### Off

#### The affirmative plays into the linguistic style of modernity - celebrating their singularity but couching it in terms of a much larger and universal singularity. This not "THEIR" being, it is merely linguistic being.

Agamben 93 - Political Theorist (Giorgio, 1993, The Coming Community, p. 16-18)

THE ANTINOMY of the individual and the universal has its origin in language. The word "tree" designates all trees indifferently, insofar as it posits the proper universal significance in place of singular ineffable trees (terminus supponit significatum pro re). In other words, it transforms singularities into members of a class, whose meaning is defined by a common property (the condition of belonging E). The fortune of set theory in modern logic is born of the fact that the definition of the set is simply the definition of linguistic meaning. The comprehension of singular distinct objects m in a whole M is nothing but the name. Hence the inextricable paradoxes of classes, which no "beastly theory of types" can pretend to solve. The paradoxes, in effect, define the place of linguistic being. Linguistic being is a class that both belongs and does not belong to itself, and the class of all classes that do not belong to themselves is language. Linguistic being (being-called) is a set (the tree) that is at the same time a singularity (the tree, a tree, this tree); and the mediation of meaning, expressed by the symbol £, cannot ip. any way fill the gap in which only the article succeeds in moving about freely. One concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal and the particular has long been familiar to us: the example. In any context where it exerts its force, the exampte is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for example: para-deig;ma, that which is shown alongside (like the German Bei-spiel, that which plays alongside). Hence the proper place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space in which its undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds. This life is purely linguistic life. Only life in the word is undefinable and unforgettable. Exemplary being is purely linguistic being. Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, except by being-called. Not being-red, but being-called-red; not being-Jakob, but being-called-Jakob defines the example. Hence its ambiguity, just when one has decided to take it really seriously. Being-called-the property that establishes all possible belongings (being-called-Italian, -dog, -Communist)-is also what can bring them all back radically into question. It is the Most Common that cut:; off any real community. Hence the impotent omnivalence of whatever being. It is neither apathy nor promiscuity nor resignation. These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity. They are expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself, the sign e. Tricksters or fakes, assistants or 'toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community.

#### An identity tossed away, excluded from contemporary discourse - told it is worthless - the affirmative's response is that of petty bourgeoisie, to scream one more time that they are special, that they matter - they search endlessly for the product they have seen on advertisements but will never find - the impact is extinction and the impossibility of solving impending global problems.

Agamben 93 - Political Theorist (Giorgio, 1993, The Coming Community, p. 70- 72)

IF WE had once again to conceive of the fortunes of humanity in terms of class, then today we would have to say that there are no longer social classes, but just a single planetary petty bourgeoisie, in which all the old social classes are dissolved: The petty bourgeoisie has inherited the world and is the form in which humanity has survived nihilism. But this is also exactly what fascism and Nazism understood, and to have clearly seen the irrevocable decline of the old social subjects constitutes their insuperable cachet of modernity. (From a strictly political point of view fascism and Nazism have not been overcome, and we still live under their sign.) They represented, however, a national petty bourgeoisie still attached to a false popular identity in which dreams of bourgeois grandeur were an active force. The planetary petty bourgeoisie has instead freed itself from these dreams and has taken over the aptitude of the proletariat to refuse any recognizable social identity. The petty bourgeois nullify all that exists with the same gesture in which they seem obstinately to adhere to it: They know only the improper' and the inauthentic and even refuse the idea of a discourse that could be proper to them. That which constituted the truth and falsity of the peoples and generations that have followed one another on the earth-differences of language, of dialect, of ways of life, of character, of custom, and even the physical particularities of each person-has lost any meaning for them and any capacity for expression and communication. In the petty bourgeoisie, the diversities that have marked the tragicomedy of universal history are brought together and exposed in a phantasmagorical vacuousness. But the absurdity of individual existence, inherited from the subbase of nihilism, has become in the meantime so senseless that it has lost all pathos and been transformed, brought out into the open, into an everyday exhibition: Nothing resembles the life of this new humanity more than advertising footage from which every trace of the advertised product has been wiped out. The contradiction of the petty bourgeois, however, is that they still search in the footage for the product they were cheated of, obstinately trying, against all odds, to make their own an identity that has become in reality absolutely improper and insignificant to them. Shame and arrogance, conformity and marginality remain thus the poles of all their emotional registers. The fact is that the senselessness of their existence runs up against a final absurdity, against which all advertising runs aground: death itself. In death the petty bourgeois confront the ultimate expropriation, the ultimate frustration of individuality: life in all its nakedness, the pure incommunicable, where their shame can finally rest in peace. Thus they use death to cover the secret that they must resign themselves to acknowledging: that even life in its nakedness is, in truth, improper and purely exterior to them, that for them there is no shelter on earth. This means that the planetary petty bourgeoisie is probably the form in which humanity is moving toward its own destruction. But this also means that the petty bourgeoisie represents an opportunity unheard of in the history of humanity that it must at all costs not let slip away. Because if instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity-if humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without the incommunicable. Selecting in the new planetary humanity those characterist: cs that allow for its survival, removing the thin diaphragm that separates bad mediatized advertising from the perfect exteriority that communicates only itself-this is the political task of our generation.

#### Instead of their identiy pho-politics you should endorse our concept of whatever singularity - who you are as a person is impossible to reduce to any single strand or thought and to do so would be completely reductionist. Identity is not a limit, it is a threshold.

Agamben 93 - Political Theorist (Giorgio, 1993, The Coming Community, p. 72-75)

WHATEVER IS the figure of pure singularity. Whatever singularity has no identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities. Through this relation, as Kant said, singularity borders all possibility and thus receives its omnimoda determinatio not from its participation in a determinate concept or some actual property (being red, Italian, Communist), but only by means of this bordering. It belongs to a whole, but without this belonging's being able to be represented by a real condition: Belonging, being-such, is here only the relation to an empty and indeterminate totality. In Kantian terms this means that what is in question in this bordering is not a limit (Schranke) that knows no exteriority, but a threshold (Grenze), that is, a point of contact with an external space that must remain empty. Whatever adds to singularity only an emptiness, only a threshold: Whatever is a singularity plus an empty space, a singularity that is finite and, nonetheless, indeterminable according to a concept. But a singularity plus an empty space can only be a pure exteriority, a pure exposure. Whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside. What is thought in the architranscendental quodlibet is, therefore, what is most difficult to think: the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure exteriority. It is important here that the notion of the "outside" is expressed in many European languages by a word that means "at the door" (fores in Latin is the door of the house, thyrathen in Greek literally means "at the threshold"). The outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access-in a word, it is its face, its eidos. The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside. This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the empty hands of humanity.

#### We understand how the notion of whatever being may seem impossible at a glance, but isn't everything: that we will ever solve for global warming, poverty, hunger, exclusion? Fidelity to the idea of equality is a war and this round is a battlefield - signing your ballot negative means that this battle has already been won.

