### Destruction K

#### The affirmative screams for the "deconstruction of Indefinite Detainment " - this is not an accidental word choice, it is intentional. Peppered through the 1AC is a vision of America, a vision of the prison industry essentially the same and timeless- a blot on their conscience that 'emerged' 300 years ago - this is what they mean by desconstruction - they reduce suffering to a timeless state, and imprison all of us into no-place. They rob the critique of any material praxis or historical meaning.

Spanos 93 (William V., Heidegger and Criticism, p. 121-123)

Derrida's differance "without positive terms" reveals its historically specific origins in the cultural and sociopolitical occasion leading up to and through the events of May 1968; in the hands of his American fol­lowers it is reduced to a methodology of reading that precludes the per­ception of the question of language as simultaneously and equiprimor­dially a question of temporal being. Thus limited to a nonreferential textuality, deconstruction must eschew interpretation (what it pejora­tively calls "hermeneutics") in favor of an ironic or self-reflexive com­portment that observes and delights in the "spectacle" of the undecidable play occurring simultaneously throughout history, which is to say, uni­versally: nowhere/no time. This metamorphosis of language as positive material praxis into free-floating theatrical performance and of the dia­logic reader into spectator suggests that deconstruction understands the dismantling process, not as an opening up, a releasement (or decoloni­zation) of the radical temporality of being that metaphysical structuration closes off and forgets, but an ironic remarking of the baselessness of ca­nonical logocentric texts everywhere and every time in history. Guided by such a metaphorics of theatricality, the deconstructive criticism of Derrida's American followers, especially those who have appropriated deconstruction for literary criticism, becomes in essence a negative, in-deed, a deterministic nihilist critical movement. The deconstructive ges­ture remembers the "dangerous" supplementarity and thus the duplicity, the absolute undecidability, of "writing in general," but it is blinded by its oversight both to the worldliness of the text under scrutiny and to the positive, the pro-jective, that is, worldly possibilities it dis-closes: to that which, despite the admittedly significant limitations of Heidegger's own discursive practice, the Heideggerian destruction enables. Although deconstruction as it is practiced in North America calls into question the privileged status of the dominant (post-Enlightenment) philosophical discourse and its metaphorics of presence or center and light, its ironic "liberation" of the reader from the prison house of meta-physical language-what Nietzsche called the nihilism of teleological se­riousncss-reincarceratcs him/her in the prison house of an essentially similar, violently leveled, nihilistic space. After all, the Daedalean laby­rinth that Derrida appropriates in GIas to characterize and celebrate the scattered center of "the scene of writing"" was a prison designed by Daedalus to contain the Minotaur who would destroy the disciplinary city of anthropomorphic Man. At best, as in Derrida, deconstruction calls into question the dominant anthropological institutional discursive practices of the contemporary occasion and activates the Nietzschean affirmation: "the joyous affirma­tion of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as a loss of the center. And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, affir­mation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal ad-venture of the trace."s9 At worst, however, as even the best practitioners of deconstruction have come to realize, it becomes a sterile textual game emptied of the awful existential/historical (genealogical) resonances of the Nietzschean affirmation of play. I mean emptied of the "self-activating" dread or anx­iety in the face of the abyssal nothing that Heideggerian destruction iden­tifies as die Unheimlichkeit or, on another related register, of those "actual intensities and creations of life," to which, according to Foucault's critical genealogy, the "suprahistorical" or "monumental" history of the human­ist historians "bar[red] access."90 In the hands of Derrida's belated Amer­ican literary disciples-the institutional critics and teachers whom J. Hillis Miller curiously calls the "critics of uncanniness" to distinguish them from the "canny critics" (the structuralists, including the New Critics)91-deconstruction is reduced to purely formal, and quite com­fortable observational exegesis of the aporetic "scene of writing." How-ever brilliant the results, they all too often betray little, if any, awareness of the historically specific origins of deconstruction in the effort to ex-pose the violence inherent in the discourse of humanist modernity. Nor do they reflect consciousness of the dislocating profundity of the abyss-the decentered and uncanny temporal realm of radical difference-over which Derrida's (and de Man's) pyrotechnical interpretive practice is willing to dance.

#### Having deliberately removed the entire question of temporality, the aff's methodological gesture erases the ontological positioning of difference in favor of a linguistic focus on differance. This legitimizes American exceptionalism.

Pease 93 (Donald, Heidegger and Criticism, Foreward, 1993)

