### Off 1

#### To Grasp at Being the 1AC relies on a notion of DASEIN propelled by a being toward death - this is an egotistical ontology that denies relationships toward otherness.

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, October 18th, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/10/18/living-from-death-on-eating/)

In the open to Process and Reality, Whitehead writes that, All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living– that is to say, with ‘objective immortality’ whereby what is divested from its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming. (xiii – xiv) I have been haunted by this passage ever since I first read it. What Whitehead is, in effect, saying is that all things live from death. While I would not go as far as Whitehead in claiming that all things live from death– I don’t think this is true of rocks, hydrogen atoms, and stars –it is certainly true of organic beings. To live is to live from death, because to live is to eat. With the exception of sunlight and chemicals used in photosynthesis and chemosynthesis, eating is the transformation of other organic matter into the patterned matter of the organism. Eating is a set of operations that de-forms another organic being and re-forms that being into wood, leaves, bark, muscle, bone, blood, and nerves. Even trees and grass are a kind of carnivore in the way they eat the microbes of the soil. However, because there is no such thing as an unformed matter, a matter that does not have an intrinsic structure of its own, the deformation of organic beings and their reformation into cells for another organic being is never simply the unilateral or hylemorphic imposition of a form upon these materials. That which is eaten contributes something of its own to the machine that eats, contributing form to the organization of the vampire. I will be different depending on my diet. My cells will have different powers, different capacities, depending on whether I live from the death of these organic beings or those organic beings. I will even think differently depending on the death that I live from, this food affecting my moods and ability to cognize in this way, those foods affecting my moods and ability to cognize in that way. Those who suffer from depression and anxiety disorders are advised to maintain a particular diet. read on! This is what Whitehead means by “objective immortality”. It is not that the organic being is preserved as itself, but rather that its being contributes differences to the being of the being that consumes it. The dead continue to contribute their differences, making the beings that live from them different than they would otherwise be. Days after I had buried my beloved cat Tabby in the back yard, a tiny forest of trees began to sprout from her grave, growing in that particular location and not in others. Something of those trees is Tabby. Had those seeds grown elsewhere, those trees would have a different pattern or structure, their cells would be of a different nature. A becoming-cat of the tree. This “objective immortality” that is carried on in the reapers of death is an instance of what Alaimo calls “trans-corporeality”. Between Heidegger and Whitehead, we thus have two very different conceptions of death; two conceptions of death that are not necessarily opposed, but which are simply different. With Heidegger we have an individualist conception of death. In Heidegger I know that entropy, dissolution, absence, is my ultimate destiny. I am a being-towards-death, a being that knows that death is my ultimate destination; but above all, I am a being that knows that only I can die my own death, that no one else can die it for me. This being towards death thereby individualizes me. In knowing that only I can die my own death, I come to the realization that all of my decisions, all of my decisions, are my own; that no one else can make them for me and that I can never attribute them or pass them off on someone else. For each and every thing, it was always I that chose this thing. My being-towards-death thus leads me to take responsibility for my being. I’m not here doing Heidegger nearly the justice he deserves. By contrast, in Whitehead we get a collectivist notion of death. Here my being is not a being-towards-death– though it can be that too –but rather my being is a being-from-death. I am a being that lives from death. And while our being is ultimately solar in the sense that that which lies at the base of the food chain derives its nourishment from the light of the sun, plants as well as us live from the death of countless other beings. Insofar as we live from countless other beings, we are thus a crowd of other beings. There is thus a truth of metempsychosis. We are solar, we are bacteria, we are trees, grasses, cows, lambs, fish, and eels. Even the air I breath is of the trees. It is for this reason that the Japanese, before their meals, say “itadakimasu“, thanking their food, not God, for imparting its life-force on to them. In Whitehead’s being-from-death we thus realize our trans-corporeality, or the manner in which we live from a crowd of other beings. Rather than an individualist conception of death that subtracts us others, this being-from-death draws us ineluctably to the awareness of how we are bound up with others. It is clear then, that while ethical questions might ultimately be bound up with questions of life and death, they can’t be bound up with the rejection of death. This is because there can be no question of extricating ourselves from death. In our being-from-death we are inextricably and necessarily bound up with death. The question then is not one of whether or not to renounce death, but rather of how we ought to live with death. As Derrida said, it is a question of how to eat well. Perhaps we could say that there is a nihilistic way of being-from-death that betokens “hyper-death” through the bio-catastrophe that it invites: ecological monoculturalization, factory farming, the devastation of fisheries, etc. Then, perhaps, there would be an ethical way of living from death. I scarcely know how to even pose these questions. Eating well does not amount to having a “well appointed” table, but rather would be a way of eating that says “itadakimasu” and really means it, seeking to preserve the biodiversity of the planet and its fecundity for producing difference. It would be a way of living-from-death that does not produce absolute death or the utter annihilation of that from which we live.

#### Specificly, we critique their notion of ever grasping at 'Being' and their impulse to exclude the drone and the coming 'singularity'. The impact is denial of Otherness which also constitutes a denial of the self - its the biggest impact in the round.

**Introna 10** (LUCAS, PROFESSOR OF ORGANIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS @ LANCASTER UNIVERSITY, AI & SOC, 2010, VOL. 25, “THE ‘MEASURE OF A MAN’ AND THE ETHOS OF HOSPITALITY: TOWARDS AN ETHICAL DWELLING WITH TECHNOLOGY,” PG. 93-102)

