## 1NC 1

#### Interpretation—the resolution requires them to defend enactment of a topical USFG policy.

Ericson 3 Jon, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Limits—failure to adhere to the communal topic leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow and un-educational debate—a balanced controversy is key to decision-making skills.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 43-45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decision-making is the only transferable skill—means framework turns case.

Steinberg and Freeley 8 – Justin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 9-10

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions everyday. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

## 1NC 2

#### The 1AC's approach to those of disability is to bring them into the fold, to challenge the notion of society that allows their exclusion in the first place - this approach re-entrenches a notion of productivity and denies difference.

**Gullì 10** (Bruno, philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign, Productive, and Efficient: The Place of Disability in the Ableist Society” in “Earthly Plentitudes: A Study of Sovereignty and Labor,” 2010, p.132-155)

She reviews various critiques of equality before speaking of the dependency critique. They are the difference critique, the dominance critique, and the diversity critique. Generally speaking, however, the traditional concept of equality proves incapable of becoming common, for it entails the idea of “man as the mea sure of humanity” (p. 5). It is then equalities, if anything, that might reach into the common with a view to the fundamental aspect of difference: “We are different from another and we are equal to another” (p. 11). Indeed, difference is a relative category, whether understood together with identity or with equality. In the former case, every being is different from any other in virtue of being identical with itself; but precisely in this there is commonality. In the latter, a being is different from those to which it is not equal in virtue of being equal to those that are not different from it. Obviously, the former situation is, ontologically speaking, more fundamental and common than the latter, of which it must constitute the inner structure.10 Of the latter, Kittay gives an example that might be useful to quote: For instance, to insist that difference is the property of a deaf child in a class of hearing children— and so the deaf child must accommodate herself to her hearing peers— is to ignore the fact that the hearing child is also different from the deaf child. Neither hearing nor deafness is inherently a difference. Instead the difference is in the relation these children bear to one another. (Ibid.; emphasis added) The last two sentences show that the most fundamental and common reality is given by a being’s self- identity, or rather by it singularity, its thisness, which points to the commonality of difference as a relational concept, as well as to the problematic nature of a hastily posited equality. For Kittay, it is only the dependency critique that moves toward “an appreciation of the inevitable variety of human interaction and a more adequate understanding of what is morally acceptable in asymmetric relations” (p. 15). This critique addresses the question of a gendered labor and the necessity of its redistribution; it also challenges the traditional logic of inclusion and exclusion, typical of the distribution of labor and justice. In particular, Kittay argues, it highlights the contingent nature of the difference that has historically assigned women the role of dependency workers and caregivers (p. 16). However, she also notes that even among women the work of de pen den cy has not been evenly distributed (p. 28), for class and race are equally fundamental moments in the division of labor. Obviously, dependency work “must be done by someone” (ibid.). The question for Kittay is how to end the stigmatization of this type of work and of those who do it. One of the main reasons for this stigma, particularly in modern, capitalist societies, is that the work of care is not productive. In this sense, the critique of productivity and sovereignty becomes fundamental. Kittay says: Rather than ask if women’s care of dependents results in them being marked as different, we need to ask whether doing dependency work excludes those who do it from the class of equals, and if so, what we must understand and do to end this exclusion. (Ibid.) It is here that the concepts and realities of productivity and sovereignty show their persistence, here that their critique must be incensed and their danger exposed. Thus, for Kittay, the “dependency critique considers … the inescapable fact of human dependency and the ways in which such labor makes one vulnerable to domination” (ibid.). In this sense, a formal discourse on justice remains far from creating the structures of true equality, which only an emphasis on non- productive, non- sovereign, care can bring about. In other words, the truth of a fundamental in equality cannot be altered by a formal positing of the principle of equality (who is equal to whom?) that operates through a logic of inclusion and exclusion. True equality cannot be established empirically; that is, the standard of the equal must be a transcendental and univocal concept, such as the dignity of individuation— certainly not man as the measure.11 Otherwise, as in Aristotle, justice would remain equality for equals and in equality for unequals (Politics 1280a10– 15). When the latter are excluded from the society of equals, the semblance of equality obtains; so does the shadow of in equality. Merely demanding equality does not solve the problem of who will do the work that generates in equality in the first place: the labor of support and care, the labor without which there could not be a human community. As Kittay says, what is important is a new and fairer distribution of this labor “across the population” (1999: 19). Care and equality are to be brought into “a dialectical relation” (ibid.). In this sense, equality is not a reduction of difference to the same, with the consequent exclusion of the irreducible one(s). Rather, it is the neutrality of subject and object, of carer and cared for— the substance and product of care. It is “being with,” in Nancy’s sense (see Chapter 1). It is also care in Heidegger’s sense, as “being- ahead- of- oneself- already- in (the world) as being- together- with (innerworldly beings encountered)” (1996a: 180).

