as attractive, and not in the minds of those who held a vision of EU-style, social-welfare capitalism as the next evolutionary stage of liberalism. ¶ There’s just as little evidence of sustained liberal magnetism operating in the politics of the developing world, where entrenched autocrats guarding their legitimacy frequently caricature democracy promotion as a not-very-surreptitious strategy to replace existing regimes with either self-serving instability or more servile allies of the West. In practice, the liberal order’s formula for democratic freedom has been mostly diluted down to observing electoral procedures. The results have been almost uniformly disappointing, as the legacy of post–Cold War international interventions from Cambodia to Iraq attests. Even the more organic “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century have stalled into equilibria Freedom House identifies as only “partly free”—in reality affording average citizens little access to political or economic opportunities. Only two years past the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring a similar disillusionment has set in across the Middle East, where evidence for the magnetic pull of a liberal world order is extremely hard to find.

### Congressional Lead

#### Air sea battle causes nuclear miscalc

David C. Gompert, 8-2-13 (is an adjunct senior fellow and Terrence K. Kelly is the director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program at the Arroyo Center at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.; he served as President Obama's principal deputy director of national intelligence., “Escalation Cause: How the Pentagon's New Strategy Could Trigger War with China”, RanD)

Air-Sea Battle increases the odds that a crisis will turn violent. Already, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) leans toward early strikes on U.S. forces if hostilities have begun or appear imminent (this inclination is a first premise of the Air-Sea Battle concept). Given that, to be most effective, Air-Sea Battle would need to take down Chinese targeting and strike capabilities before they could cause significant damage to U.S. forces and bases. It follows, and the Chinese fear, that such U.S. capabilities are best used early and first — if not preemptively, then in preparation for further U.S. offensive action. After all, such U.S. strikes have been used to initiate conflict twice in Iraq. This perception will, in turn, increase the incentive for the PLA to attack preemptively, before Air-Sea Battle has degraded its ability to neutralize the U.S. strike threat. It could give the Chinese cause to launch large-scale preemptive cyber- and anti-satellite attacks on our Air-Sea Battle assets. Indeed, they might feel a need, out of self-defense, to launch such attacks even if they had not planned to start a war. It is a dangerous situation when both sides put a premium on early action.

**Turn Tea Party: influence is crashing now and will result in primary losses-Budget battle proves**

Weber, 1/16 [Peter, senior editor at The Week, “Maybe the Tea Party really *is* finished,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/255177/maybe-the-tea-party-really-is-finished>, ALB]

Tea Party activists and the conservative groups that have enforced their agenda are vehemently opposed to the $1.1 trillion omnibus spending bill that will fund the government through September. On Wednesday evening, the House passed the bill anyway, 359 to 67, with plenty of votes to spare.¶ Sixty-four of those no votes were from conservative Republicans. But it seems pretty clear from the vote tally that Tea Party–style "ideological purity has lost its power," says Jonathan Weisman in The New York Times. "The budget process that is culminating in the passage of the spending bill has ushered in a remarkable marginalization of the Republican far right."¶ The process Weisman is referring to started after the Republicans shut down the government in October, in a power play designed and promoted by the same groups that opposed the omnibus spending bill — Heritage Action, the Club for Growth, and various Tea Party–branded outfits.¶ After 16 politically disastrous days, the House voted to reopen the government, 285 to 144 — will all 144 nays from the GOP side. About two months later, when it came time to vote on the first budget out of Congress since 2009 — a bipartisan document from Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) and Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.), similarly opposed by the Tea Party groups — only 62 House Republicans voted no.¶ Since the October shutdown, House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) "has reasserted control over his fractious Republican conference, leaving his far-right flank angry and isolated," says Weisman. "The speaker's public and private denunciations of the outside conservative groups have created conditions in which members must choose sides, and they have."¶ In December, when the Beltway media declared that the Tea Party's hold on the GOP was broken, I was skeptical. But the trend is hard to ignore. The Club for Growth and Heritage Action both said they would tally the omnibus spending bill vote on their conservative score cards, a key tool of persuasion over the past three years. As in December, the threat didn't have much effect.¶ The Tea Party faction still has its trump card — mounting primary challenges against Republicans not deemed conservative enough. But even that threat seems to be losing its sting. Here's how Rep. Mike Simpson (R-Idaho), facing a strong, well-financed Tea Party challenge, responded after voting yes on the omnibus: "If I started voting how they want me to, versus what I think is right, then they've already won."¶ House Republican leaders are also starting to play hardball. On Wednesday, National Journal reported that the House GOP's campaign arm, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), has quietly blacklisted conservative political firm Jamestown Associates, urging House members to look elsewhere for campaign support. Jamestown's sin? Working with the Senate Conservatives Fund to support Tea Party candidates against sitting Republican lawmakers.¶ The National Republican Senatorial Committee, Republican National Committee, and Chamber of Commerce had already cut off Jamestown. The message is pretty clear: Republicans need to fight Democrats, not other Republicans; you're with us or against us; and if you're against us, there will be consequences.

