### f/W

Our Interpretation is that the affirmative must defend a politics that concludes that The United States Federal Government substantially increasing statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States in one or more of the designated topic areas.

This is predictable the resolution requires them to defend enactment of a topical USFG policy.

Ericson 3 Jon, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Limits and Ground - failure to adhere to the communal topic leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow and un-educational debate—a balanced controversy is key to decision-making skills.

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp43-45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Switch-side debate—only our framework creates a form of education that improves critical thinking and prevents violent dogmatism.

Olbrys 6—Stephen Gencarella Olbrys (Ph.D., Indiana University, 2003) is Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Massachusetts, Dissoi Logoi, Civic Friendship, and the Politics of Education, Communication Education, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 353-369

Unlike the ABOR and Powell Memo, both of which institutionalize opposition, adaptation of dissoi logoi warrants engagement. The metaphor of balance shifts from one of equal distribution of opinions on campus to the action of keeping one’s poise, of teaching students to maintain an intellectual equilibrium through a deep understanding of their footing. The aim of practice in dissoi logoi is not simply awareness of other ideas\*often shorthand in consumer society for paying attention only to opinions one wishes to hear\*but rather the ability to reproduce them, to understand them, and to critique them all. This meets Bauerlein’s (2004) call for adversarial voices in higher education but also moves to internalize that process as a productive friction for the development of an individual’s intellect and character rather than simply externalize it through the establishment of a spokesperson marketplace; as such, this practice would place an onus on the student to take responsibility for their own education as a site of productive friction and on the professor for encouraging such responsibility and reflexivity. Judicious adaptation of dissoi logoi is thus necessary to combat the political divisiveness and enclaves ultimately encouraged by the Powell Memo and ABOR. A thorough historical understanding of the Sophistic movement and early conceptualizations of democracy would benefit students in several ways. First, it provides ample preparation to argue one’s opinion eloquently. This is the closest sense to the Sophists’ notion, a way to influence the polity through oratorical finesse; the (ancient) metaphor here is a ‘‘throw,’’ the learned ability to parry an opponent in wrestling. Second, practice in dissoi logoi encourages the ethical appreciation of other positions, which in turn creates an empathy counter to the prevalent politics of ideological piety aiming for annihilation of differing opinions. A prochoice student assuming an anti-abortion role could not, for example, merely assert ‘‘I want to dominate women,’’ just as a anti-abortion student could not simply declare in opposition, ‘‘I want to kill babies.’’ Both would have to conduct considerable research to argue the contrary claim. Third, dissoi logoi in the curriculum places intellectual pressure on student ideologues of any persuasion, including those uncommitted to general education. Fourth, the responsibility to understand multiple perspectives activates an integrative approach to education (cf. Gayle, 2004). Earnest performances of dissoi logoi demand importing concepts, information, and experiences from other classes, while at the same time providing practical training for the adaptation of knowledge in nonclassroom situations. Fifth, dissoi logoi emphasizes necessary engagement with an alterity that is fundamental for the emergence of citizenship in democracy and public debate. It does not erase the significance of values\*indeed, a profitable topic for discussion could revolve around values as universals or as constructed conventions\*but locates them within historical contexts. Finally, appropriate performance of dissoi logoi affords an alternative to the shouting-matches or programmatic utterances that pass for contemporary debate; and, as a practice of listening (to others and to oneself) as much as speaking, it entails broad questions about human responsibility to other humans. In this manner, dissoi logoi aids a critical thinking marked by student involvement in their own education, but does not reduce talk in the public sphere to rational deliberation bereft of emotions or artistry. This is also a gesture to an ancient notion in which citizens learn to reach good judgments (personal and collective) by hearing various opinions on an issue. Advocating the practice of dissoi logoi as an integral part of higher education will fuel criticism. Conservatives might argue against the inherent relativism implied by respect for contrary positions. Progressives might take issue with the justification for dominant order in expecting students to speak on its behalf, particularly in a classroom setting where opportunities to challenge that order are more readily available than in the ‘‘real’’ world. Both critiques are legitimate, and are related to concerns about deliberative democratic theories, notably the problems of unequal resources for expression (such as privileging particular cultural or gendered ways of speaking) and the normative approval of voicing opinion over silence. Both conservatives and progressives might call into question the definition of citizenship wrought through this practice, and assert that the other side would simply utilize dissoi logoi as a cover for indoctrination under the guise of neutrality. Likewise, they might note that intellectual exposure does not occur in a vacuum but is contingent upon outside social forces. In an era when progressivism reigns, students would be more inclined to accept progressive values, and vice versa when conservatism reigns. The problematic of detailing arguments for racist, sexist, classist, or homophobic beliefs might quickly arise as a serious concern for classroom decorum and institutional codes concerning hate and free speech, to say nothing of the unease in requiring a student to explain an opinion that they find reprehensible or for which there is no accepted widespread political value (such as fascism), but for which there exist seminal historical texts (such as Mussolini’s The Doctrine of Fascism). Implementation of dissoi logoi within classroom practice is not simple. It requires an appreciation of the social contexts of education (in knowledge and in citizenship) as a kind of apprenticeship rather than as unchallenged instruction. The positions of power that distinguish students from professors would also require earnest address. While most formulations of academic freedom provide for assignments that require students to represent viewpoints with which they disagree as long as there is a reason germane to the subject matter and no hostility wrought upon the student, dissoi logoi necessitates a further step of open communication with students about the nature of pedagogy itself\*for example, its structure and aims\*if not involvement by the students in deciding upon controversies to engage, appropriate ways to assess their achievements, the possibility of conscientious objection, the shared responsibilities for safe expression, and the means to address inevitable tensions. Such a commitment also requires that professors interrogate their own pieties and practice engagement with adversaries (and the cultivation of civic friendship) themselves. Demonstration of sites of agreement and common human desires (itself a productive impiety in a world predicated on enclaves of political ideology) in tandem with respectful invitations for adversaries to present their case would not only be novel\*and thereby attractive to undergraduates\*but serve the purpose of modeling in the classroom the kind of democratic behavior hoped for outside it. Before abandoning dissoi logoi as too risky or unsettling, then, let us consider the educative gains in its contentious nature. Let us assume that a class addresses terrorism from a perspective of dissoi logoi. The first topic for discussion might be whether this is even suitable for such a practice. That is, are some issues so obvious to common sense and community values that they cannot be made problematic, or so reprehensible that they should not be defended, even if hypothetically or in an attempt to understand the structure of their logic? A range of questions would follow. Beyond addressing the views on the left and the right for the causes of and responses to terrorism, would students need to discuss\*and therefore gain knowledge of\* militant fundamentalist Islam’s difference from mainstream Muslim religious practice? Should the history of Israel come into play, or European colonization of the Middle East? Should the representation of the United States in American media be juxtaposed to that on al-Jazeera? Should the United States close its borders to immigrants and keep tabs on minority communities? Should the sympathies and sensitivities of the classroom participants play in the decision to have a discussion in which all students would be responsible for voicing all opinions? All of these are important questions for serious public discussions concerning American responses to terrorism, and the pursuit of any of them requires thorough research and an abiding commitment to an active learning that challenges taken-for-granted assumptions. Civic Friendship and the Question of Citizenship in Higher Education Although they offer starkly different solutions, both the oppositional model of ABOR and the Powell Memo and the engagement model of dissoi logoi respond to the tyranny of any dominant ideology in higher education. Both also draw attention to the absence in contemporary American society of civic friendship as getting along with others whose opinions differ from one’s own. Discussions of civic friendship are missing from most assessments of pedagogy on either the left or the right, a lack that flatly impoverishes theories of democratic education to assist students in becoming citizens in a world predicated on pluralism and tolerance of other’s opinions. Long theorized as a necessary component of healthy political order, the concept of civic friendship is itself currently in flux. Recent considerations have recognized its role in education (Blacker, 2003; Scorza, 2004) and as an antidote to what Kahane (1999) calls the politics of annihilation. These developments conceptualize civic friendship in a much different manner than do Neo-Aristotleans (who rely heavily on ancient notions of fraternity, similarity, and instrumentality), communitarians and civic republicans (who regard such bonds as a social obligation), theorists of an ethic of care (who require willing emotional capacities to embrace alterity), and traditional liberals (who locate friendship within the private sphere). Blacker, for example, draws upon Rawlsian political liberalism in defining civic friendship as an expression of mutual respect and concern for democracy’s stability (Blacker, 2003, p. 249) but seeks a path that would accommodate the constitutional nonestablishment principle and the comprehensive moral groundings of religious and secular organizations in any given local community. In this model, civic friendship operates ‘‘in the service of deepening citizens’ chosen comprehensive allegiances’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 254), but also fosters exposure to the moral codes of others to assist in the understanding of democratic pluralism and to overcome mutual suspicions; public schools assist in creating contexts for discussion and interaction rather than overtly teaching specific moral orthodoxies. For Blacker, exposure to rather than sheltering from the deepest moral convictions of others

