### Off 1

#### Interpretation- “Restrictions” must *permanently* remove an activity under the President’s authority- allowing the President to do it later isn’t T

DOE ’95 (Personnel Security Administrative Review Cases – DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS Hearing Officer's Opinion Case Name: Personnel Security Hearing Date of Filing:December 5, 1995 – http://www.oha.doe.gov/cases/security/vso0075.htm)

In contrast, it is not clear, as the Army and the DOE alleged, that the individual was being dishonest when he signed a document stating that he had never been restricted or suspended from flight duty. DOE Exhibit 5(g)(3). There is no dispute that the individual washed out of pilot flight training. However, the record contains no clear and consistent definitions of the terms "restricted" or "suspended." As pointed out by the individual, neither term is defined in the glossary of the Army Flight Regulations. Post-hearing brief of individual at 6. In the civilian world, the word "restrict" means "to hold within limits" and the word suspend means "to bar for a period of time" or "to cause to stop for a period." Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 1002, 1166 (1984). Thus, the word "restrict" implies that, for example, a pilot or naval flight officer has been limited from certain duties that a pilot or naval flight officer would normally have, unlike in the present case, where the individual never became a pilot and nothing in the record indicates that the individual was ever restricted in his duties as an naval flight officer. Neither is there any evidence that, prior to his suspension in 1991, the individual was suspended from flight duty, i.e. barred from certain duties for a period of time and then returned to those duties. Therefore, I do not find that the individual's denials that he was ever restricted or suspended from flight duty constitute derogatory information under Criterion (l).

#### And, Restrictions can’t MODIFY- can ONLY legally hinder

Searcy v. Searcy 2002 (Monte W. Searcy, Appellant v. Susan C. Searcy, Respondent. Case Number: WD60604 Handdown Date: 09/24/2002 Appeal From: Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Hon. Randall R. Jackson. Missouri Court of Appeals Western District – http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=mo&vol=/appeals/092002/&invol=9092402\_2002.)

The trial court may modify visitation rights "whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child, but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger the child's physical health or impair his emotional development." Section 452.400.2. As used in section 452.400.2, the word "restrict" means "'to set bounds or limits to'or 'to check, bound**,** or decrease the range, scope or incidence of.'" Turley v. Turley, 5 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Mo. banc 1999) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1937 (1981)). As the Missouri Supreme Court explained in Turley, "[a] modification of visitation does not itself rise to a restriction or limitation. For sec. 452.400.2 to apply, the modification must restrict or limitone party's visitation rights compared to [that party's] visitation rights under the original agreement." Id.

#### Violation- the aff permits the President to keep and use war powers authority on issues of indefinite detention—they only modify current tactics to include the Geneva Conventions

#### Reasons to vote-

#### Ground- our interpretation is the only way for the neg to use the core “indefinite detention” or “offensive cyber operations” good ground- they let the aff impose MORE effective procedures

#### Limits- they allow any number of different ways of implementing detentions or targeted killings- we’re the only way to have a procedural limit on the aff’s implementation- key to counterplan research and knowing what DAs could link

#### Extra topicality—two of their advantage areas stem off the application of the Geneva Conventions, which is a MODIFICATION to existing procedure, not a restriction. Makes it impossible to go neg

### Off2

#### Congressional restrictions kill PC- Obama’s first term proves other objectives outweigh SOP questions

Ackerman and Hathaway 11 (Bruce and Oona, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 447, lexis)

President Bush had now transformed a war authorized by Congress into a war authorized by the president alone. Gone was Saddam's "continuing" threat to the national security of the United States. Gone were the U.N. Security Council resolutions. In their place, the president presented Congress with a fait accompli - a document that committed the country to fight the war for three more years. n115 But would the new administration go along with this unconstitutional power play? Only months before, Senators Obama, Biden, and Clinton had endorsed a resolution demanding the submission of any new Iraq agreement to Congress for approval. n116 Now that they were president, vice president, and secretary of state, they could make their earlier resolution into reality.¶ As they pondered their next steps, developments in Iraq provided an ironic commentary. The new Iraqi constitution, like our own, required the chief executive to submit the bilateral agreements to the country's parliament for ratification. In stark contrast to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki followed constitutional requirements, providing the Iraq assembly with an opportunity to deliberate upon and approve the bilateral agreement. n117 Did Iraq's embryonic democracy have an important constitutional lesson to teach the oldest democracy in the world? n118¶ [\*475] While campaigning for the presidency, Senators Obama and Clinton appeared to think so. But on January 20th, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton silently acquiesced in their predecessor's usurpation of congressional authority. They made no public effort to reconcile this decision with their previous protests. Their silent acceptance of Bush's agreement with Iraq - effectively ratifying it - had obvious political advantages: when Obama announced his determination to withdraw combat troops by August 2010, Republicans were in no position to denounce the administration's plans as tantamount to surrender, for the pronouncement was consistent with the plan announced in the agreement negotiated by President Bush. n119¶ Congress joined in this act of collective amnesia - with politics, once again, serving as the obvious motivation. The Democrats in control of both houses had better things to do than embarrass their new president with constitutional objections to the ongoing military effort in Iraq. They were preparing themselves for the coming struggle over the stimulus package, health care reform, financial reform, and other high-priority initiatives. No one was prepared to fight for Congress's right to approve an agreement that was already in place and was serving as the basis of the country's war in Iraq.¶ Nor were minority Republicans inclined to act as the nation's constitutional conscience. This would not only involve a direct attack on Bush's earlier actions. It would (implicitly) suggest that President Obama had the constitutional prerogative to repudiate the Bush agreement and opt for a speedier pullout in Iraq - a policy few if any Republicans in Congress supported.¶ Political imperatives were now trumping the institutional logic of the separation of powers. n120 Both political parties had an interest in allowing President Obama to silently ratify President Bush's transformation of a limited war into an unlimited conflict. With no one contesting the matter, the media failed to note the odd disjunction posed by Iraq's turn to parliamentary participation and Washington's embrace of executive unilateralism.