Badiou 10 - Professor at European Graduate School (Alain Badiou, “The Idea of Communism,” pages 245-260)

So we can now return to our subject, the communist Idea. If, for an individual, an Idea is the subjective operation whereby a specific real truth is imaginarily projected into the symbolic movement of a History, we can say that an Idea presents the truth as if it were a fact. In other words, the Idea presents certain facts as symbols of the real of truth. This was how the Idea of communism allowed revolutionary politics and its parties to be inscribed in the representation of a meaning of History the inevitable outcome of which was communism. Or how it became possible to speak of a 'homeland of socialism', which amounted to symbolizing the creation of a possibility - which is fragile by definition - through the magnitude of a power. The Idea, which is an operative mediation between the real and the symbolic, always presents the individual with something that is located between the event and the fact. That is why the endless debates about the real status of the communist Idea are irresolvable. Is it a question of a regulative Idea, in Kant's sense of the term, having no real efficacy but able to set reasonable goals for our understanding? Or is it an agenda that must be carried out over time through a new post-revolutionary State's action on the world? Is it a utopia, if not a plainly dangerous, and even criminal, one? Or is it the name of Reason in History? This type of debate can never be concluded for the simple reason that the subjective operation of the Idea is not simple but complex. It involves real sequences of emancipatory politics as its essential real condition, but it also presupposes marshalling a whole range of historical facts suitable for symbolization. It does not claim (as this would amount to subjecting the truth procedure to the laws of the State) that the event and its organized political consequences are reducible to facts. But neither does it claim that the facts are unsuitable for any historical trans-scription (to make a Lacanian sort of play on words) of the distinctive characters of a truth. The Idea is a historical anchoring of everything elusive, slippery and evanescent in the becoming of a truth. But it can only be so if it admits as its O"tn real this aleatory, elusive, slippery, evanescent dimension. That is why it is incumbent upon the communist Idea to respond to the question 'Where do correct ideas come from?' the way Mao did: , 'correct ideas' (and by this I mean what constitutes the path of a truth in a situation) come from practice. 'Practice' should obviously be understood as the materialist name of the real. It would thus be appropriate to say that the Idea that symbolizes the becoming 'in truth' of correct (political) ideas in History, that is to say, the Idea of communism, therefore comes itself from the idea of practice (from the experience of the real) in the final analysis but can nevertheless not be reduced to it. This is because it is the protocol not of the existence but rather of the exposure of a truth in action. All of the foregoing explains, and to a certain extent justifies, why it was ultimately possible to go to the extreme of exposing the truths of emancipatory politics in the guise of their opposite, that is to say, in the guise of a State. Since it is a question of an (imaginary) ideological relationship between a truth procedure and historical facts, why hesitate to push this relationship to its limit? Why not say that it is a matter of a relationship between event and State? State and Revolution: that is the title of one of Lenin's most famous texts. And the State and the Event are indeed what are at stake in it. Nevertheless, Lenin, following Marx in this regard, is careful to say that the State in question after the Revolution will have to be the State of the withering away of the State, the State as organizer of the transition to the non-State. So let's say the following: The Idea of communism can project the real of a politics, subtracted as ever from the power of the State, into the figure of 'another State', provided that the subtraction lies within this subjectivating operation, in the sense that the 'other State' is also subtracted from the power of the State, hence from its own power, in so far as it is a State whose essence is to wither away. It is in this context that it is necessary to think and endorse the vital importance of proper names in all revolutionary politics. Their importance is indeed both spectacular and paradoxical. On the one hand, in effect, emancipatory politics is essentially the politics of the anonymous masses; it is the victory of those with no names,10 of those who are held in a state of colossal insignificance by the State. On the other hand, it is distinguished all along the way by proper names, which define it historically, which represent it, much more forcefully than is the case for other kinds of politics. Why is there this long series of proper names? Why this glorious Pantheon of revolutionary heroes? Why Spartacus, Thomas Muntzer, Robespierre, Toussaint Louverture, Blanqui, Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Mao, Che Guevara and so many others? The reason is that all these proper names symbolize historically - in the guise of an individual, of a pure singularity of body and thought the rare and precious network of ephemeral sequences of politics as truth. The elusive formalism of bodies-of-truth is legible here as empirical existence. In these proper names, the ordinary individual discovers glorious, distinctive individuals as the mediation for his or her own individuality, as the proof that he or she can force its finitude. The anonymous action of millions of militants, rebels, fighters, unrepresentable as such, is combined and counted as one in the simple, powerful symbol of the proper name. Thus, proper names are involved in the operation of the Idea, and the ones I just mentioned are elements of the Idea of communism at its various different stages. So let us not hesitate to say that Khrushchev's condemnation of 'the cult of personality', apropos Stalin, was misguided, and that, under the pretense of democracy, it heralded the decline of the Idea of communism that we witnessed in the ensuing decades. The political critique of Stalin and his terrorist vision of the State needed to be undertaken in a rigorous way, from the perspective of revolutionary politics itself, and Mao had begun to do as much in a number of his writings.11 Whereas Khrushchev, who was in fact defending the group that had led the Stalinist State, made no inroads whatsoever as regards this issue and, when it came to speaking of the Terror carried out under Stalin, merely offered an abstract critique of the role of proper names in political subjectivation. He himself thereby paved the way for the 'new philosophers' of reactionary humanism a decade later. Whence a very precious lesson: even though retroactive political actions may require that a given name be stripped of its symbolic function, this function as such cannot be eliminated for all that. For the Idea - and the communist Idea in particular, because it refers directly to the infinity of the people - needs the finitude of proper names. Let's recapitulate as simply as possible. A truth is the political real. History, even as a reservoir of proper names, is a symbolic place. The ideological operation of the Idea of communism is the imaginary projection of the political real into the symbolic fiction of History, including in its guise as a representation of the action of innumerable masses via the One of a proper name. The role of this Idea is to support the individual's incorporation into the discipline of a truth procedure, to authorize the individual, in his or her own eyes, to go beyond the Statist constraints of mere survival by becoming a part of the body-of-truth, or the subjectivizable body. We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous operation? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact - often a violent one that IS accompanied by different versions of the 'cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an exception but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain measure of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle - husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues - that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one person or another's entry into the body of- truth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found - to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what is impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real political meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw. But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism - must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion with four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice. The fiveperson meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure. The second reason is that every event is a surprise. If this were not the case, it would mean that it "could have been predictable as a fact, and so would be inscribed in the History of the State, which is a contradiction in terms. The problem can thus be formulated in the following way: how can we prepare ourselves for such surprises? And this time the problem really exists, even if we are already currently militants of a previous event's consequences, even if we are included in a body of- truth. Granted, we are proposing the deployment of new possibilities. However, the event to come will tum what is still impossible, even for us, into a possibility. In order to anticipate, at least ideologically, or intellectually, the creation of new possibilities, we must have an Idea. An Idea that of course involves the newness of the possibilities that the truth procedure of which we are the militants has brought to light, which are real-possibilities, but an Idea that also involves the formal possibility of other possibilities, ones as yet unsuspected by us. An Idea is always the assertion that a new truth is historically possible. And since the forcing of the impossible into the possible occurs via subtraction from the power of the State, an Idea can be said to assert that this subtractive process is infinite: it is always formally possible that the dividing line drawn by the State between the possible and the impossible may once again be shifted, however radical its previous shifts - including the one in which we as militants are currently taking part - may have been. That is why one of the contents of the communist Idea today as opposed to the theme of communism as a goal to be attained through the work of a new State - is that the withering away of the State, while undoubtedly a principle that must be apparent in any political action (which is expressed by the formula 'politics at a distance from the State' as an obligatory refusal of any direct inclusion in the State, of any request for funding from the State, of any participation in elections, etc.), is also an infinite task, since the creation of new political truths will always shift the dividing line between Statist, hence historical, facts and the eternal consequences of an event. With this in mind, I will now conclude by turning to the contemporary inflections of the Idea of communism.12 In keeping with the current reassessment of the Idea of communism, as I mentioned, the word's function can no longer be that of an adjective, as in 'Communist Party', or 'communist regimes'. The Party-form, like that of the Socialist State, is no longer suitable for providing real support for the Idea. This problem moreover first found negative expression in two crucial events of the '60s and '70s of the last century: the Cultural Revolution in China and the amorphous entity called 'May '68' in France. Later, new political forms, all of which are of the order of politics without a party, were - and are still being tried out.13 Overall, however, the modern, so-called 'democratic' form of the bourgeois State, of which globalized capitalism is the cornerstone, can boast of having no rivals in the ideological field. For three decades now, the word 'communism' has been either totally forgotten or practically equated with criminal enterprises. That is why the subjective situation of politics has everywhere become so incoherent. Lacking the Idea, the popular masses’ confusion is inescapable. Nevertheless, there are many signs suggesting that this reactionary period is coming to an end. The historical paradox is that, in a certain way, we are closer to problems investigated in the first half of the nineteenth century than we are to those we have inherited from the twentieth. Just as in around 1840, today we are faced with an utterly cynical capitalism, which is certain that it is the only possible option for a rational organization of society. Everywhere it is implied that the poor are to blame for their own plight, that Mricans are backward, and that the future belongs either to the 'civilized' bourgeoisies of the Western world or to those who, like the Japanese, choose to follow the same path. Today, just as back then, very extensive areas of extreme poverty can be found even in the rich countries. There are outrageous, widening inequalities between countries, as well as between social classes. The subjective, political gulf between Third World farmers, the unemployed and poor wage earners in our so-called 'developed' countries, on the one hand, and the 'Western' middle classes on the other, is absolutely unbridgeable and tainted with a sort of indifference bordering on hatred. More than ever, political power, as the current economic crisis with its one single slogan of 'rescue the banks' clearly proves, is merely an agent of capitalism. Revolutionaries are divided and only weakly organized, broad sectors of working-class youth have fallen prey to nihilistic despair, the vast majority of intellectuals are servile. In contrast to all this, as isolated as Marx and his friends were at the time when the retrospectively famous Manifesto of the Communist Party came out in 1847, there are nonetheless more and more of us involved in organizing new types of political processes among the poor and working masses and in trying to find every possible way to support the re-emergent forms of the communist Idea in reality. Just as at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the victory of the communist Idea is not at issue, as it would later be, far too dangerously and dogmatically, for a whole stretch of the twentieth century. What matters first and foremost is its existence and the terms in which it is formulated. In the first place, to provide a vigorous subjective existence to the communist hypothesis is the task those of us gathered here today are attempting to accomplish in our own way. And it I insist, a thrilling task. By combining intellectual constructs, which are always global and universal, with experiments of fragments of truths, which are local and singular, yet universally transmittable, we can give new life to the communist hypothesis, or rather to the Idea of communism, in individual consciousnesses. We can usher in the third era of this Idea's existence. We can, so we must.