(whether political, religious, or aesthetic) is the sine qua non of civic friendship, ‘‘where one develops an ability to perceive and, where appropriate, appreciate what lies beneath and behind the politics of those who agree and, most importantly, those who do not’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 261). To achieve these goals, he advocates a ‘‘school stamps’’ program for extracurricular activities and the creation of student counseling groups drawn from diverse community members. Blacker concludes with praise of civic friendship as a worthy challenge to an education that avoids controversy under the guise of decorum, and as sound pedagogical justification when ‘‘fundamentalist parents complain about environmentalist volunteers, atheist parents about clergy, and the whole lot of them about who-knows-what’’ (Blacker, 2003, p. 267). Blacker’s comments coincide with Scorza’s, for whom civic friendship is best modeled on Emerson’s ‘‘turbulent union,’’ a regard for one’s friend as a ‘‘beautiful enemy’’ who tempts us to become like them (Scorza, 2004, p. 95). Emerson’s political friendship opposes as anti-democratic those ‘‘conceited’’ forms of interaction that seek only to conquer rather than to learn from the other. As such, Emerson (and Scorza) posit the communicative norms of ‘‘truth’’ and ‘‘tenderness’’ at the root of civic friendship, meaning a coupling of a frankness and the ‘incivility’ to speak one’s mind with a respect and the civility to engage the other as a worthy equal. Like Scorza, Kahane recognizes that friendships (personal and civic) evolve, and locates a recognition of the ‘‘ongoing relationship\*not shared objective qualities or capacities’’ (Kahane, 1999, p. 269) as the basis for this practice, since such evolving commitment also permits friends to disagree and even to fight but to likewise establish limits preventing a total dissolution of the friendship. Scorza (2004, p. 91) upholds the case of Jefferson and Adams as an example of a friendship that developed over time and between fierce political rivals. Similarly for Kahane, an ongoing relationship necessitates a developing sense of a history of contact to cement a valued coformation and encourage its repeated performance in the future. Blacker, Scorza, and Kahane do not declare a one-to-one correlation between personal friendship and civic friendship but do perceive politically significant structural similarities. Recognizing also that friendship cannot be imposed from authority, they all suggest that materialized opportunities for civic friendship (without long-standing artificialities or limits to communication, as installed by many versions of discourse ethics) might ignite very positive ventures for the individual’s moral development and for the improvement of democratic pluralism by fostering respect for alterity. This is not to suggest a naı¨vete´ about what leads contemporary undergraduates to establish bonds of friendship, nor to deny the massive number of influences beyond the classroom that may pull them against civic friendship with those who differ ideologically, nor to propose that higher education should unconditionally and primarily become a conduit for friendship. It is, instead, to recognize a correlation between undergraduates struggling to define themselves as citizens in a society marked by lip-service to diversity and extreme divisiveness in politics on the one hand, and the possible function of education to assist the young in becoming participants in a pluralist democracy on the other. Civic friendship provides a context for the appreciation of citizenship as both a subject of intellectual inquiry and a communicative practice. In turn, the question of citizenship emerges as an apt topic for disputation within the classroom. The differences between the Powell Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact might, for example, provide a point of entry for students to examine the different configurations of citizenship within liberal democracy depending on the inflection of liberal democracy or liberal democracy. That is, all three programmatic statements suggest a correlation between ideas taught in the classroom and behaviors of matriculated students in public culture. The Powell Memo does not specifically address higher education’s role in civic education but implies such influence in the argument against radicalizing pedagogies. The actual word ‘‘citizen’’ appears infrequently in the document, but in usage reveals an intimate connection between education and citizenship. Powell claims, for example, that business executives must be ‘‘good citizens,’’ dismisses the head of the AFL-CIO as not ‘‘the most endearing or publicminded of citizens’’ from a business perspective, and justifies ‘‘citizen groups’’ who rewrite textbooks. ‘‘Citizen’’ here functions rhetorically in two ways: as a catch phrase for someone whose behavior is judged by others and as an organized political group. Given the context of the corporate mission outlined by Powell, it would be judicious to view this notion of citizenship within the lens of liberal democracy, which emphasizes particular rights (property and voting especially) and maintains a close kinship with consumer identity. The language of ABOR differs from the Powell Memo in this regard, a point that would be instructive for students to recognize so as not to assume all oppositional models of education are alike. ABOR opens with a direct commentary on the mission of the university as the pursuit of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research, the study and reasoned criticism of intellectual and cultural traditions, the teaching and general development of students to help them become creative individuals and productive citizens of a pluralistic democracy, and the transmission of knowledge and learning to a society at large. This commitment to citizenship aligns ABOR with the aforementioned Campus Compact Presidents’ Declaration, which warrants that institutions provide students opportunities to ‘‘embrace the duties of active citizenship and civic participation’’ and to demonstrate and teach democratic principles. A cynical reading of ABOR might take its abundant mission statement as parasitic, drawing upon metaphors from the Ivory Tower and civic education to appear authentic to both. Let us assume, however, that the language of ABOR is genuine and in agreement with Campus Compact. If so, they advance a notion of citizenship as a performative mode, one that emphasizes the democratic more strongly than liberalism. Drawing the distinction between these two inflections of liberal democracy\*or between those that argue higher education should have no role in the training of citizens (as Fish’s aforementioned essay does) and those that do (such as the Memo, ABOR, and Campus Compact)\*is no easy task but certainly one that exists within the purview of legitimate academic exercise, especially in classes dedicated to the theory and practice of rhetoric. The nuances and multiple variations of each theme require substantial intellectual work, and any position on citizenship taken by students could be held responsible to such informed research. Yet, the students’ discussion need not terminate solely with demonstration of knowledge of the histories and trajectories of various conceptualizations of citizenship. They might also become the topic for a formidable exchange over the nature and needs of citizenship in contemporary society, and might likewise entail debate over the ‘‘best’’ kind of ‘‘education suited to the realization of citizenship’’ (Callan 2004, p. 71). In other words, through their research on the subject of citizenship, students could be encouraged towards reflexive action that asks them to debate the values they come to understand. Such a cultivation of reflexivity, performed within a context of dissoi logoi, also suggests that the question of citizenship in higher education is not left strictly to faculty and administrators to decide. Rather, students must come to terms with and take up the question of citizenship themselves. A pedagogy that encourages civic friendship provides a stable and ‘safe’ ground for this unfolding, a scaffolding into citizenship through civic friendship. Conclusion In the interest of all students, it is important to treat seriously the recent call for diversity in higher education by conservative critics. Analysis of the rhetorical structures of the Powell Memo and ABOR reveals, however, a similarity that justifies cause for alarm among progressive, moderate, and even libertarian educators. These texts call for higher education to be moved by degrees to serve corporate conservatism rather than the general good. Still, throughout ABOR and other calls for civic education such as Campus Compact, there arises a common exhortation for a balanced relationship between teaching knowledge and training in citizenship in public higher education. One problem inherent in oppositional models of education such as ABOR (or its progressive equivalents) is the development of a history of contact between different political traditions and moralities. ABOR and the Powell Memo establish forums for opposition, not exchange; taken to their extremes, the end result is that youth simply pen themselves into their own tribe’s enclaves and never test ideas and beliefs against alternatives. This would be a disaster in terms of student intellectual and ethical development. In contrast, an emphasis on engagement models of education such as dissoi logoi would address this absence of contact, and through them the classroom would become a site for lively disputation over public virtues and the impetus for fostering relationships predicated on respect and understanding. In direct response to those who, like Fish, assert that educators ‘‘do their job,’’ I contend that training in democratic citizenship is an important part of the work of scholars in rhetoric, following a tradition that hearkens to antiquity. Adaptations ofdissoi logoi are necessary to expand the practice’s applicability for the intellectual development and civic engagement of all students in contemporary society, but such practice echoes an ancient expectation for a mixture of knowledge and oratorical display in presenting a case. This emphasis on knowledge united with rhetorical performance should satisfy those who seek the academic benefits of the Ivory Tower and those who regard public education as civic training. To require participation in this practice within the classroom would provide an antidote to the apathy permeating contemporary public culture and prevent higher education from becoming an instrument of party politics without resorting to closed enclaves of thought. Both oppositional and engagement models raise the question of suitable contexts to cultivate civic friendships through which students gain a more thorough understanding of their own moral capacities and of those in others with whom they must find a way to get along in pluralist democratic society. Although there are no definitive reasons why an oppositional model could not promote civic friendship, when such opposition unfolds on campus merely as the creation of antagonist enclaves rather than opportunities for students to struggle internally and with others over political ideas that inform their social worlds and identities, the meaningfulness of the gesture of friendship is easily lost. This essay has argued that the practice of dissoi logoi more readily serves the purpose of civic friendship, particularly if it puts into play debate over the very meanings of citizenship and friendship, and the role of higher education in the cultivation of both. In this manner, all educators and students may participate in the discussion of public virtues as an intellectual and civic enterprise, and appreciate higher education as a place to interrogate everything and to take nothing for granted in the pursuit of understanding and knowledge.