**Obama will win the debt ceiling fight now- his political strength is the key factor**

**Kapur 9/12**/2013 (Sahil, Talking Points Memo’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent. His articles covering politics and public policy have been published in The Huffington Post, The Guardian and The New Republic, Cantor: If We Can’t Defund Obamacare, Let’s Delay It, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/eric-cantor-obamacare-debt-ceiling-shutdown-default.php)

In order to persuade conservatives lawmakers to vote to keep the federal government funded past Sept. 30, House **Republican leaders are proposing to stare down** President Barack **Obama over the debt ceiling by seeking a one-year delay of Obamacare.¶** At a closed-door meeting Tuesday, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) floated a strategy to delay the rollout of Obamacare for one year in exchange for lifting the debt ceiling. The meeting was focused on pitching a plan that lets Republicans vote to defund Obamacare without risking a government shutdown if the Senate rejects the idea, a move that is meeting fierce resistance on their right flank, which wants to go further.¶ A senior Republican aide familiar with Cantor’s remarks said he was essentially trying to persuade his members that the debt limit, which the federal government is expected to hit in mid-October, provides a better opportunity than a threatened government shutdown to undermine Obamacare.¶ “He didn’t draw any red lines,” said the GOP aide. “He said it’s a better opportunity than [the continuing resolution] and a delay there is very doable.” The aide added that the concession wouldn’t necessarily just involve Obamacare; there could be other reforms. The aide admitted that it depends in part on what the president is willing to give up.¶ **It all sounds far-fetched**. After all, trading a government shutdown for default would be like trading a common cold for cancer. And **it remains to be seen whether GOP leaders would let the economy collapse if they don’t get their way, or if they’re merely saying what they have to say to get through the shutdown crisis.**¶ An upside to proposing the debt ceiling idea now is that it helps persuade Republican lawmakers not to withhold their support for keeping the government open. Cantor’s suggestion this week comes as Republicans are taking heavy fire from conservative advocates for refraining from risking a government shutdown over Obamacare. House leaders have postponed consideration of the continuing resolution until next week to build support.¶ Last month, Speaker John **Boehner** (R-OH) **floated the idea of delaying or defunding the health care reform law in a debt ceiling package. But he, too, stopped short of drawing any red lines**. A leadership aide described it at the time as an “option.”¶ Despite the anti-Obamacare frenzy consuming their right flank, **Republican leaders recognize that both a shutdown and default would be a disaster for their party**, potentially threatening their House majority ahead of a mid-term election when they hope to win back the Senate. **Their balancing act to satisfy conservatives enough to avert a shutdown but not to create expectations that threatening debt default is the way to go.¶** Back in January, **when** President Barack **Obama held firm** and refused to negotiate **on the debt limit**, **as he is now**, **the House GOP backed down** **and lifted the debt ceiling without substantive concessions** (but rather symbolic ones). **Republican** **leaders recognize that it will be extremely difficult to extract major** Obamacare **concessions**, especially on the eve of its rollout. **The last-ditch option in** Speaker John **Boehner’s** (R-OH) **pocket would be to avert disaster by bringing up legislation that passes with the support of mostly Democrats. This route is far from ideal for him, but he hasn’t ruled it out**.¶ In a memo to Republicans last Friday, Cantor vowed to continue attacking Obamacare, but not necessarily at risk of wreaking havoc on the economy. Instead he promised that leaders will “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” He said Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”¶ At the end of the day, **the battle over Obamacare is largely a side show** that Republican leaders have to deal with. The real fight, where Republicans have genuine leverage, is over how much the government will spend next fiscal year and whether Congress will make permanent the lower spending levels after the automatic cuts known as sequestration.

**Failure to act on the debt ceiling collapses the economy-Multiple internal links**

**Swagel, 9/4** [Phillip, professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, assistant secretary for economic policy at the Treasury Department from 2006 to 2009, “Fiscal Collisions Ahead,” <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/fiscal-collisions-ahead/>, ALB]

**A failure to act would harm the economy. Not lifting the debt ceiling in particular would be expected to have catastrophic economic effects**. **Interest rates could skyrocket if investors question the full faith and credit of the United States government, leading to a credit crunch that pummels business and consumer spending**. The calamity might be avoided if the Treasury Department makes payments to bondholders to avoid a default, but even with this contingency plan (which the Treasury shows no sign of putting into place), the spectacle of a government that cannot finance its routine operations would doubtless translate into a severe negative impact on private confidence and spending.¶ **A shutdown of nonessential government operations on Oct. 1 would mean an unintended reduction in spending that could retard [halt[ the recovery, but the larger consequence again would be indirect through a hit to confidence**. **With the government unable to attend to routine matters, it does not take much to imagine that American families and companies would halt plans to spend, invest and hire**. This would repeat the natural instinct that contributed to the plunge in economic activity in the fall of 2008.¶ **Fiscal uncertainty matters for monetary policy as well, because the Federal Reserve will hesitate to start unwinding its expansionary policy if a serious fiscal drag seems imminent**.

**Best studies prove economic collapse causes war**

**Royal 2010** (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how **periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that **rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power** (see also Gilpin, 1981) **that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation** (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states.** He argues that **interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, **the likelihood for conflict increases,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, **the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.** (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. **'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect.** Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. **DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**. In summary, **recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.'** This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Off3

#### Unique LINK—Obama is massively expanding Presidential War Powers Now—Plan is a unique reversal of that trend.

Friedersdorf, 9-12-13 (That’s yesterday)[Obama Acts Like He Doesn't Know He's an Executive-Power Extremist On the fake moderation of a president who talks a good game but doesn't follow through CONOR FRIEDERSDORF SEP 12 2013 is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/ 09/obama-acts-like-he-doesnt-know-hes-an-executive-power-extremist/279583/]

It's often hard to tell if President Obama is lying to the American people or to himself. Is he willfully misrepresenting who he is? Or is he blind to his true self? Over the last five years he has repudiated many of the positions he took in 2008, but still talks like and perhaps likes to think of himself as the man who ran on change. A passage from his Tuesday speech on Syria provides a striking example. The relevant passage -- an aside on executive power -- comes just after the president explains that he favors a strike on Syria to deter the use of chemical weapons (emphasis added): That's my judgment as commander-in-chief. But I’m also the president of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. So even though I possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress. I believe our democracy is stronger when the president acts with the support of Congress. And I believe that America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together. This is especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president, and more and more burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force. What a fascinating paragraph! Even as Obama implies that he is a circumspect steward of constitutional democracy, he asserts that even absent "a direct or imminent threat," he has absolute power to wage war without congressional support, the Constitution and the opinions of the demos be damned. If the passage ended there it would be staggering in its internal tension. As Jack Goldsmith explained in detail, intervening in Syria without congressional sign-off would "push presidential war unilateralism beyond where it has gone before." Asserting that power without using it is still an extreme position to take.¶ Obama goes a delusion farther. Ostensibly because he hasn't yet intervened, even though he repeatedly and needlessly asserts his right to do so unilaterally, he casts himself as moving away from unilateralism and toward consulting Congress. The benefits are "especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president," he notes, "while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force."¶ The grammer is priceless. Who "put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president"? In Obama's telling, "a decade" put the executive power there.¶ The absence of a human subject in the sentence isn't hard to figure out. For all President George W. Bush's faults, he sought and received majority support for the Patriot Act, the September 2001 AUMF, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq. Obama's expansion of the drone war and his illegal war-making in Libya didn't turn out as bad as Iraq, so it's hard to see him as a worse president, but Obama has done more than Bush to expand the war-making power of the White House. As for "sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force," it's Obama who went into Libya despite the fact that a House vote to approve U.S. involvement was brought to the floor and voted down.¶ Yet Obama complains about these trends as if someone other than Obama is responsible for them, and as if he has been and remains powerless to do more to reverse them. When Obama asked Congress to vote in Syria, no one forced him to insist that he had the power to intervene militarily even if a legislative vote declared otherwise. No one forced him to defend the extreme position that the presidential war power is so sweeping that it includes waging wars of choice rejected by Congress that don't involve any direct or imminent threat to the United States. ¶ He went out of his way to defend that maximal precedent, even as gave us the impression that he was trying to rein in executive power that he claims to find regrettable and worrisome. It's all consistent with Obama's favorite rhetorical tactic: granting the validity of an objection in his rhetoric, then totally ignoring the objection in his actions. In so doing, he confuses public discourse and subverts debate. We know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions. He believes the president has the power to intervene militarily without Congress in places that do not threaten America; that he can order American citizens killed in secret without due process; that he can secretly collect data on the phone calls of all Americans; that he can invoke the state-secrets privilege to avoid adjudicating constitutional challenges to his policies on their merits; that he can indefinitely detain prisoners without evidence, charges or due process, that he can sit in judgment of anyone on earth, then send a drone anywhere to strike them.¶ Yes, we know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions, that there are many steps to rein in executive power that he could take but hasn't taken ... and that he worries repeatedly about an excess of executive power in his rhetoric. What we don't know is the reason for this disconnect. After all, this ain't like Gitmo. If he really wanted to do more to shrink executive power, he could do a lot unilaterally, and no one could stop him. Is he trying to fool us? Or is he fooling himself, because he likes to think of himself as more prudent and moderate man than he is? Can he not bear the truth that he's a Cheneyite extremist\*? My best guess is that he's trying to fool us. But it's hard to know for sure.¶ \*It would be fascinating to look at the many issues on which Bush-Cheney and Obama take the same position, and compare how many times each was referred to in the media as "out of the mainstream," a phrase that faded fast circa January 2009.