Instead of creating value systems in our own self-image, the absolute otherness of every Other should be the only moral imperative, so argues Levinas and Derrida. We need an ethics of the artificial that is beyond the self-identical of human beings. Such an ethics beyond anthropocentric metaphysics need as its ‘ground’, not a system for comparison, but rather a recognition of the impossibility of any comparison—every comparison is already violent in its attempt to render equal what could never be equal (Levinas 1991[1974]). How might we encounter the other, ethically, in its otherness? This is what I will no turn to. 3 Hospitality as the ethics of a community that have nothing in common ‘‘Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the ethos... ethics is hospitality; ethics is entirely coextensive with the experience of hospitality, whichever way one expands or limits that.’’—Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p. 16–17. The fundamental problem for the android Data is that the question of the ethical, its imperative, is already colonised by humans. In this ethical landscape, it becomes impossible for Data to state his case unless it is made in human terms—terms such as ‘machine’, ‘property’, ‘sentience’, etc. It is us humans who are making the decisions about the validity, or not, of any criteria or category for establishing the ethical significance of a being. It is Data— and by extension all non-humans—that is on trial, not we humans. Our moral worth is taken for granted. As such we are the measure. For example we often take ‘sentience’ as criteria for considering moral significance or worth because we argue that it is a necessary condition for the feeling of pain (Singer 1977). Why should pain be a criterion for moral significance? Is it because we can feel pain? Are not all our often-suggested criteria such as originality, sentience, rationality, autonomy, and so forth, not somehow always already based on that which we humans by necessity comply with? Is not the essential criterion for moral worthiness (in most ethical thought) a being in our image, like us? Is our ethics not always an ethics of those with whom we have something in common? Obviously one can legitimately ask whether it is at all possible for us humans to escape our own moral prejudices—especially if we realise the intimate link between ethics and politics. Furthermore, it seems that every attempt one might have to define common inclusive ethical categories or criteria for all things will fail, as it already violates every entity by exactly denying that which is most significant—its radical otherness. Indeed, as was suggested, most attempts (even some radical environmental ethics) are mostly informed by the assumption that at some level we can indeed compare the incomparable—and, ultimately that the only legitimate reference point for such comparison is that which is in the image of the human Other. But what about the non-human Other, the inanimate, the artificial? What about the community of those with whom we have nothing in common? 2 There has been many attempts to define more inclusive ethical categories and values such as a biocentric ethics (Goodpaster 1978; Singer 1977), an ecocentric ethics (Leopold 1966; Naess 1995) or even an infocentric ethics by Floridi (2003). The non-human (inanimate) other One might suggest that, for us human beings, a wholly Other, that is indeed wholly Other, is the inanimate Other. In many respects, the destitute face of the human Other, in the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas for example, is already in some sense a reflection of the human face opposite it. We can indeed substitute ourselves for the Other (become her hostage) because we can imagine—at least in some vague sense—what it must be like for the human Other to suffer violence because we suffer violence. It is possible for us to substitute ‘us for them’ because it could have been my friend, my child, my partner, etc.). As Husserl (1970/1929) argues, in his Cartesian Mediations, through empathy, ‘‘we project ourselves into the alien cultural community and its culture’’ (p. 135) in which the ‘‘the Other’’ exists ‘‘phenomenologically [as] a ‘modification’ of myself’’ (p. 115). Through empathy, our egos constitutes a ‘‘single universal community’’ of human intersubjectivity (p. 140)—a community with a common unity. As human beings, that also encounter ourselves as Other, we know that we always exceed and overflow the caricatures that the intentionality of consciousness endeavours to impose on us, that we are always infinitely more (or radically other) than any and all such caricatures. It is this infinity that Levinas points to when he claims ethics as ‘first philosophy.’ What about the inanimate Other? In his book Technology and Lifeworld Ihde (1990) argues for an extension of Levinas’ notion of alterity (or quasi-otherness) to inanimate things.3 He argues that the ‘religious object’ ‘‘does not simply ‘represent’ some absent power but is endowed with the sacred. Its aura of sacredness is spatially and temporally present within the range of its efficacy’’ (98). Ihde argues, however, that this quasi-otherness always remains in the domain of human invention. In other words, it is still within the realm of that which we humans bring to it—even if it is unintentional or not for instrumental purposes, hence his designation of the object as quasi-other. One might say it is plausible to see the religious object as an Other in some way (even if it is quasi-other) but what about everyday objects such as the table? I want to suggest with Harman (2002, 2005) that the table (and all other inanimate objects) are also infinitely other, always more than that which human intentionality brings to it. In Tool-Being Harman (2002) argues that even the table, in the fullness of its being, is infinite. Although the intentional acts of consciousness transform it by necessity into a caricature (into some form of present-at-hand being), such acts do not, and never can, exhaust it. As Harman (2002) suggests: ‘‘However, deeply we meditate on the table’s act of supporting solid weights, however, tenaciously we monitor its presence, any insight that is yielded will always be something quite distinct from this act [of being] itself’’ (22)—what he calls its tool-being. The table, here before me, is always more than all the perspectives, levels or layers that we can enumerate, more than all the uses we can put it to, more than all possible perspectives, levels, layers or uses. Harman (2002, 2005) argues that any and all possible relations between humans and things will inevitably fail to grasp them as they are; they are, in the fullness of their being, irreducible to any and all of these relations.4 In short: they are, in the fullness of their being, infinite and wholly Other. Indeed, as was suggested above, one might claim that they are in a sense more Other (if one can say this at all) than the human Other since we can never in any sense put ourselves ‘in their shoes,’ as it were. Thus, if the infinitely otherness of the Other is what compels us—puts our own right to existence into question, as Levinas argues—then we have no basis for excluding the inanimate Other from the kingdom of Others—even if Levinas did not arrive at this conclusion. His Other is always the humanistic, or ultimately, the theistic Other. This paper endeavours to go beyond this boundary, to forsake all boundaries, to enter into a community that have nothing in common (Lingis 1994). Is such a community possible?

#### Also turns the case.

Introna 10

(LUCAS, PROFESSOR OF ORGANIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS @ LANCASTER UNIVERSITY, AI & SOC, 2010, VOL. 25, “THE ‘MEASURE OF A MAN’ AND THE ETHOS OF HOSPITALITY: TOWARDS AN ETHICAL DWELLING WITH TECHNOLOGY,” PG. 93-102)