### K

#### The 1AC positions itself from a position of powerlessness, do not buy their claims of militancy, at the end of the day their identify and politics are reactionary - concerned with challenging executive authority rather than making the past an outrage to the present - the impact is resentment.

Dawson 13 - John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago (Michael C., http://www.salon.com/2013/07/07/whats\_next\_for\_the\_black\_left/, 7/7/13, Whats Next for the Black Left?)

1. Barbara Ehrenreich's and Derrick Muhammad's work on the racial realities of the economic crisis and white racial resentment reinforce the need for a conversation on the left about how to openly discuss race in such a way that Americans have to both confront the facts of race in this country and listen to each other so that they begin to understand their real interests.7 Otherwise white resentment will continue to be aimed at the wrong people (different types of white resentment have different targets). We will have to counter Fox News and its allies. We still have Glenn Beck shouting to a very large and receptive audience that universal programs such as health care are actually “stealth reparations” because they disproportionately affect people of color. Why can we not have a truth and reconciliation discussion here? In South Africa, truth telling was transformative of both society and individuals. Progressive change necessitates a psycho- logical transformation as well as a societal one. While Meister argues that in South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission became a substitute for success—it symbolized satisfaction with the democratic victory rather than full economic emancipation and full defeat of settler colonialism—he points out that if one looks to Gandhi, then one realizes that reconciliation, relent- less political struggle for justice, and eventual victory need not be incompatible. Dialogue and eventual reconciliation would be steps along the way the road to full victory, not full victory itself. Political theorist Wendy Brown was skeptical of claims of reparations, apologies, and calls for remembrance and reconciliation, basing her point of view on a critique of identity politics very different from the one found in Rorty, Gitlin, and Brubaker and Cooper. Brown argued that identity politics is a form of politics based on weakness and thus has limited possibilities for generating progressive change. Its investment in the past and in suffering all but forecloses the chance that such a movement could become the basis for a democratic future: What are the particular constituents—specific to our time yet roughly generic for a diverse spectrum of identities—of identity's desire for recognition that seem often to breed a politics of recrimination and rancor, of culturally dispersed paralysis and suffering, a tendency to reproach power rather than aspire to it, to disdain freedom rather than practice it? In short, where do the historically and culturally specific elements of politicized identity's investments in itself, and especially in its own history of suffering come into conflict with the need to give up these investments, to engage in something of a Nietzschean “forgetting” of this history, in the pursuit of an emancipatory democratic project? She added that “politicized identity” leads to, as Nietzsche predicted, “impotence . . . incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection.” Identity, according to this view, becomes a substitute for action, though Brown agreed that these characteristics do not describe the civil rights movement . She was skeptical about the current reparations movement, which she saw as based on weakness, rancor, and perhaps a sense of impotence, and she worried, “Once guilt is established and a measure of victimization secured by an apology or by material compensation, is the historical event presumed to be concluded, sealed as past, 'healed,' or brought to 'closure'?” The current reparations movement need not be based on a politics of rancor (although it has generated plenty of rancor on the part of those who feel their privilege and comfort threatened). Redistributive justice and political power are at the center of the demands this movement has advanced, as is the desire for freedom. Reparations are not about the triumph of the weak; rather, they are a demand for a conversation about justice and the way that racial oppression in the past is linked to black disadvantage today and to the continued existence of an unjust racial order. Indeed, the demand for reparations is frequently associated with the demand for self-determination. Self-determination is not about revenge, and definitely not about victimhood. The crux of self- determination—the key demand of the politicized nationalist and leftist wings of the black power movement—was the collective ability to choose the future that has the highest likelihood of being just; depending on one's ideology, this was a future that was often seen to be egalitarian and sometimes nonpatriarchal, one where blacks would be able to govern themselves. This was a politics more consistent with Marx than Nietzsche. The demand for a discussion of reparations, like the best of the truth and reconciliation movements, is an invitation to discuss how to build a system free from domination, racial and otherwise. I partly agree with Brown's argument that making a historical event or formation contemporary, making it “an outrage to the present” and thus exploding or reworking both the way in which it has been remembered and the way in which it is positioned in historical consciousness as “past,” is precisely the opposite of bringing that phenomena to “closure” through reparation or apology (our most ubiquitous form of historical political thinking today). The former demands that we redeem the past through a specific and contemporary practice of justice; the latter gazes impotently at the past even as it attempts to establish history a irrelevant to the present or, at best, as a reproachful claim or grievance in the present. We must begin the process of “making a historical event . . . 'an outrage to the present.'” Yet there is no inherent contradiction that prevents a reparations movement or truth and reconciliation movement from taking on this role. There is no inherent reason that such movements need wallow impotently in the past. How reparations and truth and reconciliation movements unfold is a product of the political contestation that takes place within these movements—of the politics that govern their development. I do energetically agree that Brown's critique well describes much of post-black-power-era black politics, a politics that by and large embraces the values and constraints of neoliberalism, including an emaciated understanding of the politically allowable and feasible. A process of truth and reconciliation, as messy and undoubtedly rancorous as it would be, could help us move beyond the current degenerate state of American politics to a politics that is more truly democratic.

What do I have to gain from burning all this shit down? This is perhaps a difficult question to answer but it is not impossible, to an extent it is also unavodiable. Here I am, Andy in the back of the room may not identify as white but I am sure he has been approached as such - your politics must not burn bridges, they should build them.

Dawson 13 - John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago (Michael C., http://www.salon.com/2013/07/07/whats\_next\_for\_the\_black\_left/, 7/7/13, Whats Next for the Black Left?)