#### Presidential leadership is necessary to prevent loose nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorist organizations

Daryl G. Kimball, 12-4-12 (Executive Director of the Arms Control Association , “Obama Underscores Need for Further Progress to Reduce Nuclear Dangers”, Armscontrolnow.org)

In his first foreign policy-related address since his reelection, on Monday Dec. 3 President Obama praised the architects of the highly-successful Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, he reaffirmed his commitment to the action plan toward a world without nuclear weapons, and he underscored his commitment to achieve further progress to reduce the threats posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.¶ While Obama did not break new ground, his remarks are an important signal to his national security team, the Congress, the American public, and the world that he intends to complete unfinished nuclear risk reduction tasks that he set out in his historic Prague address in April 2009.¶ In the speech which capped a day-long conference titled “Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction: Partnering for a More Secure World” at the National Defense University, Obama praised former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dick Lugar (R-Ind.) for their visionary and bipartisan leadership to conceive of and support the program.¶ Begun in 1991, the program has deactivated over 7,600 warheads and destroyed over 900 intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has dismantled 33 submarines that carried nuclear weapons and 155 bombers. It also has funded security measures to safeguard facilities housing weapons of mass destruction and destroy chemical and biological weapons.¶ However, the President said, “…even with all your success — the thousands of missiles destroyed, bombers and submarines eliminated, the warheads that have been deactivated — we’re nowhere near done. Not by a long shot. And you all know this. There’s still much too much material -— nuclear, chemical, biological -— being stored without enough protection. There are still terrorists and criminal gangs doing everything they can to get their hands on it.”¶ “And make no mistake,” Obama said, “if they get it, they will use it; potentially killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people, perhaps triggering a global crisis. That’s why I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security. That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.”¶ Significant progress has been achieved to lock-down vulnerable nuclear material worldwide, but the to-do list is long, its underfunded, and its unfinished, as the March 2012 ACA-PGS status report on the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits explains.¶ One key step that Congress could take in the bipartisan tradition of Nunn-Lugar would be to finally approve the implementing legislation for two nuclear terrorism prevention conventions: the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, are common sense measures that enhance the world’s ability to prevent incidents of nuclear terrorism and punish those responsible.¶ As ACA Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann wrote in a recent ACA Issue Brief, “Time Is Now to Act on Treaties to Guard Against Nuclear Terrorism,” the legislation for these treaties has been delayed as a result of an impasse on the Senate Judiciary Committee between chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa).¶ Second Term Nuclear Risk Reduction Opportunities¶ Obama said “Nunn-Lugar is the foundation for the vision that I laid out, once I was elected President, in travel to Prague — where nations come together to secure nuclear materials, as we’re doing with our Nuclear Security Summits, where we build on New START and continue to work to reduce our arsenals; where we strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the spread of the world’s most deadly weapons; where, over time, we come closer to our ultimate vision — a world without nuclear weapons.”¶ Continuing to reduce the nuclear threat, strengthen the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and move closer toward a world without nuclear weapons will require stronger presidential leadership on the objectives that Obama and his team laid out in his first term.¶

#### Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

Jaspal– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

### Off4

#### The President of the United States should issue an executive order requiring the creation of a commission to resolve the legal status of persons detained in an Active Theater of War and apply the Geneva Conventions to persons detained in an Active Theater of War.

#### Executive commissions to implement Geneva protections solve the whole aff- their solvency advocate

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The D.C. Circuit’s reversal revealed a fundamental paradox in the government’s¶ approach to the Afghan conflict and the “war on terror.”11 Presidents¶ Obama and Bush have insisted the nation cannot be at “war” with al Qaeda and¶ therefore the protections of the Geneva Conventions and other international law do not apply to nor protect captured persons.12 When the Bagram detainees¶ challenged the legality of their detentions, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the executive’s¶ judgment and denied habeas relief because Bagram was in an “active¶ theater of war in a territory under neither the de facto nor the de jure sovereignty¶ of the United States.”13 This paradox puts Bagram detainees in a legal¶ “black hole”14 where they cannot obtain relief through traditional military justice¶ (like Geneva-governed military commissions) and domestic courts refuse¶ to hear their habeas claims. This Note argues the Bagram detainees are entitled to the same habeas¶ access the Supreme Court granted the Guant´anamo Bay detainees in¶ Boumediene. The two groups are sufficiently similar both in the context of their¶ captures and the degree of control the U.S. exercises over their sites of detention.¶ Moreover, treating detainees like prisoners, rather than combatants, is a¶ crucial step toward conducting the war on terror in a way consummate with¶ international humanitarian values, including individual dignity, minimization of¶ civilian harm, and discriminate use of force. Though this Note skirts the torture¶ debate, the abuses at Bagram are actually symptomatic of larger accountability¶ issues in American military policy that deserve deeper scrutiny. Although the¶ D.C. Circuit’s decision in Al Maqaleh v. Gates identified valid practical military¶ concerns inherent in an “active theater of war,” such as access to judicial¶ functions and presentation of sensitive evidence, these concerns are not insurmountable.¶ While courts should not discard claims of military necessity, the¶ D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Al Maqaleh demonstrates applying anachronistic¶ precedent to habeas cases involving the practical concerns of modern warfare¶ leads to contradictory results. The nation is at war, but it refuses to treat the¶ people it detains as prisoners of war.

