## Off

#### A. Interp

#### Increase means from a baseline

Rogers 5 Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis

 [\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. HN16While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004); Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13; Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action --- the aff is not

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### The only War Power authority is the ability to MAKE MILITARY DECISIONS

Bajesky 13 (2013¶ Mississippi College Law Review¶ 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9¶ LENGTH: 33871 words ARTICLE: Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles' Heel of War Powers NAME: Robert Bejesky\* BIO: \* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.)

A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer's intended for Congress to be the dominant branch in war powers. Congressional war powers include the prerogative to "declare war;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fall short of "war"; "make Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "organize, fund, and maintain the nation's armed forces;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." n25 In contrast, the President is endowed with one war power, named as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. n26¶ The Commander-in-Chief authority is a core preclusive power, predominantly designating that the President is the head of the military chain of command when Congress activates the power. n27 Moreover, peripheral Commander-in-Chief powers are bridled by statutory and treaty restrictions n28 because the President "must respect any constitutionally legitimate restraints on the use of force that Congress has enacted." n29 However, even if Congress has not activated war powers, the President does possess inherent authority to expeditiously and unilaterally react to defend the nation when confronted with imminent peril. n30 Explicating the intention behind granting the President this latitude, Alexander Hamilton explained that "it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." n31 The Framers drew a precise distinction by specifying that the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." n32

#### B. Violation and reasons to prefer – The aff is not a limitation on presidential authority to make military decisions. It is at best an investigation of the relationship between animals and governmental decision-making. They result in a redefinition of what counts as war powers.

#### This makes the topic unpredictable. It’s not what you do but what you justify and they allow all affs to redefine anything as being part of war powers. This infinitely expands the topic, making it unpredictable for the neg. Crushes research and prevents in round clash.

#### They make the topic bidirectional – investigations or method focus don’t foreclose a decrease in war powers authority. Affs must defend an outcome to their investigation. It can’t be open ended.

#### There are topical versions of their aff. They can read advantages related to not entering troops into hostilities based on saving non-human animals. Our interp is not exclusionary but instead balance the debate to ensure fairness for both teams.

## Off

#### Their ethics cause massive destruction – nature is a self destructive system which will destroy itself through carbon deficiencies

Ward, 2009 (Peter, Professor of biology and Earth and space sciences at the University of Washington and an astrobiologist with NASA, *The Medea Hypothesis,* 52-54)

Calcium is an important ingredient in this process, and it is found in two main sources on a planet's surface: igneous rocks and, most importantly, the sedimentary rocks called limestone. Calcium reacts with carbon dioxide to form limestone. Calcium thus draws CO2 out of the atmosphere. When CO2 begins to increase in the atmosphere, more limestone formation will occur. This can only happen, however, if there is a steady source of new calcium available. The calcium con­tent is steadily made available by plate tectonics, for the formation of new mountains brings new sources of calcium back into the system in its magmas and by exhuming ancient limestone, eroding it, and thus releasing its calcium to react with more CO2. At convergent plate margins, where the huge slabs of the Earth's surface dive back down into the planet, some of the sediments resting on the descend­ing part are carried down into the Earth. High temperature and pressure convert some of these rocks into metamorphic rocks. One of the reactions is the carbonate metamorphic reaction, where lime­stone combining with silica converts to a calcium silicate—and car­bon dioxide. The CO2 can then be liberated back into the atmosphere in volcanic eruptions. The planetary thermostat requires a balance between the amount of CO2 being pumped into the atmosphere through volcanic action and the amount being taken out through the formation of limestone. The entire system is driven by heat emanating from the Earth's in­terior, which causes plate tectonics. But as we have seen there is more to this cycle than simply heating from the interior. Weather­ing on the surface of the Earth is crucial as well, and the rate of weathering is highly sensitive to temperature, for reaction rates in­volved in weathering tend to increase as temperature increases. This will cause silicate rocks to break down faster and thus create more calcium, the building block of limestone. With more calcium avail­able, more limestone can form. But the rate of limestone formation affects the CO2 content of the atmosphere, and when more lime‑ stone forms there is less and less CO2 in the atmosphere, causing the climate to cool. Here is a key aspect of the overall Earth system that helps refute either Gaia or Medea. If the Medea hypothesis is correct, we should be able to observe or measure a reduction of habitability potential (as measured by the carrying capacity, or total amount of life that can live on our planet at any give time) through time, or as measured by an observable shortening of the Earth's ability to be habitable for life in the future. For our own Earth, habitability will ultimately end for two reasons. The first of these is not Medean; it is a one-way effect. The ever-increasing energy output of our Sun, a phenomenon of all stars on what is called the main sequence, will ultimately cause the loss of the Earth's oceans (sometime in the next 2 to 3 billion years, accord­ing to new calculations). When the oceans are lost to space, planetary temperatures will rise to uninhabitable levels. But long before that, life will have died out on the Earth's surface through a mechanism that is Medean: because of life, the Earth will lose one resource with­out which the main trophic level of life itself—photosynthetic or­ganisms, from microbes to higher plants—can no longer survive. This dwindling resource, ironically, (in this time when human society worries about too much of it), is atmospheric carbon dioxide. The Medean reduction of carbon dioxide will then cause a further reduc­tion of planetary habitability because the CO2 drop will trigger a drop in atmospheric oxygen to a level too low to support animal life. This is an example of a "Medean" property: it is because of life that the amount of CO2 in the Earth's atmosphere has been steadily dropping over the last 200 million years. It is life that makes most calcium car­bonate deposits, such as coral skeletons, and thus life that ultimately caused the drop in CO2, since it takes CO2 out of the atmosphere to build this kind of skeleton. Life will continue to do this until a lethal lower limit is attained. This finding is important: in chapter 8 I will show a graph that supports this statement. As pointed out by David Schwartzman, while limestone can be formed with or without life, life is far more efficient at producing calcium carbonate structures—a process that draws CO2 out of the atmosphere—than nonlife. There is only one way out of the lethal box imposed by Darwinian life: the rise of intelligence capable of devising planetary-scale engi­neering. Technical, or tool-producing, intelligence is the unique so­lution to the planetary dilemma caused by Medean properties of life. New astrobiological work indicates that Venus, Mars, Europa, and Titan are potentially habitable worlds at the present time, at least for microbes, just as the Earth was early in its history. Did they undergo a reduction in habitability because of prior Medean forces? And cer­tainly the cosmos is filled with Earth-like planets, based on both new modeling of still-forming solar systems and observations by the Butler and Marcy planet-finding missions. While the "planet find­ers" cannot yet directly observe any planet that is Earth-sized (a planet of this size is still too small for us to see with our current technologies), the orbits exhibited by some of the Jupiter- and Saturn-sized planets that can be observed suggest that smaller, Earth-like planets might exist there. Would Medean forces occur in alien life, as well as Earth life? If such life were Darwinian, the answer would be "certainly."