At the beginning of this book I invoked David Scott's rejection of the romantic narrative of black politics—a narrative tied to a period in which international black victories ranged from the independence of African and Caribbean nations to the dismantling of Jim Crow in America. Today we are mired in an era of epic tragedy, Scott wrote, in which dreams of independence morphed into the terror of today's failed states and what Cornel West called the “black nihilism” that permeates America's disintegrating black ghettos today. If Scott is right—and there are elements of my analysis of the effects of neoliberalism on black politics in the United States that resonate with his narrative—then what is the basis for utopian thinking? When we start the process of imagining new worlds, “we must tell no lies, claim no easy victories,” as Amilcar Cabral succinctly put it. We must understand the conditions from which we must build. Even though much of modern public policy appears raceless, the black community is under severe attack as a result of the neoliberal political agenda. The Tea Party's devastating attack on public sector unions is, for example, greatly increasing the amount of poverty and misery in American black communities. Steven Pitts demonstrated that public sector employment remains the foundation for black employment that it has been since before World War II. Consequently, an attack on public sector employment is an attack on the black community: “The public sector is the largest employer of Black workers; there is a greater likelihood that a Black Worker will be employed by in the public sector compared to a non-Black worker; wages earned by blacks in that industry are higher than those earned by Blacks in other sectors; and inequality within an industry is less in the public sector compared to other industries”. Workers of all races and ethnicities are facing hard times during yet another jobless “recovery,” and building political unity among them is still a daunting task. Lani Guinier argued that the burdens of integration were distributed unfairly among the poor and working people of the country, thus further under- mining the basis for bringing those at the bottom together across racial lines. Building interracial unity was always more difficult than liberals (and in particular white leftists) imagined it would be, since white workers had an investment in whiteness that often led them to privilege race over class when making decisions about political alliances. Any new rebuilding of interracial unity has to confront how to change the white working class's (and, to the degree possible, the white middle class's) perceptions so that they see it as in their interest to ally with nonwhite Americans.

Coalition building must begin from the perspective that we all are dying - perhaps at different rates, but at a comparable velocity none the less.

Halberstam 13 - Professor of English and Director of The Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California. (Jack, http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study)

These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The undercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.” In the essay that many people already know best from this volume, “The University and the Undercommons,” Moten and Harney come closest to explaining their mission. Refusing to be for or against the university and in fact marking the critical academic as the player who holds the “for and against” logic in place, Moten and Harney lead us to the “Undercommons of the Enlightenment” where subversive intellectuals engage both the university and fugitivity: “where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong.” The subversive intellectual, we learn, is unprofessional, uncollegial, passionate and disloyal. The subversive intellectual is neither trying to extend the university nor change the university, the subversive intellectual is not toiling in misery and from this place of misery articulating a “general antagonism.” In fact, the subversive intellectual enjoys the ride and wants it to be faster and wilder; she does not want a room of his or her own, she wants to be in the world, in the world with others and making the world anew. Moten insists: “Like Deleuze. I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be in that. And I plan to stay a believer, like Curtis Mayfield. But that’s beyond me, and even beyond me and Stefano, and out into the world, the other thing, the other world, the joyful noise of the scattered, scatted eschaton, the undercommon refusal of the academy of misery.” The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing it for the Other, you must also be doing it for yourself. While men may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism, no one will really be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us. Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit in any way from them. Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things or die. All of us. We must all change the things that are fucked up and change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontation. Revolution will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study. Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized and antagonizing. Like all world-making and all world-shattering encounters, when you enter this book and learn how to be with and for, in coalition, and on the way to the place we are already making, you will also feel fear, trepidation, concern, and disorientation. The disorientation, Moten and Harney will tell you is not just unfortunate, it is necessary because you will no longer be in one location moving forward to another, instead you will already be part of “the “movement of things” and on the way to this “outlawed social life of nothing.” The movement of things can be felt and touched and exists in language and in fantasy, it is flight, it is motion, it is fugitivity itself. Fugitivity is not only escape, “exit” as Paolo Virno might put it, or “exodus” in the terms offered by Hardt and Negri, fugitivity is being separate from settling. It is a being in motion that has learned that “organizations are obstacles to organising ourselves” (The Invisible Committee in The Coming Insurrection) and that there are spaces and modalities that exist separate from the logical, logistical, the housed and the positioned. Moten and Harney call this mode a “being together in homelessness” which does not idealize homelessness nor merely metaphorize it. Homelessness is the state of dispossession that we seek and that we embrace: “Can this being together in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question?” I think this is what Jay-Z and Kanye West (another collaborative unit of study) call “no church in the wild.”

Commitment to meaningful work that makes our lives flourish matter.

Dawson 13 - John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago (Michael C., http://www.salon.com/2013/07/07/whats\_next\_for\_the\_black\_left/, 7/7/13, Whats Next for the Black Left?)

4. We have to renew our commitment to the value of meaningful work that can actually support oneself and one's loved ones, and to education for all that not only makes it possible to acquire meaningful and rewarding work but allows each person to dis- cover for themselves what it means to flourish while contributing to society. Berlant put it well: Optimism for the present would require the Left to focus on rethinking the structure of labor or work in relation to being- with. . . . There is so little work now, the sense of value might as well be reinvented. There is so little commitment to public education now, its purposes might as well be reimagined from the bottom up—but not its people, for education has to be the ground for the popular. Not the education that preunderstands a vocation, but education as the inculcated relation to work whose value is not just ends-oriented apprenticeship or putting in time but diffused, risky, and a bit random not just about tasks but about making worlds.

#### The 1NC represents the ultimate culmination of distancing the everyday lived experience from emancipatory politics - our alternative is to re-energize the politics of everyday existence.

Nadia C 7 (November 9th, 2007, http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/selected/asfuck.php)

