### Off

#### The 1AC declares the United States federal government to be iredeemable, while this may be a new position, I recall from my own history a similar story that goes by a different name. There is a danger that this politics results in perpetual victimization that mimics the ontology of the State of Israel - the impact is a repetition of fascism, a dehistoricizing of violence, and an insensitivity to suffering.

Lerman 9 - (Anthony, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/must-jews-always-see-themselves-as-victims-1639277.html, March 7th 2009)

In the wake of Israel's attack on Gaza, eager voices are telling us that anti-Semitism has returned – yet again. Eight years of Hamas rockets and the world unfairly cries foul when Israel retaliates, they say. Biased media are delegitimising the Jewish state. The Left attacks Israel as uniquely evil, making it the persecuted Jew among the nations. Even theatres keep wheeling out those anti-Semitic stereotypes, Shylock, Fagin and the "chosen people", just to torment us. If this bleak picture were an accurate portrayal of what Jews are experiencing today, who could deny that suffering is the determining feature of the Jewish condition? In most Jewish circles, if you pause to question this narrative and suggest that it might be exaggerated, that it unrealistically implies a level of dreadfulness and victimhood unique to Jews, you'll attract hostility and disbelief in equal measure, and precious little public sympathy. But in the work of Professor Salo Baron, probably the greatest Jewish historian of the 20th century, we find powerful justification for just such a questioning. Professor Baron spoke out angrily against what he called the "lachrymose conception of Jewish history", which placed suffering at the centre of Jewish life. "Suffering is part of the destiny" of the Jews," Professor Baron said in an interview in 1975, "but so is repeated joy as well as ultimate redemption." Another distinguished historian, Professor Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, said Baron always fought against the view of Jewish history as "all darkness and no light. He laboured mightily to restore balance". Baron, who was born in Poland and went to America in 1930 to teach at Columbia University in New York, died aged 94 in 1989, perhaps one of the most significant years in post-war Jewish history. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the suppression of Jewish religious practice and cultural expression came to an end. More than two million Jews were finally free to choose to be Jewish or not. An astonishing number chose Jewishness and a remarkable revival of Jewish life began. This historic moment aptly illustrates the central truth of Baron's critique. Twenty years on, that revival continues, but the world's response to Israel's war on Gaza and the dramatic rise in anti-Semitic incidents in a number of countries since the war began have led many to paint a very dark picture of the current Jewish predicament. So, in thinking about the accuracy of this, especially in view of the poisonous weed of anti-Semitism that Howard Jacobson, writing in The Independent last month, claims to find growing in practically every patch of criticism of Israel, I wondered what light Professor Baron would have found in the current darkness. Would he have concluded that the lachrymose conception of Jewish history has returned and that a restoration of some balance is required? Have we Jews succumbed psychologically to a sense of eternal Jewish victimhood, a wholly negative Jewish exceptionalism, or is paranoia justified? Some pioneering research, published as Israel's bombing of Gaza began, throws some light on this. It reveals just how much the feeling that no matter what we do, we are perpetually at the mercy of others applies to Jewish Israelis. A team led by Professor Daniel Bar Tal of Tel Aviv University, one of the world's leading political psychologists, questioned Israeli Jews about their memory of the conflict with the Arabs, from its inception to the present, and found that their "consciousness is characterised by a sense of victimisation, a siege mentality, blind patriotism, belligerence, self-righteousness, dehumanisation of the Palestinians and insensitivity to their suffering". The researchers found a close connection between that collective memory and the memory of "past persecutions of Jews" and the Holocaust, the feeling that "the whole world is against us". If such a study were to be conducted among Jews in Britain, I suspect the results would be very similar. For Jews to see themselves in this way is understandable, but it's a distortion and deeply damaging. As Professor Bar Tal says, this view relies primarily on prolonged indoctrination that is based on ignorance and even nurtures it. The Jewish public does not want to be confused with the facts. If we are defined by past persecutions, by our victimhood, will we ever think clearly about the problem of Israel-Palestine and the problem of anti-Semitism? To justify its attack on Gaza, Israel threw the mantle of victimhood over the residents of southern Israel who have lived under the constant threat of rocket attack from the territory since 2001. Israeli government and military spokespeople seemed to get a remarkably sympathetic hearing