In the first, more traditional sense, I mean the values and interests built into the very materiality of the technologies we draw upon—inscribed in their ‘flesh’ as it were (Winner 1980). In drawing upon the possibilities presented by these technologies, we become wittingly or unwittingly enrolled into particular scripts and programmes of action (in the actor network theory sense of the word). These scripts and programmes make certain things possible and others not, include certain interests and others not (for example the increased use of ATM may have lead to the closure of bank branches which exactly excludes those that can not use ATM’s, such as physically disabled people). In this sense of use, the ethics of machines is very important and is in desperate need of our attention (an example of this type of work is the paper by Introna and Nissenbaum (2000) on search engines and the work of Brey (2000) as proposed in his disclosive ethics). However, this paper is not primarily concerned with this sense of technological ethics. It is rather concerned with the question of the moral and ethical significance of technological artefacts in their technological being, i.e. the question of the weight of our moral responsibility towards technological artefacts as artificial beings. In order to develop and structure the discussion, I will draw on a particular episode of Star Trek (2003) titled: ‘‘The measure of a man’’.1 In this episode, the ethical significance, and therefore subsequent rights, of the android Data becomes contested. This ‘case study’—if I may call it that—will give us some indication of how the problem of ethical significance of the artificial can become apparent and considered. In discussing this case, I will argue that its approach to the issue, as well as the work of Levinas, is essentially anthropocentric—ultimately the measure of ethical significance is ‘the measure of a man’. I will argue, with Heidegger (1977a), that it will ultimately fail to provide us with an adequate way to consider the ethical significance of the artificial. I will then proceed to suggest, with the help of Derrida, a more radical interpretation of Levinas as a possible way forward towards an ethics (or rather ethos) of hospitality—an ethical dwelling with the artificial other that so pervade our everyday being in the world. […]Such a suggestion points the intimate link between ethics and politics. I will return to this matter in the next section. The final step in his defence, which draws on the first two, is that ultimately we are going to be judged as a species about how we treat these creations of ours; and if 97 they are ‘‘expendable, disposable, aren’t we?’’ This is an interesting step and captures the essence of Heidegger’s argument against western metaphysics which is humanistic and in which everything is valued in human terms and subsequently everything (also humanity) is robbed of its worth: [I]t is important finally to realise that precisely through the characterisation of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for man’s estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does no let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing (Heidegger 1977a, p. 228, emphasis mine). In this regard, neither Riker nor Picard escape this anthropocentric valuing. Riker argues that machines are instruments of man, at its disposal. They should be valued in terms of their value ‘for us.’ However, in the sociotechnical assemblages of contemporary world, it is increasingly difficult to draw a clear boundary between ‘them’ and ‘us.’ If they are merely ‘for us’, then we all are a ‘for us’. As Heidegger (1977b) argues in his essay The Question Concerning Technology, in such a world we all become ‘standing reserve’ (at the disposal of the network). Picard’s humanistic defence invokes a hierarchy of values in which Data becomes valued because he is ‘like us’ (sentient beings). However, if Heidegger is right then even where valuing is positive it is always subjectivising. Thus, neither of these positions escape the ‘technological’ world view in which the world is rendered present as a ‘for us’ (Gestell/enframed in Heidegger’s terminology). As enframed beings not only the artificial but also man becomes mere ‘standing reserve’ within which other possibilities for being are concealed. Not only this. In framing beings (and itself) in its own terms the very concealing of other possibilities for being itself becomes concealed.

#### Decay and change is the Ontologial condition or both life and non-life, our alternative is a flat plane ontology which recognizes how becoming is always a process. An ontology is only as good as the ethics it produces, if we prove that their ontology denies the possibility for an ethical encounter with the Other, you should vote negative instantly.

Clark 10

(Nigel, Senior Lecturer in Geography @ Open University, UK, *Parallax*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Open Research Online, “Ex-Orbitant Generosity: Gifts of Love in a Cold Cosmos,” http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/13534640903478809, Pg. 80-95)

In this way, desire or love *is* becoming, and generosity is generativity - which makes it, to borrow a formulation from Ray Brassier, `ontologically ubiquitous’.56 Effectively, there is no need for a distinctive ethics to address the injuries of transmutation, because the catastrophe itself is ultimately productive. With the championing of pure process and incessant becoming that characterises much of the contemporary take on `immanence’, what counts is not so much the substantive bodies that happen to come into being, so much as the great overarching stream of generative matter-energy from which all individuated forms are bodied forth. Where the unlimited potential for becoming or change takes precedence over the limited and constrained condition of the actual bodies it gives rise to, there can be no absolute and irreparable loss. Whatever dissolution of bodily integrity takes place, what ever fate befalls actual beings, is less of a termination than a reconfiguration, a temporary undoing that facilitates a renewed participation in the greater flow. And with this prioritization of process over product, of virtuality over actuality, whatever fidelity is called for is to the `flux of invincible life’ itself - rather than to its interruptions.57 `Catastrophe’, in this sense, is the speedy, if painful, passage to a fresh start, to a new life. If it is a crack that fissures the ontological universe, then it is ultimately a self- suturing one. But for some theorists who take the event of the cataclysm to heart, a non- annihilating disaster is not a disaster worthy of the name. As Edith Wyschogrod concludes of Deleuzo-Guattarian catastrophism: `Because there is nothing but the fullness of desiring production, they cannot, strictly speaking, explain disease and natural catastrophe....’ 58 For Ray Brassier, the fashionable avowal of pure process or immanence raises a more general issue: that of how such philosophies are to account for discontinuity at all, how they are to explain breaks in pure productivity or lapses into inactivity. This is a problem not just for Deleuze, he suggests, `but for any philosophy that would privilege becoming over stasis’.59 Brassier’s engagement with solar extinction returns us to the literal exorbitance of an earth open and precarious in the face of an inhospitable cosmos and to the Levinasian theme of existence fissured by impassable rifts. Whereas Harman stresses the innumerable ruptures that punctuate a universe of heterogeneous objects, Brassier zeroes on the quandaries posed by one particular juncture. Against any philosophy that assumes the necessity of a thinking being to make sense of the world, and equally counter to any philosophical stance that posits an incessant stream of becoming, he draws out the significance of the moment when terrestrial life might be – or rather, will be - totally, irredeemably, extinguished. Playing off a discussion by Jean-François Lyotard about our sun gradually burning out and rendering the earth uninhabitable - an eventuality which scientists have predicted with some confidence – Brassier points up the certainty of non-existence that weighs upon all life.60 For Levinas, the impossibility of self-identity, of synchronicity, and of the closure of reciprocity is signalled by the passage into the time of the other: the interruption of self- presence by `a time *without me*’.61 In his working through of the inheritance of Levinas, Derrida observes that love is always a rupture in the living present, haunted by the knowledge that `One of us will see the other die, one of us will live on, even if only for an instant’.62 This is love’s exorbitance, the impossibility of its recuperation into an economy of reciprocal, synchronous or symmetrical gestures. For Brassier, that fact that terrestrial life is eventually doomed by solar catastrophe promises a time without me, without any of us, without thought or experience, without even the life that lends death its much-touted significance. This is a quite literal crack in the ontological edifice of the universe: objective scientific knowledge that propels thought on the impossible task of thinking thought’s own non-being. As Brassier announces: `Lyotard’s `solar catastrophe’ effectively transposes Levinas’s theologically inflected `impossibility of possibility’ into a natural-scientific register, so that it is no longer the death of the Other that usurps the sovereignty of consciousness, but the extinction of the sun’.63 In the face of the other, in its exposure to the elements, we catch a glimpse of our own vulnerability and finitude.64 In the face of a cyclone, or the face of others traumatised by gale-force winds, we see forces strong enough to overwhelm communities, cities, entire regions. We may also in some opaque sense - but in a way that is currently subject to elucidation by the physical sciences - feel an intimation of energies that could overwhelm an earth. And ultimately annihilate every conceivable entity. In Brassier’s words: roughly one trillion, trillion, trillion years from now, the accelerating expansion of the universe will have disintegrated the fabric of matter itself, terminating the possibility of embodiment. Every star in the universe will have burnt out, plunging the cosmos into a state of absolute darkness and leaving behind nothing but spent husks of collapsed matter.65 Negating the consolation of endless becoming or ubiquitous self-overflowing, this scenario implies that ethics too is ultimately doomed: the gift of the disaster pointing finally to the disaster of the gift. And yet, across a nation state that could have been any patch of the globe, ordinary folk offer beds to complete strangers, the townspeople of a backwater village ladle out lashings of Hurricane Gumbo to dishevelled company, and a million and one other obscure acts of love flare and fade away: tiny sparks of generosity that arc across the cracks in daily life. And keep doing so in spite of, because of, the perishability that characterises the gift, its giver and its recipient alike. For John Caputo, who also gazes directly at the coming solar disaster, it is the very `face of a faceless cosmos’ that makes of an ethical opening to an other `an act of hyperbolic partiality and defiance’.66 In this way, it is not just that each gift is an offering of flesh and the giving of a terrain, but that every gift carries the trace of the very extinguishing of existence. In its responsiveness to the inconsistency or the excessiveness of light, each generous reception murmurs against the dying of all light. Somewhere beside or beyond critical thought’s harsh cross-examination of compassion and the neo-vitalist extension of ethical dispositions into every corner of the cosmos, then, runs this other option, propelled by the very exorbitance, diachrony and asymmetry that severs being from thought and unhinges ethics from ontology. If it negates the radical passivity of generosity to demand that it enacts a moral cost accounting before it sets forth, so too does it rebuke the idea of a responsibility that is primordially receptive to declare that every spontaneous energetic or material discharge is in essence a gift. Demands might well emit from any object, but not every thing can give in or give out in response to a summons. As biologist Lynn Margulis and science writer Dorion Sagan put it: `life is matter that chooses’.67 Which appears to makes choice fairly rare in the known universe, as well as contingent and, in all likelihood, ephemeral. Like other living creatures, we humans `can turn away from faces as we can turn away from the surfaces of things’. Or choose not too. Even if it is not unique, perhaps our particularly pronounced capacity to vacillate between turning toward and turning away has a defining quality. If not us, then who?