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#### Predicating advantages off of worst-case scenarios is bad politics—enacting unexpected events manifests itself as a rationality of living with permanent catastrophe.

Aradau and van Munster ’11 (Claudia, Lecturer in International Studies and Research Director of the Securities Programme, Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance @ the Open University, and Rens, Senior Researcher @ Danish Institute for International Studies, “Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown”, Routledge, p.44)

Surprise and novelty The 'Prepare' strand of the CONTEST document covers the knowledge and actions to be taken when a danger irrupts, i.e. 'where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact' (Home Office 2009b: 13). Preparedness entails setting up capabilities to deal with a range of terrorist incidents, ensuring swift recovery, and training and equipping crisis management actors. The idea and knowledge of preparedness have emerged from the acceptance of the inevitability of nuclear attacks during the Cold War. From its application to nuclear preparedness, the concept migrated to 'all hazards' in the 1970s and is now used as a strategy of readiness for all forms of incidents, events, crises, disasters or catastrophes. Preparedness is generally taken to refer to a state of readiness to respond to unexpected and potentially catastrophic events. According to Lakoff, preparedness becomes 'an especially salient approach to perceived threats when they reach the limits of a rationality of insurance' (Lakoff 2007: 247). Even if insurance strategies are adapted to non-probabilistic, high-catastrophic risks, preparedness is seen as a techno-logy complementary or supplementary to insurance. Preparedness, just like precaution, appears to offer a solution to the limits of probabilistic insurantial knowledge, by focusing on inhabiting the event. Preparedness responds to the problematization of surprise and novelty, the unknowns that cannot be exhausted by secrecy, ignorance, risk and uncertainty. From floods and other weather disasters to the 'next terrorist attack' as a potential chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) emergency, preparedness exercises create worst case scenarios in order to foster readiness for anything smaller. Preparing for the future is based on worst case scenarios because '[t]his helps the emergency services and all those who respond to incidents of this nature to prepare for similar events of smaller scale, which are more likely to occur, as well as for worst case scenario' (London Fire Brigade 2010). As potential disasters now appear as indeterminate, unpredictable and unexpected, preparedness exercises are placed at the heart of a mode of knowledge which challenges or replaces statistical calculability. In this sense, the future of unexpected events cannot be known or predicted, it can only be enacted. Uncertainty becomes an opportunity to 'speculate not just about "the future", but a range of possible futures that might arise from the uncertain course of the forces of change' (emphasis in original) (Ralston and Wilson 2006: 102). Preparedness is closely entwined with the concept of 'planning' and the idea that planning for worst case scenarios would make subjects ready for responding to other events. As outlined in a document providing advice for businesses, 'Expecting the Unexpected', preparedness for a terrorist attack is key to any other form of future disruption: 'If your plan enables you to cope with a worst-case scenario, it will also help you deal more easily with lower-impact incidents' (National Counter Terrorism Security Office 2003: 11). Preparedness includes emergency plans, training, simulations and exercises. Simulations are supposed to test emergency management plans against the 'reality'. Unlike precautionary knowledge, which has been one response to non-probabilistic, catastrophic threats, preparedness does not depend upon the avoidance of catastrophe. Rather it entails a rationality of 'living with catastrophe', even if the catastrophe remains virtual, thrown forward into the future. It engages in the rehearsal of future terrorist attacks in order to bind future decisions to decisions in the present. Through exercises, experts and citizens are trained to deal with real-life disaster situations. Computer simulations are used to assess possibilities of escape, model behaviours in crisis situations, access for emergency services and so on. Preparedness knowledge shifts risk assessment from the pre-evental temporality of prevention and precaution to the time of the event. Exercises simulate an emergency situation and aim to prepare organizations to respond to surprising and novel events: Exercises allow participants to 'practice' the performance of duties, tasks, or operations very similar to the way they would be performed in a real emergency. An exercise can test or evaluate emergency operation plans, procedures, facilities - or any combination thereof. The exercise should simulate a realistic event, and allow the company to evaluate how all participants performed. (Emergency Management & Safety Solutions 2010) Or as a report by the British Standards Institute advises: Exercises can expose vulnerabilities in a weak organizational structure. They can start processes needed to strengthen both internal and external communication and can help improve management decision making during an incident. (Crisis Solutions 2008)