#### The drive of Productivity is the Basis for massive violence.

Alan **Stoekl,** professor of French and comparative literature at Penn State University, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion and Postsustainability, 20**07** (Pg 44 – 46)

Bataille does, then, implicitly face the question of carrying capacity. Perhaps the ultimate example of this is nuclear war. The modern economy, according to Bataille, does not recognize the possibility of excess and therefore limits; the Protestant, and then the Marxist, ideal is to reinvest all excess back into the productive process, always augmenting output in this way. “Utility” in this model ends up being perfectly impractical: only so much output can be reabsorbed into the ever-more-efficient productive process. As in the case with Tibet, ultimately the excess will have to be burned off. This can happen either peacefully, through various postcapitalist mechanisms that Bataille recommends, such as the Marshall Plan, which will shift growth to other parts of the world, or violently and apocalyptically through the ultimate in war: nuclear holocaust. One can see that, in the end, the world itself will be en vase clos, fully developed, with no place for the excess to go. The bad alternative—nuclear holocaust—will result in the ultimate reduction in carrying capacity: a burned-out, depopulated earth. Humanity is, at the same time, through industry, which uses energy for the development of the forces of production, both a multiple opening of the possibilities of growth, and the infinite faculty for burnoff in pure loss (facilite infinie de consumation en pure perte]. (OC. 7: 170; AS, 181) Modern war is first of all a renunciation: one produces and amasses wealth in order to overcome a foe. War is an adjunct to economic expansion; it is a practical use of excessive forces. And this perhaps is the ultimate danger of the present-day (1949) buildup of nuclear arms: armament, seemingly a practical way of defending one’s own country or spreading one’s own values, in other words, of growing, ultimately leads to the risk of a “pure destruction” of excess—and even of carrying capacity In the case of warfare, destructiveness is masked, made unrecognizable, by the appearance of an ultimate utility: in this case the spread of the American economy and the American way of life around the globe. Paradoxically, there is a kind of self-consciousness concerning excess, in the “naïve” society—which recognizes expenditure for what it is (in the form of unproductive glory in primitive warfare)— and a thorough ignorance of it in the modem one, which would always attempt to put waste to work (“useful” armaments) even at the cost of wholesale destruction. Bataille, then, like Le Blanc, can be characterized as a thinker of society who situates his theory in the context of ecological limits. From Bataille’s perspective, however, there is always too much rather than too little, given the existence of ecological (“natural”) and social (“cultural”) limits. The “end” of humankind, its ultimate goal, is thus the destruction of this surplus. While Le Blanc stresses war and sacrifice as a means of obtaining or maintaining what is essential to bare human (personal, social) survival, Bataille emphasizes the maintenance of limits and survival as mere preconditions for engaging in the glorious destruction of excess. The meaning of the limit and its affirmation is inseparable from the senselessness of its transgression in expenditure (la dépense). By seeing warfare as a mere (group) survival mechanism, Le Blanc makes the same mistake as that made by the supporters of a nuclear buildup; he, like they, sees warfare as practical, serving a purpose, and not as the sheer burn-off it really is. If, however, our most fundamental gesture is the destruction of a surplus, the production of that surplus must be seen as subsidiary. Once we recognize that everything cannot be saved and reinvested, the ultimate end (and most crucial problem) of our existence becomes the disposal of excess wealth (concentrated, nonusable energy). All other activity leads to something else, is a means to some other end; the only end that leads nowhere is the act of destruction by which we may—or may not—assure our (personal) survival (there is nothing to guarantee that radical destruction—consumation—does not turn on its author). We work in order to spend. We strive to produce sacred (charged) things, not practical things. Survival and reproduction alone are not the ultimate ends of human existence. We could characterize Bataille for this reason as a thinker of ecology who nevertheless emphasizes the primacy of an ecstatic social act (destruct ion). By characterizing survival as a means not an end (the most fundamental idea in “general economy”), expenditure for Bataille becomes a limitless, insubordinate act—a real end (that which does not lead outside itself). I follow Bataille in this primacy of the delirium of expenditure over the simple exigency of personal or even social survival (Le Blanc). This does not preclude, however, a kind of ethical aftereffect of Bataille’s expenditure: survival for this reason can be read as the fundamentally unintentional consequence of expenditure rather than its purpose. Seeing a nuclear buildup as the wrong kind of expenditure—because it is seen as a means not an end—can lead, in Bataille’s view, to a rethinking of the role of expenditure in the modern world and hence, perhaps, the world’s (but not modernity’s) survival.