#### We have an alternative system of ethics – humans should be prioritized for their ability to manage the environment

Ward, 2009 (Peter, Professor of biology and Earth and space sciences at the University of Washington and an astrobiologist with NASA, *The Medea Hypothesis,* XX – XXII)

To argue my case, I will use new discoveries from geology, biology, and most of the fossil record. To me, these new understandings are like a memory exhumed from some deep sleep, in reality from the deep past, that shows the absolute need to construct a new paradigm about both past and future, one that will require a rather painful shift from the kinds of conservation and environmentalism that are prac­ticed now. The philosophical underpinnings of modern environmen­talism are that the planet must be returned to environmental condi­tions that existed prior to the evolution of humankind's technological civilization, with the resulting planetwide changes to almost every facet of the environment. Instead, we humans must resort to whole­sale planetary engineering if we are to overcome the tendencies of life around us—and those of our own species—to make the Earth a less salubrious (and eventually lethal) abode for life. The sum of this record, which is meant to be the theme of this work, is the interpre­tation that the evolution of life triggered a series of disasters that are in­imical to life and will continue to do so into the future. If true, one implication is that the environmental challenges con­fronting our species and its civilizations are far more than simple overpopulation and all that entails. The fact is that we live on a rap­idly aging planet, and we will soon have but two choices if our spe­cies is to survive: engineer on a planetary scale or get off. Instead of restoring our planet to how it was before humans, we have to do ex­actly what the Gaia hypothesis suggests that life has done all along: optimize conditions for further life. We have to confront the nature of life itself and deal especially with groups of life that we animals have battled throughout our history: armies of microbes that cause their own kind of pollution, inimical to our kind of life. I will try to show in the pages to come that the cause of this in­herent tendency of life on Earth is due to one of Earth life's most deeply inherent characteristics, so deeply rooted that it would not be life without this aspect. It is that all Earth life is a slave to a process called evolution, Darwinian evolution in fact, for Charles Darwin got the process spectacularly correct even without understanding how any characteristic could be heritable. Along with replication and metabolism, evolution is one of the three tripods that defines life on Earth; take any of these legs away and it falls into the nonlife cate­gory. Life can no more help evolving than we can stop breathing and stay alive. You evolve or your species goes extinct, for the Earth keeps changing, and the formation of our own form of life was made pos­sible because of this characteristic. When life first appeared, some 3.7 billion years ago at the latest, our planet was a far more energetic and dangerous place to live on or in, and only through the ability to change generation by generation could the earliest forms of life sur­vive. It was not only survival of the fittest, but also survival of the best and fastest evolvers. Natural selection not only worked on better ways to get energy and withstand environmental difficulties but evolved better ways to evolve. Before all else, life worked on perfect­ing energy acquisition, replicating quickly and with fidelity, and evolving ever more quickly. But the price to pay is that each and every species innately "tries" to become the dominant species on the planet, with no regard to other species. Be it bacteria or bees, all try to produce as many individuals as possible and in so doing can and do poison the environment in various ways for all other species, in­cluding the species in question. How much longer will the Earth sustain life in the face of this relentless overpopulation by a variety of species, which tends to use up resources—unless we humans step in and save things, of course? Alone among all the creatures large and small, our species can ex­tend the length of the biosphere on Earth, which, like all of us, has a finite lifespan. Yet that lifespan, currently dictated by life itself, can be lengthened. Vastly lengthened.

## Off

#### The 1AC shrugs off the position of the proletariat in order for a more egaltarian position amoung the animals - this reproduces the status quo.