**The aff is an issue that the Tea Party can seize on that allows it to shift focus to foreign policy-Determines the elections**

Gabriel, 13 [Trip, NYT, “Tea Party Extends Focus to Include Rallying Against a Syria Strike,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/us/politics/tea-party-extends-focus-to-include-rallying-against-a-syria-strike.html?pagewanted=print>, ALB]

At the regular Peace Vigil in Louisville, Ky., on Sunday, some unusual newcomers joined the bearded, longtime war protesters waving signs with doves and “War Is Not the Answer”: a contingent from Indiana’s Clark County Tea Party Patriots, who came to oppose military intervention in Syria.¶ “Our bombs aren’t any better than the chemical weapons the Syrians are lobbing,” said Kelly Khuri, a leader of the Tea Party group, who was nonplused at the first protest she attended a week earlier to be linking arms with the progressive left. “It kind of freaked me out,” she said.¶ In Florida, Tea Party supporters are organizing to pressure Congress not to support the airstrike that President Obama has called for, in the event of a breakdown in the diplomatic efforts involving Russia. “We are calling our representatives and demanding they vote no on this,” said Billie Tucker, a founder of the First Coast Tea Party in Jacksonville, Fla.¶ And a Washington-based Tea Party group, FreedomWorks, organized its first-ever lobbying campaign on a foreign policy issue last week when it urged members to call Congress to reject Mr. Obama’s resolution to attack Syria.¶ The conservative movement has always had factions opposing American intervention in foreign conflicts, most recently led by Ron Paul, the two-time Republican presidential candidate and a Tea Party favorite. But the rallying of conservatives on Syria suggests a new political development: the emergence of organizing by the Tea Party to oppose American military action.¶ With prominent members of the Republican establishment favoring a military strike, in part to send a message about American resolve to potential aggressors like Iran, a grass-roots trend in the opposite direction poses a challenge to the party’s leadership that could play out in future elections.¶ Majorities of 59 percent to 63 percent of Americans in recent polls said they opposed airstrikes to punish the Syrian government over the use of chemical weapons, but Tea Party opposition is by all accounts far higher. The issue brings the movement into ideological alignment with progressive antiwar groups like MoveOn.org.¶ “There’s across-the-board opposition by Virginia Tea Party members of any U.S. involvement in Syria,” said Mark Daugherty, chairman of the Virginia Tea Party Patriots Federation. “We feel we have a basket of problems that need to be solved domestically in the U.S.”¶ Since its birth in 2009, the Tea Party movement has focused on economics, batting away other issues as distractions from its core mission to shrink government, lower taxes and, of course, defeat “Obamacare,” the president’s health overhaul.¶ Syria opened the door for movement leaders to link a national debate on foreign policy to their economic ideas.¶ “

#### Tea Party influence kills Russia relations

Sokov, ’13 [Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), 1-29-13, European Leadership Network, US-Russian Relations: Beyond the Reset, <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/us-russian-relations-beyond-the-reset_459.html>]

Contrary to common opinion, there are very few truly difficult issues on the bilateral agenda that cannot be resolved through negotiation. The increasingly conflictual nature of the relationship results from domestic politics in both countries rather than from strategic, economic, or political differences. A good illustration is the well-known controversy over missile defense. Any decent diplomat could find a solution in a matter of months. Russian concerns concentrate on the fourth – and the last – phase of the American plan (known as the Phased Adaptive Approach), which foresees deployment of systems theoretically capable of intercepting strategic missiles. The solution proposed by Russian military leaders is to limit the capability of the fourth-phase system (for example, through limits on the number of interceptors and the areas of their deployment) so that it does not undermine the existing US-Russian strategic balance while preserving the ability of the American system to intercept a small number of long-range missiles, i.e., to limit the system to its officially proclaimed purpose. In the end, this is about the predictability of the American missile defense capability. The prospect of reaching agreement, however, is barred by the Republican Party, especially its Tea Party wing, which regards any limits whatsoever as anathema. Missile defense is an article of faith. This is not about plans or capabilities: this is about a deeply ideological commitment to unrestricted unilateralism.

