# 1NC

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#### Visions of hope and a better tomorrow are wrapped in the ideals of anti-queerness. With the placement of hope in our minds, we seek a better tomorrow, which only creates an external Queer that must be exterminated, as it does not fit into these visionary requests. Rather than rejecting pure negativity for the future, we should learn to accept it, embrace it, and turn it back onto current identities.

Edelman 4 (Lee Edelman, Prof. English at Tufts University, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” 2004, pp. 4-5)

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social – such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer – but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible – to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism – I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing and certainly not what we call “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that’s always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic’s undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self-constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, is installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue a negation of this primal, constitutive, negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic’s negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the "grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial," the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our "good." 4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call "better," though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. I connect this something better with Lacan's characterization of what he calls "truth," where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good. Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and Intend[ing] toward the real." 6 Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth: The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws-even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.' Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the "aberrant or atypical", to what chafes against "normalization," finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself.' For by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social- and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as "the letter." It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee. To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears-and thereby bears down on-us all. It is, rather, to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures, that shape them. If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality-an intervention that may well take the form of figuring that reality's abortion, then queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier's collapse into the letter's cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates meaning itself. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling fails, one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory, as I construe it, marks the "other" side of politics: the "side" where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the "side" outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism's unquestioned good.

#### Using a basis of race and culture is a straight privilege. Emphasis on cultural surrounding and the preservation of our identities is incompatible with the queer state of being because it is an identity that is unfounded and rejected by communal survival standards.

Warner 3; Micheal Warner, Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993

What we may be less prepared to recognize is **that the frame of identity politics itself belongs to Anglo-American traditions and has omc distorting influences. It seems impossible in this context to raise the possibility of sexual conflict or diversity except by appealing for the homosexual minority** and by making comparisons to other minority movements. In the United States**, the default model For all minority movements is racial or ethnic. Thus the language of multiculturalism almost always presupposes an ethnic organization of identity, rooted in family, language, and cultural tradition.** Despite its language of postmodernism. M**ulticulturalism tends to rely on very modem notions of authenticity, of culture as shared meaning and the source of identity**.2°**Queer culture will not fit this bill.** Whatever else it might be, it is not autochthonous**. It cannot even be in diaspora, having no locale from which to wander.** Thus, **while notions of alternative traditions or canons have been very useful for African-American and feminist scholars, because queer politics does not obey the member/nonmember logics of race and gender**, **alternative canons and traditions cannot always be opposed to the dominant ones in the same way**.2’ Indeed, **the emphasis on reproductive continuity in such models can produce an extreme homophobia, and the tension resulting from such unrecognized disparities can make alliance politics difficult. People tend not to encounter queerness in the same way as ethnic identity. Often the disparity between racial and sexual imperatives can be registered as an unresolved dissonance.** One correspondent writes me on this point: “As a gay man of color I find certain aspects of my identity empowered and fortified within the space of the ethnic family while other aspects of my identity are negated in that very same space**. I fall in between what seems to me a split between the People tend not to encounter queerness in the same way as ethnic identity. Often the disparity between racial and sexual imperatives can be registered as an unresolved dissonance.** One correspondent writes me on this point: c Familial language deployed to describe sociability in race- or gender-based move rnents (sisterhood, brotherhood, fatherland, mother tongue, etc.) can either be a language of exile for queers or a resource of irony (in voguing houses, for example, one queen acts as “Mother”). Given such realities**, theory has to understand that different identity envi ronments are neither parallel — so that the tactics and values of one might be assumed to be appropriate for another — nor separable. Queer struggles and those of other identity movements, or alter natively of other new social movements, often differ in important ways — even when they are intermingled in experience.** There are many unavoidable structural relations between the dif lerent fields of identity politics, if only because of the intrication of genetic and erotic logics in both race and gender. Is race, is gender, a mode of desire or of reproduction? Reproduction usually implies eros; **but when identity is apprehended as desire, as ¡n same-sex or cross-race relations, its reproductive telos disappears.** **This very incommensurability between genetic and erotic logics suggests that queerness, race, and gender can never be brought into parallel alignment**. Sedgwick has gone so far as to suggest **that a damaging bias toward heterosocial or heterosexist assumptions inheres unavoidably in the very concept of gender. . . . Although many gender-based forms of analysis do involve accounts, sometimes fairly rich ones, of intragender behaviors and relations,** **the ultimate definitional appeal in any gender-based analysis must necessarily be to the diacritical frontier between different genders.** This gives heterosocial and heterosexual relations a conceptual privilege of incalculable consequence?

#### The 1AC puts faith into the immutable differences of skin color and gender, but this focus causes violence with a sin of omission towards the invisible difference of sexuality.

Gómez 5, Political theorist on Hate Crimes; (María Mercedes, On Prejudice, Violence, and Democracy, la-buena-vida.info, ongoing project from 2005 until 2008, pp. 2-3, JAR)

People who embody difference are marked in two ways. The first way is premised on the assumption that one cannot become “the other” because the borders between the norm and those outside the norm are rigid. Race and gender, for instance, have been historically conceived, in social, cultural and legal settings, as essential, visible, and largely immutable physical attributes. 4 In contrast, the second way seeks to exteriorize difference when the “other” threatens to become one of “us” or part of the norm. Prejudice against dissenting sexualities is paradigmatic of border anxiety because unlike other seemingly essential, visible and immutable differences, sexual orientation has often been seen as invisible and mutable. 5 In this case, the assumed permeability of the borders of difference –between the norm and deviance or dissent-- is related to violence in a specific way. A fundamental principle of democratic societies should be, as Nancy Fraser puts it, to achieve participatory parity for all their members in order to make collective decisions regarding the way they want to live their lives.6 Prejudices and the violent ways in which they manifest are central obstacles for the achievement of participatory parity. Many of the political, cultural and legal efforts to overcome prejudice focus on a notion of discrimination. I contend however, that explanations about different types of prejudices when collapsed into a single explanatory logic of discrimination are insufficient to elucidate the complexity of exclusionary practices.

#### The futurist hatred of Queerness is the all-encompassing standard of normalization used to discipline and punish difference – this is the site of on-going violence.

Elias et al. 3; (Karen E. Lovaas PhD, John P. Elia PhD & Gust A. Yep PhD, Professor at San Francisco University, Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 45, no. 2/3/4, p.18, 2003)

In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating pervasiveness of hatred and violence in her daily life based on being seen, perceived, labeled, and treated as an “Other.” This process of *othering* creates individuals, groups, and communities that are deemed to be less important, less worthwhile, less consequential, less authorized, and less human based on historically situated markers of social formation such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and nationality. Othering and marginalization are results of an “invisible center” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values. As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society (Foucault, 1978/1990). Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is “the site of violence” (p. xxvi). Perhaps one of the most powerful forms of normalization in Western social systems is heteronormativity. Through heteronormative discourses, abject and abominable bodies, souls, persons, and life forms are created, examined, and disciplined through current regimes of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1978/1990). Heteronormativity, as the invisible center and the presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, and perpetuating the erasure, marginalization, disempowerment, and oppression of sexual others.

#### The 1AC takes a position of jubilee – a position that assumes happiness and communal understandings of joy for the protection and preservation of identity based communities. We believe that this is too damn happy, because as long as there is difference, there can never be the type of happiness that they affirm.

#### So, in the face of their politics of jubilee, we say fuck positivity! We reject the affirmative’s visions of a happy state of being where hope and equality have a chance, because these visions only actualize the reality that there IS NO PLACE for the Queer body. We reject the resolution through the lens of queer negatvitiy. Our negative self-destruction of identity is the only action that can result in a place for the Queer in the now.