#### The Alternative Is To Sacrifice Ability – Living In The Disabled World Is A Strategy To Disrupt Productivity And Rupture The System That Creates Their Impacts.

Gullì 10 (Bruno, philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign, Productive, and Efficient: The Place of Disability in the Ableist Society” in “Earthly Plentitudes: A Study of Sovereignty and Labor,” 2010, p.132-155)

In his book on queerness and disability, McRuer offers a critique of productivity as compulsory able-bodiedness, “which in a sense produces disability” (McRuer 2006: 2). The alternative to able- bodied dogmas is that “a disabled world is possible and desirable” (p. 71). The idea that a better world is a disabled world is very provocative, but it is the necessary outcome of a critique of productivity. Of course, what this means is that disability must stop being “the raw material against which the imagined future world is formed” (p. 72)— an idea, McRuer says, typical of liberationist models. Whenever able-bodiedness is the goal, perhaps unwanted, the specters of normalization, in dependence, productivity, and sovereignty also linger. For McRuer, the construction of able-bodiedness is linked to the construction of hetero sexuality: “The institutions in our culture that produce and secure a heterosexual identity also work to secure an able- bodied identity” (p. 151). These normalizing identities, essential to the logic of the same, are not differences among differences, nor do they open up the realm of the universal. They are not differences because they have closed the gap between the norm they have established and the moments of anxiety that brought them to establish the norm. Indeed, they are not different from that anxiety, as in having moved away from it. Rather, that anxiety no longer exists, and it has never existed. They are what they have always been; what they will always be. Difference to them is a matter of indifference. Yet, they are not universals because they are incapable of the leap into what they are not, incapable of reaching into the univocal and neutral structure that connects the one to the other, the structure of otherness as such. They have lost their contingency, no longer able not to be. McRuer speaks of “those [desirable] disabled/queer moments” as of “temporary or contingent universalization” (p. 157; emphasis added), that is, moments in which, as I understand it, we are what we have not been and would not be, able not to be what we are, and thus, able to reach into the other. However, it is not the idealized other that we encounter, nor ourselves as and in the other; rather, we encounter our own otherness, which is the same with what is different from us, for it is difference itself— not merely what- is, but what- could- be. The universalizing potentiality present in this, that is, in the “dis-” of disability, just as in the “ab-” of the abnormal (the abyss surrounding the norm), subverts the logic of the contract and of a multitude united under the sovereign sign. The disunited multitude feared by Hobbes (1994: XVIII) the multitude that commits injustice, reaches, through the “dis-” of its disunity, and bears witness to, the most extreme.

## Case

#### The three tiered method isn’t inherently exclusionary -

#### Their method of challenging ableism reinforces the regmine of truth associated with heteronormativity.

Elias et al. 2003; (Karen E. Lovaas PhD, John P. Elia PhD & Gust A. Yep PhD, Professor at San Francisco University, Journal of Homosexuality, Vol. 45, no. 2/3/4, p.18, 2003)

In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating pervasiveness of hatred and violence in her daily life based on being seen, perceived, labeled, and treated as an “Other.” This process of *othering* creates individuals, groups, and communities that are deemed to be less important, less worthwhile, less consequential, less authorized, and less human based on historically situated markers of social formation such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and nationality. Othering and marginalization are results of an “invisible center” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values. As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society (Foucault, 1978/1990). Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is “the site of violence” (p. xxvi). Perhaps one of the most powerful forms of normalization in Western social systems is heteronormativity. Through heteronormative discourses, abject and abominable bodies, souls, persons, and life forms are created, examined, and disciplined through current regimes of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1978/1990). Heteronormativity, as the invisible center and the presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, and perpetuating the erasure, marginalization, disempowerment, and oppression of sexual others.