Face it, **your politics are boring as fuck.** **You know it's true**. Otherwise, **why does everyone cringe when you say the word? Why has attendance at your** anarcho-communist **theory discussion group meetings fallen to an all-time low**? Why has the oppressed proletariat **not come to its senses and joined you in your fight for world liberation?** Perhaps, after years of struggling to educate them about their victimhood, you have come to blame them for their condition. They must want to be ground under the heel of capitalist imperialism; otherwise, why do they show no interest in your political causes? **Why haven't they joined you yet in chaining yourself to mahogany furniture, chanting slogans at carefully planned and orchestrated protests, and frequenting anarchist bookshops? Why haven't they sat down and learned all the terminology necessary for a genuine understanding of the** complexities of Marxist economic **theory**? The truth is**, your politics are** boring to them because they really are **irrelevant**. They know that **your antiquated styles of protest—**your marches, hand held signs, and gatherings—**are now powerless to effect real change because they have become such a predictable part of the status quo.** They know that **your post-Marxist jargon is off-putting because it really is a language of mere academic dispute, not a weapon capable of undermining systems of control**. They know that your infighting, your splinter groups and endless quarrels over ephemeral theories can never effect any real change in the world they experience from day to day. They know **that no matter who is in office, what laws are on the books, what "ism"s the intellectuals march under, the content of their lives will remain the same**. They—we—know that our boredom is proof that these "politics" are not the key to any real transformation of life. For **our lives are boring enough already!** And you know it too. **For how many of you is politics a responsibility?** Something you engage in because you feel you should, when in your heart of hearts there are a million things you would rather be doing? Your volunteer work—is it your most favorite pastime, or do you do it out of a sense of obligation? Why do you think it is so hard to motivate others to volunteer as you do? Could it be that it is, above all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your "duty" to be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your "work" by trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long past. Have you ever felt that you were participating in a ritual, a long-established tradition of fringe protest, that really serves only to strengthen the position of the mainstream? Have you ever secretly longed to escape from the stagnation and boredom of your political "responsibilities"? It's no wonder that no one has joined you in your political endeavors. Perhaps you tell yourself that it's tough, thankless work, but somebody's got to do it. The answer is, well, NO. **You actually do us all a real disservice with your tiresome, tedious politics**. For in fact, **there is nothing more important than politics.** NOT the politics of American "democracy" and law, of who is elected state legislator to sign the same bills and perpetuate the same system**. Not the politics of the "I got involved with the radical left because I enjoy quibbling over trivial details and writing rhetorically about an unreachable utopia**" anarchist. Not the politics of any leader or ideology that demands that you make sacrifices for "the cause." **But the politics of our everyday lives**. **When you separate politics from the immediate, everyday experiences of individual men and women, it becomes completely irrelevant**. Indeed, **it becomes the private domain of wealthy, comfortable intellectuals, who can trouble themselves with such dreary, theoretical things**. When you involve yourself in politics out of a sense of obligation, and make political action into a dull responsibility rather than an exciting game that is worthwhile for its own sake, **you scare away people whose lives are already far too dull for any more tedium.** **When you make politics into a lifeless thing, a joyless thing, a dreadful responsibility, it becomes just another weight upon people**, rather than a means to lift weight from people. And thus **you ruin the idea of politics for the people to whom it should be most important.** For everyone has a stake in considering their lives, in asking themselves what they want out of life and how they can get it. But **you make politics look to them like a miserable, self-referential,** pointless middle class/**bohemian game**, a game with no relevance to the real lives they are living out. **What should be political? Whether we enjoy what we do to get food and shelter. Whether we feel like our daily interactions with our friends**, neighbors, **and coworkers are fulfilling**. Whether we have the opportunity to live each day the way we desire to. And "**politics" should consist not of merely discussing these questions, but of acting directly to improve our lives in the immediate present. Acting in a way that is** itself entertaining**, exciting, joyous—because political action that is tedious, tiresome,** and oppressive **can only perpetuate tedium, fatigue, and oppression in our lives**. No more time should be wasted debating over issues that will be irrelevant when we must go to work again the next day. No more predictable ritual protests that the authorities know all too well how to deal with; **no more boring** ritual **protests which will not sound like a thrilling way to spend a Saturday afternoon to potential volunteers**—clearly, those won't get us anywhere. **Never again shall we "sacrifice ourselves for the cause." For we ourselves**, happiness in our own lives and the lives of our fellows, **must be our cause!** After we make politics relevant and exciting, the rest will follow. But **from a dreary, merely theoretical** and/**or ritualized politics, nothing valuable can follow.** This is not to say that we should show no interest in the welfare of humans, animals, or ecosystems that do not contact us directly in our day to day existence. But the foundation of **our politics must be concrete**: it must be immediate, it must be obvious to everyone why it is worth the effort, it must be fun in itself. **How can we do positive things for others if we ourselves do not enjoy our own lives?** To make this concrete for a moment: an afternoon of collecting food from businesses that would have thrown it away and serving it to hungry people and people who are tired of working to pay for food—that is good political action, but only if you enjoy it. If you do it with your friends, if you meet new friends while you're doing it, if you fall in love or trade funny stories or just feel proud to have helped a woman by easing her financial needs, that's good political action. On the other hand, **if you spend the afternoon typing an angry letter** to an obscure leftist tabloid **objecting to** a columnist's **use of the term** "anarcho-syndicalist," **that's not going to accomplish shit, and you know it.**

### Case

Black public sphere is a barrier to aff solvency.

Dawson 13 - John D. MacArthur Professor of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago (Michael C., http://www.salon.com/2013/07/07/whats\_next\_for\_the\_black\_left/, 7/7/13, Whats Next for the Black Left?)

2. The black public sphere, what I have called the black counterpublic, must be rebuilt from the bottom up, and quickly. We need to learn from some of the more technologically innovative forces within the progressive movement to use technology as a way to help people in neighborhoods meet and talk face-to-face, have these smaller groups link to each other's discussion, and give people at the local level an online set of tools to help them organize themselves. The black public sphere has historically been central to the multiple social movements that have emerged out of black civil society, movements that in turn transformed America for the better. The black public sphere, as King and many others have said, has also been the site of trenchant, effective and influential critiques of democracy in America, as well as the instrument through which African Americans have been able, sometimes effectively, to influence political debate within the country as a whole. That is why it must be rebuilt.

#### A) LINK—their assumption of ontological blackness essentializes blackness as a racial category subservient to whiteness

Welcome 2004 – completing his PhD at the sociology department of the City University of New York's Graduate Center (H. Alexander, "White Is Right": The Utilization of an Improper Ontological Perspective in Analyses of Black Experiences, Journal of African American Studies, Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, pp. 59-73)

In many of the studies of blacks, the experiences of whites, not blacks, are used as the backing for the construction of the warrants/rules that are employed to evaluate black experiences, delimiting the "concepts and relationships that can exist" in the black community. The life histories of whites are used as the standard against which black experiences are measured and as the goals to which blacks are encouraged to strive. The employment of this ontology fallaciously limits the range of black agency, producing deceitful narratives where the navigation of the social environment by blacks is dictated by either a passive response to, or a passive adoption of, white scripts. This ontology erroneously limits descriptions and evaluations of black experiences, excluding viable causal determinants of the socio-economic status of blacks and constructing restricted descriptions of black agency. The utilization of whiteness to determine and/or evaluate blackness begins when whiteness and white life histories come to represent what is "right." "White is right" is a sarcastic phrase that was an extremely popular slur during the Black Power movement in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s; the utilization of this phrase represents a form of social critique that takes exception to both the privileging of white biographies as accurate descriptions of history and the reconstitution of these histories as a template that blacks and other people of color should follow for navigating social environments and achieving positive social mobility. Part of the prominence of the "white is right" perspective comes from the numerical superiority of whites. As a group, whites have been in the majority throughout the history of the United States and the prominence of the white experience has been used to argue that white experiences should be used as a social template. It has been used as such in the works of Robert Park (1939) and Gunnar Myrdal (1944), both of whom suggested that by copying the patterns of whites, blacks would achieve positive social mobility. However, use of the numerical superiority of whites to support claims about the "rightness" of white experiences relies on the equation of quantitative dominance with qualitative dominance and the employment of the fallacious argumentum ad populum. The actual source of the dominance of the "white is right" perspective lies in the dynamics of power. The location of the origins of the dominant ideology in power relations is conceptualized in the work of Michel Foucault (1980), who theorized that power is imbricated with discourse: We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (p. 101). Key to the deployment of discourses is an underlying strategy. As such, the prominence of the "white is right" perspective can be traced to attempts to create an "order,"or a way of thinking. Foucault's theoretical lens supports the hypothesis that the privileging of white experiences and the use of these experiences as an ontological framework for the analyses of black experiences is an effect of power imbalances.