in the media when they made this argument. But history did not begin in 2001. As the Israeli journalist Amira Hass notes, the origin of Israel's siege dates back to 1991, before suicide bombings began. The relentless emphasis on Israeli suffering, to the exclusion of all other contextual facts, and the constant mantra that no other country would tolerate such a threat posed to its citizens over such a long period provided the basis for arguing that the military option was the only alternative. The victim is cornered and there's only one way out. But the popular Israeli phrase ein breira, "there is no alternative", won't stand one second's scrutiny. There was a wealth of informed senior military and security opinion, especially following the disaster of the 2006 Lebanon war, which argued that there is no military solution to the problem of Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah. Even before Lebanon, in 2004, former IDF spokesman Nahman Shai, a senior figure in the Israeli establishment, said: "Despite all the anger, frustration, and disgust we feel, we ought to talk to Hizbollah. We must exploit every possibility to reach a compromise with them and gain precious time. Does it really embody all the evil in the region? What are we waiting for? We can always go back to fighting terrorism." Early in January this year, Israel's former Mossad chief and former national security adviser, Efraim Halevy, said: "If Israel's goal were to remove the threat of rockets from the residents of southern Israel, opening the border crossings would have ensured such quiet for a generation." Daniel Levy, former adviser in the office of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, shows clearly where the wrong choices were made: withdrawing from Gaza without co-ordinating the "what next" with the Palestinians; hermetically sealing off Hamas and besieging Gaza after the 2006 elections instead of testing Hamas's capacity to govern responsibly; instead of building on the ceasefire, Israel was the first to break it on 4 November. In short, there were other alternatives. The current flurry of diplomatic activity only confirms this. Tony Blair's first trip to Gaza, Hillary Clinton's talks with Israel's leaders and stronger language on settlements and the $5bn pledged for Gaza at the Egyptian donor conference are all discomfiting signs for Israel's polity, now in a state of electoral upheaval. They show that the Gaza offensive blasted open the doors to alternative diplomatic options, as well as the possibility of a new Palestinian unity government. Instead of validating the government's line that this was justice for Israel's traumatised southern citizens, it only served to demonstrate to the world, and especially to the new Obama administration, Israel's responsibility for the injustice of the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. It's not a political judgement to feel compassion for Israelis terrorised by Hamas rockets, and it's just the same for Palestinians living in a virtual prison in Gaza. But the objective predicaments of the two populations are not the same. To convince yourself that a turkey shoot is an act of great heroism, you need the "self-righteousness" and "blind patriotism" Professor Bar Tal found in his study. You see yourself as David against the Islamist Goliath. The world sees a powerful elephant and an aggressive, rogue mouse that draws blood. The elephant hands the mouse the power of veto over the entire Middle East peace process by demanding that the mouse recognise the elephant's existence before any meaningful negotiations with Palestinians can take place. All this does is send a message of weakness: "We genuinely believe that our existence is threatened by this mouse." Professor Baron argued that you cannot understand the history of the Jews outside of the histories of the societies in which Jews lived. Yet this narrative of victimhood is sustainable only on the basis of a negative Jewish exceptionalism which severs the Jewish experience from the historical mainstream. The hope and optimism which accompanied the collapse of communism and the Jewish revival in Europe in 1989 have certainly been eclipsed by a defensive, fearful, ethnocentric mindset, which makes a just resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict ever harder to achieve and casts a pall over Jewish life everywhere. So why are we reading our own times through the prism of a lachrymose view of Jewish history? If you're urging me to list the faults of the enemies of the Jews, to say it's all because of them, you might as well stop reading now. Yes, of course our predicament is partly caused by others who wish us no good, but before we heap blame on them, I want to hold up a mirror to ourselves, to know what's our responsibility. The liberal historian of Zionism, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, said it's "wrong to deny the Jews the dignity of having made their own history, even its pain". Consider these five interlocking points. There is every reason why the Holocaust should be a constant influence on our thinking. But by insisting on owning it, fencing it off and seeing it as uniquely unique, we're in danger of lifting the Jewish tragedy out of history altogether. And this process has been a conscious act. If seen as