### Off 2

#### Nathan and I offer our counter advocacy that we should end the use of drones.

#### Solves their aff better - the 1ac has made a case that technological thought pervades society, it is entrenched through our war practices. Yet their remedy to this is complete faith in the normative legal framework through the plan text. This fails to recognize our own technological driven tendencies and re-internalizes the dichotomies they critique.

#### Language like 'President of the united states' always already implies a legalistic framework - this dooms their solvency.

Schlag ‘90 (Pierre, professor of law at the University of Colorado, Stanford Law Review, lexis, AM)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

#### They bear whiteness to violence, but they assume that technological thought is only found in the executive - we must own up to our own tendencies for violence.

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 10-11)

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### Turns us into bodies to be mobilized for destruction.

Salter 85. M.G. Salter, lecturer in criminal law at the University of Birmingham, “The Rule of Power in the Language of Law,” The Liverpool Law Review Vol.VII(1) [1985] pg. 45

Through this linguistic patterning of administered time, the student is kept under the continual assessment of normalising judgments that examine, compare and contrast in order to accumulate a knowledge. Even the measurers are themselves externally measured, graded and assessed. Between staff, considerations of tactics determine aspects of discourse. Rarely is complete openness and honesty strategic.¶ Power also operates through legal discourse to assemble specific relations between people through individualising and collectivising them into pre-given categories. We can see this within the landlord tenant relationship. Even in their legal battles and formal agreements the relations between landlords and tenants are pre-determined through such notions as property, ownership and possessory rights. These shape the formation of intentions and the consequences of action. Legal battles for "student rights", "tenants rights" or those for blacks, consumers and women, take place upon a language already worked by power and for which the determination of what "tenancy'~ "rights" etc.~ means has already happened.¶ It is therefore inadequate to see these effects of power as mere rituals without penetrating deeper into the rules of operation that make possible and govern such elements of discourse. These rules set up an order of succession between different speakers' contributions, they determine who has the right to follow whom~ to interrupt, overrule~ qualify remarks~ re-interpret in "the light of broader policy considerations" and which positions may be taken upon what has been said by previous speakers and the status of statements made. Power also determines the effect of these modifications upon the subsequent authority of the overruled speaker.¶ Not only is the "who" prescribed in advance, but the "how" of these overrulings, qualifications, re-interpretations etc. If a statement by the Attorney-General over the use of the Emergency Powers legislation during violent strikes and unlawful picketing is subsequently to be qualified, this cannot be done in just any fashion. Power thus enforces what it has already established as the "proper" manner of any qualification. This has already pre-defined what specific element can~ in that particular qualifying discourse~ be related to what other~ if it is to count as a successful use of a particular ritualised tactic. Breach of these rules established under certain laws of co,possibility leads not to a successful "qualification" of the Attorney-General's earlier statement~ but to something else -perhaps an unintended public humiliation of a senior member of government. ¶ In our academic discourse the power of the legal professions to impose a particular form and content for "their" qualification has already structured the occasion of any possible discourse. Both inside and outside academia power has already declared which qualified person, occupying which certified occupation for how many years can give an authoritative rendition of any particular law. (8) Also it pre-determines from what place this must be offered and according to which rituals of circumstance - accompanying gestures, style and body positions - to maintain the authority of the speaker. (9)¶ A law of compossibility has then laid down rules whose historical interplay determine why the appearance and disappearance of a particular discourse could not have occurred otherwise. The effects of their operation is to assemble and hold together not only a particular legal theme, but also a group of subjects whose status empowers them to speak and command an audience upon this theme. For example, the legality of bail conditions imposed upon pickets is not a theme for anyone at any time or place. Whether student, lecturer, defence lawyer, trade union leader or picket, mastery of these rules by the subject they create within the field they open up is a pre-condition for successful practical action within it. This is certainly true when the sites are the adversarial, and therefore highly tactical, atmospheres of court rooms, television debates or picket lines.¶ Such mastery and command does not make a person master of the rules themselves. It is still power that is heard when language speaks; they are no-onets personal possession or plaything. They are outcomes of chosen practices they themselves have made possible. It does not then appear to be a question of a "ruling class" which owns and therefore has certain power at its free disposal consciously to secure its rule over a dominated class. If anything the relationship is that power rules through establishing the meaning of particular social relationships. One has power like one has a cold, i.e. we are had by it and must make the best of it, develop resistance, fight the symptoms that aggravate us, discover, understand and use its effects to our advantage. No-one is exempt. The unfinished rituals power establishes generate our legal and ethical codes as well as the social relationships of their field of application. These relationships themselves create potentially violent tensions whose threat and reality support the widely felt need for such codes and law.¶ Power operates as much through the understanding as the speaking of legal discourse. Thus even the individual's understanding of law is made to "run on time" according to preset and administered rhythms. The intelligibility of laws governing, say, official secrets and labour relations, are constantly established through what is written and said in and about them. This constituted intelligibility is not in itself dependent upon administrative and labour practices. Instead, the dependency of its theme is articulated through language which makes constant but selective use of these relations. It does so in order to lay down a way in which these relations can be authoritatively addressed through it. As a lawyer I should be able to understand these laws better than those to whom they directly apply. Of course, it is a different matter to consider what this established intelligibility then means for administrators and trade unionists.¶ Power therefore delimits and holds together a select audience for particular legal discourses. The authoritative legal version which I may attempt to render is cornered by a particular profession and expressed upon non-legal and external practices such as journalism~ trade unionism, policing, law courts and prisons. From such constituted/constituting sources legal discourse has inscribed upon it~ and inserted within it~ an implicit philosophy of life, system of ethics and criteria for "sound judgement". These are not essentially or exclusively legal in character, but are bound up with the evolution of modernist societies and their struggles with unaccountable feudal and royal power. For example, the struggle for the rule of law has always been a power-struggle between competing potential law makers, for access to and control over law making machinery and then for the gaining of universal social recognition of the laws that have been made. There can also be a struggle within academia between and among students and lecturers over the weight given to purely academic matters, research, professional training etc., that occur against external government financial and relevancy criteria.