***Nuclear war***

**Allison 10-31** (Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6)

That central point is that **Russia matters a great deal** to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir **Putin’s decision to return** next year as president **makes it** all the more **critical for Washington to manage** its **relations**hip with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, **Russia is a player whose choices affect** our **vital interests** in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. **First, Russia** remains the only nation that **can erase the** United States from the map **in 30 minutes**. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. **Second, Russia is** our **most consequential** partner **in preventing nuclear terrorism**. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. **Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing** the **prolif**eration of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, **Russian choices** to sell or withhold sensitive technologies **are the difference between failure and** the possibility of **success**. **Fourth, Russian support in sharing intel**ligence **and cooperating in operations remains essential to** the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and **combat** other **transnational terrorist groups**. **Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to** 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in **Afghanistan**. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. **Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer**. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. **Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system**. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. **A Moscow** more **closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power** to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the overturning the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. **Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what** a **Russia**n president **intent on frustrating U.S.** international objectives **could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling** S-300 air defense **missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N.** Security Council **resolutions**.

#### Congressional lead DESTROYS deliberation both at the OUTSET and about TACTICS—opposition leaders have no incentive to stop war initially and then can’t criticize it later- Iraq proves they make groupthink *worse*

Nzelibe 2007 Modified for gendered language (Jide, Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School, ARE CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED WARS PERVERSE?, Stanford Law Review59.4 (Feb 2007): 907-953, ProQuest)

Put differently, the President has managed to tap into a deep reservoir of political insurance provided by the 2002 congressional resolution authorizing the Iraq war even though his efforts to obtain this authorization were minimal. By all accounts, the congressional debates leading up to the resolution were fairly low-key and perfunctory.141 The House International Relations Committee quickly voted the Resolution out of committee by a vote of thirtyone to eleven.142 Eventually, the House passed the Resolution by a sizable margin of 293 to 133. The Senate also quickly approved the Resolution with Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-N.D.) making a special plea for bipartisanship.143 Senator Byrd (D-W. Va.) did try to plead with his colleagues to have a more serious and extensive debate on the Resolution but he was all but completely ignored.144 On October 10, the Senate voted by a margin of seventy-seven to twenty-three in support of the Resolution.14 At no stage during the few weeks that Congress debated the Resolution was there any doubt that congressional authorization would be both forthcoming and swift.¶ At bottom, if the greatest political constraints on the President during wartime come from a divided government or an active political opposition, the Iraq occupation shows that those constraints can be considerably weakened when a President first seeks congressional authorization for the use of force. President Bush's decision to seek congressional authorization most likely weakened the resolve of the Democratic Party to force the President's hand once the Iraq occupation became unpopular. But one could only imagine how different the political climate would be if the President had decided to embark on the Iraq occupation unilaterally. In some respect, he would have saved himself the trivial political capital he invested convincing Congress to approve his request for the use of force; on the other hand, he and the Republican Party would have likely inherited a colossal political burden. In a unilaterally initiated conflict, the Democratic opposition would have the option of waiting to see how the war turns out in the court of public opinion before deciding whether or not to support the war. If the war ends in failure or stalemate, the opposition would then have wide latitude in condemning every aspect of the decision to use force without the prospect of facing any political recriminations for seeming inconsistent or formally divided about the wisdom of going to war.¶ Ultimately, President Bush's ability to bifurcate political blame for the Iraqi occupation aptly illustrates the moral hazard risk inherent in first seeking congressional authorization for the use of force. If a President knows ex ante that he can get political insurance cheaply and get to share the political risks of a high-stakes military conflict with the political opposition, then it is very plausible to think that he is [they are] more likely to initiate more high-stakes conflicts with congressional authorization than he [they] would if he [they] were acting unilaterally.¶ What about the role of moral hazard in other modern conflicts? In many respects, the framework established in this Article also illuminates the political insurance role congressional authorization has played for other contemporary Presidents. One could argue, for instance, that congressional authorization for the 1982-1984 military deployment in Lebanon helped President Reagan avoid some of the political fallout once the deployment became increasingly unpopular in early 1984.146 Indeed, during the last couple of months before Congress forced a withdrawal of United States troops in February 1984 the President had lost much of the considerable foreign policy reputation he had cultivated in the wake of the successful Grenada invasion of October 1983.147 Nonetheless, Reagan sought to use the congressional authorization he received in the summer of 1983 to blunt growing congressional criticism of the deployment.148 When Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was questioned by a hostile Congress on the progress of the war in early 1984, he kindly reminded the members of Congress that that they bore a share of the blame for the outcome of the deployment by passing the resolution authorizing the use efforce the previous summer.149