#### This permanent state of emergency transforms the state into an apparatus of death—creates a state of exception.

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The catastrophist right frequently opens political terrain on the far right that the state can exploit. By framing questions like immigration as catastrophic problems, the state is able to respond with harsh and previously off-limits policies. Anti-immigrant sentiment is promoted throughout the European and American center-right, and in both places border "protection" and surveillance are expanding fiefdoms of the security state. Border Patrol is one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the United States. In the EU, or rather outside it, immigrant detention is outsourced to locations beyond the fortress walls, and beyond the news. Political attacks on multiculturalism from the center-right in Europe are in response to a resurgent and increasingly dynamic far right putting these "problems" onto the table. Since the 1980s, the social democratic and liberal left in Europe and the United States has embraced neoliberalism. It has actively promoted the global expansion of capital and deregula-tion while attacking the organized working class. But the center-left must also pay homage to ideas of justice and equality, most often directly at odds with their concrete economic policies, or fear a loss of support to competitors further to the left. While extreme right formations have pulled mainstream conservative parties further to the right, the left is also vulnerable to right-wing agitation on questions where the left has traditionally been strong, but is more recently contradicted. Increasingly, these contradictions between economic liberalization and social or economic justice cannot be avoided by center-left parties and this vulnerability provides an opportunity for the right to fragment and disorient the left. In part, for the mainstream right, immigrant scapegoating, along with attacks on multiculturalism and on the economic position of the working class, is an electoral strategy that puts the left and social democratic opposition on the defensive. In periods of economic decline and insecurity, fear generated around these cultural and social issues helps to obscure coherent critiques of economic life. Reproduced as state catastrophism they help to reinforce this fragmentation of the left. Fear is the bedfellow of right-wing catastrophism and it is expertly manipulated by the state. A right-wing catastrophic vision of the state extends back at least to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes's Leviathan posits civil war as the state of nature. To tame and achieve dominion over that hellish prospect, Hobbes envisions a "commonwealth" of men held together by contract and the dictatorial power of the sover-eign who will "punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment or ignominy" those who fail to abide by the rules.60 It stands in con-trast to the more optimistic prescriptions of Montesquieu and Rousseau that articulated the rule of law, and its implicit countervailing foci of power, over the rule of men. The Enlightenment crystallized a set of ideas that had been forming in Europe since Martin Luther. It began as a break with the dictatorial rule of the Pope and the idea of individual political liberty, and the individual that the Enlightenment presented remains a central doctrine of democratic political thought.61 Hobbes emphasized (and this is why he remains a touchstone of authoritarian ideology) that violence is at the heart of politics. There is only a choice between the ordered monopoly on violence that codifies a set of sociopolitical arrangements, the state, or an inchoate and tempestuous violence that sets each against all. Hobbes is the founder of a right-wing tradition that has as its core assumption a notion of human nature as predatory and selfish and this tradition gets made and remade against Rousseau and certain versions of Enlightenment thought right up to today. Hobbes is not the first catastrophist, but he was perhaps the best known and, at the dawn of capitalism, identified catastrophe as the disease for which the state is a cure. Conservatives hold him in special regard and there are few liberals who are not Hobbesians at heart either: Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair, and Barack Obama would all agree that the state of nature is war. If state power is an apparatus, then catastrophism is employed to expand it. States recognize that catastrophe must be averted by whatever means are available, and they understand that catastrophe aversion is a powerful political multiplier. FDR used it when he sold the New Deal, and Hitler proclaimed it when he invaded Poland. In the section "Creating Tomorrow's Dominant Force," the Project for the New American Century indicated that their transformative project to remake an American world was likely to be a long one "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event— like a new Pearl Harbor."62 Conspiracists mistake that to indicate a scripting of the attacks of September11, 2001, but it can be more accurately read as the simple recognition that catastrophe or the threat of catastrophe makes radical change possible. Goering pointed out that when it comes to persuading people of the need to go to war, "all you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists."63 Catastrophe can then be anything that makes war look like the better option. State catastrophism often indicates an exchange of political and social freedoms for relief from fear.64 The aftermath of September 11 confirms the idea that the promotion and management of fear is the foremost technique for those who wish to exercise control over events. The saturation of American culture with reminiscences of World War II in the years following 9 /11 was an extroverted yearning for a "popular" emergency and simultaneously a bulwark for an unpopular one. Confronted with a threat or the imaginary landscape of threats, the state, like the sovereign, allows itself room for exceptional action and response. In the arena of hypothetical disasters, the state does not resort to a judicial standard of proof, instead "urgent conjecture must sometimes take the place of proof" and the greater the supposed threat the greater the onus on the skeptic to prove a negative, that there is no threat.65 The detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 shocked Western intelligence services and disrupted U.S. plans to contain the Soviets to the territory they controlled at the end of World War II. The National Security Council warned President Truman that, "The United States ... is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design."66 The NSC assumed that war with the Soviets was inevitable and, when fighting broke out in Korea in 1950, its catastrophist interpretation of Soviet foreign policy became the governing American orthodoxy. Truman declared a state of emergency and four troop divisions were dispatched to Germany: "The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civili-zation itself."67 Within two years, the United States would relocate massive air, ground, and naval forces to Europe and, guided by NSC doctrine, embark on a long-term strategy to intensify the global military and political struggle with communism under the banner of the Cold War and atomic Armageddon. "The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin, for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world."68 George Kennan, then a senior Soviet analyst in the State Department, demurred from the NSC line arguing that Stalin had no taste for territory where he could not have direct political or military control, but it was too late. The ship had sailed with Truman to the Cold War.69 Asked after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to outline the dif-ference between an assumption that Iraq had WMDs and the hypothesis that Saddam might "move to acquire those weapons," President Bush responded: "So what's the difference?" His refusal to recognize the distinction between the possibility of a fact and the possibility of a desire to establish facts may have seemed novel, but it is consistent in the history of exceptions to the supposedly normal course of state action. Writing about the Weimar constitution in 1921, Carl Schmitt observed that the ability of the president to declare a "state of emergency" implicitly recognized that dictatorial power was a feature of the state. He later distinguished an enemy of the state as "in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."70 States routinely deploy emergency powers to deal with the vagaries of nature and disaster but these instances are generally temporary and localized. It is in the case of war that emergency power is most spectacularly invoked. In Giorgio Agamben's interpretation, the kind of violence Schmitt valorizes transforms the state into an "apparatus of death" and "the state of emergency defines a regime of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts that do not have the value of law acquire the force of law."71 Schmitt argued that it is impossible to predict the nature of threats or the conditions of any emergency so it is impossible to prescribe any legal form or limit to sovereign action. Post 9/11, Schmitt's key insight plays on in the procedural gymnastics over torture, assassination, kidnapping, drone murder, domestic spying, extra judicial internment, and the limits of executive power. Until the twenty-first century, one could still assume that the United States was constitutionally distinct from any of Hobbes's prescriptions. But Dick Cheney's contention that presidential power and what the president does is the same thing echoes Schmitt (and Hobbes) from beyond the grave. Schmitt's assertion that it is "precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty" recognizes that the exception becomes the rule and for him confirms that fascism is not incompatible with democracy. Henry Paulson's TARP fund for the financial sector following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a catastrophe of another sort. Announcing the program, Paulson stated that the initial $700 billion would be used to relieve banks of worthless mortgage-backed securities, but the bill never specified how these jubilee funds would be spent. The threat that Paulson iden-tified was the insolvency of many banks as a result of the collapse in value of their mortgage holdings, and the consequent "clogging up" of lending and money markets. Within weeks though, banks were using the money to consolidate and buy other banks rather than sanitizing their capital base. Paulson's threat to "the financial security of all Americans—their retirement savings, their home values, their ability to borrow" was not averted.72 But neither did the economy collapse. As much as the threats may or may not be real, the outcomes may not be as intended or the intended outcomes may not be as stated. In 2008, the invocation of imminent catastrophe allowed for a departure from normal procedures necessitating secrecy, speed, and huge quantities of money. Brad Sherman of the House of Representatives from California was warned that "the market would drop two or three thousand points the first day, another couple thousand the second day, and a few members were even told that there would be martial law in America if we voted no."73 \* \* \* Catastrophism has a long history on the right and both the state and the organized far right understand it and wield it skillfully to achieve political and propaganda goals, as this chapter has sought to show. Disease catastrophists view the achievements of the left as suicidal threats to traditional order and this view is universal on the right.74 Cure catastrophists believe that violent conflict will resolve and defeat these threats and some among that group, like Breivik and Timothy McVeigh, desire to quicken its arrival.75 In the contemporary period, marked by persistent economic and environmental crises, catastrophes are more visible and their invocation is even more common. For the left, as outlined elsewhere in this book, this presents serious problems in trying to form a political understanding that is useful for organizing and for social movements. But for the right, catastrophism is not counterproductive. As we have seen, it allows the right to influence and even dominate many political questions and at the state level real victories are being achieved. Catastrophism is a less ambivalent strategy for the right than for its adversaries on the left. From a rhetorical standpoint, catastrophism is a win/win for the right as there is no accountability for false prophecy. On the one hand, it rallies the troops and creates a sense of urgency. On the other hand, though, fear and paranoia serve a rightist political predisposition more than a left or liberal one. Authoritarian politics benefits more than left politics from fear. Twenty-first-century capitalism is characterized ' by a high degree of insecurity for all workers, both middle and working class, and fear and vulnerability constitute a growing part of the social landscape. The right can profit from exploiting these conditions, and in light of their achievements over the last generation they will continue to do so. Ironically, it is the collapse of the left that has offered up the space for them to do it, so the weeds are growing in the beloved ruins of the Keynesian state. The right has built a popular opposition to the welfare state and to income redistribution by shaping resentment against minority groups. Catastrophism for the right is the fight against equality and for war, hierarchy, and state violence. In a thoroughgoing way, right-wing catastrophe manages to materialize Samuel Huntington's prediction that "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."76 Catastrophism is one way to shift the focus from the essential questions of public policy, democracy, equality, access to education and health, environment, etc. and onto abstractions about civilization, culture, and threats to the prevailing social order that promise instability and worse. It is ironic that the contemporary right has found in identity a politics to sustain itself, much like it charges the left with having done. But in a period of declining incomes, chaotic public finances, and persistently high unemployment, the promises and predictions of a "catastrophically convulsed America that descends into a Balkanized ruin and social collapse" seeps into the right-wing Zeitgeist and finds scapegoats by successfully fragmenting an already fragile and divided political landscape. Which, of course, is the point.77