#### Change must begin with the self - their political strategy of critique on the other 'out there' will fail, we must begin our critique with our selves in here.

Chandler 13 – prof of IR @ Westminster¶ (The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534)

The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubristic liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, the object to be changed or transformed is the human – the human mindset. By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.

### Case

#### They link to their own coviello evicendece because they also engage in creating extinction scenarios

#### Aff devolves into nihilism – turns their VTL claims

Fain 11—Lecturer in the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Lucas, March 2011, *The Review of Metaphysics*, “Heidegger's Cartesian nihilism,” Academic OneFile, RBatra)

That Heidegger transforms happiness, classically understood as the completion of human nature, into the anxiety of being-towards-death may be deduced from the fact that it is death which signifies Dasein's "authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole," (45) with the consequence that ethical virtue is replaced by Dasein's pure resolve in the face of nothing. That Heidegger's conception of care may likewise be construed as an impoverished version of the Platonic doctrine of eros is plainly evident by its purely formal structure, which renders it devoid of any capacity to rank-order objects of desire. (46) By way of contrast, Platonic eros moves hierarchically between the human and the divine (that is to say, between the base and the noble), whereas Heideggerian care moves horizontally, we should even say "horizonally," in the sense that "the ontological meaning of care is temporality," and "the existential-temporal condition of the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity [of future, past, and, present], has something like a horizon." (47) That horizon is circumscribed by Dasein's thrownness into the future, and Dasein's ownmost future is, of course, its death. Hence we read, "The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future," and "The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-being." (48) It is therefore through Dasein's resolute anticipation of its death that the meaning of being reveals itself as the "temporalizing of temporality." (49) But temporality reduced to itself is stripped of all love, beauty, and value. It means simply the opening up of one's future possibilities, which is to say that the authentic meaning of being is without value, and being without value is meaningless, which is finally to say that **the meaning of being terminates in nihilism**.(50) Heideggerian fundamental ontology does not therefore escape from Nietzschean chaos. Rather, it returns us to it, only without the noble illusion that life requires us to make it lovable. (51) And this remains the case no matter whether we prefer the early language of "resoluteness" or Heidegger's later "turn" into Gelassenheit or "releasement." For insofar as Heidegger's turn (Kehre) is meant to free the meaning of being from its attachment to any notion of active or passive willing, for example, of the kind indicated by the language of resolution, it releases us ever deeper into the nullity within which the world comes to presence. (52)¶ So much for the meaning of being. Despite his revolutionary proclamations, Heidegger holds us in a double bind. On the one hand, the history of metaphysics (and its completion in the era of modern technology) (53) grips us in a nihilistic forgetting of the question of being. On the other hand, fundamental ontology empties the meaning of being of value, and this too is nihilism. (54) What matters in the last analysis, however, is not whether Heidegger is a nihilist, but whether his teaching is the true teaching. And if, as Leo Strauss once said, our capacity to evaluate Heidegger's teaching comes down to a question of competence, our measure of competence depends on our capacity for valuation, or more accurately, for prudential judgment or a capacity to discern what makes it right. (55) Yet, on the basis of Heidegger's existential analysis, there can be no such ground of legitimation apart from the pure instance of resolution (Entschluss). And this is because fundamental ontology cannot tell us on the basis of its questioning into being why such questioning should be desirable, or why we should want to invoke a spiritual revolution that founds itself on the abstract question of being. Instead, there must be some more primordial notion of the good that first directs us to the question of being--as Nietzsche would say, to the question of being as a value. In saying this, however, I do hot wish to suggest that there must be some objective or quasi-objective standard of the good that is somehow "out there" waiting to be discovered, as if it were a vein of gold embedded in the rock. Yet it is plainly evident that a more primordial access to the good must underlie any capacity for rank-ordering values or existential possibilities, and it is precisely this feature of human experience that fundamental ontology abandons or occludes by abstracting the question of being from the so-called ontic or inauthentic dimension of ordinary experience.¶ Stated simply, there is no reason why the question of being should be foundational for the future of philosophy. Yet it must be said that Heidegger never relinquished his revolutionary aspirations for bringing metaphysics to its end. For as clearly as the text of 1927 stated the need to put the future of philosophy on "new foundations" (neue Fundamente), (56) Heidegger persisted up to and through 1959 in the hope that the turn to the question of being would promise a "new ground and foundation" (neuen Grand und Boden) upon which it might be possible to confront the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. (57) Of course, it may be entirely true that our releasement into the mystery of being grants us "the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way." (58) The question is why this should be at all desirable, especially if the thinking of being expires in nihilism. And it is here that we find Heidegger without argument. As we read in a relevant passage from the "Letter on Humanism" of 1949:¶ Whether the realm of the truth of being is a blind alley or whether¶ it is the free space in which freedom conserves its essence is¶ something each one may judge after he himself has tried to go the¶ designated way, or even better, after he has gone a better way,¶ that is, a way befitting the question. (59)¶ I note in passing that we shall also have to judge whether the essence of freedom is itself a blind alley. But this just affirms my larger point. Heidegger returns us to the question of competence. But since fundamental ontology cannot stand the question of competence, we are left simply with a decision that leaves the future of philosophy hanging on the angst-ridden resolve that affirms itself in the face of death. (60) And this is Cartesianism all over again, in the sense that Heidegger's subordination of ethics to ontology--the decisive severing of the human relation to the good from the foundations of philosophy--amounts to the most radical late modern expression of the Cartesian legacy. Rather than saving us from our fall into modern decadence, Heidegger's thought results finally in a deepening of the modern crisis.