completely unfathomable, the Holocaust is easily used to justify extraordinary measures to ensure that it doesn't happen again. This is a dangerous road to travel. Being so defined by the Holocaust, Jewish leaders in Israel and elsewhere regularly use the tragedy to dramatise Israel's position or the threats facing Jews. So when the US Anti-Defamation League head Abraham Foxman described the attack on the Caracas synagogue as "the scene of a modern-day Kristallnacht" – the 9 November 1938 pogrom in Germany in which 91 Jews were killed, more than 30,000 were arrested and 191 synagogues were set on fire – he diminished Kristallnacht. But more than this: it perpetuates the view that we Jews are for ever the objects and never the subjects of history. This was never more than partially true, but ever since the establishment of the state of Israel, it has ceased to be true at all. Israel changed everything – whether you're close to Israel or not. Israel acts on the world stage; it calls itself a Jewish state; what it does affects the Jewish position worldwide; it cannot pretend to powerlessness; it's the subject of history, not the object, and in being so turns Jews everywhere into subjects of history too. This is starkly illustrated in the fact that the UK Jewish community's defence body, the Community Security Trust, reports a dramatic increase in anti-Semitic incidents since the beginning of the Gaza war. This is not a new phenomenon. For some decades, incidents have increased at times of high tension or violence in Israel-Palestine. Jewish leaders and commentators are indignant at the implication that Jews worldwide are responsible for Israel's actions. Don't conflate Jews and Israel, they say. But matters are far more complicated. Most Jews support Israel; they feel it's part of their identity; official Jewish bodies defend Israel when it's criticised. None of this justifies one single act of anti-Semitism against Jews perpetrated because someone claims to be angry about Palestine. But we can't have it both ways. If you're close to Israel, you can't just own your connection with the country when all is quiet; you have to own it when what Israel does provokes outrage. The consequence of this is recognising that by provoking outrage, which is then used to target Jews, Israel bears responsibility for that anti-Jewish hostility. If Israel were truly concerned about Jews worldwide, it would think long and hard about the implications of this reality. The incongruous truth is that while we are drawing attention to anti-Semitism more comprehensively than at any time in the past 30 years, I sense that so much of the Jewish world is more comfortable with an identifiable enemy that hates us than with a multicultural society that welcomes Jews on equal terms. Any anti-Semitism must be taken seriously, even at the best of times, but our appetite for the apocalyptic assessment of the anti-Semitic threat seems to know no bounds. When the Labour MP Denis MacShane writes that "Neo-anti-Semitism is a developed, coherent and organised system of modern politics that has huge influence on the minds of millions" and that it "impacts on world politics today like no other ideology", can we really take such hyperbole seriously? It's perfectly possible to acknowledge the pain caused by increased anti-Semitism but reject wild scenarios and counterproductive ways of dealing with the problem – such as demonising strong criticism of Israel. We should be able to have a dialogue about alternative ways of interpreting what's happening and what needs to be done. Sadly, the Jewish establishment here and other self-appointed gatekeepers of Jewish dignity see this as traitorous and a denial of anti-Semitism. Nothing illustrates better how we are in thrall to the uniqueness of our suffering than the shocking silence from most Jewish leaders that has greeted the rise of Avigdor Lieberman – a politician who, in Haaretz's words, "conducted a racist campaign against Israel's Arab citizens and is suspected of grave criminal acts" – to king-maker for the next Israeli government. It's sickening that the leaders of Israel's three largest parties have courted him and conferred respectability upon him, with not the slightest hint that they might be metaphorically holding their noses. Before we put down the mirror, the final image we see is that of Lieberman. We are not condemned to accept the fate which the closed-minded ethnocentricity of so many Jews dictates to us. Ameliorating our predicament, restoring the balance, could come from acknowledging modest but profound truths, even if we get to them through distasteful comparisons. I know that the siege, bombardment and invasion of Gaza were not like the German obliteration of the Warsaw ghetto – a comparison that critics of Israel are spreading through the internet I believe. And our need for calm and compassionate examination of the reality of the conflict would be greatly enhanced if we could retire such comparisons. But if we pause to think of the suffering of a dying Jewish child in the ghetto and a dying Palestinian child in Gaza, who would dare to suggest that their suffering is any different. Yet, as Professor Baron seems to imply, we fall all too easily into the trap of thinking that there is something unique about Jewish suffering. There isn't.