#### The affirmative plays into the hands of Americanness - advertently affirming a paradigm which underpins the structures of assimilation and exclusion - the alt is a preferable strategy for those that occupy the position of the oppressed.

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In Philip Kan Gotanda's 2002 "The Wind Cries Mary" (an adaptation of Henrik Ibsen's "Hedda Gabler"), Eiko/Hedda ends the play (and her life) by committing seppuku, Japanese ritual suicide by dagger to the neck—not the long sword to the gut (so often portrayed in popular Western representation), the method properly reserved for a certain class of men, Eiko pointedly lectures in an earlier scene. But far more radical than the change in weaponry is Gotanda's placement of the act: Eiko dies front and center stage in full view of the audience (if not her distracted family and friends), unlike the sequestered Hedda.[1](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.trinity.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.2shimakawa.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT1) It is a somewhat surprising choice for Eiko, who has chafed under her husband's and in-laws' expectations of her as a "China doll," who demands coffee when her orientalist husband offers her green tea, who likes listening to Hendrix at full volume (much to the annoyance of her pop music-loving husband). In short, Eiko is neither a China doll nor Cio-Cio San, that fabled delicate "Butterfly" archetype of Asian (especially Japanese) femininity, transportingly erotic and beautiful in her death-driven devotion to her (white) husband and child. In one sense, then, her act is one of fierce defiance, her victory over the racist construction of oriental femininity into which the play, the world depicted in it (Berkeley ca. 1968), and especially the other characters, attempt to interpellate her. You want to see a real Japanese woman? in effect she taunts them, I'll show you a real Japanese [American] woman.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.trinity.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.2shimakawa.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT2) And yet...the feminist debate over Hedda's "liberatory" end persists here as well: how "victorious" can self-annihilation be? What does it mean to say that the way one "wins" the gendering/racialization "game" is to opt out by killing oneself? And do so in the most spectacularly "oriental" way possible? Eiko's death, I would suggest, dramatizes the vexed condition of "ethnic" performance for Asian Pacific Americans. Caught between the (potentially self-canceling) pressures of exoticism/orientalism on the one hand, and erasure/invisibility on the other, Asian Pacific American theatre artists have the difficult task of carving out a space in which to perform an Asian Pacific Americanness [End Page 149] that is often too "American" to register as racially or ethnically distinct, and/or too "Asian" to be legible as American. This dilemma is, of course, simply a reflection of the larger paradox posed by "multiculturalism" as a national origin myth. As Anne Anlin Cheng has observed, "while racial and social integration offer the preeminent American social myths, assimilation remains one of the deepest sources of anxiety in the American psyche" (Cheng 2001, 70). While Cheng's excellent study maps the psychic effects of racialization both on and by Asian Pacific Americans, I want to consider the paradox of American multiculturalism from a slightly different perspective: how might we make sense of it as an effect/production of national identity itself? Elsewhere I've suggested that Asian Pacific Americanness (in mainstream representation) is an effect of "national abjection," the production of national identity (as a racialized/gendered phantasm/ideal) through the designation of that which is deemed "abject"/not-American (Shimakawa 2002). Julia Kristeva defines abjection as both a state and a process—the condition/position of that which is deemed loathsome and the process by which that appraisal is made—and deems "abject and abjection [as] ... the primers of my culture" (Kristeva 1982, 2). It is, for her, the means by which the subject/"I" is produced: by establishing perceptual and conceptual borders around the self and "jettison[ing]" that which is deemed objectionable, the subject comes into (and maintains) self-consciousness. The abject, Kristeva asserts, is constituted of that which is, at a foundational level, integral to the whole; what fuels the ongoing project of abjection is the drive to expel (and thereby differentiate from) that which, on some level, cannot be fully or decisively expelled. The abject, it is important to note, does not achieve a (stable) status of object—the term often used to describe the position of (racially or sexually) disenfranchised groups in analyses of the politics of representation. Read as abject, Asian Pacific Americanness thus occupies a role both necessary to and mutually constitutive of national subject formation—but does not result in the formation of an Asian Pacific American subject, or even an Asian Pacific American object. Rather, I deploy the discourse of abjection in describing Asian American performance because (as in Kristeva's formulation) "there is nothing objective or objectal to the abject. It is simply a frontier" (9). What characterizes Asian Pacific Americanness as it comes into visibility, I would argue, is its constantly-shifting relation to U.S. Americanness, a movement between visibility and invisibility, foreignness and domestication/assimilation; it is that movement between enacted by and upon Asian Pacific Americans that marks the boundaries of Asian American cultural (and sometimes legal) citizenship. In order for U.S. Americanness to maintain its symbolic coherence, the national abject continually must be both made present and jettisoned. In positing the paradigm of abjection as a national/cultural identity-formative process, this essay offers a way of "reading" Asian Americanness [End Page 150] in relation to and as a product of U.S. Americanness—that is, as occupying the seemingly contradictory, yet functionally essential, position of a constituent element/sign of American multiculturalismand radical other/foreigner. Given this oscillation, it is difficult to imagine a unified response or direct reaction and indeed, Asian Pacific American theatre artists have produced material that is correspondingly varied. From "Chinaman" Frank Chin's call for an Asian Pacific American theatre that would depict "real" Asian Americans and "authentic" Asian immigrant cultures/practices/mythologies and thereby disprove the grotesque "Charlie Chan" stereotypes prevalent in popular media (Chin 1995) to Pan Asian Repertory founding Artistic Director Tisa Chang's vision of an Asian American theatre in which "an Asian American could play ... a Blanche Dubois" (Chang 1994), Asian Pacific American theatre artists often find themselves having to assert their (authentic) difference and their ("American") sameness at the same time. However, neither of these strategies manages to escape the logic of abjection altogether: the insistence on "authentic" Asian (American) cultural representation (the attempt to present "our" culture/histories as a corrective to stereotypical-orientalist representations) is a reaction to an (unjust or incorrect) assignment of abject status; an assertion of "our" Americanness (the "we are just like other Americans" approach) is fueled by a desire to identify with the deject (mainstream) national subject rather than the excluded abject. Is it possible to conceive a strategy that short-circuits the national abjection process altogether? In other words, is there a way to recognize the tensions inherent in the project of "performing ethnicity" that does not rely implicitly on the integrity of a (raced) national subject? Giorgio Agamben's "whatever being" offers a possible alternative way to conceive of (communal) subjectivity that does not depend on stable political identity categories for its integrity, without requiring one to dispense with categories altogether. Unlike the common English parsing of whatever, Agamben's use of the term is differently nuanced: "[whatever being] is not 'being, it does not matter which,' but rather 'being such that it always matters'" (Agamben 1993, 1).[3](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.trinity.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.2shimakawa.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT3) The impulse to include/be included is retained, though not assigned to a particular or stable grounds of inclusion: "such-and-such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims)—and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself" (1-2, emphasis in original). Belonging itself, according to Agamben, is a state of being that acknowledges the (social and affective efficacy of the) desire for inclusion while, at the same time, resisting the concretization of static categories (defined racially, nationally, sexually, religiously, or otherwise) that would afford not only inclusion, but also exclusion. What would it mean, Agamben asks, to acknowledge the [End Page 151] desire to belong to identity categories as that which binds us across the boundaries of such categories? To define subjectivity as "being as such," that is, at the level of the impulse to belong (belonging itself), rather than at the point of inclusion in an established social category/community?[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.trinity.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v018/18.2shimakawa.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) It is important to emphasize that Agamben does not advocate a dissipation of belonging per se—his is not a dismantled universalist/humanist leveling program. "It is the Most Common that cuts off any real community," he writes; "[whatever being] is neither apathy nor promiscuity nor resignation" (10), Instead, whatever being constitutes a mode of (prospective) subject formation that achieves some of Kristeva's deject's ends (that is, the rough articulation of a subject position) without producing a concretized, jettisoned abject; and for those who might otherwise find themselves on the "wrong" side of that (nationalizing/racializing) abjection equation, perhaps Agamben's conception of "being as such" describes a strategic response to abjection that does not simultaneously reaffirm its logic; that is, it offers an alternative to abjection that does not result in simply "claiming a place" at the dejects' table.