**Power 10** (Nina Power, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Roehampton University. Theory and Event Volume 13, Issue 1, 2010)

But this generic universality, the experience of the species in production, is not enough to break with the generalities of metaphysics: the collective practice of work does not do enough to separate out man from the beasts, it merely places him in another natural category. But Gattung shouldn't be understood merely naturally; Virno's historically specific claim about the point at which we can identify the major features of human nature and our troubled interaction with the environment is a claim about our generic being, but it is also a material and a historical claim about the situation we find ourselves in now. We should remember, too, that the original reception of the idea of Gattungswesen by the Young Hegelians sought to reconcile the alienated individual with the universal in the social, in light of the fact that the universality promised by the Hegelian system appeared nowhere in reality. This absence is the reason why the young Marx could write of the proletariat that it "can lay claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general."39 But Agamben equates the living being with its political, linguistic and natural capture by the state so completely that there seems to be no room for any kind of historically anomalous or collectively unprecedented subject, the proletariat or anything else, one that would break with history or disrupt everyday order. For Agamben, Marx moves too quickly to conceive of man as a natural being, neglecting the role of art, in particular. The real break in history as Agamben sees it is not recent transformations in the nature of work (from Fordism to post-Fordism, for instance), but the advent of nihilism. The historical event that a rethinking of praxis, poiesis and work must encounter is thus a cultural-metaphysical break, and not an economic one. The importance of nihilism for Agamben explains to some extent his continued emphasis on the State (for example, in terms of the commonalities he discerns between Nazism and modern democracies), and the West's biopolitical mode of governance. If class has gone, if what we are left with is a "single planetary petty bourgeoisie" as the form in which "humanity has survived nihilism,"40 it is because, for Agamben, we exist still under the "sign" of Nazism. But does it make sense to speak of the camp, and of homo sacer as the primary images of contemporary politics? Certainly we cannot ignore the fact that illegal detention centers exist, that immigrants are simultaneously social scapegoats and exploited workers, but Agamben runs the risk of totalizing these images into seemingly insurmountable conditions of contemporary life. There is something exceedingly ominous about the following two statements, made in Means Without End, the first with reference to Tiananmen: "the tanks will appear again"41 and the second more general claim that "[t]he camp ... is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet."42

#### Their reform of the “worst aspects” of animal exploitation makes them complicit in the genocide they try to eliminate – the only way to end animal suffering is with capitalism as the starting point

Hagen, 2008

(Jamie, will be attending Brooklyn College as a graduate student in the Political Science program in the fall of 2007, “A look at the political economy of animal rights,” February 16, http://animalethicsandtheory.blogspot.com/)

Crucial to understanding how to get out of a particular paradigm and mindset is understanding how one got there - understanding the framework from which people have developed a view of animals as mere property ("Animals are nothing more than the means to an end of profit in contemporary capitalist production. Their particularity, their interests in not suffering, their desires to be free and to live as beings in the world are all subjugated-*en masse*- to the productive ends of agriculture capital." - pp 58) better allows us to understand the ways in which people will need to reinterpret and understand the world to imagine a world in which animals are treated as living beings with interests and desires who must be acknowledged and treated as such, rather than dominated. ("In short, hierarchical thinking creates prejudices which are reinforced and reproduced by economic and ideological structures." - pp 87) Often Torres references Gary Francione, another abolitionist writer to whom I've referred in the past. The two address the fundamental flaws in the current efforts of the animal rights and welfarist movements: As the movement is structured today, there is a deep and abiding disconnect between means and ends. By pursuing the means of reform, animal protection organizations assume that somehow, at some point, in some way in the future we will reach an end where animals are no longer exploited. It is almost reminiscent of the talk of the left about life after the revolution. The problem is that the primary means of activism today simply supports the basic relations which commodify animals and damn them to bloody exploitation. As long as animal rights activists are stuck on pursuing an agenda to reform the worst practices of animal agriculture, they will remain little more than consultants. It is an industry that will likely accept their demands in some measure, provided they either make for a good marketing opportunity or stall the actual abolition of animal property and animal exploitation. Worse still, organizations that engage in this kind of activism are profiting from it and maintaining their bureaucracies on the backs of the "humanely raised" animal they care so much for. This makes them a party to the animal suffering they are supposedly against. - pp 105 The criticism of the modern animal rights movement's avoidance of any real work to address common problems faced along with non-human movements stemming from the same hegemonic ideology is priceless commentary too often left undone and unsaid. (And I for one can appreciate the acknowledgment of the irrational, unproductive hostility and lack of appreciation and understanding experienced by those interested in theory expressed from the "real activists" of the movement!) While I have severe reservations about the position of the social anarchist, the use of a Marxist critique to understand the alienation of various species (separate post to follow), and the commodification of animals, is essential grounding for any successful ventures to be made in animal rights.

#### Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this structural violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**).** An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

#### One must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humanize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino**(Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on suchan interrelated knowledge, offera guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity.But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue thatto know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). Thissystematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictionsand are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . .For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

## Case

#### Their clip is nothing more than disaster porn, they occupy the position of the Maoist - the impact is imperialism and a reproduction of the harms of the 1ac.

Rey Chow, Comparative Literature—Brown University, 1993

Writing Diaspora, p. 15-16

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist promise that had been betrayed in the West."'6 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society but who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an iden-tification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric. In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the Maoist's most important ancestors is Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre. Like Jane, the Maoist's means to moral power is a specific representational position—the position of powerlessness. In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as powerless: Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone. This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Bronte's depic-tion of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire-building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Bronte's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself."19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis-4-vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist. [T]here is vis-A-vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. . . The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.