Edelman 4, Professor of English Literature; (Lee, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, pp. 28-31, JCE)

Bernard Law, the former cardinal of Boston, mistaking (or maybe understanding too well) the degree of authority bestowed on him by the signifier of his patronymic, denounced in 1996 proposed legislation giving health care benefits to same-sex partners of municipal employees. He did so by proclaiming, in a noteworthy instance of piety in the sky, that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish the marital bond. "Society," he opined, "has a special interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage." With this fatal embrace of a futurism so blindly committed to the figure of the Child that it will justify refusing health care benefits to the adults that some children become, Law lent his voice to the mortifying mantra of a communal jouissance that depends on the fetishization of the Child at the expense of whatever such fetishization must inescapably queer. Some seven years later, after Law had resigned for his failure to protect Catholic children from sexual assault by pedophile priests, Pope John Paul II returned to this theme, condemning state-recognized same-sex unions as parodic versions of authentic families, "based on individual egoism" rather than genuine love. Justifying that condemnation, he observed, "Such a 'caricature' has no future -and cannot give future to any society." Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant provocations not only by insisting on our equal right to the social order's prerogatives, not only by avowing our capacity to promote that order's coherence and integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital Ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. We might like to believe that with patience, with work, with generous contributions to lobbying groups or generous participation in activist groups or generous doses of legal savvy and electoral sophistication, the future will hold a place for us-a place at the political table that won't have to come at the cost of the places we seek in the bed or the bar or the baths. But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers, chosen as they are to bear the bad tidings that there can be no future at all: that the future, as Annie's hymn to the hope of "Tomorrow" understands, is "always! A day! Away." Like the lovers on Keats's Grecian urn, forever "near the goal" of a union they'll never in fact achieve, we're held in thrall by a future continually deferred by time itself, constrained to pursue the dream of a day when today and tomorrow are one. That future is nothing but kid stuff, reborn each day to screen out the grave that gapes from within the lifeless letter, luring us into, ensnaring us in, reality's gossamer web. Those queered by the social order that projects its death drive onto them are no doubt positioned to recognize the structuring fantasy that so defines them. But they're positioned as well to recognize the irreducibility of that fantasy and the cost of construing it as contingent to the logic of social organization as such. Acceding to this figural identification with the undoing of identity, which is also to say with the disarticulation of social and Symbolic form, might well be described, in John Brenkman's words, as "politically self-destructive." But politics (as the social elaboration of reality) and the self (as mere prosthesis maintaining the future for the figural Child), are what queerness, again as figure, necessarily destroys -necessarily insofar as this "self" is the agent of reproductive futurism and this "politics" the means of its promulgation as the order of social reality. But perhaps, as Lacan's engagement with Antigone in Seminar 7 suggests, political self-destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life. If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of futurity, if the jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate around its ritual reproduction, then the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we're called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it enforces, that we, as Guy Hocquenghem made clear, are "not the signifier of what might become a new form of 'social organisation,' "that we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose, instead, not to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. The queerness we propose, in Hocquenghem's words, "is unaware of the passing of generations as stages on the toad to better living. It knows nothing about 'sacrifice now for the sake of future generations' ... [it] knows that civilisation alone is mortal." Even more: it delights in that mortality as the negation of everything that would define itself, moralistically, as pro-life. It is we who must bury the subject in the tomb-like hollow of the signifier, pronouncing at last the words for which we're condemned should we speak them or not: that we are the advocates of abortion; that the Child as futurity's emblem must die; that the future is mere repetition and just as lethal as the past. Our queerness has nothing to offer a Symbolic that lives by denying that nothingness except an insistence on the haunting excess that this nothingness entails, an insistence on the negativity that pierces the fantasy screen of futurity, shattering narrative temporality with irony's always explosive force. And so what is queerest about us, queerest within us, and queerest despite us is this willingness to insist intransitively-to insist that the future stop here.

### Off

#### At its core debate relies on having a proposition that identifies a controversy. Each side of the debate desires to have OTHERS accept the proposition

Freeley and Steinberg, 12 [Austin and David, Argumentation and Debate, 2012, 13th Edition p. 125]

In argumentation and debate a proposition is a statement of judgment that identifies the central issue in controversy. The advocate desires to have others accept or reject the proposition. Debate provides organized argument for and against the proposition: Those arguing in favor of the proposition present the affirmative side; those arguing against it present the negative side. To promote intelligent and effective argument, a debate proposition must have certain characteristics. A. Controversy As stated at the beginning of the chapter, controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Thus an effectively worded debate proposition should begin with a subject of public dispute, or potential dispute, and clearly state the controversy or reference the point of the relevant controversy.

#### Further, the aff advocates must support change –

Freeley and Steinberg, 12 [Austin and David, Argumentation and Debate, 2012, 13th Edition p. 130]

In debates about propositions of policy, affirmative advocates support change, usually favoring new governmental policy. Policy propositions call for an agent (often the U.S. Federal Government) to actively do something new (depart from the existing set of actions in favor of different action, such as new law). Such supported change requires departure from the status quo, usually described in existing structures, stated policies or laws. The status quo is the current system or the ways things are now. For example, at one time capital punishment was legal throughout the United States; it was the status quo. Then the Supreme Court ruled that existing capital punishment statutes were unconstitutional. The status quo then became one of no capital punishment. Subsequently states enacted new capital punishment laws that met the Supreme Court’s criteria, and executions resume in those states. Thus the status quo is that some states permit capital punishment under specific circumstances. But partisans on both sides are seeking to change this status quo: Some want to expand capital punishment to all states, whereas others want to abolish it. While propositions of fact and value do not address consideration of a “status quo” as they do not call for change, they do operate from a parallel notion: that participants in the debate begin with a prior assumption regarding the proposition, that it is false. So as the status quo represents a system under attack, prior assumptions represent beliefs under attack, as critical listeners or judges reject the positively worded claim forwarded by the proposition of fact or value until it is proven true.

#### The change theory is especially true in the context of a status quo that both sides agree must change - Burden of proof theory supports that specific change is necessary

Freeley and Steinberg, 12 [Austin and David, Argumentation and Debate, 2012, 13th Edition]

In some cases, again, change may be inherent in the status quo. In such cases there is a presumption in favor of a change, but not in favor of any particular change. A typical example may be found in the automobile industry, in which most companies make annual model changes. Even though new models come out every year, the designers advocating model X have the burden of proof to convince their company that model X is better than model Y or model Z or any other model under consideration. In some situations there is no status quo; for example, when it comes time to elect freshmen class officers, there are no incumbents. Thus, when the status quo provides for a change or when a change is inherent in the status quo, the advocates of a new policy or of possible change have the burden of proof. Similarly the advocates of specific value (as in a debate on a proposition of value in which the affirmative advocates the specific value called for in the resolution) have the burden of proof. Again, the classic rule of burden of proof applies to all of these situations: One who asserts must prove.

#### The aff hasn’t sufficiently fulfilled the criteria necessary for the condition of debate.

#### 1. They haven’t identified a political solution. The existence of racism is not a controversy that can be negated.

#### 2. They haven’t identified a specific change that is necessary. In the status quo of racism, the key concept is how specifically ought we fight against it. Failure to identify specific solutions means the possibility of debate doesn’t exist. Burden of proof means that specificity is key.

#### 3. There limited focus on just themselves, the two debaters, is not sufficient for debate either. The notion of debate is getting others to accept your position.

#### There are a few impacts –

#### 1. Apriori rejection – failure to meet a criterion means a debate cannot exist. This isn’t a normative argument about whether the aff is good. It’s also not a question about whether of good debate can happen. It’s more fundamental than that. It’s a question about whether the conditions for debate actually exist. They do not.

#### 2. Fairness – Just naming a controversy creates an unfair debate. We cannot win that their aff isn’t true and we shouldn’t need to win an impact turn to the aff. That puts us in an untenable and unethical position. It also means we are robbed of debates over effective strategies to challenge their harms.

#### This is exaggerated by the fact that judges tend to judge in offense/defense paradigm, which requires us to win offense against their aff in order to prove competition of any competing strategy. Fairness is a prereq to debate. It is the gateway to all other impacts. This should be a reason to reject the aff. At the very least, it should be a reason why they don’t get permutations.