#### They PERMANENTLY make criticism of warmaking decisions impossible

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In many respects, the Democrats' tactics serve as a striking example of the dynamics illustrated here-the political insurance benefits to both the President and the ruling party of first seeking congressional authorization before embarking on a high-risk military engagement. Significantly, the President's decision to seek prior congressional authorization in the fall of 2002 seems to have significantly fragmented the Democratic Party's leadership on the wisdom of the Iraqi occupation. In other words, the fact that many leading Democratic members of Congress voted for the resolution has significantly complicated the ability of Democrats to criticize the increasingly unpopular Iraqi occupation. Indeed, rather than avoiding or curbing congressional participation on the Iraqi occupation, both President Bush and the House Republican leadership have actively solicited Congress's opinions at various stages of the conflict in order to force important members of the opposition to come clean on whether or not they support the war.¶ Thus far, the Bush Administration's strategy seems to have yielded some concrete benefits. The Democratic leaders in Congress do not seem to have come to any consensus on any aspect of the occupation, including whether or not to insist on a defined and concrete withdrawal timetable. Indeed, the leading prospective candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008-Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.)-has repeatedly made public pronouncements in support of the ongoing occupation.115 She and other prominent members of the party like Senator Joseph lieberman (D-Conn.) also hesitated in calling for any timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraqsuggesting that any such defined timetable would be both premature and imprudent.116 But other Democratic Party leaders, including House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CaI.), former presidential candidate John Kerry (DMass.), and Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean-see the unpopular war as a prime political opportunity to reverse Republican congressional gains and demand a clear timetable for withdrawal.1 As the different factions have failed to produce a unified platform, the Democratic leaders have turned to bickering and arguing with each other about the wisdom of opposing the President and insisting on a withdrawal plan.118 Indeed, one prominent Democratic member of Congress warned his colleagues about hesitating to use the fallout from the war for partisan purposes in the 2006 elections: "Democrats would be well-advised to ride this [wave of anti-war sentiment]. It's just a question of time for the party to realize that."119¶ Understandably, given this division on a highly visible national issue, many leading Democrats have made a strategic decision to steer clear from making specific recommendations about the Iraqi occupation in an election season.1 But the irony is that opposition to the war probably unites the Democratic grassroots more than any other issue. Indeed, a fall 2005 public opinion poll found that 85% of registered Democrats disapproved of the way President Bush was handling the Iraqi occupation.121 Nonetheless, Democratic leaders have tried to distance themselves visibly from the growing anti-war sentiments among their grassroots members. Indeed, in a wave of anti-war protests around the country in late 2005, no major Democratic Party leader showed up to show support for the protesters.12 In any event, the more the Democrats are forced to turn their attention away from the occupation, the less blame the Republicans have to shoulder for the declining public support for the war during an election season.¶ Unsurprisingly, Republicans have moved to capitalize on the rift within Democratic Party leadership on the Iraqi occupation. Republican members of Congress have repeatedly pointed to the division as evidence that the Democrats are indecisive, weak, and incoherent on important national security issues.123 Indeed, in mid-June 2006, the Republican members pushed aggressively for a vote on a non-binding resolution in support of the Iraq occupation.124 Ostensibly, the congressional vote would have no effect on the President's policies but it forced members of Congress, including wavering Democrats, to state on the record what their current position was regarding the occupation in the wake of the mid-term elections. Eventually, forty-two Democratic members of Congress joined an overwhelmingly united Republican contingency in endorsing a resolution that called for the occupation to work towards "creating] a sovereign, free, secure and united Iraq" without establishing "an arbitrary date for the withdrawal or redeployment" of American troops.125 Meanwhile, in the Senate, the Republican leadership also co-opted an amendment drafted by Senator Kerry calling for an explicit timetable for the withdrawal of troops.126 The amendment was eventually rejected overwhelmingly by a vote of 93-6.127¶ Interestingly, these non-binding resolutions illustrate powerfully that the President and the ruling party have a strong incentive to make proactive efforts to seek formal congressional action during wartime in order to politically box in the opposition. In this case, the Republicans sensed correctly that the Democrats were badly divided over Iraq and that an open congressional debate over the occupation would highlight those divisions. The Republicans exploited the debates during these non-binding resolutions and attempted to portray the Democrats as willing to "cut and run" at the first hint of difficulties in the battlefield.128 Finally, the division within the Democratic Party leadership makes it easier for the Republican Party leaders to portray the decision to initiate the Iraqi invasion as a complicated and ultimately difficult decision for the President. In other words, the Republican mantra seems to be that when the President decided to initiate the Iraq invasion, he was operating in good faith with the best evidence and intelligence available at the time. Thus, if the Democratic leadership still seems divided and ambivalent about the occupation three years after the ground war ended, it is more difficult to argue that the President made an impulsive or rash decision in initiating conflict.¶ To summarize, the 2002 congressional authorization of the use of force helped create and expose deep-rooted divisions in the Democratic Party over the wisdom of both the Iraq invasion and the later occupation. In the end, the authorization and the splinter it created among the Democratic Party establishment reveals the tough choices faced by opposition leaders during wartime. If the Democrats decide to stay the course and the Iraq occupation eventually ends successfully, the President and the Republican Party are likely to reap much of the resulting political windfall. But if the occupation continues to be unpopular and eventually ends with Congress forcing a troop withdrawal, the Democrats will likely be blamed for being equivocal and uncommitted in their support of the troops. Either way, congressional authorization for the use of force in Iraq seems to have diminished the ability of Democrats to exploit the political fallout of the occupation. Of course, the Democrats might eventually be able to muster a majority of members of Congress who are willing to force the President's hand by voting a concrete withdrawal timetable, but the split in the party leadership makes such a vote unlikely in the short run.