Spanos's recollection of the Vietnam controversy thus enabled him to contrast Davidson's appropriation of the Heidegger question in the 1990s with the very different usage to which Spanos had put Heidegger in the 1960s; that is, as "counter-memory" directed against the United States' official cultural memory. At that time, Spanos understood Heidegger's thinking to be recollective of the historical character of what Heidegger named Dasein, as the one in whom the question of being takes the form of an originary temporality, an endless deferral of structuration. Spanos directed this way of thinking against the ontotheological tradition, which masked the fact that "Man" exists according to the dimension of history, rather than from within the spatial enclosures affiliated with the ideology of domination and the war powers. Throughout the Vietnam era Spanos appropriated the Heideggerian inquiry into the question of Being to undermine the privileged status of such masterful academic practices as the New Criticism, structuralism, phenomenological analysis, and literary modernism. All of these efforts, Spanos argued, were grounded in the same unexamined assumptions, namely, that identity is ontologically prior to difference, that the end of time is antecedent to temporal process. These assumptions in turn justified, in the name of disinterested inquiry and American exceptionalism, masterful interpretive as well as dominative militaristic practices, with the result that the temporality of the text was reduced to a spatial form and Vietnam to a U.S. military colony. In his interpretive strategy, Spanos never tired of breaking these metaphysical enclosures, retrieving the temporality of being against the tradition's forgetting, and reassigning the interpreter to historical *Dasein*—that is, to temporal being in the world. The difference between Spanos's "destructions" of the late 1960s and those of the 1990s entailed his belated recognition (in the wake of the Heidegger controversy) that this retrieval was not enough; that it required for its historical efficacy a correlation of Heidegger's ontological critique with Foucault's genealogical method. Without "completion" by the other's method, both Heidegger and Foucault failed to realize their critique. Heidegger emphasized the site of ontology but minimized the historically specific sociopolitical site. On the other hand, Foucault emphasized sociopolitical concerns but minimized the ontological question, xiv Foreword with the potentially disastrous result that his counter-memory to the disciplinary society became particularly vulnerable to amnesia in the 1990s. In combining Heidegger's destructive hermeneutics with Foucault's genealogical method, Spanos undermined any possible reconciliation of be-ing with Being. As a result of this conjuncture, Spanos now understood the temporality of being in the world as not confined to one site but as an always changing, unevenly developed lateral field of already constituted forces, encompassing all the regions between ontology and sociopolitics. These observations require a redescription of Davidson's efforts as a reappropriation of the Heidegger question. In the 1960s Spanos deployed Heidegger as a means of recovering an originary Greek thinking against the grain of a U.S. foreign policy intent on "Romanizing" the globe. He further understood himself as a figure whose experience during the Dresden firebombing had resulted in an existential experience of Dread before the annihilation of being at this site. Spanos recounts this experience at the moment in his critical exchange when Davidson argues that the description "face to face with horror" can be properly assigned *solely* to "the production of corpses and death camps": However illiberal, indecorous, and improper it may seem to liberal humanist academics committed to the "autonomy of philosophy," I will contaminate my discourse by reference to a personal experience: I was a prisoner of war in Dresden at the time of the massive Allied firebombing, and I experienced the horror not only of that dreadful night and day, but also of the following days when those of us who were still alive in the *Arbeiten Kommandos* were assigned the task of searching the charred rubble for bodies of the incinerated dead, piling them into horse-drawn wagons, and hauling them away for mass burial. That, I can assure Professor Davidson, was not potential. It was immediate and actual—a "face to face experience of horror."8 Spanos's task of gathering charred bodies stands behind his description of the relay of sites, the indissoluble and interpenetrating force field of lived discursive practices constitutive of the history of the Occident. As the critic who had already been positioned at the site where the unspeakable could become forgotten, the Spanos of the 1990s recalls the Being of *Being and Time* against the prospect of Davidson's liberal humanism forgetting this question yet again. The existential Dread he experienced at Dresden renders Spanos immune to Davidson's efforts at humanist accommodation. Whereas Davidson struggles to assimilate the "discursive explosion" released in the Heidegger controversy to the "disinter- Foreword **XV** ested" truth claims of liberal humanism, Spanos identifies Davidson's efforts as synecdochal of the process of reconstitutions underwriting the sociopolitical dimension of the ontotheological tradition. Refusing to accommodate himself to this discourse, Spanos resituates his destructive inquiry at the interpretive site wherein his experience of Dread before the nothingness of historical temporality could be persistently retrieved as well. With Dresden understood as the backdrop against which he conducts his destructive reading of Davidson's reappropriation Spanos can also be understood to provide the missing referents for "Eastern Germans" mentioned by Heidegger in a letter to Herbert Marcuse on January 20, 1948: To the charges of dubious validity that you express "about a regime that murdered millions of Jews, that made terror into an everyday phenomenon, and that turned everything that pertains to the ideas of spirit, freedom and truth into its bloody opposite," I can merely add that if instead of "Jews" you had written "East Germans" [i.e., Germans of the eastern territories], then the same holds true for one of the allies, with the difference that everything that has occurred since 1945 has become public knowledge, while the bloody terror of the Nazis in point of fact had been kept a secret from the German people.9 In this passage, Heidegger constructs a lateral continuum that links Auschwitz together with Dresden (and the public knowledge of the resettlement of East Germans), and Spanos confirms this linkage by way of an autobiographical anecdote. Then Spanos pronounces the name Dresden as well as those of Auschwitz and Vietnam and finds in all of these "events" essentially the same technological paradigm at work. But if these events cannot be appropriated by the cultural memory of official history, and they thereby disclose its repressive powers, how can they occupy the sites in the lateral continuum forever reconstitutive of that history? Is not Spanos's ability to pronounce the names Dresden, Vietnam, and Auschwitz a "liberal humanist" forgetfulness of the alternative eventfulness they disclose? Is not his banishing of Davidson from the site of his prior appropriation of the Heidegger question by way of the pronunciation of these names a return of the totalizing gesture these names symptomatize? Consequently, do these names not return us to the site of the Heidegger controversy? The incontrovertible historical facts are that Heidegger's sympathy for National Socialism influenced his appointment to the rectorate at Freiburg, that his official plans for university reform corroborated Hitler's vision of German renewal, that he publicly supported several of Hitler's xvi Foreword political initiatives, that he urged future leaders to work for the state, and that he remained a dues-paying member of the Party until the collapse of the Reich.10 In addressing these historical facts Heidegger's European commentators constructed a complex philosophical trope, intertwining Heidegger's earlier "destruction" of the metaphysical tradition with that tradition's return (in what is called the *Kehre)* in Heidegger's affirmation of National Socialism (as Germany's historical destiny). For Lacoue- Labarthe and Derrida in particular, Heidegger's identification of the temporality of being with the destiny of the German *Volk* released a series of related mimetological lures at work in Heidegger's writing—the "clearing," "Spirit," the "unnameable"—and activated the problematic "forgetting of being" as a process of infinite self-reappropriation at work in Heidegger's writing. Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida then demonstrated the relationship between the self-forgetting of being and Heidegger's inability to speak about Auschwitz. Both speech acts depend upon a thinking of the forgotten in terms of Being, but Auschwitz, insofar as it describes an "event" that is "otherwise than Being," forecloses Heidegger's capacity to think. Its "forgetting of what is otherwise than Being" instantiates a difference from the forgotten Being that Heidegger alone recalls. Instead of thereby rationalizing Heidegger's failure to speak of the holocaust, these commentators find this silence an essential feature of his philosophy and the basis for its linkage with his politics. By recollecting the way of Being in place of Auschwitz, Heidegger rendered unforgettable what Jean- Frangois Lyotard has called the *abjection* that Lyotard also finds essential to Heidegger's politics. Spanos's contribution to the *European* appropriation of the Heidegger affair includes his recharacterization of the European debate as a repression of the commentators' own residual Heideggerianism. In constructing Heidegger's problematic of temporality as a scapegoat for the "return of metaphysics" to his thinking, they authorized its replacement with their deconstructionist problematic of writing, which liberated them from any further obligation to Heidegger's project. Unlike the Europeans, Spanos does not distinguish the later from the earlier Heidegger, but finds in such later writings as "The Age of the World Picture," *On the Way to Language,* and *The End of Philosophy* ways of foregrounding the sociocultural consequences of the spatialization of time. The references to Being and the other ontological traces that Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida cite from the later works should not, Spanos claims, be understood as Heidegger's recuperation of a metaphysics of presence, but read as already "erased" by the destructive hermeneutics of *Being and Time.* Following this "destruction" of their readings of the *Kehre* writings, Foreword xvii Spanos faults the European philosophers for their collective effort to exploit the Heidegger question to corroborate their own turn—away from ontological and toward specifically linguistic concerns—as itself an attempt to evade existential problems: the occasionality of history and the unrepresentable temporality of the infinitely deferred difference that is human fmitude. According to Spanos, Jacques Derrida in particular has overlooked the worldly dimensions of Heidegger's critical ontology by persistently transcribing ontological difference into writerly differance*,* and has thereby trapped temporality within the endlessly deferring relays of textuality. Spanos's intervention disclosed the political consequences of the Europeans' appropriation to be twofold: they authorized their belated American followers to understand Heidegger's texts as "superfluous" and to institutionalize a representation of temporal difference as Derridean "textuality." In essence, Spanos rediscovers in these post-Heideggerians the fault that originated with Heidegger; that is, the failure to theorize the political implication of a historically polyvalent logocenter, which restricts their critical discourse to the generalized site of ontology at the expense of sociopolitical critique. Having thereby "retrieved" a *second* Heideggerianism as the European post-Heideggerians' failure to theorize the lateral continuum of Being, Spanos exports this new post-Heideggerian tradition to the site of the American appropriation, where it counters Davidson's recuperative "retrieval" of liberal humanism. That Spanos finds the entire lateral continuum itself in danger of disappearing at the site of the American appropriation of the Heidegger question discloses the stakes of Spanos's project. In "retrieving" Heidegger's destructive hermeneutics in a site *missing* from Heidegger's own project, Spanos quite literally produces, as an *after-the-fact extenuating circumstance,* the sociopolitical critique that, had it been available at the time of Heidegger's wartime writings, would have rendered him immune to Nazism.

#### The impact is genocide against the Other, and a huge turn to the aff.

Spanos 2K (William, Prof of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, pg 141-144)