#### 3. Controversy/Deliberation - Controversy is essential to preventing actual atrocities. History is riddled with examples of policies that went forward untested. The results are horrifying

Leone, President of the Century Foundation, 2003

(Richard C,formerly the Twentieth Century Fund, a public policy research foundation, The War on Our Freedoms, pg 1-4)

The government of the United States reacted to the terrible events of September 11, 2001, with sweeping policy departures both at home and abroad. To date, there has been remarkably little debate about many of the changes in national policy, especially those that have significantly compromised the civil liberties of U.S. citizens. Yet history teaches us that bypassing public deliberation almost inevitably leads to outcomes that the nation ends up regretting. Looking back, there is a long list of reactions to other threats in which the absence of open debate coincided with many of the nation’s low points. During the twentieth century, the Palmer Raids after World War I, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Iran-Contra, the secret war in Honduras, and any number of other ventures went badly astray. Public deliberation entails controversy that can be painful and time-consuming, but it often prevents bad ideas from taking hold while broadening support for policies that are implemented. After 9/11, the administration of George W. Bush was understandably eager to demonstrate to the country that it would respond quickly and decisively to prevent a recurrence of the horrific terrorist attacks. And hardly anyone – not Democrats in Congress, not the media, not even major civil liberties advocates – wanted to be perceived as attempting to obstruct that effort. But in looking back on all that has happened so far during the tumultuous post 9/11 period, it is alarming how little public deliberation has occurred. For example: The limited debate about an independent investigative commission to examine and learn from possible intelligence failures leading up to 9/11, was not created until more than a year after the attacks. In contrast, a similar commission was formed within three weeks after Pearl Harbor to find out what happened. The initial acquiescence to a limited budget - $3 million- for the commission to conduct its inquiry, in contrast to the $60 - $80 million being contemplated – and criticized as low – for the inquiry into the cause of the space shuttle Columbia crash. The lack of argument and dissent over the enactment, just six weeks after 9/11, of the USA Patriot Act incorporating sweeping changes in the ways that the government can monitor and investigate all citizens.

### Case

#### Stopping the use of drones causes shift to other methods---they’re all worse for civilian casualties and state violence

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

EFFECTIVENESS IS ONE THING, MORALITY ANOTHER. The leading objection to drone warfare today is that it supposedly involves large, or "excessive," numbers of civilian casualties, and that the claims of precision and discrimination are greatly overblown. These are partly factual questions full of unknowns and many contested issues. The Obama administration did not help itself by offering estimates of civilian collateral damage early on that ranged absurdly from zero to the low two digits. This both squandered credibility with the media and, worse, set a bar of perfection -- zero civilian collateral damage -- that no weapon system could ever meet, while distracting people entirely from the crucial question of what standard civilian harms should be set against.¶ The most useful estimates of civilian casualties from targeted killing with drones come from the New America Foundation (NAF) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which each keep running counts of strikes, locations, and estimates of total killed and civilian casualties. They don't pretend to know what they don't know, and rely on open sources and media accounts. There is no independent journalistic access to Waziristan to help corroborate accounts that might be wrong or skewed by Taliban sources, Pakistani media, Pakistani and Western advocacy groups, or the U.S. or Pakistani governments. Pakistan's military sometimes takes credit for drone strikes against its enemies and sometimes blames drone strikes for its own air raids against villages. A third source of estimates, UK-based The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), comes up with higher numbers.¶ TBIJ (whose numbers are considered much too high by many knowledgeable American observers) came up with a range, notes Georgetown law professor and former Obama DOD official Rosa Brooks. The 344 known drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012 killed, according to TBIJ, between "2,562 and 3,325 people, of whom between 474 and 881 were civilians." The NAF, she continues, came up with slightly lower figures, somewhere "between 1,873 and 3,171 people killed overall in Pakistan, of whom between 282 and 459 were civilians." (Media have frequently cited the total killed as though it were the civilians killed.) Is this a lot of civilians killed? Even accepting for argument's sake TBIJ's numbers, Brooks concludes, if you work out the "civilian deaths per drone strike ratio for the last eight years…on average, each drone strike seems to have killed between 0.8 and 2.5 civilians." In practical terms, adds McNeal, this suggests 'less than three civilians killed per strike, and that's using the highest numbers" of any credible estimating organization.\*¶ Whether any of this is "disproportionate" or "excessive" as a matter of the laws of war cannot be answered simply by comparing total deaths to civilian deaths, or civilian deaths per drone strike, however. Although commentators often leap to a conclusion in this way, one cannot answer the legal question of proportionality without an assessment of the military benefits anticipated. Moreover, part of the disputes over numbers involves not just unverifiable facts on the ground, but differences in legal views defining who is a civilian and who is a lawful target. The U.S. government's definition of those terms, following its longstanding views of the law of targeting in war, almost certainly differs from those of TBIJ or other liberal nongovernmental groups, particularly in Europe. Additionally, much of drone warfare today targets groups who are deemed, under the laws of war, to be part of hostile forces. Targeted killing aimed at individuated high-value targets is a much smaller part of drone warfare than it once was. The targeting of groups, however, while lawful under long-standing U.S. interpretations of the laws of war, might result in casualties often counted by others as civilians.¶ Yet irrespective of what numbers one accepts as the best estimate of harms of drone warfare, or the legal proportionality of the drone strikes, the moral question is simply, What's the alternative? One way to answer this is to start from the proposition that if you believe the use of force in these circumstances is lawful and ethical, then all things being equal as an ethical matter, the method of force used should be the one that spares the most civilians while achieving its lawful aims. If that is the comparison of moral alternatives, there is simply no serious way to dispute that drone warfare is the best method available. It is more discriminating and more precise than other available means of air warfare, including manned aircraft -- as France and Britain, lacking their own drones and forced to rely on far less precise manned jet strikes, found over Libya and Mali -- and Tomahawk cruise missiles.¶ A second observation is to look across the history of precision weapons in the past several decades. I started my career as a human-rights campaigner, kicking off the campaign to ban landmines for leading organizations. Around 1990, I had many conversations with military planners, asking them to develop more accurate and discriminating weapons -- ones with smaller kinetic force and greater ability to put the force where sought. Although every civilian death is a tragedy, and drone warfare is very far from being the perfect tool the Obama administration sometimes suggests, for someone who has watched weapons development over a quarter century, the drone represents a steady advance in precision that has cut zeroes off collateral-damage figures.¶ Those who see only the snapshot of civilian harm today are angered by civilian deaths. But barring an outbreak of world peace, it is foolish and immoral not to encourage the development and use of more sparing and exact weapons. One has only to look at the campaigns of the Pakistani army to see the alternatives in action. The Pakistani military for many years has been in a running war with its own Taliban and has regularly attacked villages in the tribal areas with heavy and imprecise airstrikes. A few years ago, it thought it had reached an accommodation with an advancing Taliban, but when the enemy decided it wanted not just the Swat Valley but Islamabad, the Pakistani government decided it had no choice but to drive it back. And it did, with a punishing campaign of airstrikes and rolling artillery barrages that leveled whole villages, left hundreds of thousands without homes, and killed hundreds.¶ But critics do not typically evaluate drones against the standards of the artillery barrage of manned airstrikes, because their assumption, explicit or implicit, is that there is no call to use force at all. And of course, if the assumption is that you don't need or should not use force, then any civilian death by drones is excessive. That cannot be blamed on drone warfare, its ethics or effectiveness, but on a much bigger question of whether one ought to use force in counterterrorism at all.

Stephen Holmes 13, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

But Obama can make an even subtler case for drones. Well-meaning but imperfectly informed critics sometimes claim that the absence of risk to US forces explains the recklessness with which American drone operators kill combatants and noncombatants alike. Mazzetti quotes, in this context, Richard Clarke’s comment on the routinisation of asymmetry in drone warfare: ‘if the Predator gets shot down, the pilot goes home and fucks his wife. It’s OK. There’s no POW issue here.’ That noncombatants are regularly killed by pilots of unmanned aircraft sticking to their routines is widely acknowledged. But does it make sense to argue that such documented overkill results from the absence of risk to the pilots’ own lives and limbs? Obama and his supporters, rightly in my view, dismiss this line of attack as theoretically confused and empirically unproven. For one thing, the stress, panic and fear experienced on combat missions can easily increase rather than decrease the number of mistaken hair-trigger strikes on noncombatants. Reckless endangering of civilians results more often from heat-of-battle fear than from above-the-battle serenity. The drone operator is freed from the pressures of kill or be killed that can easily distort interpretations of what one sees, or thinks one sees, on the battlefield. The faux cockpits from which drones are remotely piloted are unlikely to be commandeered by berserkers.¶ An even more powerful, if still flawed, argument in favour of Obama’s campaign is the way heavy losses in any war can subconsciously put pressure on civilian politicians to inflate irrationally the aims of the conflict in order to align them with the sacrifices being made. War aims are not fixed ex ante but are constantly evolving for the simple reason that war is essentially opportunistic. Initial objectives that prove unrealistic are discarded as new opportunities emerge. Far from inducing greater caution in the use of force, heavy losses of one’s own troops may exacerbate a tendency to demonise the enemy and to hype the goals of the struggle.¶ Formulated more abstractly, the way we fight has a marked impact on when and why we fight. This is true despite what experts in the laws of war tell us about a theoretically watertight separation between jus in bello and jus ad bellum. Fighting in a way that limits the risk to one’s own troops makes it possible to fight limited-aims wars that don’t spiral into all-out wars for national survival. This, I think, is Obama’s best case for drone warfare. Land wars are ‘dumb’ because they almost inevitably involve mission creep as well as postwar responsibilities that US forces are poorly equipped to assume. Drone warfare is smart because, while helping dismantle terrorist organisations and disrupt terrorist plots, it involves less commitment on the American side, and is therefore much less likely to escalate out of control.