#### Affirming humanness checks their impact.

Donahue ’10[Thomas J. Donahue, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Institute for Philosophical Research, “Anthropocentrism and the Argument from Gaia Theory,” Ethics and the Environment vol. 15 number 3 Fall 2010, pgs. 59-61, JFang]

If anthropocentrism did imply the Dominion Thesis, that would, in my opinion, decisively refute the doctrine. But the implication does not hold good (even though a good many anthropocentrists have embraced the Thesis). The trouble with the Routleys’ argument is the middle premise, according to which humans are, on anthropocentric principles, entitled to treat as they wish anything which must serve human interests. Let us call this the Entitlement View. This view is false. The anthropocentrist need not hold that humans are so entitled. The reasons are as follows. Recall the claim made by anthropocentrism—that the only things valuable in themselves are human beings; their desires, needs, and purposes; and the satisfaction of those. The Entitlement View does not follow from this claim. For suppose I accept anthropocentrism. I still run into the problem that any plausible anthropocentric morality will forbid me from treating things in such a way that they needlessly harm other human beings. For example, suppose we concede that a mountain must serve human interests. Still, on any plausible anthropocentric morality, I may not strip mine the mountain such that the resulting sludge contaminates a nearby town’s water supply. The same would hold true even if (implausibly) all humanity agreed to use a certain thing in a way that needlessly harmed some human beings. But then it follows that on any plausible anthropocentric morality, it is false that humans are entitled to treat as they wish anything which must serve human interests. So the Entitlement View is false. Defenders of the Dominion implication might reply that a weaker version of the Entitlement View still holds good: namely, that on anthropocentrist principles, humans are entitled to treat as they wish anything which must serve human interests, so long as they do not violate any of the tenets of any plausible anthropocentric morality. But once this concession is made, the route to the Dominion Thesis seems to be blocked. For it is hard to see how one could reach the thesis that “man is entitled to manipulate the earth and all its non-human contents as he wants” by combining anthropocentrism with this weakened Entitlement View. So it seems that anthropocentrism does not imply the Dominion Thesis. Another ugly consequence attributed to anthropocentrism is the view that human beings cannot have general obligations not to harm plants, non-human animals, or ecosystems. The idea here is that, on anthropocentric principles, one cannot have obligations not to harm such beings unless incurs the obligations by promises, contracts, or the fact that the beings are someone else’s property. Let us call this “the No-obligation Thesis.” This Thesis fails, because it does not take into account all the ways that we can incur obligations. If, by harming an ecosystem, I would be needlessly harming other human beings, then clearly on anthropocentric principles I have an obligation not to harm the ecosystem. More interestingly, even if in harming the ecosystem I would not be harming other human beings, I might still have an anthropocentric obligation not to harm the ecosystem. For suppose that a great number of people strongly desire that the ecosystem not be harmed, and have connected some of their hopes and plans with its not being harmed (Yellowstone National Park might be such an ecosystem). On anthropocentric principles, it is quite possible that I would then have an obligation not to harm that ecosystem, even if the harm I might do would not (seriously) harm or endanger any human beings. And since promises, contracts, and property do not figure here, it seems that the No-obligation Thesis is also false.

#### The 1ac conflates 'life' with 'organism' - this perpetuates the biological fallacy. Only by shifting to an object-oriented-ontology can we resist the impulses toward anthropocentrism and the destruction of the biosphere.

Rowe 96 — Stan Rowe, Professor Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, 1996 (“From Shallow To Deep Ecological Philosophy,” *Trumpeter*, Volume 13, Number 1, Available Online at fhttp://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/278/413, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Organisms can be “alive” one moment and “dead” the next with no quantitative difference. The recently deceased organism has lost none of its physical parts yet it lacks “life”—an unknown quality of organization (perhaps that mystery called “energy?”) but not the organization itself. A still stronger reason exists for not equating “life” and “organisms.” The latter only exhibit “aliveness” in the context of life-supporting systems, though curiously the vitality of the latter has mostly been denied. By analogy, it is as if all agreed that only a tree trunk’s cambial layer is “alive” while its support system—the tree’s bole and roots of bark and wood that envelops and supports the cambium—is “dead.” Instead we perceive the whole tree as “alive.” The separation of “living” organisms from their supportive but “dead” environments is a reductionist convention that ecology disproves. Both organic and inorganic are functional parts of enveloping ecosystems, of which the largest one accessible to direct experience is the global ecosphere. To attribute the organizing principle “life” to Earth—to the ecosphere and its sectoral aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems—makes more sense than attempting to locate it in organisms per se, divorced from their requisite milieus. The aquatic ecologist Lindeman (1942) who pioneered examination of lakes as energetic systems adopted the ecosystem concept because of the blurred distinction between “living” and “dead” in the components of the Minnesota lakes he studied. The Biological Fallacy, equating organisms with life, is the result of a faulty inside-the-system view (Rowe 1991). Pictures of the blue-and-white planet Earth taken from the outside are intuitively recognized as images of a living “cell.” Inside that “cell,” cheated by sight, people perceive a particulate world separable into important and unimportant parts: the “organic” and the “inorganic,” “biotic” and “abiotic,” “animate” and “inanimate,” “living” and “dead.” Religions, philosophies and sciences have been constructed around these ignorant taxonomies, perpetuating the departmentalization of a global ecosystem whose “aliveness” is as much expressed in its improbable atmosphere, crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. When did life begin? When did any kind of creative organization begin? Perhaps when the ecosphere came into existence. Perhaps earlier at time zero and the Big Bang. Important human attitudes hinge on the idea of life and where it resides. If only organisms are imbued with life, then things like us are important and all else is relatively unimportant. The biocentric preoccupation with organisms subtly supports anthropocentrism, for are we not first in neural complexity among all organisms? Earth has traditionally been thought to consist of consequential entities—organisms, living beings—and their relatively inconsequential dead environments. What should be attended to, cared for, worried about? The usual answer today is “life” in its limited sense of “organisms,” of biodiversity. Meanwhile sea, land and air—classified as dead environment—can be freely exploited. In the reigning ideology as long as large organisms are safeguarded, anything goes. We demean Earth by equating “life” and “organisms,” then proving by text-book definition that Earth is dead because not-an-organism. In this way mental doors are barred against the idea of liveliness everywhere. Certainly Earth is not an organism, nor is it a super organism as Lovelock has proposed, any more than organisms are Earth or mini-Earth. The planetary ecosphere and its sectoral volumetric ecosystems are SUPRA-organismic, higher levels of integration than mere organisms. Essential to the ecocentric idea is assignment of highest value to the ecosphere and to the ecosystems that it comprises. Note the use of “ecosphere” rather than “biosphere,” the latter usually defined as a “life-filled” (read “organism-filled”) thin shell at Earth’s surface. The meaning of “ecosphere” goes deeper; it is Earth to the core, comprising the totality of gravity and electro-magnetic fields, the molten radioactive magma that shifts the crustal plates, vulcanism and earthquakes and mountain building that renew nutrients at the surface, the whole dynamic evolving “stage” where organisms play out their many roles under the guidance of the larger whole, shaped at least in part by the “morphic fields” of the living Gaia (Sheldrake 1991:162). In different times and places the source of life has been attributed to the air, to soil, to water, to fire, as well as to organisms. As with the blind men touching the elephant, each separate part has been the imagined essential component of the whole Earth. Now that the planet has been conceptualized as one integrated entity, can we not logically attribute the creative synthesizing quintessence called “life” to it, rather than to any one class of its various parts? When life is conceived as a function of the ecosphere and its sectoral ecosystem the subject matter of Biology is cast in a bright new light. The pejorative concept of “environment” vanishes. The focus of vital interest broadens to encompass the world. Anthropocentrism and biocentrism receive the jolting shock they deserve. The answer as to where our preservation emphasis should center is answered: Earth spaces (and all that is in them) first, Earth species second. This priority guarantees no loss of vital parts. The implications of locating animation where it belongs, of denying the naive “Life = Organisms” equation, are many. Perhaps most important is a broadening of the Schweizerian “reverence for life” to embrace the whole Earth. Reverence for life means reverence for ecosystems. We should feel the same pain when the atmosphere and the seas are poisoned as when people are poisoned. We should feel more pain at the destruction of wild ecosystems, such as the temperate rain forest of the West Coast, than at the demise of any organism, no matter how sad the latter occasion, because the destruction of ecosystems severs the very roots of evolutionary creativity.