#### Can’t solve – tech too engrained

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\*\* Gestell (or sometimes Ge-stell) is a German word used by twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger to describe what lies behind or beneath modern technology.[1]

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, **‘‘**nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

#### Their ontology is totalizing – causes totalitarianism

Gauthier 04 (David, Phd Candidate in Poly Sci @ Lousiana State, "MARTIN HEIDEGGER, EMMANUEL LEVINAS, AND THE POLITICS OF DWELLING," http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-11052004-163310/unrestricted/Gauthier\_dis.pdf)

As this chapter has noted, Levinas’s emphasis on “the reality of persecuted people in the daily history of the world” informs his critique of Heidegger. Levinas’s critique of Heideggerian ontology identifies how the ontological, anti-humanistic, and pagan cast of the latter’s thought is inherently totalizing. This can be viewed as the first of Levinas’s two principal objections to fundamental ontology. The second major objection, which I have ignored until now, relates to its political consequences. In sum, fundamental ontology necessarily leads to tyranny: “Even though it opposes the technological passion issued forth from the forgetting of Being hidden by the existent, Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relationship with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny.” 62 Viewed from the perspective of Levinas’ critique of the Occidental ontological tradition, such a conclusion is to be expected. For Levinas, Heideggerian Being represents merely the latest arche utilized by Western ontologists to eliminate the alterity of the Other and promote the freedom of the self. As the political manifestation of the totalization of the Other that ontology perpetrates in the realm of thought, tyranny represents the diluted essence of ontological politics. Much as ontological thought facilitates the domination of the other person by the autonomous ego, so too does it enable the state to totalize its “Other”– its subjects – in a comparatively comprehensive manner: “For the philosophical tradition the conflicts between the same and the other are resolved by theory whereby the other is reduced to the same – or, concretely, by the community of the state where by anonymous power, though it be intelligible, the I rediscovers war in the tyrannic oppression it undergoes from the totality.” 63 In this light, the tyrannical rule of the modern state extends into the political realm the violent, thematizing tendencies that characterize ontology generally. Nor is this conclusion shocking in light of the anti-humanistic cast of Heidegger’s thought. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anti-humanistic thinkers often posited grandiose schemes designed to put an end to the alienation supposedly engendered by subjective humanism. Much like earlier theoretical anti-humanists such as Marx and Nietzsche, Heidegger accuses past humanisms of contributing to modern estrangement by overlooking a pivotal aspect of the human condition. 64 A key difference between Heidegger and his anti-humanistic forebears lies in the fact that, for him, it is metaphysical inquiry into the Being of beings that engenders modern alienation rather than philosophical idealism or slave-morality. Nonetheless, the comparison remains instructive: like Marx, Heidegger anticipates a future historical epoch in which man will finally recover his original ontological unity free from the obfuscating effect of past philosophical distortions. And like Marx and Nietzsche, Heidegger provides an ample supply of metaphysical pathos that unwittingly complements the violent political objectives of totalitarian political movements. In this sense, Heidegger’s rectorship merely repeats the Marxist tragedy as farce.

#### Abandoning empiricsm causes them to foreget being

Latour 2 – Professor, Paris Institute of Political Studies (Bruno, Environmentalism, ed Direk, p 303)

Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believe in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987. p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest -- then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter-revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

#### Voting aff links to their argument – it’s an instance of calc thought

Buckley 89(last referenced date) **–** McGill University(R. Phillip, “Rationality and Responsibility in Heidegger’s and Husserl’s View of Technology,” http://ulla.mcgill.ca/arts150/arts150r3.htm) Jacome

At the root of Heidegger's understanding of technology is the fundamental distinction between "calculative" thought (rechnendes Denken)and "contemplative" thought (besinnliches Denken).1 The word "calculative" is connected to a type of thinking which finds its most powerful expression in modern science and which is motivated by measurement, by the search for results. "Calculative" also connotes how this thinking aims to manipulate and control. Just as a "calculating person" is someone who seeks to gain advantage, so too the thinking of science aims not just to observe a situation, but to make predictions, to plan for the future, to quantify in the sense of "taking stock" and thereby to keep everything in order. This thinking betrays for Heidegger a fundamental need for certainty and security: it wants to know exactly where "things"are and precisely what "they" might be doing.2 "Contemplative" thought, to the contrary, seeks neither to measure nor to control things, but to uncover their meaning (Sinn), above all, to question the meaning of things. It is a thinking which is fundamental and it is linked to Heidegger's vision of authentic philosophy. Though Heidegger is far from consistent with his terminology, contemplative thinking as authentic philosophy is often just called "thought" in his later works, and the word "philosophy" itself is frequently reserved for the philosophical tradition. Thus "thought" is at times severely contrasted with "philosophy" - that is, with the philosophy of the tradition. The link between the philosophy of the tradition and the calculative thought of modern science is made through the introduction of yet another type of thinking: "representational thinking" (vorstellendesDenken). This thinking takes the world as something that can be "placed before" (vor-gestellt) the subject, just as one places a picture before oneself and hence representational thought treats the world or reality itself as if it were a picture (Bild). For Heidegger, the appearance of the"subject" and the world becoming a "picture" are two "interwoven events" which mark the beginning of the modern age dominated by science, the age of the "world-picture."3 The calculative thinking which characterizes modern science is itself only possible on the basis of having a subject that can calculate and a "world" which is "placed before" it, a world that is easily manipulated, controlled and contained. For Heidegger, there would be no science without philosophy and its representational thinking.4 What does this "opposition" between calculative and contemplative thinking amount to? First, it is crucial to note that the thinking which Heidegger describes as taking place in science is not a "lesser" form that could be "upgraded" to a contemplative form of thought. The calculative thought of science is constitutionally incapable of being contemplative thought, and hence Heidegger's oft-quoted assentation that "science does not think."5 Certainly scientists can reflect on their own field, on its methods, procedures and so forth. But this sort of self-interrogation aimed at improvement is part of calculative thinking in the first place. Calculative thought turned in on itself remains calculative thought. This implies a "distance" between the calculative and contemplative forms of thought, or an unbridgeable "gap" (Kl~lft).6 The difference between these two types of thinking is one of kind and not degree. This "gap" does not mean that calculative thought is somehow "bad,"or that contemplative thinking is "better." To judge contemplative thought as superior to calculative thought is to think calculatively, and hence cannot be the task of authentic philosophy. Neither is Heidegger claiming that the nature of modern science as calculative is to be viewed as negative. It is the good "fortune" of science that it cannot "think" in the contemplative, deliberative or recollective sense.7 The problem, it seems, occurs when calculative thought pushes aside other forms of thinking. Heidegger wants to undermine the exclusivity of calculative thinking without denigrating it. He desires to open a space for other forms of thinking. A first step away from the domination of calculative thinking consists in uncovering the presuppositions which underlie it, in seeing that calculation is not the only possibility of human "thought." It may well be that the realm of contemplative thought can only be approached by means of this method which ultimately might be characterized as avia negative. Nonetheless, the description of calculative thought and its representational character does tell us something about the nature of contemplative thought. Contemplative thought is extremely difficult to attain because, by its very nature, it cannot be "attained." To want to have a contemplative style of thought is to remain in the clutch of the basically possessive calculative style of thinking.8 Contemplative thought is hence marked by a fundamental "passivity,"9 it consists of a certain "letting-go" of all "attitudes," of any "picturing" of the world. Put in terms which are even more expressive of passivity, contemplative thought is a "releasement" from the dominating style of calculative thought. Both "letting-go" and "releasement" are plausible translations of Heidegger's basic characterization of contemplative thought as Gelassenheit.