### Case

#### Their rhetorical strategy to 'kill the male' represents war rhetoric - this creates self fufilling prophecies and leads to violence.

Sanchez 13 – jd candidate @ Yale Law

(Andrea Nill, Mexico’s Drug “War”: Drawing a Line Between Rhetoric and Reality, THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 38: 467)

Outside of legal academia, the late Wayne C. Booth—who dedicated his life to analyzing rhetoric—similarly pointed out that war rhetoric is essentially the most influential form of political rhetoric that “makes (and destroys) our realities.”64 This is because political rhetoric is inherently aimed at changing present circumstances.65 Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson have maintained that our conceptual system itself is metaphorical and that metaphors thus “structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.”66 Citing the rhetorical use of the term “war,” they note that the very acceptance of the war metaphor leads to certain inferences and also clears the way for political action.67 Thus, the examples that follow in this section should not be merely dismissed as insignificant rhetorical flourishes. As Lackoff and Johnson warn,¶ Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions, will of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.68

#### Always choose nonviolence

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 100-102)

It would be foolish to claim that nonviolent action always succeeds against any opponent, just as it would be foolish to claim that ¶ violence always succeeds against any enemy. We must look to the evidence of history. It should be clear that the widespread belief that ¶ nonviolence “doesn’t work” is a misconception grounded in ignorance ¶ or neglect of when and where nonviolent direct action has succeeded. ¶ Similarly, the widespread confidence in violent means of struggle ¶ rests on neglect of its many failures. A review of post– World War II ¶ military interventions is beyond the scope of this book, but we can ¶ take a broad look at the historical record by reflecting briefly on important military actions of the past few decades. Vietnam, Lebanon, ¶ Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all come to mind. ¶ How well has violence “worked”? Did the outcome of the war in Vietnam outweigh the evils in death, injuries, destruction, dislocation, ¶ and influence of the war on the region, namely, Pol Pot’s reign of terror? The Vietnam war is widely considered a tragic mistake. What ¶ about the first and second wars in Iraq? When the full outcome is ¶ weighed, will justice be served by such thorough destruction of a nation’s infrastructure, deaths and injuries of tens (some say hundreds) ¶ of thousands, dislocation of millions of refugees, and a very uncertain future for the region? Beyond Vietnam and Iraq, can we honestly say ¶ that the outcomes of war are better for Lebanon, Somalia, Chechnya, ¶ and Bosnia, not to mention the prospects for the ongoing war in Afghanistan? It seems not. In every case the intentions and expectations ¶ widely missed the outcomes. So, history shows that nonviolence has ¶ succeeded with little preparation and virtually no public confidence ¶ while violence is systematically planned, of the highest priority when ¶ investing public resources, and widely supported, yet it frequently ¶ fails to be an effective means of achieving the peaceful ends desired. ¶ Critics say pacifists should “be realistic.” Pacifists ask the same of warists, and history— certainly since the end of World War II— seems to ¶ favor nonviolence. Pragmatic objections to pacifism, once examined, ¶ are not decisive refutations at all. It must be acknowledged that pacifism may or may not succeed at ¶ defeating unrestrained evil. At the same time we must admit that war, ¶ by its nature, is a test of might; as such, it can never settle questions of ¶ right.18 Rather, in war one side prevails and domination replaces the ¶ cooperation of genuine peace. And it is exactly at this point that the ¶ positive peace side of pacifism makes its strongest case: only nonviolence can create the internal order characteristic of genuine peace, so ¶ violence always fails in the long run. Violence can satisfy the urge to do ¶ something in the face of injustice, violence can satisfy the desire for ¶ revenge against evil, and sometimes violence can impose a short-term ¶ negative peace. But violence cannot create and sustain the conditions ¶ of genuine positive peace because these conditions come from within ¶ individuals and groups by agreement and cooperation, not from the ¶ outside by force or threat. The historical record of the last century— ¶ the carnage of the twentieth century which began with most victims ¶ of war being combatants and ended with most victims of war being ¶ innocent civilians— should awaken us to the need for fundamental ¶ change, as should successes of largely nonviolent revolution in much of ¶ Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the nonviolent dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and in the unarmed ¶ forces of the Philippines removing a dictator through nonviolent revolution. We are a sorry species if the best we can do is multiply and refine our means of violence while escalating our military threats and ¶ actions, carrying out increasingly devastating violence against one an-¶ other. But history shows not only the failure of violence but also the successes of nonviolence; here we find hope that we may learn from ¶ the past and reduce violence while expanding nonviolence.