#### We have to focus on the system – personal focus fails.

Rob the Idealist, Carleton College, JD candidate, 10/1/13, Tim Wise & The Failure of Privilege Discourse, www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-wise-failure-privilege-discourse/

I don’t find it meaningful to criticize Tim Wise the person and judge whether he’s living up to some anti-racist bona fides. Instead, I choose to focus on the paradigm of “White privilege” upon which his work is based, and its conceptual and practical limitations. Although the personal is political, not all politics is personal; we have to attack systems. To paraphrase the urban poet and philosopher Meek Mill: there are levels to this shit. How I Define Privilege There are power structures that shape individuals’ lived experiences. Those structures provide and withhold resources to people based on factors like class, disability status, gender, and race. It’s not a “benefit” to receive resources from an unjust order because ultimately, injustice is cannibalistic. Slavery binds the slave, but destroys the master. So, the point then becomes not to assimilate the “underprivileged”, but to instead eradicate the power structures that create the privileges in the first place. The conventional wisdom on privilege often says that it’s “benefits” are “unearned”. However, this belief ignores the reality and history that privilege is earned and maintained through violence. Systemic advantages are allocated and secured as a class, and simply because an individual hasn’t personally committed the acts, it does not render their class dominance unearned. The history and modern reality of violence is why Tim Wise’ comparison between whiteness and tallness fails. White supremacy is not some natural evolution, nor did it occur by happenstance. White folks \*murdered\* people for this thing that we often call “White privilege”; it was bought and paid for by blood and terror. White supremacy is not some benign invisible knapsack. The same interplay between violence and advantage is true of any systemic hierarchy (class, gender, disability, etc). Being tall, irrespective of its advantages, does not follow that pattern of violence. Privilege is Failing Us Unfortunately, I think our use of the term “privilege” is no longer a productive way for us to gain a thorough understanding of systemic injustice, nor is it helping us to develop collective strategies to dismantle those systems. Basically, I never want to hear the word “privilege” again because the term is so thoroughly misused at this point that it does more harm than good. Andrea Smith, in the essay “The Problem with Privilege”, outlines the pitfalls of misapplied privilege theory. Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered… Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Dr. Tommy Curry says it more bluntly, “It’s not genius to say that in an oppressive society there are benefits to being in the superior class instead of the inferior one. That’s true in any hierarchy, that’s not an ‘aha’ moment.” Conceptually, privilege is best used when narrowly focused on explaining how structures generally shape experiences. However, when we overly personalize the problem, then privilege becomes a tit-for-tat exercise in blame, shame, and guilt. In its worst manifestations, this dynamic becomes “oppression Olympics” and people tally perceived life advantages and identities in order to invalidate one another. At best, we treat structural injustice as a personal problem, and moralizing exercises like “privilege confessions” inadequately address the nexus between systemic power and individual behavior. The undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. Andrea Smith, The Problem with Privilege Bigger than Tim Wise However, the problem with White privilege isn’t simply that Tim Wise, a white man, can build a career off of Black struggles. As I’ve already said, White people need to talk to White people about the historical and social construction of their racial identities and power, and the foundation for that conversation often comes from past Black theory and political projects. The problem for me is that privilege work has become a cottage industry of self-help moralizing that in no way attacks the systemic ills that create the personal injustices in the first place. A substantive critique of privilege requires us to get beyond identity politics. It’s not about good people and bad people; it’s a bad system. It’s not just White people that participate in the White privilege industry, although not everyone equally benefits/profits (see: Tim Wise). Dr. Tommy Curry takes elite Black academics to task for their role in profiting from the White privilege industry while offering no challenge to White supremacy. These conversations about White privilege are not conversations about race, and certainly not about racism; it’s a business where Blacks market themselves as racial therapists for White people… The White privilege discourse became a bourgeois distraction. It’s a tool that we use to morally condemn whites for not supporting the political goals of elite black academics that take the vantages of white notions of virtue and reformism and persuade departments, journals, and presses into making concessions for the benefit of a select species of Black intellectuals in the Ivory Tower, without seeing that the white racial vantages that these Black intellectuals claim they’re really interested in need to be dissolved, need to be attacked all the way to the very bottom of American society. Dr. Tommy Curry, Radio Interview The truth is that a lot of people, marginalized groups included, simply want more access to existing systems of power. They don’t want to challenge and push beyond these systems; they just want to participate. So if we continue to play identity politics and persist with a personal privilege view of power, then we will lose the struggle. Barack Obama is president, yet White supremacy marches on, and often with his help (record deportations, expanded a drone war based on profiling, fought on behalf of US corporations to repeal a Haitian law that raised the minimum wage). Adolph Reed, writing in 1996, predicted the quagmire of identity politics in the Age of Obama. In Chicago, for instance, we’ve gotten a foretaste of the new breed of foundation-hatched black communitarian voices; one of them, a smooth Harvard lawyer with impeccable do-good credentials and vacuous-to-repressive neoliberal politics, has won a state senate seat on a base mainly in the liberal foundation and development worlds. His fundamentally bootstrap line was softened by a patina of the rhetoric of authentic community, talk about meeting in kitchens, small-scale solutions to social problems, and the predictable elevation of process over program — the point where identity politics converges with old-fashioned middle-class reform in favoring form over substance. I suspect that his ilk is the wave of the future in U.S. black politics. Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene Although it has always been the case, Obama’s election and subsequent presidency has made it starkly clear that it’s not just White people that can perpetuate White supremacy. Systems of oppression condition all members of society to accept systemic injustice, and there are (unequal) incentives for both marginalized and dominant groups to perpetuate these structures. Our approaches to injustice must reflect this reality. This isn’t a naïve plea for “unity”, nor am I saying that talking about identities/experiences is inherently “divisive”. Many of these privilege discussions use empathy to build personal and collective character, and there certainly should be space for us to work together to improve/heal ourselves and one another. People will always make mistakes and our spaces have to be flexible enough to allow for reconciliation. Though we don’t have to work with persistently abusive people who refuse to redirect their behavior, there’s a difference between establishing boundaries and puritanism. Fighting systemic marginalization and exploitation requires more than good character, and we cannot fetishize personal morals over collective action.

#### Their focus reproduces hegemonic structures and forms the basis for neoconservative violence

Mari boor Toon, UMD Communication Associate Professor, 2005, Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423] The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### Their form of therapeutic politics posit themselves as saving their wounded place in the community and posit you to engage in theraputic cleansing - this trades off with structured demands and turns the aff.

Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418] "leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action." Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere."71¶ Clinton's Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform. In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.73 Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities" Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.¶ Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium." More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. There was nothing to argue about."75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."77 Contributing to the ineffectiveness of a therapeutic approach in redressing social problems is its common pairing with what Burke terms "incantatory" imagery, wherein rhetors invite persons to see themselves in an idealized form. Comparing a current conflicted self against a future self individuals aspire to become is a therapeutic staple, a technique Clinton mimics in his speech on race. In one breath, he acknowledges persistent racial "discrimination and prejudice"; in another, he overtly invites audience members to picture themselves in saintly fashion: "Can we be one America respecting, even celebrating, our differences, but embracing even more what we have in common?"79 But outside private therapy, this strategy rarely results in honest self-disclosure, especially regarding thorny issues such as race. Andrew Hacker argues that individuals seldom speak candidly about race in public; rather, they express an "idealized" self with ideas and feelings they desire or, more commonly, believe they should possess, a phenomenon evident even in anonymous polling.80 The hazard of blending the confessional with the incantatory, Burke writes, is a "sentimental and hypocritical" false reassurance that society is on the proper course, rendering remedial action unnecessary.81 This danger is compounded if the problem initially has been couched as essentially attitudinal rather than structural, as Clinton did: "We have torn down the barriers in our laws. Now we must break down the barriers in our lives, our minds and our hearts."82 Indeed, in commenting on the therapeutic bent of the Conversation on Race, William L. Taylor argues that the late Bayard Rustin's reservations about the social-psychological approach to race were prescient: "Rustin said he could envision America being persuaded figuratively to lie down on the psychiatrist's couch to examine their feelings about race. They would likely arise, he said, pronouncing themselves either free or purged of any bias. And nothing would have changed."83 Furthermore, identification intrinsic in narrative experiences is double-edged; while identification can neutralize domination by creating empathy, identification also can fortify hegemony. As Cornell West warns, the privileging of emotional responses to racism and racial self-identities over other data can contribute to "racial reasoning," which blacks employ to their peril. To illustrate, he points to the failure of black leadership to challenge the qualifications by typical measures of black Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, opting instead to submit to deceptive racial solidarity built upon premises of "black authenticity." Because the problems plaguing contemporary black America, West writes, result from a complex amalgam of structural and behavioral factors, weaving solutions demands analysis of data beyond subjective personal narratives and performances of self-identity. The Conversation on Race visibly demonstrates the inertia endemic in a discursive model lacking direction and mechanisms for closure. Five months into the racial dialogue, White House aides conceded no consensus had emerged even on fundamental goals: whether the initiative should formulate race-related policy or merely explore racial attitudes.86 Moreover, Clinton himself expressed weariness over the failure in public meetings to move beyond the repetitive airing of personal opinion on issues such as affirmative action,87 concurring with critics that "we need structure for the discussion . . . so we can actually get something done."88 Months more of racial conversation, however, produced few substantive results. The University of New Hampshire's extended dialogue over the proposed conversational forum engendered similar fatigue and inaction. Arguments forwarded by both camps centered on pivotal differences between "debate" and "conversation," problem-solving tasks and relational aims, and formal and informal modes of gauging opinions. Ironically, more than one lengthy "conversation" over the conversational proposal produced no action, leading one exhausted participant to observe, "This [process] goes to the heart of my frustration with ever making this [conversational Forum] viable."89 As Burke maintains, while some symbolic forms contain "a 'way in,' 'way through,' and 'way out,'" others "lead us in and leave us there."90 Finally, a key weakness in a dialogic model for treating systemic social problems is its reliance on a crucial non-sequitur: increased intimacy will spawn an ethic of care, which, in turn, will produce an ethic of justice.91 But at the University of New Hampshire, the mistrust and estrangement that a "real conversation" purportedly would rectify had resulted, not from a lack of familiarity among principals, but from structural concerns, including the widening gap between faculty and administrative salaries, shrinking resources, and maneuvers to erode faculty governance. Likewise, the personal proximity between white families and their black slaves or servants reveals that intimacy means little in the face of structural inequities, nor does it necessarily induce removal of injustices. Illustrative is the recent revelation that South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond had fathered a daughter by his family's black domestic in 1925, an intimacy that failed to alter the 1948 Dixiecrat presidential candidate's stance on segregation.92 Similarly, although the lessening of hostility over abortion reported by some participants in the Public Conversations Project may have some merit, project leaders themselves concede their "vision for a 'conflict resolution' process for a complex issue [such as abortion] is not necessarily resolution."93 As such, the utility of such dialogues on public policies affecting the material lives of women seeking legal reproductive choices is sorely limited. As [End Page 421] Burke notes when drawing crucial distinctions between psychological and material spheres, "[T]o some degree, solution of conflict must always be done purely in the symbolic realm (by 'transcendence') if it is to be done at all." Still, a "symbolic drama," he writes, differs from "the drama of living . . . and [its] real obstacles . . . Hence, at times [people] try to solve symbolically kinds of conflict that can and should be solved by material means. Indeed, as Clinton rightly said in launching his Conversation on Race, political or military power cannot compel caring. Yet political power can command justice as evidenced in the nation's record of dismantling racial and gender barriers through judicial and legislative means.

# 2NC

### [2NC] Link

**Couple examples from the 1AC:**

**(1) by making** positive **requests that you just cannot refuse** or **by provoking you to act in defense of yourself, your students, your colleagues, or your entire race --- this is our Warner and Edelman Link**

#### The affirmative incorrectly isolates hope for justice in the future. This produces a cacophony of futures that confound queer activism. Radical pessimism is the only standpoint.

Edelman and Berlant 13; Lee, Prof. English at Tufts and Lauren, Prof. Literature at Univ. Chicago, Sex, or the Unbearable, Pp. 39-40

Fantasy tethers you to a possible world but makes you passive too, she suggests, “waiting—waiting with dread” to discover what you already know, that the shoe of realism will drop (Sedgwick 2000, 172). In one version of Eve’s project the subject of this unbearable knowledge shuttles between the paranoid rupture and the depressive position’s compulsion to repair the attachment tear that she feels too intimately. In another version, though, in the space of dread and hesitation, there is no agency-generating project, not even a welcome mat. Dread’s hesitation might be consumed in a flash, endure a long stretch, or become a state of withheld relaxation that spans an entire life’s existence. Dread gives a fundamentally queer shape to life, multiplying a cacophony of futures and attachments. This is a relational style made stark, and collective, by illness. “Dread, intense dread, both focused and diffuse . . . [was] the dominant tonality of” the first phase of aids consciousness, she writes, “for queer people, at least for those who survived” (Sedgwick 2011, 138). Dread maps out what’s weak in reparative desire; in Eve’s work, its power is in the tableau of ambivalence it produces, in contrast to shame’s familiar contrapuntal dynamic of cloaking, exposing, and desperate attaching, or paranoia’s rhythm of projection, attack, and vulnerability. Dread raises uncomfortable questions about repair, the unclarity of what repair would fix, how it would feel as process and telos, and whether it would be possible, desirable, or worth risking. As we will see, the work of dread in Eve’s oeuvre points in many directions, and indeed that is its clarifying power. Dread slices between noticing the mood made by the abrasion of loneliness and the discovery that nothing at the moment compels the drives or action toward cultivating anything, or even pretending to: this aggressive passivity is where fantasy offers consolation for living on while failing to provide a reliable cushion. A Dialogue on Love demonstrates prolifically the irreparable problem-a scene made by dread, staging the interregnum that paces, dilutes, and sometimes abandons the fantasy of repair. At one point Eve borrows Mark Seltzer’s phrase the “melodrama of uncertain agency” to describe this fantasmatic space of flailing or animated suspension (Sedgwick 2000, 157).1 The impasse not yet or perhaps never caught up in the drama of repair is neither life existentially nor life post-traumatically but existence, revealed in the stunned encounter: with the contingencies of structuring fantasy; in what one loves in one’s own incoherence; and in the bruise of significant contact, with people and with words.

**(2) I think the time has come for us to get truly hysterical,** to take on the role of "professional Sapphires" in a forthright way, **to declare that we are serious about ourselves, and to capture** some of **the intellectual power** and resources **that are necessary to combat the systematic denigration of minority women.” --- this is our Warner and Edelman Link**

#### The rhetoric of “survival strategies” implicitly valorizes the safety of culture through reproduction. This kind of heteronormative discourse constructs a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic.