### 2nc

Being will never reveal itself to you, and the assumption that you think it will is the link itself and also proves you are the exact same as the revolting Science you criticize.

Morton 13 - (Timothy, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.13106496.0001.001, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality Timothy Morton Series: New Metaphysics OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS An imprint of MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, ©2013)

So perhaps we need to get a little tough with our poor block. If somehow I were able to assess every particle of the block, every hole in the block; if I were able to evaporate it and then bring it back to its original state, or drench it with water, shoot it into the Sun, boil it in marmalade—if I were able to do everything imaginable to it, wouldn’t I know it for what it was? Imagine a wondrous machine, created by an insane genius, a machine that allows me to see every possible aspect of the cinder block, not simply as illustrations or diagrams, but as actual configurations of the block itself. I use the machine. The machine does everything to the block. As I sit there, grinning happily while the machine does its thing, a thought starts to nag at me. In using the machine, I have automatically excluded the one single accidental encounter that the janitor has with it when, cleaning away the cigarette butts and plastic cups after the party to celebrate the machine’s successful functioning, he carelessly stubs his left big toe against one corner of the cinder block and shuffles away, not paying much heed to the ontological cataclysm that has just occurred. Having every single possible encounter with the cinder block rules out only having had one encounter with it. “All” experiences of the block are reduced to “not-all.” [26] Why? Because neither the machine’s billions of encounters, nor the janitor’s unique toe-stubbing incident, are the block! The reason: because there is a real block. There is no view from nowhere from which I can see the entire block, no sub specie aeternitatis. [27] In this sense, even God (should she exist) has a partial view of the cinder block. I once had a friend who said he wanted to do everything. I seem to remember “killing a man” was somewhat high on his rather late adolescent list. Even if you could do everything, I replied, wouldn’t that rule out only doing some things? If you could do everything, you would never have the experience of not having done something. Should she exist, an omniscient omnipresent God would envy the most meager and partial knowledge of a few routes around a dull suburban neighborhood. [28] The three approaches I outlined have some significant family resemblances. The main one is the attempt to iron out inconsistencies in our picture of objects. Throughout this book I shall argue that all attempts to iron out inconsistencies are destined to fail in some way or other. I shall offer an explanation for this—objects themselves just are inconsistent. For now, let’s continue to do some ironing and see what happens. Maybe I took the wrong approach. Maybe I was too brutal. Perhaps I have been a Baconian sadist, destroying Nature in order to know it. Maybe if I just sit here and wait patiently, I will see the real block. I wait. I become impatient. I develop all kinds of contemplative practices to stay there looking at the block. I become enlightened. The block still refuses to spill the beans. I train a disciple to take over from me when I die. She sees nothing of the real block, which now has a large crack across the top, inside of which you can see right through it. She starts a religious order that carefully transmits my instructions about how to monitor the block. For tens of thousands of years, cultures, peoples, robots study the block, which is now looking pretty gnarly. A hundred thousand years later, a fully enlightened robot sits monitoring the faint traces of dust hanging in the air where the block used to sit. Still no dice. Even Buddha doesn’t know the block in the sense of “know” as “grasp as a definite concept whose reality can be checked against a definite, given thing.” When it comes to knowing about cinder blocks, Buddha is just as badly off as God. Let’s give up. Imagine the cinder block all on its ownsome. A scandalous thought perhaps, maybe even impossible to think. The block is not just a blank lump waiting to be filled in by some “higher” object (overmining). The block is not a blob of something bigger or an assemblage of tinier things (undermining). The block is not made real by some medium (the “middle object”). The block is itself. It is specific. It is unique. We might as well think it as a specific, unique real thing. The block already has qualities, such as front, back, and so on. Yet these qualities are only ever aesthetic appearances, no matter whether there is any other “observer” around to see. Yet these appearances are real aspects of the block: it isn’t a pyramid, and it doesn’t have a swan’s neck. The object itself is riven from the inside between its essence and its appearance. This can’t simply mean that the cinder block is a lump of substance that has a certain shape and color and that those are its accidents. We have already ruled that out. It must mean that in itself the block (essence) is also a non-block (appearance). The conclusion seems magical, but it’s a very ordinary kind of magic. It requires no special features, no supervenient soul or mind or animating force of any kind. It requires that our cinder block have no hidden material squirreled away inside it, no extra folds or hidden pockets of any kind. It only requires that the block exist. There is a block, whose essence is withdrawn. Withdrawn doesn’t mean hard to find or even impossible to find yet still capable of being visualized or mapped or plotted. Withdrawn doesn’t mean spatially, or materially or temporally hidden yet capable of being found, if only in theory. Withdrawn means beyond any kind of access, any kind of perception or map or plot or test or extrapolation. You could explode a thousand nuclear bombs and you would not reveal the secret essence of the cinder block. You could plot the position and momentum of every single particle in the block (assuming you could get around Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle) and you wouldn’t discover the withdrawn essence of the block. Ten of the world’s greatest playwrights and film directors (let’s say Sophocles, Shakespeare, Garcia Lorca, Samuel Beckett, Akira Kurosawa and David Lynch just for starters) could write horrifying, profound tragedies and comedies and action movies about the block and still no one would be closer to knowing the essence of the block. The block itself could evolve a godlike intelligence in which it had omniscient knowledge of itself. The slightest rat dropping, falling from a rafter above the block in the warehouse where I keep it to remind me of the obdurate persistence of things, comprehends the block in an absurdly limited way that rules out the possibility that the omniscient block knows everything about itself. This blasted cinder block is beginning to get on my nerves so perhaps we had better change the subject. But before we leave it there in the warehouse, let’s just reflect on what an elementary yet wonderful discovery we’ve just made. We live in an infinite non-totalizable reality of unique objects, a reality that is infinitely rich and playful, enchanting, anarchic despite local pockets of hierarchy, infuriating, rippling with illusion and strangeness. In this reality, objects are perfectly straightforward, with no transcendental or hidden aspects. Yet precisely because of this very fact, objects are completely weird: they hide out in the open, under the spotlight. Their very appearance is a kind of miracle. We could go so far as to suggest the possibility of what Bryant calls a dark object, an object that has no relations with any other entity whatsoever. These objects are strictly unthinkable, because if we try, we have already forged some kind of relationship with them. Our theory must allow for the existence of unthinkable objects. But even to talk about this is to involve oneself in a play of contradiction. It’s like looking at a red theater curtain, swaying gently, illuminated by spotlights. Is there anything behind it? Since there is no top object from whose VIP lounge we could survey everything perfectly and properly, no object is properly what it is—not even for itself. [29] The OOO universe is a universe of impropriety, of the improper. Yet we know this because in another sense objects only are what they are, nothing more or less, since there is no bottom object to which we could reduce them. Objects are sternly irreducible, yet marvelously improper at one and the same time. Since no object is exempt from the uncanniness we have just discovered in the cinder block, no object is the Philosopher’s Stone that will transmute everything into perfect, obvious, well ordered straightforwardness.