#### You are an educator evaluating the political rhetoric of the 1AC. Let go of expectations of the coming apocalypse and instead reorient yourself towards questioning the dominant framing of the affirmative

Gilles & Gross ‘12 (Mel, highly successful web author, and Mathew, director of internet communications for Howard Dean’s presidential campaign, highly regarded media strategist, “The Last Myth: What the Rise of Apocalyptic Thinking Tells Us About America”, Prometheus, p. 202)

Addressing the challenges of a growing global population in a period of declining resource availability—and creating a world-view that comports with, rather than denies or despairs over, the challenges we face in the twenty-first century—will require us to let go of our fears, fantasies, and expectations of apocalypse. Yet moving beyond the apocalypse is no easy task, for it is more than simply a way of thinking about the world and its future. While we may mock or deride apocalyptic thinking when we encounter it in others, it has existed as a constant companion to the Western mind since the rise of Christianity; it has been nurtured, for Americans, by the uniquely religious history of our nation; and it has become widely activated by the horrors of the twentieth century and the looming crises of the twenty-first. The apocalypse is, in other words, not just an idea but an archetype, a metaphysical belief that has taken root at the core of the Western worldview. Archetypes are more than the basis of some mythological stories, more than the means through which we interpret events in the real world. They are, as Edward Edinger once wrote, "devouring mouths— finding little egos they can consume and then living out of those egos."14 And as Carl Jung said, "One never possesses a metaphysical belief but is possessed by it." Put another way: it doesn't matter whether we believe in the archetype of the apocalypse, for the archetype of the apocalypse holds us. None of us has escaped its influence. If our idea of progress is on the verge of collapse, then our apocalyptic anxiety is easily accounted for—for the worldview to which we turn for meaning is growing increasingly meaningless. Yet the further we retreat into that apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to bring about the very apocalypse that we fear. Just as each of us must accept, at some point, our own personal mortality, letting go of the apocalyptic storyline will require us to accept a level of cultural mortality and to let the dream of ruins die. Doing so will result in a rebirth. Mircea Eliade believed that "the anguish of the modern world" was a "sign of an imminent death," but "a death that is necessary and redemptive," for it will be followed by "the possibility of attaining a new mode of being" based on "maturity and responsibility."16 The "new mode of being" that we must create is not going to be based on avoidance, or denial or despair, or longing for a future cataclysm to sort us all out and prove our beliefs correct. It's going to be based on coming to terms with the physical world and its restrictions as it is, and recognizing that those realities are fundamentally different—politically, economically, ecologically, and culturally—than the world in which most of us grew up. That world was made magical by an abundance of cheap energy, an energy that fueled a historic rise in material wealth for America and the developed nations; that fueled the dominance of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency; that fueled the rise of the American middle class, the American Dream, and the belief in American exceptionalism; and that fueled, for nearly three centuries, the belief that continued and uninterrupted progress was our birthright. Yet it also fueled an unprecedented rise in global population— a tripling in the number of human beings in less than a century, with another doubling (from four to eight billion) likely to be completed in the fifty years between 1974 and the middle of the next decade. And as the appetite of developing countries continues to grow in a world already struggling to meet the global demand for resources, and as the ecological effects of climate change and the unwinding of the global credit bubble continue to disrupt the world's economy, the unsustainability of a worldview predicated on cheap energy, cheap credit, and abundant resources is becoming obvious. We may beat our fists into the dirt, or sink our oil and natural gas wells there in hopes of finding energy in such bounteous and efficient levels as we encountered at the beginning of the twentieth century—but it is not there. We may insist that technology will find a way out of this reality or that America deserves to be exceptional by continuing to consume 25 percent of the world's resources despite having only 5 percent of the world's population—but we're not investing in those technologies, and such inequalities rarely last. We may believe that a new global consciousness will emerge to control our insatiable appetites or continue to insist that uninterrupted and unchallenged progress is our birthright—but such beliefs no longer match up with reality, for the dreams and hopes of an emerging global middle class are competing fiercely with our own. This may not be about the decline of America but "the rise of the rest," as journalist Fareed Zakaria put it.17 Yet the rise of the rest is going to have profound effects not merely on the resources of the world and our way of life but ultimately on the way we view the world. Within our lifetimes, we're not going to be building a society based on exponential growth, nor are we going to be able to build a "sustainable" society in a world of declining resources. We're going to have to learn to create a society based on decline—a decline in energy consumption, in available resources, and, eventually and inevitably, in human population. This doesn't mean we're going all the way back to the Stone Age, nor does it necessarily presage an apocalyptic collapse; such visions are merely the symptoms of our inability to imagine a world different from our own. In the century and a half before the Reformation, apocalyptic expectation in the Western world reached a feverish pitch that has rarely been matched in history—except perhaps in our own day. The governing institution of Martin Luther's day—the Catholic Church—was perceived by many as irredeemably corrupt and incapable of addressing the problems confronting society. The indulgences that the Church exacted upon its subjects were seen as increasingly rapacious and arbitrary, draining society of its belief in a just and stable world. The Scholastic method of learning, prac-ticed by monks who tried to resolve the differences between their beliefs and the texts of the ancient world, became an increasingly vainglorious and empty pursuit, producing dizzying works of scholarship without any application in the real world. The world, it seemed, could not continue as it was. Yet nobody could imagine a different world or a new path forward in history: the only way out, so many believed, was through apocalypse. But the apocalypse didn't happen. Instead, by questioning the very basis of sixteenth-century Europe's worldview—the inerrant authority of the Church—Martin Luther accelerated a process that ultimately overturned not just the Church's stranglehold on Europe but the entire political, intellectual, and spiritual basis for that stranglehold.18 By questioning the basis of a worldview, a new world was born: the Enlightenment soon followed, and the age of empiricism, science, and rationality gave rise to our own democratic institutions and unlocked the secrets of easy energy and material wealth. But now that age, too, is coming to an end. That there are limits to growth and progress has been known to us for more than a century. Pick your beginning point: Matthew Arnolds retreating sea of faith, the massacre in the trenches of World War I, the detonation of the first atomic bomb, or the looming catastrophe of global warming. No matter which moment you point to as the beginning of the end, the end of our worldview is already well under way. And as the old worldview deteriorates, our apocalyptic anxiety is rising. This rising anxiety marks a dramatic act in a long intellectual play, to be sure, but the actual resolution—the denouement—lies much further in the future. Recently, a friend of ours who is in his sixties, observing the great upheaval of the last few years, said to us: "My only regret is that I won't be around thirty years from now to see how it all turns out." This is an understandable desire, felt by many of us when we contemplate the outcome of history as the end of our lives approach. Yet by taking a step back, we recognize the hopelessness of that desire. History ebbs and flows on a scale that dwarfs us. Resolution and permanence are a trick of perception, as when, at the high and low of the tide, it seems as though the sea has stopped moving. Such moments can trick us into believing that the world is in stasis, or that everything depends on our actions on the beach. Yet the sea never stops moving. The rhetoric of the apocalypse gets it backward: this is not the most important time to be alive—being alive is the most important time. The world before us will still be marked by laughter and love and art and joy; a life is no less valu-able or beloved if one lives in an age of decline, when the tides are running out, than in an age of progress. When we free ourselves from the hypnotic spell of apocalypse, when we let go of our desire to see how things will turn out, we are free to answer a more important question. Not, are my beliefs correct? But, how do I live in accord with my values right now? Our insistence that a new world is coming later is a delusion; it is already here. We have met many who say that they will go start an organic farm when things come undone. We have met others who are already farming and say that they are doing it to prepare for the Great Unraveling. Why not choose to farm, as one example, be-cause you value independence, self-sufficiency, and the environ-ment and want to live in accordance with your values, rather than framing your life through the prism of the apocalypse, hoping to be proven right and others proven wrong? The answer as to how to live into our values is different for each of us—it may be about traveling the world as much as manning the ramparts. But the right public policy prescriptions and personal decisions will come only when we abandon our expectations that some future cataclysmic moment will eventually prove us right. During the twentieth century, a handful of influential thinkers— Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade, Carl Jung and his protege, Edward Edinger—made tremendous advancements in our understanding of the power of myths and archetypes on the human psyche. By the end of their lives, their studies had led them inexorably toward considerations of the apocalypse. The questions they pondered are the questions we now face: given the power of archetypes to manifest themselves in the real world, is the widespread and increasing belief in the apocalypse destined to become a self-fulfilling prophecy? And if the metaphysical journey of humanity can be described as the movement of meaning from myth to history, and from God to man—have we become the gods we once feared? Carl Jung observed that the development of the atomic bomb gave us the power to unleash the apocalypse on our fellow man. "Not nature, but the 'genius of mankind,' has knotted the hangman's noose with which it can execute itself at any moment," Jung wrote.19 This same genius of humankind, which unlocked the resources of the earth to build the richest civilization in the history of the world, now threatens to denude and depauperate the earth in its blind fealty and commitment to the ideal of continued growth and material progress. The gods of the traditional world, with their supernatural powers, have been replaced by humans with bombs and shopping lists; the apocalypse has moved onto an entirely secular stage, devoid of divine purpose, sanctity, or meaning. But having become gods, we must ourselves become more god-like. We must acknowledge that we can no longer wait for the arrival of some other deity—whether Jesus or Mother Nature—to come to resolve our questions in a moment of historical clarity. The future will provide us with no greater insights than the present. Indeed, when the moorings of our world actually come undone, most of us don't acknowledge it: global warming is turned into a belief; economic collapse is viewed as behind us; and cheap oil, we insist, will one day come back. To continue to expect a cataclysmic, crystallizing moment leaves us in a state of paralyzed anticipation—blinding us to the reality that much of what we fear is already here, awaiting our attention. For more than two thousand years, we've looked to the future for that moment when clarity would descend upon us... the wrongs of the world overturned…the trials of history adjourned. Consider that no such moment is coming. Consider that the veil has already been lifted, and everything we need to know has been revealed. The world doesn’t end, not for a very long time. The future is still ours—but the future is not what it was.