#### Congressional leadership causes worse interventions- Congress never has any political incentive to REJECT war- leads to worse decisions and emboldens Presidential escalation once conflict starts

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WAR POWERS, http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Matthew-Fleischman-A-Functional-Distribution-of-War-Powers.pdf)

Another risk associated with congressional authorization is that it¶ could lead the executive to engage in wars that otherwise would be too¶ politically risky. Specifically, congressional authorization diffuses the¶ cost of military failure, acting as a form of insurance.90 Given that¶ legislators lose more by voting against winning wars than voting for¶ losing wars,91 Congress members are likely to defer to the President¶ and approve most wars. In fact, “risk-averse members of Congress¶ may actually prefer that the President go solo without consulting them¶ because this gives them the flexibility to jump on the . . . bandwagon¶ if things go well, or to sharpen their swords and distances themselves¶ politically from the President if things go badly.”92 This means that¶ the Executive selectively uses congressional authorization in times¶ when the wars pose the greatest risk because he feels confident that he¶ will get political support and, at the same time, will share responsibility¶ for any political failure. Therefore, the congressional authorization¶ is insurance for the Executive’s political career, not the public. This notion is made worse since Congress will likely “delegate¶ authority over issues that are either informationally complex or in¶ which the consequences of government are difficult to predict.”93 By¶ consulting with Congress on the decision to go to war, the Executive¶ limits the opposing party’s ability to gain politically from military failure,¶ 94 as flip-flopping on support for a war tends to be politically¶ costly.95 Neutralizing the opposition is smart politically, but it can be¶ used to facilitate reelection of those politicians that make the decision¶ to enter bad wars. As discussed above, Congress’s political motivation¶ will lead to frequent approvals, and this pattern will likely repeat¶ itself frequently. Therefore, congressional authorization would not be¶ deliberative; it would incentivize excessive war-making, and it would¶ limit the opposition’s ability to effectively mount a response to an¶ unpopular war. If Congress is approving wars due to its incentive¶ structure, and doing so limits opponents’ ability to respond, this could¶ suggest that congressional involvement produces the worst results and¶ the least ability to correct those results.