Our critique is not about technology but about instead the denial of mystery - suppose the aff wins all of their solvency claims, you should still refuse the question of Being.

Baudrillard, ’10 (Jean, Carnival and Cannibal; Ventriloquous Evil, p. 70-73) [m leap]

IN THE PROMETHEAN PERSPECTIVE of unlimited growth, there is not merely the desire to make everything function, to liberate everything, but also the desire to make everything signify. Everything is to be brought under the aegis of meaning (and reality). In some cases we know that knowledge will forever escape us. But in the immense majority of cases we do not even know what has disappeared and has always already eluded us. Now, science makes a systematic effort to eradicate this secret area, this 'constellation of the mystery"' and to eliminate this demarcation line between the violable and the inviolable. All that is concealed must be revealed; everything must be reducible to analysis. Hence the whole effort (particularly since the death of God, who restrained this attempt to break open the natural world) leads to an extension of the field of meaning (of knowledge, analysis, objectivity and reality). Now, everything inclines us to think that this accumulation, this over-production, this proliferation of meaning constitutes (a little like the accumulation of greenhouse gases) a virtual threat for the species (and for the planet), since it is gradually destroying, through experimentation, that domain of the inviolable that serves us, as it were, as an ozone layer and protects us from the worst—from the lethal irradiation and obliteration of our symbolic space. Shouldn't we then, work precisely in the opposite direction, to extend the domain of the inviolable? To restrain the production of meaning the way they are trying to restrain the production of greenhouse gases, to reinforce that constellation of the mystery and that intangible barrier that serves as a screen against the welter of information, interaction and universal exchange. This countervailing work exists—it is the work of thought. Not the analytic work of an understanding of causes, of the dissection of an object-world, not the work of a critical, en-lightened thought, but another form of understanding or intelligence, which is the intelligence of the mystery.

### 1nr

#### The affirmative results in USfg action

1. Resolved means to make a firm decision about

**American Heritage Dictionary**, 19**92**

Resolved: To make a firm decision about

2. Colons are introductorily phrases which means that the federal government is the subject of the resolution not the debaters.

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2k http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

3. The United States means the government in Washington

**West’s Legal Dictionary**, 19**85** p. 744

United States: Usually means the federal government centered in Washington D.C.

Rhetoric is not inherently political- it does not engage with power, but it does re-enact the liberal humanist subject in a way that is guaranteed to be disabling and disempowering to the achievement of substantive freedom

Schlag 91

[Professor of Law @ U of Colorado Pierre Stanford Law Review p. lexis]

The Sartrean metaphysic constantly calls for individual subjects to recognize their responsibilities and to choose. The message is this: Avoid bad faith -- choose! But, in a Foucaultian sense, this construction of the subject entails a prevailing unfreedom. Each and every social, legal, and political event is immediately represented as an event calling for a value-based choice. You are free to choose between this and that. But, of course, you are not free. You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact the motions of the prescripted, already organized configuration of the individual being as chooser. You have to, you already are constructed and channeled as a choosing being. n275 Not only is this social construction of the self extraordinarily oppressive -- but it often turns out to be absurd as well. Much of its absurdity can be seen in the normative visions that routinely issue from the legal academy urging us to adopt this utopian program or that one -- as if somehow our choices (I like decentralized socialism, you like conservative pastoral politics, she likes liberal cultural pluralism) had any direct, self-identical effect on the [\*1701] construction of our social or political scene. The critical insistence on making political value choices is utterly captive to a conventional and nostalgic description of the political field -- a description and definition of the field that is guaranteed to yield political disablement and disempowerment. n276 To tell people that they are already empowered to make political value choices is, in effect, to bolster the dominant culture's representation that we are free-choosing beings and to strengthen the forces that lead to our own repeated, compelled affirmation of (meaningless) choices**.** n277 By presupposing the authenticity of the Sartrean subject, critical legal thought has greatly underestimated the extent to which this "free" subject, in its very "freedom to choose," is already constructed to compulsively act out choosing behavior -- regardless of whether the social, political, or rhetorical scene warrants or even enables a choice to be made at all. In legal thought, the sterility of this approach is manifest in articles that exhort us to engage in choosing behavior while refraining from telling us what to choose**.** For instance, a while back John Stick argued that cls-ers and liberals ought to drop epistemic warfare and start arguing about what really counts: politics (conceived, of course, as political value choice). n278 But nothing happened and, of course, that's not surprising. All dressed up and nowhere to go. What are legal thinkers supposed to say? Three cheers for democratic socialism? I (really) like Ike? The Rawlsian difference principle really does require the Rule in Shelley's Case? There is a big and very widespread category mistake at work here: the presupposition that arguing about political values is somehow synonymous with engaging in politics. n279 Talking and arguing about political values is not necessarily (or even usually) political, anymore than talking about football is political. n280 To engage in politics is to engage with [\*1702] power. Arguing about political values may or may not engage with power. It depends. But there is no reason to presuppose that academic political value talk has any desired political effect whatsoever. Whether such talk has any desired political effect depends on how the aesthetics of power have enabled and constituted this political value talk and on the context within which this political value talk is issued and heard (assuming it is heard at all).