#### Their metric of relating to the suffering of animals guarantees their destruction.

**Introna 10** (LUCAS, PROFESSOR OF ORGANIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS @ LANCASTER UNIVERSITY, AI & SOC, 2010, VOL. 25, “THE ‘MEASURE OF A MAN’ AND THE ETHOS OF HOSPITALITY: TOWARDS AN ETHICAL DWELLING WITH TECHNOLOGY,” PG. 93-102)

Instead of creating value systems in our own self-image, the absolute otherness of every Other should be the only moral imperative, so argues Levinas and Derrida. We need an ethics of the artificial that is beyond the self-identical of human beings. Such an ethics beyond anthropocentric metaphysics need as its ‘ground’, not a system for comparison, but rather a recognition of the impossibility of any comparison—every comparison is already violent in its attempt to render equal what could never be equal (Levinas 1991[1974]). How might we encounter the other, ethically, in its otherness? This is what I will no turn to. 3 Hospitality as the ethics of a community that have nothing in common ‘‘Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the ethos... ethics is hospitality; ethics is entirely coextensive with the experience of hospitality, whichever way one expands or limits that.’’—Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, p. 16–17. The fundamental problem for the android Data is that the question of the ethical, its imperative, is already colonised by humans. In this ethical landscape, it becomes impossible for Data to state his case unless it is made in human terms—terms such as ‘machine’, ‘property’, ‘sentience’, etc. It is us humans who are making the decisions about the validity, or not, of any criteria or category for establishing the ethical significance of a being. It is Data— and by extension all non-humans—that is on trial, not we humans. Our moral worth is taken for granted. As such we are the measure. For example we often take ‘sentience’ as criteria for considering moral significance or worth because we argue that it is a necessary condition for the feeling of pain (Singer 1977). Why should pain be a criterion for moral significance? Is it because we can feel pain? Are not all our often-suggested criteria such as originality, sentience, rationality, autonomy, and so forth, not somehow always already based on that which we humans by necessity comply with? Is not the essential criterion for moral worthiness (in most ethical thought) a being in our image, like us? Is our ethics not always an ethics of those with whom we have something in common? Obviously one can legitimately ask whether it is at all possible for us humans to escape our own moral prejudices—especially if we realise the intimate link between ethics and politics. Furthermore, it seems that every attempt one might have to define common inclusive ethical categories or criteria for all things will fail, as it already violates every entity by exactly denying that which is most significant—its radical otherness. Indeed, as was suggested, most attempts (even some radical environmental ethics) are mostly informed by the assumption that at some level we can indeed compare the incomparable—and, ultimately that the only legitimate reference point for such comparison is that which is in the image of the human Other. But what about the non-human Other, the inanimate, the artificial? What about the community of those with whom we have nothing in common? 2 There has been many attempts to define more inclusive ethical categories and values such as a biocentric ethics (Goodpaster 1978; Singer 1977), an ecocentric ethics (Leopold 1966; Naess 1995) or even an infocentric ethics by Floridi (2003). The non-human (inanimate) other One might suggest that, for us human beings, a wholly Other, that is indeed wholly Other, is the inanimate Other. In many respects, the destitute face of the human Other, in the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas for example, is already in some sense a reflection of the human face opposite it. We can indeed substitute ourselves for the Other (become her hostage) because we can imagine—at least in some vague sense—what it must be like for the human Other to suffer violence because we suffer violence. It is possible for us to substitute ‘us for them’ because it could have been my friend, my child, my partner, etc.). As Husserl (1970/1929) argues, in his Cartesian Mediations, through empathy, ‘‘we project ourselves into the alien cultural community and its culture’’ (p. 135) in which the ‘‘the Other’’ exists ‘‘phenomenologically [as] a ‘modification’ of myself’’ (p. 115). Through empathy, our egos constitutes a ‘‘single universal community’’ of human intersubjectivity (p. 140)—a community with a common unity. As human beings, that also encounter ourselves as Other, we know that we always exceed and overflow the caricatures that the intentionality of consciousness endeavours to impose on us, that we are always infinitely more (or radically other) than any and all such caricatures. It is this infinity that Levinas points to when he claims ethics as ‘first philosophy.’ What about the inanimate Other? In his book Technology and Lifeworld Ihde (1990) argues for an extension of Levinas’ notion of alterity (or quasi-otherness) to inanimate things.3 He argues that the ‘religious object’ ‘‘does not simply ‘represent’ some absent power but is endowed with the sacred. Its aura of sacredness is spatially and temporally present within the range of its efficacy’’ (98). Ihde argues, however, that this quasi-otherness always remains in the domain of human invention. In other words, it is still within the realm of that which we humans bring to it—even if it is unintentional or not for instrumental purposes, hence his designation of the object as quasi-other. One might say it is plausible to see the religious object as an Other in some way (even if it is quasi-other) but what about everyday objects such as the table? I want to suggest with Harman (2002, 2005) that the table (and all other inanimate objects) are also infinitely other, always more than that which human intentionality brings to it. In Tool-Being Harman (2002) argues that even the table, in the fullness of its being, is infinite. Although the intentional acts of consciousness transform it by necessity into a caricature (into some form of present-at-hand being), such acts do not, and never can, exhaust it. As Harman (2002) suggests: ‘‘However, deeply we meditate on the table’s act of supporting solid weights, however, tenaciously we monitor its presence, any insight that is yielded will always be something quite distinct from this act [of being] itself’’ (22)—what he calls its tool-being. The table, here before me, is always more than all the perspectives, levels or layers that we can enumerate, more than all the uses we can put it to, more than all possible perspectives, levels, layers or uses. Harman (2002, 2005) argues that any and all possible relations between humans and things will inevitably fail to grasp them as they are; they are, in the fullness of their being, irreducible to any and all of these relations.4 In short: they are, in the fullness of their being, infinite and wholly Other. Indeed, as was suggested above, one might claim that they are in a sense more Other (if one can say this at all) than the human Other since we can never in any sense put ourselves ‘in their shoes,’ as it were. Thus, if the infinitely otherness of the Other is what compels us—puts our own right to existence into question, as Levinas argues—then we have no basis for excluding the inanimate Other from the kingdom of Others—even if Levinas did not arrive at this conclusion. His Other is always the humanistic, or ultimately, the theistic Other. This paper endeavours to go beyond this boundary, to forsake all boundaries, to enter into a community that have nothing in common (Lingis 1994). Is such a community possible?

#### They create the conditions for their impacts to happen - they only have impacts if you accept their symbolic view of the world.

Bauldrillard 98 (Simulation and Simulacrum)

In the same way science and technology were recently mobilized to save the mummy of Ramses II, after it was left to rot for several dozen years in the depths of a museum. The West is seized with panic at the thought of not being able to save what the symbolic order had been able to conserve for forty centuries, but out of sight and far from the light of day. Ramses does not signify anything for us, only the mummy is of an inestimable worth because it is what guarantees that accumulation has meaning. Our entire linear and accumulative culture collapses if we cannot stockpile the past in plain view. To this end the pharaohs must be brought out of their tomb and the mummies out of their silence. To this end they must be exhumed and given military honors. They are prey to both science and worms. Only absolute secrecy assured them this millennial power - the mastery over putrefaction that signified the mastery of the complete cycle of exchanges with death. We only know how to place our science in service of repairing the mummy, that is to say restoring a visible order, whereas embalming was a mythical effort that strove to immortalize a hidden dimension. We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them. Whence this historic scene of the reception of the mummy at the Orly airport. Why? Because Ramses was a great despotic and military figure? Certainly. But mostly because our culture dreams, behind this defunct power that it tries to annex, of an order that would have had nothing to do with it, and it dreams of it because it exterminated it by exhuming it as its own past. We are fascinated by Ramses as Renaissance Christians were by the American Indians, those (human?) beings who had never known the word of Christ. Thus, at the beginning of colonization, there was a moment of stupor and bewilderment before the very possibility of escaping the universal law of the Gospel. There were two possible responses: either admit that this Law was not universal, or exterminate the Indians to efface the evidence. In general, one contented oneself with converting them, or even simply discovering them, which would suffice to slowly exterminate them. Thus it would have been enough to exhume Ramses to ensure his extermination by museumification. Because mummies don't rot from worms: they die from being transplanted from a slow order of the symbolic, master over putrefaction and death, to an order of history, science, and museums, our order, which no longer masters anything, which only knows how to condemn what preceded it to decay and death and subsequently to try to revive it with science. Irreparable violence toward all secrets, the violence of a civilization without secrets, hatred of a whole civilization for its own foundation.