#### B) Turns Case – essentialism makes true insurrection impossible

 Newman 3, Postdoctoral fellow:University of Western Australia, conducting research in the area of contemporary political and social though, 2003

(Saul, “Stirner and Foucault,” Postmodern Culture)

The idea of transgressing and reinventing the self--of freeing the self from fixed and essential identities--is also a central theme in Stirner's thinking. As we have seen, Stirner shows that the notion of human essence is an oppressive fiction derived from an inverted Christian idealism that tyrannizes the individual and is linked with various forms of political domination. Stirner describes a process of subjectification which is very similar to Foucault's: rather than power operating as downward repression, it rules through the subjectification of the individual, by defining him according to an essential identity. As Stirner says: "the State betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man . . . it imposes being a man upon me as a duty" (161). Human essence imposes a series of fixed moral and rational ideas on the individual, which are not of his creation and which curtail his autonomy. It is precisely this notion of duty, of moral obligation--the same sense of duty that is the basis of the categorical imperative--thatStirner finds oppressive. For Stirner, then, the individual must free him- or herself from these oppressive ideas and obligations by first freeing himself from essence--fromthe essential identitythat is imposed on him. Freedom involves, then, a transgression of essence, a transgression of the self. But what form should this transgression take? Like Foucault, Stirner is suspicious of the language of liberation and revolution--it is based on a notion of an essential self that supposedly throws off the chains of external repression. For Stirner, it is precisely this notion of human essence that is itself oppressive. Therefore, different strategies of freedom are called for--ones that abandon the humanist project of liberation and seek, rather, to reconfigure the subject in new and non-essentialist ways. To this end, Stirner calls for an insurrection: Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on "institutions." It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established. (279-80) So while a revolution aims at transforming existing social and political conditions so that human essence may flourish, an insurrection aims at freeing the individual from this very essence. Like Foucault's practices of freedom, the insurrection aims at transforming the relationship that the individual has with himself. The insurrection starts, then, with the individual refusing his or her enforced essential identity: it starts, as Stirner says, from men's discontent with themselves. Insurrection does not aim at overthrowing political institutions. It is aimed at the individual, in a sense transgressing his own identity--the outcome of which is, nevertheless, a change in political arrangements. Insurrection is therefore not about becoming what one is--becoming **human**, becoming man--but about becoming what one is not.This ethos of escaping essential identities through a reinvention of oneself has many important parallels with the Baudelarianaestheticization of the self that interests Foucault. Like Baudelaire's assertion that the self must be treated as a work of art, Stirner sees the self--or the ego--as a "creative nothingness," a radical emptiness which is up to the individual to define: "I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself" (135). The self, for Stirner, is a process, a continuous flow of self-creating flux--it is a process that eludes the imposition of fixed identities and essences: "no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me" (324). Therefore, Stirner's strategy of insurrection and Foucault's project of care for the self are both contingent practices of freedom that involve a reconfiguration of the subject and its relationship with the self. For Stirner, as with Foucault, freedom is an undefined and open-ended project in which the individual engages. The insurrection, as Stirner argues, does not rely on political institutions to grant freedom to the individual, but looks to the individual to invent his or her own forms of freedom. It is an attempt to construct spaces of autonomy within relations of power, by limiting the power that is exercised over the individual by others and increasing the power that the individual exercises over himself. The individual, moreover, is free to reinvent himself in new and unpredictable ways, escaping the limits imposed by human essence and universal notions of morality. The notion of insurrection involves a reformulation of the concept of freedom in ways that are radically post-Kantian. Stirner suggests, for instance, that there can be no truly universal idea of freedom; freedom is always a particular freedom in the guise of the universal. The universal freedom that, for Kant, is the domain of all rational individuals, would only mask some hidden particular interest. Freedom, according to Stirner, isan ambiguous and problematic concept, an "enchantingly beautiful dream" that seduces the individual yet remains unattainable, and from which the individual must awaken. Furthermore, freedom is a limited concept. It is only seen in its narrow negative sense. Stirner wants, rather, to extend the concept to a more positive freedom to. Freedom in the negative sense involves only self-abnegation--to be rid of something, to deny oneself. That is why, according to Stirner, the freer the individual ostensibly becomes, in accordance with the emancipative ideals of Enlightenment humanism, the more he loses the power he exercises over himself. On the other hand, positive freedom--or ownness--is a form of freedom that is invented by the individual for him or herself. Unlike Kantian freedom, ownness is not guaranteed by universal ideals or categorical imperatives. If it were, it could only lead to further domination: "The man who is set free is nothing but a freed man [...] he is an unfree man in the garment of freedom, like the ass in the lion's skin" (152). Freedom must, rather, be seized by the individual. For freedom to have any value it must be based on the power of the individual to create it. "My freedom becomes complete only when it is my--might; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become and own man" (151). Stirner was one of the first to recognize that the true basis of freedom is power. To see freedom as a universal absence of power is to mask its very basis in power. The theory of ownness is a recognition, and indeed an affirmation, of the inevitable relation between freedom and power. Ownness is the realization of the individual's power over himself--the ability to create his or her own forms of freedom**,**which are not circumscribed by metaphysical or essentialist categories. In this sense, ownness is a form of freedom that goes beyond the categorical imperative. It is based on a notion of the self as a contingent and open field of possibilities, rather than on an absolute and dutiful adherence to external moral maxims.

#### C) Rejection Key – mark of ontological blackness makes real world change impossible

Pinn 2004 – Professor of Religious Studies at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota (Anthony B., ‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity, Dialog: A Journal of Theology . Volume 43, Number 1)

Applied to African Americans, the grotesque embodies the full range of African American life—all expressions, actions, attitudes, and behavior. With a hermeneutic of the grotesque as the foci, religio-cultural criticism is free from the totalizing nature of racial apologetics and the classical Black aesthetic. By extension, Black theology is able to address both issues of survival (Anderson sees their importance.) and the larger goal of cultural fulfillment, Anderson’s version of liberation. That is to say, placing ‘‘blackness’’ along side other indicators of identity allows African Americans to define themselves in a plethora of ways while maintaining their community status. This encourages African Americans to see themselves as they are— complex and diversified—no longer needing to surrender personal interests for the sake of monolithic collective status.

#### Present-day Haiti proves burning it down is not a sustainable political strategy. Only way to achieve gratuitous freedom is to affirm your identity within material conditions

Newman-3, Postdoctoral fellow: University of Western Australia, conducting research in the area of contemporary political and social though, 2003 (Saul, “Stirner and Foucault,” Postmodern Culture)

Moreover, Foucault is able to see freedom as being implicated in power relations because, for him, freedom is more than just the absence or negation of constraint. He rejects the "repressive" model of freedom which presupposes an essential self--a universal human nature--that is restricted and needs to be liberated. The liberation of an essential subjectivity is the basis of classical Enlightenment notions of freedom and is still central to our political imaginary. However, both Foucault and Stirner reject this idea of an essential self--this is merely an illusion created by power. As Foucault says, "The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself" (Discipline 30). While he does not discount acts of political liberation--for example when a people tries to liberate itself from colonial rule--this cannot operate as the basis for an ongoing mode of freedom. To suppose that freedom can be established eternally on the basis of this initial act of liberation is only to invite new forms of domination. If freedom is to be an enduring feature of any political society it must be seen as a practice--an ongoing strategy and mode of action that continuously challenges and questions relations of power.      This practice of freedom is also a creative practice--a continuous process of self-formation of the subject. It is in this sense that freedom may be seen as positive. One of the features that characterizes modernity, according to Foucault, is a Baudelairean "heroic" attitude toward the present. For Baudelaire, the contingent, fleeting nature of modernity is to be confronted with a certain "attitude" toward the present that is concomitant with a new mode of relationship that one has with oneself. This involves a reinvention of the self: "This modernity does not 'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of producing himself" (Foucault, "What" 42). So, rather than freedom being a liberation of man's essential self from external constraints, it is an active and deliberate practice of inventing oneself. This practice of freedom may be found in the example of the dandy, or flâneur, "who makes of his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art" (Foucault, "What" 41-2). It is this practice of self-aestheticization that allows us, according to Foucault, to reflect critically on the limits of our time. It does not seek a metaphysical place beyond all limits, but rather works within the limits and constraints of the present. More importantly, however, it is also a work conducted upon the limits of ourselves and our own identities. Because power operates through a process of subjectification--by tying the individual to an essential identity--the radical reconstitution of the self is a necessary act of resistance. This idea of freedom, then, defines a new form of politics more relevant to contemporary regimes of power: "The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to liberate the individual from the State and its institutions, but to liberate ourselves from the State and the type of individualisation linked to it" (Foucault, "Subject" 216).