### Terrorism

#### 1. Zero risk of nuclear terrorism

Mearsheimer Professor of Political Science at UChicago ’11 (John, January, “Imperial by Design,” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=10>, Mike)

The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into serious trouble. This is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

#### 2. No motivation for nuclear terror

Francis J. Gavin 10, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, “Same As It Ever Was,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 7–37

A recent study contends that al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons may be overstated. Anne Stenersen, a terrorism expert, claims that “looking at statements and activities at various levels within the al-Qaida network, it becomes clear that the network’s interest in using unconventional means is in fact much lower than commonly thought.”55 She further states that “CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons do not play a central part in al-Qaida’s strategy.”56 In the 1990s, members of al-Qaida debated whether to obtain a nuclear device. Those in favor sought the weapons primarily to deter a U.S. attack on al-Qaida’s bases in Afghanistan. This assessment reveals an organization at odds with that laid out by nuclear alarmists of terrorists obsessed with using nuclear weapons against the United States regardless of the consequences. Stenersen asserts, “Although there have been various reports stating that al-Qaida attempted to buy nuclear material in the nineties, and possibly recruited skilled scientists, it appears that al-Qaida central have not dedicated a lot of time or effort to developing a high-end CBRN capability. . . . Al-Qaida central never had a coherent strategy to obtain CBRN: instead, its members were divided on the issue, and there was an awareness that militarily effective weapons were extremely difficult to obtain.” 57 Most terrorist groups “assess nuclear terrorism through the lens of their political goals and may judge that it does not advance their interests.”58 As Frost has written, “The risk of nuclear terrorism, especially true nuclear terrorism employing bombs powered by nuclear fission, is overstated, and that popular wisdom on the topic is significantly flawed.”59

#### 3. No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 11—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

#### Obama is prioritizing capture over drone strikes now

David Corn 13, Washington Bureau Chief at Mother Jones, 5/23/13, “Obama's Counterterrorism Speech: A Pivot Point on Drones and More?,” http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/05/obama-speech-drones-civil-liberties