### 2nc

### Case

**Resist the humanization of nature - it turns it into the artefactual and destroys the inherent ontological value within the universe. Humans don't create meaning, they reduce it.**

Lee 99 (Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, The Natural and the Artefactual, 1999)

Such a predicament shows the need not to throw the baby out with the bath water. Modem (Westem) thought has indeed privileged humans and inferiorized nature through maintaining the human/nature dualism. But while such dualism is unjustified, it does not mean that the distinction between what is human and what is natural is itself unjustitied. If ontological elimination of nature as ‘the Other’ is to be avoided, then the distinction must be retained, not in the form of dualism but of ontological dyadism, Unless ontological space is reserved for nature, nature will be eliminated ontologically and empirically. When nature becomes thoroughly humanized, when the natural has been transformed to become the artefactual, our civilization correspondingly would have transformed itself into a totally narcissistic one. Such a transformation could not be checked unless one argues for the priority of ontological values over axiological ones-the latter involves secondary characteristics like complexity, intricacy, creativity while the former involves the more fundamental values like being independent and autonomous (of hurnankind), While artefacts and naturally-occurring entities may share the same secondary characteristics, nevertheless, they do not share the same fundamental ontological status, To appreciate ‘the ontological distance' that humankind has traveled since the inception of the modem Scientific Project in the seventeenth century in Westem Europe, one must go back again to Aristotle. At the beginning of this book, readers were reminded that Aristotle maintained that in explaining all phenomena, the four causes must be invoked and distinguished, even in the case of naturally-occurring beings like individual organisms. However, in reality, he admitted it was very difficult to separate out these causes where biotic nature was involved, as the individual organism qua organism exhibited them all but in a way which rendered them inextricably entwined with one another. Aristotle realized that it was only with artefacts that the four causes could be externally identified and assigned each to its source. In the case of a building, one could easily point to wood as its material cause, to the mason who constructed it as its efficient cause, to the plan either drawn on a sheet of paper or held in the mason’s head as its final cause, and to the purpose which the owner had intended for it as the final cause. But in the case of individual organisms, although explanatory cogency and intelligibility demanded that one identified these four causes, the distinctions between them could only be made intellectually rather than empirically. Artefacts in Aristotle’s time were paradigmatically abiotic or exbiotic in character, However, by the late twentieth century, humankind through biotechnology, as we have seen, is able to create artefacts in the form of living organisms whose degree of artefacticity goes well beyond that achieved by the earlier technology of selective breeding or even by the Mendelian-induced technology of hybridization-the immanent telos of a naturally-occurring organism under which the four causes are inextricably entwined is replaced by an extemal Ielos imposed by humankind, under which its four causes, as an artefact, can be extemally identified and assembled. Under biotechnology, the material cause of the artefactual organism can be introduced from another species, be that plant or animal: its efficient cause is, thereby, anthropogenic; its formal cause is the extemal telos imposed on it by its anthropogenic efficient cause, such as the desire for a genetically engineered sheep to produce milk containing human rather than sheep homiones; and its final cause is to serve the end of its human creator, such as to produce human hormones which, when harvested from the organism, could be used to improve human health. Such an individual organism in the language of this book (see Chapter 5), no longer exists ‘by itself’ although it does exist ‘for itself.' A being which exists ‘by itself’ is a being which has not come into existence or continues to exist in order to serve human ends. A biotic artefact has lost that status. But a biotic artefact continues to exist ‘for itself’ that is to say, it continues to strive to maintain its own functioning integrity just as a naturally occurring organism does. Humankind has learned to use its science and its technology, especially in the last twenty odd years, precisely to capnire the status of a naturally-occurring organism as a being capable of existing ‘for itself’ to turn it into a being which is no longer capable of existing ‘by itself' Just as the four causes in a naturally-occuning organism are so inextricably entwined that they can only he distinguished intellectually, in the same way, a naturallly-occurring organism in existing ‘for itself’ is at one and the same time inextricably also existing ‘by itself’ But modem science and its technology has succeeded spectacularly in prizing apan these two inextricably entwined modes of existence. This transformation of the biotic as a naturally-occurring being to become an artefactual being has taken more than two thousand years to reach this most recent deep level of artefacticity. And we have just seen that such a transformation involves a revolution at once at two levels, conceptual and technological-it now makes sense both empirically and conceptually to separate out the four Aristotelian causes assigning them to extemal anthropogenic sources and to destroy the being which exists `by itself’ without destroying also the being which exists ‘for itself' This achievement enables theoretical biologists like Varela and Maturana to conceptualize even naturally-occurring organisms as mere machines. Such a revolution is awesome but ontologically worrying. We should not delude ourselves that the humanization of nature will stop at biotic nature or indeed be confined only to planet Earth. Other planets in our solar system, too, may eventually be humanized; given the technological possibility of doing so, the temptation to do so appears difficult to resist on the part of those always on the lookout for new challenges and new excitement. To resist the ontological elimination of nature as ‘the Other,’ environmental philosophy must not merely be earthbound hut, also, astronomically bounded (at least to the extent of our own solar system). We should bear in mind that while there may be little pristine nature left on Earth, this does not mean that nature is not pristine elsewhere in other planets. We should also be mindful that while other planets may not have life on them, this does not necessarily render them only of instrumental value to us, Above all, we should, therefore, bear in mind that nature, whether pristine or less than fully pristine, biotic or abiotic, is ontologically independent and autonomous of humankind--natural forms and natural processes are capable of undertaking their own .trajectories of existence. We should also remind ourselves that we are the controllers of our science and our technology, and not allow the products of our intellectual labor to dictate to us what we do to nature itself without pause or reflection. However, it is not the plea of this book that humankind should never transform the natural to become the artefactual, or to deny that artefacticity is not a matter of differing degrees or levels, as such claims would be silly and indefensible. Rather its remit is to argue that in systematically transforming the natural to become the artefactual through our science and our technology, we are at the same time systematically engaged in ontological simplification. Ontological impoverishment in this context is wrong primarily because we have so far failed to recognize that nature embodies its own fundamental ontological value. In other words, it is not true, as modernity alleges, that nature is devoid of all value and that values are simply humanly conferred or are the projections of human emotions or attitudes upon nature. Admittedly, it takes our unique type of human consciousness to recognize that nature possesses ontological value; however, from this it would be fallacious to conclude that human consciousness is at once the source of all values, or even the sole locus of axiologically-grounded intrinsic values. But most important of all, human consciousness does not generate the primary ontological value of independence in nature; nature's forms and processes embodying this value exist whether humankind is around or not.