#### Restricting detention policies means we kill and extradite prisoners

Jack Goldsmith 09, a professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, 5/31/09, “The Shell Game on Detainees and Interrogation,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052902989.html

The cat-and-mouse game does not end there. As detentions at Bagram and traditional renditions have come under increasing legal and political scrutiny, the Bush and Obama administrations have relied more on other tactics. They have secured foreign intelligence services to do all the work -- capture, incarceration and interrogation -- for all but the highest-level detainees. And they have increasingly employed targeted killings, a tactic that eliminates the need to interrogate or incarcerate terrorists but at the cost of killing or maiming suspected terrorists and innocent civilians alike without notice or due process.¶ There are at least two problems with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, it is not ideal for security. Sometimes it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist (if possible) than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries.¶ The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone. We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.¶ It is tempting to say that we should end this pattern and raise standards everywhere. Perhaps we should extend habeas corpus globally, eliminate targeted killing and cease cooperating with intelligence services from countries that have poor human rights records. This sentiment, however, is unrealistic. The imperative to stop the terrorists is not going away. The government will find and exploit legal loopholes to ensure it can keep up our defenses.¶ This approach to detention policy reflects a sharp disjunction between the public's view of the terrorist threat and the government's. After nearly eight years without a follow-up attack, the public (or at least an influential sliver) is growing doubtful about the threat of terrorism and skeptical about using the lower-than-normal standards of wartime justice.¶ The government, however, sees the terrorist threat every day and is under enormous pressure to keep the country safe. When one of its approaches to terrorist incapacitation becomes too costly legally or politically, it shifts to others that raise fewer legal and political problems. This doesn't increase our safety or help the terrorists. But it does make us feel better about ourselves.

#### The aff is tokenism - they use the status of people who are idefinitely detained as a starting point to talk about ableist structures of exclusion - their politics is one that highlights the suffering in one group, only to let them be starved to use them as an example of the suffering of another.

#### The presentation of the 1AC is ableist - turns their entire aff.

Berube ‘3 (Michael, “Citizenship and Disability: Disability is a matter of civil rights, even if the Supreme Court doesn't seem to agree.”, http://www.alternet.org/story/15809/citizenship\_and\_disability)

Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and thepurpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Nowimagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I thinkthere's a very good reasonto extend the franchise,to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

#### This is a debate about the content of this debate. The ballot has no assigned meaning, the only thing is signifies is the judge determines which team wins the debate based on the debating that occurs.

####  Reject their ROB, it’s self serving and it methodologically flawed.

P.Madhu [PhD, Associate fellow @ School of social sciences Mahatma Ghandi University] “On Identity Politics”, accessed November 14, 2013¶ https://www.academia.edu/3564332/On\_Identity\_Politics

Identity bias is deeply ingrained in understanding the social ever since the social is¶ problematized. Cults, religions, races, nations, cliques, orders, castes and genders often¶ claim superiority to themselves and thereby inflict inferiority over others. At the species¶ level, homo sapiens claim themselves as superior. The claims continue to modify¶ relations among humans and their relation with the other species and things.¶ Identities are not mere descriptions. They are associated with claims of superiority and¶ inferiority. Often such claims are ‘essentialized’: the occupants of various positions¶ within the social space1 were deluded to believe they are in their respective position¶ because that should be ‘naturally’ so. Human species is believed to be ‘naturally’¶ superior to the others.¶ Historically, there are times in which one section occupies higher position in the social¶ space within the set of rules constructed for social mobility. At other times, when the¶ rules of social mobility go under discursive transitions, the social space is transformed¶ repositioning the orders of mobility. Within the transformed space the privileged may¶ be turned underprivileged and vice-versa, all within emergent patterns of social, cultural¶ and symbolic capitals. The transformation of the social space and the transition of¶ mobility patterns deserve serious sociological attention than what usually claimants of¶ various types of identity politics do.¶ The enunciative principles of various discursive formations that defined the rules and¶ practices of social mobility within a given social space has to be studied meticulously¶ rather than resorting to simplistic assumptions of identity politics. Unlike serious¶ studies, the adventures of Identity politics short circuits understanding the social with¶ simplistic sloganeering. The identity politics academics is fundamentally narcissistic and¶ hence replaces the careful analysis of processes with preoccupations of villains, heroes,¶ victims, conspirators, good ones and bad thugs.¶ Identity politics is methodologically defective. Monoliths of identities are non-existing¶ social realities. All that appears as monoliths are constituted by multiple fields of¶ exterior relations2. All that appears as entities are consequent of processes elsewhere.¶ Therefore, essence of an entity does not lie within. Any claims of identity essences are¶ therefore methodologically defective. Identity politics is methodologically flawed¶ whenever it proposes the ‘us versus them’. It is doubly flawed because such claims of¶ narcissistic too. All claims of narcissisms are methodologically unsustainable. Further,¶ any claim of identity essence can be done only at the cost of neglecting interplaying¶ genealogies of identities3. Conditions and trajectories of the possibilities of identity¶ formations and not identities themselves are methodologically tenable. In other words¶ not the identities per se but the micro-politics of their formation and continuation are¶ methodologically viable.¶ Identities are methodologically unviable even within the strictly empirical sense. Identity¶ claims are generic, least applicable to the particulars. The particulars are always distinct¶ and different from the generic identities within which they are bracketed4. For this¶ reason, identities do not actually represent those whom they claim to represent.¶ Identity claims when made as politics, inherently it is flawed with representing a¶ dominant minority within the identity bracket than the entire range of members within¶ it. Practically, identity politics is politics of hegemony of a voiced within the identity¶ bracket. A ‘minority politics’5 within the identity bracket would make identity politics¶ unviable. Minority politics within the identity bracket is the politics of the unvoiced¶ within the bracketed identity. The identity politics co-evolves with other methodological¶ fallacies of appeal to emotion, alleging conspiracy within the sociological processes,¶ reductionism and tending to be prematurely revolutionary without closely looking at the¶ micro processes constituting and sustaining the identities. However, it is successful to¶ some extent because it has generated a sense of justice in real world politics among the¶ deprived. A scholarly genuine approach to identities would be of greater merit because¶ that would liberate one from the clutches of identities of one’s own and that of the¶ other. It will be instrumental in nullifying all claims of identities and consequent social¶ and political dominations. Identity politics is methodologically unviable. However,¶ demystifying and undoing identities is methodologically tenable and politically sensible.