#### Congress COMPARATIVELY MAKES WORSE, MORE BELLIGERENT decisions than Presidential leadership- ONLY Presidential leadership imposes political costs for warmaking

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One of the most exhaustively discussed topics in the discourse of the separation of war powers is the role of ex ante congressional authorization on the use of force.1 Almost without exception, this literature assumes that prior congressional authorization will likely lead to a "slow down" effect in the build up to an international confrontation and thus will make the United States less likely to embark on foreign wars. To pro-Congress commentators, this effect is unquestionably benign because in a constitutional system purportedly biased against foreign military adventures, ex ante congressional authorization ensures that any decision to use force is vetted against the views of a broad range of politically accountable actors.2 To its detractors, congressional authorization is undesirable because it clogs up the President's war-making prerogative and compromises the United States's ability to confront unpredictable foreign military threats.3 Nonetheless, both sides of the debate assume that congressional authorization will generally create a drag effect on the President's ability to use force.4¶ If the 2002-2003 foreign policy debate about whether to use force in Iraq is any guide, however, congressional authorization will often fall short of both the "slow down" and deliberative functions. Hardly less than one month after he first requested congressional authorization for the use of force in the fall of 2002, President Bush received an open-ended endorsement from Congress to use force to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," and to "enforce all relevant United Nations security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."5 Other "make weight" efforts at congressional authorization for the use of force in the post-World War II era abound.6 Nonetheless, various commentators, especially pro-Congress scholars, seem to hold out hope that the tide of congressional indifference will turn and Congress will become more proactive in war powers. Nonetheless, there is a gaping hole in the literature as to whether congressional authorization could plausibly serve any significant political functions for the President or the ruling party. In other words, if as Presidents routinely insist, Congress has no clear constitutional role to play in initiating conflicts, why do Presidents nonetheless seem to seek out congressional resolutions before they use force? More importantly, as the political fallout over the current Iraqi occupation mounts and critics call for a concrete timetable for withdrawing troops, does the President and/or the Republican Party stand to reap any benefits from the 2002 congressional authorization?¶ Contrary to the received wisdom, this experimental Article advances the empirically plausible assumption that congressional authorization of the use of force might actually have a perverse effect. Thus, rather than create a drag effect that minimizes the impulse to rush into imprudent wars, congressional authorization might actually do the opposite: because such authorization allows the President to spread the potential political costs of military failure or stalemate to other elected officials, it will lead the President to select into more high-risk wars than [they] he would otherwise choose if [they] he were acting unilaterally. In other words, since congressional authorization acts as a political "insurance policy" that partially protects the President against the possible political fallout from a military misadventure, he is likely to be more willing to engage in wars where the expected outcome is uncertain. More importantly, not only is the President likely to use congressional authorization as a hedge to prevent future political opponents from exploiting his misfortunes, he is also likely to use it to protect members of his party in Congress who are more likely to be electorally vulnerable in the absence of such authorization.¶ While this notion of congressional authorization as political insurance might appear puzzling, it makes sense when understood as a cheap mechanism designed to protect a vulnerable President or ruling party from the insecure political atmosphere that is likely to exist in the aftermath of a high-risk conflict. Significantly, two factors operate in tandem to ensure that the initial presidential decision to seek congressional authorization will not be particularly costly from a political perspective. First, since a member of Congress is likely to have less information than the President about the likely outcome of a high-risk conflict, he or she is likely to defer to the President's judgment that the conflict will have a positive outcome and hope to ride the President's electoral coattails as voters rally around the flag. Thus, the purported institutional benefit of deliberation by multiple voices that congressional authorization is supposed to confer is likely to be trivial, if not nonexistent. Second, since the electoral consequences of voting against a successful war are likely to be dearer than voting for a losing war, the President is relatively assured of getting a favorable vote to use force from those members of Congress who are elected from swing districts. In sum, seeking congressional authorization for the use of force becomes a tradeoff in which Presidents are willing to accept the relatively low short-term costs of involving other elected officials in the war decision-making process in exchange for long-term political security.