With this symbolic denouement, the “wound” suffered by “America” has been utterly, if not explicitly, healed. To invoke an analogous metaphor, the ghost that has haunted the collective American psyche is exorcised. The internal divisions within the American body politic have not only been reconciled; the reconciliation has rendered the res publica stronger and more dedicated to the principles of American democracy in its struggle against radicals and communist imperialism. But what, in the context of the emergence of the end-of-the-Cold War discourse, needs to be thematized is that the metaphor of trauma has undergone a telling metamorphosis: the metaphor of the wound, which implies healing, that is, ideological reconciliation, has become – or is at the threshold of being represented as – a collective psychological illness, a national “syndrome,” which implies the imperative to blame a negative ideological cause. The fourth and “final” phase of the American culture industry’s renarrativization of the Vietnam War was inaugurated on the concurrent occasion of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States’s surgically executed “victory” against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. What is especially telling about the official representation of this historical conjecture, especially by the television networks, is that, from beginning to end, it was this contrasting negative measure of Vietnam that utterly determined its narrative shape: the linear/circular structure of decisive victory. From the inaugural debates about the question of legitimacy of America’s intervention in the face of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait through the brief period of the war itself to its immediate aftermath, it was the specter of the Vietnam War – the “divisive” and “self-defeating” national anxiety precipitated by its radical indeterminacy – that the narrative structure of closure, enabled by a “victory” by the United States in the Cold War, was intended to decisively efface. This transformation of a national anxiety into a productive negative image was symptomatically reflected by President Bush’s virtually unchallenged guarantee to the American public on the eve of the war that it would not be “another Vietnam” and, more strategically, by the exclusive mediation of the events of the Gulf War by the American military information agencies in a way that the events of the Vietnam War had made unthinkable. And it was the long process of cultural forgetting, which had ostensibly (re)constituted the actual defeat of the United States into a drastically mistaken withdrawal from Vietnam, that had prepared the ground for this cultural transformation. In short, the representational forgetting of the actualities of the war systematically undertaken by the ideological state apparatuses had generally arrived at a form of remembering it that attributed the defeat of America to the infectious impact of the multisituated protest movement in the United States on the American public and its intellectual deputies. In this “final” phase, that is, the earlier public need to “heal the wound” – a recuperative and conciliatory gesture of forgetting – became, in the words of President George Bush and official Washington, a matter of “kicking the Vietnam syndrome.” Aided and abetted by the culture industry, this early gesture of forgetting metamorphosed at the time of the Gulf “crisis” into a virulently assured assumption that the resistance to America’s intervention and conduct of the war in Vietnam in the 1960s was a symptom of the national neurosis. (This interpretation of the active resistance to the Vietnam War was not a sudden reactionary political initiative enabled by the circumstances of the Gulf War. Its origins can be traced back to the period of the Vietnam War itself, to the reaction against the protest movement by such influential conservative and liberal humanist intellectuals as George Kennan, Walter Jackson Bate, and Allan Bloom, among many others. The disruptions of the traditional white Anglo-American and male-dominated cultural value system in American colleges and universities – whether in the form of the common body of shared knowledge informing the general education program [the litterae humaniores] or the canon of great books – were undertaken in the name of relevance. In the name of high seriousness, these anxious traditionalists reduced this emancipator initiative to an unhealthy or neurotic obsession with novelty and/or vulgarity and represented it – as Arnold had represented the rise of working-class consciousness in late Victorian Britain – as a symptom not simply of a “centrifugal” process precipitating a dangerous cultural “heterogeneity,” but as a collective “death wish” [Bate] on the part of the American academy.) Whatever its limitations, the protest movement in the Vietnam decade was, in fact, a symptomatic manifestation of a long-overdue and promising national self-doubt about the alleged legitimacy of America’s representation of its internal constituencies (blacks, women, gays, ethnic minorities, the poor, the young, and so on) and about the alleged benignity of its historically ordained exceptionalist mission to transform the world (the barbarous Others) in its own image. In this last phase of the amnesiac process, this healthy and potentially productive self-examination of the American cultural identity came to be represented as a collective psychological sickness that, in its disintegrative momentum, threatened to undermine “America’s” promised end. By this I mean the end providentially promised to the original Puritans and later, after the secularization of the body politic, by History: the building of “the city on the hill” in the “New World,” which is to say, the advent of the New World Order and the end of history. In the wake of the Cold War, and especially the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s army – and the consequent representation of the shattered American consensus occasioned by the Vietnam War as a recovery of a collective mental illness – there came in rapid and virtually unchallenged succession a floodtide of “reforms,” reactionary in essence, intended to annul the multiply situated progressive legacy of the protest movement(s) of the Vietnam decade by overt abrogation or accommodation. Undertaken in the name of the “promise” of “America,” these reforms were intended to reestablish the ontological, cultural, and political authority of the enlightened, American “vital center” and its circumference and thus to recontain the dark force of the insurgent differential constituencies that had emerged at the margins in the wake of the disclosures of the Vietnam War. At the domestic site, these included the coalescence of capital (the Republican Party) and the religious and political Right into a powerful dominant neoconservative culture (a new “Holy Alliance,” as it were) committed to an indissolubly linked militantly racist, antifeminist, antigay, and anti-working class agenda; the dominant liberal humanist culture’s massive indictment of deconstructive and destructive theory as complicitous with fascist totalitarianism; the nationwide legislative assault on the post-Vietnam public university by way of programs of economic retrenchment affiliated with the representation of its multicultural initiative as a political correctness of the Left; the increasing subsumption of the various agencies of cultural production and dissemination (most significantly, the electronic information highways) under fewer and fewer parent, mostly American, corporations; the dismantling of the welfare program; and, symptomatically, the rehabilitation of the criminal president, Richard Nixon. At the international site, this “reformist” initiative has manifested itself as the rehabilitation of the American errand in the world, a rehabilitation exemplified by the United States’s virtually uncontested moral/military interventions in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, the Middle East, and Kosovo; its interference in the political processes of Russia by way of providing massive economic support for Boris Yeltsin’s democratic/capitalist agenda against the communist opposition; its unilateral assumption of the lead in demanding economic/political reforms in Southeast Asian countries following the collapse of their economies in 1998; its internationalization of the “free market”; and, not least, its globalization of the instrumentalist version of the English language. What needs to be foregrounded is that these global post-Cold War “reformist” initiatives are not discontinuous processes, a matter of historical accident. Largely enabled by the “forgetting” of Vietnam – and of the repression or accommodation or self-immolation of the emergent decentered modes of thinking the Vietnam War precipitated – they are, rather, indissolubly, however unevenly, related. Indeed, they are the multisituated practical consequences of the planetary triumph (the “end”) of the logical economy of the imperial ontological discourse that has its origins in the founding of the idea of the Occident and its fulfilled end in the banal instrumental/technological reasoning in the discourse of “America.” In thus totally colonizing thinking, that is, this imperial “Americanism” has come to determine the comportment toward being of human beings, in all their individual and collective differences, at large – even of those postcolonials who would resist its imperial order. This state of thinking, which has come to be called the New World Order (though to render its rise to ascendancy visible requires reconstellating the Vietnam War into this history), subsumes the representative, but by no means complete, list of post-Cold War practices to which I have referred above. And it is synecdochically represented by the massive mediatization of the amnesiac end-of-history discourse and the affiliated polyvalent rhetoric of the Pax Americana. Understood in terms of this massive effort to endow hegemonic status to the transformation of the metaphorics of the “wound” to (neurotic) “syndrome,” the forgotten of the systematic process of forgetting apparently accomplished by the renarrativization of history since the humiliatingly visible fall of Saigon in 1975 takes on a spectral resonance of epochal and planetary significance. As such, it calls on the differential community of oppositional intellectuals to undertake a genealogy of this end-of-history discourse that would retrieve (wiederholen) as precisely as possible the essence of that which the United States’s intervention in Vietnam and its conduct of the war disclosed, that which the American Cultural Memory, in the form of a “new Holy Alliance,” has feverishly attempted to bury in oblivion by way of its multisituated and long-term labor to hegemonize a demonic representation of this (self-)disclosure.

#### The alternative is Heideggerian destruction. We advocate the DESTRUCTION of status quo indefinite detention! Heideggerian destruction retrieves the question of temporality and better attends to the present. Our destructive approach does not textualize or depoliticize difference but attends to difference as one site along a continuum of being.