**Taylor 06** [Paul, Professor of Communication Studies, “The Pornographic barbarism of the Self-reflecting sign”,

IJBS, Volume 4 Number 1, published 2006] Jean **Baudrillard has compared the West’s relationship to images in terms of obscenity**. In the light of events in Iraq, frequent accusations that his work is willfully abstruse should be reconsidered. **Baudrillard takes the notion of the obscene literally. An etymological analysis of the word gives us** “ob” – a prefix meaning hindering – and “scene” – from the Latin and Greek words for “stage”. Ignoring its conventional connotation of depravity, his re-reading of the term *obscene* gives us **the notion that Western media-dominated society is ob-scene because its proliferation of images has imploded the traditional, symbolically coded distance between the image and viewer that is implied with a stage.** Baudrillard’s writing contains the repeated theme **that in the West we suffer from a virus-like proliferation of immediate images that replace the distance needed for either considered reflection or a developed sensitivity to the ambiguities of cultural meanings.** Baudrillard’s analysis illuminates the present mediascape. For example, he argues: “… **we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the obscene, its power to exterminate all ambiguity and all seduction and deliver to us the definitive fascination of bodies without faces, faces without eyes, and eyes that don’t look**”. This has chilling pertinence to **the dehumanized images** of Iraqi prisoners **in which their faces are hooded, deliberately pixilated, or only appear as minor details within a broader tableau** (e.g., the naked man cowering in front of snarling guard dogs). Originally used in a different context, Baudrillard also provides an unwittingly prescient description of the furor over the *Daily Mirror* pictures’ authenticity:…**we don’t look for definition or richness of imagination in these images; we look for the giddiness of their superficiality**, for the artifice of detail, the intimacy of their technique**. What we truly desire is their technical artificiality, and nothing more.** Beyond the manifest obscenity of the Pornography of the Abu Ghraib photographs, Baudrillard’s broader theoretical point relates to **how their staging paradoxically relies upon the actual absence of a stage.** A surfeit of images is presented to us so that: ”**Obscenity takes on all the semblances of modernity. We are used to seeing it, first of all, in the perpetration of sex, but it extends to everything that can be perpetrated in the visible – it becomes the perpetration of the visible itself**”. In a form of semiotic potlatch, **images become their own justification for the decontextualized consumption for its own sake** of such formats as *MTV Cribs* and *Bumfights*. **Everything becomes a potential image for the voyeuristic gaze and less and less is ruled out on grounds of taste or any other consideration.** The pornography of the image lies here in its explicitness**. Nothing is left to the imagination and all is revealed to the passive viewer**. An apparently overwhelming sexual will-to-reveal that Welsh identified in the rise of gonzo porn may at least partially explain the sexual aspect of the Abu Ghraib pictures. As Sontag recently argued, we live in a world where, increasingly: An erotic life is for more and more people what can be captured on video. To live is to be photographed, to have a record of one’s life, oblivious or claiming to be oblivious to the camera’s non-stop attentions ...Ours is a society in which secrets of private life that, formerly, you would have nearly anything to conceal, you now clamour to get on a television show to reveal.

**This is disaster porn.**

**Olujobi 06** (Gbemisola “The Africa You Need to Know”

http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20061128\_the\_africa\_you\_need\_to\_know/ ; Posted on Nov 28, 2006)

**Putting an indelible question mark on disaster journalism,** they say, **“Reduced to nameless extras in the shadows behind Western aid workers or disaster tourists, the grieving, hurting and humiliated human beings are not asked if they want to be portrayed in this degrading way.**” Has anyone ever considered this? They also reveal that “Somali doctors and nurses have expressed shock at the conduct of **film crews** in hospitals. They **rush through crowded corridors, leaping over stretchers, dashing to film the agony before it passes. They hold bedside vigils to record the moment of death. When the Italian actress Sophia Loren visited Somalia, the paparazzi trampled on children as they scrambled to film her feeding a little girl—three times. This is disaster pornography.”**

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## AT: Bare Life

#### The state can always be challenged through attempts to recognize the social fantasy and assume the role of bare life.

Edkins 3, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, 2003 [Jenny, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 216]

At the point at which changes in the political ordering of the state are demanded, protests move to the sites that are central to the current structure. The protests reclaim memory and rewrite it as a form of resistance. The story is never finished: the scripting of memory by those in power can always be challenged, and such challenges are found at moments and in places where the very foundations of the imagined community have been laid out. They play on, and demand a recognition of, the contingency of political community and its structure as social fantasy. For the most part, these protests are insistently non-violent. As such they have a particular effectiveness in their appeal against the structures of sovereign power put into place by the treatment of life as bare life that was discussed in the previous chapter. In a sense that I shall explore in this chapter, they assume, or take on, bare life. The protesters, in refusing vio­lent means, expose the violence of the state. This exposure is particularly poignant and powerful when it takes place in the face of the memorials to state violence.