So Obama's speech Thursday on counterterrorism policies—which follows his administration's acknowledgment yesterday that it had killed four Americans (including Anwar al-Awlaki, an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen)—is a big deal, for with this address, Obama is self-restricting his use of drones and shifting control of them from the CIA to the military. And the president has approved making public the rules governing drone strikes.¶ The New York Times received the customary pre-speech leak and reported:¶ A new classified policy guidance signed by Mr. Obama will sharply curtail the instances when unmanned aircraft can be used to attack in places that are not overt war zones, countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The rules will impose the same standard for strikes on foreign enemies now used only for American citizens deemed to be terrorists.¶ Lethal force will be used only against targets who pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans" and cannot feasibly be captured, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in a letter to Congress, suggesting that threats to a partner like Afghanistan or Yemen alone would not be enough to justify being targeted.¶ These moves may not satisfy civil-liberties-minded critics on sthe right and the left. Obama is not declaring an end to indefinite detention or announcing the closing of Gitmo—though he is echoing his State of the Union vow to revive efforts to shut down that prison. Still, these moves would be unimaginable in the Bush years. Bush and Cheney essentially believed the commander in chief had unchallenged power during wartime, and the United States, as they saw it, remained at war against terrorism. Yet here is Obama subjecting the drone program to a more restrictive set of rules—and doing so publicly. This is very un-Cheney-like. (How soon before the ex-veep arises from his undisclosed location to accuse Obama of placing the nation at risk yet again?)¶ Despite Obama's embrace of certain Bush-Cheney practices and his robust use of drones, the president has tried since taking office to shift US foreign policy from a fixation on terrorism. During his first days in office, he shied away from using the "war on terrorism" phrase. And his national security advisers have long talked of Obama's desire to reorient US foreign policy toward challenges in the Pacific region. By handing responsibility for drone strikes to the military, Obama is helping CIA chief John Brennan, who would like to see his agency move out of the paramilitary business and devote more resources to its traditional tasks of intelligence gathering and analysis.¶ With this speech, Obama is not renouncing his administration's claim that it possesses the authority to kill an American overseas without full due process. The target, as Holder noted in that letter to Congress, must be a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or an associated group who poses an "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and who cannot be captured, and Holder stated that foreign suspects now can only be targeted if they pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans." (Certainly, there will be debates over the meaning of "imminent," especially given that the Obama administration has previously used an elastic definition of imminence.) And Obama is not declaring an end to the dicey practice of indefinite detention or a conclusion to the fight against terrorism.

#### Restricting detention policies means we kill and extradite prisoners

Jack Goldsmith 09, a professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, 5/31/09, “The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogation,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html>

The cat-and-mouse game does not end there. As detentions at Bagram and traditional renditions have come under increasing legal and political scrutiny, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied more on other tactics. They have secured foreign intelligence services to do all the work -- capture, incarceration and interrogation -- for all but the highest-level detainees. And they have increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ It is tempting to say that we should end this pattern and raise standards everywhere. Perhaps we should extend habeas corpus globally, eliminate targeted killing and cease cooperating with intelligence services from countries that have poor human rights records. This sentiment, however, is unrealistic. The imperative to stop the terrorists is not going away. The government will find and exploit legal loopholes to ensure it can keep up our defenses.¶ This approach to detention policy reflects a sharp disjunction between the public's view of the terrorist threat and the government's. After nearly eight years without a follow-up attack, the public (or at least an influential sliver) is growing doubtful about the threat of terrorism and skeptical about using the lower-than-normal standards of wartime justice.¶ The government, however, sees the terrorist threat every day and is under enormous pressure to keep the country safe. When one of its approaches to terrorist incapacitation becomes too costly legally or politically, it shifts to others that raise fewer legal and political problems. This doesn't increase our safety or help the terrorists. But it does make us feel better about ourselves.

### Transatlantic

#### Multiple alt causes to transatlantic relations

Stivachtis -10 – (Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html)

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense.

#### US isolation prevents collaboration.

Anderson -11 (William, June 24, 2011, The U.S.-EU High Level Development Dialogue: Building on the Legacy of the Marshall Plan, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct\_publication\_attachments/Anderson\_MarshallPlanLegacy\_Jun11.pdf)

However, can USAID and others in the administration convince the Congress that modest contributions to macro and sector level budget support through country financial systems in well-managed economies make sense? If the United States cannot participate in country-owned aid mechanisms where the EU and most other major donors do so, the United States effectively excludes itself from 1) regular meetings of donor directors to agree on key macro and sector policy positions, and 2) high-level policy dialogue sessions between donors and senior country representatives. Such self-imposed isolation makes it more difficult for the United States and the EU to collaborate effectively in programming assistance to obtain greater results. In a period of downward political pressure on aid budgets, squeezing maximum impact from flat or decreasing levels of assistance is essential to reach development objectives.

#### Obama solves transatlantic relations

Wittes and Youngs 9 [Tamara, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. Department of State, research fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, and Richard, director general of FRIDE, assistant professor at the University of Warwick, “Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach,” January, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, no 18, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01\_middle\_eastern\_democracy\_wittes/01\_middle\_eastern\_democracy\_wittes.pdf]

As the Obama Administration assumes office, hopes are high that transatlantic cooperation can be revitalized. If debates over Iraq poisoned the U.S.-European relationship during the Bush Administration, and bitterly divided the European Union itself, they also affected broader policy deliberations. In the years since the invasion of Iraq, the issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East has often been a focus of discussions over the breach in transatlantic relations—sometimes presented as a major cause of discord, and sometimes presented as the stepping stone to renewed harmony of purpose. Within the United States, President-elect Barack Obama’s transition team has begun to consider new options for Middle East policy. The European Union, meanwhile, has launched a new Union for the Mediterranean, while also revising its overarching security strategy. As these new plans take root, views differ on how far transatlantic cooperation can be rebuilt and on how desirable or meaningful such cooperation may be. It is within this period of shifting policies that this paper offers its analysis.

#### Iraq and Arab-Israeli conflict prevent relations.

Wittes and Youngs 9 [Tamara, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. Department of State, research fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, and Richard, director general of FRIDE, assistant professor at the University of Warwick, “Europe, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach,” January, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, no 18, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01\_middle\_eastern\_democracy\_wittes/01\_middle\_eastern\_democracy\_wittes.pdf]

Despite plentiful E.U. rhetoric asserting the need to move beyond the disagreements over Iraq, in practice most European governments continue to see and speak about the Middle Eastern democracy agenda through the lens of broader U.S. policy failures in the Middle East. If many European policymakers and commentators have come to question the normative legitimacy of democracy promotion, it is because they have come to associate the latter with U.S. actions in Iraq. Compounding this “Iraq spill-over,” the well-known European line persists that Washington’s imbalanced position on the Arab-Israeli conflict complicates other areas of policy in the Middle East. The European conviction remains strong that support for democratic reform is unlikely to prove fruitful until the Arab-Israeli peace process makes significant progress, a development that in turn requires a more even-handed U.S. attitude. In short, transatlantic differences on broader issues continue to infect attitudes toward the formallyshared agenda of democracy promotion.