### Block

Perhaps there are different costs to racism,

Badiou 10 Professor at European Graduate School (Alain Badiou, “The Idea of Communism,” pages 245-260)//KP

So we can now return to our subject, the communist Idea. If, for an individual, an Idea is the subjective operation whereby a specific real truth is imaginarily projected into the symbolic movement of a History, we can say that an Idea presents the truth as if it were a fact. In other words, the Idea presents certain facts as symbols of the real of truth. This was how the Idea of communism allowed revolutionary politics and its parties to be inscribed in the representation of a meaning of History the inevitable outcome of which was communism. Or how it became possible to speak of a 'homeland of socialism', which amounted to symbolizing the creation of a possibility - which is fragile by definition - through the magnitude of a power. The Idea, which is an operative mediation between the real and the symbolic, always presents the individual with something that is located between the event and the fact. That is why the endless debates about the real status of the communist Idea are irresolvable. Is it a question of a regulative Idea, in Kant's sense of the term, having no real efficacy but able to set reasonable goals for our understanding? Or is it an agenda that must be carried out over time through a new post-revolutionary State's action on the world? Is it a utopia, if not a plainly dangerous, and even criminal, one? Or is it the name of Reason in History? This type of debate can never be concluded for the simple reason that the subjective operation of the Idea is not simple but complex. It involves real sequences of emancipatory politics as its essential real condition, but it also presupposes marshalling a whole range of historical facts suitable for symbolization. It does not claim (as this would amount to subjecting the truth procedure to the laws of the State) that the event and its organized political consequences are reducible to facts. But neither does it claim that the facts are unsuitable for any historical trans-scription (to make a Lacanian sort of play on words) of the distinctive characters of a truth. The Idea is a historical anchoring of everything elusive, slippery and evanescent in the becoming of a truth. But it can only be so if it admits as its O"tn real this aleatory, elusive, slippery, evanescent dimension. That is why it is incumbent upon the communist Idea to respond to the question 'Where do correct ideas come from?' the way Mao did: , 'correct ideas' (and by this I mean what constitutes the path of a truth in a situation) come from practice. 'Practice' should obviously be understood as the materialist name of the real. It would thus be appropriate to say that the Idea that symbolizes the becoming 'in truth' of correct (political) ideas in History, that is to say, the Idea of communism, therefore comes itself from the idea of practice (from the experience of the real) in the final analysis but can nevertheless not be reduced to it. This is because it is the protocol not of the existence but rather of the exposure of a truth in action. All of the foregoing explains, and to a certain extent justifies, why it was ultimately possible to go to the extreme of exposing the truths of emancipatory politics in the guise of their opposite, that is to say, in the guise of a State. Since it is a question of an (imaginary) ideological relationship between a truth procedure and historical facts, why hesitate to push this relationship to its limit? Why not say that it is a matter of a relationship between event and State? State and Revolution: that is the title of one of Lenin's most famous texts. And the State and the Event are indeed what are at stake in it. Nevertheless, Lenin, following Marx in this regard, is careful to say that the State in question after the Revolution will have to be the State of the withering away of the State, the State as organizer of the transition to the non-State. So let's say the following: The Idea of communism can project the real of a politics, subtracted as ever from the power of the State, into the figure of 'another State', provided that the subtraction lies within this subjectivating operation, in the sense that the 'other State' is also subtracted from the power of the State, hence from its own power, in so far as it is a State whose essence is to wither away. It is in this context that it is necessary to think and endorse the vital importance of proper names in all revolutionary politics. Their importance is indeed both spectacular and paradoxical. On the one hand, in effect, emancipatory politics is essentially the politics of the anonymous masses; it is the victory of those with no names,10 of those who are held in a state of colossal insignificance by the State. On the other hand, it is distinguished all along the way by proper names, which define it historically, which represent it, much more forcefully than is the case for other kinds of politics. Why is there this long series of proper names? Why this glorious Pantheon of revolutionary heroes? Why Spartacus, Thomas Muntzer, Robespierre, Toussaint Louverture, Blanqui, Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Mao, Che Guevara and so many others? The reason is that all these proper names symbolize historically - in the guise of an individual, of a pure singularity of body and thought the rare and precious network of ephemeral sequences of politics as truth. The elusive formalism of bodies-of-truth is legible here as empirical existence. In these proper names, the ordinary individual discovers glorious, distinctive individuals as the mediation for his or her own individuality, as the proof that he or she can force its finitude. The anonymous action of millions of militants, rebels, fighters, unrepresentable as such, is combined and counted as one in the simple, powerful symbol of the proper name. Thus, proper names are involved in the operation of the Idea, and the ones I just mentioned are elements of the Idea of communism at its various different stages. So let us not hesitate to say that Khrushchev's condemnation of 'the cult of personality', apropos Stalin, was misguided, and that, under the pretense of democracy, it heralded the decline of the Idea of communism that we witnessed in the ensuing decades. The political critique of Stalin and his terrorist vision of the State needed to be undertaken in a rigorous way, from the perspective of revolutionary politics itself, and Mao had begun to do as much in a number of his writings.11 Whereas Khrushchev, who was in fact defending the group that had led the Stalinist State, made no inroads whatsoever as regards this issue and, when it came to speaking of the Terror carried out under Stalin, merely offered an abstract critique of the role of proper names in political subjectivation. He himself thereby paved the way for the 'new philosophers' of reactionary humanism a decade later. Whence a very precious lesson: even though retroactive political actions may require that a given name be stripped of its symbolic function, this function as such cannot be eliminated for all that. For the Idea - and the communist Idea in particular, because it refers directly to the infinity of the people - needs the finitude of proper names. Let's recapitulate as simply as possible. A truth is the political real. History, even as a reservoir of proper names, is a symbolic place. The ideological operation of the Idea of communism is the imaginary projection of the political real into the symbolic fiction of History, including in its guise as a representation of the action of innumerable masses via the One of a proper name. The role of this Idea is to support the individual's incorporation into the discipline of a truth procedure, to authorize the individual, in his or her own eyes, to go beyond the Statist constraints of mere survival by becoming a part of the body-of-truth, or the subjectivizable body. We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous operation? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact - often a violent one that IS accompanied by different versions of the 'cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an exception but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain measure of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle - husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues - that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one person or another's entry into the body of- truth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found - to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what is impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real political meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw. But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism - must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion with four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice. The fiveperson meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure. The second reason is that every event is a surprise. If this were not the case, it would mean that it "could have been predictable as a fact, and so would be inscribed in the History of the State, which is a contradiction in terms. The problem can thus be formulated in the following way: how can we prepare ourselves for such surprises? And this time the problem really exists, even if we are already currently militants of a previous event's consequences, even if we are included in a body of- truth. Granted, we are proposing the deployment of new possibilities. However, the event to come will tum what is still impossible, even for us, into a possibility. In order to anticipate, at least ideologically, or intellectually, the creation of new possibilities, we must have an Idea. An Idea that of course involves the newness of the possibilities that the truth procedure of which we are the militants has brought to light, which are real-possibilities, but an Idea that also involves the formal possibility of other possibilities, ones as yet unsuspected by us. An Idea is always the assertion that a new truth is historically possible. And since the forcing of the impossible into the possible occurs via subtraction from the power of the State, an Idea can be said to assert that this subtractive process is infinite: it is always formally possible that the dividing line drawn by the State between the possible and the impossible may once again be shifted, however radical its previous shifts - including the one in which we as militants are currently taking part - may have been. That is why one of the contents of the communist Idea today as opposed to the theme of communism as a goal to be attained through the work of a new State - is that the withering away of the State, while undoubtedly a principle that must be apparent in any political action (which is expressed by the formula 'politics at a distance from the State' as an obligatory refusal of any direct inclusion in the State, of any request for funding from the State, of any participation in elections, etc.), is also an infinite task, since the creation of new political truths will always shift the dividing line between Statist, hence historical, facts and the eternal consequences of an event. With this in mind, I will now conclude by turning to the contemporary inflections of the Idea of communism.12 In keeping with the current reassessment of the Idea of communism, as I mentioned, the word's function can no longer be that of an adjective, as in 'Communist Party', or 'communist regimes'. The Party-form, like that of the Socialist State, is no longer suitable for providing real support for the Idea. This problem moreover first found negative expression in two crucial events of the '60s and '70s of the last century: the Cultural Revolution in China and the amorphous entity called 'May '68' in France. Later, new political forms, all of which are of the order of politics without a party, were - and are still being tried out.13 Overall, however, the modern, so-called 'democratic' form of the bourgeois State, of which globalized capitalism is the cornerstone, can boast of having no rivals in the ideological field. For three decades now, the word 'communism' has been either totally forgotten or practically equated with criminal enterprises. That is why the subjective situation of politics has everywhere become so incoherent. Lacking the Idea, the popular masses’ confusion is inescapable. Nevertheless, there are many signs suggesting that this reactionary period is coming to an end. The historical paradox is that, in a certain way, we are closer to problems investigated in the first half of the nineteenth century than we are to those we have inherited from the twentieth. Just as in around 1840, today we are faced with an utterly cynical capitalism, which is certain that it is the only possible option for a rational organization of society. Everywhere it is implied that the poor are to blame for their own plight, that Mricans are backward, and that the future belongs either to the 'civilized' bourgeoisies of the Western world or to those who, like the Japanese, choose to follow the same path. Today, just as back then, very extensive areas of extreme poverty can be found even in the rich countries. There are outrageous, widening inequalities between countries, as well as between social classes. The subjective, political gulf between Third World farmers, the unemployed and poor wage earners in our so-called 'developed' countries, on the one hand, and the 'Western' middle classes on the other, is absolutely unbridgeable and tainted with a sort of indifference bordering on hatred. More than ever, political power, as the current economic crisis with its one single slogan of 'rescue the banks' clearly proves, is merely an agent of capitalism. Revolutionaries are divided and only weakly organized, broad sectors of working-class youth have fallen prey to nihilistic despair, the vast majority of intellectuals are servile. In contrast to all this, as isolated as Marx and his friends were at the time when the retrospectively famous Manifesto of the Communist Party came out in 1847, there are nonetheless more and more of us involved in organizing new types of political processes among the poor and working masses and in trying to find every possible way to support the re-emergent forms of the communist Idea in reality. Just as at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the victory of the communist Idea is not at issue, as it would later be, far too dangerously and dogmatically, for a whole stretch of the twentieth century. What matters first and foremost is its existence and the terms in which it is formulated. In the first place, to provide a vigorous subjective existence to the communist hypothesis is the task those of us gathered here today are attempting to accomplish in our own way. And it I insist, a thrilling task. By combining intellectual constructs, which are always global and universal, with experiments of fragments of truths, which are local and singular, yet universally transmittable, we can give new life to the communist hypothesis, or rather to the Idea of communism, in individual consciousnesses. We can usher in the third era of this Idea's existence. We can, so we must.