#### Our alternative is a politics of bereavement. Only this seeking which recognizes ongoing injustice but centers around grievablity and morning and a commitment to the future is a productive method to resolves the aff and other instances of violence.

Weisband 9

Edward, Professor of Political Science @ Virginia Polytechnic University and State University, *Alternatives*, No. 34, “On the Aporetic Borderlines of Forgiveness: Bereavement as a Political Form,” Pg. 359-381)

Rituals of forgiveness provide emotional outlets for those compelled to find a way to continue, to live together or apart under the shadows of cataclysmic violence. But many conceptual as well as cultural contradictions assail notions of political forgiveness and efforts at reconciliation can become an impediment to consolation. Even when collective memories of past violence and political evil tend to be configured around forgiveness, the question arises as to what sets of consequences: mutual recognition or mutual recrimination, reconciliation with or without remorse. As Jean Hatzfeld’s study of the “killers” of the Rwandan genocide indicates, profound ignorance persists on the part of many of the perpetrators as to the price that had to be exacted from the survivors in return for the nebulous rewards presented by the possibilities of forgiveness. “The killer has no idea of the ordeal that begins for the victims once they have agreed to forgive, for in so doing they not only reopen old wounds but also lose the possibility of gaining relief through revenge,” Hatzfeld observes.40 He continues, “the killer does not understand that in seeking forgiveness, he is demanding that the victim make an extraordinary effort, and he remains oblivious to the survivor’s dilemma, anguish, and courageous altruism. . . . The killer does not realize that when he asks for forgiveness as though it were a simple formality, his attitude increases the victim’s pain by ignoring it.”41 Thus the walls, borders, and boundaries separating the emotional and psychic dimensions of personhood and personality from their expression in bereavement must find appropriate containers in the intimate places of redemptive self-healing and atonement as well as in the public spaces of commemoration that pay homage to victims. But even more than this, they must allow, in aspiration at the very least, perpetrators to express remorse and to atone in ways that transcend the entanglements of guilt, punishment, and forgiveness. What must be forgiven is unforgivable and what must be remembered must also be forgotten. Political evil demands that recrimination be transcended while simultaneously permitting no exit. Survivor and successor generations, culture to culture, inherit the legacies of grievous loss resulting from political evil, but their lives must move on. The children and successor generations of victims must find ways to live with the children and successor generations of those who perpetrated the violence. How to do this if not through mutual recognition of suffering and sorrow through forms of bereavement that transcend forgiveness in the name of universal reconciliation? In collective forms of forgiveness, successor generations pay homage to those who suffered and to the trauma of survivor generations. But for whom do the bells toll? Successor generations divide. They imitate as they learn and learn as they imitate. And what they learn to imitate are the very cultural mores and artifacts of identification that persist in the lures of invented difference, notwithstanding their sometimes common desires to mourn and to pay homage. Cultural values and meanings produce “subjects” as subjects invent themselves through mimetic processes of self and otherness, identity and difference, and through the psychic and emotional relations between “the self” who resides “in the other” and “the self in the other” who belittles the self. Even after the onslaughts of political evil have passed, human character remains centered by tyrannies of small, dare one say, miniscule differences, that foment sectarian violence within and among communities that share land, life, and history in proximity but also in hate. Thus cultures instruct through imitation in ways that resist transcendence, in ways that incapacitate mourning and the rituals of remembrance and consolation. Bereavement is what discourses of forgiveness impede or prevent. For forgiveness adheres to the vernaculars of fault, liability, and tort. It readily devolves into a discourse of judgment that exacts a price for its expression. If “you” accept that “I” forgive “you” for being “wrong,” you admit to guilt or failing. Forgiveness implies a kind of exhortatory form of promise; it presumes a commissive speech act performance that renounces what one is due on scales of account. As Nicholas Wolterstorff argues, forgiveness does not consist of “attitudes” but rather a willingness to give up what is owed. Forgiveness, he indicates, consists of the “enacted resolution to forego enjoying or claiming the goods to which one has a retributive right, whatever those goods may be.”42 But the one life good that cannot be disavowed by forgiveness is solace through bereavement. This is the one element that remains most elusive even when a consensus over wrongdoing exists or when juridical findings impose retributions on perpetrators. Forgiveness presents a paradoxical task for survivor as well as successor generations, a task that sets up the implausible aim: to forgive but simultaneously to seek reconciliation. Forgiveness is precisely the emotion that makes the politics of reconciliation elusive to achieve and consolation forever an illusion to entertain. In this lies its aporetic quality. In forgiveness one rarely mourns as a kind of bereavement that represents a more profound form of remembrance. Forgiveness presumes an “authentic truth” to history and in memory. It demands that others, especially the generations successor to evildoers, themselves reciprocate offers of forgiveness. In law this may appear operative but it runs up against human sentiment, ideology, and/or political and social identity constructions.