**Spanos 93** (William V., *Heidegger and Criticism*, p. 82-84)

In what follows, I intend to explore some important aspects of this critical oversight. I want to suggest by way of a disclosive remembering that the Heideggerian destruction, whatever Heidegger's specific socio­political application, is inherently more adequate than deconstruction to the radical emancipatory task of contemporary oppositional intellectuals: not simply to the defense of the discourse of difference against the charge of nihilistic relativism made by its traditional humanistic critics, but to the effective critique of the metaphysical binary logic of mastery—"culture or anarchy" as Matthew Arnold codified it—that informs the humanistic discourse and the cultural and sociopolitical institutions it reproduces.' I want to suggest that insofar as it is multisituated—that is, understands the being into which it inquires as an indissoluble, how ever asymmetrical, continuum between language and sociopolitics—the Heideggerian destruction is more amenable than deconstruction to the literary, cultural, and sociopolitical adversarial purposes of the decentered postmodern countermemory. I cannot assume even at this late date that my readers, both humanists and deconstructors, are conversant with Heidegger's destruction as such (beyond its crude representation as an instrument of fascist violence in the aftermath of the publication of Victor Farias's Heidegger and Nazism in 1987) or with its differential relationship to deconstruction (beyond that articulated in various texts by Derrida). I will therefore begin by recalling at some length Heidegger's definition in the second part of the introduction of Being and Time, a definition that the oversight of decon­structors has relegated to oblivion: If the question of Being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments produced by it is necessary. We understand this task as the de-struction of the traditional content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the guidelines of the question of Being. This de-struction is based upon the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of Being were gained. This demonstration of the provenance of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the investigation which displays their "birth certificate," has nothing to do with a pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. The de-struction has just as little the negative sense of disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition, and that always means to fix its boundaries. These are factually given with the specific formulation of the question and the prescribed demarcation of the possible field of investigation. Negatively, the de-struction is not even related to the past: its criticism concerns "today" and the dominant way we treat the history of ontology, whether it be conceived as the history of opinions, ideas, or problems. However, the de-struction does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent. Its negative function remains tacit and indirect. . In accord with the positive tendency of the de-struction the question must first be asked whether and to what extent in the course of the history of ontology in general the interpretation of Being has been thematically connected with the phenomenon of Time. We must ask whether the range of problems concerning Temporality which necessarily belongs here was fundamentally worked out or could have been.' To understand the relationship between Heidegger's destruction and Derrida's deconstruction, it will first be necessary to define the latter in its generality. What should be marked at the outset, however, is that the -beginning" that Heidegger wishes to retrieve from the ontotheological tradition is absolutely related to the question of temporality that this sclerotic speculative/recollective tradition, in all its manifestations, has also forgotten in forgetting the question of being. This disclosed "begin­ning" is not an absolute origin that reproduces a genetic (or strictly circular) representational model of interpretation, as it seems often to be understood both by Derrida (and assumed by his progeny) and by Heidegger's orthodox disciples, existentialists, or humanists. As the "Existential Analytic of Dasein"—the analytic of being-in-the-world­in Being and Time bears insistent witness, it is, rather, always already an ontic/ontological beginning: a (constituted) ground that is groundless. It is a condition in which structure is simultaneously articulated and un­dermined, in which a temporality "grounded" in nothing (words) is an "absent cause" of the destruction of structure (the Word) and the dissem­ination of difference. As such it is clearly similar to Derrida's differance, but more inclusive, and more corrosive. That is, it contains differance as one (textual instance) of several instances in an indissoluble relay encom­passing the totality of being.

### Cap K

#### The prison system is merely a symptom, not the cause of capitalism.

Parenti 2k (Christian Parenti is an American investigative journalist and author.) “Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex” http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Prison\_System/BeyondPrisonIndusComp.html

CLASS WAR FROM ABOVE¶ While all of the specific interests mentioned above help explain part of the crackdown, they don't go far enough. Beyond the interlocking corporate interests and the question of job creation and regional economic development there lies the broader and historically deeper question of class and racial control.¶ In many ways the criminal justice build-up is an organically evolving means of managing the class and racial polarization of a restructured American economy At the heart of the matter lies a basic contradiction: Capitalism needs and creates poverty, intentionally through policy and organically through crisis. Yet, capitalism is also always threatened by the poor. These surplus populations help scare working people into obedience and keep wages low. But at the same time the poor (who in a white supremacist system are disproportionately people of color) scare the upper middle classes (who are mostly white). At times the impoverished classes, the dangerous classes, even rebel, demanding justice, burning down the ghetto, or worse yet, organizing themselves into coherent coalitions that can leverage the state for economic redistribution and racial equality¶ From the New Deal in the 1930s through the culmination of the War on Poverty in the 1970s (that's right-it all really came to fruition under Nixon), an ever larger portion of America's cast-off populations were absorbed through ameliorative and co-optive social reforms. Spending on health care, education, urban development and welfare were all expanded. At the same time corporate America came under increased regulation in the areas of health and safety, labor arbitration and environmental pollution.¶ People of color, particularly in agricultural regions, were largely excluded from many of these reforms and managed the old fashioned way-via brute force. Nonetheless, by the late sixties America's burgeoning social democracy had begun to cause trouble for the owning classes. By the early seventies profits began to shrink and unemployment began to rise but wage demand still increased. In fact labor was in a more militant mood than ever. By the early seventies wildcat strikes had shut the nation's postal system, coal fields, truck industry and railways.¶ From capital's point of view government anti-poverty programs were, shall we say, spoiling the working classes. During one nationwide strike in which 12 unions beat General Electric it was figured that strikers had collected $25 million in welfare. And, despite recession in the early seventies, the ratio of quits to layoffs was rising.¶ In short, workers were losing their fear of unemployment and bosses because the nation's incipient social welfare system was taking up the slack and supporting them: the War on Poverty was subsidizing the war against capital.¶ Reagan put an end to all that with: severe recession in the early eighties engineered to put labor back in its place; conservative courts, and a mass assault on all forms of government subsidies to poor and working people (from low-income housing programs, to job training to welfare). All this helped to tip the scales back in capital's favor. Now profits are in recovery while the people, particularly people of color, bleed.¶ But how to control the new surplus populations?¶ In retrospect the ever evolving answer is clear: Racialize poverty via the code of crime, and then hound the victims with police narc squads, SWAT teams, and quality of life enforcement; send the INS to raid their homes; and lock up as many as possible for as long as possible.¶ Thus criminal justice regulates, absorbs, terrorizes, and disorganizes the poor. It also bolsters white supremacy by demonizing, disenfranchising and marginalizing ever larger numbers of brown people. But unlike social democratic/welfare co-option-that other way of managing poverty-anti-crime repression doesn't have the deleterious side effect of economically empowering or at least cushioning the poor and subsidizing their struggles. Nor does the new model of control let loose dangerous notions of racial equality and social inclusion, as did the rhetoric surrounding the New Deal War and the War on Poverty¶ Finally one last caveat: The politicians who produce these laws and other policies do not necessarily do so for the structurally beneficial impacts they will have. Rather, the average get-tough pol is simply looking for a compelling issue that speaks to voters' anxieties without actually saying anything revealing or dangerous about class power and privilege. On such a journey there seems to be no better horse to ride than the trusty stead of crime coded racism. But the inevitable outcome of such electioneering is legislation that is also useful in bolstering and reproducing an unequal society.

#### Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this structural violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**).** An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

#### Our alternative is to return the priority of political contestation to class. The aim of our alternative makes the production of social relations, capitalism and class, the starting point for resistance and criticism.

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be seen as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the workings, movements and proﬁt levels of multinational corporations but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class conveniently draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’ (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) provide capital with its superexploited labor pools—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social relations constitutive of racialized differences are considerably shaped by the relations of production and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority, however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because class is an essentially (hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signiﬁes one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘gender, race, and ethnicity are all understood as social constructions rather than as essentialist categories’ the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one or another form of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (1) how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and (2) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system. This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach. Having a concept of class helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. This, of course, does not imply that we ignore racism and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘race’ doesn’t explain racism and forms of racial oppression. Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

### DA

#### a.) How progressive of you, right on! the 1AC is apt in describing the ethical injustice of colonialism, but leaves out how it is pertinent FOR THEM save for this condesending savior mentality.