#### Obsession with Vietnam will center American policy debates on military power, causing a right-wing backlash and continually eschewing diplomatic solutions

Kane 9 (John, U of Sydney, Australian J of Intl Affs, 63.4, informa Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University) TBC 7/9/10

Kissinger was surely correct about this. The problem with American military power after Vietnam was not that it had been significantly diminished—it had not—but that it had been somehow emasculated, creating an enduring dissensus between rightist 'hawks' and leftist 'doves'. The former, arguing that the full extent of America's military might had not even been deployed in Vietnam, were deeply resentful of what they regarded as the domestic betrayal that had produced an unnecessary defeat and wished to wipe out the humiliation of Vietnam through convincing and wholehearted assertions of American power. This required, too, the restoration of presidential authority, sapped by popular and congressional distrust after Vietnam and Watergate. Such hawkish dreams were largely frustrated by the persistence among populace and politicians of the 'Vietnam syndrome', but their influence would be increasingly felt as more radical kinds of conservative gained ascendancy over the liberal wing of the Republican Party following the fall of Nixon.6 Meanwhile, the Democrats, after the candidacy of George McGovern in 1972, moved further Left to become the party of injured American innocence, as suspicious and fearful of military power as had been America's peace activists earlier in the twentieth century. The result was not merely dissensus on foreign policy but an obsession with either the possibilities or dangers of military power that, in the long run, elevated the military dimension of international relations above the diplomatic. Discussions of foreign policy post-Vietnam tended to revolve endlessly around the question of when and how the use of military force could be justified. (It is sobering to think that the famous Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, with its insistence on strictly national interests, overwhelming force, a swift victory and a clean exit might have precluded American participation in World War II.) It was not surprising, then, that when an ultra-conservative administration came to power in 2000, its foreign policy team should be made up of figures whose predilection was for military rather than diplomatic affairs. Most had spent their government careers either in the armed forces or as Department of Defense bureaucrats striving to build America's military strength (in Donald Rumsfeld's case, to reshape it for a new era). It was strange, but telling, that those with actual army or navy experience—the State Department's Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, respectively, who had both served in Vietnam—were the cautious ones with respect to military force, while the men they contemptuously referred to as the 'chicken hawks'—Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and his aide 'Scooter' Libby, all at Defense—were conservative ideologues ready and willing to wield it when the occasion arose, as it did after September 11, 2001. None had the background of a Dean Acheson or an Averill Harriman, or the propensities of even a George Marshall who, though an indomitable old soldier, left his most considerable mark in the field of diplomacy (Mann 2004: 273-4).

#### Identity-for-itself is a trump card that renders coalitional politics and democracy inoperable - our habitat for politics must be bounded by questions of how we OUGHT to live as opposed to the ways we should be perceived - this sticks the aff's politics in a framework of resistance - the impact is slave ontology which guts the 1ac's solvency

Brown 95—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, States of Injury, 47-51)

The postmodern exposure of the imposed and created rather than dis- covered character of all knowledges—of the power-surtuscd, struggle-¶48¶produced quality of all truths, including reigning political and scientific ones—simultaneously exposes the groundlessness of discovered norms or visions. It also reveals the exclusionary and regulatory function of these norms: white women who cannot locate themselves in Nancy Hartsock’s account of women’s experience or women s desires, African American women who do not identify with Patricia Hill Collinss account of black women’s ways of knowing, are once again excluded from the Party of Humanism—this time in its feminist variant. ¶Our alternative to reliance upon such normative claims would seem to be engagement in political struggles in which there are no trump cards such as “morality” or “truth."Our alternative, in other words, is to struggle within an amoral political habitat for temporally bound and fully contestable visions of who we are and how we ought to live. Put still another way, postmodernity unnerves feminist theory not merely because it deprives us of uncomplicated subject standing, as Christine Di Stefano suggests, or of settled ground for knowledge and norms, as Nancy Hartsock argues, or of "centered selves and “emancipatory knowledge," as Seyla Bcnhabib avers. Postmodernity unsettles feminism because it erodes the moral ground that the subject, truth, and nor- mativity coproduce in modernity. When contemporary feminist political theorists or analysts complain about the antipolitical or unpolitical nature of postmodern thought—thought that apprehends and responds to this erosion—they arc protesting, inter' aha, a Nictzschcan analysis of truth and morality as fully implicated in and by power, and thereby dplegiti- mated qua Truth and Morality Politics, including politics with passion- ate purpose and vision, can thrive without a strong theory of the subject, without Truth, and without scientifically derived norms—one only need reread Machiavelli, Gramsci, or Emma Goldman to see such a politics flourish without these things. The question is whether fnninist politics can prosper without a moral apparatus, whether feminist theorists and activists will give up substituting Truth and Morality for politics. Are we willing to engage in struggle rather than recrimination, to develop our faculties rather than avenge our subordination with moral and epistemological gestures, to fight for a world rather than conduct process on the existing one? Nictzschc insisted that extraordinary strengths of character and mind would be necessary to operate in thce domain of epistemological and religious nakedness he heralded. But in this heexcessively individualized a challenge that more importantly requires the deliberate development of postmoral and antirelativist political spaces, practices of deliberation, and modes of adjudication.¶49¶The only way through a crisis of space is to invent a new space —Fredric Jameson. “Postmodernism"¶Precisely because of its incessant revelation of settled practices and identi- ties as contingent, its acceleration of the tendency to melt all that is solid into air. what is called postmodernity poses the opportunity to radically sever the problem of the good from the problem of the true, to decide “what we want” rather than derive it from assumptions or arguments about “who we are.” Our capacity to exploit this opportunity positively will be hinged to our success in developing new modes and criteria for political judgment. It will also depend upon our willingness to break certain modernist radical attachments, particularly to Marxism’s promise (however failed) of meticulously articulated connections betwreen a com- prehensive critique of the present and norms for a transformed future—a science of revolution rather than a politics of oneResistance, the practice most widely associated with postmodern polit- ical discourse, responds to without fully meeting the normativity chal- lenge of postmodernity. A vital tactic in much political w’ork as wrcll as for mere survival, resistance by itself does not contain a critique, a vision, or grounds for organized collective efforts to enact either. Contemporary affection for the politics of resistance issues from postmodern criticism’s perennial authority problem: our heightened consciousncss of the will to power in all political “positions” and our wrariness about totalizing an- alyses and visions. Insofar as it eschew’s rather than revisesthese problematic practices, resistance-as-politics does not raise the dilemmas of responsibility and justification entailed in “affirming” political projects and norms. In this respect, like identity politics, and indeed sharing with identity politics an excessively local viewpoint and tendency toward positioning without mapping, the contemporary vogue of resistance is more a symptom of postmodernity’s crisis of political space than a coherent response to it. Resistance goes nowhere in particular, has no inherent attachments, and hails no particular vision; as Foucault makes clear, resistance is an effect of and reaction to power, not an arrogation of it.¶What postmodernity disperses and postmodern feminist politics requires are cultivated political spaces for posing and questioning feminist political norms, for discussing the nature of “the good” for women. Democratic political space is quite undcrtheonzed in contemporary femi- nist thinking, as it is everywhere in latc-twentieth-ccntury political the- ory, primarily bccausc it is so little in evidence. Dissipated by the increasing tcchnologizing of would-be political conversations and pro- cesses, by the erosion of boundaries around specifically political domains¶50¶and activities, and by the decline of movement politics, political spaces are scarcer and thinner today than even in most immediately prior epochs of Western history. In this regard, their condition mirrors the splayed and centrifuged characteristics of postmodern political power. Yet precisely because of postmodernity’s disarming tendencies toward political disori- entation, fragmentation, and technologizing, the creation of spaces where political analyses and norms can be proffered and contested is su- premely important.¶Political space is an old theme in Western political theory, incarnated by the polis practices of Socrates, harshly opposed by Plato in the Repub- lic, redeemed and elaborated as metaphysics by Aristotle, resuscitated as salvation for modernity by Hannah Arendt. jnd given contemporary spin in Jurgen Habermas's theories of ideal speech situations and com- municative rationality. The project of developing feminist postmodern political spaces, while enriched by pieces of this tradition, necessarily also departs from it. In contrast with Aristotle’s formulation, feminist politi- cal spaces cannot define themselves against the private sphere, bodies, reproduction and production, mortality, and all the populations and is- sues implicated in these categories. Unlike Arendt’s, these spaces cannot be pristine, ratified, and policed at their boundaries but are necessarily cluttered, attuned to earthly concerns and visions, incessantly disrupted, invaded, and reconfigured. Unlike Habermas, wc can harbor no dreams of nondistorted communication unsullied by power, or even of a ‘com- mon language,’\* but wc recognize as a permanent political condition par- tiality of understanding and expression, cultural chasms whose nature may be vigilantly identified but rarely “resolved,” and the powers of words and images that evoke, suggest, and connote rather than transmit meanings.42 Our spaces, while requiring some definition and protection, cannot be clean, sharply bounded, disembodied, or permanent: to engage postmodern modes of power and honor specifically feminist knowledges, they must be heterogenous, roving, relatively noninstitutionalized, and democratic to the point of exhaustion.¶Such spaces are crucial for developing the skills and practices of post- modern judgment, addressing the problem of “how to produce a discourse on justicc . . . when one no longer relies on ontology or epistemology.”43 Postmodemity’s dismantling of metaphysical foundations for justice renders us quite vulnerable to domination by technical reason ¶51¶unless we seize the opportunity this erosion also creates to develop democratic processes