This arguement turns itself - they assert that every view comes from "somewhere" yet they chastise us for not having a transcendent universal subject capable of grasping at this context - this is the universalization of the particular - We have an independent impact also: their assertion that this omission is coupled with some manner of malicious intent - this creates a sadistic super-ego which chastises otherness.

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There are two important points to note here. First, every “technology” of observation has its blind spot or unmarked space. It is impossible to make any indications at all without delimiting a marked space. That delimitation will necessarily be accompanied by an unmarked space that falls outside indications. Put differently, there is no form that does not contain an unmarked space. We can thus say that every apparatus of observation is characterized by a constitutive finitude. There is no view from nowhere, nor way of observing that observes everything (even for God, as Judge Schreber well knew). Second, every observation suffers from a sort of “transcendental illusion”. The distinctions or forms we use to indicate things in the world become invisible while we use them. While every indication requires a distinction that necessarily contains an unmarked space, we are generally unconscious of the distinctions we use (they withdraw into the background) and are unaware of the unmarked space that haunts our distinctions. If we noticed the unmarked space of the distinctions that render our observations possible, then they wouldn’t be unmarked. As a consequence, our tendency is to treat the world that we indicate (the empirical) as identical to the world itself, ignoring the manner in which our experience (the empirical) is transcendentally constituted by a distinction we have drawn. For Luhmann, the task of sociology consists in observing the observer. Before proceeding to discuss this, I see no particular reason to restrict this project to sociology. Luhmann, of course, has his reasons for treating this as a project for sociology rather than philosophy. Philosophy, claims Luhmann, is a discourse of ontology that seeks to investigate what is and what is not. Sociology, for Luhmann, brackets such concerns, suspending the question of what is and is not, instead restricting itself to what social systems think exist and do not exist. For example, if you’re doing a sociology of religion you don’t occupy yourself with questions of whether or not religious claims are true or have a referent, but instead investigate how religious communities encounter their world. There are two problems with this thesis. First, it is incoherent. There’s no way around making ontological claims, no matter how much one insists that they’re not making ontological claims. Here there really needs to be a rhetorical analysis of how claims to be outside of metaphysics and ontology function as communicative strategies for advancing the hegemony of ones own ontology and metaphysics. Luhmann is minimally committed to the thesis that observers exist. To make the claim that observers exist is to make the claim that particular classes of entity are. This is an ontological claim. Its the claim– not unlike Leibniz’s or my own or Harman’s or Bogost’s –that being consists of observers (though we don’t all use that language). In my ontology, to be a machine or an object is to be an observer. An object isn’t simply something observed, but is something that observes. Second, there’s a rich tradition in philosophy of observing the observer. We find it in Kant, of course. Among the phenomenologists, and so on. Back to observing the observer or second-order observation. “Observing the observer” doesn’t consist in looking at a person, animal, computer, or rock and observing them; but rather consists in looking at the forms or distinctions that a system uses to make indications. At a very abstract level, we can say that “observing the observer” or second-order observation is the formal schema for all critique. Critique does not so much consist in “debunking”, as observing the distinctions that a discourse uses to make its indications or observations. Critique uncovers the historical a priori– to use Foucault’s term in The Archeology of Knowledge –or historical transcendental upon which a particular mode of observing the world is based. In particular, critique aims to draw attention to the unmarked state upon which observations are based (what is excluded?), and the manner in which the distinctions or forms used to make observations withdraw from the observer, creating a “reality effect” that make the world experienced by observers seem identical to how one observes in the marked space. In observing the distinctions that an observer uses to make their indications along with the blind spots that inhabit their distinctions, we open the possibility of broaching new areas of inquiry and investigation, as well as recuperating the excluded. In other words, second-order observation is primarily about observing the blind spots, the unmarked space, and how they systematically function with respect to the marked space. However, there is an ethics to critique. First, we must remember that no observer is infinite. Not only is every observer finite in that the very possibility of their observation requires an exclusion in order to create a marked space where indications become possible, but we must also remember that observers are finite in terms of time and space. There’s a tendency to forget this when we make criticisms of observers for not having read x or y, or for failing to take q and r into account. Such criticisms are always premised on the fantasy of omniscient observers that, like Laplace’s Demon, have no limitations physically, in terms of energy, in terms of time, in terms of information availability as to what they have access to, and so on. When we make arguments of this sort, we’re implicitly berating people for not being omniscient. There seems to be nothing generous nor ethical in such demands. Indeed, they look like the demands of a sadistic Kantian superego. Such demands are worse when we treat such oversight or ignorance as being based on malicious intentions, rather than as the result of mere finitude. Second, we must also always remember that our observation of observers in our critical capacity does not violate the general structure that applies to all observations: to observe is to draw a distinction that produces a form that necessarily produces an unmarked space and where the distinctions we use withdraw from our own awareness. All too often, second-order observers treat themselves as being omniscient, failing to recognize that their own observations contain two blind-spots: the unmarked state of their own distinction and the withdrawal of their own distinction from view such that the world comes to seem as identical to how they observe the world. This is as true of the critic as of the observer whose transcendental the critic