Halberstam 13 - Professor of English and Director of The Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California. (Jack, http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study) -modified

These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” In the essay that many people already know best from this volume, “The University and the Undercommons,” Moten and Harney come closest to explaining their mission. Refusing to be for or against the university and in fact marking the critical academic as the player who holds the “for and against” logic in place, Moten and Harney lead us to the “Undercommons of the Enlightenment” where subversive intellectuals engage both the university and fugitivity: “where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong.” The subversive intellectual, we learn, is unprofessional, uncollegial, passionate and disloyal. The subversive intellectual is neither trying to extend the university nor change the university, the subversive intellectual is not toiling in misery and from this place of misery articulating a “general antagonism.” In fact, the subversive intellectual enjoys the ride and wants it to be faster and wilder; she does not want a room of his or her own, she wants to be in the world, in the world with others and making the world anew. Moten insists: “Like Deleuze. I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that. And I plan to stay a believer, like Curtis Mayfield. But that’s beyond me, and even beyond me and Stefano, and out into the world, the other thing, the other world, the joyful noise of the scattered, scatted eschaton, the undercommon refusal of the academy of misery.” The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing it for the Other, you must also be doing it for yourself. While men may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism, no one will really be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us. Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s [messed] up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things or die. All of us. We must all change the things that are fucked up and change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontation. Revolution will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study. Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized and antagonizing. Like all world-making and all world-shattering encounters, when you enter this book and learn how to be with and for, in coalition, and on the way to the place we are already making, you will also feel fear, trepidation, concern, and disorientation. The disorientation, Moten and Harney will tell you is not just unfortunate, it is necessary because you will no longer be in one location moving forward to another, instead you will already be part of “the “movement of things” and on the way to this “outlawed social life of nothing.” The movement of things can be felt and touched and exists in language and in fantasy, it is flight, it is motion, it is fugitivity itself. Fugitivity is not only escape, “exit” as Paolo Virno might put it, or “exodus” in the terms offered by Hardt and Negri, fugitivity is being separate from settling. It is a being in motion that has learned that “organizations are obstacles to organising ourselves” (The Invisible Committee in The Coming Insurrection) and that there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned. Moten and Harney call this mode a “being together in homelessness” which does not idealize homelessness nor merely metaphorize it. Homelessness is the state of dispossession that we seek and that we embrace: “Can this being together in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question?” I think this is what Jay-Z and Kanye West (another collaborative unit of study) call “no church in the wild.”

#### b.) Absent this discussion, the affirmative occupies the position of the Maoist - the impact is imperialism and a reproduction of the harms of the 1ac.

Rey Chow, Comparative Literature—Brown University, 1993

Writing Diaspora, p. 15-16

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist promise that had been betrayed in the West."'6 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an iden-tification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric. In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist's most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist's means to moral power is a specific representational position—the position of powerlessness. In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as powerless:

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 Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone. This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte's depic-tion of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire-building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself."19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-4-vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist. [T]here is vis-A-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. . . The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

### 2nc

Cant perm

Spanos 1993 (William V., Heidegger and Criticism, p. 90-91)

In the terms of this essay, deconstruction minimizes precisely what the Heideggerian destructive mode takes to be the "first" of the always and simultaneous twofold operation of this hermeneutic practice. If the destructive mode of inquiry is understood not simply as the critique of structuration but also as the retrieval by violence (releasement) of the temporality of being from structuration, be-ing from Being, the lived futural possibilities of Dasein's understanding from permanent presence, it is also and simultaneously a projective mode of inquiry. In accordance with the dis-closive imperatives of the hermeneutic circle, it thus invites us, even if Heidegger himself failed decisively to accept the invitation or, in accepting it, misrepresented its imperatives, to open up our horizonal interpretive focus on the question of being to the "world": to take into "interested" or "careful" consideration the linguistic and, through the linguistic, the cultural, economic, and sociopolitical sites that consti­tute being-in-the-world. I mean Heidegger's insistence on the ontic/ ontological equiprimordiality of Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede (Das­ein's occasion, understanding, and discourse). The Heideggerian destruction retrieves the domain of knowledge as a historical and material field of forces from the disciplinary compartmen­talization to which it has been subjected by the universalizing metaphys­ical tradition. In thus retrieving knowledge as a diachronic and, at any historically specific moment, indissoluble relay, the destruction instigates a mode of inquiry in which, wherever one situates the question—whether at the site of ontology, language, psychology, history, ecology, gender, economics, culture, or politics—one is always already address­ing the other topoi in the kinetic field: always and necessarily discovering their affiliative relationship, however assymetrical and temporary it may be, to the chosen site. The circle of destructive understanding thus makes explicit what the traditional compartmentalization of knowledge into disciplines, and the "advanced" deconstructive textualization of differance, tends to preclude: the historical materiality of language and the worldli­ness of the text.

#### Prisons are always in a state of flux, they drastically change over time

The Howard League for Penal Reform, legal reform advocacy group, ¶ HISTORY OF THE PRISON SYSTEM, accessed January 6, 2014¶ <http://www.howardleague.org/history-of-prison-system/>

Prison is just one of a number of sanctions available to the courts to deal with those who commit criminal offences. Imprisonment today is the harshest sanction available, but this has not always been the case.¶ 16th and 17th Centuries¶ Sanctions for criminal behaviour tended to be public events which were designed to shame the person and deter others; these included the ducking stool, the pillory, whipping, branding and the stocks. At the time the sentence for many other offences was death.¶ Prison tended to be a place where people were held before their trial or while awaiting punishment. It was very rarely used as a punishment in its own right. Men and women, boys and girls, debtors and murderers were all held together in local prisons.¶ Evidence suggests that the prisons of this period were badly maintained and often controlled by negligent prison warders. Many people died of diseases like gaol fever, which was a form of typhus.¶ The most important innovation of this period was the building of the prototype house of correction, the London Bridewell. Houses of correction were originally part of the machinery of the Poor Law, intended to instil habits of industry through prison labour. Most of those held in them were petty offenders, vagrants and the disorderly local poor. By the end of the 17th century they were absorbed into the prison system under the control of the local Justices of the Peace.¶ 18th Century¶ Although the 18th century has been characterised as the era of the 'Bloody Code' there was growing opposition to the death penalty for all but the most serious crimes. Such severe punishment was counter-productive, as jurors were refusing to find thieves guilty of offences which would lead to their execution.¶ By the mid-18th century imprisonment, with hard labour, was beginning to been seen as a suitable sanction for petty offenders.¶ Transportation was a much-used method for disposing of convicted people. Convicts were shipped to the British colonies like America (until the end of the American War of Independence in 1776), Australia, and Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania).¶ Transportation was curtailed at the end of the 18th century. Other sanctions therefore had to be found. The two prominent alternatives were hard labour, and for those unable to do this, the house of correction. This practice lead to the use of prison hulks from 1776 until their phasing out in 1857.¶ Prison hulks were ships which were anchored in the Thames, and at Portsmouth and Plymouth. Those sent to them were employed in hard labour during the day and then loaded, in chains, onto the ship at night. The appalling conditions on the hulks, especially the lack of control and poor physical conditions, eventually led to the end of this practice. But the use of prison hulks did much to persuade public opinion that incarceration, with hard labour, was a viable penalty for crime.¶ In 1777, John Howard (namesake of the Howard League) condemned the prison system as disorganised, barbaric and filthy. He called for wide-ranging reforms including the [installation](http://www.howardleague.org/) of paid staff, outside inspection, a proper diet and other necessities for prisoners.¶ Jeremy Bentham, and other penal reformers of the time, believed that the prisoner should suffer a severe regime, but that it should not be detrimental to the prisoner's health. Penal reformers also ensured the separation of men and women and that sanitation was improved.¶ In 1791 Bentham designed the 'panopticon'. This prison design allowed a centrally placed observer to [survey](http://www.howardleague.org/) all the inmates, as prison wings radiated out from this central position. Bentham’s panopticon became the model for prison building for the next half century.¶ In 1799 the Penitentiary Act specified that gaols should be built for one inmate per cell and operate on a silent system with continuous labour.¶ 19th Century¶ The first half of the 19th century represented a watershed in the history of state punishment. Capital punishment was now regarded as an inappropriate sanction for many crimes. The shaming sanctions, like the stocks, were regarded as outdated. By mid-century, imprisonment had replaced capital punishment for most serious offences - except for that of murder.¶ Ideas relating to penal reform were becoming increasingly popular thanks to the work of a few energetic reformers. Many of these ideas were related to the rehabilitation of offenders. Religious groups like the Quakers and the Evangelicals were highly influential in promoting ideas of reform through personal redemption.¶ The 19th century saw the birth of the state prison. The first national penitentiary was completed at Millbank in London, in 1816. It held 860 prisoners, kept in separate cells, although association with other prisoners was allowed during the day. Work in prison was mainly centred around simple tasks such as picking 'coir' (tarred rope) and weaving.¶ In 1842 Pentonville prison was built using the panopticon design; this prison is still used today.¶ Pentonville was originally designed to hold 520 prisoners, each held in a cell measuring 13 feet long, 7 feet wide and 9 feet high. Pentonville operated the separate system, which was basically solitary confinement. In the next 6 years, 54 new prisons were built using this template.¶ In 1877 prisons were brought under the control of the Prison Commission. For the first time even local prisons were controlled centrally. At this time prison was seen primarily as a means to deter offending and reoffending. This was a movement away form the reforming ideals of the past.¶ The Prison Act 1898 reasserted reformation as the main role of prison regimes. This Act can be seen to set the penal-welfare context which underlies today’s prison policy. It led to a dilution of the separate system, the abolition of hard labour, and established the idea that prison labour should be productive, not least for the prisoners, who should be able to earn their livelihood on release.¶ 20th Century¶ The development of the prison system continues. At the end of the 19th century there was recognition that young people should have separate prison establishments - thus the borstal system was introduced in the Prevention of Crime Act 1908. Borstal training involved a regime based on hard physical work, technical and educational instruction and a strong moral atmosphere. A young person in borstal would work through a series of grades, based on privileges, until release.¶ In 1933, the first open prison was built at New Hall Camp near Wakefield. The theory behind the open prison is summed up in the words of one penal reformer, Sir Alex Paterson: "You cannot train a man for freedom under conditions of captivity".¶ The Criminal Justice Act 1948 abolished penal servitude, hard labour and flogging. It also presented a comprehensive system for the punishment and treatment of offenders. Prison was still at the centre of the system, but the institutions took many different forms including remand centres, detention centres and borstal institutions.¶ In April 1993 the Prison Service became an Agency of government. This new status allows for greater autonomy in operational matters, while the government retains overall policy direction.¶ The 1990s have also seen the introduction of prisons which are designed, financed, built and run by private companies. Supporters of privatisation argue that it will lead to cheaper, more innovative prisons, while organisations like the Howard League argue that private prisons are flawed both in principle and in practice.¶ 21st Century¶ There are currently 139 prisons holding men, women and children in England and Wales. The supremacy of imprisonment as a way of dealing with offending behaviour shows no signs of abating.¶ Further new prisons are being planned. These like all new prisons will be part of the PFI programmes and managed by the private sector. There are currently 11 privately managed prisons, however two prisons which began life managed by the private sector have been brought back into public management.