for formulating postepistemelogical and postontological judgments. Such judgements require learning how to have public conversations with each other, arguing from a vision about the common (“what I want for us") rather than from identity (“who I am”), and from explicitly postulated norms and potential common values rather than false essentialism or unreconstructed private interest.44 Paradoxically, such public and comparatively impersonal arguments carry potential for greater accountability than arguments from identity or interest. While the former may be interrogated to the ground by others, the latter are insulated from such inquiry with the mantle of truth worn by identity-based speech. Moreover, post identity political positions and conversations potentially replace a politics of difference with a politics of diversity—differences grasped from a perspective larger than simply one point in an ensemble. Postidentity public positioning requires an outlook that discerns structures of dominance within diffused and disorienting orders of power, thereby stretching toward a more politically potent analysis than that which our individuated and fragmented existences can generate. In contrast to Di Stefano's claim that 'shared identity” may constitute a more psychologically and politically reliable basis for “attachment and motivation on the part of potential activists,” I am suggesting that political conversation oriented toward diversity and the common, toward world rather than self, and involving a conversion of ones knowledge of the world from a situated (subject) position into a public idiom, offers us the greatest possibility of countering postmodern social fragmentations and political disintegrations.¶Feminists have learned well to identify and articulate our "subject positions —we have become experts at politicizing the “I”that is produced through multiple sites ofpower and subordination. But the very practice so crucial to making these elements of power visible and subjectivity political may be partly at odds with the requisites for developing political conversation among a complex and diverse “we.” We may need to learn public speaking and the pleasures of public argument not to overcome our situatedness, but in order to assume responsibility for our situations and to mobilize a collective discourse that will expand them. For the political making of a feminist future that does not reproach the history on which it is borne, we may need to loosen our attachments to subjectivity, identity, and morality and to redress our underdeveloped taste for political argument.

#### Drone technology makes killing difficult – surveillance increases empathic feelings – no pilot experience this as a video game

Coeckelbergh 13 [Mark Coeckelbergh, Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Netherlands, “Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting,” Ethics and Military Technology, June 2013, Springer]

Let me further develop this argument. There is a real possibility that empathic bridging happens since surveillance of (potential) targets takes up much of the time of the ‘crews’ in the control room. The actual killing is only a small part of what they do; usually they watch (potential) targets. In addition, it would be wrong to understand the epistemic relation between drone crews and their opponents as purely ‘technical’ or as mere consisting of (passively) ‘watching’ screens. People do not perceive the world in a passive and ‘neutral’ way. What they see on the ground is never entirely ‘objective’. Perception is active; there is always interpretation: the interpretation communicated to them by their commanders, but also personal interpretation. The military practice leaves room for, and makes possible, active interpretation, in particular the construction of narrative. People make up stories about the people they monitor. Time renders this possible. As said, drone crews have time for that; they spend a lot of time on keeping an eye on particular people.¶ Drones can engage in “persistent surveillance”. That means they don’t just swoop in, fire missiles and swoop out; they may spend hours, days, or even months monitoring a particular target. [Drones are] equipped with imaging technologies that enable operators even thousands of miles away to see details as fine as individual faces […]. (Brooks 2012)¶ How easy is it to kill people you came to know in this way, if you have seen their face? Did not that ‘target’ become more of a person? Did not the appearance of the opponent and interpretation of his status shift? Once the drone operator gains ‘a certain intimacy’ (Bumiller 2012) with the lives of the people on the ground (this is what pilots operating in Afghanistan reported), [they] sees that the people he is supposed to kill are similar to [themselves]. They also have families, they also ‘wake up in the morning, do their work, go to sleep at night’ (an Air Force major quoted in Bumiller 2012). And if drone crews see the suffering of persons they inflict, their fighting can no longer entirely be compared to a video game; it is not even the same as firing a missile from an airplane in which you are present. Lieutentant Colonel Mike Weaver, a veteran F15 fighter pilot says: ‘I’ve flown manned aircraft and believe me this, in terms of combat, is more up close and personal.’ (Weaver quoted in Caroll 2012). Drone operators explicitly dismiss the suggestion that they are playing a video game (Bumiller 2012), and it seems they do so for good reasons. A CIA drone operator told a journalist:¶ I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces… see these guys playing with their kids and wives… After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of the house. I see the women weeping and in positions of mourning. That’s not PlayStation; that’s real. (drone operator quoted in Brooks 2012)¶ For the drone operator, the ‘reality’ of the situation is constructed in terms of the suffering and death on the ground and the relation between his actions and that suffering and death. He knows it is real because he sees what happens to the people and thus knows that his actions make a difference between life and death. Or in the words of a pilot who used to fly missions from an air force base outside Las Vegas: ‘There’s no video game in the world that makes the difference between life and death (pilot Chad quoted in Caroll 2012). This puts a heavy load of moral responsibility on the shoulders of these people and those who order them to kill. Again: it does not render killing easy, but rather the very opposite.

#### Their language is one of BEING instead of WANTING - the impact is resentiment and a wounded attachment to suffering itself.

Brown 93—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, Wounded Attachments, Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 390-410)