### 2NC

#### The affirmative reinforces capitalism’s drive to “normalize” the disabled population – more inclusion, more control and more normality serves to solidify the institution that is the ROOT CAUSE of disability oppression.

Michael Oliver, Professor of Disability Studies @ University of Greenwich, 1999, “Capitalism, Disability and Ideology: A Materialist Critique of the Normalization Principle”, http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/archiveuk/Oliver-cap-dis-ideol.pdf; AB

At the outset, I should say two things. I have no particular interest in the history of normalization and therefore, I am not attempting to provide a revisionist history of it. Neither do I think that normalization, or social role valorization as it has become in its reincarnation, has much to offer in developing a social theory of disability. I am interested however in the oppression of disabled people in capitalist societies and what normalization does, or rather does not say about it. This interest has led me to begin to sketch out what a social theory of disability might look like (Oliver 1990) .For me, all social theory must be judged on three inter-related elements: its adequacy in describing experience; its ability to explain experience; and finally, its potential to transform experience. My own theorizing on disability is located in Marxist political economy which, I would argue offers a much more adequate basis for describing and explaining experience than does normalization theory which is based upon interactionist and functionalist sociology. In fact I would go further and argue that the social theory that underpins Marxist political economy has far greater transformative potential in eradicating the oppression that disabled people face throughout the world than the interactionist and functionalist theories that underpin normalization ever can have. And I will go even further than that and argue that already this theory has had a far greater influence on the struggles that disabled people are themselves currently engaged in to remove the chains of that oppression than normalization which is**,** at best a bystander in these struggles, and at worst part of the process of oppression itself. In presenting this argument, I will begin by articulating my own theoretical position based upon Marxist political economy and hereinafter referred to as materialist theory. I will then demonstrate the inadequacies of normalization theory's explanation of the rise of the institution before going on to provide a critique of the ideology which underpins it. Next, I will take issue with the argument that normalization has been successful because it is based upon 'experience'. Finally I will look at what both normalization and materialist theories say about change, having briefly described the appalling material conditions under which disabled people live throughout the world. Before proceeding further, it is perhaps necessary to explain the use of terminology in this chapter. Underpinning it is a materialist view of society; to say that the category disability is produced by capitalist society in a particular form implies a particular world view. Within this world view, the production of the category disability is no different from the production of motor cars or hamburgers. Each has an industry, whether it be the car, fast food or human service industry. Each industry has a workforce which has a vested interest in producing their product in particular ways and in exerting as much control over the process of production as possible. Producing a materialist theory of disability The production of disability therefore is nothing more or less than a set of activities specifically geared towards producing a good - the category disability - supported by a range of political actions which create the conditions to allow these productive activities to take place and underpinned by a discourse which gives legitimacy to the whole enterprise. As to the specifics of the terminology used in this discourse, I use the term disabled people generically and refuse to divide the group in terms of medical conditions, functional limitation or severity of impairment. For me disabled people are defined in terms of three criteria; (i) they have an impairment; (ii) they experience oppression as a consequence; and (c) they identify themselves as a disabled person. Using the generic term does not mean that I do not recognise differences in experience within the group but that in exploring this we should start from the ways oppression differentially impacts on different groups of people rather than with differences in experience among individuals with different impairments. I agree that my own initial outlining of a materialist theory of disability (Oliver 1990) did not specifically include an examination of the oppression that people with learning difficulties face (and I use this particular term throughout my paper because it is the one democratic and accountable organisations of people with learning difficulties insist on). Nevertheless I agree that "For a rigorous theory of disability to emerge which begins to examine all disability in a materialist account, an analysis of normalization must be included". (Chappell 1992.38) Attempting to incorporate normalization in a materialist account however, does not mean that I believe that, beyond the descriptive, it is of much use. Based as it is upon functionalist and interactionist sociology, whose defects are well known (Gouldner1970), it offers no satisfactory explanation of why disabled people are oppressed in capitalist societies and no strategy for liberating us from the chains of that oppression. Political economy, on the other hand, suggests that all phenomena (including social categories) are produced by the economic and social forces of capitalism itself. The forms in which they are produced are ultimately dependent upon their relationship to the economy (Marx 1913) .Hence, the category disability is produced in the particular form it appears by these very economic and social forces. Further, it is produced as an economic problem because of changes in the nature of work and the needs of the labour market within capitalism. "The speed of factory work, the enforced discipline, the time-keeping and production norms -all these were a highly unfavourable change from the slower, more self-determined methods of work into which many handicapped people had been integrated" . (Ryan and Thomas 1980.101) The economy, through both the operation of the labour market and the social organisation of work, plays