#### Aff obscures ongoing hunger strikes

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On 22 May 2013, the Dutch State Secretary of Security and Justice and Minister for Migration offered the House of Representatives a memorandum issued by the Council of State2 concerning ‘the options to administer food and drink to an alien in detention who is on hunger and/​or thirst strike, against his will.’3 This essay sets out to unpack the main premises of these recommendations in the framework of biopolitics, its colonial heritage and contemporary deployment in the Netherlands. Whilst understood in a historical continuum, this little document gains relevance as it represents a significant step over the threshold of the human. The hurried policy briefing note came to address the mounting hunger strikes of asylum seekers, who have been protesting against being detained, asserting that they are not criminals but asylum seekers and demanding treatment befitting their status. The State Secretary was in a rush to control a potentially explosive situation — the eruption of the dead bodies of aliens in the public sphere — after the suicide of the Russian activist Aleksandr Dolmatov in a Dutch detention centre.4 The death of Dolmatov, who had formally applied for political asylum, caused a stir in the Netherlands due to international criticism. In death, Aleksandr Dolmatov became a priority to the Dutch state. The recommendations of the Council of State, originally issued on May 15, were made in response to the Secretary’s request on May 13 for information regarding, in particular, the ‘possible conflict’ between ‘the state’s plight to care for the “detained alien”’ and their ‘right for respect of one’s private life.’5 In the Netherlands, according to Amnesty International, the detention of asylum seekers following the asylum request became a common rather than extraordinary practice. Amnesty points out the fact that vulnerable groups, including minors, are being detained and warehoused and that this régime resembles that of, and in this case is harsher than, common (criminal) detention.6 We argue that the status of asylum seekers as ‘detained aliens’ is, in essence, a technique of control. Placing asylum seekers under the category of ‘detainees’ effectively puts them in the hands of the state, which has a ‘strong duty to care’ for persons under its responsibility. Consequently, force-​feeding is read as ‘giving care.’ Within this construction, the deprivation of freedom (being detained by the Dutch state) and violence (being subjected to non-​consented bodily intervention) are transformed into dutiful benevolence (being cared for by the Dutch state). It is worth noting that the consideration to force-​feed asylum seekers occurs at the same time that asylum seekers are dying at European Union’s borders under the watchful eyes of its surveillance systems, or committing suicide in EU detention centres under conditions of a lack of medical care. This distribution of care is carefully managed. Despite Dolmatov’s suicide and the reported ‘missteps’ of the Ministry of Justice epitomised by the ‘body-​cuffed’ deportation of Cheikh Bah and Issa Koulibaly, two emaciated Guineans after 70+ days of hunger strike, the Dutch state persists in the pursuit of a politics of isolation, incarceration and forceful deportation of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. These actions have been object of critique and protest. In respect to force-​feeding, we call attention to the stance of physicians’ professional associations. The day after the State Secretary’s request to the State Council, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) published an advice note:7 Physicians’ Federation KNMG strongly advises physicians not to cooperate with force-​feeding. Medical ethics does not give physicians any leeway for treatment by force of a competent patient who can understand the effects of his [sic] refusal of treatment. Thus, the consent of the patient is also required for the administration of food or fluid. This position, which is shared by the Dutch Human Rights Organization for Health Professionals Johannes Wier Foundation,8 was made known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It aligns with the position of peers elsewhere as regards force-​feeding in Guantánamo Bay. In 2006, The Lancet published a letter authored by UK and US physicians (and undersigned by 255 peers of several countries) stating that physicians who refuse to respect the prisoners’ informed decision to refuse treatment ‘should be held to account by their professional bodies’ and denounce the practise of screening health-​care staff ‘to ensure that they agree with the policy of force-​feeding before working in Guantánamo Bay.’9 In 2009, Leonard Rubenstein (Physicians for Human Rights) and George Annas (Global Lawyers and Physicians) issued a statement in the same reputable journal:10 The use of coercion, physical force, or physical restraints to force-​feed competent individuals on hunger strike has been condemned by the World Medical Association as a form of “inhuman and degrading treatment” that is prohibited according to Common Article 3.9. They indicated that, 2 years before physician-​assisted force-​feeding of individuals on hunger strike at the centre in Guantanamo Bay began, President Bush’s Bioethics Council had described the force-​feeding of competent prisoners on hunger strike with the use of restraints and a nasogastric tube as a form of torture. On 22 May 2013, in conformity with the US political establishment, which has ignored this position, the Dutch Council of State informed the Secretary that the state does have the option of force-​feeding detained asylum seekers. It is not our intention to examine the legality of the document issued by the Council of State; we are not equipped to do so.11 Still, we would like to call attention to some of its important implications. The short amount of time in which the document was produced, and the circumstances that gave rise to it, created the ideal conditions for the implementation of urgent or extraordinary measures — albeit within the framework of human rights and, in particular, according to European legislation and the Dutch Constitution. The main concern of the state, it seems, was to establish the lawfulness of force-​feeding detained asylum seekers. For the Council, when carried out according to ‘recognised medical standards,’ force-​feeding is ‘in principle not deemed inhuman or humiliating.’ The Council acknowledges that it may constitute a limitation of the detainee’s right to their private life (personal autonomy), and a violation of the prohibition of torture. However, the Council indicates that, following European legislation, force-​feeding may be performed by the state when exercising its duty to protect the life of those under its care. The document delves into the procedural requirements to force-​feeding with respect to ‘proportionality’, a requirement that may be ignored in cases of thirst-​strike, and ‘quality.’ It concludes that regarding the possible incompatibilities between the duty of the state and the prohibition of torture and inhumane and humiliating treatment and the right to one’s private life, the previous prevails. Force-​feeding is, thus, rendered acceptable, even when the asylum seeker refuses to undergo the procedure. Following the document, the procedure is set in motion according to the national legal guidelines, whereby the head of the penitentiary institution decides and a physician determines whether they will carry out force-​feeding. The Council does acknowledge the KNMG’s advice not to force-​feed in conformity with the guidelines adopted by the World Medical Association. However the state, relying on its Constitution and the legal framework provided by Europe, has effectively greenlit torture. It is only through a political sleight-​of-​hand, enforced detention and deportation quotas, which stretch the realm of ethics, that the state is permitted to force-​feed a detainee against their will. This constitutes effectively what Giorgio Agamben termed the ‘state of exception,’ whereby the fundamental rights of some persons are suspended. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben points out that, In such a state of exception, subjection to experimentation can, like an expiation rite, either return the human body to life […] or definitively consign it to the death to which it already belongs. What concerns us most of all here, however, is that in the biopolitical horizon that characterizes modernity, the physician and the scientist move in the no-man’s-land into which at one point the sovereign alone could penetrate. (Agamben 1998, 159) The correlation between body experimentation in concentration camps, where the physician gained political power through state delegation, and force-​feeding in detention is not negligible. In this aberrant situation, it is the individual physician (effectively turned into civil servant) on behalf of the state that has the discretionary power of acting, freed from professional ethics, upon these subjects. The state will search incessantly for such a servant willing to force-​feed, until it finds them. It is critical to pause here to reflect on the current state of the Dutch democracy in its use of extraordinary provisions that annul the rights of some subjects. Analysis of the power of the state to decide who lives and dies has been fundamental to contemporary philosophical critique to the West. A paramount query in this regard is, who are assigned to the ‘category’ of subjects that have served, recurrently and consistently throughout history, as necropolitical objects of state power, which confer upon them ‘the status of living dead’ or of the non-​human (Mbembe, 2003). In Precarious Life. Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler points to the constitutive relationship between ‘who counts as a human’ and others: It is not just that some humans are treated as humans, and others are dehumanized; it is rather that dehumanization becomes the condition for the production of the human to the extent that a “Western” civilization defines itself over and against a population understood as, by definition, illegitimate, if not dubiously human. (Butler 2006, 91) The subject turned into non-​person is then free-​game. Following Butler, it is those placed outside of the human realm who are rendered object of ‘indefinite detention’ in the ‘contemporary war prison;’ a house to ‘unliveable lives’ (Ibid 2006, xv). The alien, the Muslim, the black, the other, all of whom are already conceived as non-​human through what Walter Mignolo defines as ‘epistemic imperial racism,’ are marked for incarceration (Mignolo 2009). In State of Exception, Agamben calls attention to the Patriot Act and the following ‘military order’ issued by George Bush in 2001, whereby ‘non citizens’ or ‘aliens’ suspected of involvement in terrorist activities could be taken into custody and then detained indefinitely. What is new about President’s Bush order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being … Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply “detainees,” they are the object of a pure de facto rule’. (Agamben 2005, 3) Agamben argues that the removal of the individual ‘from law and judicial oversight’ can only be compared to the legal situation of Jews in the Nazi Lager (Ibid, 4). However, there is actually an earlier genealogy of bare life, which is found in imperial colonialism. The experimentation with the life of certain human bodies was already an earlier practice in the suspended zone or limit space of the colonies. Mignolo outlines this heritage in Dispensable and Bare Lives — Coloniality and the Hidden Political/​Economic Agenda of Modernity: From the sixteenth century on, epistemic and ontological constructions of racism had two major devastating consequences: the economic and legal/​political dispensability of human lives. Dispensable lives were and are either assumed (naturalized “feelings”) or established by decree (laws, public policies). Two human communities that paid the price of economic and political devaluation of human lives were enslaved Africans from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century and German Jews in the twentieth century. (Mignolo 2009, 73 – 74) It is in this historical context that the actions of the Dutch state should be understood. The legal move to (un)name and classify detained asylum seekers emerges, then, as the afterlife of imperial colonialism. The invisibilisation of those relegated to the zone of the non-​being (after Fanon [2008]) is a fundamental aspect to (mass) incarceration. For the maintenance of the national myth of a human and humane society, the Netherlands must keep the non-​being out of sight. The Dutch state is well aware that the stakes are high regarding what is admitted to or excluded from the public sphere. Asylum seekers on hunger strike are protesting against their physical and metaphorical exclusion from the Dutch public sphere. Their deaths would catapult them into this very anaemic space, however briefly, and disturb the carefully constructed and policed human face of the Dutch nation. Hunger strikes ‘call for’ the application of exceptional rules, for they qualify as acts of resistance to the power of the state. The tension, on the one hand, between an ethics of care that doesn’t decry death, as is the case with euthanasia in the Netherlands and, on the other, ‘death as protest’ indicates that for asylum-​seekers another ethics (or lack thereof) applies. While voluntary death as a means to end suffering is allowed, death as a form of protest is not. Disciplinary power and biopower shape a certain kind of subject and a specific embodied response to power. In the zone of the non-​being one’s body is the last, if not only, means to protest oppression, whereby a ‘slow death’ stands for the body’s radicalisation. The Dutch state does not recognise hunger strike as a valid and deliberate political act, as a refusal to live under intolerable conditions, or as a form of revolutionary suicide that ‘strategically blurs the difference between risking one’s life in order to confront oppressive forces and resolutely taking one’s life in order to end unbearable suffering.’ (Ryan 2000, 391) Under these circumstances (the Dutch state forces asylum seekers to subsist in a ‘space of death’), force-​feeding represents a prolonging of suffering (or a staying of death). Force-​feeding suggests a desire for their continued existence — however, outside of the Netherlands.

Medina, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Insurrectionary genealogies exploit the openness of our (indefinitely multiple) pasts. As G.H. Mead suggested in the Philosophy of the Present (1949), the past is as open as the future,56 and they are both equally dependent on the present. As Mead puts it, ‚the novelty of every future demands a novel past.‛ 57 The past is renewed in and through our interpretative practices; it is rendered present in our lives through interpretations that are always the result of re-descriptions and negotiations from the vantage point of the present informed by our current vision of the future.58 For this reason, our past is incessantly novel: we make it and remake it, incessantly, in every present.59 But here an important worry arises: the worry of instrumentalization. We can do harm to past subjects by instrumentalizing their struggles, by co-opting their voices and experiences and using them for our own purposes. If forgetting or ignoring past subjects and their struggles can be unjust, we also commit injustices through the **epistemic spoliation of past lives**. We have obligations with respect to subjects of the past, who had their own interests and values. For example, those who have lived under slavery, the victims of Auschwitz, those tortured and killed by dictatorial regimes, the thousands who die every year in the USA without medi- cal attention or basic necessities, and many others should be remembered not simply because we find it useful or in our interest, but because their lives and deaths deserve critical attention and to be put in relation to our own. Following Mead as well as critical theorists as different as Jürgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin, James Bohman (2009) and Max Pensky (2009) have argued against the instrumentalization of the past and for the need to give moral recognition to past subjects and moral weight to their experiences and perspectives. As Bohman puts it, ‚we do not just deliberate about the past but rather with the past.‛ 60 From a Foucaultian perspective the instrumentalization worry is appeased not by giving moral recognition to subjects of the past as partners in deliberation, but rather, by acknowledging their agency and power/knowledges, whether or not these can be recruited to our deliberation processes in the way we would like.