#### Exclusive Presidential control is critical to sustain *political opposition to intervention-* only way to have ANY genuine deliberation

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The flip side of the political uncertainty associated with high-risk wars is that they provide the political opposition with a significant opportunity to exploit the potential political fallout if there is military failure or stalemate. Here, the dynamic suggests that when there is a dramatic and continuous decline in public support for the use of force, the political opposition will smell blood and try to mobilize the public against the President and the ruling party. Indeed, the political science literature suggests that failed military engagements tend to increase significantly the political opposition's willingness to challenge incumbents from the ruling party.29 To the extent that the opposition has the flexibility to heap blame exclusively on the President and his party, it expands the possible scope of political opportunities it can reap from a failed military engagement. Studies of the effects of military stalemates or failures on presidential popularity suggest that Presidents have reason to be especially concerned in high-risk conflicts. For instance, in his well-known study of public opinion during both the Korean and Vietnam wars, Mueller showed that a ten-fold increase in the number of casualties resulted in a fifteen percent drop in support for these wars.30 The unpopularity of these wars ultimately damaged the reputations of Presidents Truman and Johnson and hurt the electoral prospects of Democratic Party candidates.3 ' Unsurprisingly, both Truman and Johnson decided not to run for reelection in the midst of divisive and unpopular wars. Extending the analysis more broadly to a wider range of wars, Timothy Cotton has shown that high-stake wars have had a generally detrimental effect on the electoral prospects of candidates of parties that occupied the White House when the war started.32 Indeed, Cotton's evidence suggests that war tended to have a negative effect on the electoral prospects of the war party, regardless of whether the war was popular or not.33 In the end, the evidence bears out Bruce Russet's observation that "[governments lose popularity in proportion to [a] war's cost in blood and money."34¶ In any event, the President should be able to hedge against the political opposition's ability to fully exploit potential military failure by inviting them to participate formally in the decision to initiate conflict. In this picture, distributing the costs of the decision to initiate a high-risk war among multiple political participants removes from the opposition a key issue they could use against the President in the event of military failure or stalemate. This assumption is consistent with the analysis by certain commentators that elected officials have an incentive to delegate authority in order to shift political blame to other actors.35 Unsurprisingly, despite repeated claims by Presidents that Congress has no formal constitutional role to play in initiating conflicts, Presidents have routinely sought congressional authorization for high-risk conflicts. Indeed, in a previous project, I suggested that Presidents generally seek congressional authorization in conflicts involving the deployment of more than twenty thousand ground troops for over three months.36¶ At a certain level, however, the dynamic of how the President protects himself from political blame in the midst of a high-risk international crisis is quite complex. Significantly, when the President seeks congressional authorization for the use of force, he cannot simply shift the bulk of the political risks of military failure to members of Congress. Since the public is likely to identify the President as the primary agenda setter for war, he is likely to receive the lion's share of the blame for any military failure, even if he successfully seeks prior congressional authorization for the use of force.37 As a result of this dynamic, the President is likely going to use congressional authorization only as a shield rather than a sword; in other words, he is likely to use it defensively against members of the opposition who might want to use the fact of military failure opportunitistically to exploit the President's vulnerability. In this picture, members of Congress who are on record for supporting the conflict cannot credibly claim once the war becomes unpopular that the President had no good rationale for going into war; they can usually quarrel with the manner in which the war was prosecuted but not the objectives.39 Moreover, switching support for the war will usually be politically costly for members of Congress, although such switches do sometimes occur when the casualties become significant enough and the war seems to have reached a stalemate.40¶ In sum, congressional authorization for high-risk conflicts will likely serve as a political insurance policy. For the President, such authorization enables him to spread some of the risks of a potentially unfavorable military outcome to other political actors, especially congressional members of the opposition party. Like any insurance policy, however, seeking congressional authorization requires that the President incur some up-front costs for downstream political benefits. In this case, the President incurs some costs when he tries to convince members of Congress, including those from the political opposition, to provide ex ante support for his military initiatives. But as discussed in Part IH, these ex ante costs for the President are likely to be trivial; in any event, such costs are likely to be significantly less than the ex post benefits that the President reaps from obtaining congressional authorization.