Lippert 8 - University Assistant in American Studies @ the University of Vienna – 2008 (Leopold, Utopian Contemporaries: Queer Temporality and America, thesis, November. [PDF Online @] othes.univie.ac.at/2818/1/2008-11-26\_0303723.pdf) Accessed 07.02.11 jfs

Edelman opens his book with what he modestly terms “a simple provocation” (Future, 3), and what encapsulates the futility of an affirmative and assimilationist queer politics. He argues “that queerness names [...] the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism” (Future, 3), and reveals the implicitly homophobic discourse of all the Obamas and O’Sullivans who are fighting for the future of our children and our grandchildren. The futurist bias towards heteronormativity has been fueled, as Judith Butler points out, by “fears about reproductive relations” (“Kinship”, 21), by uncanny anxieties over the prospect that queer citizenship may interfere with a nation “imagined for fetuses and children” (Berlant, Queen, 1), and by the fundamental antithesis that the queer and the child embody. The principal concern of futurist America, then, is the fate of its offspring, expressed in a fearful inquiry: “What happens to the child, the child, the poor child, the martyred figure of an ostensibly selfish or dogged social progressivism?” (Butler, “Kinship”, 21). Edelman recognizes that the mythical child – as the epitome of a heteronormative future-oriented social – can only be saved by a “marriage of identity to futurity in order to realize the social subject” (Future, 14), which leads him to the ensuing claim that only the linear temporal process of “ever aftering” (“After”, 476, emphasis in the original) can keep “society alive” (“After”, 476). Heteronormative America, accordingly, is constituted through its own posterity, through a temporal operation to which queerness is inherently antagonistic. In an imagined community that relies on futurism as its life-giving engine, then, “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (Edelman, Future, 4).

**(3) the** **subject enters a future where contexts and social realities change,** and that **the subject enters a state of jubilee rather than counts itself as a beat in the march to utopia --- this is our Warner and Edelman Link**

### Lyrics

Then she said she impregnated, that's the night your heart died
Then you gotta go and tell your girl and report that
Main reason cause your pastor said you can't abort that
Now your driver say that new Benz you can't afford that
All that cocaine on the table you can't snort that
That going to that owing money that the court got
On and on that alimony, uh, yeah-yeah, she got you homie
'Til death but do your part, unholy matrimony

### [2NC] Impact

**\*EXT:** “Othering and marginalization are results of an “invisible center” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values. As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society (Foucault, 1978/1990). Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is “the site of violence” (p. xxvi).”

\*Elias et al. 2003 from the 1NC

#### The type of heteronormative thinking that futurism runs on instills a fundamental fear of impurity in society. This amplifies systemic violence against the Queer body and places us on a trajectory towards omnicide.

Sedwick 1990 (Eve Sedgwick, Professor of English CUNY, “Epistemology of the Closet,” 1990, pp. 127-130.)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorray, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing--the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or ¶ persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence.¶ If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist \*imaginaire\*. In our culture as in \*Billy Bud\*, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time \*after the homosexual\* is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time \*after the human\*; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there \*were\* homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow.¶ Fragments of visions of a time \*after the homosexual\* are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture [book published in 1990 -Alec]. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations.26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine lustre this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked--in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.¶ It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy [sic]. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is \*one thing\* with \*one cause\*, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly \*to the degree\* that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission.¶ Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups [the disabled -Alec], then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole¶ human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse in entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct \*risk group\*, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal.27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones by opened and opened and opened?

### !: Life-in-Capture

#### The queer body is always dead – whether trapped in the legal system or the closet within the family space, queer persons are constantly alienated from their own bodies and desires, constituting a life-in-capture.

Stevens 11; Eric, Fugitive Flesh: Gender Self-Determination, Queer Abolition, and Trans Resistance in “Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison-Industrial Complex” ed. Eric Stanley and Dean Spade Pp 7-8

Many trans/queer youth learn how to survive in a hostile world. Often the informal economy becomes the only option for them to make money. Selling drugs, sex work, shoplifting, and scamming are among the few avenues that might ensure they have something to eat and a place to sleep at night. Routinely turned away from shelters because of their gender presentation, abused in residential living situations or foster care, and even harassed in “gay neighborhoods” (as they are assumed to drive down property values or scare off business), they are reminded that they are alone. Habitually picked up for truancy, loitering, or soliciting, many trans/queer people spend their youth shuttling between the anonymity of the streets and the hyper-surveillance of the juvenile justice system. With case managers too overloaded to care, or too transphobic to want to care, they slip through the holes left by others. Picked up—locked up—placed in a home—escape—survive—picked up again. The cycle builds a cage, and the hope for anything else disappears with the crushing reality that their identities form the parameters of possibility.10 With few options and aging-out of what little resources there are for “youth,” many trans/queer adults are in no better a situation. Employers routinely don’t hire “queeny” gay men, trans women who “cannot pass,” butches who seem “too hard,” or anyone else who is read to be “bad for business.” Along with the barriers to employment, most jobs that are open to folks who have been homeless or incarcerated are minimum-wage and thus provide little more than continuing poverty and fleeting stability. Back to where they began—on the streets, hustling to make it, now older—they are often given even longer sentences. While this cycle of poverty and incarceration speaks to more current experiences, the discursive drives building their motors are nothing new. Inheriting a long history of being made suspect, trans/queer people, via the medicalization of trans identities and homosexuality, have been and continue to be institutionalized, forcibly medicated, sterilized, operated on, shocked, and made into objects of study and experimentation. Similarly, the historical illegality of gender trespassing and of queerness have taught many trans/queer folks that their lives will be intimately bound with the legal system.

### L/!: ID Politics

#### Why does identity and our social location matter in the face of oppression? The affirmative’s response to Western colonialism is to grab ahold of their identity in a fight against being just another target for white, heteronormative thinking. But this disclosure and use of defining ourselves is the same practices we wish to escape – defining ourselves creates target sites for colonial thinking.

Kibele 13; 5/9/13; “My Gender in the Face of Colonialism: A Quest,” http://originalplumbing.com/index.php/society-culture/travel/item/621-my-gender-in-the-face-of-colonialism-a-quest

One thing that I notice since relocating to the West is the social pressure (maybe even a requirement?) to define who, how, and why you are the person you are. Sometimes you can't have a simple conversation without taking three minutes to disclose all of your identities and current life practices. Needless to say that is a trend in most queer/trans spaces. XXXXXXXXXXThe hyper-performance of identification satisfies the individual desire to feel defined and established, along with comfortably placing yourself within the structures we live under. And this definitely applies to gender discourses as well.¶ ¶ When I tell people I am gender non binary trans\* femme, I first feel overwhelmed because that is a lot of words, and then confused because I don't understand how a group of words that I not so long ago discovered in a language that isn't my own can dictate so much in my life. I was initially thrilled to have a phrase to describe who I am after years of not being able to define myself. These days however, I have been feeling a disconnect with the terminology available to describe my gender to the ways in which I live my life, per my gender. Frankly, I do not even think about my gender that much, it is more of an evolving spiral of production and reproduction as opposed to a set-in-stone definition-- And that is very exciting. ¶ ¶ But-- I realize how both my physical and mental colonization contributes to my situation: The context in which I was brought up (Middle East) is diametrically opposed to the one I am living in now (New York City). The same goes for the language and culture I currently consume. (I talk about these issues more on my personal tumblr: hysthetics.com). I have let the Western and White queer and trans discourses of gender somehow sneak their way into my life. I now realize that me seeking validation in identifying within this system not only perpetuates colonialism and cultural imperialism, it also halts me from carrying my gender to its full potential. Sadly however, when I tell people that I don't really identify as anything, it ignites confusion and anxieties on their end and I can see from their reactions that they would much rather have a definite, documentable answer from me. (Keep in mind that my personal identification, or the lack thereof, has nothing to do with how I am treated and read in the world but that is a discussion for another article.)¶ ¶ And that is the basic practice of colonialism-- Seeing something new, and something that does not belong to you and demanding access and documentation per your values and practices.¶ ¶ Maybe I have taken in the Western individualistic self-branding idea and reverted it at exponential levels, or I simply do not get the discourse, but my answer to this uncomfortable state of being is to say that my gender is my gender and it can't be compared, situated, or categorized with anyone else's. When I identify the way I identify currently is simply an enactment of the politics of the self- because frankly I don't see any other alternative that makes sense to me right now.