What might be entailed in transforming these investments in an effort to fashion a more radically democratic and emancipatory political culture? One avenue of exploration may lie in Nietzsche's counsel on the virtues of "forgetting," for if identity structured in part by ressentiment resubjugates itself through its investment in its own pain, through its refusal to make itself in the present, memory is the house of this activity and this refusal. Yet erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities that the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate, if not cruel.33 Indeed, it is also possible that we have reached a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche, whose skills as diagnostician usually reach the limits of their political efficacy in his privileging of individual character and capacity over the transformative possibilities of collective political inven- tion, in his remove from the refigurative possibilities of political conversation or transformative cultural practices. For if I am right about the problematic of pain installed at the heart of many contemporary contradictory demands for political recognition, all that such pain may long for more than revenge is the chance to be heard into a certain reprieve, recognized into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence losing, itself. Our challenge, then, would be to configure a radically democratic political culture that can sustain such a project in its midst without being overtaken by it, a challenge that includes guarding against abetting the steady slide of political into therapeutic discourse, even as we acknowledge the elements of suffering and healing we might be negotiating. What if it were possible to incite a slight shift in the character of political expression and political claims common to much politicized identity? What if we sought to supplant the language of "I am"-with its defensive closure on identity, its insistence on the fixity of position, and its equation of social with moral positioning-with the language of reflexive "wanting"? What if it were possible to rehabilitate the memory of desire within identificatory processes, the moment in desire-either "to have" or "to be"-prior to its wounding and thus prior to the formation of identity at the site of the wound? What if "wanting to be" or "wanting to have" were taken up as modes of political speech that could destabilize the formulation of identity as fixed position, as entrenchment by history, and as having necessary moral entail- ments, even as they affirm "position" and "history" as that which makes the speaking subject intelligible and locatable, as that which contributes to a hermeneutics for adjudicating desires? If every "I am" is something of a resolution of desire into fixed and sovereign identity, then this project might involve not only learning to speak but to read "I am" this way, as in motion, as temporal, as not-I,as deconstructable according to a genealogy of want rather than as fixed interests or experiences. The subject understood as an effect of a (ongoing) genealogy of desire, including the social processes constitutive of, fulfilling, or frustrating desire, is in this way revealed as neither sovereign nor conclusive even as it is affirmed as an "I." In short, this partial dissolution of sovereignty into desire could be that which reopens a desire for futurity where Nietzsche saw it sealed shut by festering wounds expressed as rancor and ressentiment. 'This instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed . . . incarcerated within."' Such a slight shift in the character of the political discourse of identity eschews the kinds of ahistorical or utopian turns against identity

politics made bya nostalgic and broken humanist Left as well as the reactionary and disingenuous assaults on politicized identity tendered by the Right. Rather than opposing or seeking to transcend identity investments, the replacement- even the complex admixture-of the language of "being" with "wanting"would seek to exploit politically a recovery of the more expansive moments in the genealogy of identity formation. It would seek to reopen the moment prior to its own foreclosure against its want, prior to the point at which its sovereign subjectivity is established through such foreclosure and through eternal repetition of its pain. How might democratic discourse itself be invigorated by such a shift from ontological claims to these kinds of more expressly political ones, claims which, rather than dispensing blame for an unlivable present, inhabited the necessarily agonistic theater of discursively forging an alternative future.

### 2nc

Badiou 1 - Professor of Philosophy at Université Paris VIII (Alain, Professor of Philosophy at Université Paris, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, 2001. pg. xii-xiv)

An ethics of truths, then, is designed to cultivate: a sense of discernment (do not confuse the true and the false); courage and endurance (do not betray the true); moderation and restraint (resist the idea of total or ‘substantial’ truth). The logic relation of Good and Evil is thus perfectly clear: first the Good (the affirmation of a truth), then the risk of Evil (as perversion of the Good). The polemic thrust of the book’s opening chapter follows as an equally logical conse­quence, for the recent liberal-humanist recourse to ethics —what Badiou calls our ‘ethical ideology’ — presumes the opposite derivation: first the assumption of an a priori evil (totalitarianism, violence, suffering), then the imposition of an essentially defensive ethics, a ‘respect’ for negative liberties and ‘human rights’. ‘Ethics’ here simply means protection from abusive interference. It amounts to an intellectual justification of the status quo. Operating exclusively in the realm of consensus, of the ‘self-evident’, ethics is intrinsi­cally conservative. The prevailing ‘ethical ideology’ has two ‘philosophical’ poles. First, a (vaguely Kantian) universalizing pole which, indifferent to the particularity of any given situation, pro-scribes in advance any possibility of an organized, militant and situated intervention in the name of some collective ‘Good’: ethics here is grounded in the abstract universality of general ‘human’ attributes or rights. And second, a (vaguely Uvinasian) differential pole, attuned to the irre­ducible alterity of the Other: ethics here is expressed in an equally abstract respect for mainly cultural ‘differences’. Neither *this* universality nor *this* alterity, Badiou suggests, can be rigorously founded without tacit reference to theo­logy. Either way, the ethical ideology conceives of ‘man’ as a fundamentally passive, fragile and mortal entity — as a potential victim to be protected (most often, as a ‘margin­alized’, ‘excluded’ or ‘Third World’ victim, to be protected by a dutiful, efficient, and invariably ‘Western’ benefactor! exploiter). By contrast, **an ethic of truths presumes that every individual can be active and ‘immortal’**, is indifferent to established or state-sanctioned differences, operates in the realm of practical division (for or against the event), and situates its affirmation precisely there where the state of the situation can see only the non-known and the non-obvious.

Whatever being is k2 emancipatory politics - the affirmative re-entrenches white supremacy.

Bryant 13 - Professor of Philosophy @ Collins College (Levi,http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/10/31/the-thirst-for-identity/, October 31st 2013)

Perhaps a somewhat disturbing thought with respect to how we think about contemporary political struggles: In the Manifesto, Marx and Engels famously say that under capitalism “…all that is solid melts into air”. Contrary to Heidegger with his romanticism about rootedness– being a Black Forest peasant is probably much better from the standpoint of a philosopher contemplating their existence from afar than for Black Forest peasants themselves; just ask the people of the Limousin region of France –one of the great things about capitalism is that it erodes local customs, traditions, and superstitions, revealing subject as “void”. Every subject alternatively becomes “noone and everyone” because all essentialist identities (the Great Chain of Being where everyone has a place and function) are eroded under capitalism. From an economic, quantitative point of view, a child can do the same labor as a man and a woman and a black man and a Baptist and a Jew and… Well you get the idea. For the first time in history, universality is genuinely introduced as concrete universality insofar as everyone can equally be measured by the abstract dollar, thereby evacuating all identity (cf. Brian Rotman’s Signifying Nothing for the importance of this). While concrete universality is instantiated at this point, we nonetheless get abstract equality. Cultural predicates have been evacuated of their determinative power over identity under capitalism. As Charles Taylor says of religion in A Secular Age we come to recognize religion as a belief, an option, whereas before it was an intrinsic determinate and the agency of the divine in the world was as obvious as the agency of germs in a men’s restroom. Now one can try on religions like so many outfits. One can opt to be a Tibetan Buddhist or jump from Catholicism to Unitarianism. Or one can opt out altogether and be an atheist. This happens more or less with everything. It all becomes custom. Just think, for a moment, how novel the concept of ones practices, identity, and culture as custom is. To call these things “custom” is to already note a minimal distance between subject and identity. Where before what we call custom would be invisible because that just is what someone is, now all of these things become outfits. Again, subject becomes void. If this gives us an abstract equality, it’s because the conditions of equality are all there by virtue of the voiding of the subject and the disambiguation between imaginary identity and status as an agent, but nonetheless this equality hasn’t been effectuated in the concrete. Paradoxically, capital reveals that equality is possible, while nonetheless maintaining the most profound inequality that’s ever existed (incidentally, this is why every discourse that romanticizes rootedness and historicity is necessarily reactionary. Such discourses seek to suture the status of subject as subject or void, filling them with a substantial content– no matter how contingent or thrown –when, in fact, subject means that every content fails). read on! The paradox of capitalism from the standpoint of Marxist inflected critical theory is that it sets up the conditions for emancipatory politics by revealing subject as void that is thereby capable of fashioning itself in opposition to all prior history and inherited traditions– as an empty square I can play Magister Ludi’s glass bead game –while nonetheless using this very nullification of all identity predicates as the ground of exploitation and alienation. The paradox of emancipatory politics is that it thereby aims for an emancipation of “nothing”– here I’m playing Heideggerian linguistic games –or that which is necessarily without identifying predicates precisely because it is without void. Of course, us materialists have a particularly difficult time with all of this because we’re under the obligation– cf. Adrian Johnston’s work that’s managed to ask the right question –of explaining how a material system can give rise to a void or empty square. The burning materialist question is how a nothing can emerge within matter creating a gap between predicates and (in)substantial beings we refer to as subject. Might this not also be why anarchism functions as a sort of vanishing mediator in political thought, oscillating between libertarian free market capitalist theory and emancipatory Marxist thought? Perhaps anarchism marks the place of subject qua subject as void and therefore finds itself perpetually oscillating between all of these political orientations. I would say that Marx’s repressed fantasy– that which simultaneously is the motor of his thought and what he must perpetually hold at bay to sustain his desire, the desire called Marx –is anarchism. Now let’s add Lacan to the mix. The erosion of identity that takes place under capitalism, the revelation of subject as void, turns out to be an anxiety provoking structure. Subject wonders what it is for the Other. Che vuoi? From the standpoint of even vulgar psychology we can see how identity– which isn’t the same as subject –can be anxiety reducing. To be something is not only to know– in no matter how phantasmatic a manner –who you are, but is also to be able to answer to a set of questions of what you are for the Other. Put more concretely, knowing what you are for the Other– no matter how abject your position might be with respect to the Other –also means being capable of how others will respond to you. Identity is not so much about knowing yourself, but rather knowing what you are for other people and how they’re likely to respond with respect to you. As a consequence, being noone would be deeply anxiety provoking as it would entail never being able to anticipate how others will respond to us. Think here of Lacan’s famous example of the preying mantis before a female preying mantis that doesn’t know whether it’s wearing the mask of a male or female preying mantis. Will I be eaten or not? A subject as void has no answer to this question. Lacan liked to say that the moment the unconscious opens– the revelation of being as void –it also closes. Don’t we see this same dynamic at work at the broader social level? With the revelation of subject as void, suddenly we see the emergence of all sorts of sutures over the void. In a desperate attempt to cover over this anxiety provoking void we see the rise of identity politics: Christian and Muslim fundamentalisms, men’s right groups, white supremacy groups, sexual orientation groups, women’s right groups, gay rights groups, lesbian rights groups, etc, etc., etc. The capacity to name what we are sutures over our being as void, thereby pacifying the horrifying identity. In the context of homosexual politics, this is perhaps why the poly/bisexual is so horrifying. S/he upsets all those smooth and defined identities, refusing identity. What, then, if all the identity politics we see today isn’t rather an anxiety reducing mechanism arising from our inability to know what we are for the Other rather than a political issue. We would then face a paradox where we would simultaneously have to acknowledge that all of the politics that arise around these identities are indeed sites of struggle, while also recognizing that somehow they are obfuscations of struggle. How to navigate this?