### Case

#### The rejection of trauma and oppression must be an ongoing movement. The aff segmenting to say it’s just about them for this 2 hour space is bad politics- the question should be about what is good for the debate community at large. Our answer for what is best about the debate community is bereavement. It is not good to militarize, it is not good to have suffering focus, it is not good to externalize.

#### The scholarship of the 1AC concerns itself with you 'recognizing' their damage, there is a danger in this politics because it posits communities themselves as damaged and leads to academic voyeurism.

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Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).

#### Refusing the fascination with the scarred body changes the target of our gaze to larger institutions of oppression which solve the aff better.

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For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative (p. 78), expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing. To explore how refusal and the installation of limits on settler colonial knowledge might be productive, we make a brief detour to the Erased Lynching series (2002–2011) by Los Angeles–based artist Ken Gonzales-Day (see Figure 12.1). Gonzales-Day researched lynching in California and the Southwest and found that the majority of lynch victims were Latinos, American Indians, and Asians. Like lynchings in the South, lynchings in California were events of public spectacle, often attended by hundreds, sometimes thousands of festive onlookers. At the lynchings, professional photographers took hours to set up portable studios similar to those used at carnivals; they sold their images frequently as postcards, mementos of public torture and execution to be circulated by U.S. post throughout the nation and the world. Lynching, we must be reminded, was extralegal, yet nearly always required the complicity of law enforcement—either by marshals or sheriffs in the act itself, or by judges and courts in not bothering to prosecute the lynch mob afterward. The photographs immortalize the murder beyond the time and place of the lynching, and in their proliferation, expand a single murder to the general murderability of the non-White body. In this respect, the image of the hanged, mutilated body itself serves a critical function in the maintenance of White supremacy and the spread of racial terror beyond the lynching. The spectacle of the lynching is the medium of terror. Gonzales-Day’s Erased Lynching series reintroduces the photographs of lynching to a contemporary audience, with one critical intervention: The ropes and the lynch victim have been removed from the images. Per Gonzales-Day’s website (n.d.), the series enacted a conceptual gesture intended to direct the viewer’s attention, not upon the lifeless body of lynch victim, but upon the mechanisms of lynching themselves: the crowd, the spectacle, the photographer, and even consider the impact of flash photography upon this dismal past. The perpetrators, if present, remain fully visible, jeering, laughing, or pulling at the air in a deadly pantomime. As such, this series strives to make the invisible visible. The Erased Lynching series yields another context in which we might consider what a social scientist’s refusal stance might comprise. Though indeed centering on the erasure of the former object, refusal need not be thought of as a subtractive methodology. Refusal prompts analysis of the festive spectators regularly backgrounded in favor of wounded bodies, strange fruit, interesting scars. Refusal shifts the gaze from the violated body to the violating instruments—in this case, the lynch mob, which does not disappear when the lynching is over, but continues to live, accumulating land and wealth through the extermination and subordination of the Other. Thus, refusal helps move us from thinking of violence as an event and toward an analysis of it as a structure. Gonzales-Day might have decided to reproduce and redistribute the images as postcards, which, by way of showing up in mundane spaces, might have effectively inspired reflection on the spectacle of violence and media of terror. However, in removing the body and the ropes, he installed limits on what the audience can access, and redirected our gaze to the bodies of those who were there to see a murder take place, and to the empty space beneath the branches. Gonzales-Day introduced a new representational territory, one that refuses to play by the rules of the settler colonial gaze, and one that refuses to satisfy the morbid curiosity derived from settler colonialism’s preoccupation with pain.

#### We understand these are your stories to tell, but you also need to be aware that doesnt make you any less complcit in the dangers in this form of scholarship.

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Participatory action research and other research approaches that involve participants in constructing the design and collection of voice (as data) are not immune to the fetish for pain narratives. It is a misconception that by simply building participation into a project—by increasing the number of people who collaborate in collecting data—ethical issues of representation, voice, consumption, and voyeurism are resolved. There are countless examples of research in which community or youth participants have made their own stories of loss and pain the objects of their inquiry (see also Tuck & Guishard, forthcoming).