### AT: Tell Us About Yourself

**---Forced outing is a strategy for straight supremacy.**

#### You sound like the police to me.

Chamayou 13; Research scholar in philosophy at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris (Gregoire, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v016/16.2.chamayou.html, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2013, Fichte's Passport - A Philosophy of the Police)

In 1797 the philosopher Fichte descended one time from the heights of speculative philosophy, setting aside the abstract dance of the ego and the non-ego, in order to propose concrete measures, police measures. He writes in the Foundations of Natural Right that, "The principal maxim of every well-constituted police power must be the following: every citizen must be readily identifiable, wherever necessary, as this or that particular person. Police officers must be able to establish the identity of every subject."1 The immediate consequence of this principle of identification, or rather of police identifiability, was a new system of passports: "Everyone must always carry a passport with him, issued by the nearest authority and containing a precise description of his person; this applies to everyone, regardless of class or rank," with the further specification that, "Since merely verbal descriptions of a person always remain ambiguous, it might be good if important persons (who therefore can afford it as well) were to carry accurate portraits in their passports, rather than descriptions."2 In the eighteenth century there already existed passports that travelers were required to obtain from authorities not only when crossing State borders, but also when moving within a territory from one town to another. These internal passports, letters of safe-conduct and travel authorizations, were issued now and then on the occasion of a trip. As a means of controlling mobility, the apparatus was by default directed toward certain undesirable categories of the population: "the idle, beggars, vagrant Jews, Gypsies and other unknown or suspicious types."3 When circumstances appeared to demand it the apparatus would be tightened up, but there did not yet exist any unified system of identification documents such as we know it today. Hence we can immediately grasp the novelty of Fichte's proposal: to generalize the system of passports across the entire population, making it a universal, obligatory and permanent system.4 If the police could be reduced to a single principle or formula, it would end with a question mark. It would be a simple and implacable question: 'Who are you?' What defines the police, what gives it its ultimate essence is this interpellation, this perfectly concrete operation that for us has become so familiar, of checking our identity: 'Papers please!' The passport makes it possible to respond to this injunction immediately and without ambiguity. This is its principal function as an identity on paper. Yet when it comes from the mouth of the police, the question 'who are you?' always assumes other functions than a simple recognition. If the question of identity carries with it complex philosophical questions, on the other hand, as Philip Agre writes, "In an institutional setting, to 'know who somebody is' is roughly speaking the ability to get hold of them."5 When this body I was speaking to vanishes into the crowd, by knowing his name, I will be able to find him again. Inversely, if I learn his name, by consulting a central registry I will find a description [signalement] of the corresponding body. I will know his history, I will find his coordinates, I will find him again. Given a body, find its name. Given a name, find its body. Given a set of properties, find the name and locate the corresponding body. Questions of identification are unfolded within this triptyque, this triple relation of correspondence, translation and equivalence between the name, the body and its attributes: to individualize a description, to corporealize a name, to name a body. The goal above all, the will that animates the installation of these systems of correspondence, is to acquire a power, and fundamentally, a power of capture. To be able to recognize is to be able to find again: once I have recognized you, you will not escape me. Consequently, from the police perspective the question of the ego and of identity receives a rather prosaic interpretation. In this sense there is a certain irony in seeing what is certainly one of the most speculative expressions of the philosophy of the self - that of Fichte - lead in an entirely practical way to the invention of a tool of police identification, the constitution of a police technology of the ego. As a result, after an interval of dozens of pages, we find in Fichte's text a revealing hiatus regarding the differential status of the face in matters of morality as well as those of the police. On the one hand, in a lyrical and anachronistically Levinasian passage, the face is presented as the very foundation of ethics or of the moral relation to the Other;6 on the other hand, the face later appears in a different register, this time ensnared in an exigency belonging purely to the police: that everyone's face be permanently seen, that no one be able to conceal their face, now appears as an imperative of securitarian identification. The great ethical discourses on the sacredness of the face often serve to conceal much more down-to-earth police projects of identifying subjects.7 The passport is not only an identification document, but also a portable archive of one's travels. The written traces of previous ID-checks allow one to know not only who you are, but where you've been. To the descriptive order is therefore added a narrative order (one's itinerary). The question 'who are you?' is extended into the question 'who goes there?' To these little personal books, these telegraphic novels, now correspond other works: these are the registers where, at each ID checkpoint - inns, sentry boxes, village gates - the traces of every passage are recorded in duplicate. To the portable archives formed by passports correspond the static archives of the registers kept at every checkpoint. Yet this is not all: to the memory of every past voyage, to the archives of yesterday's trips, is added another type of trace, this time prescriptive - that of the future itinerary. For Fichte's passport functions like a travel warrant: at each checkpoint one must indicate the next stage of the journey. Consequently, movements can be strictly controlled, as we can continually track each and every one of them.8 Thus equipped, the police know where everyone has been, where they are, and where they are headed.

# 1NR

### What is Queer Negativity?

#### Queer theorist Jackie Wang explains:

Jackie Wang, “Negative feminism, anti-social queer theory and the politics of hope,” 10/2/13, Blog: Ballerinas Dance with Machine Guns; Website: loneberry.tumblr.com; http://loneberry.tumblr.com/post/724635724/negative-feminism-anti-social-queer-theory-and-the

What is negative feminism and anti-social queer theory? My fragmentary answer: it is a queer critique that aims to decenter positivity, productivity, redemptive politics of affirmation, narratives of success, and politics that are founded on hope for an imagined future. It’s rude politics and has no interest in being polite. It embraces masochism, anti-production, self-destructiveness, abjection, forgetfulness, radical passivity, aggressive negation, unintelligibility, negativity, punk pugilism, and anti-social attitudes as a form of resistance to liberal feminist and gay politics of cohesion. It’s about not-becoming because the notion of becoming is perceived as following the capitalist logic of production and models of success that are often tied up with colonialism. It asks, why the fuck should queers be nice? And asserts that politeness is heteronormative and we should embrace our utter failure at functioning within a colonialist, heteronormative, capitalist, racist, sexist and transphobic framework. Jack “Judith” Halberstam is an academic who has probably articulated this theory most lately. I want to talk about his theories and raise some pressing questions and criticisms of his controversial ideas in the context of my limited conversations with him. This essay is largely based on Jack’s article, The Anti-Social Turn in Queer Studies (pdf).¶ Driving in a car with Jack, my roommate Matthew and his partner JD. We have excited conversation about everything from bats to drag. Jack is rushed to get to get to the airport but is incredibly calm, easy going, and undemanding even though there’s no time for the promised dinner with the college’s budget. JD is a Buddhist enthusiast, eager to discuss this inspiring interest of his. In the car he mentions how much happier his is since coming to Buddhism, how it has transformed his thinking and allowed him to think lovingly of strangers, even the little buggers with their giant carts of shit standing in front of you in line at the grocery store. Now Jack is some whose recent work revolves around the heteronormativity of politics of hope and the imperialism of happiness. Jack adds, “But why would I want to think lovingly of everyone? Maybe there are people out there that are truly undeserving of my love.” The comments JD made sparked a fascinating discussion emotional dynamicness and the value of positive feelings, giving me a glimpse of the place from which Jack’s theories of queer failure and negative feminism come from. We questioned why there is a tendency to privilege certain “positive” or “good” feelings and examined the impulse to flatten or repress the full spectrum of affective responses. ¶ For me, the (anti)politics of negation discussed by Jack arise from a queer resistance to emotional flatness and the privileging of feeling good to feeling like shit. It’s about challenging the productive and rationalist logic of capitalism that makes you feel insane if you can’t function within its framework. It’s about thinking through how emotion informs how we approach politics and how privileging an approach that only values positive feelings erases and denies the position of people who refuse to or simple just can’t feel happy about participating in such a shitty context. People who are angry or depressed as fuck and seek self-annihilation because the world demands our unity.¶ So where does radical negation get us? Jack’s borrowed mantra, no future, rejects such temporal considerations. But most of us out there probably still care about the viability specific political strategies. While I was at Ida, I got into a discussion with two people who were critical of Jack’s negative feminism and anti-social queer theory. They raise some good criticisms that I am trying to think through here.¶ It was a few months ago when I brought Jack to New College to give a lecture. I was working as the Gender and Diversity Center Program Coordinator and got to spend some time with writers and intellectuals like bell hooks and Eileen Myles. At the time I was most familiar with Jack’s work on trans men, queer temporalities and subcultures, and female masculinity; but was wholly fascinated by his lecture on the queer art of failure. It seemed relevant given that lately, in the radical queer community, there seems to be a point of contention between those who adhere to a politics of community and affirmation and those who adhere to a politics of cynicism.¶ But of course it’s not that simple, and maybe it’s more accurate to say that some approach politics with an attitude of constructiveness and other approach it with an attitude of destructiveness. Jack is trying to explore the destructive side of things; particularly a disorganized and unintelligible form of self-destructiveness and masochism as a form of resistance. But unlike the nihilistic posturing of those that are too-queer-for-everything, Jack is [We are] not interested in a purely aestheticized attitude, nor is he necessarily all critique. What we get is still a strategy, albeit an anti-rational and anti-organizational one. While Jack’s theories are somewhat nihilistic, it dissociates itself from nihilism’s historical complacency with sexism. He writes that he would rather “turn to a history of alternatives, contemporary moments of alternative political struggle and high and low cultural productions of a funky, nasty, over the top and thoroughly accessible queer negativity.” ¶ So I wouldn’t say that Jack’s theories don’t advocate doing nothing, rather, doing something through a refusal to do anything, a radical form of passivity. Similar, Jack notes that, “Negativity might well constitute an anti-politics but it should not register as apolitical.” A passive consumer who watches TV all day and drives an SUV to work wouldn’t be the same as, say, the narrator of Jamaica Kincaid’s Autobiography of my Mother, who refuses to be happy or do anything because she rejects the impetus to participate while she is forced to exist under colonialism. Jack writes that, “She opposes colonial rule precisely by refusing to accommodate herself to it or to be responsible for reproducing it in any way. Thus the autobiographical becomes an unwriting, an undoing, an unraveling of self.” While the narrator is resistant to the logic of production and participation, the strategy is—in a roundabout kind of way—a perverse form of productivity.