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#### Turns the aff – War is a social condition that can be untaught through counter-hegemonic praxis.

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 23-24)

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature. Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles. Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

## Vietnam

#### Focusing on Vietnam invokes humiliation which makes interventionist wars inevitable and forecloses the possibility for peace

Mendible 7 (Myra, Florida Gulf Coast U., Radical Pyschology, vol 7,

http://www.radicalpsychology.org/vol7-1/mendible.html) TBC 7/9/10

In a victory speech following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed it a proud day to be American. The president’s speech officially heralded a new structure of feeling in America, one more suited to an imperial power’s spectacular reemergence on the world stage. It pronounced an official end to the “Vietnam syndrome,” a malaise that had presumably stricken the American psyche for over 16 years. The war had been the antidote for what ailed us, Bush’s speech assured us, the means to restore the nation’s honor and reclaim its rightful status. Americans could finally trade in the sackcloth of humiliation for the mantle of pride. By God, we had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” (Bush, para. 15). There are several problems, of course, with this version of history and with the ways that the “we” is constituted in its narrative. This essay is concerned with the extent to which Vietnam consistently plays out in popular memory as a psychodrama of humiliation, casting America in the role of victim and producing certain alignments and associations in the citizenry. Bush’s speech capitalized on a set of assumptions that have long dominated public discourse about the war. News pundits, filmmakers, and political leaders alike have exploited the evocative power of this humiliation tale, invoking its stock characters and compensatory themes to elicit predictable responses in target audiences. This affective logic binds subjects to cycles of compensatory violence, fueling militaristic strains in America’s political culture and setting the stage for a series of wars and interventions. I hope to show how this humiliation dynamic structures conflicts in ways that short-circuit the consideration of peaceful options.

## Wendy Brown

#### Their language is one of BEING instead of WANTING - the impact is resentiment and a wounded attachment to suffering itself.

Brown 93—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, Wounded Attachments, Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 390-410)

What might be entailed in transforming these investments in an effort to fashion a more radically democratic and emancipatory political culture? One avenue of exploration may lie in Nietzsche's counsel on the virtues of "forgetting," for if identity structured in part by ressentiment resubjugates itself through its investment in its own pain, through its refusal to make itself in the present, memory is the house of this activity and this refusal. Yet erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities that the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate, if not cruel.33 Indeed, it is also possible that we have reached a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche, whose skills as diagnostician usually reach the limits of their political efficacy in his privileging of individual character and capacity over the transformative possibilities of collective political inven- tion, in his remove from the refigurative possibilities of political conversation or transformative cultural practices. For if I am right about the problematic of pain installed at the heart of many contemporary contradictory demands for political recognition, all that such pain may long for more than revenge is the chance to be heard into a certain reprieve, recognized into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence losing, itself. Our challenge, then, would be to configure a radically democratic political culture that can sustain such a project in its midst without being overtaken by it, a challenge that includes guarding against abetting the steady slide of political into therapeutic discourse, even as we acknowledge the elements of suffering and healing we might be negotiating. What if it were possible to incite a slight shift in the character of political expression and political claims common to much politicized identity? What if we sought to supplant the language of "I am"-with its defensive closure on identity, its insistence on the fixity of position, and its equation of social with moral positioning-with the language of reflexive "wanting"? What if it were possible to rehabilitate the memory of desire within identificatory processes, the moment in desire-either "to have" or "to be"-prior to its wounding and thus prior to the formation of identity at the site of the wound? What if "wanting to be" or "wanting to have" were taken up as modes of political speech that could destabilize the formulation of identity as fixed position, as entrenchment by history, and as having necessary moral entail- ments, even as they affirm "position" and "history" as that which makes the speaking subject intelligible and locatable, as that which contributes to a hermeneutics for adjudicating desires? If every "I am" is something of a resolution of desire into fixed and sovereign identity, then this project might involve not only learning to speak but to read "I am" this way, as in motion, as temporal, as not-I,as deconstructable according to a genealogy of want rather than as fixed interests or experiences. The subject understood as an effect of a (ongoing) genealogy of desire, including the social processes constitutive of, fulfilling, or frustrating desire, is in this way revealed as neither sovereign nor conclusive even as it is affirmed as an "I." In short, this partial dissolution of sovereignty into desire could be that which reopens a desire for futurity where Nietzsche saw it sealed shut by festering wounds expressed as rancor and ressentiment. 'This instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed . . . incarcerated within."' Such a slight shift in the character of the political discourse of identity eschews the kinds of ahistorical or utopian turns against identity politics made bya nostalgic and broken humanist Left as well as the reactionary and disingenuous assaults on politicized identity tendered by the Right. Rather than opposing or seeking to transcend identity investments, the replacement- even the complex admixture-of the language of "being" with "wanting"would seek to exploit politically a recovery of the more expansive moments in the genealogy of identity formation. It would seek to reopen the moment prior to its own foreclosure against its want, prior to the point at which its sovereign subjectivity is established through such foreclosure and through eternal repetition of its pain. How might democratic discourse itself be invigorated by such a shift from ontological claims to these kinds of more expressly political ones, claims which, rather than dispensing blame for an unlivable present, inhabited the necessarily agonistic theater of discursively forging an alternative future.

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