### 1nr

#### Perm can never solves - One must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humanize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino**(Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on suchan interrelated knowledge, offera guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity.But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue thatto know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). Thissystematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictionsand are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . .For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

The perm “solving” impacts is the problem- reform only allows capitalism to promote the belief that it can fix itself. – 1NC Parenti ev gives specific examples of how the capitalist sytem re-invents itself to silence the dissent – HC reform, prison reform, etc is nothing more than a small bandaid. Even if end prison systems, it won’t solve things like racialized violence b/c we will still have people like George Zimmerman w/ racialized violence

**Luxemburg 99** Rosa, Polish-Jewish-German Marxist theorist, socialist philosopher, and revolutionary. “Reform or Revolution.” Chapter VI. Conquest of Political Power..

Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic development that can be picked out at the pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages. Legislative reform and revolution are different factors in the development of class society. They condition and complement each other, and are at the same time reciprocally exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat.¶ Every legal constitution is the product of a revolution. In the history of classes, revolution is the act of political creation, while legislation is the political expression of the life of a society that has already come into being. Work for reform does not contain its own force independent from revolution. During every historic period, work for reforms is carried on only in the direction given to it by the impetus of the last revolution and continues as long as the impulsion from the last revolution continues to make itself felt. Or, to put it more concretely, in each historic period work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution. Here is the kernel of the problem.¶ It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their duration but according to their content. The secret of historic change through the utilisation of political power resides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative modification into a new quality, or to speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to another.¶ That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society. If we follow the political conceptions of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that is reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the wage labour system but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself.

Class is the primary cause of all other forms of oppression – can’t challenge other forms of domination without challenging class first

Kovel 2, Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, 2002

(Joel, *The Enemy of Nature,* pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away**.**

Capitalism makes error replication terminally inevitable – turns the aff

Meszaros 6(Istvan, Monthly Review, September, “The Structural Crisis of Politics”)

2. The Nature of Capital’s Structural Crisis In this respect it is necessary to clarify the relevant differences between types or modalities of crisis. It is not a matter of indifference whether a crisis in the social sphere can be considered a periodic/con-junctural crisis, or something much more fundamental than that. For, obviously, the way of dealing with a fundamental crisis cannot be con-ceptualized in terms of the the categories of periodic or conjunctural crises. To anticipate a main point of this lecture, as far as politics is con-cerned the crucial difference between the two sharply contrasting types of crises in question is that the periodic or conjunctural crises unfold and are more or less successfully resolved within a given framework of politics, whereas the fundamental crisis affects that framework itself in its entirety. In other words, in relation to a given socioeconomic and political system we are talking about the vital difference between the more or less frequent crises in politics, as against the crisis of the estab-lished modality of politics itself, with qualitatively different require-ments for its possible solution. It is the latter that we are concerned with today. In general terms, this distinction is not simply a question of the apparent severity of the contrasting types of crises. For a periodic or conjunctural crisis can be dramatically severe—as the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933” happened to be—yet capable of a solution within the parameters of the given system. Misinterpreting the severity of a given conjunctural crisis as if it was a fundamental systemic crisis, as Stalin and his advisers did in the midst of the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933,” is bound to lead to mistaken and indeed volun-taristic strategies, like declaring social democracy to be the “main enemy” in the early 1930s, which could only strengthen, as in fact it trag-ically did strengthen, Hitler’s forces. And in the same way, but in the opposite sense, the “non-explosive” character of a prolonged structural crisis, in contrast to the “thunderstorms” (Marx) through which periodic conjunctural crises can discharge and resolve themselves, may also lead to fundamentally misconceived strategies, as a result of the misin-terpretation of the absence of “thunderstorms” as if their absence was the overwhelming evidence for the indefinite stability of “organized capitalism” and of the “integration of the working class.” This kind of misinterpretation, to be sure heavily promoted by the ruling ideological interests under the pretenses of “scientific objectivity,” tends to rein-force the position of those who represent the self-justifying acceptance of the reformist accommodationist approaches in institutionalized—for-merly genuinely oppositional—working–class parties and trade unions (now, however, “Her Majesty’s Official Opposition,” as the saying goes). But even among the deeply committed critics of the capital system, the same misconception regarding the indefinitely crisis-free perspective of the established order can result in the adoption of a self-paralyzing defensive posture, as we witnessed in the socialist movement in the last few decades. It cannot be stressed enough, the crisis of politics in our time is not intelligible without being referred to the broad overall social framework of which politics is an integral part. This means that in order to clarify the nature of the persistent and deepening crisis of politics all over the world today we must focus attention on the crisis of the capital system itself. For the crisis of capital we are experiencing—at least since the very beginning of the 1970s—is an all-embracing structural crisis.18 Let us see, summed up as briefly as possible, the defining characteristics of the structural crisis we are concerned with. The historical novelty of today’s crisis is manifest under four main aspects: ♦ (1) its character is universal, rather than restricted to one particular sphere (e.g., financial, or commercial, or affecting this or that particu-lar branch of production, or applying to this rather than that type of labour, with its specific range of skills and degrees of productivity, etc.); ♦ (2) its scope is truly global (in the most threateningly literal sense of the term), rather than confined to a particular set of countries (as all major crises have been in the past); ♦ (3) its time scale is extended, continuous—if you like: permanent— rather than limited and cyclic, as all former crises of capital happened to be. ♦ (4) its mode of unfolding might be called creeping—in contrast to the more spectacular and dramatic eruptions and collapses of the past— while adding the proviso that even the most vehement or violent con-vulsions cannot be excluded as far as the future is concerned: i.e, when the complex machinery now actively engaged in “crisis-management” and in the more or less temporary “displacement” of the growing con-tradictions runs out of steam.... [Here] it is necessary to make some general points about the criteria of a structural crisis, as well as about the forms in which its solution may be envisaged. To put it in the simplest and most general terms, a structural crisis affects the totality of a social complex, in all its relations with its con-stituent parts or sub-complexes, as well as with other complexes to which it is linked. By contrast, a non-structural crisis affects only some parts of the complex in question, and thus no matter how severe it might be with regard to the affected parts, it cannot endanger the continued survival of the overall structure. Accordingly, the displacement of contradictions is feasible only while the crisis is partial, relative and internally manageable by the system, requiring no more than shifts—even if major ones—within the relatively autonomous system itself. By the same token, a structural crisis calls into question the very existence of the overall complex concerned, postulat-ing its transcendence and replacement by some alternative complex. The same contrast may be expressed in terms of the limits any particular social complex happens to have in its immediacy, at any given time, as compared to those beyond which it cannot conceivably go. Thus, a structural crisis is not concerned with the immediate limits but with the ultimate limits of a global structure....19 Thus, in a fairly obvious sense nothing could be more serious than the structural crisis of capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction which defines the ultimate limits of the established order. But even though profoundly serious in its all-important general parameters, on the face of it the structural crisis may not appear to be of such a decid-ing importance when compared to the dramatic vicissitudes of a major conjunctural crisis. For the “thunderstorms” through which the con-junctural crises discharge themselves are rather paradoxical in the sense that in their mode of unfolding they not only discharge (and impose) but also resolve themselves, to the degree to which that is feasible under the circumstances. This they can do precisely because of their partial char-acter which does not call into question the ultimate limits of the estab-lished global structure. At the same time, however, and for the same reason, they can only “resolve” the underlying deep-seated structural problems—which necessarily assert themselves again and again in the form of the specific conjunctural crises—in a strictly partial and tempo-rally also most limited way. Until, that is, the next conjunctural crisis appears on society’s horizon. By contrast, in view of the inescapably complex and prolonged nature of the structural crisis, unfolding in historical time in an epochal and not episodic/instantaneous sense, it is the cumulative interrelationship of the whole that decides the issue, even under the false appearance of “normality.” This is because in the structural crisis everything is at stake, involving the all-embracing ultimate limits of the given order of which there cannot possibly be a “symbolic/paradigmatic” particular instance. Without understanding the overall systemic connections and implications of the particular events and developments we lose sight of the really significant changes and of the corresponding levers of poten-tial strategic intervention positively to affect them, in the interest of the necessary systemic transformation. Our social responsibility therefore calls for an uncompromising critical awareness of the emerging cumulative interrelationship, instead of looking for comforting reassurances in the world of illusory normality until the house collapses over our head.