a key role in producing the category disability and in determining societal responses to disabled people. In order to explain this further, it is necessary to return to the crucial question of what is meant by political economy. The following is a generally agreed definition of political economy, "The study of the interrelationships between the polity, economy and society, or more specifically, the reciprocal influences among government the economy, social classes, state and, status groups. The central problem of the political economy perspective is the manner in which the economy and polity interact in a relationship of reciprocal causation affecting the distribution of social goods". (Estes et al 1982) The central problem with such an agreed definition is that it is an explanation which can be incorporated into pluralist visions of society as a consensus emerging out of the interests of various groups and social forces and indeed, this explanation has been encapsulated in a recent book on disability "A person's position in society affects the type and severity of physical disability one is likely to experience and more importantly the likelihood that he or she is likely to receive rehabilitation services. Indeed, the political economy of a community dictates what debilitating health conditions will be produced, how and under what circumstances they will be defined, and ultimately who will receive the services". (Albrecht (1992.14) This quote lays out the way in which Albrecht pursues his argument in three parts. The first part shows how the kind of society people live in influences the kinds of disability that are produced, notably how the mode of production creates particular kinds of impairments. Further, he traces the ways in which the mode of production influences social interpretation and the meanings of disability and he also demonstrates how, in industrial societies, rehabilitation, like all other goods and services is transformed into a commodity. The second part of the argument shows how intermediate social institutions in America, such as the legal, the political and welfare systems contribute to the specific way in which disability is produced and their role in the transformation of rehabilitation into a commodity. The final part considers what this may mean in terms of future developments in social policy and what effects it may have on the lives of disabled people. It is difficult to disagree with this formulation at the descriptive level but the problem with this pluralist version of political economy is that the structure of capitalist America itself goes unexamined as does the crucial role that the capitalist economy plays in. shaping the experience of groups and individuals. Exactly the same criticism can be levelled at normalization theory. Devaluation according to normalization theory is a universal cognitive process and economic and social conditions are only relevant to who gets devalued. Political economy, as it is used here, takes a particular theoretical view of society; one which sees the economy as the crucial, and ultimately determining factor, in structuring the lives of groups and individuals. Further, while the relationship between various groups and the economy may differ in qualitative ways, the underlying structural relationship remains. "The convergence and interaction of liberating forces at work in society against racism, sexism, ageism and economic imperialism are all oppressive 'isms' and built-in responses of a society that considers certain groups inferior. All are rooted in the social-economic structures of society. All deprive certain groups of status, the right to control their own lives and destinies with the end result of powerlessness. All have resulted in economic and social discrimination. All rob (American) society of the energies and involvement of creative persons who are needed to make our society just and humane. All have brought on individual alienation, despair, hostility, and anomie". (Walton 1979.9) Hence the oppression that disabled people face is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism. And this oppression is structured by racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and disablism which is endemic to all capitalist societies and cannot be explained away as a universal cognitive process. To explain this further it is necessary to go back to the roots of capitalism itself. Disabled people and the rise of capitalism Whatever the fate of disabled people before the advent of capitalist society and whatever their fate will be in the brave new world of the twenty first century, with its coming we suffered economic and social exclusion. As a consequence of this exclusion disability was produced in a particular form; as an individual problem requiring medical treatment. At the heart of this exclusion was the institution -something on which we would all agree. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, institutions proliferated in all industrial societies (Rothman 1971) but to describe this, as Wolfensberger does, as 'momentum without rationale' (p3) is patently absurd. The French Marxist, Louis Althusser (1971), suggested that all capitalist societies are faced with the problem of social control and they resolve this by a combination of repressive and ideological mechanisms. The reason for the success of the institution was simple; it combines these mechanisms almost perfectly. It is repressive in that all those who either cannot or will not conform to the norms and discipline of capitalist society can be removed from it. It is ideological in that it stands as a visible monument for all those who currently conform but may not continue to do so -if you do not behave, the institution awaits you. It is for this reason that the institution has been successful. Its presence perfectly meets capitalism's needs for discipline and control (Foucault 1972). It is also the reason why, despite the fact that the defects of institutions have been known for the 200 years that they have existed, they have remained unaddressed. Indeed, the principle of 'less eligibility' was central to the rise of the institution. It is simply not true to say that we have only known of their defects in recent years because, if this were the case, they would then not have been performing their ideological control function. Day trips to institutions, which originated in the 1850's not the 1950's, were precisely for this purpose; to demonstrate how awful they were for the purposes of social control, not to educate the public about their reform (p8).