### [2NC] Impact/Alt Framing

#### This debate space and the 1AC’s hope for the future are key to be Queered. It is your job to introduce Queered perceptions of reality at the local level.

Morton 1995 (Donald Morton, Professor of English Syracuse University, “Birth of the Cyberqueer,” May 1995 PMLA, Volume 110, No. 3, pp. 369-381, jstor)

Queer theory departs from traditional humanist literary and aesthetic studies (and from gay and lesbian studies) by virtue of its absorption of ludic (post)modern theoretical developments along their two main axes. Aside from the overtly ludic Derridean-Deleuzean axis, in which "liberated" desire subverts the official relations of signifieds (conceptuality) and signifiers (textuality), there is the historicist Foucauldian strand, which insists that outside the text are material institutions, enabled by discourses but not textualist in the Derridean sense.5 These institutions (as against historical materialism's global account of them) are disconnected and autonomous, and they can be sites of liberation where marginal groups seize power (which is voluntarily reversible). For these historicists, social inequality is a measure of the inequality of power among groups and is not, as conceived by Marx, produced by exploitation during capitalism's extraction of surplus value. On the political plane, Foucault's work converges finally with Derrida's and diverges from Marx's. It is undoubtedly some seeming agreements between Marx and Foucault (for instance, in the view that desire is not so much repressed as produced) that results in the use of such misledingp hrasesa s "Foucauldian Marxism" (Kernan 207), an expression that blurs the differences between the forms of materialism in Marx and Foucault and creates the impression that Foucauldian materialism is a better (because more upto- date) Marxism. While indeed rejecting Derrida's pantextualism, Foucault's work nevertheless coincides in crucial ways with ludic theory. The desire or sexuality Foucault writes about in The History of Sexuality is discursive: sex is "produced" in those interminable discourses early in church confessionals and later on the psychiatrist's couch. Of course, Foucault extends the notion of materiality (beyond textualism) by tying the generation of discourses to specific historically developed institutions such as the church, the prison, and the asylum. But at the same time, he theorizes these institutions as purely local sites that emerge islandlike on the surface of a culture and, like Lyotard's language games, have no common measure ("Nietzsche" 148-52). While Foucault's localization of the material has provided theoretical support for localist political actions, by groups like Act Up and Queer Nation, it has also blocked the possibility of theorizing, as Marx does, systematic global exploitation in relation to the mode of production.

#### Violence against the Queer begins at the fundamental denial of a better future and the death drive. Recognizing an impossible future translates Queerness into the 1AC’s identity and broader politics.

Giffney 2008; (Noreen Giffney, Proffessor at University College Dublin Ireland, “Queer Apocal(o)ptic/ism: The Death Drive and the Human,” Published in “Queering the Non/Human, 2008, pp 65)

For Edelman, reproductive futurism presents 'an always impossible future' (11), 'a fantasmatic future' (31) which translates queerness, I think, into heteronormativity's aggressor — the Queer - a repository for displaced feelings of anxiety. This anxiety arises because of the existence of the death driveXXXXXXXXXXXXXX within (Klein 1997/1946,4) and the subject's resultant fear of death (Klein 1997/1948, 28, 29); the fear that the future will never arrive or that the subject will not be alive to experience in it. Thus anxiety arising from the presence of an internal threat (that is, the death drive) is deflected outwards to become the fear of an external threat (that is, the Queer). This internal object of fear is displaced onto the Queer who then 'becomes the external representative of the death instinct' (Klein 1997/1948, 31). Through a denial both of the existence of the death drive and the social's narcissistic investment in the Child as the wish fulfilment of its desired immortality, heteronormativity projects the death drive onto the figure of the Queer who comes to stand in for everything that is considered to be dangerous to the Child and thus the future. It is my contention that reproductive futurism operates by first denying the presence of the death drive through the inauguration of a fantasy of self-fulfilment at the same time that the anxiety of heteronormativity's own internal shortcomings and disciplining mechanisms are displaced onto the Queer (A. Freud 2000/1937, 69-82). The instantiation of this fantasy arises, in the words of Anna Freud, because 'the mere struggle of conflicting impulses suffices to set the defence mechanisms in motion' (69).

### AT: Perm

#### The body is a sight for the production of a freed being – their understanding of identity pins being down and prevents its creative journey through the infinite. We should not seek to understand identity, we should seek to reach the point where identity itself is meaningless and fluid.

Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 78-79)

Landscape reappears with another role in imaging the schizoanalytic ‘subject’, if a subject remains. Just as Lenz found himself in machinic engagement with his surroundings, so that there was no sense of separateness between his ‘self’ and the snowflakes, stars and mountain peaks, so Deleuze and Guattari describe themselves as deserts, inhabited by concepts that wander across them and move on their way, so they are being continually reconstituted and remade. ‘We are deserts,’ said Deleuze but populated by tribes, flora and fauna. We pass our time in ordering these tribes, arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to prosper. And all these clans, all these crowds, do not undermine the desert, which is our very ascesis; on the contrary they inhabit it, they pass through it, over it. In Guattari there has always been a sort of wild rodeo, in part directed against himself. The desert, experimentation on oneself, is our only identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 11) The ‘individual’ here is explicitly seen as multiple and political, and the process of subjectification is presented as dynamic and continuing, never as something that has reached or could reach a satisfactory conclusion. For Deleuze and Guattari living is always a process of becoming, never of contemplating an achieved ‘being’. Deleuze describes Guattari as ‘a man of the group, of bands or tribes, and yet he is a man alone, a desert populated by all these groups and all his friends, all his becomings’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 16). There is something of the fluidity of identity of ‘the man of the crowd’ in Edgar Allen Poe’s story, where the man participates in the identities of the various tribes and crowds that swarm through the city (Ballantyne, 2005, 204–9). He takes to an extreme, and embodies a principle in a way that only a fictional character can: the principle that we are not formed in isolation, but socially, and we are constituted by way of ideas and practices that do not originate in us but which pass through us and inhabit us and influence the things we do, occasionally perhaps consciously, but for the most part without our having any particular awareness of it happening. So the individual is seen as not so much a political entity as a politics (a micropolitics) populated and engaged, harmonious or conflicted. The image is always of lines and intensities, intersecting planes and multiple colours, atmospheres, flows – never hard dry objects, bounded forms or clear contours. And the face, this white screen/black hole assemblage, is a means of engaging with others, a way of putting into circulation certain sorts of signification that our little parliament, our pandaemonium, feels will help it on its way.