#### We have to be mindful of our rhetoric, war rhetoric

Sanchez 13 – jd candidate @ Yale Law

(Andrea Nill, Mexico’s Drug “War”: Drawing a Line Between Rhetoric and Reality, THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 38: 467)

Outside of legal academia, the late Wayne C. Booth—who dedicated his life to analyzing rhetoric—similarly pointed out that war rhetoric is essentially the most influential form of political rhetoric that “makes (and destroys) our realities.”64 This is because political rhetoric is inherently aimed at changing present circumstances.65 Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson have maintained that our conceptual system itself is metaphorical and that metaphors thus “structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.”66 Citing the rhetorical use of the term “war,” they note that the very acceptance of the war metaphor leads to certain inferences and also clears the way for political action.67 Thus, the examples that follow in this section should not be merely dismissed as insignificant rhetorical flourishes. As Lackoff and Johnson warn,¶ Metaphors may create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions, will of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.68

### 2nc

no cards

### 1nr

#### Always choose nonviolence

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 100-102)

It would be foolish to claim that nonviolent action always succeeds against any opponent, just as it would be foolish to claim that ¶ violence always succeeds against any enemy. We must look to the evidence of history. It should be clear that the widespread belief that ¶ nonviolence “doesn’t work” is a misconception grounded in ignorance ¶ or neglect of when and where nonviolent direct action has succeeded. ¶ Similarly, the widespread confidence in violent means of struggle ¶ rests on neglect of its many failures. A review of post– World War II ¶ military interventions is beyond the scope of this book, but we can ¶ take a broad look at the historical record by reflecting briefly on important military actions of the past few decades. Vietnam, Lebanon, ¶ Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all come to mind. ¶ How well has violence “worked”? Did the outcome of the war in Vietnam outweigh the evils in death, injuries, destruction, dislocation, ¶ and influence of the war on the region, namely, Pol Pot’s reign of terror? The Vietnam war is widely considered a tragic mistake. What ¶ about the first and second wars in Iraq? When the full outcome is ¶ weighed, will justice be served by such thorough destruction of a nation’s infrastructure, deaths and injuries of tens (some say hundreds) ¶ of thousands, dislocation of millions of refugees, and a very uncertain future for the region? Beyond Vietnam and Iraq, can we honestly say ¶ that the outcomes of war are better for Lebanon, Somalia, Chechnya, ¶ and Bosnia, not to mention the prospects for the ongoing war in Afghanistan? It seems not. In every case the intentions and expectations ¶ widely missed the outcomes. So, history shows that nonviolence has ¶ succeeded with little preparation and virtually no public confidence ¶ while violence is systematically planned, of the highest priority when ¶ investing public resources, and widely supported, yet it frequently ¶ fails to be an effective means of achieving the peaceful ends desired. ¶ Critics say pacifists should “be realistic.” Pacifists ask the same of warists, and history— certainly since the end of World War II— seems to ¶ favor nonviolence. Pragmatic objections to pacifism, once examined, ¶ are not decisive refutations at all. It must be acknowledged that pacifism may or may not succeed at ¶ defeating unrestrained evil. At the same time we must admit that war, ¶ by its nature, is a test of might; as such, it can never settle questions of ¶ right.18 Rather, in war one side prevails and domination replaces the ¶ cooperation of genuine peace. And it is exactly at this point that the ¶ positive peace side of pacifism makes its strongest case: only nonviolence can create the internal order characteristic of genuine peace, so ¶ violence always fails in the long run. Violence can satisfy the urge to do ¶ something in the face of injustice, violence can satisfy the desire for ¶ revenge against evil, and sometimes violence can impose a short-term ¶ negative peace. But violence cannot create and sustain the conditions ¶ of genuine positive peace because these conditions come from within ¶ individuals and groups by agreement and cooperation, not from the ¶ outside by force or threat. The historical record of the last century— ¶ the carnage of the twentieth century which began with most victims ¶ of war being combatants and ended with most victims of war being ¶ innocent civilians— should awaken us to the need for fundamental ¶ change, as should successes of largely nonviolent revolution in much of ¶ Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the nonviolent dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and in the unarmed ¶ forces of the Philippines removing a dictator through nonviolent revolution. We are a sorry species if the best we can do is multiply and refine our means of violence while escalating our military threats and ¶ actions, carrying out increasingly devastating violence against one an-¶ other. But history shows not only the failure of violence but also the successes of nonviolence; here we find hope that we may learn from ¶ the past and reduce violence while expanding nonviolence.

#### Taking solely individual approaches fails to change macro-level societal trends that replicates the impacts

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(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.