### 1NR

#### USFG action is the only way to resolve disability

Stephen Percy, professor School of Public and International Affairs, Ph.D., Indiana University A.B., Hamilton College, ‘Disability policy in the United States,’ 2002

The Americans with Disabilities Act abandoned the condition-of-aid approach and set forth a variety of statutory mandates prohibiting some actions and pre-scribing others for state and local governments and the private sector. This shift in policy approach was congruent with the view of the ADA advocates that strong federal requirements bearing down upon both the public and private sectors were required to break down persistent discrimination based on disability. Through the ADA, national standards concerning non-discrimination and those providing reasonable accommodations were established across the nation through a single statute – pre-empting the governing authority of states and localities.40 Adopting a national rather than subnational, or centralized versus de-centralized, policy model for disability rights protections responded to a concern that not all states could be counted on to enact serious non-discrimination statuses. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (of the US Congress), in its report on the ADA, cited the testimony of one disability rights activist who claimed that “Enough time has, in my opinion, been given to the States to legislate what is right. Too many states, for whatever reason, still perpetuate confusion. It is time for Federal action.”41 The ADA’s federal pre-emption of state and local authority was also propelled by the general agreement in Congress that the ADA represented another in a series of civil rights policies for which the federal government had accepted primary responsibility for enacting and enforcing. Despite the fact that Republicans during the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush regularly railed against the creation of new federal mandates, there was widespread support for the ADA in both houses of Congress and in the White House – unusual bipartisan support for major civil rights legislation. While some Republicans, taking a conservative stance, voiced displeasure about ADA provisions concerning coverage, enforcement, and penalties, they were generally comfortable with the plan for a national civil rights bill for people with disabilities which would strengthen and expand the mandates included in earlier federal laws. Attorney-General Richard Thornburgh, for example, testifying on behalf of President Bush at congressional hearings on the ADA, claimed that “Over the last 20 years, civil rights laws protecting disabled persons have been enacted in a piecemeal fashion. Thus, existing Federal laws are like a patchwork quilt in need of repair. There are holes in the fabric, serious gaps in coverage that leave persons with disabilities without adequate civil rights protections.”42 The move to “nationalize” disability rights policy also reflected the willingness of Congress to enact pre-emption statuses in the area of civil rights43 and a shift in federalism away from aiding places and toward directly aiding persons.44 By the late 1980s, the disability movement had reached full political force, joining interest groups that had proliferated in other policy areas and who were having a growing impact on policy issues related to federalism.45 Scores of national, state, and local organizations representing persons with disabilities had, by this time, organized politically, adopted effective political tactics, and learned to cooperate in pursuit of national civil rights legislation to end discrimination based on disability. These groups demanded that people with disabilities be recognized as full citizens of the United States and that the federal government take action to ensure that they receive full benefits of that citizenship. They were joined by civil rights organizations representing women and minorities who helped sustain the push for enactment of comprehensive national civil rights legislation.

The disability rights movement considers the ADA as part of the solution to the medical model

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 In all, the disability rights movement proposed solution to the problem of the oppressive marginalization of people with disabilities entails a three pronged approach: 1) the ideological, challenging the medical model and proposing to replace it with a new one, the social model, as the proper model for understanding disability; [and] 2) the legislative, proposing new laws, e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to guarantee the rights of those with impairments; and 3) the organizational, proposing the creation of Independent Living Centers in which those with impairments are be responsible for their own success (or failure).¶ The Social Model¶ The old, medical model, as noted above, is a plausibility structure, i.e., a set of policies and procedures, whose premises unobtrusively control the lives of people with impairments. Indeed, it is a structure which oppresses such persons by rendering them disabled and dehumanized. Specifically, according to the medical model, the problems facing persons with a disabilities are, simply, medical problems. Medical problems, of course, call for treatment by an array of medical professionals. Submission to professional treatment, as viewed by the medical model, renders the impaired (sick) person passive, unable to exhibit the defining mark of personhood, the control of one's own affairs. Consequently, the disability rights movement views the medical model as oppressive, a major source of the exclusion of people with impairments disabilities from the mainstream, the putative domain of "healthy," unimpaired people.

#### Their use of metaphors as a starting point disadvantages those with autism – turns the aff

Amber ’11 (Amber has Autism and is a teacher) “Metaphors etc and Autism” http://www.talkaboutautism.org.uk/forums/generalautism/index.cfm?mode=completethread&threadId=8363

One of the Big Lessons for those of us with autism and very literal 'visual thinking' minds is that people don't say what they mean. ¶ Even as an adult, I 'see' words in pictures, and so whatever picture it creates, that's the meaning I get. It takes a long time to persuade my brain that there is an alternative, which really slows me down when I'm talking to people and trying to join in sensibly. Here's some ways to confuse an Ann:¶ He has the heart of a lion (er, yuk - how the heck did he end up with a Lion's heart?!)¶ You had better pull your socks up (I always look down to check whether they've fallen down or not)¶ It is raining cats and dogs (no, it's raining rain. There are no cats and dogs falling from the sky, honest)¶ The referee gave him a yellow card (er no, he didn't - the ref kept the card but made the man leave the game)¶ Lend me a hand (eek, my hands are not detachable!)¶ Don't count your chickens (whyever not - it's the best way to find out how many you have, otherwise some might be missing?)¶ I will drop you a line (do I want a line dropped on me? What sort of line? Fishing line? Washing line??!)¶ I'm feeling blue (you're not blue, you're people-colour! How do you feel a colour anyway? You can feel a texture, but what does a blue feel like?)¶ I'm going to grab a bite on the way home (A bite is what happens when for example a dog attacks someone. How do you 'grab' a bite?! Isn't that dangerous?)¶ I will be back in just a minute (but you were gone for 6 minutes and 23 seconds!)¶ Keep your eye on that person (why would I want to put my eye on them - wouldn't they think that was a bit weird?)¶ Keep your nose to the grindstone (you are joking, aren't you? That's a very dangerous instruction!)¶ The difficulty is that when I get confused or think a phrase is meant as a joke, people can get quite cross. They might think I'm being sarcastic or awkward deliberately.¶ When I'm working in schools, I hear teaching staff using non-literal phrases and then wondering why children on the autism spectrum do strange things. ¶ "Mark that page" ('Johnny, why are you scribbling on the page with the marker pen - that's not what I ask you to do!' [yes, it is])¶ "Give me a break, Sam!" ('Sam, why have you just broken that pencil - that's very naughty behaviour!' [well, you asked for a break...]¶ "Read the book on the table over there" ('Maz, why are you sitting on the table! You know you're not allowed to climb on tables in this classroom!' [well, you just told Maz to read it on the table]¶ Learning how to 'speak autism' is so important when being our lives. Like any other new language, it takes a bit of practice, but it can be great fun.¶ Ann (Community Champion)